


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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA



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
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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

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SUMMARY

French North Africa is, to all intents and purposes, a political appendage of metropolitan France, which provides its foreign policy, military security, and over-all administration. Even if these favorable circumstances did not prevail, this region would possess a considerable value to Western security because of its location and vast extent.

The area, which comprises Algeria, French Morocco, and Tunisia, is five times as large as metropolitan France. More than two-thirds of the region is desert, which all but precludes invasion from the south, save by highly trained, professional soldiers, such as those who followed General Leclerc during World War II on his celebrated march through central Africa to the Mareth Line in Tunisia. Aside from the widely scattered oases of the interior, the fertile land is confined to a narrow strip along the 2,000 miles of Mediterranean and Atlantic shores.

Nearly all of the 21 million inhabitants reside in this verdant, and for the most part, mountainous area. Less than eight percent are Europeans while the balance is composed of Berbers and Arabs. The Berbers, who are the indigenous stock and constitute two-thirds of the native population, and the Arabs exist in the primitive and impoverished economy which has characterized for centuries this aspect of Mediterranean culture. Their lives are dominated by the exigencies of a rural environment, and by the disciplines of the Moslem religion.

Small native nationalist movements in each area are a source of concern to the administrations. Except for membership in an ineffective Committee for the Liberation of North Africa, located in Cairo, there apparently is no inter-area liaison or agreement among the nationalist groups. A Communist Party, subsidiary to the French Communist

Party, also exists in each area, and has been unsuccessful in efforts to form a united front with the nationalists. Neither the nationalists nor the Communists have the cohesion, means, and sustained drive that would be required in a successful effort against French hegemony.

The standard of living of the native masses would not decline catastrophically were the French to withdraw despite the fact that the French phase of the local economy has improved substantially since World War II. French policy now favors the development of light industry and sources of electric power, increased agricultural production, and a search for subsoil deposits of petroleum and strategic minerals. Primarily for personal security reasons, much French capital has flowed into the area. ECA aid has contributed largely to industrial development. Of \$96 million in ECA aid reallocated to North Africa by France, more than half went into fuels, machinery and equipment, while the balance consisted of foodstuffs and other agricultural products and manufactured goods. These imports reflect continuing gaps in the local productivity.

An economic problem arises from the fact that native populations, aided by modern medicine and sanitation, are growing at the rate of nearly two percent annually. Whether modern agriculture can increase production proportionately remains to be seen.

The location of French North Africa relative to the Eurasian land mass makes its denial to the USSR essential to the security of the Atlantic community. It affords a base for launching military operations against Europe and for the protection of the western Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches. The military establishments in being are capable of rapid expansion, although they are at pres-

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It is based on information available to CIA as of June 1950.

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ent handicapped by shortages of skilled labor and inadequate industrial facilities.

Because the French anticipate that North Africa might, in the event of war, be neutralized temporarily by the USSR, they are planning to establish a focus of resistance in West Africa. Realization of the plans will be de-

layed for some time because the French lack the funds to develop army, air, and naval bases. The Atlantic littoral of Morocco would retain substantial military value to the US, even if the western Mediterranean were rendered untenable.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Genesis of Present Political System: Circumstances Leading to the Presence of France in North Africa.

The area, known as French North Africa among the nations of the Atlantic community, is called the Maghreb, or "Western Land," throughout the Arab world. Among the ancients, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia bore the Roman names Numidia, Mauretania, and Africa, areas whose Mediterranean littoral was identified in the early nineteenth century as a part of the Barbary Coast.

France's entry into this region followed the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), which ended France's hope of recovery of its former empire lost during the preceding century in a series of wars culminating with the defeat of Napoleon. A new wave of Gallic imperialism rose during the ensuing fifteen years and found an outlet in the vast, and hitherto largely neglected, continent to the south.

In 1830 a French expeditionary force was launched on the pretext of restoring order in Algeria, but shortly found itself engaged in full-scale warfare. The hitherto disunited Arabs and Kabyle Berbers rallied under the leadership of the fabulous Abd-el-Kader, the Sultan of Tlemcen. They dominated the field for seventeen years until French arms, successively under Generals Bugeaud (later Marshal and Duc d'Isly), Lamoricière, and the Duc d'Aumale, were at last triumphant, and Algeria became the nucleus of a new colonial empire.

Following the conquest of Algeria, martial adventure on the Dark Continent became fashionable. Fortunately for France the conquest of Tunisia in 1881, "to protect Algeria from the east," was little more than a military parade led by General Boulanger, a political opportunist who was viewed by Bismarck as "the greatest political obstacle to continued

friendly relations between France and Germany." Bismarck, intent upon the consolidation of Germany and other designs in Europe, was gratified to see the French dissipating their energies on African soil, and raised no objections to the creation of a French protectorate over the Regency of Tunis.¹

Having gained this much, the French began planning an empire which would spread across North Africa from the Atlantic to the Nile. The celebrated Fashoda incident in September 1898 put an end, however, to the eastward realization of this dream. The French were forced to abandon Colonel Marchand in the presence of an overwhelming British force under General Kitchener, and to drop further pretensions to what is now the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The British, on the other hand, apprehensive of Germany's growing power in Europe, did not offer further opposition to French expansion in Africa.

Having been outmaneuvered on the Nile, the French turned their attention to Morocco, "to protect Algeria from the West." During the latter part of the nineteenth century and up until 1912, this state had been the victim of the violence of the many pretenders to its throne and native uprisings, of ruthless concession-hunters and, finally, of almost complete financial and economic prostration. French missionaries, settlers, and traders who had been infiltrating the country for some time were not infrequently the objects of attack, so that about 1900 they began to entreat Paris for protection. French troops in increasing numbers were sent to Morocco in order to "establish order," a task which they performed so effectively that in 1912 the Sul-

¹ Tunisia is still referred to as the Regency of Tunis, a usage that persists from the time of Turkish rule (1705) when the Bey of Tunis was a Prince Regent for the Sultan in Constantinople.

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tan was obliged to sign the Treaty of Fez. This instrument placed the country under French protection and gave the great colonial administrator, Marshal (then General) Lyautey an ample field for the exercise of his talents. He not only succeeded in pacifying the area, but also in preserving it for France during the first World War.

The Treaty of Fez (1912) completed France's dominion over a land area which extends 1,450 air miles from Cape Noun on the Atlantic Ocean to Cape Bon in the Mediterranean. Save for its shallow coastal strip and widely scattered oases in the interior, this vast stretch of land, which embraces parts of the Sahara Desert in its southern reaches, is arid and inaccessible.

The problems which confronted French colonial officials in Morocco in 1912 were generally similar to those previously encountered in Tunisia and Algeria; the solutions developed along familiar and similar lines. The first French step was to free the French Zone of Morocco from all traces of international control, starting with the establishment of a new judicial system for the purpose of abolishing foreign capitulations which had been in existence since 1358. By 1930 every effective vestige of foreign privilege in French Morocco had been eliminated, except that of the United States (established in 1787 and renewed in 1836) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the United Kingdom (established in 1856). Reforms were initiated in the administrative, economic, financial, and military branches of the government, many of which were greatly retarded by the two World Wars.

After the fall of France in 1940, the Vichy Government, with the consent of the Nazis, continued the forms and character of the French political administrations and military control in North Africa. After the area was liberated by the Allies, however, the De Gaulle Government-in-Exile gave colonial policy a new direction. In January 1944 Consultative Assembly debates on colonial problems discussed decentralization of administrative control. Also in January 1944, the Brazzaville Conference of colonial administrators recommended a federal assembly of French colonies, a centrally planned economy, and a large de-

gree of industrialization, as well as decentralization and a considerable local self-administration for each area. This Conference laid plans for improving the social and economic lot of native peoples, and, when the De Gaulle Government was transferred to Paris, some steps were taken.

De Gaulle was cautious, however, in the matter of self-rule. A Committee on Overseas France was set up to explore the colonial problem, and finally recommended a curious blend of federalism and centralization in the form of the "French Union," with membership based on "free consent." This recommendation was incorporated in the draft constitution rejected in May 1946, but the phrase "free consent" was omitted from the Constitution of the Fourth Republic as adopted in October 1946. French attempts to draw the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia within the French Union as "Associated States" have met with consistent opposition from the nationalists, who demand autonomy.

The fall of France in 1940 and the promises of political independence implied in the Atlantic Charter and the Brazzaville Conference encouraged the nationalists in the three states to hope for the withdrawal of French control. By late April 1945 nationalist feeling had become intense. On 8 May (VE-Day) a native uprising occurred at Setif, Algeria. Between 100 and 300 French were slain. Within a few days, Arab population centers in the vicinity had been bombed by French planes in reprisal; and between 1,000 and 3,000 Arabs died.

Fundamentally, the natives of French North Africa have remained substantially unchanged for centuries. The French have imposed a veneer of European civilization on only a small part of the urban populations. The rural natives and the terrain over which they are widely scattered have remained essentially untouched by their contact with Europeans. The political scene is deeply conditioned by illiteracy, extreme poverty, indifference, and a relatively primitive outlook in the mass of the people; on the upper levels there is more self-interest than a burning zeal for democracy. Upon these disparate conditions the metropolitan French have imposed a paternalistic and generally uniform *modus vivendi*.

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2. The Present Political System.

The Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates are viewed by the French as prospective Associated States of the French Union; Algeria, on the other hand, has the status of an Overseas Department in the French Republic and the French Union. It consists of the departments of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine which, with certain exceptions, are administered much as metropolitan departments, and of the Southern Territories which are still under military jurisdiction, although the Algerian Statute provided for departmental status for them also. The Fezzan, a large but sparsely populated area in adjacent Libya, is also under French military administration.

a. Algeria.

Algeria enjoys a considerable range of civil liberties. Press and radio are uncensored.

The 80-90 percent illiteracy of the people enables France to keep Algeria on a level of civilization below that required for full democratic self-government. The nationalists are demanding more extensive modern education, with a greater use of Arabic in the curriculum.

The complacency with which France has regarded its political and economic position in Algeria is revealed by the fact that prior to Vincent Auriol's visit in 1949 only five chiefs of the French State, including Napoleon III, had crossed the Mediterranean to inspect this area.

The French Government has followed primarily a policy of assimilation in Algeria. A decree of 1848 declared that Algeria was an integral part of French territory and permitted French citizens to send representatives to the Constituent Assembly in Paris. At the same time the government began to set up administrative organisms corresponding as closely as possible to those in metropolitan France. The cultural assimilation of the Algerians was less successful because of the enormous differences in religion, language, customs, and race which separate the Moslems from the French. Except for the few upper class Jews the Jewish minority (about two percent of the total population), which was given full French citizenship by the Cremieux

Decree of 1870, has not been assimilated culturally by the French.

At that time there were many legal difficulties which deterred any Moslem from attaining a similar status. The chief of these was the requirement that he renounce Koranic law, and place himself under the French judicial system. Most Moslems preferred to remain under Koranic law. Until quite recently only a few thousand had elected to follow this alternative course, and these were viewed with contempt by both the French and the natives. The overwhelming majority of the population was left with few civil rights.

This situation was highly satisfactory to most of the French minority residing in Algeria. The most vehement of these are the "colons," a group of large landowners who, despite their initiative and personal courage, are distinguished for their reactionary political ideas.

In 1944, however, General De Gaulle's French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers gave some 60,000 Moslems the right to vote in the first college without requiring that they renounce their rights under Koranic law. Simultaneously the number of natives empowered to choose local assemblies was increased from 200,000 to 1,400,000, and the proportion of native representation in these assemblies was raised from one-third to two-fifths.

On 20 September 1947 the Algerian Statute became effective by its passage in the National Assembly in Paris. The Statute stipulates that Algeria shall continue to exist as three French departments under a semi-autonomous administration in Algiers, which is endowed with civil responsibility and financial autonomy. Although the Statute abolished the Southern Territories and "considered them as departments," it was not until February 1950 that the Algerian Assembly took any action. At that time the Assembly approved a resolution of the Government General to liquidate a portion of the Southern Territories by extending the boundaries of the three existing departments to the south. Until this action has been approved by the National Assembly in Paris, these areas remain under military jurisdiction.

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The Statute also provides for universal suffrage,¹ creates an Algerian Assembly and establishes Arabic and French as official languages. The Statute, which is modified by local usage, asserts that all citizens have equality of opportunity and obligation in the public service, and enjoy the liberties and rights of French citizens.

(1) *Government.*

A Governor General, who is subordinate to the French Minister of the Interior, is appointed for an indefinite term by the President of the French Republic with the approval of the Council of Ministers. He is charged with the administration of Algeria and maintaining the constitutional rights and liberties of the population.

The present Governor General is Marcel Edmond Naegelen,² a Socialist who has held office since February 1948. This official is aided by a Council of Government, the Algerian Assembly, an extensive civil service, and by his civil and military aides and advisers. His chief assistant is a General Secretary of Government of his own choice. (See accompanying chart.)

A Council of Government, over which the Governor General presides, acts as a civilian cabinet; it is also charged with "watching over the executions of the decisions of the Algerian Assembly." The President and one of the Vice Presidents of the Assembly are automatically members of the Council, two others are appointed by the Governor General, and the remaining two are elected annually by the Assembly, one from each "college."

(2) *Legislative Bodies.*

The members of the Algerian Assembly are elected for six years; half of the Assembly is elected every three years. Their duties are primarily consultative. The effectiveness of the Algerian Assembly is curtailed by the fact that all of its measures must be approved by the French Government.

¹ Legally Moslem women, as French citizens, have the right to vote; as Algerians, however, their qualifications are subject to the Algerian Assembly, which has not yet fully implemented this provision.

² Because Naegelen is a member of the French National Assembly, his leave of absence is extended semi-annually by that body.

The Assembly's principal function is discussion and approval of the Algerian budget, after it has been drawn up by the Governor General and before it is promulgated in Paris by a decree of the Minister of the Interior, countersigned by the Minister of Finance. Both the Governor General and the Algerian Assembly can initiate expenditures. The Assembly also elects six representatives to the Assembly of the French Union³ at Versailles.

A superficial appearance of political equality exists between the French and native representatives in the Assembly. Each group has 60 members. The two sections, or "colleges," sit together and have equal rights. Moreover, the presidency of the Assembly alternates annually between its two "colleges."

The term "the first electoral college" denominates the eligible voters among the 1,000,000 Europeans and a small number of assimilated natives who elect one-half of the Assembly from their own ranks. The "second electoral college," on the other hand, consists of the eligible voters among the 8,000,000 natives who elect the balance of the Assembly. Thus, although there are eight times as many natives as there are French and *assimilés* in Algeria, each group has the same number of representatives not only in the local body but also in the French National Assembly and the Council of the Republic in Paris.


The political indifference of the native Algerians is indicated by the fact that in the April 1948 elections for the Assembly, the 1,320,000 natives eligible to vote for candidates to the "second college," cast only 39 percent of the total ballots; whereas the 612,500 eligible Europeans and *assimilés* cast 61 percent of the total.

In view of the skillful way in which the French manipulate these elections, it is not altogether surprising that 103 of the 120 members elected were either Frenchmen or pro-French Moslems, while only seventeen seats were won by native nationalists. A single

³ This consultative body was created by the French Constitution of 1946 and came into being at the end of 1947. Most questions regarding Overseas Territories are submitted to the Assembly of the French Union for its opinion. Algeria is represented by eighteen delegates, twelve of whom are elected by the General Councils.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA



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Communist, a Frenchman, sits for Oran. French control of the Assembly is further guaranteed by a method of balloting which can be invoked at the will of the Governor General, the Finance Committee, or one-fourth of the Assembly. In this case, the balloting on a given measure is delayed for 24 hours, at which time a two-thirds vote is required, unless a majority in each "college of the Assembly" has been obtained.

(3) *Local Administration.*

The electoral inequality noted above is more marked on the cantonal level. Three-fifths of the 168 seats of the three General Councils¹ are filled by Europeans and two-fifths by Moslems.

	<i>Moslem Councillors</i>	<i>European Councillors</i>
Department of Oran	22	33
Department of Algiers	21	32
Department of Constantine	25	35
	—	—
	68	100

The Southern Territories are under military administration. The area is divided into "circumscriptions," "circles," annexes and posts, communes of "*plein exercice*,"² mixed communes and all-native communes, all of which are supervised by French native affairs officers and administrators. Ancient Arab traditional taxes and customs are in force, and order is maintained by the picturesque camel corps. Plans are underway for integrating them into the existing departments. The Assemblies in Paris and Algeria are faced with the formulation of laws which will guide the change-over.

(4) *Judicial System.*

The judicial branch of the Algerian Government is dual, using both French and Moslem law. French law is under the direction of the Ministry of Justice in Paris, while Moslem law descends from the Government General in Algiers. The two bodies of law frequently overlap in civil and commercial matters; in

¹ The party affiliations of the candidates elected in March 1949 are shown on page 8.

² Communes with powers approximating those of a French commune.

criminal cases, however, French law has sole jurisdiction. In areas where a serious conflict exists, Moslem law is gradually being modified under French pressure; where French influence is at a minimum, such as in the Kabyle regions inhabited by Moslem Berber tribes and in the Southern Territories where the unorthodox Mozabites, a special Islamic sect, dwell, the ancient practices continue.

French courts, which follow the pattern of those in metropolitan France, have jurisdiction over French nationals, Europeans, and assimilated natives who have renounced their personal status under Moslem law. There is a growing tendency for French tribunals to expand their complex jurisdiction over the natives in an increasing number of civil instances as well as in criminal cases. With the exception of the Courts of Assize, which concern themselves only with serious criminal offenses, all French courts have both civil and criminal jurisdiction.

(5) *Political Parties.*

The same political parties exist in Algeria as in metropolitan France, although rightist parties are, on the whole, more conservative. There are two nationalist parties, as well as certain pro-French native groups with legal standing.

A political dichotomy results from the semi-colonial status and outlook of the French, on the one hand, and the politically inert native masses, on the other. The local scene is further complicated by the multi-party setup. The "colons" dread a weakening of French authority in Algeria, and gravitate toward the right in support of anti-Communist and colonialist policies. The "colons" number, however, less than ten percent of the local European population, but exert much more influence than their numbers suggest.

The result of the cantonal elections of March 1949 was to keep nationalist representation at a minimum; no Communists were elected. As the following table shows, the second college elected an overwhelming majority of pro-French Moslems.

Nationalism. The general ineffectiveness of nationalists in Algeria is heightened by the fact that the two movements—the Movement

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DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE RENEWED HALF OF THE GENERAL COUNCILS (MARCH, 1949)	
FIRST COLLEGE	
Independent Republicans	15 Seats
RPF and affiliated	13
Radical Socialists	10
Independent Radicals	2
MRP (Popular Republicans)	3
Socialists	4
Right Independents	2
Independent	1
TOTAL 50	
SECOND COLLEGE	
Franco-Moslem Union	9 Seats
Algerian Union	9
Independents	9
Socialists	2
MRP	1
Moslem Federation	1
UDMA	2
* (Pro-Administration)	
TOTAL 33	

for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), formerly the Algerian People's Party, and the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA)—refuse to cooperate. There is now little difference in the long-range aims of these groups: the MTLD aspires to complete independence from France even at the price of open violence; the UDMA believes that Algeria should achieve its independence peacefully, its immediate aim being to have Algeria declared an Associated State of the French Union. The MTLD is led by the fiery and mystical Messali Hadj while the UDMA is headed by the more moderate and Europeanized Ferhat Abbas. Since the nationalists now control only fourteen percent of the seats in the Algerian Assembly, they are unable to exert a substantial effect on the local French administration.

Communism. The Algerian Communists are numerically smaller than the native parties but better organized and much noisier. The Party has concentrated most of its efforts on the poorer native and European labor (particularly dockers and utilities employees), and in recent months has made an effort to attract segments of the native rural population. The Party is led by Paul Caballero and Pierre Fayet who follow the line laid down in Moscow; it seeks closer association with the native nationalists and advocates a general policy of liberation for all dependent native populations. The Algerian Communists have met with little success because they are faced with almost insurmountable obstacles created by the Moslem faith, the primitive state of na-

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tive culture, and the political apathy of the population.

(6) *Labor.*

Organized labor is the most effective Communist mass weapon in Algeria. The greatest number of unionized workers are grouped into the three Departmental unions which are affiliated with the French CGT. A coordinating committee, made up of prominent Algerian Communists, directs the three organizations.

The leadership claims a total membership of 250,000, three-fourths of whom are Algerian natives; it is believed, however, that membership is substantially less than 100,000. The CGT has concentrated its activity among dockers and railway and streetcar workers. Strikes called by the CGT have not been notably successful, nor have the dockers been able to impede the movement of military materiel consigned to the Far East.

b. Tunisia.

The French found in Tunisia a relatively well-developed, homogeneous native society and the remnants of a once-effective local government, which had formerly sworn fealty to Constantinople. This government had been in the form of an absolute monarchy under a succession of sovereign Beys.

The French wisely availed themselves of this situation and retained a native shadow-government alongside their protectorate regime. Under the Bardo Treaty (1881) and the Marsa Convention (1883) the powers of government, including the direction of for-

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eign policy, rest with France. Nevertheless, the Bey of Tunis, under the control of France, retains as a legal fiction the powers attaching to the exercise of sovereignty.

The Bey is required by the Marsa Convention to undertake any administrative, judicial, and financial reforms judged useful by the French Government.

Frenchmen and their descendants retain their French citizenship. Moslems and Jews are considered Tunisian nationals. Non-Tunisians may acquire French or Tunisian nationality by naturalization. Any non-Moslem born in Tunisia, at least one of whose parents was born in Tunisia, acquires French nationality at birth. According to the French law of 20 December 1923, however, such nationality may be repudiated within a year after the attainment of majority.

(1) *Government.*

The present native ruler is Lamine Pasha Bey, a close relative¹ of Moncef Pasha Bey who was deposed by the French in 1943 and who has since died.

France's chief representative in Tunisia is the Resident General. He is appointed by the President of France upon the suggestion of the French Council of Ministers. His tenure of office is at the pleasure of the French Government. The present incumbent is Louis Perillier, a career civil servant with Rightist tendencies.

The Resident General, who is responsible to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acts as Foreign Minister for the Bey, and conducts all external affairs. French military and naval commanders in Tunisia are under his orders.

The accompanying chart illustrates the complexity imposed upon the Tunisian Government by the fact that it is a protectorate. The native government is not allowed to make policies or pass laws, but must administer the measures laid down by the French after consultation with the Bey's ministers. The Resident General may, and does, veto native proposals which conflict with French aims. It

¹ Succession is dynastic, rather than hereditary; the Regency throne has been occupied since the beginning of the eighteenth century (1705) by the Hussein family.

will be noted, moreover, that when the Bey's Cabinet Council reaches a deadlock, the question must be passed to the Resident General's Council of Ministers for solution. It will also be noted that all the Moslems, with the exception of the Prime Minister, who sit on the Council of Ministers are merely *ex officio* members of that body, and that each has a French "adviser" who conforms the minister's activities to French policies. Each minister must consult his adviser regarding the conduct of all affairs of his department, and all documents transmitted by the ministers to the Secretary General for implementation must first be "certified" by the advisers. On the other hand, the French members of the Bey's Cabinet Council sit as full members of that body, and are not encumbered with Moslem "advisers." This situation is, of course, highly irritating to Tunisian sensibilities.

French political domination is not restricted to these, the top organs of government. Tunisians are disenfranchised save for a relatively small group of "notables,"² who are judged to be sufficiently reliable from the French viewpoint. These individuals are allowed to join with the French residents in electing persons to the Grand Council of Tunisia which consists of 53 French and 53 Tunisian members. This body, which occasionally reacts in its own self-interest, exercises functions which are similar to, but even less vital than those of the Algerian Assembly. Tunisian notables also elect members to the rural Unit Councils and to the Municipal Council of the city of Tunis. Other officials are appointed by the French authorities.

French control of the region, which has always been rendered difficult by the shadowy and sometimes dual nature of the administration, has become even more difficult for the French because of increasing nationalism and the high cost of military occupation, and because world opinion, exploited by USSR propaganda, favors independence for dependent peoples.

As a result of these conditions, the French administration has made certain superficial and ineffective gestures to appease native

² A group of natives who pay direct taxes, hold certain diplomas, or are veterans.

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sentiment. An illustration is a decree promulgated by the Resident General in April 1948 creating a Mixed Delegation to supplant the old Superior Council. In the new body, which is derived from the elected members of the Grand Council, the French Government is not represented. The purpose of the Delegation is to afford a medium whereby the French and native members of the Grand Council may continue to work on problems on which that body has become deadlocked. The Delegation will also act on behalf of the Council, when it is not in session, in matters relating to the budget. The decree, in other words, places in the hands of elected Tunisian and French citizens powers which had previously been under the guidance of French protectorate officials.

On the whole, however, the actual control continues to center in the Resident General. He is aided, as the chart shows, by a Secretary General of Government, who is Minister of Interior *ex officio*, and by French Directors responsible for Finance, Education, Public Works, all of whom are members of the Council, and by the vital Department of Public Security, which is not represented on the Council. As has been pointed out, certain Moslem Ministers sit *ex officio* in this body.

The Bey's Cabinet Council parallels the Resident General's Council of Ministers but is concerned with the administration of the regulations, laws, etc., which originate in the French organization. The Moslem Prime Minister, who at present is Mustapha Kaak, is the head of this body and is technically responsible to the Bey. The French Secretary General also sits on this Cabinet Council and is directly responsible to the Resident General. Other French officials who are full members of this native body are shown on the chart. It is of interest that laws do not become enforceable until they bear the seal of the Bey and are signed by the Resident General. By refusing to allow the use of his seal, the Bey has been able on rare occasions to exert almost a veto power over French legislation.

(2) *Civil Service.*

Classified civil service consists of three categories: (1) supervisory posts, reserved exclusively for French citizens, pertaining to the

execution of the Marsa Convention; (2) territorial administration, Tunisian judiciary, and Arabic language educational posts, reserved exclusively for Tunisian Moslems; and (3) a variety of other posts open, at least in theory, equally to French and Tunisian nationals.

(3) *Local Administration.*

The French exert a regulatory influence on the lower orders of Tunisian society through their Office of Native Affairs. Its representatives usually work directly with native Tunisian officials and, under certain conditions, with the people themselves. This phase of the protectorate has been successful largely because the French have used discrimination in making permanent appointments to this service and because, as a result, these French officials have a general reputation among the natives for fairness and integrity.

(4) *Legislative Representation.*

The French minority of about 140,000 persons, less than four percent of the population, is represented in the French Council of the Republic by two Councillors elected by ballots mailed to Paris by French members of the Grand Council and French members of the elected municipal councils. The Tunisians object to this representation in the Council of the Republic, and have refused participation in the assembly of the French Union.

(5) *Judicial System.*

The judicial system, as in Algeria and Morocco, is dual. French courts have jurisdiction in all cases in which one of the contesting parties is a non-Tunisian, while Tunisian courts have authority when both litigants are Tunisians. The Tunisian secular courts enforce both Moslem and French law. These tribunals include cantonal magistracies, regional courts of the first instance, courts of appeal, and the Court of Cassation. Tunisian ecclesiastical courts, on the other hand, deal with matters subject to Koranic law. Among the reforms introduced since the establishment of the protectorate are the codification and modification of the civil and criminal procedure of the Tunisian secular courts. A joint Tunisian Land Tribunal, responsible for the registration of landed property, has accomplished a great deal toward the consolida-

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tion of real estate property titles. A rabbinical court exists at Tunis for persons subject to Mosaic law.

(6) *Political Parties.*

The Tunisians are more culturally advanced and politically conscious than the natives of the other French North African areas.

Nationalism. There are two nationalist parties in Tunisia, both of which are legally proscribed but are permitted to operate. The Old Destour (Constitution) and the Neo-Destour represent the desire of the Moslem population for independence from France. These parties are relatively small, but incorporate the natural and literate leadership of the Tunisian nation.

The Neo-Destour party, formed in 1934, is an offshoot of the Old Destour party, and was formed by young radicals who considered the older members too pro-French. Although at one time the Neo-Destourians supported the idea of local autonomy, a position similar to that of the Algerian UDMA, the party (under the active leadership of Habib Bourghiba and Salah ben Youssef) now works for complete independence, with violence threatened as a last resort. They advocate a constitutional monarchy headed by a dynastic, sovereign ruler. A French offer in 1947 to include leading Destourians in the Resident General's cabinet was rejected because the leaders feared that such an action would expose them to arrest unless they were safeguarded by holding the premiership and several of the key ministries, and because the Destourians concluded that acceptance of this overture might be construed as nationalist submission to the French protectorate regime. The chief source of political power exercised by the nationalists is in their control of labor, a matter of growing concern to the French.

Communism. A small but active Communist Party, guided by Mohammed Ennafaa, has achieved a limited degree of success in making common cause with the Neo-Destourians in local labor's demands for the elimination of social and economic injustice. The Communist Party of Tunisia has had more tangible results than its Algerian and Moroccan counterparts in efforts toward a rapprochement with the nationalists. A Communist-

directed Tunisian Committee for the Defense of Peace was established in 1949 with a considerable Neo-Destour representation on its directorate. Recently, Neo-Destourian members have openly expressed opposition to their Communist colleagues. The chief appeal of the Communists for the nationalists is the Soviet catchline, "full and immediate independence for all dependent colonial peoples," which for French consumption has been watered down to "early liberation."

(7) *Labor Organizations.*

The two important labor unions in Tunisia are the Communist-controlled USTT (Syndical Union of Tunisian Workers) and the nationalist-dominated UGTT (General Union of Tunisian Workers). The Communist-controlled USTT, led by Georges Poropane and Hassan Sadaoui, has made repeated attempts to incorporate the nationalist-dominated UGTT whose able leader, Farhat Hached, has had years of intensive training under French labor leadership.

By the shrewd use of religious and nationalist appeals to the Tunisian workers, Hached's union not only avoided joining forces with the USTT, but has increased its membership from 40,000 to 70-80,000, while USTT membership within three years has declined from 40,000 to 15-18,000. Despite its aversion to Communism, the UGTT somewhat hesitantly accepted affiliation with the Communist-sponsored World Federation of Trade Unions in July 1949 in order to procure the world "sounding board" thus provided. Subsequent to this affiliation, Hached has appealed to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for an investigation of social and labor conditions in French North Africa. Although the WFTU has no official connection with ECOSOC it has access to ECOSOC meetings. Hached, by accepting WFTU membership for his union, has placed himself in a position to make use of the propagandistic values attaching to this indirect connection. The UGTT may ultimately withdraw from the WFTU and join the anti-Communist ICFTU, with which the leaders have expressed sympathy. French Residency officials have stated that they consider the UGTT of greater importance than the USTT; however, the unions have equal

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representation at the consultative level in economic and social matters. Because of its rapid growth, the UGTT overshadows its sponsor, the Neo-Destour party, and now occupies a position that is potentially dangerous to French interests. Although Communist labor in Tunisia failed to merge with and absorb the larger nationalist labor union, Communist influence upon Tunisian labor must not be discounted in view of the UGTT's affiliation with the WFTU.

c. Morocco.

The native government which the French found in Morocco was much weakened by corruption, economic chaos, intrigues, and the rivalries of pretenders to the sultanate.

Under the guiding genius of Marshal Lyautey, France took full advantage of the political and economic disorder within the decrepit Sherifian¹ Empire. The French installed their own government beside a native government (Makhzen) which was composed of the remnants of the old Moorish imperial regime. In addition to the over-all administration of the area, the Treaty of Fez permitted the French Government to assume the responsibility for the conduct of Moroccan foreign affairs and the maintenance of a defense force.

The Moslem religion and the native customs were respected; the authority of the sultanate was diminished and the reformation of the Sherifian Government was begun. The territorial limits of the Sherifian Empire included then, as now, the French, Spanish, and International (Tangier) Zones of Morocco.

Despite the fact that the Treaty of Fez provides for a protectorate, the French have governed Morocco since 1912 under a state of siege decree. This places the population under modified martial law which gives the French military and civil authorities the right to intervene in cases of civil disobedience and to exercise the extraordinary disciplinary powers that would otherwise be inapplicable. In addition, in 1939 strict military censorship

¹ "Sherifian" derives from the title "Sherif," denoting an Arab prince or chief descended from the prophet Mohammed, bestowed upon the Sultans of Morocco of the present dynasty. Succession to the sultanate is elective within the dynasty, and not necessarily hereditary.

was imposed and has not yet been lifted, except for non-Communist French newspapers.

(1) *Government.*

The shadow government of the Sherifian monarchy is represented at present by a Sultan of the Alaouite dynasty, in the person of Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef ben El-Hassan V, eighth of his line, now in the twenty-third year of his reign.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Fez, the French Government is represented by a Resident General who is the sole diplomatic intermediary, with the rank of ambassador, between the Sultan and all representation of foreign powers in Morocco. The Resident General is responsible also for the implementation of the treaty.


This officer, a political appointee, is selected by the French Council of Ministers, and is responsible to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Three soldiers, including the present incumbent, General Alphonse Juin, and six civilians have held this position during the 38 years of the Protectorate's existence.

The Resident General is assisted chiefly by a Deputy whose title is Delegate to the Residency General and who is a career officer of the French Foreign Service. The Resident General is also assisted by a Diplomatic Counsellor and by the chiefs of his civil, military, and diplomatic cabinets. (See accompanying chart.)

The Resident General exercises direct control over the Directorates of the Interior and Sherifian Affairs, and the Security Services, all of which are concerned with the political problems of a country which has evolved from tribalism to the initial stages of a modern society in less than four decades. The Directorate of the Interior is the most important of these agencies because it exercises police control over the entire area. The Directorate of Sherifian Affairs is charged with liaison between the various branches of the French and native governments and is the medium by which official communications are dispatched and received between the rural Caids (tribal chiefs), the urban Pashas (mayors), and the Makhzen.

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Another figure of importance in the Residency¹ is the Secretary General of the Protectorate who controls and coordinates the non-political administrative services. He supervises the Directorate of Public Works (of importance in a region where no roads existed 38 years ago), the Directorate of Education (charged with reducing the high illiteracy rate), and the Directorate of Public Health and Family Care (which with ever increasing responsibilities is charged with the health and sanitation of a population which until 1912 was living under extremely unsanitary conditions). The Directorate of Finance, also under his control, is a complex organization which includes central services and the decentralized services of registry, stamp-duty, domain or landed property, and the administration of customs and internal revenue. It is also heir to the old Service of the Debt which was part of the Makhzen before the establishment of the Protectorate in 1912. In addition, there are two directorates: that of Agriculture, Commerce, and Forests and that of Industrial Production and Mines. The Sherifian Office of Control and Exportation and the Moroccan Office of Tourism, charged respectively with international trade and travel, are both under the Directorate of Agriculture and Commerce. The Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services are combined in an office, not a Directorate, also under the authority of the Secretary General of the Protectorate.

(2) *Legislative System.*

A Council of Government was created in 1919, and enlarged in 1926, to assist and advise the Resident General. It is composed of French and Moroccan sections which convene separately twice annually. The sessions of the Council of Government, during which the delegates of all three Colleges are consulted, afford the Resident General a considerable cross section of public opinion, both Moroccan and French.

The chief function of the Council of Government is to make recommendations on the budget and on lesser matters of economic and social interest to the native majority and

¹ The term "Residency" is used to designate the Resident General and his closest official colleagues.

French minority. Delegates (77 in number) of the French section are elected by French citizens. In 1948, for the first time, delegates to the Second College (21 members) of the native Moroccan section were elected; the remainder (56 members of the First and Third colleges) continue to be appointed.

The electorates which choose these delegates are composed of large numbers of "representative" farmers, and businessmen and industrialists, who are organized into regional advisory Chambers of Agriculture, and of Commerce and Industry. Agriculturalists who are elected to the Council of Government constitute the First College of that body; businessmen and industrialists constitute the Second College; a third College, which has existed since 1926, consists of functionaries, employees, and members of the liberal professions.

In the absence of any popularly elected assembly empowered to pass laws, legislation is promulgated by "dahir."² Refusal to sign a Protectorate dahir is a prerogative enjoyed by the Sultan which the present incumbent has invoked occasionally, and from which, in certain instances, no amount of pressure from the Residency has been able to deter him. Some dahirs have, nevertheless, become law without the Sultan's signature.

(3) *Native and Local Administration.*

Native administration is concentrated under the Sultan in a central Makhzen or native government, a relic of the old Sherifian Empire. Principal official posts are those of Grand Vizir (Prime Minister), presently occupied by the aged Mohammed Hadj el Mokri, Vizir of Justice, Vizir of the Habous (inalienable collective religious property and endowment for support of religious or charitable institutions), a Director of Protocol, and five representatives of the Grand Vizir assigned to the modern Sherifian departments referred to above, which are the chief technical departments with French direction.

² A dahir is a decree-law promulgated by the Resident General and signed by the Sultan or the Grand Vizir. An order of the Vizir is a statutory order issued by the Grand Vizir acting under powers permanently delegated by the Sultan.

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The Resident General is represented by French Civil Controllers in his relations with the native Makhzen authorities of the urban centers and rural inland areas. Native Affairs officers, however, still remain in charge of administrative functions in the more remote parts of Morocco.

Morocco is divided into seven regions: of these, three (Oujda, Rabat, Casablanca) are each headed by a French Civil Controller; three (Marrakech, Meknes, Fez) by a general or colonel of the French Army; and one, the Agadir-Confines of the Sahara, is a military area under command of a general.

Nineteen cities of Morocco are organized as municipalities, and governed separately from the regions. Two of the larger cities, Casablanca and Fez, because of their mixed Moslem and European (French) populations have two administrations, one Moroccan and the other French.

(4) *Representation in Paris.*

Like the Tunisians, Moroccans are not represented in the French Parliament and refuse to participate in the Assembly of the French Union. They also resent the fact that the French residents in Morocco, who number about a quarter of a million (less than three percent of the total population) are represented by three members in the French Council of the Republic. These officials are designated in Morocco as candidates for the Council of the Republic, by the people they represent, and are subsequently elected in and by the French National Assembly.

The combined French citizen membership in the French Council of the Republic for Tunisia (two) and Morocco (three) is only 1.5 percent of the upper house of Parliament and is politically negligible.

(5) *Judicial System.*

In Morocco, as in Algeria and Tunisia, the system of justice is dual. French justice, based on the Napoleonic Code, was instituted by Marshal Lyautey in 1913. With one exception, the foreign consular courts which existed prior to 1913 were eliminated over a period of years, with the recognition of the French Protectorate by foreign powers. These courts were superseded by the French court system. The sole exception is the United

States which retains its capitulatory rights and privileges in Morocco and exercises consular jurisdiction. This relic of extraterritorial justice owes its existence to the continued adherence of the United States to its Treaties with Morocco of 1787 and 1836, the latter a renewal and development of the former, and to the reaffirmation, extension and clarification of these treaties by the Madrid Convention of 1880 and the Act of Algiers of 1906.

As in metropolitan France, there are courts of the peace, courts of first instance, and a Court of Appeals. There is, however, a notable absence of the small army of court officials so prevalent in France. The functions of these minions of the law are discharged by the auxiliary servants of justice, composed of a body of secretary-registrars, or recorders, and also are assumed to some extent by the lawyers who act in the official capacity of attorneys and notaries. Since 1930 a certain number of notaries have been appointed for the larger cities by the protectorate government.

The courts of first instance also have criminal jurisdiction, and perform the functions of French Courts of Assizes. The number of assessor-jurors is limited to six, of whom at least three must be French citizens; the others are European or Moroccan, according to the nationality of the person on trial.

Before the arrival of the French, the native courts, from that of the Sultan down, had absolute authority. A pasha, or mayor, for example, was all things to his people; he was a governor, a direct representative of the Sultan for purposes of administration and appeal, and a judge of criminal proceedings, whose sentences were immediately executed. The French have instituted certain reforms, such as the abolition of corporal punishment, including mutilations. In many ways Moslem justice is still primitive by western standards and native nationalists have urged that the Moslem laws be modernized and codified. Divorce procedures are loose and facile. As matters stand, civil law suits can be dragged out interminably, especially in the lower tribunals such as those in which the Cadis exercise their religious jurisdiction, the temporal

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jurisdiction of the Pashas and Caid, and to a lesser extent in the Djemaas,¹ the local assemblies of the Berber tribes. The power of justice of the Pashas has been somewhat reduced and their activities placed under the control of a French court adviser, known as a Government Commissioner. Penalties entailing a prison term of more than two years have been under the jurisdiction of the High Sherifian Court in Rabat since 1918.

The Jewish minority, about three percent of the total population, has its own rabbinical courts, competent for civil lawsuits, and an appellate jurisdiction, the High Rabbinical Court of Rabat.

(6) *Reform Measures.*

The reforms indicated in the Treaty of Fez have been realized only in part. Not only was much time consumed in the pacification of the country and in the fighting of two world wars, but the fact is that French policy, hoping to keep Morocco in subject status, has at certain times either opposed or failed to implement the changes proposed in these articles. A more rapid rate of progress has been made since 1947 than in any comparable period in the past in the fields of judicial, administrative, educational, economic, and financial reform.

(7) *Political Parties.*

Nationalism. Nationalism is the chief rallying point of politically conscious Moroccans. The French have outlawed, but tolerate, both of the nationalist parties: the important Istiqlal (Independence) and the very much smaller but corrupt, from the native viewpoint, Shoura (Democratic Independence). Istiqlal is one of the more pro-US and anti-USSR nationalist parties in North Africa.

Although the precise size of these illegal organizations is unknown, it is probable that together they do not exceed 50,000. Their vitality arises chiefly from hatred of the French and from religious sentiments which are frequently inflamed by competent and

¹ *Djemaas* are administrative, judicial, and at times legislative.

Djemaas judiciaires, with strictly judicial functions, exist in Berber territory; there were 16 such tribunals in 1929.

fanatical leaders. Their potential influence is reckoned by the French less on a numerical basis than on the assumption that these parties constitute a hard core of a widely-held but generally latent nationalistic feeling which could be aroused and put into action under conditions generally unfavorable to the French administration.

Nationalist leaders agree generally that the native population is immature politically, as compared with their neighbors in Tunisia. But, having given up hope of obtaining any real preparation for independence from the French, Istiqlal leaders demand complete and immediate independence with a constitutional government under the Sultan. They admit, however, that they would require French or other outside assistance for a time after such independence was achieved.

It is of interest to note that the Sultan's popularity with the mass of the people has grown constantly as he has offered resistance to Resident General Juin. The Sultan has given strong, consistent, but usually covert, support to the Istiqlal party, despite the blandishments and threats of the French authorities, which have included defamation of character, and even a few trial balloons designed to test public response to the idea of placing young Prince Moulay Hassan on his father's throne.

Istiqlal has benefited by the fanatical and energetic leadership of Allal el Fassi, now residing in Tangier because he fears curtailment of his liberty should he return to French Morocco. The present active leader of Istiqlal in Morocco is Ahmed Balafrej who, although lacking the fire and eloquence of El Fassi, is a better political organizer and enjoys the confidence and strong backing of the Sultan.

Under the leadership of Mohammed ben Hassan el Wazzani, its founder, the Shoura party has weakened itself because of its willingness to compromise with the French, for whom it has acted as a stalking-horse. It has, consequently, failed to divide nationalist opinion, although it has attempted to do so by advocating Moroccan autonomy within the framework of the French Union. In this respect, it has fallen in line with an earlier policy of the Communists with whom the Shoura is reported to have engaged in limited collabora-

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tion. Shoura leaders reportedly came around to Istiqlal's thinking in the spring of 1950, and both groups now strive toward complete separation from French control.

Communism. The Moroccan Communist Party, like its counterparts in Tunisia and Algeria, makes up for its small size by its volatility and close organization. It also enjoys a considerable advantage over the nationalist parties because it has legal status and controls the principal labor federation.

In the absence of its former leader, the Algerian Ali Yata, driven underground by the French, the destinies of the Party are in the hands of Abdeslam Bourquia, a typical follower of the usual anti-US political and Communist-directed CGT labor lines. He is less noxious to the French than the more appealing and inflammatory Ali Yata.

Because the Istiqlal and the Sultan are both apprehensive of Soviet intentions, Communist advances toward rapprochement with the nationalists have met with much more resistance than in Algeria and Tunisia. Recently, however, fear that the US might relinquish its privileged treaty position in Morocco, in deference to increasing French objections, has led Moroccan nationalists to despair of US aid or sympathy in their struggle for independence. This pessimism has caused the Istiqlal to take under consideration proffered Communist assistance in spite of the incompatibility of Islam and Communism. Only political expediency would prompt the nationalists to accept this assistance.

The similarity of Communist activities and their timing throughout North Africa indicate that the three Communist parties in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco operate according to a common plan directed from Paris. The Soviet Consulate in Algiers undoubtedly maintains contact with the local leaders and the French Communist Party, as well as with Moscow.

Because of the French ban on Moslem labor's right to organize, the French have played into the Communists' hands and the Communist-directed local CGT has with relative ease dominated European and native labor. Despite the rigid control exercised by the protectorate, Communists in Morocco

have more recently been somewhat successful in their proselytizing in the rural areas. Communist influence is more evident in the field of labor in Morocco than in the political arena, where it carries little weight.

d. Committee for the Liberation of North Africa.

International liaison among nationalist leaders has been maintained through the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa, formed in Cairo in January 1948 under the chairmanship of the Rif leader, Abd-el-Krim. Eleven delegates representing all nationalist parties except the Algerian UDMA party composed the original committee. The aim of the organization was to work for the complete independence of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, without negotiating with the French or Spanish before achieving independence. The committee seeks to obtain this independence by peaceful means, if possible, and contends that if violence is necessary the responsibility will lie with France and Spain.

The committee has proved ineffective because of the lack of delegated authority from the North African parties, the failure of Abd-el-Krim to regain his prestige since his exile, the return to North Africa of the most influential committee members, the defeat of the Arab League on the Palestine question, and the League's declining influence and loss of prestige in North Africa. Being located in friendly Egyptian territory, however, the Cairo headquarters has been able, to a degree not possible within North Africa, to contact and seek the assistance of Arab and other friendly nations, to establish an active propaganda center, and to meet freely to study North African problems. Recent statements by Abd-el-Krim suggest that he is seeking to increase the activity and the influence of the committee and to focus world attention on nationalist aspirations.

A second North African nationalist group, the Maghreb Bureau, forerunner of the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa, functioned until recently in Cairo. This body consisted of representatives of Istiqlal, Neo-Destour, and MTLD, and maintained a separate entity although cooperating with the Abd-el-Krim Committee. The eclipse of its

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activities by the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa and the decline in vitality of the Arab League, from which it received limited financial assistance, have caused the Maghreb Bureau to suspend operations, at least for the present.

3. Stability of the Present Administration.

The French political position in North Africa may be regarded as stable but on the defensive. The major force, aside from war, which might cause the French to move out at some later date is not only the nationalist movements in the area but the change in world attitude toward colonial possessions. The British withdrawal from India, Burma, and Ceylon in 1948, the establishment of Israel in 1949, recent developments in Indonesia and Indochina, and the United Nations General Assembly's decision to grant independence to Libya, including the Fezzan, by 1952, all affect the future of the French in North Africa.

The nationalist leaders will continue to exploit this situation in their dealings with the French and the US. Much emphasis will also be laid on the anti-democratic menace of Communism. But the fact remains that most of the peoples in French North Africa have lived for centuries in a culture pattern which has afforded them no mass sense of democratic procedures. The growing native middle class has not yet developed sufficient size or cohesiveness to exert an effective political influence. Most nationalist leaders, when they speak of independence and liberty for the area, are aware of the fact that they do not represent a literate and politically conscious population which could in the next decade realize a system of popular self-government. Nor do the natives, save for a minority, desire a democratic government. They do, however, feel the resentment common to all occupied peoples, and desire to be rid of French control.

It is generally admitted, however, even by many of the more ardent nationalists, that the French have, on the whole, benefited the area sociologically and economically. During the past 36 years France was engaged in two life-and-death struggles against Germany, with results that were all but disastrous to

French economy; many schools have been established, the state of public health and sanitation is much improved, roads and railways have been built, and a degree of public security established which is far superior to the conditions which prevailed before the establishment of French control.

The value of its North African interests to the French nation is a compound of history, economy, and sentiment. The region as a producer of wealth for the "protecting" nation cannot be compared to the rich Netherlands East Indies when under Dutch control or to India during the British occupation. Indeed, if it were possible to compute the total military costs as well as those of civil administration, both French and native, including the improvements which have been realized, it is probable that such a theoretical financial statement would show an over-all deficit for France. To be sure, many individual Frenchmen and groups have grown rich in North Africa, and the growing volume of trade is fairly substantial, but whereas the British held India with its population of 450,000,000 for many decades with a garrison of 50,000 troops, the French are even now employing not less than 90,000 troops in their far less opulent African domain in order to keep 21,000,000 natives in order.

The French view of the matter does not stop there, however. Much French blood has been shed, and an enormous amount of capital has been expended. The hope is always latent in the French estimate of the situation that North Africa, rather than making a few Frenchmen rich, may eventually return at least a *quid pro quo* to the French nation as a whole. It is also assumed that the area will serve as a political and military refuge should France be again overrun by an enemy and that it might again serve as a springboard for a successful counterattack. It should also be noted that while the world empires of the nineteenth century have been falling apart with notable rapidity since the end of the second World War, French *amour propre* is still stimulated by the fact that these protectorates exist and that Algeria is politically, at least, an integral part of the French nation.

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France will, therefore, endeavor to hold the region, although in doing so it will be required to grant much greater concessions to the na-

tive populations than it has thus far seen fit to accord.

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CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. Genesis of the Present Economic System: Economic Factors Concurrent with and Subsequent to French Military Penetration and Political Administration of North Africa.

The present economic system in French North Africa is based on three factors: (1) the primitive production and trading which characterize the Berber and Arab civilization; (2) the traditional utilization of the area as a ready market for the output of French industry; and (3) the recent efforts of the French toward industrialization against the possibility that France will again be overrun by an invader.

The economic development of the area was deliberately retarded during the nineteenth century by French policy designed to protect the interests of metropolitan industry and commerce. Until recently, industrialists were discouraged from establishing factories in North Africa to produce finished or semi-finished goods. French commercial interests retain special advantages in Tunisia and Algeria. Morocco, on the other hand, by virtue of the Treaty of Algeciras (1906) maintains an "Open Door Policy" and imposes import duties and special import taxes.¹ In general, inter-territorial trade is free throughout the area.

It appears, however, that the profits which have accrued to French individuals and industries have been, in the long run, more than offset by the vast military and civil expenditures necessary to pacify and govern the impoverished natives.

¹ Goods of foreign origin on entry into the French Zone of Morocco are subject to an import duty of 10 percent ad valorem, except for silk, fabrics, precious stones, jewelry, wines, liquors, and alimentary pastes on which the duty is 5 percent ad valorem. In addition to the import duty, a special tax of 2.5 percent ad valorem is levied on imports into the French Zone.

The great majority of the 20 million natives exist on a low standard of living, which is becoming further depressed because the population is increasing at the rate of 1.7 percent annually while food production has remained relatively constant. The natives, 85 to 90 percent of whom are illiterate, are engaged in small-scale agriculture, commerce, mining, and handicrafts. Few of the natives are skilled workers or technicians, and most of these could not meet western standards. Unemployment is not a serious problem except during drought years.

Nationalization is widespread among non-native industries. It is manifested in varying degrees of French, Algerian, and Protectorate Government control, by government participation in capitalization or in management, and by subsidies. The governments have majority participation in all petroleum industries, public utilities, and local airlines. Nearly all rail lines are state-owned. Tobacco processing, the manufacture of matches, the distillation of alcohol, and exploitation of forest lands are state monopolies. Most mining activities are strictly regulated.

2. The Present Economic Situation.

a. Agriculture.

Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco comprise an area of more than a million square miles, of which about three-quarters are sterile desert or wasteland; the balance (250,000 square miles) is arable. Production per acre of such essential crops as wheat and barley averages, however, little more than half the US output.

French agriculturists have demonstrated that the use of modern agricultural practices and equipment would permit the area to meet its own food requirements and to produce a substantial surplus for export. Most of the land is, however, farmed by natives who still employ primitive methods. They have little

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knowledge of insect control, use poor quality seeds, and seriously lack irrigation facilities. Severe droughts in recent years and a scarcity of consumer goods in local markets have helped retard production.

Because of the war and the droughts which occurred through 1943-45, the food situation became so stringent that essential commodities were rationed until the late winter and early spring of 1949. Conditions have now so improved that only such imported items as coffee, green tea, and special milk products are on the restricted list. Shortages of meat and dairy products continue.


(1) *Land Utilization.*

Land tenure, before the French occupation, was governed by tribal custom and Moslem law. When French occupation began, a small portion of each territory was privately owned, possibly one-third was *habous* property (endowed for the support of religious charities), while the vast bulk of the land was collectively owned by tribes or tribal fractions. Almost immediately after occupying Algeria, the French confiscated large areas of the tribal lands, thus forcing the natives back into mountains and deserts. The seized land was

turned over to French colonists. When still more land was needed for colonization, the French forced modification of the existing Moslem laws and customs and thereby legalized the permanent alienation of both *habous* and collective lands to Europeans, who obtained rights tantamount to private ownership. As a direct result of these ruthless operations, almost half the natives in Algeria were uprooted.

Later, in Tunisia, the French practiced a milder land policy; native land tenure was disturbed even less in Morocco. In both protectorates, however, reduction of communal lands rather than confiscation of large areas prevailed, and native laws regarding *habous* and collective land were modified.

The rate of transfer of land from native to French control has slowed down appreciably, although allotments of agricultural land are set aside annually for European colonization. From the meager statistics available on land tenure, it has been estimated that Europeans farm about 47 percent of the cultivated land in Algeria, 22.5 percent in Tunisia, and 14 percent in Morocco, as indicated in the following table. Comparatively small areas of land,



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which are to be made arable by irrigation projects, will be distributed primarily to natives.

(2) *Production.*

In economic importance, cereals lead all other products. These are followed by wine, citrus fruits, green vegetables, olives and olive oil, cork, livestock, fibers, and tobacco.

(3) *Cereals.*

All cereal production, centered largely in the rich coastal regions, is under strict governmental control. Of the acreage sown, 84 percent normally is devoted to wheat (44 percent) and barley (40 percent). Native farmers favor barley because it requires less cultivation and is more resistant to drought.

As may be seen from the following table, cereal production has been fairly static over the last fourteen years. Cognizant of the need to increase production, both French and local authorities are intensifying their efforts to educate native farmers and procure more efficient tools for their use. The arrival of modern farm equipment through ECA should

eventually be reflected in increased yields. Although the 1949 estimated harvest is only slightly below that of 1948 and compares favorably with the 1935-39 average, it must be remembered that the North African population has increased by 3,000,000 (or eighteen percent) in the intervening decade. It is probable that local breadgrain requirements in 1949-50 will be satisfied, but is unlikely that there will be any large quantity for export. On the other hand, the large exportable surplus of barley cannot be sold on the world market because North African prices are too high.

(4) *Wine.*


Viticulture is of great importance in French North Africa, particularly in Algeria, where one-half of the total exports consist of wine. In 1948 Algerian wine production totalled 334 million gallons, or considerably below the estimated average prewar annual production of 500 million gallons. A vast program of rehabilitation of vineyards is under way, and in about ten years maximum production may again be reached.

CEREAL PRODUCTION
(In metric tons)

	WHEAT	BARLEY	OATS	CORN ^a
1935-39 average	2, 000, 000	2, 075, 000	221, 500	218, 000
1946	2, 670, 000	1, 669, 000	173, 720	220, 000
1947	1, 728, 000	1, 782, 000	120, 000	257, 000
1948 preliminary	2, 150, 000	2, 260, 000	216, 560	340, 000
1949 estimate	2, 079, 000	2, 290, 000	243, 200 ^b	319, 000
1949 estimate for France (as of 1 August 1949)	7, 068, 000	1, 354, 000	3, 196, 000

^a Morocco only.

^b Algeria and Morocco only.



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The vast majority of Algerian wines are common table varieties used extensively in France for blending with the finer grade French wines. In 1948 almost 238 million gallons were exported to France and other French territories, more than two-thirds of the total Algerian production.

Tunisia and Morocco are net importers of wine; domestic production in both countries is substantially lower than consumption.

The following table compares the 1947 and 1948 wine production for French North Africa with that of France, the world's leading producer, and of Spain:

PRODUCTION
(In gallons)

COUNTRY	1948	1947
Tunisia.....	15, 800, 000	12, 000, 000
Algeria.....	334, 000, 000	219, 000, 000
Morocco.....	10, 500, 000	11, 000, 000
Total French North Africa.....	360, 300, 000	242, 000, 000
France.....	1, 129, 000, 000	1, 031, 000, 000
Spain.....	475, 000, 000	536, 000, 000

(5) *Fruits.*

Fruit growing ranks third as a source of North Africa's agricultural wealth, with citrus fruits predominating. Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco devote a total of 123,550 acres to citrus fruits, and the production goal is 350,000 metric tons (almost 50 percent higher than the 1947-48 yield of 237,300 metric tons), or slightly more than three percent of the world's total.

As in the case of wine, Algeria leads the other two countries in citrus fruit production, with 122,300 metric tons in 1947-48, of which 93,472 tons were exported, principally to France. Over 90 percent of the groves are owned by Europeans, who produce 92.5 percent of the total output. As in the production of cereals, the more modern methods of cultivation employed by Europeans result in greater yield. Moroccan production has steadily increased from 32,000 metric tons in 1942-43 to an estimated 130,000 metric tons in 1948-49, of which 81,801 tons were exported, chiefly to France. Plans are being made to expand production to 175,000 metric tons by 1952-53. In Tunisia about 60 percent of the

plantings are owned by natives. Yearly production has risen from 18,000 metric tons for 1945-46 to about 25,000 metric tons during 1948-49. The maximum possible production from present cultivation is 50,000 metric tons annually.

In 1949, the Algerian commercial production of dried figs amounted to 16,500 metric tons. Date exports amounted in 1948-49 to 24,500 metric tons, a portion going to Morocco.

Almonds produced in Morocco amounted to 4,200 metric tons in 1948-49, and are estimated at 3,440 metric tons for 1949-50. France is the only important importer of Moroccan almonds.

(6) *Vegetables.*

Pulse production, chiefly broad beans, lentils, peas, chick peas, and beans, totalled 131,000 metric tons for Algeria and Morocco in 1947-48. Normally, production is in excess of the countries' needs, and substantial exports are customary. There is also a considerable production and export of fresh vegetables. (From Morocco alone, a monthly average of more than 4,300 metric tons of fresh vegetables was exported in 1949.)

(7) *Oils.*

Large imports of peanut and palm oil from West Africa permit French North Africa to export quantities of olive and linseed oils. Algerian and Moroccan olive crops in 1948 totalled 123,000 metric tons, from which were pressed some 14,000 metric tons of olive oil. Algerian oil is consumed domestically, but Moroccan olive oil is one of the largest sources of dollars for the Protectorate Government, which exported 4,916 metric tons (\$4,146,918 in value) to the US in 1948. (In 1949, Morocco exported 446.7 metric tons of olive oil to the US, valued at \$343,264.)

Production of olive oil in Tunisia fluctuates seasonally. About 42,000 metric tons were produced in 1948-49, 25 percent above the 1940-49 average annual production. The 1949 surplus available for export amounted to 10,000 tons, of which more than one-third has already been exported to France.

(8) *Livestock.*

Livestock is not only a source of meat and hides, or wool, but is also a source of draft

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NORTH AFRICAN HERDS.			
	Algeria (1947)	Morocco (1948)	Tunisia (1950)
SHEEP	3,000,000	10,000,000*	2,500,000
GOATS	2,145,000	6,009,000	1,800,000
CATTLE	682,000	1,660,000	450,000
ASSES	282,000	554,600	185,000
CAMELS	140,000	165,400	150,000
HORSES	189,000	155,000	100,000
MULES	222,000	140,800	60,000
BOGS	90,000	96,600	60,000

* 1950 estimate

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power. There is, however, a great deficit in dairy products—annual milk production in Algeria, for instance, is about 9.5 pints per capita. During the years of severe drought (1943–45), sheep and hogs were reduced by more than one-half and other herds suffered to a lesser extent. Adequate rainfall and good pasturage have resulted in substantial improvement in numbers, although several more years will be required before drought losses are made good.

The table above indicates the approximate number of domestic animals in the area.

Wool production, which averaged 28,000 metric tons annually in 1931–35, dropped to about 22,000 metric tons in 1947 and 1948. Consumption is in excess of production, however, and imports of South American and Australian wools are necessary to supply the woolen trade. Although most goat hair is processed locally, a small amount is exported (Algerian production in 1948 was 5,500 metric tons, of which 375 were exported).

France and French territories are the principal importers of North African hides, most of which are tanned locally.

(9) Fishing.

Morocco has a sizable fishing industry, and plans are being developed for its expansion. Authorities hope that with the procurement of modern refrigeration equipment the Moroccan fishing industry can be extended to supply Algeria and Tunisia, as well as to furnish fresh fish for the French market. More than 1,400 craft were engaged in fishing in 1948, and the catch was estimated at 55,938 metric tons.

Some 15,000 fishermen are employed in Tunisian fisheries. Sponge fishing, producing about 125 tons annually, is the most important element of the Tunisian fishing industry. The annual fish catch is estimated at 9,000 metric tons.

(10) Tobacco.

Algerian tobacco production, 19,500 metric tons in 1948, is almost sufficient to supply the local market. Tobacco imports are declining, and exports increasing. Morocco raises a small quantity of tobacco—1,600 metric tons in 1946.

(11) Fibers.

Vegetable fiber and esparto and alfa grasses grow wild. In 1948 Algeria and Morocco harvested some 115,000 metric tons of alfa (used in the manufacture of fine paper), about one-third of which was exported. About 130,000 tons of vegetable fiber were exported. Great Britain is the chief purchaser of Algerian esparto grass (used in the manufacture of cordage, shoes, baskets, and paper); production in 1948 amounted to 162,025 metric tons. Morocco produces about 25 tons annually of sisal, and larger quantities of hemp and flax.

(12) Forests.

The forests and wooded areas of French North Africa were estimated in 1937 to cover 18.7 million acres. In Morocco about 56,000 acres (of a total of 6,425,000 acres) is primarily cork oak, and 64,750 acres predominantly cedar. Other stands include varieties of oaks and conifers.

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In Algeria (8,948,000 acres) and Tunisia (2,511,000 acres) wooded areas are principally scrub forests including oaks (cork, evergreen, and deciduous), conifers, and wild olive. Oases of date palms are found in desert areas of Algeria and to some extent in Tunisia.

Wild cork is the principal forest product; others include firewood, lumber, and some pit props for the local mines. Charcoal manufacture is a widespread, small-scale native industry; production and consumption statistics are not available.

(13) *Cork.*

Algerian cork production is surpassed only by Portugal and Spain. Algeria normally produces 35-40,000 metric tons of cork annually (one-seventh of the world production); lesser amounts are produced in French Morocco (17-18,000 metric tons) and Tunisia (3,000 metric tons). Of the 1,087,000 acres devoted to cork in Algeria, 617,750 acres of the less desirable areas are owned by the state and the balance by private individuals and local governments. Rehabilitation of cork forests is essential or production will soon be drastically reduced.

The government does not control the harvesting and processing of cork. Some 17-18,000 Algerian natives are employed for two months annually in stripping the trees. About 14,000 metric tons of cork, or substantially less than half the production, are processed in Algeria in four large factories, fifteen small factories, and 50 hand shops, employing a total of 5,000 laborers, and producing 4,000 tons of finished products, such as stoppers, mats, and similar articles. Because few cork processing establishments exist in either French Morocco or Tunisia, a portion of Moroccan and Tunisian cork is processed in Algeria.

All unprocessed cork and the bulk of the manufactured products are exported. France is the principal importer of the manufactured products, while the US imports raw and scrap cork as well as some manufactured articles.

b. Mineral Resources.

French North Africa's second most important economic asset is its mineral wealth. Known sources of phosphates and iron ore are extensive; mineral fuels are scarce or of poor quality. The development of all resources is

carried on by the state or by semi-private or private firms with governmental permit. Substantial wage increases, higher costs of transportation, and replacement of essential equipment have forced the governments to grant subsidies to keep the mines in operation, with the result that annual production equals and in some cases surpasses prewar tonnages.

Antiquated mining methods restrict mineral output in all areas. Mechanization is not warranted, however, at properties with low-grade or limited reserves. Transportation difficulties, particularly in Morocco and Algeria, also hamper production.

Since there are few smelters and phosphate processing plants in North Africa, the bulk of the raw ore is exported. This situation will probably continue because of the high cost of plants and equipment, and the lack of skilled labor and of technical experts.

North Africa is the world's largest producer of phosphates with 5,761,000 metric tons mined in 1948. The two principal deposits (Khouribga and Louis Gentil), with tremendous reserves and yielding 75 percent commercial ore, are in Morocco and furnish more than one-half of the total production. Most of the remainder comes from Tunisian deposits, with a smaller production in Algeria.

Iron ore production in 1948 was more than 2,868,000 metric tons, of which 1,870,700 were mined in Algeria where reserves are estimated at 30 to 40 million tons (average iron content 53 percent). Known reserves in Morocco are about 30 million metric tons from which 30-85,000 metric tons are produced annually. Tunisia also possesses substantial deposits.

Morocco is the only important source of manganese ore in the French Union, and produces at present about one-half of the French steel industry's requirements. Manganese production has almost tripled in the past decade (from 78,000 metric tons in 1938 to 195,400 tons in 1948). The largest known deposit is remotely located south of the Atlas mountains, far from railhead or seaport, and production is limited by the carrying capacity of truck transport. With adequate transportation, production could be doubled in the next few years, thus making France self-sufficient in this strategic material, and perhaps

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providing a small exportable surplus. A semi-processing plant of limited capacity is located at Casablanca.

Many non-ferrous metals and non-metallic minerals are found in French North Africa. All areas produce substantial quantities of lead and zinc, while Algerian mines yield antimony, mercury, barite, and diatomite. Moroccan mineral production includes minor quantities of copper—in the form of chalcopyrite—and cobalt.

Although known coal deposits are estimated at 100 million metric tons, production is substantially below requirements. Algerian coal is of mediocre quality and three-quarters of Algerian consumption requirements are imported. Moroccan coal is of better quality than Algerian, yet is also considered low

grade. About 80 percent of Moroccan coal requirements are imported. Tunisian industry and power depend entirely upon imported fuels.

Known petroleum resources are insignificant. Morocco is the only one of the three areas producing any appreciable amount of petroleum and in 1948 supplied only ten percent of its own needs. Prospecting for oil is under way in all three areas. After prolonged negotiations, British and US oil interests were finally granted permission in August 1949 to investigate petroleum potentialities in Tunisia. Preliminary discussions are now under way by US and French capitalists who desire to prospect in Algeria.

The following table compares 1948 production with that of 1947:

MINERAL PRODUCTION
(Metric tons)

	ALGERIA	TUNISIA	MOROCCO	1948 TOTAL	1947 TOTAL
<i>Ferrous Minerals</i>					
Iron Ore	1, 870, 700	696, 100	301, 300	2, 868, 000	2, 109, 500
Manganese Ore			195, 400	195, 400	103, 400
(Mn content)			(104, 970)	(104, 970)	(49, 000)
Pyrite	34, 230	3, 215		37, 440	42, 020
<i>Non-Ferrous Minerals</i>					
Lead Ore	1, 750	21, 620	39, 200	62, 570	50, 710
(Lead concentrate)	(1, 050)	(13, 370)	(28, 240)	(42, 660)	(34, 960)
(Lead metal)				(17, 960)*	(9, 840)
Zinc Ore	13, 780	4, 940	4, 660	23, 380	21, 800
(Blende)	(560)	(4, 720)	(4, 070)	(9, 350)	(9, 880)
(Calamine)	(13, 220)	(220)	(590)	(14, 030)	(11, 920)
(Zn content)	(6, 130)	(2, 470)	(2, 340)	(10, 940)	(10, 180)
Antimony Ore	2, 540		895	3, 435	1, 140
(Sb content)	(855)		(450)	(1, 305)	(540)
Cobalt Ore			2, 100	2, 100	2, 660
(Co content)			(280)	(280)	(370)
Copper Ore			1, 800	1, 800	170
(Cu content)			(440)	(440)	(40)
Mercury	13. 15			13. 15	11. 7
<i>Non-metallic Minerals</i>					
Phosphates	670, 600	1, 863, 700	3, 226, 700	5, 761, 000	5, 422, 800
Fuller's Earth	27, 640		3, 810	31, 450	22, 800
Diatomite	8, 410			8, 410	6, 540
Barite	7, 610	230		7, 840	6, 970
Fluorspar		525		525	
Asbestos			400	400	790
Graphite			285	285	440
<i>Mineral Fuels</i>					
Coal	222, 600		290, 300	512, 900	473, 100
Lignite		70, 520		70, 520	75, 700
Petroleum	110		12, 920	13, 030	3, 030

* Produced in Tunisia from Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan ores.

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c. Industry.

Since the war, the French Government has modified its economic doctrine and encouraged industrialization in North Africa. Considerable progress has been made under the new policy despite the government's inability to import sufficient equipment from abroad, the need to construct plants, insufficient fuel and power facilities, inadequate transportation, and scarcity of skilled labor. Industries particularly encouraged include: food processing, metallurgical, electrical, chemical, fat processing, paper and pasteboard, construction materials, textile and leather, wood, and cork plants.

The influx of fugitive French capital into North Africa since 1945, the postwar demand for consumer goods, and industrial replacement and reequipment needs have now levelled off, and the trend toward expansion, except in chemical and metallurgical industries, probably will be slowed. Because of transportation inadequacies and the absence of appreciable deposits of commercial-grade fuels in the area, there is little probability that any heavy industry will be established in the immediate future.

Although most technicians are drawn from the European minority of the population or from Europe itself, the North African native population is a potentially good source of skilled industrial labor. The Arabs and Berbers are intelligent, have an aptitude for mechanics, and are quick to grasp new principles when given an opportunity to learn.

(1) Manufacturing.

Two distinct types of manufacturing establishments prevail throughout French North Africa—native handicraft carried on in the homes, and hundreds of small factories owned, financed, or managed by the European, or foreign, minority. Handicrafts are confined to rug and carpet making, some textile weaving, and leather, metal, and wood crafts. The greatest number of processing plants in the factory category are devoted to foodstuffs—fish, fruit, and vegetable canneries, flour and oil mills, and distilleries. Locally grown tobacco, as well as the imported tobacco, is processed in Algeria. Other manufactures are leather, matches, soap, paper, textiles, shoes,

and certain electrical products. Except for the recent establishment in Casablanca of the Société Chérifienne de Matériel Industriel et Ferrovière (SCIF) which will produce, among other things, railroad cars for local use, there are no facilities for the production of transportation equipment. Repair facilities for automotive and aircraft equipment are adequate for present requirements.

(2) Construction.

Industrial and commercial construction received a particular impetus during World War II and reached its peak in early 1948. Housing continues to be in short supply, owing both to the increasing population and the trend toward urban expansion. The principal deterrents to the industry are the shortage of materials, skilled workers, and capital. Government control over rentals has seriously discouraged the construction of housing, and it is unlikely that substantial amounts of capital will be attracted until higher investment returns are assured.

Construction activity has been greatest in Tunisia, where wartime property damage is estimated at \$335-420 million. Reconstruction is well under way, but work has been handicapped by non-delivery or delayed shipment of supplies and equipment from the US.

(3) Power.

Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Algeria have excellent water power sources, but until more dams are constructed to capture and hold a greater portion of surplus water from seasonal rains, hydroelectric facilities cannot provide for year-round power needs. Tunisia is almost totally deficient in water power sources, and practically all electricity produced locally is dependent upon imported fuels. Thermal and diesel installations in Algeria and Morocco also require imported coal and oil fuel.

Electric power produced in 1948 is estimated at 950 million kwh, of which one-third was produced by Algerian and Moroccan hydroelectric installations. While Algeria and Tunisia have made constant gains in power production in postwar years, the largest increase occurred in Morocco where power production increased 21.40 percent in 1948 over 1947. As a phase of the government's

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industrial expansion program, several large hydroelectric power projects are under construction in all areas. The completion of major power projects now under way in Morocco should enable that area by 1954 to produce 800 million kwh annually, which would permit the exportation of electricity to Algeria.

(4) *Transportation.*

Wartime disruption of the transportation systems had been overcome by 1948, although modernization and expansion of existing equipment is necessary to service adequately the increasing industrialization.

There are slightly more than 5,000 miles of railroad in French North Africa—concentrated chiefly on the littoral—of which only a small percentage is electrified (475 miles in Morocco and 150 miles in Algeria). Planned improvements of existing rail lines include doubling the tracks, electrification, replacement of steam locomotives by diesel engines and modification of steep grades and sharp turns. In 1948 Algeria and Morocco together reported more than 14.6 million metric tons of freight handled. (In Algeria alone, 62 percent more freight and 11 percent more passengers were carried in 1948 than in 1947.) Present equipment is barely sufficient for adequate service. The French Government is attempting to interest ECA or US private capital in extending North African railroads toward the Atlantic Coast and to open up east Moroccan and west Algerian mineral areas. The ultimate terminus of this project would be on the Moroccan west coast, which would then provide an interior route from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. This project would increase trackage by 1,750 miles and would cost about 29 billion francs (\$82,860,000).

The primary road network, consisting of some 30,000 miles of improved roads, also is concentrated in coastal areas. A 1947 census of commercial vehicles indicated slightly over 30,000, which number has been greatly increased by truck imports. By utilization of the extensive road network, the truck transport system is providing serious competition for the railroads, and cessation of gasoline rationing in mid-1949 further stimulated business. Moroccan truckers hauled a monthly average of 124,500 metric tons of

freight in 1949, or more than one-fourth of the 562,000 metric tons of freight carried in an average month in 1949 by the railroads.

Air freight and passenger traffic has also been greatly increased in recent months.

Port facilities are being enlarged and modernized, and new ports constructed. The port of Casablanca is particularly in need of enlargement. The reconstruction of Tunisian ports, which suffered considerable war damage, is well under way, and the state-controlled port authorities have outlined plans for extensive expansion of facilities.

d. Finance.

(1) *Money.*

Each area has its own monetary unit, the Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian franc; all are tied to one another and the French franc at the rate of one to one. On 19 September 1949 a single official rate of about 350 francs to the dollar was established in place of the previous base rate of 214, the commercial rate of 272, and the official "free" rate of 330.

Paper currency, issued by the two central banks, is the principal circulating medium. French currency is not legal tender in French North Africa; each of the French North African currencies is legal tender only in the state for which it is issued. All, however, are freely interchangeable on a franc-for-franc basis at any bank in the area, thereby greatly facilitating trade and capital transactions between these areas and metropolitan France. A law of August 1948 permitted resumption of trade in gold in Morocco, and it has become an important center for gold transactions. Small denomination coins, up to two francs, of non-precious metals also circulate, but they have been of little significance since inflationary forces raised prices to a point where coins became too cumbersome for transaction purposes.

The quantity of money in circulation rose steadily during the war and postwar periods, as a result of governmental deficit financing and extensive investment operations instigated by French authorities and financiers. The latest available monetary statistics for this inflationary period are shown in the following chart (comparable statistics for Tunisia are not available).

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MONEY IN CIRCULATION		
	LEGAL TENDER	BANK DEPOSITS
<u>MOROCCO</u>		
31 Dec. 1938	638	831
" 39	1,072	1,152
" 45	13,167	11,924
" 46	14,887	24,198
" 47	19,107	31,265
" 48	24,151	46,999
" 49	26,721	49,888
<u>ALGERIA</u>		
1 Sept. 39	3,200	4,000
30 Sept. 45	25,573	18,562
" 46	26,990	27,058
" 48	43,000	45,000

(Figures shown are in millions of francs)

WE 950

Inflation has interfered with postwar economic recovery in the three countries, just as it has done in France and many other areas. The Moroccan inflation has been particularly bad, because of the better prospects for investing fugitive capital from metropolitan France. During 1949, however, there has been repatriation of money to France, accompanied by a decrease of money in circulation and a decrease in checking accounts. Apparently this contribution to inflation has largely run its course.

(2) Central Banking.


By the Act of Algieras in 1906 a central bank was created for Morocco, the *Banque d'Etat du Maroc*, the controlling interest in which is held by a private firm in France, the *Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas*, although its direction is now in the hands of the Protectorate Government. Its functions are those of an ordinary central bank: issuance of currency, depository for state funds, clearing house, rediscounting, and the operation of branch establishments. Although most of the twenty-odd commercial banks in Morocco are affiliated with the central bank, their credit policies are not yet under its supervision. A step in this direction was taken

on 1 January 1948 by a directive from the *Direction des Finances*, the government organ which frames bank policies, requiring affiliated banks to report all loans in excess of 1,500,000 francs. So far the bank has not acted as a direct loan control agency, although indirectly its influence is exerted through its regular functions. Machinery for supervision over the granting of all credit in the country having been established, increased governmental controls over the economy may be forthcoming.

The primary difference between the central banking in Morocco, on the one hand, and in Algeria and Tunisia, on the other, is that a single institution, the *Banque de l'Algérie et de la Tunisie*, has had the sole privilege of operating for both countries. The bank is owned and controlled by the Government of France. When in 1948 the Tunisian Government received without payment from France a bloc of the bank's shares, it for the first time gained an element of control in the bank. Simultaneously the French ceded an even larger bloc to the Algerian Government General. Little or no change in bank policy is expected in the immediate future.

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(3) Commercial Banking.

Commercial banks in French North Africa are privately owned, many being branches of the larger private banks in France. Short-term credit is little in demand, for the ancient native specie habits still prevail to such an extent that most business is transacted on a cash basis. The use of checking accounts is far less prevalent than in Western Europe, notwithstanding a postwar trend in the direction of replacing currency in circulation by the use of bank deposits.

Postwar bank loans in Morocco have grown considerably, a trend which reflects increased investment activities as well as the falling value of the franc.

The primary reason for the increase in loans is the abundance of capital coming from France during the latter's unsettled economic and political conditions. Most loans are from 30 to 90 days, as banks are cautious about long-term loans.

In Algeria loans were more limited, totaling only 2.4 billion francs in 1948, in spite of an abundance of liquid funds.

While there is no outstanding example of the existence of the ownership and control of the leading commercial banks in French North Africa by private industry, banking interests control large segments of industry. French military occupation of each country was followed by economic penetration, wherein French private banking interests were active in establishing control over potential trading and industrial possibilities. In Morocco, for example, from 1902 onward

the *Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas* consented, at the request of the French Government, to lend funds to the faltering Sherifian Government and negotiated the 5 percent Moroccan loan of 1904; in 1906 it took part in the creation of a central bank for Morocco; it created the *Régie des Tabacs* (Tobacco Monopoly); and it formed the *Compagnie Générale du Maroc* through whose intermediary it contributes to the construction and development of the railways, port installations, electric power supply and distribution, and road transportation.

Another example is that of *Mirabaud et Compagnie*, a bank which has belonged to a single French family for generations, and which is especially active in mining undertakings in Tunisia, such as the rich *Phosphates de Gafsa*, lead and zinc mines in Morocco through participation in the *Métallurgie de Penarroya*, mineral prospecting and promotional ventures throughout French North Africa by the intermediary of its subsidiary *Société Française d'Etudes et d'Entreprises*. Many others, including the Rothschild banking dynasty, have been interested in financial ventures in the three areas, so that a considerable segment of existing larger enterprises which have not been nationalized are either owned or partially controlled by the banks.

The effect of various French fiscal and trade policies with respect to French North Africa has been to favor French banking almost to the exclusion of foreign-owned and controlled banking interests. As a consequence, so lim-

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ited is the field of opportunity open to foreign banking that no important foreign banks operate in the areas, except two Italian banks in Tunisia and a British bank in Algiers.

In addition to commercial banks, there are government-owned and controlled savings institutions, postal and ordinary, throughout the three areas. Current deposits with savings institutions are many times those of prewar, reflecting the inflation as well as a preference for increased liquidity. A number of insurance companies, predominantly French, also have investment banking activities which are controlled to a high degree by the government. Because the two most notable economic features of the area are a low standard of living and an extremely unequal distribution of wealth, the role of savings institutions is to accumulate a large share of the available money suitable for investment. These large savings comprise an important part of the total purchasing power, approximately 90 percent of which is concentrated in the hands of Europeans and wealthy natives who together constitute but 10 percent of the population.

(4) *Government Finance.*

The three countries have similar, but separate, methods of government finance. The budget systems are patterned after that of France, insofar as each has an ordinary budget, an extraordinary budget, and one or more special budgets. The ordinary budget covers the regular recurring expenses of the government departments; the extraordinary budget is used for such projects as new public works, and, more recently, postwar reconstruction. The 1949 Tunisian budgets totalled 29.1 billion francs, of which over one-third is obtained from French appropriations—3 billion francs from ECA counterpart funds and 7 billion francs from regular appropriations—which have been the primary source of deficit finance and hence are inflationary in character. The 1949 Moroccan budget totalled 31.3 billion, of which 12 billion francs are loaned from French counterpart funds, and 0.2 billion are advances from the French Treasury. The Algerian budget for 1949 totalled 52.5 billion francs. Special loans are floated from time to time as additional sources of deficit finances.

Government finance in Morocco is a dual function, for in addition to the French Protectorate Administration budget, the Makhzen, or native Moorish Government, has its own separate budget. Comparison of the 1948 Makhzen budget of 277 million francs with the 22,482 million franc budget of the Protectorate Administration in Morocco indicates the limited sphere of operations of the native government. The other two countries have this duality of government but not of budget.

Preparation of budgets is a function of the local governments, subject to final approval by the French Ministries of Interior (Algerian budget), Foreign Affairs (Moroccan and Tunisian budgets), and Finance. In Tunisia approval by the Grand Council is required, unless the Tunisian and French Sections of the Council disagree, in which case the Mixed Delegation makes the decision. Since 1947, the Algerian Assembly approves the budget after its proposal by the Governor General and prior to final approval in Paris. Contributions from French North Africa to the French Government for military purposes were increased during the war (the maximum Algerian contribution was 600 million francs in 1943) and subsequently reduced. Postwar contributions have been largely returned for social welfare and reconstruction.

Revenues are derived principally from taxation, customs duties and income from state-owned properties and monopolies. For the fiscal year 1949, Morocco's budgeted revenues included 5,980 million francs from direct taxes, 8,088 million francs from customs duties, 2,165 million francs from indirect taxes, and 1,745 million francs from registration and stamp taxes. Another major source of income was 6,408 million francs income from the state monopolies of Morocco. The Algerian budget for 1949 was based on expected tax revenues of 31,160 million francs, income from state properties of 777.6 million francs and 1,864 million francs from miscellaneous sources. While the Tunisian budget was not broken down, anticipated revenue in 1949 from all sources was 16,340 million francs.

With negligible exceptions, taxation is for support of the local governments. There is

virtually no taxation in the area by the central government at Paris. Revenue from taxes is high relative to that in France. For example, Algerian taxes in 1948 consumed 25 percent of the country's national income compared to 19 percent in France. Most taxes are borne by the consumer, and cannot easily be increased because of the public's limited purchasing power.

Expenditures prior to the war were made for the most part from the Ordinary Budget and were allocated among the various departments of government for administrative purposes. In the postwar period, expenditures have increased rapidly as a result both of increased costs during an inflationary period and of the enlarged scope of governmental economic functions. Whereas the majority of prewar expense was for personnel, outlays for building and equipment are now nearly as large as for payrolls. Reconstruction of war damage and public works projects in combination accounted for 61 percent of budgeted expenditures for the Tunisian Protectorate for 1948. In Algeria and Morocco, where war damage was negligible, public works projects constitute about one-half of government expenditures.

Budgetary deficits have been largely financed by loans and Treasury advances from the Government of France. Although an additional burden to the French taxpayer, these "subsidies" are employed as a means of reinforcing political domination of the area. During recent years, the proportions of French financial aid has been increasing, until the 1949 budgets of Morocco and Tunisia provided for deficits of 10 and 13 billion francs, respectively.

The public debts of those two areas had at the end of 1949 exceeded 40 billion francs in Morocco and 31 billion francs in Tunisia. These debts were expected to reach 54 and 40 billion francs, respectively, before the end of 1950. The Algerian public debt is expected to reach 30 billion francs by the end of the 1951 fiscal year (31 March 1951).

(5) *Capital Movements.*

Capital had been at a premium in all three countries prior to the end of the recent war.

Savings had been low and most funds for credit operations had come from abroad with high rates of interest. The protectorate governments had leaned heavily on their central banks for investment financing. Since the cessation of hostilities there has been, until recent months, a heavy influx of private capital from France, because of the relatively less stable conditions in metropolitan France. Such funds were invested in industrial enterprises, mining, land and the building boom, notably in Morocco where the bulk of the "hot money" is to be found. It is estimated that 10 billion francs (about \$30 million) entered Morocco as fugitive capital in 1948 alone.

The effects of postwar capital influx have been: (1) a heavy contribution to inflation by stimulation of investment activities; (2) lowering exorbitant interest rates to normal; (3) a large increase in short-term bank loans—relative to long-term loans—for the banks fear a sudden withdrawal of deposits for repatriation to France; and (4) speculation in many directions, aiding prosperity for the wealthy minority.

Further extensive private investment, however, appears unlikely, for the trend has reversed as a consequence of improved conditions in France, returning confidence in the French franc, and glutting some French North African markets.

e. International Trade.

The relative importance of foreign trade to the three areas is indicated by the value of exports per capita for 1948: Algeria, 8,400 francs, and Morocco and Tunisia each about 4,000 francs. For French North Africa as a whole, the per capita value of exports in 1948 was slightly less than 6,000 francs, as compared with the figure for the metropole of 10,400 francs.

French North Africa is particularly important as a market for French metropolitan goods, accounting for 28 percent of France's exports in 1948. As a source of supply, French North Africa accounted for 16 percent of France's imports in 1948. French North Africa exceeds in importance all other French overseas territories, accounting in 1948 for about 65 percent of France's trade with all French overseas territories.

Licenses are required in Algeria and Tunisia for trade with countries outside the franc zone. In French Morocco licenses are also required, except for a list of 20 items which may be imported without license, provided the importer does not request an official allocation of foreign exchange. Import permits are restricted to goods which are essential to the economy of the respective areas and which France and its possession cannot supply in sufficient quantities.

(1) *Commodity Composition of Trade.*

French North Africa exports agricultural products, minerals, and metals; it imports tropical food products (coffee, sugar, tea), textiles, steel, and manufactured goods.

By far the most important export by value is Algerian wine, which in 1948 accounted for more than half of Algeria's total export trade and about a third of the total value of all French North African exports. Although the volume of production and exports of wine are well below the prewar level, total value has increased because of the higher level of post-war prices.

The second most important export commodity is phosphate rock, accounting for about 17 percent of Morocco's exports, 24 percent of Tunisia's exports, less than 2 percent of Algeria's exports, and 8 percent of total French North Africa's exports in 1948. Phosphate rock being a low value commodity, value data fail to reflect the significance of North Africa as a world supplier. The most important markets are France, Great Britain, and Italy. The very wide distribution of phosphate rock is shown in the following table.

Canned fish was Morocco's second most important export in 1948, accounting for 13 percent of total Moroccan exports and approximately 4 percent of North African exports in 1948.

Dried figs and dates from Algeria were the fourth most important North African export in 1948, amounting to about 6 percent of Algerian exports and slightly less than 4 percent of the total for the whole area.

Other export commodities in order of importance by value (1948) for the area as a whole were iron ore (7 percent of Tunisia's

DISTRIBUTION OF PHOSPHATE ROCK EXPORTS
JANUARY-JUNE 1949

(In metric tons)

	MOROCCO	ALGERIA	TUNISIA
France.....	247, 925	50, 403	190, 352
Great Britain.....	352, 523	23, 975	213, 531
Italy.....	212, 941	15, 920	162, 546
Spain.....	127, 079	25, 835	80, 410
Portugal.....	48, 730	11, 950	19, 460
Germany.....	73, 809	115, 767
Netherlands.....	148, 258	48, 680	50, 766
Belgium.....	133, 737	29, 396
Yugoslavia.....	12, 900	9, 710
Poland.....	12, 210	2, 650
Hungary.....	4, 650	2, 438
Finland.....	26, 481
Czechoslovakia.....	20, 614
Other.....	637, 033	51, 155	54, 198
Total Exports.....	1, 908, 226	331, 487	978, 319

exports and less than 2 percent of Algeria's exports), lead (12 percent of Tunisia's exports and 1 percent of Morocco's exports), and manganese (4 percent of Morocco's exports).

Of the total value of imported commodities in 1947, fuel (coal and petroleum) and wood accounted for over 10 percent. Cotton fabrics; coffee, sugar and tea, as a group, and automobiles and parts, each accounted for between 5 and 10 percent of the total. Wheat and rice, meat and dairy products, and peanut oil (the locally produced and more valuable olive oil being exported) were smaller but nevertheless significant import categories. Imports of agricultural machinery, particularly for Morocco, are increasing under the ECA program.

(2) *Geographical Distribution of Trade.*

Trade with the French Union (chiefly metropolitan France) accounts for well over two-thirds of the total trade of French North Africa. Of the three areas, Morocco has shown the largest increase in postwar trade with France. Before the war the area as a whole exported more (about 13 percent more in 1938) to France than it imported; imports increased more sharply after the war than exports, and by 1947 the area had a 30 percent trade deficit with France. The drain on the metropole continued at about this rate during 1948. French policy, the overvalued franc, and the world-wide payments difficulties of the

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postwar period have undoubtedly contributed to the concentration of North African trade within the franc area.

Prewar trade with the United States was negligible, and exports have never assumed significant proportions. Imports, on the other hand, increased spectacularly after the war to satisfy deferred requirements for manufactured goods, the US accounting for about a fourth of each area's total imports in 1946. Shortage of dollar exchange and the increased availability of capital and consumer goods from France caused a falling off of imports from the dollar area in 1947 and 1948. In 1948, however, the value of US exports to French North Africa was \$72 million, or almost seven times the value of US imports from French North Africa. Machinery and steel mill products accounted for 40 percent of the total, grain (to Algeria) 21 percent, coal and petroleum 16 percent, and textiles (chiefly cotton fabrics) 7 percent. US imports from French North Africa amounting to \$10.7 million consisted of olive oil (principally from Morocco) 35 percent; iron ore (mainly from Algeria) 23 percent; cork (about two-thirds from Algeria) 17 percent. Although most of the North African iron ore went to the UK, French North Africa exported to the US 470,272 long tons, or 7.7 percent of US total imports of iron ore in 1948. North African cork accounted for 15 percent of the total value of US imports of cork in 1948. Efforts are being made under the ECA program to increase exports to the US and to curb dollar imports, so that by 1952 the area hopes to balance its dollar account.

French North African trade with the UK has traditionally provided the French Union with net earnings of sterling. In 1947, for example, the UK was the market for 12 percent of Tunisia's exports, 7 percent of Morocco's exports and 4 percent of Algeria's exports. Phosphate rock from Morocco and Tunisia accounted for 88 percent of the UK's imports of phosphate from all sources in 1947 and 1948. North African iron ore exports to the UK were of even greater value and represented 25 percent of the UK's total iron ore imports for 1947 and 1948.

(3) *Balance of Payments.*

Each of the three countries has always shown a deficit in the balance of payments on current account (which in addition to commodities trade includes the invisible items of profit remittances, bank charges, shipping costs, interest on investments, loans and the public debt, and tourist payments), made possible by contributions from the French budget, by loans guaranteed by the French Government, and by private investment from France. The deficit increased during the latter part of World War II with heavy importing for the military occupation and with decreased exporting caused by droughts and war disruptions. In the postwar years the deficit has grown rapidly.

Complete figures for the international payments situation of French North Africa are not available. Trade in commodities accounts form the greatest part of the deficit. The next most important item of foreign exchange expenditure is interest payments on investments and loans. Tourism is also a net foreign exchange expenditure, for the money spent by wealthy natives who periodically depart for cooler lands is not entirely offset by foreign tourists. Other negative balances are shipping charges, primarily to France, and premiums to France for several kinds of insurance, to the US for fire, to Switzerland for accident, and to the UK for marine insurance. The only net receipt of foreign exchange on current account in French North Africa is a negligible one, wages sent home by the 100,000 Algerians and the Moroccans working in France.

A reduction in inflow of foreign exchange during recent years has been caused by decreased exports as a result of grain and olive crop failures brought on by the drought years of 1943 through 1945, and by postwar inflationary forces which have raised prices of export products above world market prices. In addition to a reduction in foreign exchange income, the deficit has been enlarged by extraordinary expenditures on imports used in reconstruction and by higher world prices (which affect adversely all countries with an import surplus).

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Two trends have been important in the postwar balance of payments on current accounts. One is heavy dollar expenditures and the other is increasing trade in the French franc. The former is attributable to purchases of US manufactured goods, a large portion of which has been financed by ECA aid; the latter can be largely accounted for by the French North African export price situation. Commodities out-priced in world markets (grains, fruits, wines, and minerals such as manganese) can be sold in France, which is ready and willing to pay above world prices for goods that can be purchased with francs. Not only does increased trade with its overseas territories fit in with the French conception of overseas territorial functions, but also exports of metropolitan France have tended since World War I to be too highly priced for sale in world markets. Hence, overseas territorial trade has appeared to the French to be doubly advantageous. The combined trends of increased trade with France and increased imports from the US permitted foreign exchange other than dollars and French francs to constitute but a small part of the postwar international currency transactions in French North Africa until 1948, when increasing receipts of sterling developed from the reviving export trade to the UK.

The governments of the three territories have taken similar measures to combat the payments problem. Foreign commerce, other than with France and the French overseas territories, has been subject to licensing since the beginning of World War II. Foreign currency is allocated, in principle, only for importation of goods essential to the economy and unobtainable in France or its possessions. A considerable quantity of exchange, however, enters and leaves the countries through smuggling operations, especially to Tangier, where there is a free market for all currencies.

The devaluations of the franc in December 1945, January 1948, and September 1949 temporarily helped bring prices more nearly into line with world markets. Such changes, how-

ever, are initiated in Paris and are in line with the French Government's devaluation policies. At the time of each successive devaluation it was hoped that no substantial increase in the cost of living would result and prices would remain steady, in order that more goods could be sold to the hard currency countries. The cost of living is still increasing, however, and wages and prices are rising. Following each devaluation, export prices have generally aligned themselves with the new rates of exchange, and increased exporting to countries other than France has been largely thwarted.

(4) *ECA Aid.*

Heavy postwar imports have been made possible in large part by reallocations to French North Africa of US aid to France. Of the \$1.3 billion of ECA shipments realized to France and its overseas territories as of 31 January 1950, \$96 million, or 7.1 percent of the total, have been shipped to French North Africa. This value is almost 50 percent greater than the value of shipments to the other French overseas territories combined. It now appears that the program for overseas territories will require some 20 percent of all ECA dollars available to France through the fiscal year 1951-52.

A breakdown of aid to each of the three countries is not available, but statistics on the kinds of commodities shipped to the area as a whole are indicated in the following chart.

That the lion's share is in fuels and equipment indicates a trend, however small, toward industrialization.

In addition to the outright allocation of ECA funds, a total of 19,730 million francs in counterpart funds were loaned by France to French North Africa in 1948-49 (Algeria 11,132, Morocco 3,848, and Tunisia 4,750 million francs). These funds are, for the most part, expended for equipment and materials used in public works, such as irrigation and power projects and port and road construction.

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ECA AID TO FRENCH NORTH AFRICA-as of 31 January 1950

Coal and related fuels	\$8,577,000
Other industrial supplies	\$11,084,000
Total food and agricultural	\$13,549,000
Ocean freight	\$16,126,000
Crude oil and petroleum products	\$23,348,000
Equipment	\$23,697,000

TOTAL \$96,361,000 = 7.1% of US Aid to France

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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Genesis of Present Foreign Policies.

Because Morocco and Tunisia are French protectorates and Algeria is an integral part of the French Republic, the foreign affairs of French North Africa are directed by the Quai d'Orsay.

The French have become so accustomed to conducting the diplomatic business of these states that they regard the activities of the United Nations involving Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco as invasions of French prerogatives. French foreign policy directives are implemented, and negotiations with foreign diplomatic representatives are conducted by the Resident Generals of the Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates, in their capacities as Foreign Ministers for the Bey and Sultan, and by the Governor General of Algeria.

2. Significant Relations with Other Nations.

The most-favored-nation treaties between the Sultan of Morocco and the US, signed in 1787 and 1836 and reaffirmed by the Act of Algenciras in 1906, gave the US extraterritorial, or capitulatory, rights. Under them US citizens have broad economic rights. Moreover, they and their proteges are subject only to US law enforced by the Consular Courts at Tangier and Casablanca.

In 1871 the Sultan, fearing even then that his empire was on the point of being dismembered by the European powers, asked the US to establish a protectorate in his country. The US declined, but is today the only foreign power that maintains a diplomatic mission (its Tangier legation) accredited to the Sultan.

Franco-American relations in this area have been in frequent dispute despite the qualified recognition of the French protectorate by the US in 1917. The French would like to terminate US extraterritorial rights, and negotiations having that end in view were suspended when the US entered the first World War. Subsequently renewed, they were again sus-

pending just prior to the second World War. Discussions are once more in progress, but on a lower level, not only in regard to extra-territorial but also in respect to certain commercial rights.

The French have at times seemed on the point of submitting the question of US capitulatory rights to the International Court of Justice. Should the US be divested of these rights, the Sultan would lose one of the last evidences which support Morocco's claim to status as an international personality.

Under the terms of a tripartite agreement between US, UK, and France, US civil and military aircraft are permitted to overfly French North Africa and land at designated airfields in stipulated numbers.

3. Significant International Issues.

Algeria is included in the North Atlantic Treaty as an integral part of France; Morocco and Tunisia, being protectorates, are not included. There can be little doubt, however, that any substantial increment of US arms to the French Army will further strengthen French control of the whole of French North Africa.

Native politicians are fully aware of this and have expressed the hope that US arms will not be employed by the French against native nationalist movements. Despite these apprehensions, native opinion continues to be sympathetic toward US policies in general and to the over-all intent of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Although French North Africa is not directly represented in the United Nations, various nationalist leaders have been attempting to stimulate UN interest in the social and economic conditions existing under the French protectorate administrations of Morocco and Tunisia. Their hope is that an investigating committee of the UN would make a report that would be favorable to the cause of native nationalism.

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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY SITUATION

1. Genesis of Present Military Policies.

Under the Protectorate Treaties which determine French military policy in Tunisia and Morocco, the native rulers may not maintain regular military establishments. Internal security in both protectorates, as in Algeria, is a responsibility of the French Army, approximately twenty percent of which is usually disposed in French North Africa. A number of French Air Force planes sufficient for internal security purposes is assigned to the area; but they would be valueless against invasion. The French Navy maintains three bases in North Africa: Bizerte, Casablanca, and Mers-el-Kebir (Oran). The last is being developed and may well become the main operating base of the French Navy in North Africa.

Large-scale military operations by the French in North Africa would be handicapped logistically by the absence of industrial and manufacturing plants, although local repair facilities are adequate for normal peacetime requirements.

2. Strength and Disposition of the Armed Forces.

a. Army.

After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the French gradually increased their effective military strength in North Africa until by the end of 1947 approximately 125,000 men were in the area. This force, about one-fifth of the French Army, was deemed adequate to meet any contingency short of concerted, widespread, native rebellion.

In the past two years, revolts in Madagascar and Indochina and budgetary considerations have obliged France to withdraw troops from North Africa. In December 1948, General Juin, Commander in Chief of all Armed Forces in North Africa, set 104,000 men as the minimum number required for the maintenance of order. Nevertheless, by 1 March 1950 only

90,000 French troops were in the whole area. There is every indication that this figure will be maintained, pending further clarification of the situation in Indochina. The distribution of ground forces is approximately as follows: Morocco, 40,000; Algeria, 40,000; Tunisia, 10,000. The Fezzan is garrisoned by several hundred men, chiefly located in and around Sebha, capital of the region.

(1) Composition and Morale.

Army units are made up of regulars, volunteers, and French and Algerian conscripts. (There is no compulsory military service in the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco.) The Berber segments of the populations produce good soldiers; the famed "*Goumiers*" are among the world's best fighting men. Coming from the rural tribes, they fought magnificently under Abd-el-Krim, who led them in rebellion against the French and Spanish two decades ago, and again (83,000 strong) under French officers in World War II. Some doubt exists, however, as to the loyalty of these native troops in the event of a large-scale nationalist uprising. Inasmuch as they constitute 37 percent of the French Army in North Africa, defection on their part might seriously compromise French security.

Considerable improvement has recently been noted in the morale of French army officers in North Africa, which has, in turn, greatly improved the effectiveness of the ground forces. Despite a sharp reduction in personnel since 1947, the ground forces have been transformed into an effective military machine. The credit for this metamorphosis is due to the able leadership of General Juin, whose work has been assisted by the arrival of many experienced regular soldiers now being rotated from Indochina.

A General Staff, originally planned by and intended for the use of the late General Leclerc, has been established in Algiers. Its

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size, its scope, and the high rank of its members indicate that a new and important phase of discussions on the strategic defense of the area has begun. This development suggests that General Juin may be compelled to devote more of his efforts to his duties as Commander in Chief, and to relinquish some of his political responsibilities as Resident General of Morocco.

(2) *The Native Military Academy.*

A military academy for natives, known as Dar El Beida (White House), was established at Meknes, Morocco, in 1919 by Marshal Lyautey. Its organization was entrusted to the capable hands of General Juin, then a captain; General Leclerc, then a lieutenant, was among the school's earliest instructors. Lyautey's objective was to provide basic civil education and training in a military atmosphere for sons of prominent native families. Students were to be trained for important posts in the Sherifian Government (Makhzen). Lyautey believed that the nomadic and warlike Berbers of the interior would be more effective friends for France than would the timid and sedentary Arabs of the littoral. The school has, therefore, graduated only four non-Berbers since its foundation. The ability which the school's graduates have demonstrated in various civil and military posts has justified Lyautey's expectations.

Dar El Beida can accommodate about a hundred students; at present slightly more than eighty are in attendance. Graduates are eligible on equal terms with French students for admission to French military schools. Of the seventeen students graduating in June 1949, eight applied for admission to the French Military Academy at Coëtquidan, in Brittany.

b. Navy.

While the French Navy maintains a few minor ships on permanent duty in North African waters, the area's proximity to southern France renders it valuable for naval logistic support and as an alternate principal base area for the French fleet. In addition to the naval bases at Bizerte, Casablanca, and Mers-el-Kebir, naval air stations are operated at Agadir, Khouribga, Arzew, Lartigue and Karouba, and jointly with the US at Port Ly-

autey. The naval base at Mers-el-Kebir is undergoing reconstruction and extension designed to make it the most completely equipped French naval base in Africa and to serve as the southern terminus of the France-North Africa lifeline in the event of an emergency. The shore establishments have repair facilities which are employed by units of the French Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets.

A new development is underway at Arzew, near Oran, where the French have established a joint amphibious training center. The artificial harbor, which is not a commercial port, serves also as a submarine and seaplane base. This site was selected outside metropolitan France for strategic reasons.

c. Air Force.

Because of its favorable climate and geographic situation, Morocco is the principal basic training area for the entire French Air Force, as well as the concentration area for the operational units assigned for service in North Africa. The French Air Force has its fighter training school at Meknes. While the North African air command is totally inadequate for large military operations, and is severely handicapped by dwindling and obsolescent materiel, it is able to carry out such light bombing, patrol, reconnaissance, and liaison activities as may be required to control the natives.

Bomber units are composed of old US, French, and British types. The fighter force consists of British and US World War II aircraft; the types most serviceable and in constant use are: Mosquitoes, Thunderbolts, Airacobras, and Spitfires. Total aircraft in North Africa number 341, assigned as follows: French Air Force tactical units 137, trainers 142, naval air units 30, naval trainers 32. Present personnel, including 200 pilots, consists of 450 officers and 3,500 other ranks.

In this area there are 139 existing airfields: 48 in French Morocco, 71 in Algeria, and 20 in Tunisia. Most of them are small, natural-surfaced fields which are used infrequently.

Thirteen of the French Moroccan fields are considered important to military operations. In this group, Casablanca/Cazes, Khouribga, Marrakech, and Rabat/Salé airfields are suitable for limited medium bomber operations.

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Agadir/Ben Sergao, Meknes, and Port Lyautey are classified as light bomber fields. With minor improvements, five others could be used by light bombers.

Algeria has twenty airfields of military significance, including: Algiers/Maison Blanche, suitable for medium bomber operations; Oran/La Senia, capable of limited medium bomber use after runway repair; Blida and Tafaraoui, for light bombers (nine other airfields have runways suitable for light bombers, but completely lack base facilities); and seven fields requiring runway repairs and provision of base facilities to accommodate light bombers.

Tunis/El Aouina and Bizerte/Sidi Ahmed airfields, suitable for light bomber operations, are the best airfields in Tunisia. The runway at Kairouan/Hami is suitable for light bombers, but has no base facilities. Three other fields show possibilities for light bomber operations, but runway repairs and complete installation of field facilities would be required.

The French and US Air Forces are constructing jointly a large airfield in Morocco at Nouasseur, fifteen miles south of Casablanca. This project is expected to be completed in 1951, providing space and facilities for future US maintenance and repair requirements similar to the US Naval Air Activity installations at Port Lyautey.

d. Police and Security Forces.

Rural Morocco, northern Algeria, and Tunisia are policed by units of the *Gendarmerie Nationale* and the *Garde Républicaine* (sometimes referred to as the *Garde Mobile*), which are under the direction of the French Ministry of the Interior, but controlled in French North Africa by the Residents General of Morocco and Tunisia and the Governor General of Algeria. Although para-military in organization, training, and discipline, these three organizations are distinct from the military forces in North Africa. The cities maintain their own police departments. The vast southern territories, which embrace more than half of Algeria, and the whole of the Fezzan, remain under direct military control.

3. War Potential.

a. Manpower.

Because Algeria is part of metropolitan France, its male population is subject to conscription under the laws that require military training throughout the Republic. Tunisia and Morocco, on the other hand, being protectorates, are not subject to this law. In these areas, the French rely on voluntary enlistment, chiefly from nomadic tribesmen, to fill the ranks of native units of the French Army.

Although there are over one million males of military age in Algeria fit for some kind of military service, conscription in Algeria averages only 30,000 a year. Voluntary enlistments on an annual basis from the protectorates and from Algeria average far less. Volunteers are, for the most part, professional soldiers interested in adventure, plunder, and pensions.

At present there is a general lack of equipment and training facilities in the area.

b. Industry and Natural Resources.

Local industry cannot support even the present relatively small military forces; nor is this situation likely to be remedied in the immediate future, for lack of essential fuels, equipment, and skilled labor.

Food production is little more than adequate to meet the normal peacetime requirements of the native population, and would be insufficient to supply the needs of a military force.

Although uranium ores are reported, it is believed that the quantity available is insignificant. Some monazite (a source of thorium) has been reported. (See Chapter II, *Mineral Resources*.)

c. Science.

There are no industrial plants or equipment and practically no research facilities suitable for the manufacture of atomic weapons.

A guided missile and rocket testing range and experimental station is located at Colomb Béchar (Algeria). The range has limited instrumentation; it will be completed in 1952. Another testing range located at Abadla is in the initial project stage.

A field testing station, operated by the French Army, for biological and chemical war-

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fare experiments is located at Beni-Ounif, near the oasis town of Figuig (Algeria). The Pasteur Institutes in North Africa are not believed to be engaged in biological warfare research.

4. Military Intentions and Capabilities.

The military resources of this area in an emergency could be placed under the complete control of the French national defense establishment. The 90,000 troops in the area are barely sufficient to maintain internal order, and could not repel a determined invasion by a modern attacking force.

The internal logistic situation is approximately what it was at the end of World War II. A single east-west highway runs along the Mediterranean and skirts the Atlantic lit-

toral. It is generally paralleled by a single-track steam and electric railroad system. Since the road and the railroad cross mountains, many rivers and ravines, traffic can be easily interrupted by bombing the numerous tunnels, passes, and bridges which are essential to the operation of the systems. Both the roads and railroads are scarcely adequate for normal peacetime traffic and would have to be substantially strengthened to sustain large-scale military operations. The north-south road systems which communicate with the interior are, to a large extent, primitive.

In the event of another invasion the movement of supplies would be dominantly a marine problem. Port facilities are open to both sea and air attack.

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CHAPTER V

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY

French North Africa is strategically important to the United States because of its geographic location in relation to the Eurasian land mass. It is essential to the security interests of the United States that this area be denied to the USSR in that it could serve as a base from which military operations could be launched onto the European Continent and as a buffer area to a power in possession of the continent. Control of the area thus would be vital to control of the western Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches. Although lacking in industrial facilities of any consequence, French North Africa presently possesses substantial air, naval, and ground facilities which

are capable of further development in a relatively short period of time.

So long as France remains amenable to US policy, and so long as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco remain peaceful and under French control, US security is enhanced offensively and defensively. Political instability in France, the strain on French manpower and finance incident to the war in Indochina, the persistent but as yet ineffective nationalist claims for independence, and Communist activities within the area are all matters which affect French policy but they are not likely, singly or collectively, to overthrow French rule in North Africa.

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CHAPTER VI

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY

Future developments in French North Africa affecting US security depend almost wholly upon the conditions which will prevail in metropolitan France and upon the will of the French Government to maintain the *status quo* in the continent of Africa. So long as France is not forced into the role of a Soviet Satellite and so long as US policy and French policy are compatible, no change will take place in the present situation. The natives of French North Africa are politically so divided and apathetic as to prevent for a considerable time the native nationalist movements from gaining sufficient electoral or military power to alter the situation. The same general condition plus the antipathy of Islam

for Communist doctrine also precludes the possibility that Communism will come to power in these areas in the foreseeable future. It is far more likely, on the other hand, that France will continue in a somewhat slow and halting manner to foster the industrial development of the region and to yield gradually and astutely to the pressures exerted by the native population for better living conditions, equality of opportunity, and finally, for more political power.

It is probable that France will make every effort to maintain its position in French North Africa and that, unless France itself is communized, conditions in French North Africa will not adversely affect US security.

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CHAPTER VII
THE FEZZAN

Any consideration of French North Africa must include mention of the little-known Fezzan, a vast topographic depression comparable in size to France itself, situated in southwest Libya, and separated from the Mediterranean to the north by Tripolitania. Reaching from the southern part of Tunisia southeast to the mountains of the Tibesti range, the Fezzan skirts southern Algeria to the west, French West and Equatorial Africa to the south, and invades the Libyan Desert to the east. Before 1942, the Fezzan was part of the Italian-controlled southern military zone of Libya. During the winter of 1942-43, General (then Colonel) Leclerc's Free French troops occupied this territory in the course of their famous forced march from Pointe Noire in French Equatorial Africa, up the Congo, and overland around Lake Tchad to El Gatrún in southern Fezzan to join forces with General Montgomery's Eighth Army on the Mar-eth Line in Tunisia.

1. The Land and People.

The territory is composed of several chains of permanently watered oases scattered along four relatively fertile valleys. These lie like the spread-open fingers of a hand, the palm of which is on Sebha, the capital, in what is otherwise a wilderness of desert and rocky ridges. These luxuriant oases contrast strikingly with the surrounding desert which is both desolate and forbidding.

The Fezzan is one of the principal caravan crossroads and camel train supply stations for the peoples of the Sahara. It is supplied with 7,000 camels, 16,000 sheep and goats, and more than 6,000 donkeys.

The area is a zone of contact for three principal nomadic groups: (1) from the north and northeast, the Arabized tribes, mostly of Berber origin; (2) from the west, the Touareg, picturesque, blue-veiled, camel-borne warriors of the desert; and (3) from the south, the

Toubou, a black race speaking a Sudanese dialect, completely Islamized and renowned as cameleers.

The population of the Fezzan totals 60,000, of which about one-third is sedentary and two-thirds nomadic or semi-nomadic. The sedentary Fezzanese live in the valleys and on the escarpments. The oases produce principally dates and grain.

2. French Administration.

After its occupation by the French, the administration of the Fezzan was entrusted to the Government General of Algeria by a decree of 1 September 1943 issued by General de Gaulle's French Committee of National Liberation. A senior officer of the Native Affairs Service of Algeria was named Military Governor of the Territory, provided with a few hundred troops, and established at Sebha.

For administrative purposes the Fezzan has been divided by the French into three areas: (1) the Fezzan proper, composed of the subdivisions of Brach, Sebha, and Murzuch, governed by a Military Governor directly responsible to and deriving authority from Paris; (2) the regions of Serdeles and Gat, subject to the control of the military commandant of the Southern Territories of Algeria; and (3) the region of Gadames, under the authority of the Commanding General of the Southern Territory of Tunisia.

In the hope of retaining the Fezzan, the French have expended a considerable amount of effort and some money upon its economic improvement and cultural advancement, including small-scale land reform, local tax exemptions, water distribution and irrigation modernization, seed loans, sanitary and medical attention, and the initiation of modern educational facilities. French schools in the region can accommodate 500 children and Khattab (religious) schools, 2,000.

3. Trade.

Under French control, Fezzanese trade has been diverted from the former centers of Tripoli and Misurata to Tunisia, Algeria, and the French Sudan. Factors contributing to this change include the construction of a road to Tunisia, the use of the Algerian franc (which is at par with the French franc) as legal tender, foreign exchange controls, import and export licensing requirements, and rationing of almost all imported goods.

The principal commodities with which the Fezzanese traders and farmers are concerned are dates, winter wheat, barley, millet, sorghum, and tobacco. Dates are the chief export, while green tea, coffee, sugar, cotton goods, fats, and oils are the leading imports.

From 1943 through 1947 the foreign trade, under French occupation and administration, increased in value, but the balance of trade became even more unfavorable.

	<i>(in French francs)</i>	
	1944	1947
Total imports	50,368,000	94,658,000
Total exports	27,135,000	38,065,000


The total annual import-export trade for the period from 1944 to the second quarter of 1948 never exceeded two thousand tons. Customs barriers are non-existent.

4. Future Status.

The Fezzan is frequently referred to disparagingly as "that distant spot on the way

from nowhere to nowhere, with a date-and-camel economy," and as a place without interest to the world at large. The French, however, view the matter differently. They consider the Fezzan to be strategically important to France as a relay point for air traffic between France, central Africa, and Madagascar, and politically important as a means of consolidating the frontiers of French North, West, and Equatorial Africa. Moreover, they have expended considerable effort in search of petroleum.

The French have been forced, however, to modify their plans in accordance with the recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly to establish an independent and sovereign Libya by 1952. In order to maintain a maximum foothold in the area, therefore, the French in February 1950 established the framework of a semi-autonomous administration under Bey Ahmed Seif en Naceur, chief of the local Ouled Sliman tribe. This action, as well as that of the British in establishing quasi-autonomy in Cyrenaica, has been a source of concern to the United Nations Commissioner for Libya, who is charged with assisting in the formation of an independent state. The High Commissioner feared that the hasty establishment of autonomous regimes under the aegis of the French and the British might intensify tribal animosities and jeopardize the ultimate creation of a unified Libyan state. When Libya acquires statehood, it is probable that France will endeavor to maintain its predominant influence in the Fezzan.



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APPENDIX A

TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. General.

French North Africa lies between Libya on the east and Spanish Sahara and the Atlantic Ocean on the west. French West Africa is to the south and Spanish Morocco and the Mediterranean Sea to the north. The total area of the three political units of French North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—is 1,053,248 square miles, and the total population is approximately 20,510,000 (1948).

French North Africa is divided into four principal physiographic regions: (1) a discontinuous coastal plain, narrow along the western and northern coasts and widening to the east along the coast of Tunisia; (2) the Atlas Mountains and associated plateaus and intermontane valleys, which extend across the entire northern section; (3) the Saharan Depression, south of the Anti-Atlas and Saharan Atlas ranges; and (4) the Ahaggar Massif, in southeastern Algeria. (See accompanying map.)

Climatically, French North Africa may be divided into three zones: (1) a narrow zone of Mediterranean Climate in the north; (2) a low latitude steppe zone in the central section; and (3) a low latitude desert zone in the south.

Land use in French North Africa reflects the climate and the relief of the various regions. The coastal lowlands and adjacent terraced uplands are farm lands. The lower seaward-facing slopes of the coastal mountains are either under cultivation or used for grazing; the higher slopes are forested. In the interior, the steppelands of the High Plateaux region and the slopes of the mountains that face it are used for grazing sheep and goats and for growing alfa grass. The desert south of the Anti-Atlas and the Saharan Atlas ranges and in southwestern Tunisia is a region of oasis agriculture and nomadic sheep herding.

2. Terrain.

a. Coastal Lowlands.

The Atlantic coastal lowland is a narrow plain that rises gradually eastward to the Moroccan Meseta and the Atlas ranges. The plain is somewhat wider between the Tensift and Umm er Rbia rivers than to the north or south.

The Sebou Basin in the north is a broad, U-shaped valley between the Rif and Middle Atlas ranges. The valley narrows in the east to approximately a mile and a half near Taza, forming a gap through which pass the main routes of trade between Morocco and Algeria. East of the Taza Gap the tributaries of the Moulaya River form another basin that drains toward the Mediterranean.

There is no continuous Mediterranean plain in either Algeria or northern Tunisia. The coast ranges that closely parallel the northern coast jut out into the sea in the form of rocky headlands, and plains are found only where wadis or rivers cut through the mountains to the sea. In Algeria, the elongated valley of the Chêlif River, which flows south of and parallel to the coastal range; the Mitidja Sahel, near Algiers; and the plain of Bône are the only large coastal plains east of Oran.

In northeastern Tunisia, the narrow discontinuous coastal plain merges into the broad delta of the Medjerda River. This is the only delta area in northwest Africa, although there are other areas of alluvium. South along the coast from Bon Peninsula to the Libyan border is a continuous plain that varies in width from 15 to 40 miles. Near Gabes a gap between the mountains of northwestern Tunisia and the Ksour Mountains provides access to an extensive area of salt marshes and shallow lakes known as the Shott region.

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b. *Atlas Mountains and Associated Plateaus and Intermontane Valleys.*

The Atlas Mountains and associated plateaus and intermontane valleys extend southwest to northeast completely across French North Africa from south of Agadir in Morocco to the Bon Peninsula in northeastern Tunisia. The area is a series of highly complex parallel physiographic regions.

A southern arc of the Rif Mountains of Spanish Morocco extends into Morocco to the Fez-Taza region, where it is separated from the Middle Atlas range by a synclinal depression. This depression is drained toward the west by the Sebou River and toward the northeast by a tributary of the Moulaya River. The main watershed of Morocco is the Middle Atlas Range, which extends northeastward from the central part of the High Atlas and forms the divide from which the Umm er Rbia and Sebou rivers flow westward to the Atlantic and the Moulaya flows northeastward to the Mediterranean. The High Atlas and the Anti-Atlas ranges function as watersheds in the south, but a scarcity of surface water reduces their importance as divides. The Tensift and Sus are the most important rivers flowing from these ranges. Elevations are in general higher in the southwest and lower toward the northeast. From 13,000 feet in the High Atlas Range, the elevation declines to about 5,000 in eastern Morocco. At the southern end of the High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas Range separates the basins of the Sus River and the Wadi Draa.

The pattern of parallel ridges and valleys continues eastward, with the high ranges of Morocco merging into the Tell Atlas, the High Plateaux, and the Saharan Atlas. The Tell Atlas is a series of disconnected plateaus along the coast, between which are long, narrow river plains and terraced uplands. These plains and uplands are the most fertile part of the Tell region.

Elevations in the High Plateaux average over 3,500 feet in the western part but decrease to 1,375 feet in the Hodna Depression, at the narrower eastern end. South of the Plateaux is the Saharan Atlas, a chain of isolated massifs that rise barely 400 feet above the level of the Plateaux and present no bar-

rier to the north-south movement of people and trade.

Still farther east the Saharan and Tell Atlas ranges become higher and converge, uniting in the Aures Massif, a region of bold relief and elevations up to 7,500 feet. Although the massif is structurally a part of the Saharan Atlas, it is separated from the main range by the Hodna Depression.

Northern Algeria is in general a region of enclosed basins and interior drainage. The Seybouse, Chéelif, Soummam, and Rummel are the only wadis that cut through the Tell Atlas and divert the drainage of small portions of the High Plateaux to the Mediterranean. For the most part, drainage from both the Saharan and Tell Atlas ranges is toward the center of the Plateaux, where the surface water collects in depressions and forms salt marshes and lakes (shotts). The southern slopes of the Saharan Atlas are drained by wadis that flow into the desert and disappear in the sandy wastes.

In northern Tunisia, the Kroumirie Highland and the Medjerda Mountains parallel the coast; and the Tunisian Dorsal, the easternmost extension of the Atlas system, extends across the north-central section of the country, terminating in the Bon Peninsula. Between the two ranges are the high plains of northwestern Tunisia. The Medjerda River, which flows south of and parallel to the northern coastal mountains for 150 miles, drains the high plains and the bordering mountain slopes.

The Ksour Mountains, which have occasional flat-topped summits with elevations of 2,000 feet, parallel the southeastern coast of Tunisia from the vicinity of Medenine to the Libyan border. These mountains present a bold escarpment to the east and slope gently to the sandy lowlands in the west.

c. *Saharan Depression.*

South of the Saharan Atlas is a region of lowland plains and plateaus. The region is principally one of vast sand dunes and limestone hammadads. Elevations range from below sea level, in the Shott Region of west-central Tunisia, to approximately 3,000 feet.

The lowland plains of west-central Tunisia and southern Algeria are enclosed basins with

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interior drainage. The increase in elevation toward the margin is more rapid toward the Atlas Mountains in the north than toward the plateaus in the south and east and the highlands to the west.

The Plateau of Tademait, rising above the depression between the Ahaggar Massif and the Western Erg, divides the plain into two basins. The eastern basin includes southwestern and central Tunisia and east-central Algeria. The western basin is a part of the great depression of the western Sahara. Intermittent streams flow from the margins to the centers of these basins, where salt marshes and lakes are formed during the rainy season.

d. Ahaggar Massif.

The Ahaggar Massif, in the southernmost part of Algeria, is an extremely rugged, mountainous highland surrounded by a belt of sandstone plateaus. Elevations range up to 10,000 feet in the mountains, but the surrounding plateaus are mostly below 5,000 feet. Both the Ahaggar and the surrounding plateaus are deeply trenched by wadis. Although a few of the streams in the higher areas are perennial, wadis flowing from the highlands into the desert during the rainy season provide the principal drainage.

3. Climate.

The three climatic types of French North Africa are differentiated on the basis of winter climate. The distinguishing features of the Mediterranean type of climate are cool, wet winters, with the mean temperature of the coldest month between 45° and 65° F., and hot, dry summers. The characteristics of a Low Latitude Steppe Climate are cool winters and hot summers, with a mean annual temperature of over 64°, low relative humidity, and a marked diurnal range of temperature. Most of the rain falls during a short period in the spring. The Low Latitude Desert Climate has a lower average annual rainfall than the steppe, rains occur more irregularly, the average annual temperature is higher, and the diurnal range of temperature is much greater.

a. Mediterranean Climate.

The coastal plains of Algeria, northern Morocco, and northern Tunisia and the seaward

slopes of the coast ranges lie within the Mediterranean climatic zone. Olive and evergreen oak trees are typical vegetation. Climatic conditions may vary locally, but there is general conformity throughout the region.

Over most of the area, average annual rainfall ranges between 16 and 32 inches. The Kroumirie Highlands in northwestern Tunisia, however, receive as much as 60 inches of rain annually, whereas in the area west of Oran, which lies in the rainshadow of the Iberian Peninsula and the Rif Mountains, the average annual rainfall is only 8 inches. Most of the rain in the region is the result of the movement of low-pressure areas from west to east through the Mediterranean in winter. In general, the average annual precipitation decreases southward along the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the Mediterranean coast of eastern Tunisia, and inland from all coastal regions.

Although temperatures are relatively uniform throughout the area, they are higher in summer and lower in winter along the Mediterranean coast than along the Atlantic. Mean temperatures for the warmest month vary from 67° to 77° along the Atlantic coast and from 75° to 82° along the Mediterranean. The mean temperature for the coldest month varies from 54° to 56° along the Atlantic and from 50° to 54° along the Mediterranean. On both coasts temperatures occasionally drop to freezing, and snow sometimes falls. Along the Mediterranean, temperatures in general increase from west to east. In the Atlantic coastal region, the cool Canary current modifies the influence of latitude, which normally causes an increase in temperature toward the Equator.

The seaward slopes of the mountains rising behind the coastal lowlands have a modified Mediterranean climate. Temperatures are lower in winter; average annual precipitation is higher; snow falls more often and remains on the ground longer; and there is a greater likelihood of summer rainfall.

b. Low Latitude Steppe Climate.

The steppe zone includes the High Plateaux and bordering mountains, the coastal lowlands in Morocco south of approximately 31° N., and in Tunisia south of 36° N., and

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west-central Tunisia. The Atlas Mountains to the north and west partially exclude from the Plateaux the influence of both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the Saharan Atlas range on the south modifies the influence of the desert. Typical vegetation of the Low Latitude Steppe is alfa grass in the north and xerophytic shrubs in the extreme south.

Average annual precipitation ranges from 16 inches in the north to 8 inches at the foot of the Saharan Atlas and in the southern coastal regions of Morocco and Tunisia. Along these coasts the rainfall regime is similar to that in the Mediterranean climatic zone, with winter maximum and June-to-September drought. Inland from the coastal regions, the regime changes rapidly to that of the Plateaux, where the maximum rainfall is in the spring. Thunderstorms occasionally occur in summer, and some rain and snow fall during the winter. On the steppe both the seasonal distribution and the total amount of precipitation fluctuate greatly from year to year.

Temperatures also reflect the difference between the coastal steppe regions and the steppe region on the Plateaux. On the coastal steppe, the mean temperatures from the coldest and warmest months and for the year are a little higher than in the Mediterranean region to the north, but the Mediterranean climatic regime is recognizable. On the Plateaux, temperatures reflect the continental location of the region. North winds sweep across the Plateaux at below-freezing temperatures during the winter months. Minimum temperatures are often below 32° F., and the mean temperature for the coldest month is only 40°. During the summer there is less contrast between the coastal region and the Plateaux. Mean temperatures for the warmest month vary between 79° and 83°. The diurnal range of temperature is greater during the summer than the winter and in the interior than on the coast.

c. Low Latitude Desert Climate.

The area south of the Saharan Atlas and Anti-Atlas ranges and the southwestern portion of Tunisia have a Low Latitude Desert Climate. Xerophytic shrubs, sparsely scattered through the desert, are the only peren-

nial vegetation, although an ephemeral plant growth appears for a short time after a rain. Precipitation averages less than 8 inches in the northern portion of the desert, and in the southern portion years may pass without rain. Life, other than a nomadic existence, can be maintained only in the scattered oases and along wadi beds in which the water table is near the surface.

Nearly all of the desert region is included within the area having an average annual temperature of at least 79°; in much of the area the average is 86°. Mean values are important only in obtaining a general picture, for while the days are extremely hot, the nights are nearly always cool.

In the Ahaggar, extreme temperatures occur both in the summer and in the short winter season, a minimum of 19° having been recorded at Ft. Laperrine, at 4,429 feet elevation. Precipitation is extremely unpredictable, both as to quantity and the season in which it may occur. Snow falls quite often at elevations above 8,000 feet, but it never remains more than 24 hours.

4. Land Use.

a. Coastal Lowlands and Terraced Uplands.

The types of agriculture practiced in the coastal lowlands and the terraced uplands are determined by the average amount of rainfall, its seasonal distribution, and its dependability. The regions that have a Mediterranean climate are primarily croplands and secondarily grazing lands, whereas the regions that have a Steppe climate are primarily grazing lands and secondarily croplands.

The coastal plains and highlands are the main regions of cereal production. Wheat is most important in the coastal plains and terraced uplands of northern Tunisia, and barley is grown more extensively in the high plains around Constantine and the northern section of the coastal lowland of Morocco. Oats are grown to some extent in the plains around Oran and along the lower Medjerda River. Corn is grown around Constantine, Casablanca, Marrakech, and in the well-watered districts of northern Tunisia, but the total acreage is small.

Garden crops are raised near the larger cities, in the valleys of the principal wadis,

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and especially in the plains south of Bizerte and the Bon Peninsula. Beans, lentils, chick-peas, potatoes, and tomatoes are the principal crops.

Olive culture is important in all the coastal plains regions and in the terraced uplands up to 2,000 feet. Tunisia has nearly 19 million trees, over half the total in French North Africa; Algeria has 9 million; and Morocco 7 million. Most of the olive oil is produced in the plains area between Sousse and Sfax in Tunisia; in the Sebou Basin around Fez and in the area surrounding Marrakech, in Morocco; and in the eastern section of the Department of Algiers and the western part of the Department of Constantine, in Algeria.

The principal wine-producing regions are the Sebou Basin and the central portion of the coastal plain in Morocco, and the areas around Oran and Algiers in Algeria and around Tunis in Tunisia. The citrus industry is centered in the coastal lowlands and the valleys of the principal wadis of Algeria and northern Morocco. Almond trees are grown principally on the dry interior plain around Marrakech. Tobacco is grown in the regions around Bône and Algiers.

The important livestock of French North Africa are sheep, goats and cattle. The principal regions for raising sheep and goats in Tunisia are the plains around Sousse and Sfax and the southern coastal region, and in Algeria the high plains behind Oran. The cattle industry is concentrated in the Bizerte-Tunis region of Tunisia, the Department of Constantine in Algeria, and the northern coastal region of Morocco.

b. Seaward-facing Slopes of the Atlas Ranges.

The lower parts of the seaward-facing slopes of the Tell Atlas in Algeria and Tunisia and of the High and Middle Atlas ranges in Morocco are cultivated, but the higher slopes bear various types of natural vegetation. Maquis vegetation extends from the upper limits of the cultivated zone to approximately 3,500 feet. Above the maquis zone are forests of thuya (*arborvitae*) in southeastern Morocco and western Algeria, evergreen oak in northeastern Morocco and central Algeria, and Aleppo

pine throughout the regions of lower rainfall in Algeria. Cork oak forests dominate the area eastward from Bougie in Algeria to the vicinity of Bizerte in Tunisia. Cedar forests are found in those areas of northeastern Morocco and eastern Algeria which receive the highest annual rainfall. The higher slopes of the Tunisian Dorsal are covered with thuya and Aleppo pine forests. An evergreen oak thicket covers the upper slopes of the Anti-Atlas. In southwestern Morocco, both the coastal lowlands and the lower slopes of the Anti-Atlas range support a steppe vegetation.

c. The Plateaux and Adjacent Mountains.

The interior slopes of the Atlas Mountains in Morocco and the Tell Atlas in Algeria, the High Plateaux, the Shott Region of Tunisia, and both slopes of the Saharan Atlas are covered with a steppe vegetation, except for scattered forests on the higher and better watered slopes of the Saharan Atlas. The primary economic use of this region is for grazing. Alfa grass grows wild over about 15,700 square miles of the Plateaux.

d. The Desert.

Vegetation in the Saharan Depression and the desert area of southwestern Tunisia is of two types: ephemeral flowers that spring up immediately after a rain, mature, bloom, and die within a few days; and xerophytic shrubs which are able to exist in the desert only because they are structurally adapted to conserve the small amount of water that is available. Both types are sparsely distributed and are of no economic value. The few inhabitants in the region live in the oases that are scattered throughout the area. In the oases date palms, some grains, and enough garden vegetables to satisfy local needs are grown under irrigation.

e. Ahaggar Massif.

In the Ahaggar Massif and the surrounding plateaus three distinct vegetation types are present. Below 6,000 feet the vegetation is of a tropical desert type and is very sparsely distributed over the area. Between 6,000 and 8,000 feet permanent vegetation of a low-altitude Mediterranean type covers the slopes of the mountains and the plateau regions. Vegetation of high-altitude Mediterranean

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type is found in the region above 8,000 feet. Sufficient water is available at the lower levels of the Massif for the maintenance of permanent settlements, and gardens are cultivated

around such settlements and in the better watered beds of the wadis. The raising of camels, sheep, and goats is the principal occupation of the people.

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APPENDIX B
COMMUNICATIONS

Facilities for communication in French North Africa compare most unfavorably with those of most Western European countries. The coastal regions are adequately served by rail and road networks, but few roads or railroads into the interior have been constructed, because of the difficulty of terrain and the relative unimportance of inland desert wastes.

1. Ports.

a. Morocco.

(1) Casablanca is by far the most important of the French Moroccan ports, and ranks fourth of all French ports. Over 80 percent of all merchandise entering and leaving French Morocco passes through Casablanca; this traffic in 1949 amounted to 5,750,000 metric tons. Because of the increasing needs of the port, local authorities have considered the construction of an extensive "avant-port" to increase the total sheltered harbor area from 200 to 440 hectares, but these improvements have not been effected because of lack of funds.

(2) Safi is a phosphate and fishing port. In 1948, 1,024,300 metric tons of cargo were handled. With the exception of Casablanca, Safi is outstripping all other ports in Morocco in rate of growth.

(3) Port Lyautey, located 12 miles inland on the Sébou River, is a useful small port. Only small cargo boats or coasters can navigate the shallow channel of the river.

(4) Fedala, 17 miles north of Casablanca, is a peacetime oil discharge port. A sizable sardine fleet is based in the port.

(5) Agadir is a port for fishing craft and miscellaneous traffic. It handles about 50,000 tons annually, all effected by lighters. A port improvement project is under study in Paris.

(6) Mazagan } receive small coasters and
(7) Mogador } fishing craft.

(8) Rabat-Salé has irregular traffic.

(9) Mehdia, west of Port Lyautey, on the Atlantic coast, is a small port under construction.

The merchant marine registered under the Sherifian flag consists of thirty ships, eight of which were added during 1949. The total gross tonnage of this fleet is approximately 35,000 metric tons with a total cargo capacity of 50,000 metric tons. In 1948 the Sherifian fleet moved five percent (or 400,000 metric tons) of the total movement in French Moroccan ports.

b. Algeria.

Algeria is amply supplied with good ports. A total of 9,000,000 metric tons of cargo was handled by all Algerian ports in 1948.

(1) Algiers port is one of the principal coal-ing and fueling stations in the Mediterranean, and ranks second in importance of all French ports for passenger traffic. 400,000 metric tons of commodities are handled monthly. Good marine repair facilities are available. Completion of projected improvements should materially increase the port capacity.

(2) Oran is one of the more important ports of French North Africa. The port can handle about 350,000 metric tons of merchandise per month. Four steamship lines make Oran a regular port of call.

(3) Mers-el-Kebir, 4 miles west of Oran has the best natural anchorage on the Algerian coast and is being developed into a new harbor and naval base.

(4) Bône is a small commercial port with modest facilities. It is located near a rich agricultural area. Cargo handling capacity is 280,000 metric tons per month. The port is also equipped for handling phosphates and iron ore.

(5) Arzew, a small port with limited facilities, is used principally as a training area and

seaplane base. Maximum cargo handling capacity is 30,000 metric tons monthly.

(6) Mostaganem port can handle 50,000 metric tons of cargo monthly. Facilities are limited, but because of its location and the rich hinterland the port will probably increase in importance.

(7) Bougie is a small commercial port with limited facilities. The export of iron and zinc ores, phosphates, and agricultural products is increasing and the port is becoming more important.

(8) Philippeville, with a capacity of 40,000 metric tons monthly, is the principal outlet for agricultural products of the Department of Constantine. Port and rail facilities are being improved.

(9) Béni-Saf is a privately owned port used principally for the export of iron ore.

(10) The port of Nemours in western Algeria is being extended and modernized with financial help from French Morocco.

A few Algerian ships, registered as a part of the French merchant marine, are engaged in coastwise shipping.

c. Tunisia.

(1) Port facilities at the twin ports of Tunis-La Goulette are being modernized, but several years will probably elapse before reconstruction is completed owing to the shortage of building materials and skilled labor. Traffic in 1947 totalled 1,288,143 metric tons for both ports.

(2) Sfax is one of the more important ports in eastern Tunisia and handles the greatest tonnage of any Tunisian port. It serves both as an outlet for phosphates, and as an important fishing and sponge center. Reconstruction necessitated by the considerable wartime damage has not been completed.

(3) Bizerte is the less important of the two French naval ports in North Africa. War damage has been cleaned up, but planned expansion cannot be carried out because of the lack of funds. The base is equipped with repair facilities.

(4) Sousse is a small commercial port with a capacity of 25,000 metric tons monthly. The principal exports are phosphates, salt, olive oil, grain, and esparto grass.

(5) Gabès is a small fishing port, although certain agricultural products are exported.

The Tunisian merchant marine is insignificant and is wholly engaged in coastwise shipping.

2. Navigable Inland Waterways.

There are no navigable waterways in either Algeria or Tunisia. The Sébou and Moulouya rivers in Morocco, however, are navigable to small boats and barges for 50 and 30 miles inland, respectively.

3. Roads.

Of the three territories, Tunisia is best equipped with constructed roads with about 0.25 miles of road per square mile. Comparable figures for Algeria and Morocco are 0.035 and 0.025. These figures compare most unfavorably with those of most Western European countries. Actual mileage is as follows:

	<i>Main</i>	<i>Second-</i>	<i>Minor</i>	<i>Total</i>
Tunisia	3, 730	8, 700	3, 730	16, 160
Morocco	3, 500	2, 500	12, 500	18, 500
Algeria	4, 982	25, 500	?	30, 482+
Total	12, 212	36, 700	16, 230+	

The coastal and mountain regions are well served by engineered roads which become fewer and of poorer quality inland until in the desert regions few are better than natural tracks. The roads are the main lines of transportation and are adequate for the present needs of the population.

In Tunisia the roads radiate from the four coastal cities of Tunis, Sousse, Sfax, and Gabès and from the town of Medenine. These five centers are linked by a coastal road that passes from Morocco through Algeria and Tunisia into Libya. The network in the north is fairly dense with numerous connecting roads between the radial routes, but in the south the network is open. Extending into Algeria are three good roads, roughly parallel, from Tunis. The roads southwest of Gabès and Medenine are principally ancient caravan routes, slightly improved but in many places obstructed to motor traffic by drifting sands.

The two principal routes in Algeria are the international highways connecting Morocco

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and Tunisia through Algeria. One closely follows the coastline, and the other parallels it 50 miles inland. Both are two-lane thoroughfares except the section from Constantine to the Tunisian border where the road is scarcely wide enough for double traffic. Numerous roads connect these east-west highways. Hard-surfaced roads to the south branch off at Mascara, Algiers, and Constantine, and after crossing the high plateaus and penetrating the Sahara Atlas mountains, become trans-Saharan motor routes to French West Africa.

Moroccan motor roads link the ports with the principal cities of the interior and with Algeria. The main roads are 26 feet wide, of which the paved surface is 13 feet. The principal routes are:

Tangier-Rabat-Casablanca-Marrakech (385 miles)

Casablanca - Mazagan - Marrakech (182 miles)

Port Lyautey-Fez-Taza-Oujda (319 miles)

Mazagan-Mogador-Agadir (271 miles)

4. Railroads.

The railways of French North Africa consist of separate but interconnected lines operating on three main track gauges over a total route length of 5,468 miles. All, except 139 miles of normal gauge and 10 miles of meter gauge, are single track. In Morocco about 42 percent and in Algeria about 4 percent of the total route length is electrified. There are no electrified lines in Tunisia other than about 29 miles worked as a tramway in and near the city of Tunis.

ROUTE LENGTH
(By Gauges and Traction)

	MOROCCO	ALGERIA	TUNISIA
	Miles	Miles	Miles
1.435 meter (4'8½")			
Steam.....	670	1,371	317
Electric.....	477	127
1.055 meter (3'5½")			
Steam.....	875
1 meter (3'3½")			
Steam.....	484	1,056
0.60 meter (1'11½")			
Steam.....	91
Total.....	1,147	2,948	1,373

The Moroccan system consists of two main lines. The main east-west line runs eastward from Casablanca and joins the Tangier-Fez line at Petitjean. It continues eastward from Fez through Oujda into Algeria. From Oujda a branch line, utilized principally for ore shipments, extends 285 miles south to the iron mines of Kenadsa (Algeria). The main north-south lines extend from the Spanish Moroccan border to Petitjean and from Casablanca to Marrakech. Branch lines connect with the coastal city of Safi and the inland town of Oued Zem. The main line from Marrakech through Casablanca and Petitjean to Fez and the branch line to Oued Zem are electrified. The Casablanca to Benguerir section of the Casablanca-Marrakech line has a capacity of 12 trains daily, each of 300-ton capacity. Other sections of the system have only half this capacity.

The Algerian railways are localized along the Mediterranean. Most of the lines are single track with capacities ranging from six trains each way daily on the narrow gauge lines to twelve a day on the standard gauge Casablanca-Tunis line. The interior is penetrated by four lines that connect with the principal east-west lines. The longest of these extends from Oran to Abadla 478 miles southwest. The three interior lines connect Djelfa to the main line at Blida, Touggourt to the main line at El Guero, and Tebessa to both Ouled-Rahmoun and Souk-Ahras on the main line.

The Tunisian standard gauge system is restricted to northern Tunisia. The main line (120 miles) has branches from Djedeida to Bizerte (45 miles), from Mateur to Tabarka (64 miles), and from Mateur to Mastouta (50 miles). The narrow gauge system is composed of three east-west lines branching off a north-south coastal line extending from Tunis through Sousse and Sfax to Gabès (261 miles). The northernmost of the east-west lines runs from Tunis to Algeria (162 miles) and connects with other lines of the system. The central line extends west from Sousse for 179 miles and is connected to the southernmost line by a 29-mile branch line. The southernmost line extends from Graiba, on the coast to the inland town of Tozeur (146 miles).

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The three largest undertakings are the state-controlled national systems of the *Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Maroc* (CFM), the *Chemins de Fer Algériens* (CFA), and the *Compagnie Fermière des Chemins de Fer Tunisiens* (CFT) which together operate 88 percent of the total route mileage of French North Africa.

The present over-all system is adequate for the normal needs of the region. The equipment, however, has been overtaxed for years and needs substantial repairs and modern replacement. The main source of revenue is traffic in minerals and agricultural products.

Current plans call for: (a) in Morocco, the extension of coalfield and mineral lines, the extension of main-line electrification eastward to Taza, and the replacement of steam by diesel electric traction on the Safi and Abadla lines; and (b) in eastern Algeria the completion of the conversion to standard gauge and electrification of the Oued Keberit-Kouif line. The long-projected trans-Saharan railway which was to link the North African systems to Sénégal and the Niger is in abeyance. Also plans for the doubling of the Oran-Algiers main line and the extension of the Oran-Ain Temouchant branch to rejoin the main line at Marnia are shelved.

5. Airlines.

Civil aviation in French North Africa functions under control of the French Secretariat General for Civil and Commercial Aviation in Paris. Control is exercised through a District Director in the Overseas Department of Algeria, and a Regional Director in each of the protectorates of French Morocco and Tunisia. Foreign scheduled air services into the area are confined to a long-range service conducted by Trans World Airline (US), which stops at Algiers and Tunis on a trunkline air route to India, and a few regional services. *Aero Portugese* of Portugal and *Iberia* of Spain fly into neighboring French Morocco, while *Linee Aeree Italiane* (LAI) of Italy and *Air Malta* fly into nearby Tunisia. French scheduled air services into French North Africa are conducted primarily by *Air France*, which links Paris with Algeria, French Morocco, and Tunisia. A number of French private air carriers, notably *Compagnie de Transports Aériens In-*

tercontinentaux (TAI) and *Aigle Azur*, supplement the activities of *Air France* in linking the mother country with the French North African territories. In addition to the services flown from Paris, *Air France* maintains air services in North Africa conducted from its base in Algiers.

Local airline companies have been established in each of the three areas: several small carriers in Algeria, two in French Morocco, and one in Tunisia. The leading Algerian carrier, *Air Algérie*, organized in 1947, links Algeria with Tunisia, in addition to conducting services to France and Western Europe. The organization has a fleet of 11 DC-3's. Its main depot shop is located in Algiers. A statistical comparison of this company's operations gives some indication of the growing importance of air transportation in this area.

	Oct 47- Sept 48	Oct 48- Sept 49
Number of hours flown.....	10, 184	14, 710
Number of passengers carried.....	14, 720	35, 692
Freight hauled (in metric tons).....	3, 930	4, 819

The two French Moroccan carriers are *Air Atlas* and *Air Maroc* (the former a subsidiary of the French nationalized airline *Air France*). Both carriers fly services to Spain and France, *Air Atlas* flying additional local and regional services, including a service to Algiers. *Air Atlas* has six DC-3 aircraft; *Air Maroc*, six DC-3's and two C-46's. During 1949 these companies carried a total of 23,102 passengers, 1,253 tons of air freight, and 95 tons of mail.

The Tunisian carrier, *Tunis Air*, is also a subsidiary of *Air France*. This company conducts scheduled passenger services to Nice and Rome, as well as a regional service to Algiers, all connecting with *Air France* schedules. Its fleet is composed of 4 DC-3's.

6. Other Communications Facilities.

Telephone and telegraph facilities operate under government monopoly and in general follow the density pattern of population. Facilities are rudimentary in certain aspects, but they have been greatly improved since World War II. Modernization and expansion have been due largely to the recognized strategic value of North African ports and air bases.

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Aside from division of administrative control, the telecommunication systems in French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia could operate as one system. Equipment and practices are mainly French.

The underground cable across French North Africa originates in Casablanca, French Morocco, and extends via Oran, Algeria, to its terminal point in Tunis. Its total length is about 1,428 miles. The decision to extend a cable net across this area was made by the Vichy Government in 1941. In 1943 actual construction began at various points, utilizing sections which had been laid between certain large urban centers prior to 1941. Administration of the system is handled by a Board of Directors composed of representatives from the three Post Telegraph and Telephones (PTT) concerned. When this cable goes into operation, probably at the end of 1950, existing facilities will be almost doubled and service will be comparable to any modern Western cable system.

International and domestic cable service to France is adequate for present requirements; operations are excellent and efficient despite old equipment. The system is well integrated with the landline network of North Africa, and the facilities could probably accommodate a limited additional load with present equipment.

Radio plays three primary roles in this area today: i.e., international communication, broadcasting, and military. Of these three roles, international communication has progressed rapidly since the end of World War II.

French stations at Rabat and Algiers handle increasing traffic loads, but their facilities have not changed materially since the war years.

Radio broadcasting has also made great strides during the five years but is the subject of more official enthusiasm than actual effectiveness. Radio receiver density is very low, so that only about 10-15 percent of the population can be considered to be reached by this medium.

French military forces have widely scattered radio installations and operate numerous networks linking France with its overseas colonies. Most of their equipment is believed to

be made up of US Army Signal Corps types of World War II vintage.

a. French Morocco.

The Moroccan Government owns and operates the country's domestic telecommunication facilities, through the PTT. The equipment, operating techniques, and the essential training of native technicians are basically French, although the introduction of American equipment and operating methods during World War II has had considerable influence on the country. Morocco can produce only a negligible percentage of the equipment it needs for telecommunications, and thus must continue to rely almost entirely on France or the US to meet its needs. The country has a domestic wire net that provides fair to good service. The PTT has its headquarters in Rabat.

The telephone system provides the widest coverage, and is thus the most important means of communication. Morocco has 45,153 telephone subscribers; principal exchanges are located in Rabat-Salé, Casablanca, Marrakech, Fez and Meknes. The Moroccan Government depends heavily on this network and, to a lesser degree, on the telegraph system for administration of the country, whereas the Army depends largely on radio. Telegraph lines connect most of the population centers, and in many places, telegraph and telephone wires are carried on the same poles. An extensive telegraph net exists for the operation of the railway system. The telegraph circuits follow along the railway and are operated on a closed circuit system.

The French Army operates an extensive network of radio stations, which provide the only means of communication in the sparsely populated regions of southern and southeastern Morocco. Although they are used primarily for military purposes, the stations also handle official and even public traffic.

b. Algeria.

The PTT system in Algeria is owned and operated by the government. The wire net is very extensive and provides service for most of the towns and villages in the country. Telephone service is more widely used than telegraph and is the most dependable means of

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communication; there are 75,670 telephone subscribers. The telephone service is more than adequate for the country's needs. Main telephone centers are located at Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.

The telegraph system is not widely used in Algeria. Most of the circuits are carried on telephone wire. There are six circuits to Tunisia and six to Morocco.

c. Tunisia.

Tunisia has an extensive network of telephone and telegraph circuits with many interconnecting lines. The system is antiquated, except for the city of Tunis. The Tunisian Government operates all telecommunication

facilities for the French PTT, which owns the systems. Although the lines were in a total state of disrepair following World War II, they have since been repaired and modernized so that they are now above their prewar efficiency.

Telephone subscribers number 15,600.

There are 207 PTT telegraph stations and 81 railroad telegraph stations located throughout Tunisia. Ninety percent of all telegraphic messages in 1948 were relayed to and from the capital city of Tunis. Of these, some 29 percent were local, 37 percent international (mainly to France), and the remaining 34 percent to other North African stations.

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APPENDIX C
POPULATION

The population of French North Africa, which had remained relatively static before the French conquests, has grown rapidly since the introduction of minimum European standards of health and sanitation. Average life expectancy is now about 35 years. The net population growth is 400,000 (or about 2 percent) annually. At this rate of growth the population will soon expand beyond food production capabilities. The following table gives some indication of the population distribution. Figures are based on calculated estimates, rather than on actual census records, because population tabulations in this semi-primitive area are not accurate.

Most of the population is concentrated along the Mediterranean and Atlantic littorals and the fertile river basins and interior oases. The standard of living is low, similar to that of other countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Among the vast majority of the native population the mode of life has altered little in centuries. Important chieftains, senior functionaries, and wealthy traders, on the other hand, enjoy a way of life now rare in Europe.

The European minority is predominantly French, but also includes large numbers of Italians, Spanish, Greeks, and Maltese. French is the predominant and official language. The Europeans live in the large towns and are usually engaged in government, commerce, the professions, or skilled trades.

Berber is the dominant native racial stock of the area. Since the Arab conquerors first overran the area in the seventh century A. D., there has been a considerable intermixture between Berber and Arab. The Arab has imposed his religion, language, dress, and many of his customs on a large part of the Berber community. The Berbers, however, have preserved some distinct racial characteristics; a negroid strain is evident in some sections. Generally speaking, the Berbers populate the rural districts and the interior regions, while most of the Arabs congregate in the urban and coastal areas. About one-fourth of the Berbers are nomads, and an equal or greater number are semi-nomadic. Arabic is the predominant language among the urban natives, a great many of whom also understand French. In the isolated rural areas, various Berber dialects predominate. Except for the upper-class minority engaged in the professions, the natives are considered unskilled by western standards.

The basis of native society is the authority of the father over his family and dependents. Polygamy is still common, but because of the poverty of the masses only about one family in six is polygamous. Many tribal characteristics remain, although the tribe today tends to be a territorial division. The markets are the most important centers of rural life. Native quarters (medinas) differ markedly from the European quarters; as in medieval English

	TOTAL FNA	MOROCCO	ALGERIA	TUNISIA
1931.....	14, 250, 000
1936.....	16, 100, 000
1948.....	20, 510, 000	8, 613, 000	8, 666, 000	3, 231, 000
Density per square mile.....	19	53	10. 2	16. 9
Europeans and Jews.....	1, 874, 600	525, 000	1, 040, 000	309, 600
Natives.....	18, 635, 400	8, 088, 000	7, 626, 000	2, 921, 400
Gainfully employed.....	2, 200, 000	1, 600, 000	680, 000
		(1950)	(1950)	(1936)

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towns, the members of one trade (guild) live together and have their shops in one particular district.

Fewer than 10 percent of the native population are literate. Although the French authorities claim to be engaging in a campaign against illiteracy, school facilities are so inadequate that fewer than one-fifth of the children can be enrolled in school.

The Moslem religion permeates almost every aspect of life and the Koran regulates relationships and actions. Mosques abound in both urban and rural regions. Prayers are said five times daily; and the month's fast of Ramadan is observed annually by the natives. Comparatively few North African Moslems make the pilgrimage to Mecca, however. There are local holy men, but no clergy in the European sense. The Moslem Sunni (comparable to moderate Christian Protestants) sect prevails, although a minority adheres to the Shiah (comparable to extreme Christian Catholics) sect. Synagogues and Christian churches are located in the principal urban areas. The Roman Catholic is the largest of the Christian communities.

The Arabs as a whole are fanatical and deeply superstitious. On the other hand, the Berbers are democratic by nature and, although occasionally liable to fanaticism, rarely moved by religious enthusiasm. Many religious customs common in the country before the arrival of Islam survive among the

Berbers, including fetishes such as the hanging of bits of rag on sacred trees, a votive offering of the native women to ward off sterility.

Habous (religious endowed property) lands and buildings are scattered throughout the area, the income supporting religious and charitable works and such institutions as schools and hospitals.

The Moslem brotherhoods (*confréries*), or religious organizations, also play an important role in native life. Membership is predominantly rural and Berber, and adherents are scattered widely throughout the area. *Zaouias* (headquarters) are located in all of the principal coastal and interior cities where a particular group is dominant, and in villages one or another of the groups usually plays an important role in communal affairs. The principal differences between the various brotherhoods are the initiatory ceremonies, prayers, and religious rites. These organizations lack efficient organization, and attachment to the order in many instances seems to be limited to a feeling of reverence for the *Sherif* (hereditary leader). Ties to the mother *zaouia* generally appear too loose to organize an effective group. The Arabic word for the orders is synonymous with the word "way," indicating that the brotherhoods are thought of as a way of life and not as a political or religious movement with determined objectives. The brotherhoods are a somewhat amorphous but substantial force on the side of tradition and conservatism.

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APPENDIX D
BIOGRAPHIES

ABBAS, FERHAT 1899-

Before World War II Ferhat Abbas was active in the pro-French assimilationist *Fédération des Elus Musulmans*. After the defeat of France and during the Vichy regime in Algeria he became more pro-nationalist in sentiment, and in February 1943 was among the Algerian Arab leaders who addressed a manifesto to the French authorities demanding reforms in the French administration. In 1944 he founded the strongly pro-nationalist *Amis du Manifeste*, the general aim of which was the eventual establishment of Algerian autonomy within the framework of the French Union. The *Amis* was dissolved by governmental decree in May 1945 and Abbas subsequently founded the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA) and was elected on this ticket to the Constituent Assembly in June 1946. He recently resigned from membership in the Assembly of the French Union.

Although he has been reported to have close relations with the Algerian Communist Party and to have received subsidies from the Communists, he has recently been extremely critical of Communist activities in Algeria.

BALAFREJ, AHMED 1912-

Balafrej is the principal policy-maker and strategist of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which he helped to form in 1944, and is believed to have the confidence of the Sultan. He envisages the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez (1912) and its replacement by a French-Moroccan Treaty under which an independent Morocco would rely on French guidance and advice.

Well educated and intelligent, he is the most westernized of the Istiqlal leaders and is believed to be largely responsible for the party's moderate approach to the Moroccan problem. He is not unfriendly toward the United States, although he believes the US is indifferent to Moroccan nationalist aims. He could be ex-

pected to play a major role in the government of an independent Morocco.

BOUMENDJEL, AHMED BEN MOHAMMED 1908-

Probable successor to Ferhat Abbas as leader of the UDMA (nationalist) party of which he has been a member since 1945, Boumendjel is an Algerian who has accepted French citizenship and a French wife. He studied law in Paris and at the University of Algiers and is regarded as much more intelligent and subtle than Abbas. His influence in the UDMA is toward moderation. He is a Moslem and at present is a member of the Assembly of the French Union, having been elected to that post by the Algerian Assembly in 1948.

BOURGHIBA, HABIB 1904-

Although friendly to France and French culture, Bourghiba is the outstanding leader of Arab nationalism and opponent of French policy in Tunisia. Politically astute, he has rejected the repeated efforts of the French to win him over. In 1933 he founded the Neo-Destour Party, of which he is president. Regarded as the inspiration for the hard core of nationalism in Tunisia, he nevertheless has a definite moderating influence and is attempting to negotiate with France for concessions leading to independence.

Bourghiba represented Tunisia on the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa from its inception in Cairo in 1948 until late 1949 when he returned to Tunisia to reassume the active leadership of the Neo-Destour Party. His efforts to date have had no notable success.

Bourghiba is a Moslem and a graduate of the *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris*. During the war he refused to collaborate with the Axis. He is an anti-Communist but might be persuaded to collaborate with the Communists if hope of other help were lost and he had become convinced that the Communist

collaboration furnished the only possibility of gaining independence.

BOURQUIA, ABDESLAM *circa* 1920—

A French Moroccan journalist, Bourquia is a die-hard Communist. Fairly intelligent and well educated, he is a useful propagandist for the Moroccan Communist Party. In 1948 he was said to be completely under the control of the French members of the Secretariat of the Moroccan Communist Party who found him useful in proselyting among the natives.

CABALLERO, PAUL

Very little is known of this Secretary General of the Algerian Communist Party. He may be one of the large group of Spanish Loyalists who settled in Oran after fleeing from Spain during the Civil War. He and other prominent members of the Politburo of the Algerian Communist Party are alleged to receive their directives at secret meetings with Leon Feix, permanent representative of the French Communist Party in Algeria.

ENNAFAA, MOHAMMED BEN BRAHIM BEN SAID 1920—

Ennafaa is one of the principal members of the Central Committee of the Tunisian Communist Party. He is reported to have the difficult assignment of endeavoring to obtain a rapprochement with the Neo and Old Destour (nationalist) Parties in order to achieve a "National Front" of all Moslem and Communist elements. His chief labors are said to be addressing Party cells and city and regional conferences and writing articles for the Communist Party organ, *L'Avenir de la Tunisie*. He closely follows the Cominform line in attacking the US, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. Although he is considered to be well educated for a Tunisian Moslem born in humble circumstances, Ennafaa is not believed to be as able and forceful as Ali Djerad, whom he replaced in May 1948 as the Party's apologist among the Moslems.

FARHAT, SALAH 1890—

This Tunisian lawyer has been Secretary General of the Old Destour Party since its foundation in 1933. Moderate on most issues, he apparently believes that Tunisian independence will not be realized for some time to

come. He is thought to be friendly toward the US. On the whole, Farhat's views are typical of conservative Tunisian Arabs who were educated in France.

FASSI, SI ALLAL EL 1910—

Second only to Balafrej in the leadership of the Istiqlal Party, Fassi has been associated with the Moroccan nationalist movement since its inception. Exiled to French Equatorial Africa in 1937 by the French because of his nationalist activities, he was not permitted to return until 1946. He served in Cairo as the Istiqlal representative on the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa from January to December 1948. Fassi now resides in the International Zone of Tangier because he fears curtailment of his movements should he return to the French Zone. A religious zealot and fiery orator, he has given indications of being out of sympathy with the conservative policies of Balafrej. So long as he remains in Tangier, however, he probably will have little chance of success in a program of gathering dissident party members about himself.

HACHED, FARHAT

Leader of the nationalist-sponsored *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT), Hached is reputed to have such intelligence and ability that he is head and shoulders above other French and Tunisian labor leaders. He is energetic, and has a large following. In his writings, he uses slogans instead of facts. He has had years of intensive training under French labor leadership and has been engaged for several years in organizing Tunisian labor. Held responsible for the bloodshed during strikes and riots at Sfax in August 1947, he waged a vigorous and successful campaign to have strikers reinstated and his union representation restored to the labor commission. Efforts by the Communist-backed USTT to affiliate the UGTT with their organization failed, although the unions have collaborated in limited local objectives from time to time. It is generally thought that Hached has no love for the Communists and that he will work with the USTT only as long as something can be gained locally by intermittent and joint action. Although Hached accepted affiliation for the UGTT with

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the Communist-dominated WFTU, he probably would be disposed to collaborate with any international labor organization with a world-wide audience.

HASSAN V, SIDI MOHAMMED BEN YOUSSEF BEN EL Sultan of Morocco, 1912—

The present Sultan of Morocco—the nominal ruler of three areas, French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, and the International Zone of Tangier—was elected to this position at Fez on 18 November 1927 by an assembly of Vizirs and Elders of the Mosques. His election is said to have been engineered by the French because he presumably could be molded and controlled more easily than his older and more intelligent brothers. In recent years, however, he has asserted his independence of French authority. He is reported to visualize himself as the leader of the Arab world in northwest Africa, and in Tangier in 1947 he made a ringing defense of the Arab League. His relations with General Juin are strained. The Sultan has felt that Juin oversteps his authority. He is the virtual, although not nominal, head of the Istiqlal Party, the principal nationalist organization in French Morocco, and is in close contact with the party leaders. Because he is aware of the sparsity of capable personnel among Moroccans and because he realizes a nationalist uprising would be futile and injurious to his position, he advocates moderation for the national movement. Genuinely concerned with the welfare of his people, he is interested in the betterment of education and living conditions.

JUIN, General ALPHONSE-PIERRE 1888—

The present Resident General for France in Morocco and Commander in Chief of all French armed forces in North Africa began his colonial career by being born at Bône, Algeria, in 1888.

The General, who is the top-ranking military figure of France, graduated from St. Cyr and joined the First Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs in 1911. His subsequent career was spent generally in Europe and North Africa.

Juin's appointment to the civilian post he now occupies took place in May 1947 when

the French cabinet had been purged of Communists and had decided to impose a more stringent administration upon Morocco. Juin brought to this task the conservatism of a career soldier, substantial administrative capacity, powerful anti-Communist convictions, and a devout adherence to the traditional rights and privileges of Frenchmen at home and abroad. These characteristics account for the fact that Juin has always had the complete confidence of General de Gaulle despite the fact that he commanded the French Army of the Vichy Government. They also explain the somewhat strained relationship which exists between the General and the Sultan of Morocco.

From the French point of view, Juin's civilian administration has been successful in that he has reestablished French prestige and maintained internal security. In recent months, his military duties have become more important with his appointment as chief of the Southern European-Western Mediterranean military region under the Atlantic Pact.

KAAK, MUSTAPHA 1893—

Kaak is the son of a Tunisian Government official and from 1911–17 served in the *Section d'Etat* of the Tunisian Government while working for a law degree. He was a member of the Grand Council of Tunisia from 1928 to 1934, when he was believed to be a strong sympathizer, if not a member, of the Old Destour Party. With Old and Neo-Destour Party members he signed a petition in 1944 asking for Tunisian autonomy. He was appointed Prime Minister of the Tunisian Government in July 1947 at the height of his popularity with the nationalists. However, the Neo-Destourians now consider him a tool of the French and a traitor and the Bey has on several occasions publicly shown his dislike for the Prime Minister. He is believed to be honest and capable, but ineffective in dealing with French authorities in the manner expected by the nationalists. In fact he is responsible to the Resident General and not to the Bey. He has remained in office primarily because it has been impossible to find a Prime Minister who could be equally acceptable to French authorities, nationalists, and the Bey.

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LAMINE PASHA BEY, MOHAMMED Bey of Tunis 1881-

Lamine was appointed Bey of Tunis by General Giraud in May 1943 to succeed Mohammed el-Moncef Bey, who was deposed by the French for his pro-German activities. The manner of his appointment marked him as a tool of the French, and until the death of Moncef in 1948, Lamine was anathema to the Tunisian nationalists. Since that time, Lamine has been recognized as the legitimate Bey, his prestige has been greatly increased, and the nationalists have given him their support. He is believed to be somewhat under the influence of his son, Prince Chadly, who is a close friend of Neo-Destour leader, Salah ben Youssef. Lamine has recently shown some reluctance to go along with the French, and has opposed various decrees proposed by the Resident General.

LYAUTEY, Marshal LOUIS HUBERT GONZALVE 1854-1934

Although a professional soldier, Lyautey's reputation rests upon his creative genius as a colonial administrator and defender of French tradition and interests. In April 1912 he was appointed High Commissioner and Resident General in Morocco to quell disturbances at Fez and to consolidate the recently established protectorate. His success is indicated by the fact that during World War I, although the Moroccan interior was in effect demilitarized in order to free troops for service in Europe, Lyautey not only maintained order but enlarged the area of French control. After World War I, he conquered the Atlas region, established a defensive barrier to the north of Ouergha, and directed the final counter-attack against Abd-el-Krim. Except for a brief period (December 1917 to March 1918) when he served as French War Minister, Lyautey's service in Morocco was continuous until 1925. He was made a Marshal of France in 1921 as a reward for his achievements in North Africa.

MAZELLA, MICHEL, 1907-

A French Moroccan journalist and former teacher, Mazella was appointed Treasurer of the Moroccan Communist Party at its second

annual congress in April 1949. In the absence of Ali Yata, he is the actual leader for Communist activities in the area.

MESSALI HADJ circa 1903-

Most vocal of the extreme Algerian nationalists, Messali studied at the University of Paris and resided in that city from 1923 to 1937. In the latter year, he helped found the nationalistic *Parti Populaire Algérien* and was imprisoned for two years. In 1941 Vichy condemned him to 16 years at hard labor. He was released but immediately placed in "forced residence" by General Giraud the following year. A strong anti-Communist, he also opposes the inclusion of Algeria in the Atlantic Pact. Although he opposes taking sides in the East-West conflict, in the event of war he would probably try to trade Algerian Moslem assistance for support of Algerian independence. Messali regards Ferhat Abbas, the Algerian UDMA leader, as an upstart.

NAEGELEN, MARCEL EDMOND 1892-

Naegelen has been increasingly prominent in the French Socialist Party since 1934, and following World War II he emerged as one of the leaders of the Party. He also has been a close friend and admirer of Léon Blum. Naegelen succeeded Yves Chataigneau as Governor General of Algeria in February 1948. His tenure of office has been renewed each six months since August 1948. Upon his arrival in Algiers the Administration underwent a marked change from the complaisance of his predecessor. He returned to a firm hand in dealing with both nationalist aspirations and the Communists. He has travelled extensively in Algeria to revive French prestige and to strengthen the psychological ties binding Algeria to France. Naegelen is alert, intelligent, and personally ambitious.

NISARD, MAURICE 1914-

This young Tunisian-Jewish lawyer is said to be the ablest of the Tunisian Communist officials. He is one of the principal Party Secretaries, a member of the Party's Politburo and Central Committee, and the chief editorial writer for the Party organ, *L'Avenir de la Tunisie*. He is quick and intelligent, and is proficient in three languages—Arabic,

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Italian, and French. Described as agreeable and well-mannered socially, Nisard has the reputation of being an able lawyer. He is unquestionably the most competent of the local Communist leaders and the "spark plug" of the Politburo and the Central Committee. His energy and keen mind constitute an important element in the local Communist strategy and activity. His attitude toward the US is one of violent hostility and his editorials consistently follow the Cominform line in attacking American "imperialism."

PERILLIER, MARCELLIN MARIE LOUIS
1900-

In June 1950 Perillier was selected to replace Socialist Jean Mons as Resident General of Tunisia. A career civil servant of Rightist sympathies, Perillier has had considerable experience in North African affairs. He is intelligent, capable, extremely ambitious, and an astute politician. He is said to owe his appointment in Tunisia not only to his administrative ability but to his friendship and close association with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman.

Although he is still in the process of becoming acquainted with his new duties, Perillier apparently intends to rule Tunisia firmly and the reform program which he will implement will be introduced cautiously, without relinquishing France's prerogatives in the area.

He is reported to be favorably disposed toward Great Britain and the US.

POROPANE, GEORGES 1902-

As Secretary General of the *Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs de Tunisie* (USTT), Poropane is the effective leader of this Communist-controlled and WFTU-recognized Tunisian labor union. Poropane is a French-Jewish skilled worker at the French naval arsenal at Sidi Abdallah (Ferryville). He gained his experience as a union organizer with the Tunisian section of the French CGT until the schism in October 1946. As a member of the Central Committee of the Tunisian Communist Party, Poropane is the apologist for Communist labor doctrines and writes the principal articles for the USTT in the Communist Party organ, *L'Avenir de la Tunisie*.

He is reported to be honest, industrious, but somewhat lacking in political sagacity.

SADAOUI, HASSEN, 1899-

A militant member of the Tunisian Communist Party, Sadaoui was "elected" President of the *Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs de Tunisie* (USTT) to provide the union with a Moslem president. He is a quiet but industrious labor leader of importance in Tunisia's labor movement, although he is considerably less active politically than Georges Poropane, the USTT's Secretary General.

WAZZANI (OUAZZANI), MOHAMMED BEN HASSAN 1910-

Wazzani has long collaborated with other nationalist elements in demanding reforms from the French. Released in 1946 after ten years' exile, he disagreed with the ideas of the Istiqlal leaders and established a new group called the Shoura (Democratic) Party, but he has not succeeded in building up a large following. He is reported to have close connections with the French Residency, and is considered by the more active nationalists to be an agent of the French Administration. There were indications in 1949 that he was mildly pro-Communist.

YATA, ALI 1920-

Ali Yata, Secretary of the Moroccan Communist Party, disappeared in July 1948 when his arrest was ordered by the Protectorate authorities in connection with the illegal distribution of Communist propaganda through the mails. Although his whereabouts are not definitely known, he probably is in close touch with events in Morocco and directs the Party activities from his underground headquarters.

YOUSSEF, SALAH BEN 1908-

This Paris-trained Tunisian lawyer, who has spent six years in French prisons because of his nationalistic convictions, is Secretary General of the Neo-Destour Party. He is regarded as fiery by temperament and politically somewhat immature. It is reported that he and his colleagues still hold the US high in esteem and that at heart he is less anti-French than his speeches suggest. It is believed that ben

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Youssef will not urge his followers to violence until all peaceful means toward Tunisian independence have been exhausted. It is also said that he has considered joining forces with the local Communists as a means of furthering Tunisian nationalism. In July 1947, he declined a post in the new Tunisian cabinet be-

cause the French refused to accept an all-Destour government. Although formerly a close associate of Bourghiba, during the latter's absence in Cairo ben Youssef established his political position so effectively that his closest associates were disgruntled at Bourghiba's resumption of leadership.

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APPENDIX E

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- B. C. 525 Introduction of the camel into North Africa by the Persian conquest.
- A. D. 647 First of the three Arab invasions of North Africa.
- 682 Conversion of the Berbers to Islam.
- 732 Origin of Zeitouna University, Tunis, oldest of the three celebrated Arab universities in North Africa. (The other two are Karaouiyyine in Fez and El Azhar in Cairo.)
- 1358 Treaty with Pisa granting capitulations in Morocco; the first instance of extraterritorial jurisdiction in North Africa.
- 1577 Agreement establishing a French consul in Tunis.
- 1603 Capitulations in Morocco granted to France by treaty.
- 1665 Agreement guaranteeing pre-eminence of the French consul in Tunis.
- 1705 Inception of the Regency of Tunis under the ruling Husseinite dynasty following the non-recognition of the Sultan of Constantinople by the Bey of Tunis, Hussein ben Ali.
- 28 May 1767 Treaty between Morocco and France extending rights of protection not only to foreigners but also, for the first time, to natives in their employ.
- 1787 Extraterritorial rights in Morocco granted to the US by a most-favored-nation treaty.
- 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna, marking the disintegration of the First French Empire.
- 1827 Affront tendered the French consul by the Dey of Algiers.
- 5 July 1830 Capture of Algiers, followed by the conquest and occupation of Algeria by the French.
- 16 September 1836 Re-negotiation of the terms of the US-Moroccan treaty of 1787. This treaty is the basis of the special US privileged position throughout Morocco.
- 9 December 1856 Treaty of peace and commerce between UK and Morocco, granting limited capitulatory rights.
- 1861 Treaty of commerce between Spain and Morocco.
- 1871 US declined offer by Sultan to obtain a protectorate over Morocco.
- 12 May 1881 The treaty of Le Bardo establishing a French protectorate over Tunisia.
- 8 June 1883 The Convention of La Marsa modifying the Le Bardo treaty.
- July-August 1898 The Fashoda incident.
- 8 April 1904 Anglo-French general agreement known as the "Entente Cordiale" delimiting their respective spheres of influence, particularly in relation to the Moroccan question.
- 31 March 1905 Visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor von Bulow to Tangier to insist on Germany's interest in Morocco and full independence of the Sultan.
- 7 April 1906 Act of Algeciras derived from the International Conference designed to effect governmental reorganization and economic reforms in Morocco.
- 1 June 1911 German gunboat "Panther" dispatched to Agadir, to protect German interests in Morocco.

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- 30 March 1912 The Treaty of Fez establishing a French protectorate over Morocco.
- 1914-1918 French North Africa emerged from World War I with French hegemony preserved by the untiring efforts of General Lyautey.
- May 1926 Abd-el-Krim, leader of the Rif revolt in Morocco, surrendered to the French.
- 18 November 1927 Accession to the throne of H. M. Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef ben El-Hassan V, present Sultan of Morocco.
- 1934 Termination of successful military operations engaged in pacification of last dissident tribes in Morocco.
- 7-8 November 1942 Allied landings in French North Africa.
- 17 November 1942 Clark-Darlan Agreement, Algiers.
- December 1942-
January 1943 Conquest and occupation of the Fezzan by General Leclerc's Free French Forces.
- 12 May 1943 El Moncef Pasha, Bey of Tunis, deposed by the Allies following their victory over the Axis troops in Tunisia.
- 3 June 1943 Constitution in Algiers of the French Committee of National Liberation by Generals de Gaulle and Giraud following their Casablanca agreement.
- 30 January 1944 The Brazzaville Conference of French colonial administrators.
- 8 May 1945 Bloody repression by French of nationalist-instigated native uprisings at Sétif and Guelma in the Kabyle regions of Algeria.
- 27 October 1946 Adoption of the French Constitution of the Fourth Republic providing for the organization of the French Union.
- 10 April 1947 During Tangier visit while he was relatively free from French control, the Sultan in a politically-slanted religious speech backed the Arab League as a unifying influence among the Moslems of the Maghreb.
- 1 June 1947 Escape of Abd-el-Krim while en route to France after twenty-one years of exile on Reunion Island.
- 7 June 1947 Replacement of Eirik Labonne by General Alphonse-Pierre Juin as Resident General of France in Morocco.
- 20 September 1947 Algerian Statute, approved by French National Assembly, became a law.
- 5 January 1948 Announcement by the Maghreb Office of the Arab League of the organization in Cairo of the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa under the chairmanship of Abd-el-Krim.
- 4-11 April 1948 First general elections ever held in Algeria to vote for members of the Algerian Assembly established by the Algerian Statute.
- 1 September 1948 Death of El Moncef Pasha, deposed Bey of Tunis, left Sidi Mohammed El Lamine the undisputed native ruler of Tunisia.
- 29 May 1949 Visit of Vincent Auriol, President of the Fourth Republic, to Algiers, the first French chief of state to do so since the visit of Gaston Doumergue, President of the Third Republic, in 1930.
- 21 November 1949 Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly for an independent and sovereign Libya (including the French-occupied Fezzan) no later than January 1952.

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