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SUMMARY

Bulgaria in 1950 is a vassal state of the Soviet Union, which is rapidly being integrated into the Soviet Orbit and being exploited politically and economically. The successful "September 9, 1944 coup d'etat" of the Fatherland Front coalition, dominated by the small Bulgarian Communist Party, wrested control from the regency of young King Simeon. By reason of their well-disciplined, compact organization and unswerving Soviet support, the Communists have, by force, moulded Bulgaria into a Communist state.

Bulgaria is still nominally under political control of the Fatherland Front, which in actuality is the Communist Party. The single list of candidates to the National Assembly is nominated by the Fatherland Front. In turn, the National Assembly elects the cabinet and appoints the judiciary. Thus, through control of the Fatherland Front, the Communist Party controls every activity of the Bulgarian people and enforces its directives by police action. The Agrarian Party, the only ostensibly non-Communist Party now participating in the Front, is made up wholly of Communist supporters who represent no part of the predominantly peasant population of Bulgaria.

The 1944 Fatherland Front coup d'etat met with general approval of the Bulgarian people. After the outlawing of all political parties by the Royal Government in 1934, the large popular parties had not maintained strong cohesive organizations. The Communist Party alone, directed by able leaders who had resided for many years in Moscow,

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maintained and perfected a small but effective underground organization in Bulgaria. This Communist Party was the strong force in the anti-Nazi resistance movement during World War II and consequently was already organized to assume leadership of the Front.

With collapse of the Axis in 1944, the disorganized country willingly accepted the well-laid Communist plans for an ostensible coalition government. Under the Fatherland Front, Communists had no difficulty in assuming control of key positions in the new government. Non-Communist political leaders did not become aware of the Communist plan to control the country and tie it irrevocably to Moscow until after the Communists had effectively established complete police control.

The USSR has successfully blocked all efforts of the non-Communist nations to protect the Bulgarian people from imposition of Communist totalitarianism. By taking advantage of its position as chairman of the Allied Control Commission, supported by its own occupation army during the Armistice period, and as one of the three supervisory powers under the Peace Treaty, the USSR directed the systematic extermination of all opposition leaders and groups, and set up a Soviet-controlled police state.

Bulgarian economic progress since the war has been slow and sporadic. Industrial output is barely equal to that of the prewar period. Bulgaria lacks developed facilities and capital goods for major industrial expansion. Expansion requires large imports of coal, coke, oil, iron, steel, equipment and machinery and chemicals. Electric power is also in short supply. Poor transportation facilities have hindered economic development despite peak loading.

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Agricultural production has risen and in some instances equals the prewar status. Grain production and livestock numbers in 1950 should approximate prewar averages; the output of industrial crops, particularly tobacco, the chief export to the West, and beet sugar have risen sharply. Collectivization, disguised as a cooperative movement, has not yet attained full achievement, although Bulgaria is the most highly collectivized of the Soviet Satellites.

The USSR has consolidated its authority over Bulgaria by: (1) forcing the Bulgarian economy to coordinate its activities more closely with other Soviet bloc countries under the Kremlin-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance; (2) placing Soviet personnel in the administration of key economic ministries; (3) increasing the number of Soviet advisers and technicians in important lines of the economy; (4) dictating trade agreements; and (5) acting as a profiting middleman in the disposal of important Bulgarian exports. The present Bulgarian Five-Year Plan itself was undoubtedly drawn under Moscow's guidance.

The fundamental aims of Bulgarian economic planning, as in all Communist countries, are to communize, modernize, and industrialize. A prewar production ratio of 70:30 between agriculture and industry is to be replaced by the end of 1953 by a ratio of 45:55. Total industrial output by the end of the Five-Year Plan is scheduled to be more than double 1940 production. Principal emphasis is on heavy industry, which is to absorb 83 percent of investment funds. The largest investments are for the development of electric power, mining and the mechanization of agriculture.

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During 1949 and 1950, the weak Bulgarian Army has received increasing Soviet attention. Soviet "advisers" now control the Ministry of Defense and direct political and military training of the armed forces. The Bulgarian Army has steadily increased in size. Its strength is estimated at 105,000. Soviet equipment has almost entirely replaced German materiel, and large Soviet military shipments into Bulgaria continue. At least 30,000 uniformed militia and 13,500 frontier guards are trained and equipped to supplement the army immediately.

The greatest threat to Soviet control of Bulgaria is disaffection within the party itself. Since the beginning of 1949, the party has undergone a continual purge, initiated by the demotion, arrest, trial and execution of Traicho Kostov and conviction of his alleged co-conspirators. Since the trial in December 1949, a continuing party purge has removed 90,000 party members and at least one-third of the Central Committee. Simultaneous purges have removed numerous high-level government and army officials, charged with Kostovism (i.e. suspected of less than complete subservience to the Krenlin). To insure against deviation within the Bulgarian Communist Party and the government, Soviet officials supervise and direct the activities of all key ministries, the army and militia.

Bulgaria occupies a strategic position bordering on Turkey and Greece, which are bases of the Western position in the Near East. It also borders on Yugoslavia, the successful dissenter from Stalinist Communism. This makes the continuance of complete Soviet control over

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Bulgaria a prime consideration for the Krenlin. Offensively, Bulgaria would provide one of the main bases for aggression in the Balkan area. Defensively, Bulgaria acts as a buffer between Western powers and the Soviet Ukraine. In the current cold war phase of East-West relations, Bulgaria is useful for propaganda and pressures against Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Genesis Of Present Political Situation.a. Historical Background of the Bulgarian State.

Through centuries of struggle alternately for domination and survival, the Bulgarians have maintained their identity as an intensely nationalistic and aggressive people. The Bulgars, a migratory Mongolian tribe powerfully organized under a military leader, overwhelmed the Slavs south of the Danube in the seventh century. The resulting merger of conquerors and conquered created as a Bulgarian heritage the name, military organization and fierce nationalism of the Asiatic invaders and the language and customs of the Slavs. Although the Bulgarian state in the tenth century became the most powerful in southeastern Europe, encompassing territory from the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara to the Adriatic, it succumbed to Byzantine rule (1018-1186). Bulgaria recovered its independence and became a successful conqueror under the Asen dynasty (1187-1258), but weakened by internal dissension and invasion, it was finally incorporated into the Ottoman Empire (1393), losing all political independence.

In 1876, after five centuries of subjection to Turkish rule, the Bulgarians rose in revolt. Such violence marked the suppressive measures taken by the Turks that the European powers demanded radical Turkish colonial reforms. Failure of the Turks to comply with these demands culminated in the Russo-Turk War (1877-1878) and the defeat of the latter.

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The Russian-dictated terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) established a large, autonomous Bulgaria, comprising approximately three-fifths of the Balkan peninsula, including western Thrace and almost all of eastern Macedonia as far as the Vardar River. The European powers, alarmed by growing Russian influence in the Balkans, called the Congress of Berlin in 1879, and there nullified the Treaty of San Stefano, reducing Bulgaria to the small territory between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains and creating the separate eastern province of Rumelia. Russia's willingness to satisfy Bulgarian territorial aspirations in the larger state envisioned at San Stefano, created strong Bulgarian susceptibility to Russian influence. Pro-Russian sentiment has since been a powerful influence in Bulgarian affairs.

The Treaty of Berlin established Bulgaria as a constitutional monarchy under nominal Turkish suzerainty. Russian-sponsored Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a nephew of Czar Alexander II, was elected by the first Bulgarian Assembly to head the new state, pursuant to a constitution adopted at Trnovo in 1879. For several years, Alexander was the creature of Russia, accepting a Russian-dominated cabinet which immediately suspended the new constitution. His ambition to become a ruler finally led him, however, to turn from Russian influence, restore the constitution, and effect a reconciliation with his people. With popular Bulgarian and Rumelian backing, he annexed and incorporated the latter province into Bulgaria. His success was short-lived. Aroused by the Bulgar territorial acquisition, the Serbs invaded the country. Although they were unexpectedly routed, intervention by Austria saved

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then and it limited Bulgarian gains to an increase in national prestige. Bulgaria's growing independence also caused Russia to redouble its efforts to regain control of Bulgaria. Russian intrigues brought about a coup, which forced Alexander to abdicate. After a counter-revolution, he returned for a time, then finally abdicated again because of lack of Russian support.

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was elected by the assembly to succeed Alexander. His position was rendered so difficult by Russian and Turkish opposition that the government was for six years virtually a Liberal Party dictatorship under Premier Stambulov. Anxious to receive Russian recognition, Ferdinand ousted Stambulov and established a Russophile regime. Discontent with Bulgarian dependence alternately on Turkey and Russia led Ferdinand, as it had led his predecessor, to resort to war to strengthen his position. In the First Balkan War (1912) Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece wrested Macedonia from Turkey. The inability of the victors to agree on a division of the spoils precipitated an attack by Bulgaria on Serbia, which led to the Second Balkan War. Serbia, aided by Greece, Turkey, and Rumania, won a quick victory that deprived Bulgaria of all Macedonian territory except the small Pirin area. As an additional Bulgarian penalty, the southern Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania. The severing of most of Macedonia from Bulgaria still serves as an issue for Bulgarian irredentism against Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia.

In World War I, Bulgaria, embittered by Balkan war losses and lured by promises of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of her neighbors, joined the central powers. By the treaty of Neuilly (1919),

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Bulgaria was forced to withdraw from territory seized from Yugoslavia and Greece and occupied during the war. Bulgaria also lost to Yugoslavia an additional strip along the Yugoslav border (the so-called Western Provinces) and lost to Greece, Western Thrace with its Aegean outlet.

During the reign of Ferdinand, partly as a result of Bulgarian territorial losses of the Second Balkan War, strong internal opposition had grown up in Bulgaria. Ferdinand held down this opposition by the use of the army and of terrorists of the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). The latter organization had been founded in 1893 for the purpose of liberating Macedonia from the Turks and creating an independent Macedonian state. As the result of Ferdinand's efforts, IMRO came under Bulgarian influence and survived through Bulgarian support. Boris, who succeeded his father Ferdinand at the end of the war, maintained himself in power through the army and IMRO and moved steadily toward dictatorship, suspending the constitution and abolishing political parties.

The strong pro-German orientation of Bulgaria, fostered by Boris and his cabinet, brought Bulgaria into World War II again on the losing side, but not as a united nation. Although the German Army occupied Bulgaria and Bulgaria declared war against England and the US, many oppositionists fled to Yugoslavia, joining anti-Nazi partisan forces there, while others remained in Bulgaria and organized partisan bands which proved a constant source of harassment to the Nazis.

In the summer of 1944, as the Russian Army was on the verge of entering Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Government, realizing that defeat and

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Soviet occupation were imminent, sent a delegation to Cairo to seek peace from the Western allies. The USSR, however, established its own pre-eminent right to power in Bulgaria by issuing a declaration of war against Bulgaria and immediately granting an armistice. Soviet troops then occupied the country.

On 28 October 1944 Bulgaria signed an armistice agreement with the USSR, the UK and the US, which provided for an Allied Control Commission of the three powers under Russian chairmanship to regulate and supervise the execution of its terms until a peace treaty could be signed. The Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria became effective on 15 September 1947. By a plebiscite in 1946, Bulgaria became a republic. The young King Simeon, who had succeeded to the throne upon the death of Boris in 1943, was exiled to Egypt, and the regency which had ruled for him was disbanded.

b. Origin and Rise of the Communist Party.

Bulgarian Communism emerged from the Soviet Democrat Party. In 1903 under the leadership of Dimitar Blagoev, the "narrow" socialist group broke away from the Social Democrat Party as a "Marxist Party of the labor class." The two persons destined to become the most influential leaders of the Communist movement in Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov, were members of this group. In 1919 the party became the Bulgarian Communist Party and entered the Communist International, which Dimitrov and Kolarov helped to create.

The Bulgarian Party Congress in 1921 adopted as its goal the Soviet form of dictatorship of the proletariat and proclaimed as an indispensable

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prerequisite for accomplishment of the aims of Communism the alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class.

The ill-fated Communist uprising against the Bulgarian Government on 17 September 1923, later described as "premature" by Dimitrov, resulted in the outlawing of the party. Dimitrov, Kolarov and other leaders fled from the country and became actively associated with the Comintern and the Soviet Politburo, directing from abroad the underground activities of Bulgarian Communism. During the next twelve years there was constant factional dissension within the party, which was resolved when Dimitrov, faithfully following the dictates of the Comintern, succeeded in 1935 in discrediting the "deviationists", charging them with the bombing of the Sveti Nedelya Cathedral in 1925 and failure to aid in the suppression of the rightist coup d'etat of 1934, which resulted in the outlawing of all Bulgarian political parties.

Having purged its ranks of dissident elements and completely bolshevized the party, Dimitrov, echoing the Comintern, adopted the propaganda theme of fighting against Fascism. The Party Plenum of February 1936 pointed out as the immediate task of the party the building of a popular anti-Fascist front of "democratic" organizations with the ostensible goal of restoring those rights which the Fascist dictatorship denied. The Communists had no difficulty in securing the support of all opposition groups in these objectives.

Upon the entry of Bulgaria into World War II, these segments of the population opposed to the pro-German Government immediately began partisan activity. The Communists quickly assumed leadership of these

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efforts. Years of underground and partisan activities in Bulgaria, directed by Dimitrov, Kolarov and other Bulgarians in Moscow, had built up a tight and well-disciplined Bulgarian Communist organization ready on Bulgaria's surrender to impose its leadership on the completely disorganized country.

In keeping with a Communist policy of "outward" cooperation with all socialist parties and trade union movements for the ultimate purpose of dominating them, the first Fatherland Front which staged the successful coup of 9 September 1944 was nominally a coalition of four parties--Zveno, Agrarian, Social Democrat, and Communist. Of these groups, however, only the approximately 40,000 Communists were homogeneous and effectively organized with a definite plan of action, although the three other parties represented at least 75 percent of the Bulgarian people.

The non-Communist coalition parties were all represented in the new cabinet under the ostensible leadership of Kimon Georgiev (Zveno) as Prime Minister. The strategic Ministries of Interior and Justice, controlling the police and courts, were reserved by the Communists. With the support of the occupying Red Army it would undoubtedly have been possible to effect an immediate Communist dictatorship for Bulgaria, but the USSR apparently decided that it would not be expedient to disclose its ultimate plans for Bulgaria before the peace treaty negotiations had been completed.

To the dismay of the great majority of the Bulgarian people, the Communists, under the cloak of the armistice provision that Bulgaria wipe

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out all Fascist-type organizations, immediately set about the wholesale purging of all elements opposed to Communism. It is estimated that during the first year of the Fatherland Front at least 3,000 persons were executed through "legal" action while several times that number were put to death without trial. Thousands were thrown into "labor-educational" camps. Supported and directed by the Soviet delegation in the Allied Control Commission and by Bulgarian Communists newly returned from Moscow, the Communist partisan forces came out of the underground and established their control throughout Bulgaria, disarming all other elements including the few units of other Fatherland Front parties which possessed arms. The police, accused of being pro-Fascist, were replaced by a Communist-directed People's Militia, and leadership of local government units was seized by the Communists. Although the army was ostensibly under Zveno Party leadership, top Communist administrators were filtered into the War Ministry with the result that a drastic army purge was effected. The Communists were aided in their effort to control the government by the development of splinter groups in the other coalition parties, at least some of which were fostered by deliberate Communist tactics.

The situation on the eve of the 1945 national elections was critical for uninterrupted continuation of Communist control. Nikola Petkov, the leader of the numerically superior Agrarian Party withdrew from the Fatherland Front and attempted to take his entire party with him. A small splinter group which remained within the Fatherland Front was immediately recognized by the Front as the only legal Agrarian Party. The same procedure followed with the Social Democrat Party. Kosturkov,

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a member of the Radical Party, which was too small even to be included in the original Fatherland Front, indicated willingness to join the cabinet and was made Minister of Education. Although his party disavowed him, the Communists officially announced that five parties supported the Fatherland Front, with Kosturkov as leader of the fifth party.

The Agrarian and Social Democrat opposition parties boycotted the polls, despite the fact that their right to participate in the elections had been insisted upon by the US and UK as members of the Allied Control Commission. The opposition claimed that the ministries most closely concerned with the elections (Interior and Justice) were in the hands of Communists, and that the militia, courts and electoral machinery would be employed in such a way as to assure a Communist victory. Specific objections were made to the reduction of the age for voting and office-holding, to the granting to the army and militia of the right to vote, and to exclusion of the opposition from use of the radio. The opposition was further discouraged by a newly adopted Law for the Defense of the People's Authority, which provided for the death penalty for the formation or leadership of any "Fascist" organization aimed at weakening or destroying the authority of the Fatherland Front, and for any action that provoked disorder or discontent.

Despite repeated US and UK protests that election conditions were unsatisfactory and that any government so elected was not truly representative, the elections were held. The Ministry of the Interior announced that 85 percent of those eligible had voted, and that the Fatherland Front

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had received 88 percent of the votes cast. By prearrangement, the splinter Agrarians within the Front and the Communists each received about one-third of the seats in the assembly.

At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, the three foreign ministers agreed that the Soviet Government would give "friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of the inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of an additional two representatives of other democratic groups, who (a) are truly representative of the groups of the parties which are not participating in the government, and (b) are really suitable and will work loyally with the government." Leaders of the opposition Agrarians and Social Democrats were willing to participate on these terms but made additional demands for new elections, the right of the opposition to be represented in the Ministries of Interior and Justice, and the release of imprisoned party members. Moscow informed the government in Sofia that such demands were contrary to the Moscow Agreement, and another Communist-dominated cabinet was installed.

The opposition parties actually participated in national elections held in October 1946 after Bulgaria became a republic under even more restrictive conditions than those to which they had objected in 1945. Protests by the US and Great Britain brought forth bland denials that any adverse conditions existed and assurances that Bulgaria was complying wholeheartedly in the Allied demands for free and open elections. Actually, the elections were marked by Communist resort to hooliganism and physical violence. The official results showed 364 seats for the Fatherland Front

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and 101 for the opposition, with the opposition polling a million and a quarter votes. The cabinet subsequently formed was headed by Premier Georgi Dimitrov, former Secretary-General of the Third International.

The Communists, having obtained a nominal ascendancy in Bulgaria under a thin veneer of legality, proceeded immediately with the task of crushing opposition forces. A mounting series of alleged plots and conspiracies against the Fatherland Front Government, conveniently implicating opposition leaders, were discovered at opportune intervals. All opposition newspapers were gradually suspended. In September 1947, after a trial conducted with a typical disregard of all Western concepts of justice and judicial procedure, the Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov was condemned to death and hanged. In the following year, Kosta Lulchev, leader of the Social Democrats, and eight others were convicted of treason and sentenced to prison. Since then the Communists have disposed of all other opposition leaders estimated by the Communists to have sufficient actual or potential following to threaten Communist control.

2. Government Structure.

In September 1946, the monarchy was abolished by plebiscite, and Bulgaria became a republic. A constitution, adopted in December 1947, outlined a democratic form of government structure. This "government", however, has served only as a legal facade for the real authority in Bulgaria--the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and its elite Politburo, whose members are appointed and removed on orders from the Kremlin. In a widely publicized speech, Prime Minister Chervenkov

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stated that "no constitution, no organization, no personality in Bulgaria can be held above the Central Committee and the Politburo." "The Central Committee," he declared, "is responsible for everything in our country."

The formal divisions of the government are completely controlled by members of the Stalinist hierarchy of the Communist Party. All important positions are filled by Communist Party members of those completely submissive to that party. Intense Soviet fear of deviation from Moscow and failure of over-ambitious economic planning for Soviet exploitation of Bulgaria have motivated a continuing purge of government and party officials. Although Bulgarian Communists hold the positions, it is reliably reported that Soviet citizens actually direct operations in key ministries.

a. The Constitution.

A tremendous Communist propaganda campaign by the Fatherland Front before the 1946 elections, featured a draft constitution prepared by a Communist-dominated commission in the image of the Soviet 1936 Constitution. With comparatively minor changes, the draft was adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 4 December 1947. It is democratic in form and language, but all liberal provisions and guarantees have, in practice, been nullified by the adoption of restrictive laws permitted by its loose wording and by arbitrary action of police authorities.

The constitution provides that all authority emanates from the people through referendum and the free, general, and direct election of representatives in the National Assembly, called "the supreme organ of state authority." All citizens over 18 regardless of sex, nationality,

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race or religion are entitled to vote. Equality of all citizens, inviolability of the person and the home, and freedom of religion, speech, the press, communication and assembly are declared to be basic.

The foundations are laid for modern social legislation: labor is a right of each citizen, with remuneration proportionate to quantity and quality of work; the state insures pension rights and indemnities in case of illness, accident, unemployment and old age; public health service is insured; marriage and family are under the protection of the state; education is a right, primary education being free and compulsory; rights and protection of minorities are guaranteed; aid in the development of science and art is promised.

The constitution further provides that "the land belongs to those who cultivate it" and that private ownership and its transfer by inheritance "are recognized and protected by law." Such guarantee is being increasingly circumscribed by the wide extension of state ownership and monopoly and by broad undefined terms of the state-controlled Economic Plan repeatedly referred to in the constitution.

Since the National Assembly has sole authority to amend the constitution, adopt all laws and determine their constitutionality, Communist control of candidates to the assembly means control of the country.

b. Executive.

The government (Council of Ministers) is the supreme executive and administrative organ of state authority, and consists of the President of the Council of Ministers (Premier), the Vice-Presidents (Vice Premiers),

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the President of the State Planning Commission, the President of the Commission for State Control, the President of the Committee for Science, Art and Culture, and the Ministers. In the present council there are eighteen ministries.

(Appendix B lists members of the Council of Ministers as of 1 August 1950.)

c. Praesidium.

In keeping with Soviet practice, the function of Chief of State is vested in a Praesidium, elected and subject to dismissal by the National Assembly. The Praesidium consists of a president, two vice-presidents, a secretary, and fifteen members. Its powers technically include convoking the assembly, promulgating all laws, exercising right of pardon, acting in place of the assembly when that body is not in session (but subject to confirmation by the assembly), appointing and recalling diplomatic representatives and receiving foreign diplomats. The authority of the Praesidium, however, is so limited by restrictions that it takes no independent action.

d. Legislature.

The National Assembly is nominally the supreme organ of state authority and the sole legislative body. People's representatives are elected for a four year term, one representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants. In the present assembly elected in December 1949, there are 240 members. To preserve the fiction of a Fatherland Front, 156 are listed as Communists, 48 as Agrarians, and 36 as "Independents."

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In reality, all of the members are Communist-approved in advance, a single electoral list of "Fatherland Front" candidates being presented to the voters. There is no provision for voting against a candidate and blank ballots are considered to be in favor of the list.

According to the constitution, only the assembly passes and interprets laws and decides on their constitutionality. It elects the "Government" (Council of Ministers), and the Praesidium, adopts the State Economic Plan, adopts the budget and determines taxes, controls the referendum, and decides questions of war and peace. Since the elimination from the assembly of actual opposition in 1947, all assembly votes have been unanimous and by acclaim. Its sole function under the present Communist regime is to give rubber stamp approval to action previously determined by Communist Party leaders.

e. Judiciary.

The constitution provides that "judges are independent; in issuing their decisions, they obey solely the law." Supreme judicial supervision over all courts is exercised by the Supreme Court whose members are elected by the National Assembly for five years. The Chief Prosecutor, charged with "supreme supervision of the strict application of the laws," is elected by the assembly for five years and appoints and dismisses all other court prosecutors.

In March 1948, the assembly adopted the "Law on the Organization of the People's Courts" which provides for the administering of justice by the Supreme Court, the Regional, District and local People's Courts,

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and other special courts instituted by special laws. In general, the District Courts have original jurisdiction and the Regional Courts and the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The constitution reserves to the assembly the authority to determine the constitutionality of laws.

A striking instance of the flexibility of Bulgarian judicial procedure to meet Communist needs was the adoption of the "Law for the Trial of Members of the Government" on 20 October 1949. This measure provides for trial by the Supreme Court of government officials for crimes committed by them in their official capacity and simultaneously for any other crimes outside their official capacity. The simultaneous indictment of any person associated with them in such crimes is also authorized. This law thus permits the almost immediate sentencing, without right of appeal, of those deemed dangerous by the Communist regime. The defendant is allowed only seven days after the service of the indictment to prepare his case, and the government must bring the case to trial within one week thereafter. By the timely passage of this law, Traicho Kostov was hanged seventeen days after service of the indictment.

f. Local Government.

Local government under the constitution is administered by a People's Council for each municipality and county, members of which are elected for a term of three years. The councils have constitutional authority to carry out all economic, social and cultural enterprises of local interest and to promulgate and implement economic plans and budgets within the limits of the State Economic Plan and Budget. Because of rigid

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Communist control of local elections as well as of all council actions, the councils serve merely to disguise, under the fiction of representative government, the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which is exercised through a parallel party structure.

3. Communist Political Control.

a. Political Parties.

Bulgaria is rapidly approaching the form of the Soviet single-party state. Nominally, two of the parties originally comprising the Fatherland Front coalition still remain in existence--the Communist and Agrarian. The latter makes use of the name of the party which, before its extermination in 1947, was the largest single political party. On several occasions before King Boris outlawed political parties, it had received a clear majority in national elections.

To preserve the appearance of a democratic government, the Communist Party goes through the motions of presenting its single list of candidates through the fiction of a Fatherland Front coalition. Communist leaders, however, lose no opportunity to point out that the party is not subservient to the Fatherland Front but is, rather, its directing force.

(1) The Communist Party.

The Communist Party is the pre-eminent political organization, superior to, and controlling the Government of Bulgaria.

(a) Organizational Structure.

According to the statute of the party, which follows the basic pattern of that of the USSR, the following groups constitute the main organizational structure: The Party Congress is the "supreme organ

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of the party." It meets once every two years and "establishes the tactical line of the party on basic questions of current policy." The Central Committee "determines the manner of election" of delegates to the congresses. The Congress elects the Central Committee and determines the number of its members. The Central Committee is charged with the "organization" of a Politburo for its political work, an Organization Bureau "for the general direction of organizational work," a Secretariat "for current work of organizational-executive nature," and a Central Control Commission for "party control." Between party congresses the Central Committee convokes a National Party Conference at least once a year. Delegates are elected by district and urban committees of the party, but the "norms for representation" and "the manner of election" are determined by the Central Committee.

Theoretically, the conference can remove Central Committee members, and can fill vacancies from the list of candidate members selected by the congress. In practice, however, supreme authority and leadership of the Communist Party and through it, of the country, is vested in the Central Committee and the Politburo. Georgi Dimitrov was Secretary-General of the Central Committee, consisting of approximately forty members, until his death in July 1949. Since that time, no successor has been officially named, but Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov, although nominally designated First Secretary, occupies Dimitrov's former position.

(The members of the Politburo and Central Committee are listed in Apendices C and I.)

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(b) Party Membership.

Vasil Kolarov announced to the Bulgarian Fifth Party Congress in December 1948 that membership of the party comprised 500,000 "perfectly organized and disciplined" workers. In June 1950 at the party conference, Premier Chervenkov admitted that over 90,000 members had been eliminated since the congress and that the membership consisted of 428,845 members and 13,307 candidate members.

The social composition of the party announced to the Fifth Party Congress was as follows:

Workers	27%
Peasants	45%
Employees (presumably civil servants)	16%
Craftsmen	6%
Others (students, housewives, etc.)	6%

According to Chervenkov, the composition of the party had not changed appreciably since December 1948; but he emphasized the fact that new membership recruits had been drawn too heavily from the civil servant groups and that the number of workers should be increased. The number of women members, 61,206, was stated to be entirely insufficient.

(c) Leadership.

The individual stature of leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party has markedly declined in the past eighteen months. Communist control in Bulgaria from 1944 to 1949 was in the hands of able Bulgarian Communists who had participated in the machinations of international Communism for the past twenty years. The leading Communist, Georgi Dimitrov, and his first deputy, Vasil Kolarov, fled from Bulgaria

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after the ill-fated 1923 Communist uprising and remained in the Soviet Union until 1944. The complete subjugation of opposition to Communist control of Bulgaria was accomplished under the leadership of these convinced Communists.

The party maintained a facade of solidarity until the early part of 1949 when Traicho Kostov, the heir-apparent to Dimitrov, was deprived of his party and government positions and later (December 1949) tried as a traitor and hanged. "Kostovism" has become the Bulgarian synonym for any deviation from absolute subservience to Moscow and to it has been attributed the failure of Bulgaria to meet the requirements of the Moscow-directed economic plans. After the deaths of Dimitrov and Kolarov, a ruthless Kremlin campaign was launched to eliminate top Bulgarian Communists whose loyalty to Moscow might be secondary to their Bulgarian patriotism. According to pronouncements of the hierarchy, the resultant party purge, which has already taken a toll of from 15-20 percent of its membership, including hundreds of high ranking members, will continue.

(2) The Fatherland Front Coalition.

The Fatherland Front, which formed the first postwar government of Bulgaria was made up of four political parties which actually represented the masses of the people in the following order: Agrarian, Social Democrat, Communist and Zveno. The extremely small Radical Party was added later. The Agrarian and Social Democrat leaders, although opposed to Communism and suspicious of Communist tactics, recognized the necessity of joining in the coalition but mistakenly thought that their numerically superior representation would prevent them from being submerged by the

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Communists. As outlined in Chapter IB, the Communists have cleverly and ruthlessly used the Fatherland Front to: (1) secure, initially, a coalition of existing political parties; (2) maintain the fiction of coalition by exterminating the actual party representatives and leaving in the Front a splinter group of Communist collaborationists under the name of the original party; and (3) bring about the disbandment of the collaborationist parties as fast as practicable.

The Fatherland Front--which is the sole Bulgarian political organization tolerated by the Communist Party--has degenerated into a convenient Communist organization. The Fatherland Front (i.e. Communist) ticket is the only one presented to the people for their automatic approval. Apparently the Communists, in view of stolid peasant resistance to communization and collectivization programs, still feel it necessary to maintain the fiction of Agrarian participation as a party within the Front. The Front has also become an ideological catch-all for the numerous and overlapping political control organizations which have been set up by the Communists for purposes of coercion and propaganda.

b. Political Pressure.

"The 'mechanism' of our People's Democracy consists of the directing force, in the person of the Communist Party--vanguard of the worker's class--and of a series of 'transmission belts' and 'levers' which help the vanguard with the workers' class, the peasant, craftsmen, people's intelligentsia--the mass of the working people ...," said Vulko Chervenkov in June 1949.

Under the direction of the Communist Party, Bulgarians of all ages and both sexes have been regimented into country-wide mass organizations. These organizations are the "transmission belts" for disseminating a constant flow of Soviet ideology to every Bulgarian and for extending

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Communist domination into every possible field of popular activity and interest including labor, education, culture, and recreation.

Among the more important of these Communist-controlled organizations, with their Communist-claimed membership are: Bulgarian Trade Unions (ORPS), over 1,000,000; Bulgarian Women's Union, 600,000; Dimitrovan Union of People's Youth, 600,000; Union of Bulgarian-Soviet Societies, 1,100,000; General Farmers' Trade Union, 1,200,000. These organizations serve the purpose of direct popular country-wide control, not only in the larger cities but in the smallest villages. The Bulgarian Home Radio Service, for example, reported in January 1950 that the Sofia division of the Bulgarian-Soviet society consisted of 469 separate organizations with branches "in almost all enterprises and offices of more than 30 workers and officials." The many mass organizations serve ideally as forums for the constant reiteration of Communist propaganda aimed at the ideological reorientation of the Bulgarian people.

c. Secret Police.

Communist ideology, forced on the Bulgarian people at a constantly increasing tempo through every conceivable medium of **thought-control**, has made converts of a maximum of 10 percent of the population. However, through actual force, exercised principally by the People's Militia, the Communist regime holds the entire population of Bulgaria in complete subjugation.

The Law for the People's Militia, adopted on 25 March 1948, gives the Minister of Interior supreme power over the militia which, in turn, is given practically unlimited authority over the lives of all Bulgarians.

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Little is known concerning the actual composition and operation of the militia, (other than as set forth in the above law), that makes numerous references to special laws that may be invoked when necessary. Probably the most powerful divisions are the Uniformed Militia (a militarized body which is organized territorially and includes the Frontier Militia and the Special Militia), the Economic Section, charged with responsibility for combating economic sabotage, and the all-powerful State Security Section, which guards the security of the Communist Government of Bulgaria both inside and outside the country. No reliable information on militia strength is available, but total personnel has been estimated as high as 120,000. The high efficiency of the militia is unquestioned. The recent removal of Anton Yugov, Minister of Interior since the 1944 coup, and the increasingly frequent reports of the presence of Soviet MVD personnel in the militia indicate the Kremlin's fear (which may or may not be well-founded) lest national deviation threaten its most powerful Bulgarian control weapon.

All basic individual rights are constantly violated by militia action. The Bulgarian citizen is under constant surveillance; his home is subject to entry and search without warrant; his telephone is tapped; even his presence on the street at an unusual hour is challenged by militia men. Thousands of Bulgarians have been seized by the militia men without formal charge and have disappeared. Their fate--which even their immediate families may never learn--may be forced labor, imprisonment or execution.

4. Bulgarian Resistance to Present Regime.

Resistance in Bulgaria is largely confined to wishful thinking on the part of the great majority of the population, that the hated Communist

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regime will be overthrown as the result of a Soviet defeat at the hands of the West in a third World War. The popular leaders under whom anti-Communist resistance might have been developed have either been killed by the Communists or jailed. A very few anti-Communist leaders have escaped from the country, but time is erasing from the remembrance of the people the resistance activities of these leaders, and has probably left some resentment of their release from the harsh life of their countrymen.

Every organization in Bulgaria that was a potential source for stimulating resistance has either been destroyed or thoroughly communized. The Orthodox Church, with its 6,000,000 members, although nominally independent, is actually under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate. Its hierarchy has been cleared of dissidents. The small, once influential Protestant and Roman Catholic groups have been even more completely brought under Communist control by replacement of the Western-influenced clergy with those subservient to the regime, and by the closing of their schools. All cultural organizations with Western ties have been disbanded, and the importation of all books and periodicals from the West has been banned.

Although it is improbable that the Communist regime can readily convert the adult population of Bulgaria to its ideology, the atmosphere of suspicion, horror and fear engendered by the police state minimizes the possibility of effective organized resistance without tangible aid from outside the country. A sporadic series of trials and convictions of purported leaders of "resistance" bands are widely publicized in Soviet propaganda media. It has been impossible to ascertain, however, whether the resistance groups actually exist or whether this is merely another Soviet means of impressing on the people the complete futility of any resistance.

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Since 1949, the regime has permitted a large continuing exodus of the 750,000 Moslem Turks who constitute Bulgaria's only large minority. Inasmuch as permission to depart from the country has been granted otherwise only to a few reliable Communists since 1944, it is apparent that the regime fears the resistance potentialities of this homogeneous and almost wholly anti-Communist group.

5. Stability of Regime.

The maintenance of a firm hold on Bulgaria is of great strategic significance to the USSR for the following reasons: (1) through Bulgaria's traditional claims to Macedonia, the USSR hopes to be able to continue its drive toward an outlet on the Aegean Sea by encouraging Greek-Bulgarian hostility; (2) traditional Yugoslav-Bulgarian rivalry can be used as a pretext for Soviet pressure on Tito; (3) offensively, Bulgaria is a valuable advance base for spear-heading a Russian drive to the Turkish straits; (4) defensively, the loss of Bulgaria would open a natural invasion route to the Soviet Ukraine; and (5) the loss of Bulgaria, which traditionally has been regarded as the most Russophile of any of the Satellites would be a major blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union.

Although the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians are opposed to the regime, the government has complete police control. The only present threat to Soviet supremacy in Bulgaria is from within the party itself. Before the Kremlin can assure its hold on Bulgaria, it must ensure the absolute loyalty of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The tremendous continual party purge since 1949 indicates that the Soviet Union considers its control of the Bulgarian Party to be imperfect. Indeed, it is probable that large

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segments of the party are restive under the increasing exploitation of the country by the USSR. There is, however, no indication of any wide-spread organized Bulgarian Communist opposition which might threaten Soviet control.

Soviet domination of the party, army, police, and government seems, under current conditions, sufficient to maintain the stability of the present regime by force if necessary.

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CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. Present Economic Situation.

The economic value of Bulgaria to the USSR is slight. Mineral resources of uranium and other non-ferrous ores, however, are assuming increasing importance to the Soviet Orbit. Under certain military conditions, the country may provide some logistical support to the Soviet Union, but it cannot be considered as an important economic asset to the Soviet Orbit.

Economic progress since the war has been slow and sporadic. Industrial output is barely equal to that of the prewar period. Predominantly a land of small peasant farms, Bulgaria lacks developed facilities and capital goods for major industrial progress, and development is contingent on imports of coal, coke, oil, iron, steel, equipment, machinery, and chemicals. Electric power is also in short supply. Transportation facilities have always been poor. The railroads, although they have carried an unprecedented volume of traffic, have not met planned goals, and failure to meet schedules has seriously interfered with planned production in some sectors of the country.

Agricultural production has risen and in some instances equals the prewar status. Grain production and livestock numbers in 1950 should approximate prewar averages; the output of industrial crops, particularly tobacco, the chief export, and beet sugar, has risen sharply. Collectivization, disguised as a cooperative movement, has not yet attained

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full achievement, although Bulgaria is the most highly collectivized of the Soviet Satellites. The tempo of further collectivization will be largely governed by the availability of agricultural equipment, most of which will have to be imported, although the industrialization program includes the domestic development of the agricultural machinery industry.

Soviet control over the Bulgarian economy, and therewith over Bulgarian politics, is increasing. The USSR has tightened its authority by: (1) forcing the Bulgarian economy to coordinate its activities more closely with other Soviet bloc countries under the Krenlin-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance; (2) placing more Soviet personnel in the administration of key economic ministries; (3) increasing the number of Soviet advisers and technicians in important lines of the economy; (4) dictating certain trade agreements; and (5) acting as a middleman in the disposal of certain important Bulgarian exports. The present Bulgarian Five-Year Plan itself was undoubtedly drawn with Moscow's guidance and approval.

The fundamental aims of Bulgarian economic planning, as in all Communist countries, are to communize, modernize, and industrialize. A prewar production ratio of 70:30 between agriculture and industrial production is to be replaced by a ratio of 45:55 by the end of 1953. To meet this ration industrial output would have to rise to more than double the 1948 production by the end of the Five-Year Plan. Principal emphasis is on heavy industry, which is to absorb 83 percent of investment funds. The heaviest investments are being directed toward the development of electric power and mining, and the mechanization of agriculture.

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Thus far, Bulgaria has been the least successful of all the Satellites in the execution of its industrial program. The Two-Year Plan (1947-1948) missed certain scheduled goals by wide margins. The current plan appears to be faring no better. Industrial production is lagging, and despite efforts to maintain average qualitative standards, production of defective materials is high. Schedules for industrialization will most certainly not be met. Both materials and equipment are lacking, and there are shortages of industrial managers, technicians, engineers, and skilled labor.

2. Agriculture.

Agriculture dominates the Bulgarian economy, provides a means of livelihood for about three-quarters of the total population, and accounts for about 90 percent of all exports. Small peasant holdings have always predominated; in the prewar period, no holdings exceeded 100 hectares, and 89 percent of the 900,000 farms were 10 hectares or less. This number was augmented in 1946 by the redistribution of 134,690 hectares belonging to "kulaks" (owners of 10 hectares or more) and the former estates of Southern Dobruja.

The Five-Year Plan calls for a 57 percent increase over 1939 levels of agricultural production. To accomplish this, the government has stressed the formation of "farm" cooperatives, which could readily be converted into collectives. A surplus of landless and marginal peasants has made possible the past growth of cooperatives from 110 units in 1944 to 1,605 units in 1950. One general limitation on the government's program from now on is the need to avoid peasant resistance on a scale that would jeopardize the Bulgarian economy. To achieve limited objectives the government has a

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strong weapon in its control over the limited supply of fertilizer, seed, and machinery. A second limitation on collectivization plans is the availability of mechanized agricultural equipment. It is doubtful whether either machinery or the amount of arable land in cooperatives will be sufficient to achieve a planned increase from 3 percent in 1949 to 60 percent in 1953.

Bulgaria is divided into four major agricultural areas: the Danubian Tablelands, the Balkan Mountains, the Central Depression, and the Southern Highlands. Land use is estimated as 41 percent arable, 33 percent in forests, 10 percent in meadows and pasture, and 16 percent other. Approximately three-quarters of the arable land is planted in wheat and maize. The soil is generally fertile. The chief hazard is drought, which is chronic in the Southern Highlands and frequent in the Danubian Plains. Except for rough pasture lands, the Balkan Mountains are unimportant agriculturally. Along the Danube, wheat and maize production predominates. The principal crops grown in the Central Depression, where comparatively intensified agriculture is practiced, are corn, wheat, roses, and sunflowers. Specialty crops, such as tobacco, fruits, vegetables, rice, and cotton come from the Southern Highlands.

Government plans provide for a considerable improvement in agricultural equipment and practices. As an initial step, in 1948 the government requisitioned heavy farm machinery to form the 86 machine tractor stations now in operation. Because there is no domestic production of heavy agricultural equipment such as combines, tractors, and threshing machines, the establishment of a planned 150-tractor station network, essential for servicing cooperatives, is dependent upon imports, mainly from the USSR. The Five-Year

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Plan calls for an increase in the tractor pool of from 4,200 to 10,000 units. Annual domestic fertilizer utilization is set at 65,000 tons for 1953, an amount exceeding the consumption of the entire country between 1935-1944. Although these objectives are not likely to be met, a gradual improvement over present day yields is likely to result from a continuation of the better rotation system introduced by the Germans; elimination of strip farming; the use of improved seeds, fruit trees, and breeding stock from the newly organized state farms; drainage and irrigation projects along the Danube and the Hritza River Valley, and superior agro-techniques.

Communization, shortage of seed, and drought have combined to prevent the re-establishment of Bulgaria's prewar position as a food exporter and have necessitated substantial grain and some potato shipments from the USSR. Better yields in 1948, after the 1945-1947 drought, have gone far toward restoring normal conditions, but peasant hoardings and refusal to **utilize land fully** has necessitated grain imports for the urban population.

Wheat and maize occupy about 60 percent of seeded acreage. Other grains are relatively unimportant and normally account for but 20 percent of the total cereal crop. Ordinarily, yields are superior to those of the other Balkan countries.

Output of fruits and vegetables, primarily because of the drought, has barely regained prewar levels. The chief vegetables are potatoes and beans, both of which were exported prior to 1945. Current potato production barely meets domestic requirements, and bean yields, despite increased plantings, are still below prewar.

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Industrial crops have been increasing steadily in importance over the past fifteen years and have received special emphasis under the Communist regime. Tobacco, Bulgaria's most important export, which is bought by the USSR and resold to the West, exceeds the prewar production rate. Oilseed crops, sunflowers, soya, and cotton are scheduled to provide substantial export capacity by the end of the Five-Year Plan. The planned expansion of cotton output to 20,000 tons (double prewar) by 1953 is to come from Southern Dobruja, and should be enough to meet domestic textile requirements. The cultivation of roses for essences has declined to one-third of prewar, although increased plantings are being made as the result of pressure from the USSR. An analysis of the major crop yields is outlined in Appendix A.

Animal husbandry is backward. Half of all cattle are used entirely for draft purposes; the other half, for both draft and milking. Livestock numbers now exceed prewar levels although they suffered from German requisitions in 1943, and from the shortage of fodder crops. Further increases are planned by 1953, particularly in the number of hogs and poultry. Growth in population has outdistanced the rise in livestock numbers, however, so that today there is shortage in over-all animal products even though there are some exports.

The government has plans for expanding the food processing industry, which, if accomplished, could make it an important factor in the Bulgarian economy. Ample facilities already exist to fulfill domestic requirements; there are 4,000 flour mills, 7 sugar refineries, 15 breweries and 6 distilleries, 100 canning factories, 6 frozen food and 20 oil extracting plants. German influences greatly expanded the last three categories in the late thirties and during the war.

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Bulgaria's urban food rationing system, since its inception in 1941, has been continually plagued by difficulties created by peasant hoarding, bureaucracy, and poor transportation. Government-allocated acreage and production quotas theoretically control the utilization of food, but peasant intransigence has greatly handicapped the Communist programs. These factors are in part responsible for the continued imports of Soviet grain--160,000 tons in 1949-19 --although it is possible that a large part is destined for stockpiling.

3. Forest and Forest Products.

Bulgaria's wood products industry, which is primitive and underdeveloped, furnishes the bulk of domestic consumption, except of pulp and paper products. Newsprint is so critical that circulation of the two leading Communist papers had to be curtailed in January 1950.

The Five-Year Plan calls for a 63 percent expansion in the wood processing industry. If attained, this would eliminate dependence upon imports for construction timber (currently 30,000-50,000 tons from Rumania), and furnish a valuable export item. Although 1949 schedules have been met, fulfillment of the plan is unlikely. It is improbable that sufficient felling and processing equipment will be acquired and the necessary transport facilities developed to reach the 1953 goal, owing to its relative unimportance in the orbit economy. Indigenous production by 1953 should cover construction timber requirements, but pulp and paper products will still be needed from abroad.

Timber output has increased gradually since 1934, in direct ratio to transportation facilities. Annual growth, between 6 and 6.5 million cubic meters exceeded fellings until 1947. The total cut of 5.6 million

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cubic meters, in 1938 (.9 million for industrial use and 4.7 million for fuel) reached 7 million cubic meters (2 million industrial and 5 million fuel) by 1949.

4. Transportation.

Five overburdened rail lines form the backbone of the Bulgarian transportation system. Practically all freight and passenger travel is by rail. Although through truck routes are developing, motor haulage is still largely restricted to urban drayage. Waterborne commerce primarily transits the Danube and Black Sea, and air movements are insignificant. Administration has recently been nationalized by consolidation of the 18 directorates concerned with transportation into one ministry with four administrations (rail, auto, water, and air).

The railway system is one of the weakest in Europe. It has long suffered from undermaintenance, overexploitation, and decrepit equipment. Traffic is too diversified, the largest tonnage being coal (17.6 percent of all freight), followed by grain (11.1 percent). Line capacity is limited by shallow road beds, light ballast and rails, sharp curves, and frequent gradients; double heading of locomotives is required for many trains. Average speed in 1946 was 12 miles per hour and the maximum line capacity was 12 trains daily, with an average of 8 to 10.

Equipment inventories, although statistically superior to prewar (185 percent for locomotives and 141 percent for freight cars, comparing 1938 and 1949), are generally obsolete. Because railway equipment manufacturing facilities have been non-existent, with the possible exception of a plant in Sofia, all rolling stock has had to be imported, traditionally from Germany and Austria. Used equipment of Czech, Polish

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and German origin has constituted the bulk of postwar acquisitions. Practically all cars are of the light two-axle type, and a few have air brakes; postwar acquisition of West German air brakes was halted by Western export controls. Chief repair facilities are in Sofia, Plovdiv and Gorna Orehovitsa. Railway shop capacity, although still inadequate, is slowly increasing, and a return to prewar efficiency is indicated by a drop in the number of unserviceable locomotives from 60 percent in 1944 to 12.5 percent in 1949.

Projected and partially completed rail lines would greatly ease the current situation and would be of some strategic importance. A major difficulty which has developed, however, in that the 184 kilometers of new and 27,186 kilometers of repaired trackage "contributed" by "volunteer" youth brigades proved to be unserviceable until it was completely rebuilt. Goals of the Five-Year Plan are: (1) an estimated 27 percent increase over 1949 in tons per train, (2) a reduction in turn-around-time from six to five days, (3) large increases in locomotives and car inventories, (4) an almost quadrupling of cars with automatic brakes, and (5) the installation of 161 kilometers of block signals. Over-all fulfillment is not expected until the late fifties, taking into consideration other prior orbit demands. But thanks to greatly intensified use of existing facilities and Soviet standards and techniques, the freight load is nearly double that of the prewar period, and existing deficiencies may not be critical for the accomplishment of the Five-Year Plan. The deficiencies of the transportation system would not seriously hamper Soviet military operations in the Balkans. Existing roads and railways give the Soviet Union direct connection across Bulgaria with the frontiers of Turkey,

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Greece, and Yugoslavia. These routes are adequate to support military operations against all three of these countries simultaneously.

Motor transport has always been underdeveloped, with neither roads, vehicles, nor maintenance facilities adequate even by the low standards of the Balkans. Accordingly, the government is stressing this field, planning the doubling of highway mileage, a 395 percent increase in freight tonnage, and a 59 percent increase in motor vehicles by the end of the Five-Year Plan. Projected truck and bus routes are to supplement the rail network. Motor services paralleling rail lines are to be eliminated and the equipment is to be shifted to improve schedules in areas such as the Balkan mountains, where few other forms of modern transportation exist. Under this plan, 35 percent has been added to road mileage, and freight tonnage hauled has been doubled in the past two years. At this rate of progress, planned increases should generally be made on schedule, but even so, vehicle traffic will continue to be of minor importance in Bulgarian transportation.

The present supply of trucks, augmented by abandoned German vehicles, is greater than prewar. Equipment, except for a few spares, must be imported. Most of it comes from the USSR, which has furnished Bulgaria 1,500 trucks since the war; supplementary sources are Czechoslovakia, Austria, and France. The problem of maintenance is formidable, as a result of the diversified origin of past acquisitions, which often require obsolete parts, and the shortage of skilled mechanics and repair shops. **The situation** is being eased by concentrating imports on a few Soviet and Czech models, and by increasing the pool of trained labor and expanding repair facilities.

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The Bulgarian Merchant Marine has always been small. It now consists of about 25 vessels with a gross dead weight of 20,000 tons. Port capacity is low; stevedore labor is inefficient and underpaid, and mechanized handling equipment scarce. Domestic shipbuilding is largely confined to the port of Stalin (Varna) which has the industry's only drydock. Regular sailings are confined to the Black Sea and the Danube. There is also an irregular service in the Eastern Mediterranean. Bulgarian ships have never been capable of carrying more than a minor share of foreign trade. But the increase in Soviet-Bulgarian commerce, which requires a comparatively short haul, has led to a greater reliance on the home fleet. The shift in foreign trade, which is predominately waterborne, from Central Europe to the USSR has also resulted in reducing Danube River shipments to but a fraction of prewar volume. Stalin has replaced Bourgas as the leading port.

5. Ferrous Minerals and Metals.

Lacking facilities for iron and steel production, Bulgaria must rely upon orbit resources for both current requirements and the equipment and technical assistance necessary to develop domestic production. Lack of investment capital, poor transportation facilities, and low domestic requirements previously prevented development of a steel industry, but raw materials, except for metallurgical coking coal, are sufficient to support a small one, and the government plans to develop one. The Five-Year Plan calls for a coking plant, two blast furnaces, and a small integrated steel mill, with a capacity of 20,000 tons of pig iron and 10,000 tons of raw steel. Inasmuch as construction is not yet underway,

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these goals will not be met until well after 1953. The relatively small deposits of high grade iron ore, nickel, titanium, tungsten, chromite, and manganese are being increasingly exploited. Their extraction receives a high priority because they are all in short supply in the satellite countries.

6. Non-Ferrous Minerals and Metals.

Bulgaria's natural resources of most value to the Soviet Orbit are its comparatively small supply of good quality ores of copper, lead, zinc, pyrites, antimony, gold, and uranium. With the exception of gold, all of these minerals are in short supply in the Soviet Orbit, and for this reason the deposits are to be vigorously exploited.

Prewar non-ferrous mineral production was never large, and reserves were only incompletely surveyed. Since the war, the Communist regime has not released data on the extent of deposits or output. However, plans for the expansion of production in the Five-Year Plan are relatively extensive.

Special emphasis is to be given to the extraction of copper, lead, and zinc. New construction is to include a lead-zinc works, a concentrating plant for copper and other ores, and reconstruction of copper recovery plants for the production of electrolytic copper. This program is to be accomplished with the technical and financial help of the USSR.

There is no available accurate information on production of uranium in Bulgaria. Production at the most important source, the Golen mine at Bukhova, has been estimated to be about 120 tons of ore per week. The ore is concentrated at Bukhova and loaded on Soviet vessels at Stalin

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for shipment to the USSR.

One of the most acute problems facing the Communist regime in the exploitation of mineral resources is the shortage of manpower. An unusually high rate of labor turnover and inadequate labor discipline in 1949 hampered fulfillment of the plan for non-ferrous metal mining and caused the industry to fall short of its goal by 25 percent. Productivity has remained among the lowest in Europe. These factors and the prevailing ineptitude in the implementation of a socialized economy foredooms the attainment of 1953 production plans for non-ferrous minerals.

7. Fuel and Power.

Developed resources of coal and electric power are barely adequate to meet current domestic energy requirements. There is no crude petroleum production, even though large oilshale deposits could be exploited at low cost. Oil demands are primarily met by imports from neighboring Rumania. Three kinds of coal are mined: low grade anthracite; a type of bituminous which is generally unsuitable for metallurgical coke; and a good quality of lignite. Production in 1948 was 3.4 million metric tons, and output in 1949 remained the same. Reserves of bituminous and lignite are large. About 90 percent of all coal production is lignite from the Pernik Basin near Sofia. Some 40 percent of total output is consumed by the railroads, 38 percent by industry (principally to generate electric power), and 18 percent for private heating. The remaining 4 percent is exported as lignite briquettes.

Coal supplies are presently inadequate because of the decline in quality, failure to meet planned goals, and poor distribution; household

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consumption has had to be rationed. Good mining equipment, left by the Germans, is wearing out, and the small quantities of USSR machinery available are of poor quality. Also, inefficiency and unrest among the miners is keeping productivity at a low level. Under prevailing conditions, the 1953 goal of 6.5 million metric tons will not be reached; it is doubtful indeed if output will rise much above the current level.

Because of a lack of industries which are large-scale users of electricity, the development of electric power has been slow. Electricity is second to coal and fuel wood as a source of energy. Output in 1948, although double that of prewar (1939) and mainly consumed by a lagging industry, was still far short of meeting requirements. Electricity is available to only half of the total population. The present trend is not so much to increase generating capacity as to attain wider distribution. Lignite fuel and water power resources are sufficient to permit further increases in the production of electricity. Bulgaria is handicapped by lack of equipment, capital, and technical skill. Soviet Orbit production of electrical equipment has not been adequate to meet Bulgarian and other Satellite requirements. Therefore, Bulgaria must look to the West for such imports.

The total plant capacity of 127,000 kilowatts in 1946 barely exceeded prewar. From 1947 to 1949 only about 40,000 kilowatts were added. Most of the increase was thermal, but future construction calls for emphasis on hydro-electricity, which would alter somewhat the 1949 ratio of 6:4 favoring thermal. A planned 110,000 volt network, which will be only partially complete by 1953, will greatly improve the power supply in

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all but the eastern section of the country. The total capacity scheduled under the Five-Year Plan (1953) is 460,000 kilowatts. It is estimated that it will be impossible to construct the 300,000 kilowatts of additional capacity required to attain this goal because of the generally low level of technical skill, the shortage of qualified personnel, and the dependence upon imports from the West.

8. Chemicals.

The chemical industry of Bulgaria is based primarily on the output of little more than workshops turning out comparatively large quantities of crude wood distillation products and small amounts of explosives, carbides, copper sulfate, glycerine, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, rubber articles, bone glue, perfume, paints and varnishes. There is no production of basic or heavy chemicals, such as sulphuric acid, synthetic ammonia, caustic soda, or soda ash, much of which must be imported from western Europe.

Plans for a modern domestic chemical industry revolve around completion of a single \$23 million plant at Dimitrovgrad in the Maritza coal basin. It is estimated that this installation, initially designed by Austrian specialists, will manufacture

annually 230,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and nitrogenous compounds. Because construction and equipment of the plant cannot be accomplished solely by domestic effort, currently inadequate Soviet assistance must be increased if full production is to be attained by 1953.

9. Production Equipment.

The weakest link in the Bulgarian industrialization program is the almost complete absence of a machine building industry. The Five-Year

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Plan recognizes the weakness and provides a goal for 1953 that would be sevenfold the output of 1939. Realization of this objective is unlikely because of domestic shortages in technical labor, special equipment, and component parts. Even if production goals were attained, domestic requirements must continue to depend largely upon imports. Hence, unless the Soviet Orbit greatly steps up its aid, which thus far has been barely adequate, owing to the scarcity of such equipment in the orbit, another phase of the Five-Year Plan will remain unfulfilled and will have an adverse effect on all segments of industrial development.

The minor postwar production developed so far has been confined to simple, general-purpose type machines, such as drill presses, lathes, milling machines, and planers. None of these are on a mass production basis; rather, imports from Czechoslovakia and the USSR are now meeting current requirements.

10. Textiles.

In terms of employment, the manufacture of textiles is Bulgaria's largest industry. To achieve the planned target for 1953 (production is to be 230 percent of the 1939 level), efforts are being directed toward increasing domestic production of fibres, technological improvements, and obtaining additional machinery. The government policy is to increase production in the mills and to decrease that of the village hand looms.

Estimated Production of Major Textiles
(in thousands of meters)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>Planned 1953</u>
Cotton	30,000	25,000	30,000	90,000
Wool	3,000	3,100	3,300	7,600
Silk and Linen	2,000	1,800	2,000	4,500

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The industry is dependent to a great extent on outside sources, particularly the USSR, for raw fibres. Some 60 percent of raw cotton and 90 percent of raw wool requirements are of domestic origin. The textile industry is currently serving Soviet interests. Bulgarian mills, for example, retain for domestic use only, a small part of the yarn spun from Soviet cotton. The greater part is returned to the USSR.

Postwar growth of the industry has been small, and in view of the shortages of raw cotton and machinery in the Soviet Orbit and of the low priority apparently assigned to the Bulgarian textile industry, it is unlikely that the production planned for 1953 will be attained.

11. Domestic Finance.

One aspect of the transition to a Communist economy in 1948 was the transformation of the government's budget into an instrument of state planning, and specifically of forced industrialization. Increasingly heavy government expenditures are financed primarily by the turnover tax (a levy on all transactions), supplemented by expropriations, a graduated income tax, "voluntary" loans, and other taxes designed in part to eliminate private enterprise.

The 1949 budget of 165 billion levass was more than twice the amount fixed for 1947 and over sixteen times that of 1939. Revenue of 211 billion levass and expenditures of 202 billion were budgeted for 1950, the first year for which a planned surplus has been announced. The largest sum to be expended is for the expansion of industry, followed by national defense and state security, and social welfare. A lesser amount is spent for government administration. Now that the transition

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to a Communist economy has been made, future budgets will not increase so swiftly, and will show more extensive use of Soviet budgetary practices.

Inadequate accounting, gross mismanagement, and excessive production costs brought about a serious financial confusion within the Bulgarian economy in 1948. As a result, the government has been forced to resort to supplemental budgets. Manipulation of appropriations and expenditures between various categories and the denunciations accompanying the removal of the Finance Minister in late 1949 indicate obvious mismanagement of financial affairs. The systematic adoption of Soviet methods should restore financial order within the next year or two. The national financial plan, like the national budget, aims at developing industrial production. The largest capital investments are planned for heavy industry, transportation, and electric power development. State enterprises in 1953 are to supply 84 percent of investment income. The remainder is to come from wholesale trade and other sources. Unless there is a large increase over revenue that has so far been derived from state enterprises, the Five-Year financial plan will not be more than two-thirds fulfilled.

The State Bank, which is accountable to the Ministry of Finance, controls the flow of currency, serves as a government fiscal agent, and handles all foreign transactions. The only other important institution is the investment bank, which provides long-term credits for the investment plan. The several hundred local popular and cooperative banks are subordinate to the National State Bank. Technically, the main function of the two principal banks is to serve as media for financing budgetary

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operations in accordance with state economic plans. Maladministration and poor organization of the banking system, however, have largely prevented it from fulfilling its function.

12. Foreign Trade.

Bulgarian foreign trade is not significant in world markets. Chief strategic exports are small quantities of uranium and other non-ferrous ores, which go entirely to the Soviet Orbit countries. The composition of trade reflects the difficulties inherent in the industrialization of Bulgaria's predominantly agricultural economy. Imports are largely industrial materials and equipment, and exports are for the most part tobacco and other agricultural products.

Bulgarian commerce was slow to recover from the effects of World War II. Bulgaria did not receive lend-lease, US war surplus, and UNRRA goods, and it was not until 1947 that the volume of Bulgarian external commerce approached normal. At first, trade was monopolized by the USSR. Since 1947 it has been shared more and more by the other Satellites. Trade with Western Europe is insignificant, in quantity, although imports from that area are of increasing importance to the Bulgarian plan for industrialization.

The Soviet Union continues to dominate Bulgarian trade. The 1949 trade agreement of \$113 million involved Soviet shipments of machine tools, tractors, vehicles, petroleum products, cotton, non-ferrous metals, and iron and steel manufactures. In return, Bulgaria is to supply principally tobacco, with lesser amounts of lead and zinc concentrates, copper and tin ores, and cement. Tobacco resales to third countries (including the US) have been of particular benefit to the USSR.

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The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), organized in 1949 in Moscow, is to coordinate intra-orbit foreign trade and trade with the outside world, with the primary aim of furthering industrialization in the Satellite area. CEMA's policy of expanding intra-orbit trade will aid the industrialization of backward Bulgaria, because it will make available industrial supplies that otherwise could not be obtained. In the period 1946-1949, despite the break with Yugoslavia, the estimated Satellite share of total Bulgarian exports increased from 17 to 30 percent, and the share of total imports from 8 to 45 percent. The benefits obtained from Satellite trade are best illustrated by trade relations with Czechoslovakia. The Czechs have furnished and pledged to Bulgaria, in part on long-term credit, a variety of industrial items such as rolled materials, machinery, instruments, and chemicals in exchange for foodstuffs and non-ferrous ores. Czechoslovakia has resisted greater Czecho-Bulgarian trade because the latter can supply little of value after fulfilling USSR demands. Moreover, that which Bulgaria delivers is of mediocre quality. All Bulgarian 1950 trade pacts with Eastern European countries provide for a sharp increase in the volume of trade. Bulgaria's internal difficulties, however, make it improbable that exports can be appreciably increased.

Bulgarian trade with Western Europe, even in 1949, when it reached a postwar high, is but a fraction of the previous annual average. Exports of \$15 million to Western Europe in 1949 were only a little greater than one percent of total Eastern European exports to Western Europe, and imports were less than 2 percent of total imports, partly as a result of Bulgarian reluctance to compensate for nationalized properties. The principal development with the West during 1949 was the restoration of

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relations with Western Germany and a half-million dollar increase in trade with Austria. The former reopened to Bulgaria a source for industrial and precision equipment, while the latter is the main supplier of strategic grinding disks and is a source of railroad equipment. Practically all the Western European countries have furnished ball-bearings and are contributing to Bulgaria's hydro-electric development plans. Future trade relations with that area will continue on a small scale for producers in OEEC countries seeking to broaden markets in the face of increasing competition and will be limited by stricter export controls on items sought by Bulgaria. Commerce with other than European countries will continue to be negligible.

13. Standard of Living.

The standard of living in Bulgaria is second to that of Hungary, which leads the Balkan Communist countries, but compared to Western Europe it is quite poor. Since 1944, a gradual improvement in living conditions in the prewar and war periods has been reversed. The present situation is as bad as at any time since 1920, and was caused, in part, by economic dislocations resulting from the war and from the impact of Communist industrialization plans on an indifferent and even hostile peasant population. Minor government efforts to improve conditions will probably have little effect, but may check further declines in the standard of living.

The diet of the population resembles that of other Southeastern European countries, in that over 70 percent of the total caloric intake is obtained from cereals. Consumption of meat and dairy products is low. To supplement the meat supply, the government has encouraged the expansion

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of the fishing industry; the output in 1950 is to be three times that of 1939. The country as a whole has a higher nutritional level than that of Rumania and Yugoslavia, because the traditional cultivation of vegetables permits a more varied diet. Bread, however, has been scarce in the cities during the past year; bread rations were cut in 1949, and the price has risen.

The disease rate is high, particularly in the overcrowded urban centers. Tuberculosis is widespread; 200,000 active cases and 50 deaths daily were admitted in 1947. Modern drugs are scarce, except for scattered lots of former German supplies and donations from international relief organizations.

14. Population and Manpower.

The total population of Bulgaria is increasing gradually. From slightly over 6 million in January 1935, it grew to 7 million by 1946 (320,000 being acquired from Rumania with Southern Dobruja), and is estimated at 7.2 million as of January 1950. Approximately 60 percent of the populace is within the working ages of 15 to 55. The total population is divided about equally between the two sexes. Density of population in Bulgaria (about 64 persons per square kilometer) is low, compared with other countries of Europe. Minorities, including scattered rural settlements of Turks and gypsies, comprise about 13 percent of the total.

Government controls, encompassing all phases of labor activity, regulate the assignment and allocation of the working population. Under the law of March 1948, persons between the ages of 18 and 50, specialists over 50, and foreign residents are subject to work mobilization. More

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recent laws not only subject both men and women to mobilization, but also provide that construction workers, defined to include nearly all able-bodied persons, must contribute time to state or public projects. Various "voluntary" brigades and labor "educational" camps are an additional source of labor. Despite such measures, turnover and absenteeism are widespread, owing to poor working conditions and low wages. Moreover, low morale and the shortage of skilled supervisory personnel are retarding development of Bulgaria's economic plans.

The population of Bulgaria is estimated to be 76 percent rural. Government plans call for a moderate growth in the number of non-agricultural workers from 880,000 in 1950 to 948,000 in 1953. This will be accomplished only by reducing the present work force of 2.7 million, and will depend in large part on the rate of agricultural mechanization. The government also plans to induct women and youths into the ranks of non-agricultural labor.

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia supply Bulgaria with technical specialists. Special courses and apprentice training have been initiated, and enrollment in vocational institutes is double that of prewar. The quality of education, however, is inferior to that available in Germany, Italy and other Western countries.

Independent trade unionism has not existed since 1934, when the government outlawed strikes and organized all workers and employers into national syndicates. Most non-agricultural labor is now enrolled in the General Workers' Professional Union (ORPS) which includes 32 national unions. "Voluntary" membership rose from around 600,000 in September 1947

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to 750,000 two years later. Like the Soviet trade unions, ORPS serves principally as a channel for political indoctrination, increasing labor productivity, and administering rationing.

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CHAPTER III

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Development of Bulgarian Foreign Policy.

The surrender of Bulgaria to the USSR on 9 September 1944 and the successful coup d'etat of the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front on 23 September established a firm basis for Bulgarian subservience to the USSR. The Bulgarian Armistice provided for supervision by an Allied Control Commission of the Three Powers under chairmanship of the USSR until the effective date of the peace treaty. The Soviet chairman acted unilaterally to approve Communist maneuvers, and by refusal to participate in any discussion of Bulgarian violations, effectively nullified US and UK attempts to force Bulgarian compliance with the armistice terms. Until the end of 1947, the over-riding Soviet influence in the country was further guaranteed by the presence of the Red Army.

A system of interlocking military, political, economic, and cultural agreements with the USSR and with the other Satellites firmly subordinates Bulgaria's external as well as internal affairs to Kremlin policy. Bulgaria became a member of the Cominform at its inception. Together with the other Soviet Satellites, Bulgaria rejected participation in the European Recovery Program in 1947 and obediently cooperated in the creation in January 1949 of the Soviet-sponsored Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, designed to integrate the economy of the entire orbit under Soviet domination. Bulgaria has faithfully echoed the Moscow-led chorus of protests and war-mongering charges against

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the Atlantic Pact and the Military Aid Program. Bulgarian propaganda consistently follows the Kremlin line.

a. Relations with Yugoslavia.

The course of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations since 1944 graphically illustrates the complete dominance of Sofia by Moscow.

Immediately after the Fatherland Front assumed control of Bulgaria, a program of friendship and cooperation between the traditional enemies was initiated, with the usual political, economic, military, and cultural treaties and agreements.

The meeting of Tito and Dimitrov at Bled in July 1947 climaxed this friendship campaign. The Bled Protocol provided for coordination of the economic plans of the two countries, a customs union, readjustment of Bulgarian-Yugoslav border areas, renunciation by Yugoslavia of the \$25,000,000 reparations awarded to it by the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, an agreement for coordinated activity in their attitudes toward "frequent provocation by the Greek Monarch-Fascists" and on problems in connection with the Danube, "which belongs solely to the countries along the Danube." On 28 November 1947, Tito and Dimitrov again met and signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance.

The mutual vilification campaigns initiated by Tito's break with the Cominform revealed the fact that the Bled agreements included plans to incorporate Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia into the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic. Undoubtedly this was a part of the larger Soviet plan at that time for the creation of a subservient Macedonian State which would eventually include

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Greek Macedonia. The planned seizure of Greek territory probably included promises to Bulgaria of an outlet to the Aegean through western Thrace in exchange for the loss of Pirin Macedonia.

The expulsion of Tito by the Cominform resolution of 28 June 1948 signaled a complete reversal of the vaunted Bulgar-Yugoslav unity. Emphasis, however, is still placed by Bulgarian propaganda on the fact that there is no quarrel between the Yugoslav people, who are represented as reluctant victims of Tito's savage police control, and Bulgaria.

Should the Kremlin decide that overt military action must be used to destroy Tito, not only is Bulgaria in a strategic geographic position for launching such an attack, but long-standing Serbo-Bulgarian territorial disputes could furnish an excuse for attack. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Government is conducting an extensive campaign to discredit and harass Tito. On Bulgarian initiative, the Treaty of Friendship and the customs union and border agreements have been abrogated. Bulgaria has hurled against Tito vituperative charges of espionage and subversion, highlighted by trials of alleged Titoite spies and saboteurs. On the diplomatic front, Bulgaria has declared almost the entire staff of the Yugoslav Legation in Sofia persona non grata. Yugoslavia has retaliated in the same manner.

Bulgaria continues to maintain a stepped-up war of nerves against the Tito Government by troop activity along the Yugoslav border, frequent border incidents, constant harassment of Yugoslav representatives in Sofia, and a continuing propaganda barrage charging that Yugoslavia plans an attack on Bulgaria.

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h. International Obligations.(1) Peace Treaty.

The Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria became effective on 15 September 1947. The USSR deposited its ratification immediately after the hanging of Nikola Petkov and expulsion of the opposition deputies from the National Assembly. As the treaty provided for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Bulgaria within ninety days after its effective date, the Soviet Union delayed ratification until Communist control was assured by almost complete annihilation of organized opposition led by Petkov.

Bulgaria, with firm Soviet support, has consistently violated every major provision of the treaty, and has either refused to answer or insolently denied repeated protests of the US and other Western signatories. The USSR, charged jointly with the US and the UK with representation of the Allied Powers in all matters concerning execution and interpretation of the treaty for eighteen months after its effective date, effectively blocked repeated attempts of the Western signatory powers during that period to enforce Bulgarian compliance.

Attempts by the Western nations to secure a satisfactory reply to a series of notes specifically enumerating flagrant violations of the treaty by which Bulgaria is bound "to secure to all persons ... the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms" have completely failed. The USSR has consistently refused to participate in the arbitration of disputes as provided by the treaty, and has joined Bulgaria in piously maintaining that: (1) every citizen of Bulgaria enjoys complete freedom and all human rights as set forth

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in the Bulgarian Constitution; (2) the alleged violations are in fact legitimate acts of the Bulgarian Government in its effort to stamp out dangerous enemies of the state conniving to overthrow the completely democratic government of Bulgaria; (3) the Western protests constitute meddling in the strictly domestic affairs of Bulgaria, which the latter will not tolerate; and (4) no dispute exists inasmuch as Bulgaria has always faithfully complied with each provision of the treaty.

In 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations, over bitter protests of the the USSR, placed on its agenda violations of human rights by Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. By a resolution on 22 October 1949, the assembly referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague a request for an advisory opinion whether the diplomatic exchanges between the Western Powers and the three Satellites constitute disputes under the terms of the respective treaties, and, in the event of an affirmative opinion, how the dispute would be decided if the three Satellites refused to recognize the existence of a dispute. Proceedings were stalemated by Satellite refusal to name representatives for arbitration and by the ruling of the International Court of Justice in July 1950 that the UN has no right to name such arbitrators.

(2) Attempts to Enter UN Organization.

Since 25 July 1947, Bulgaria repeatedly has requested admission to the United Nations. The USSR's offer to accept Italy and other Western-sponsored nations in exchange for the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania was twice rejected. The last proposal, made on 21 June 1949, would have doubled Soviet bloc representation in the General Assembly.

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g. Relations with the US.

The holding of the key chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission by the USSR and the presence of the occupying Red Army in Bulgaria until December 1947 rendered completely impotent every attempt of the US to break Soviet control of Bulgaria. During the entire armistice period the US, joined by the UK, protested constantly against the terroristic methods by which the USSR engineered destruction of all opposition in Bulgaria through rigged elections, suppression of basic freedoms, and "judicial murder" of opposition leaders.

Despite the failure of the US to impede the Soviet attempt to subjugate Bulgaria, the US accorded recognition to the People's Republic of Bulgaria on 1 October 1947 and exchanged diplomatic representatives. The attempt to maintain correct relations was unsuccessful from the start. With increasing insolence, Bulgaria ignored the normal courtesies of diplomatic procedure, evading entirely or refusing to acknowledge repeated US objections to the violation by Bulgaria of its obligations as a civilized government. Attacks upon the US and its diplomatic representatives became increasingly virulent.

In December 1949, during the trial of Traicho Kostov, the US Minister in Sofia was charged with espionage and subversion. These proceedings were climaxed in January 1950 by a formal Bulgarian demand for the withdrawal of the minister based on these allegations. The US replied with an ultimatum that the Bulgarian Government either withdraw the request for the minister's recall or accept severance of diplomatic relations. After four weeks of complete silence on the part of Bulgaria, the US, on 20 February, 1950 informed Bulgaria that it was withdrawing its entire legation and requested withdrawal of the small Bulgarian Legation in Washington. The US pointed out in its formal

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note that "despite all these difficulties, the US Government wishes to maintain diplomatic contact with Bulgaria because of the sincere desire of the American people to work toward better understanding with the Bulgarian people" and reaffirmed its continuing friendship for the people of Bulgaria, although it had become impossible to maintain its Legation in Sofia "in view of the present attitude of the Bulgarian Government."

d. Relations with Other Western Powers.

Bulgaria still maintains diplomatic relations with major western European powers, although their diplomatic missions have been subjected in varying degree to restrictive measures. Great Britain has borne the brunt of Bulgarian pressure and in order to keep diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria has had severely to curtail its activities. Small legations are still maintained by Italy, France, Switzerland, and Sweden. These are doubtless tolerated because of their relatively small influence on, and limited contact with, the Bulgarian people.

e. Relations with Greece.

The unsuccessful attempts of Bulgaria to acquire Macedonia as part of the Great Bulgaria envisioned by the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) have set a pattern of strife and bitter enmity between Greece and Bulgaria. Armed Bulgarian raiders constantly terrorized the Greek Macedonia area in the early 1900's. Bulgaria attacked Greece in the Balkan Wars of 1913. In both World Wars, Bulgaria seized and occupied part of Macedonia and Western Thrace but was forced out by the peace treaties.

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At the end of World War II, Greece presented claims against Bulgaria for some 6,500 square miles of territory extending across the frontiers of Western Thrace and Greek Macedonia. Bulgaria countered with claims for access to the Aegean Sea through territory acquired by Greece from Turkey following World War I. The final decision denied Bulgarian claims, fixed the boundaries as of 1941, and awarded to Greece reparations from Bulgaria in the amount of \$45,000,000, on which payment has never been made.

Bulgaria has relentlessly pressed its claims to Greek territory and has continuously fostered unrest in northern Greece. On 3 December 1946, Greece brought the situation before the UN Security Council, charging Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia with aiding Communist guerrillas in northern Greece. The Balkan Commission appointed by the UN, although hampered in every possible way by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, found that those countries had given such assistance. A commission remaining in Greece has reported the continued Bulgarian aid to Communist guerrillas and violation of Greek territory.

Since the defeat of the major portion of the Greek guerrilla forces in 1949, Bulgaria has continued to give refuge to guerrillas and their dependents, harboring 5,000 to 10,000 guerrillas at the present time. Bulgaria has joined with the other Satellites in refusing to return captured Greek children, alleging that they are being protected from "Athens assassins."

Although repeatedly denying UN authority over its peace treaty violations, Bulgaria has continued to send protests to the UN charging numerous Greek violations of their common border. However, the UN Special Committee on the Balkans

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stated in its 1950 report that Bulgaria continues to "give moral and material assistance to guerrilla raiding and sabotage parties," and added "the Special Committee is of the opinion that the continuing potential threat to Greek political independence and territorial integrity is to be found at present chiefly in Bulgaria."

f. Relations with Turkey.

Relations between Communist Bulgaria and Turkey are markedly hostile. Bulgarian-born Turks, of whom there are at least 700,000, constitute Bulgaria's only large minority. Although the Bulgarian Government claims to represent the entire Turkish minority, through the participation of a small Communist group in the assembly, in reality the Turks have been ruthlessly persecuted, and large groups have been removed from strategic sections of Bulgaria.

The policy of the Bulgarian Government to refuse to permit its citizens to leave the country has been relaxed in the case of those of Turkish origin. Since 1949, considerable numbers have been permitted to emigrate to Turkey, apparently in order to lessen the internal threat to the present regime of a hostile and homogeneous minority and to reap the benefits of confiscation of property of the emigrants.

Turkish-Bulgarian diplomatic relations have been openly strained since 1948 when the Turkish military attaches were declared persona non grata. Charges and counter-charges of provocation of border incidents, oppression of respective minority groups and violation of their property rights continue to be exchanged. Bulgarian propaganda claiming aggressive Turkish intentions continues to be intensified.

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2. Probable Trend of Bulgarian Foreign Policy.

Bulgarian foreign policy will continue to be directed by the Soviet Union to serve its own best interests. It is likely that Soviet policy will continue to force Bulgaria to maintain its harassment of all diplomatic representatives, except those of the USSR and those of the other satellites, with the design of accomplishing complete isolation of Bulgarians from Western contacts. For the time being, however, the fiction of Bulgaria as a sovereign nation will be maintained to strengthen the Soviet position by sheer force of numbers in international affairs and as a token concession to Bulgarian national pride.

Although the Bulgarian political structure is undergoing repeated purges to replace suspected deviationists, there is no indication of any weakening of actual Soviet control, nor of the existence of any active resistance movement. It is, therefore, probable that only a major war and the defeat of the USSR would return to Bulgaria its freedom of action in conducting relations with other countries.

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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY SITUATION

Since the "liberation" of Bulgaria in 1944, Soviet influence has entirely supplanted that formerly exercised by Germany. A great many Bulgarian Communists who had served in the Soviet Army during World War II returned with the Soviet Army and assumed important posts in the Ministry of Defense and the command of larger units of the Bulgarian Army. The presence, throughout the Bulgarian military organization, of at least 2,000 Soviet advisers increases the effectiveness of Soviet orientation and strengthens the reliability of the army.

Sweeping purges of non-Communist officers from 1946 to 1948 and their replacement by Communists, although initially detrimental to the efficiency of the armed forces, have made the Bulgarian armed forces probably the most reliable in the orbit. Soviet emphasis has been placed on the improvement of the army; the air force and the navy remain small and relatively ineffective adjuncts.

In the event of Soviet-directed hostilities against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey, it is probable that the Bulgarian Army under its present pro-Soviet leadership would fight well, particularly if successful. Although the average Bulgarian soldier is not a Communist, he is amenable to discipline, imbued with traditional Bulgarian chauvinism, and generally apathetic politically. Should initial successes be followed by reverses, the Bulgarian Army, as in the past, would disintegrate rapidly.

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The Minister of Defense is responsible for over-all direction of the armed forces, including supervision of political and military training. The Chief of the Army General Staff is responsible for general efficiency of all armed forces, and commanders of ground, naval, and air forces report to him.

1. Army.

a. Strength and Organization.

The Bulgarian Army is composed of four armies, consisting of 11 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and miscellaneous independent regiments and brigades. The estimated total strength of officers and men is 105,000. This force is supplemented by an estimated 13,500 frontier troops and at least 30,000 members of the uniformed militia.

The army units are generally distributed throughout the country, with the following significant concentrations: (1) the Sofia area; (2) the upper Struma Valley; and (3) the Kurdzhali-Khaskovo-Svilengrad area. During 1949-1950, particularly during the 1950 summer maneuver season, there was a general gravitation of troop strength from the southern frontier to the Yugoslav border.

b. Personnel.

Most of the general officers are politically reliable, relatively able, and have had varying amounts of combat experience either as partisan commanders or as officers in the Soviet Army. A high percentage are graduates of the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. Junior and field grade officers represent the weakest link in the chain of command, both in training and Soviet orientation.

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The sweeping purges of non-Communist officers between 1946 and 1948, in which an estimated 10,000 or more were dismissed, created a severe shortage of trained field grade officers. In order to relieve this shortage, considerable emphasis has been placed on both political and combat training of field grade officers. In spite of recent improvements, it will probably be several years before the trained officer shortage is eliminated.

The majority of conscripts in the Bulgarian Army are of peasant origin. The individual soldier is amenable to discipline, has considerable physical endurance and personal bravery, but is generally poorly educated and lacking in mechanical training or experience. Through mandatory political indoctrination courses, the regime is attempting to insure political reliability throughout the armed forces.

c. Equipment.

Large quantities of materiel are being furnished to the Bulgarian Army by the USSR with the ultimate goal of achieving complete standardization of equipment. There are still fairly sizable stocks of German materiel in the hands of Bulgarian troops. Bulgarian armored units are equipped with a minimum of 350 Soviet T-34/85 tanks. At least 80 percent of the artillery is of Soviet manufacture. The obsolescent German weapons which are still in use will probably be scrapped in the near future as rapidly as they can be replaced from Soviet stocks.

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Fire control and signal equipment is believed to be in short supply. This lack will have an adverse effect on the artillery and especially the anti-aircraft artillery capabilities.

d. Capabilities.

Although reasonably well-equipped, trained and led, the Bulgarian Army alone has limited offensive capabilities. Morale and the will to fight would probably be relatively high at least initially against Yugoslavia and Greece which held territory long coveted by Bulgarians. Bulgarian enthusiasm for any attack directed against Turkey would be tempered by a healthy respect for Turkish fighting capabilities.

In a conflict between the USSR and Western Powers, Bulgarian troops would probably be utilized for maintaining security within Bulgaria, occupation duties in areas overrun by the Soviet Army, and guarding lines of communication. The size of the Bulgarian combat force used would depend in large measure on the theatre in which it was committed. It is probable that in a Soviet drive against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey, Bulgarian forces of considerable size would engage in combat.

2. Navy.

The Bulgarian Navy is small (2,300 officers and men) and subordinate to the army. For its primary operational function — security of the sea frontier — the navy is equipped with one over-age destroyer and about 40 miscellaneous small craft, including 16 harbor minesweepers. Naval headquarters are located at Varna. There are two subordinate naval commands, the Danube and the Black Sea, with headquarters at Ruse and Varna, respectively. Naval bases are located at Ruse, Varna, and Burgas.

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Coastal elements of the frontier troops perform garrison duty at the naval bases and serve as coast watchers. Although administratively under the Ministry of Interior, these units are probably under local operational control of the naval base commands at Varna and Burgas. Coast artillery has been transferred from the navy to the army. The navy's over-all capabilities are weak because of lack of combat experience and Soviet reluctance to provide modern equipment.

3. Air Force.

The Bulgarian Air Force, which is a component of the army, has negligible offensive capabilities and is incapable of defenses against strategic air attack by a major power. The air corps personnel numbers about 6,500, of whom 330 are pilots of mediocre quality. Tactical aircraft consists of 38 light bombers and 48 fighters of Soviet World War II design, out of a total aircraft strength of some 210. Aircraft in tactical units are maintained and kept operational only with the greatest difficulty. Lack of aircraft suitable for the lift of airborne units precludes their tactical use in sizable numbers.

Bulgarian air facilities, comprising 37 airfields and one seaplane station, are inadequate to support a major air effort. Only two airfields have hardsurfaced runways (Sofia/Vrazhdebra and Graf Ignatiev).

Bulgaria's Air Force is currently dependent upon imports of planes and engines from Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Bulgaria's four aircraft plants have the capacity to produce only a limited output of light training planes or gliders of wooden construction; and so far as is known, there are no aircraft engine plants in the country. Since the end of World War II, the

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aircraft industry in Bulgaria has engaged only in the repair and maintenance of aircraft. Bulgarian requirements for aircraft munitions, armament, and aviation gasoline must be met by imports. Bulgaria lacks effective radar defense, but reportedly has an extensive visual and sonic warning system.

4. Other Military and Quasi-Military Organizations.

a. People's Militia.

The primary function of the People's Militia, which is under the Ministry of the Interior, is to maintain internal security. The uniformed militia is estimated at a strength of at least 30,000. Of this total, the Frontier Guards number about 13,500. The uniformed militia units are trained and equipped as well as or better than units of the armed forces. Loyalty to the regime is believed to be greater than that of the armed forces. The total number of militia (including the Economic Section for the control of economic sabotage and the powerful State Security Section) is estimated as high as 120,000. A large proportion of the non-uniformed militia also receives military training.

b. Guerrillas.

Greek guerrillas, estimated to number between 8,000 and 10,000 are receiving training in camps throughout Bulgaria for possible use either in Yugoslavia or Greece.

c. The Union of Fighters Against Fascism.

The Union of Fighters Against Fascism consists of approximately 200,000 armed men, most of whom have had military training and some combat experience and are loyal to the present regime. Members are divided into

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small units and receive periodic combat training. The primary purpose of the organization is to support the militia and to maintain a general surveillance over the population.

d. The National Union for Sport and Technics.

The National Union for Sport and Technics includes between 400,000 and 600,000 members and has as one of its goals the military training of the Bulgarian youth. All of the sport activities of this organization are designed to help build up the country's military manpower potential.

e. The Anti-Fire Defense Organization.

The Anti-Fire Defense Organization, with a strength of less than 1,000 men, probably forms part of a Civil Defense Corps aimed at strengthening air raid defenses or internal security forces. The members must complete 18 months of military training, after which they are given additional paramilitary training in special schools.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY

1. General.

Under complete Soviet domination, Bulgaria's status affects US security only as it may be exploited to further Soviet foreign policy aims. Bulgaria is strategically important to the US because of its geographic location adjoining Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, where the interests of the US and the USSR conflict.

In the event of war between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, Bulgaria would serve the Soviet Union offensively as a bridgehead and communication line into the Mediterranean area and the Near East. Defensively, it is an important Soviet buffer against any attack aimed at the relatively vulnerable Ukraine.

The fiction that Bulgaria is a sovereign and independent nation is consistently maintained and exploited by the Soviet Union. Although all Bulgarian participation in international affairs is wholly dictated by the USSR, the Soviet Union is in a position to disclaim responsibility for the acts of the "sovereign Bulgarian nation" in the event of any miscalculation. The USSR has made full use of this subterfuge in refusing to cooperate in Western attempts to force Bulgarian adherence to the terms of its peace treaty, thus permitting Bulgaria to engage in a growing rearmament program.

Bulgaria, together with the other Cominform Satellites, is a continuing threat to peace in the Balkans, necessitating diversion of funds and manpower by adjoining countries to the maintenance of costly military

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establishments at the expense of development of their normal economies. Bulgaria has continually provoked incidents on the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish borders; large-scale troop maneuvers have been held near the border regions during 1950; a virulent propaganda campaign has been consistently waged charging US-sponsored aggressive plans of all three neighboring countries against Bulgaria. The possibility is ever-present that the USSR might direct a Satellite attack, to include Bulgaria, against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey, in that order.

2. Political.

Of strategic importance to the US is the fact that at least eighty percent of the Bulgarian population, which is anti-Communist, and probably a majority of Bulgarian Communists, resent Soviet control and exploitation of their country. The Soviet-oriented Bulgarian Communists and the Soviet agents in Bulgaria have tried through propaganda and terror, to eliminate this potential source of resistance, but they have not been entirely successful. Because of Bulgaria's exposed strategic position, continuing emphasis must be placed by the USSR on control measures. If the Soviet control apparatus over the Bulgarians should be weakened appreciably and if Western aid were assured, Bulgarian resistance might threaten continued Communist domination.

3. Economic.

The present economic value of Bulgaria to the Soviet Orbit is slight, although Soviet exploitation has succeeded in obtaining: (a) certain metals, including uranium, which are in short supply in the orbit; (b) the resale of Bulgarian tobacco, one of the country's most important commercial crops, and

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(c) the use of agricultural products, particularly wheat, in good crop years. Industrially, Bulgaria will be a liability to the USSR for many years, unless the Soviet Orbit is able to supply basic equipment and technical education far in excess of probabilities. In the event of war, Bulgaria could contribute significant amounts of food to Soviet and orbit forces in that area.

4. Military.

The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis within the past year on improvement of the Bulgarian Army. The result has probably been a significant increase in the offensive and defensive potential of the Bulgarian Army. The Bulgarian Army would probably fight effectively in any Soviet-sponsored aggression against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey because of historic Bulgarian antipathy toward these neighboring countries. The Bulgarian Army, however, would need to be substantially augmented by other Soviet/Satellite forces to defeat any of these countries.

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CHAPTER VI

PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY

Soviet control of the Bulgarian Government, the Communist Party, and the people will become progressively stronger. Penetration of all Bulgarian activities by an ever-increasing number of Soviet agents and an intensive Stalinist-Communist education program for the Bulgarian people will prevent the organization of any large-scale resistance movement in Bulgaria. Soviet fears of Bulgarian national deviation, however, will continue to plague the regime and result in continuing purges.

Bulgaria will become progressively more isolated from the West and more firmly integrated into the Soviet Orbit. The Bulgarian Government will impose increasingly restrictive measures on remaining Western diplomatic missions and may at any time sever diplomatic relations entirely. Improved radio jamming and more stringent radio control measures may cut off the last access of the Bulgarian people to Western information.

There is a growing danger to US security in the strengthening of the Bulgarian Army, which may become powerful enough to launch an offensive action against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey. Bulgarian propaganda places continuing emphasis on the danger of imminent attack from neighboring countries described as tools of US aggressive plans for destruction of the Soviet Orbit. Bulgaria's relentless campaign to harass Greece by constant border violations will continue to hamper US efforts to build up the Greek economy as a bulwark against Soviet external and internal aggression.

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APPENDIX A

TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain.a. Danubian Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Bank of the Danube, unlike the marshy, willow-lined Rumanian side, rises sharply from the river. The valley bottom widens in only a few places, notably near Vidin and east of Ruse. Immediately along the river, however, are 5 of the 39 Bulgarian towns with a population of more than 10,000. The towns are supported chiefly by traffic with the rich Danube tableland. South of the 300- to 400-foot cliffs along the river, the tableland slopes gradually upward to the Stara Planina or its foothills. The wide, level tableland is interrupted by a series of north-south valleys which typically have a high steep bank on the east and a gentle rise on the west. Of all the streams that flow across the tableland to the Danube, only the Iskur rises south of the Stara Planina. The others are short and seasonal in flow, since the Planina has no region of permanent snow. Most of the villages are located in the valleys, which provide both shelter and water supply. Between the valleys, the broad upland is a monotonous expanse of rolling grain fields. The Danube tableland, with its fertile yellow wind-blown soil, is one of the richest agricultural areas of Bulgaria and normally supplies one-third of the cereal harvest of the country. Population density is about 80 per square kilometer.

From west to east the altitude of the tableland increases to 1,650 feet at the divide in the Deli Orman. Although once heavily forested, the

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Deli Orman now has only scattered clumps of small trees, scarcely distinguishable from the thick bushes. Beyond the divide, the Dobrudzha presents a different landscape. A network of ravines gives the area a rugged, hilly aspect, particularly in western Dobrudzha; eastern Dobrudzha bears more resemblance to the Danube tableland. In eastern Dobrudzha, however, aridity is pronounced. There are no permanent streams and the countryside is treeless.

b. Stara Planina.

The Stara Planina is the southernmost section of the S-shaped mountain complex that curves across eastern Europe from Czechoslovakia to the Black Sea. The worn, rounded surface of the Stara Planina is reflected in the name, which is Bulgarian for "Old Mountain." Although the mountain chain reaches 7,800 feet at its highest point, the average elevation is 5,000 feet. Toward the west, the chain continues to the Black Sea as a series of isolated hills. The more accessible areas have long been cut over and grazed, but the steeper slopes still have stands of beech.

The Stara Planina has never been a formidable barrier to transit or colonization. Passes are high, but relatively accessible and numerous; west of Kotel, nine roads and two railroads cross the mountain. On the north, slope villages extend to elevations of 2,600 feet. Every valley has a scattering of houses with fields of buckwheat, rye or barley, and fruit trees. The Stara Planina and the foothills are the center of the Bulgarian cottage industries--lace making, leather working, etc.--but the importance of the towns of the area is steadily diminishing. Gabrovo, which has doubled its population in the past 25 years, is the single

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exception. Here a modern industry, including more than 15 textile mills, has replaced the family workshop.

On the north, the approach to the crest of the Stara Planina is gradual, but there is a sharp drop on the south to a series of valleys at levels ranging from 900 to 1,500 feet. The valleys of Pirdop, Karlovo, Kazanluk, and Sliven are located in the depression between the Stara Planina and the two lower mountain chains that parallel it to the south. The eastern valleys are joined by both road and railroad, which pass over relatively low saddles between them, but the railroad connection through to the Pirdop Valley has not yet been completed. The valleys, sheltered by the circling mountains, support a dense agricultural population. Where slopes are not too steep, the valley sides are used for vineyards, orchards, and rose gardens. The alluvian soils of the valley floors are covered with fields of wheat and corn.

In the basin between the Stara Planina and the Vitosha Planina, Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, occupies a position similar to that of Karlovo, Kazanluk, or any of the valley towns. Although it is not centrally located in Bulgaria nor surrounded by especially prosperous country, the city dominates the largest basin east of the Yugoslav border and the strategic route from Belgrade to Istanbul. Since its choice as the capital in 1878, Sofia has become the outstanding commercial and industrial center of the country. Its population of 435,000 is more than three times as large as that of the second city, Plovdiv.

c. Maritsa Lowland

The Maritsa lowland region is about 30 miles wide and it extends west from the Black Sea two-thirds of the way across Bulgaria. The greater

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part of the area is drained by the Maritsa River system. The gradient of the Maritsa is low, with a fall of about 350 feet between Pazardzhik and the Turkish frontier. The western half of the region and the area immediately east of Stara Zagora are nearly flat, with a relative relief of less than 70 feet. The remainder of the region consists of low hills. Near Plovdiv and up the river from Pazardzhik, where the Maritsa flood plain widens, the marshy river bed has been planted to rice. Beyond the flood limits, the fertile, steppe-like land stretches north to the Sredna Gora and south to the Rodopi Mountains. About three-fourths of the land in crops is devoted to cereals, especially winter wheat. On the slopes are vineyards and mulberry trees. In the sandy parts of the hills toward Khasikovo, brushwood thickets are intermixed with the grain fields. East of the Tundzha the landscape changes gradually. Villages are still large but are further apart than in the rest of the lowland. Population density falls below 50 per square kilometer, and in the vicinity of Burgas it is as low as 30 per square kilometer. At Burgas, the lowland ends in three shallow lakes that are barely separated from the Black Sea by low bars. In this area, settlement is discouraged by low crop yields from the salt-impregnated soils and by malarial marshes.

d. Southern Mountains .

The Southern Mountains are characterized by centers of very dense population in the few spots that are favorable for agriculture and scattered shepherd villages in the mountains proper. Unlike the single chain of the Stara Planina, the Southern Mountains are a substantial barrier to communication and form a real ethnic and climatic boundary. The main groups of mountains are the Strandzha, Rodopi, Pirin-Rila, and Yugoslav border ranges.

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Relative relief in the Strandzha reaches 800 feet near the Turkish border although elevations are little more than 2,000 feet above sea level. Because of relatively high rainfall (35.2 inches at Malko Turnovo), the region supports a considerable stand of timber. The chief occupations of the few inhabitants are wood cutting and charcoal burning. The area is one of the most primitive, poverty-stricken, and inaccessible parts of Bulgaria.

The altitude of the Rodopi Mountains increases from east to west. The eastern Rodopi Mountains, drained by the Arda River and its numerous tributaries, do not exceed 3,000 feet in elevation except immediately along the Greek border. Unlike the other Southern Mountains, they are honey-combed with settlements. The many villages are small, if not tiny, rarely consisting of more than 50 families and often of fewer than ten. The chief cash crop is almost invariably tobacco. In the great mass of central and western Rodopi, the few small basins—like those of Devin, Chepelare, and Dospat—are high and isolated. Agricultural production is limited to rather meager harvests of grain, chiefly rye.

The Mesta River divides the Rodopi from the Pirin and Rila Mountains. Here are not only the highest summits in Bulgaria but the highest in the Balkan Peninsula. The mountains have undergone intense glaciation and present a typically alpine appearance, with sharp-cut peaks (above 8,000 feet) and lakes. East-west communications consist of two roads; one, from the basin of Petrich to Nevrokop, which is little more than a trail; the other, from Razlog to Simitli, which is suitable for one-way traffic in good weather. North-south communication is restricted to the Mesta and Struma Valleys. Except for a few areas—notably the basins about Petrich, Gorna Dzhumaya, Dupnitsa, and Kyustendil in the Struma

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Valley and Nevrokop and Razlog-Bansko along the Kosta--the river valleys are narrow and tortuous. Population is concentrated in the basins.

Specialty crops such as tobacco, cotton, poppy, and vineyards are the main source of income. Kyustendil is well-known for its orchards, particularly prune orchards.

The mountains along the western frontier are quite different in appearance from the Rila-Pirin group. They are considerably lower, rarely over 6,000 feet, and much more rounded in form. Because of long-standing Bulgarian-Yugoslav hostility as well as difficult terrain, only five roads and no railroads cross the border south of Sofia.

2. Climate.

The characteristic features of Bulgarian climate are: (1) a considerable annual range of temperature, with an average January temperature of about 28°F. and an average July temperature of about 75°F.; and (2) more rainfall in the summer than in the winter. Within this framework, the climate varies considerably from one part of the country to another.

The climate is most rigorous in Danubian Bulgaria. The temperature regularly falls to 5° -10°F. in winter and may rise to over 100°F. in August. Some parts of the area have the lowest rainfall in Bulgaria, less than 20 inches annually. Southward toward the Stara Planina, the rainfall increases. In the foothills it amounts to 26-31 inches and in the higher parts of the mountain reaches 45 inches. Average temperatures, particularly summer temperatures, decrease rapidly with increase in altitude. Petrohan at 4,600 feet has a January average of 23°F. and an August average of 57°F.

The Stara Planina acts as a shield for central Bulgaria. Winter average temperatures are about 5 degrees higher than in Danubian Bulgaria.

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Rainfall is heavier than on the Danube tableland but does not equal that of the foothills. The climate resembles that of west-central Kansas, although Kansas is a few degrees hotter in the summer and has a more pronounced summer rainfall maximum.

No generalization can be applied to the Southern Mountains, where climate depends on local altitude and exposure. In the lower Struna and Mosta Valleys, which are open to influences from the Mediterranean Sea, the minimum rainfall is in August and September and the maximum is in winter. Average winter temperatures are above freezing. On the basis of records for Petrich, the closest climatic parallel in the US is probably the hills north of Los Angeles, California.

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APPENDIX B

BULGARIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**

<u>Title</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>
Premier	/*Vulko CHERVENKOV	Communist
Vice Premiers	/*Vladimir POPTOLIOV	"
	/*Raiko DANILANOV	"
	Georgi TRAIKOV	BANU
President, State Planning Commission	/*Karlo LUKANOV	Communist.
President, State Control Commission	/*Dimo DICHEV	"
President, Committee for Science, Art and Culture	Sava GANOVSKIY	"
Foreign Affairs	/*Lincho NEICHEV	"
National Defense	Petr PANICHEVSKIY	"
Interior	/*Rusi HRISTOSOV	"
Electrification and Amelioration	Kimon GEORGIEV	Formerly ZVENO; probably Communist
Agriculture	/*Titko CHERNOKOLEV	Communist
Home Trade	/*Pelo PELOVSKIY	"
Health	Petr KOLAROV	"
Posts, Telephone and Telegraph	/*Tsola DRAGOICHEVA	"
Education	/*Kiril DRALIALIEV	"
Communal Economy	Petr KALENOV	BANU
Industry and Mines	/*Anton YUGOV	Communist
Labor and Social Welfare	Dobri TERPESHEV	"
Justice	Radi NAIDENOV	BANU
Public Works (Construction)	/*Blagoi IVANOV	Communist
Finance	/*Kiril LAZAROV	"
Transport	/*Georgi CHANKOV	"
Foreign Trade	/*Dinitser GANEV	"
Forestry	/*Georgi POPOV	"

Member or candidate member of CP Central Committee

* Member of CP Politburo

** Information received as of 1 August 1950

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APPENDIX C

POLITBURO OF BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY*

<u>Title</u>	<u>Name</u>
President of Council of Ministers	Vulko CHERVENKOV
Minister of Industry and Mines	*Anton YUGOV
Minister of Transportation	Georgi CHANKOV
President of Praesidium	Georgi DALIHANOV
First Vice Premier	Vladimir POPTOLKOV
Minister of Agriculture	Titko CHERNOKOLEV
Vice President, Council of Ministers	Raiko DALIHANOV
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mincho METCHEV

CANDIDATE MEMBERS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Name</u>
Minister of Foreign Trade	Dimitar GANEV
Personnel Chief, Ministry of Defense	Dimitar DILIOV

* YUGOV, demoted from his position as Vice Premier and Minister of Interior, has been the subject of vicious attack by Chervenkov. It is likely that his nominal retention on the Politburo is to maintain the fiction of policy level participation by old-time Bulgarian Communists.

* Information received as of 1 August 1950

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APPENDIX D

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Members

Grudi ATANASOV
 Siteryu ATANASOV
 Katya AVRALIOVA
 Nikola BALKANDJIEV
 Stella BLAGOEVA
 Dobri BODUROV
 Georgi CHAIKOV
 Titko CHERNOKOLEV
 Vulkro CHERVENKOV
 Georgi DANILANOV
 Radko DANILANOV
 Dimo DICHEV
 Dimitar DILIOV
 Tsola DRAGOICIEVA
 Kiril DRAMALIEV
 Dimitar GANEV
 Asen GREKOV
 Rusi HRISTOSOV
 Blagoi IVALIOV
 Georgi KOSTOV
 Ruben LEVI
 Alexander MILENOV
 Mincho MEICIEV
 Polo PELOVSKY
 Georgi POPOV
 Vladimir POPTOLIOV
 Todor PRAHOV
 Ivan RAIKOV
 Pencho STAIKOV
 Boris TASKOV
 Lambo TEOLOV
 Georgi TSAIKOV
 Padenko VIDINSKY
 Anton YUGOV
 Todor ZHILVKOV

Candidate Members

Dimitar BRATANOV
 Petko BIGARANOV
 Stoyan DELCHEV
 Diko DIKOV
 Atanas DIMITROV
 Dancho DIMITROV
 Elena DIMITROVA
 Elena GAVRILIOVA
 Lyuben GERASTIIOV
 Stoyan KARADJOV
 Apostol KOLCHEV
 Ferdinand KOZOVSKY
 Kyril LAZAROV
 Karlo LUKANOV
 Mincho MINCHEV
 Vera MACHEVA
 Misho NIKOLEV
 Petr PANCHEVSKY
 Yanko PANOV
 Petr PENNERDJIEV
 Mincho STEFANOV
 Teko TAKOV
 Vasil TOPALSKY
 Slavcho TRINSKY
 Stanka TSEKOVA
 Dimitar YANEV
 Nikola YANEV
 Zhivko ZHILVKOV

NOTE: No complete list of members and candidate members of the Central Committee has been published since 1948. The persons listed above are believed to constitute the Committee as of 1 August 1950. Since December 1948, three members have died and the party has announced the removal of eleven others. In addition, three other members are presumed to have been removed since they have been under arrest for many months.

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APPENDIX E

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CHANKOV, Georgi Ivanov

Present Positions:	Minister of Transport Member of Politburo, Central Committee and Orgburo of Bulgarian Communist Party.
1909	Born in Mokren, Kotel District, Bulgaria.
Before 1927	Little known of early life; worked as a tailor's apprentice.
1927 to 1932	Metel worker; dismissed because of union activities; organized one of first Bulgarian Komsonol groups.
1932 to 1933	In USSR at Moscow Lenin Academy.
1933 to 1934	Professional organizer of Bulgarian Communist Party; member of Central Committee of Bulgarian Youth Union.
1934 to 1935	Arrested as strike leader; escaped to USSR.
1935 to 1943	Communist organizer in Bulgaria; arrested and imprisoned; escaped in 1943.
1943 to 1944	Political Commissar in partisan forces.
1944 to date	Member of Politburo and Central Committee of BCP.
1947 to 1948	President, State Control Commission.
October 1949 to date	Minister of Transport.

COMMENT: Generally considered to be organization boss of BCP. Regarded as a tough organizer rather than a brilliant politician. Chankov's present appointment is part of the complete reorganization of the Transport Ministry because of the miserable condition of transport in Bulgaria. It is probable that Chankov is directing the political tightening of the ministry while operational renovation is under the control of numerous "specialists" imported from the USSR.

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CHERVENKOV, Vulko Volov

Present Positions:	Prime Minister Member of Politburo and First Secretary of Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party President of Fatherland Front.
24 August 1900	Born in Zlatitza, Pirdop District, Bulgaria.
1914 to 1919	Leader student strikes and demonstrations.
1919	Joined Communist Party.
1920 to 1925	Leader Communist Youth Organization; participated in unsuccessful 1923 uprising; fled to USSR and condemned to death in absentia.
1925 to 1944	In USSR: (1) studied Marx Leninism and became director of Marx-Lenin School; (2) member of Central Committee of BCP in Moscow (1941); (3) directed clandestine Bulgarian-Hristo Botev radio station (1941-1944).
September 1944	Returned to Bulgaria with Red Army.
1944 to date	Member Politburo and Central Committee of BCP.
1945 to date	Deputy GMA.
1947 to date	Leader in organization of Fatherland Front; Chief Secretary, 1948; resigned in 1949; elected President, March 1950.
October 1947	Attended Warsaw meeting for organization of Cominform.
1947 to date	Has held increasingly important Cabinet positions, becoming first vice premier under Kolarov and succeeding Kolarov as Premier.

COMMENT: Although enjoying no personal popularity in Bulgarian Communist circles, through close association with Dimitrov in Moscow, strengthened by personal relationship (Chervenkov's wife is a sister of Dimitrov), and unquestionable subservience to Moscow, Chervenkov has climbed steadily to his present pre-eminent position in Bulgaria. He is described as a ruthless and malicious man, of not more than average intelligence, rough and uncultured.

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DAMIANOV, Georgi Parvanov

Present Positions:	President of Praesidium Member of Politburo and Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party.
23 September 1892	Born in Iopushna, Berkovitsa District, Bulgaria.
Before 1914	Member Socialist Party and labor organizer among students and miners.
1914 to 1919	Graduated from reserve officers' school; served in army; wounded on Dobrudja front.
1919 to 1923	Communist organizer Mihailovgrad district.
1923 to 1925	Commanded brigade in abortive 1923 uprising; fled to Yugoslavia; member of BCP emigre committee; returned Bulgaria and organized underground band in Berkovitsa.
1925 to 1944	In USSR, except for brief period in Bulgaria to perfect underground; graduate and instructor Frunze Military Academy; served in Red Army; assisted Dimitrov in BCP and Comintern work; helped organize International Brigade for Spanish Civil War.
1944 to date	Member Politburo and Central Committee BCP.
1946	Promoted to Major General Bulgarian Army.
1946 to May 1950	Minister of National Defense.
May 1950 to date	President of Praesidium.

COMMENT: Damianov's removal as War Minister and appointment to the prestige job of President of the Praesidium followed months of rumor of Soviet dissatisfaction with Bulgarian Army control. Because of his long residence in the Soviet Union and service in the Red Army, it is likely that Damianov will retain his party positions.

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DALJANOV, Raiko

Present Positions:	Vice Premier Member Central Committee and Politburo BCP.
10 December 1903	Born in Gergina, Gabrovo.
To 1926	Very little known of early life; joined BCP; worked as shoemaker's apprentice.
1926 to 1927	Imprisoned for Communist activities.
1927 to 1932	In USSR; activities unknown.
1932 to 1936	Communist worker in Bulgaria.
1936 to 1939	Returned to USSR; participated in Spanish Civil War.
1939 to 1943	Returned to Bulgaria; again imprisoned.
1943 to 1944	Active in Communist Partisan activities.
1944 to date	Elected President, General Workers Trade Union.
1945 to date	Member of Central Committee and Politburo BCP; Central Committee Fatherland Front.
1946 to date	Member of various delegations, representing Trade Unions in Prague, Paris, Moscow, Milan.
20 January 1950	Vice Premier.

COMMENT: Dynamic veteran labor leader and responsible for Communist control of labor in Bulgaria.

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GEORGIEV, Kimon Stoyanov

Present Position: Minister of Electrification.

11 September 1882 Born in Pazrdzhik, Bulgaria.

1912 to 1919 Graduate Sofia Military Academy; served in Balkan Wars and World War I; retired with rank of colonel.

1923 One of organizers of June 1923 coup which overthrew Stambuliski Government.

1926 to 1928 Minister in Liapchiev Cabinet.

1928 Organizer with Damien Velchev of Zveno Association.

1934 to 1935 Participated in overthrow of Ilushanov Government; Prime Minister and Minister of Justice in short-lived authoritarian regime; twice arrested by order of King Boris .

1943 to 1944 Arrested and interned by pro-German regime.

1944 to 1946 Zvenist group led by Georgiev converted into political party which joined Fatherland Front; Prime Minister of first FF Government until succeeded by Dimitrov.

1946 to 1947 Vice Premier and Foreign Minister.

1947 to date Minister of Electrification; lost Vice Premiership in Cabinet formed in January 1950.

COMMENT: Although Georgiev prior to 1944 had been instrumental in the suppression of Communism and establishment of semi-Fascist regimes, as a shrewd, experienced and opportunistic politician he joined the FF coalition. His previous anti-Communist activities and precarious personal position have made him an excellent "front" for Communist maneuvering to maintain the fiction of a coalition government. Since the complete reorganization and purge of the Ministry of Electrification announced in September 1949 included severe criticism of Georgiev, it is probable that Georgiev maintains only the title of Minister with little or no authority. He will be a convenient scapegoat for a continuing failure of the electrification program.

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HEICHEV, Mincho Kolev

Present Positions:	Minister of Foreign Affairs Member of Politburo and Central Committee BCP.
23 March 1887	Born in Stara Zagora.
To 1913	Education included study at Geneva, Bern, and Brussels.
1913 to 1933	Practiced law; joined CP (1913) and participated in abortive 1923 coup and jailed for one year; subsequently jailed for short periods for Communist activities.
1933 to date	Member of Central Committee BCP.
1941 to 1944	Interned in concentration camp where active as Communist organizer.
1944 to 1946	Minister of Justice in first Fatherland Front Cabinet; Deputy to GHA; Chairman commission to draft constitution.
1946 to 1947	Minister of Education.
1947 to 1950	President of Praesidium.
1949	President Bulgarian Soviet Societies; Member of Politburo.
27 May 1950	Minister of Foreign Affairs.

COMMENT: As a convinced Communist and intelligent lawyer, Heichev has been instrumental in formulating much of the legislation by which Communist control of Bulgaria was secured. As Minister of Justice, he organized the People's Court which tried and sentenced thousands of alleged Nazi conspirators.

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PANCHEVSKY, Petr Pavlov

Present Positions: Minister of Defense
Candidate Member Central Committee BCP.

1902 Born in Butan, Orakhovo.

1923 Participated in Communist uprising and fled to Yugoslavia.

1923 to 1937 In USSR: attended military schools and joined Red Army.

1937 Participated in Spanish Civil War.

1939 to 1943 Fought with Red Army, attaining rank of colonel, including defense of Moscow.

1943 Entered Bulgaria with Soviet forces as member of Third Ukraine Front.

1944 to 1947 Activities unknown, but at some time during this period was transferred to Bulgarian Army.

1947 to 1950 Held various military commands, including Chief Inspector of Armored Troops.

27 January 1950 Appointed Assistant Minister of Defense.

27 May 1950 Appointed Minister of Defense.

9 June 1950 Elected candidate member of Central Committee BCP.

COMMENT: Panchevsky is an able and experienced army officer. His long residence in the USSR and combat experience during the Spanish Civil War and World War II as a Soviet officer holding high Soviet decorations for valor indicate that except for the accident of Bulgarian birth, he is a Soviet Russian. He is reportedly married to a Russian and speaks Bulgarian with a Russian accent. His election to the Central Committee probably presages his rapid rise in the Bulgarian CP hierarchy.

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POPTONOV, Vladimir Romov

Present Positions: Vice Premier
Member of Politburo and Central
Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party.

1890 Born in Belitza, Razlog District (Macedonia).

Before 1923 Active in teachers' socialist organizations,
affiliating with left-wing group which in 1918
became Communist Party; trained as mass agitator
and led preparations of 1923 Communist uprising
in Razlog district; fled to Yugoslavia, then to
Moscow; condemned to death in absentia.

1924 to 1944 In USSR: edited Communist publications under
Dimitrov; participated with Chervenkov in clandestine
Bulgarian Hristo Botev radio station; returned
Bulgaria after September 1944.

1945 to date Member Politburo and Central Committee of BCP;
editor Rabotnichesko Delo until 1949; Deputy in
GMA; chairman of Foreign Affairs Commission of
GMA and participated in various Communist con-
ferences in Rumania, Hungary, and Poland.

October 1947 Attended Warsaw Conference for Cominform organiza-
tion.

February 1949 Secretary General of Fatherland Front, succeeding
Chervenkov.

August 1949 to May 1950 Minister of Foreign Affairs.

January 1950 to date Vice Premier.

COMMENT: Poptonov is a hardened Macedonian revolutionary, thoroughly indoctrinated in Soviet subservience. He is the top Macedonian authority in the BCP and has considerable power in determining Macedonian policy. Since the Tito defection, he has spearheaded attacks against purported Yugoslav aggression in Macedonia. His removal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have been merely to make room for the general shifts necessary to introduce a new Minister of War without removing anyone from Cabinet level, as Poptonov was the only one holding two positions. There is evidence that Poptonov is devoting all of his time to Macedonian issues; there is no evidence that he has fallen into disfavor.

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YUGOV, Anton Thaney

Present Positions:	Minister of Industry and Mines Member of Politburo, Central Committee and Orgburo of Bulgarian Communist Party.
1904	Born in Karassouli, Greek Macedonia.
Before 1934	Tobacco worker, participating in union activities and strikes; member and organizer of Komsozol and Communist Party; active in ILRO; sentenced to death in absentia by Mihailov.
1934 to 1936	In USSR: activities unknown.
1936 to 1941	Party organizer Petrich area; organized and led tobacco workers' strikes.
1941 to 1944	Leader partisan activities; member partisan general staff.
9 September 1944	Assigned to Bulgarian Army as Major General.
1944 to date	Member Politburo and Central Committee of BCP.
1944 to July 1949	Minister of Interior.
July 1947	Attended Bled Conference.
July 1949	Vice Premier in Kolarov cabinet, losing post as Minister of Interior.
20 January 1950 to date	Minister of Industry and Mines, losing vice premiership.

COMMENT: Yugov as a seasoned revolutionary, organizer and partisan, occupied a key position in the Communist take-over as Minister of the Interior, controlling the police organization. His downfall has been rapid since the death of Dimitrov, doubtless because of lack of complete Soviet orientation and as a victim of Chervenkov's power grab. Yugov has been publicly criticized by Chervenkov. He in turn has publicly admitted his faults in a servile orgy of self-criticism. Although no announcement has been made of his removal from either the Politburo or the Central Committee, it is probable that his days of influence are over.

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APPENDIX F

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN
COMMUNIZATION OF BULGARIA *

1944

- September 5 USSR declares war against Bulgaria.
- September 9 Successful coup d'etat of Fatherland Front;
accepts USSR armistice terms.
- October 3 Decree law setting up People's Courts.
- October 28 Armistice for Bulgaria signed in Moscow.

1945

- November 9 Return of Georgi Dimitrov to Bulgaria after
22 years in Soviet Union.
- November 18 First election of deputies to National Assembly
(boycotted by Opposition).

1946

- February Law for Confiscation of Property acquired
through speculation.
- March 12 Land Reform Bill.
- April 27 Decree Law for Defense of People's Republic.
- September 8 Bulgaria becomes a republic by popular
referendum.
- October 16 Law for Compulsory Labor Mobilization.
- October 27 Election of deputies to National Assembly;
Dimitrov becomes Premier (Vote: Fatherland
Front, 70%; Communist Party, 55%).

* Information received as of 1 August 1950

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1947

February 18 Law for Tobacco Monopoly.

March 6 Currency reform cuts Bulgarians' Bank deposits and freezes holdings.

April 1 First Two-Year Plan adopted.

May All opposition newspapers suspended.

July 9 Bulgaria rejects participation in Marshall Plan.

July 30-31 Tito-Dimitrov conference in Bled.

August 21 Bulgarian application for UN membership rejected.

August 26 Opposition parties outlawed by National Assembly.

September Cominform formed in Warsaw with Bulgarian participation.

September 15 Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria effective.

September 23 Opposition Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov hanged.

October 1 New Bulgarian application for UN membership rejected.

November First restricted area declared in Bulgaria - approximately 15 kilometers around border.

November 28 Yugo-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.

December 4 Constitution adopted.

December 15 USSR announces all troops withdrawn from Bulgaria in accordance with treaty.

December 16 Bulgarian-Albanian Treaty of Friendship.

December 23 Law for Nationalization of Industry, Banks, etc.

1948

January 16 Bulgarian-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship.

February 27 Law for Labor-Economic Mobilization.

March 6 Law for Expropriation of Large Urban Properties.

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1948

March 18 USSR-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.
 April 23 Czech-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.
 May 29 Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.
 August 11 Fusion of FF Social Democrats with Communist Party announced.
 September 1 Decree law closing all foreign schools.
 September 18 State Secrets Act.
 November Trial and sentencing of Social Democrat Kosta Lulchev and eight deputies.
 December 18-26 Fifth Congress of Bulgarian Communist Party.
 December 29 First Five-Year Plan adopted.

1949

January 25 Formation of CEIA with Bulgarian participation.
 February 19 Dissolution of FF Zveno Party.
 February 23 Bulgaria bans Papal Mission.
 March 1 Law Project for the Cults (subordinating all religious organizations to State control).
 March 6 Dissolution of FF Radical Party.
 March 8 Sentencing of fifteen Protestant Pastors.
 May 15 Election for People's Councils (Votes cast, 96.73%; for Fatherland Front, 93.01%).
 June 11-12 Central Committee of CP expels Kostov and adopts anti-Tito resolution.
 July 2 Death of Georgi Dimitrov in Moscow.
 July 4-5 Sentencing of nine additional Protestant Pastors.
 August 25 CEIA meeting in Sofia.
 October 1 Bulgaria denounces Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.
 October 3 Bulgaria denounces Yugoslav frontier convention.

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1949

- October 29 Law for the Trial of Members of the Government.
- December 1 Two-thirds of Bulgaria declared to be restricted zone.
- December 7 Bulgaria withdraws from World Health Organization.
- December 16 Traicho Kostov hanged (US Minister charged with conspiracy to overthrow Bulgarian Government).
- December 18 Election for deputies to National Assembly (Vote for Fatherland Front (Communist) candidates, 97.66%).

1950

- January 19 US Minister declared persona non grata.
- January 23 Death of Vasil Kolarov.
- February 1 Vulko Chervenkov succeeds Kolarov as Premier.
- February 16 Special courts for Ministry of Transport established.
- February 20 US withdraws Legation from Bulgaria.
- February 21 Bulgaria indicts Bulgarian employees of US Legation.
- March 8 US Legation employees sentenced to long terms.
- June 10 National Communist Party Conference; expulsion of 90,000 party members in continuing purge announced.

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MAPS


- 10928 - Bulgaria: Roads
- 10929 - Bulgaria: Railroads
- 11639 - Bulgaria: Population


The following maps will be available in the Map Library when completed:

- 11573 - Bulgaria: Physiographic Regions
- 11653 - Bulgaria: Agricultural Regions


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