


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FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP, JOINT STAFF

# ARAB STATES



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ARAB STATES

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**S E C R E T**

**SECRET****SUMMARY**

US security interests would be seriously damaged if an unfriendly power controlled the Arab area, not only because of the importance of the region's oil but also because an unfriendly power in possession of the great potential military bases in the area would be in a position to threaten southern Asia and Africa. It could isolate the Arab world from Europe and the Far East and could block the development of world communications.

These strategic considerations, from the point of view of US global security, require stability in the Arab world. Despite a low standard of living and semi-feudal political regimes, the Arab states are capable of developing strength, cohesion, and stability. Notwithstanding the Palestine issue, they still look to the US and UK, rather than to the USSR, for cultural, economic, and military assistance.

Of the seven states comprising the Arab League, two (Syria and Lebanon) are republics, three (Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan)\* are constitutional monarchies, and two (Saudi Arabia and Yemen) are absolute monarchies. Aden is a British colony, and the small independent sultanates and sheikhdoms along the southern and eastern Arabia coasts are closely allied to the UK by treaty. In Palestine, the new Jewish state of Israel appears to be well established, but the actual borders of the state and the final disposition of residual Arab Palestine have not yet been determined.

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\* Since this report was written, Transjordan has announced its wish to be known as the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

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Note: In this report on the Arab states, it has been deemed inappropriate to include Palestine. The political, economic, and social ostracism of Israel by the surrounding Arab states is so nearly absolute that only geographically and historically can it be considered a part of the Arab world. The areas of Palestine still under Arab control have not been considered in any detail because of the chaotic administration and economic situation there obtaining. The ultimate disposition of these areas is still unsettled. Palestine is therefore discussed in this report only as an international issue. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It is based on information available to CIA as of February 1949. However, a chronological list of events occurring between February and September will be found in the Supplement.

Although the mandatory regimes may have been necessary to educate the Arabs toward self-government, they have left a legacy of Arab disunity which is proving a formidable obstacle to the development of a strong and stable Arab world. The artificial division of this largely homogeneous area into separate states intensified regional and dynastic rivalries and built up vested interests in each state with a disintegrating effect on the once-powerful and widespread desire for Arab unity. Instead of pooling their resources, the Arab states have permitted inter-Arab rivalries to sap their strength to such an extent that most of them are today politically unstable, economically impoverished, and militarily impotent.

The economy of the Arab states is predominantly pastoral and agricultural. Social and economic standards are extremely low, and the rapid growth of the population threatens to depress these standards still further (even though Iraq and Syria have great potentialities for accommodating increased populations). In times of normal harvest there is enough food to go around at a very low level of consumption so that in general the Arab states are self-supporting. If this precarious balance, however, is upset by a disaster such as a poor harvest or war, famine conditions result. The area contains great undeveloped agricultural regions which if adequately exploited could produce sufficient food to support a greatly increased population.

The Arab states' greatest economic asset consists of vast petroleum resources, and control of these rich reserves has been a matter

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of vital concern to foreign interests. In Iraq (with oil reserves estimated at 8 billion barrels), the concession was granted to British and French companies, in which the British and French Governments, respectively, have a controlling interest; and subsequently private American interests were granted a share. In the Sheikdom of Kuwait (reserves estimated at 9 billion barrels) British and US interests share the concession. US interests control the concession in Saudi Arabia (reserves estimated at 8 billion barrels, but probably with a much greater potential). Through oil royalties and employment opportunities, these countries are able to capitalize on a natural resource which they are not capable of developing by themselves.

Militarily, the Arab states are very weak, as demonstrated by the Palestine war. In general the Arab Armed Forces are small and poorly equipped, trained, and led. With the possible exception of Transjordan's Arab Legion, none of these armies could mount a successful offensive against any of its neighbors or defend its country from invasion by any non-Arab power.

Although the Arab states prize their independent status, they realize their need for strong friends among the foreign powers. Their natural sympathies lie with the Western Powers, particularly the UK (which has traditionally maintained a dominant position in

the area) and the US. However, the Palestine issue, involving the defeat of the Arab Armed Forces and the establishment (with Western approval) of a Jewish state in what the Arabs regard as their own land, has severely strained this alignment. The Arabs feel particular resentment toward the US, which they consider to be Israel's strongest sponsor, and they have on occasion threatened to restrict US concessions in the area and to explore the feasibility of turning toward the USSR. The vested interests in the Arab countries fear the USSR, however, and so far the great mass of Arabs have remained non-receptive to Communism. Soviet support for the partition of Palestine and the Soviet Union's quick recognition of Israel have contributed to Arab distrust of the USSR. The Arab governments now take the view that the existence of Israel must be accepted and that an armistice with the Israelis is preferable to the risk of further defeat which a resumption of hostilities would entail. So long as the present regimes continue, the Arab states may be expected to reject any overtures which the USSR may make. The danger is that many Arab nationalists, disillusioned over the Palestine debacle and the failure of the governments to enact sorely needed political and economic reforms, will attempt revolutions. The ensuing chaos would provide suitable conditions for Soviet exploitation.

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## CHAPTER I POLITICAL SITUATION

### 1. General

During the sixteenth century the Near East was overrun by the Ottoman Turks under a series of energetic rulers, who conquered the Arab world. The sultans, however, found the task of holding the Empire together an increasingly difficult one, and gradually, as a result of the decadence of the court, successful rebellions by the conquered people, and wars with other powers, Turkish rule became less and less effective.

In Egypt, particularly, Ottoman control was dealt a severe blow during the nineteenth century by Mohammed Ali, the powerful Viceroy of Egypt, who ruled with little regard to the Turkish Sultanate. The vigorous regime of Mohammed Ali laid the groundwork for the modern development of Egypt and fostered the growth of nationalism within the country. Great Britain acquired actual control of Egypt in 1882 and in 1914 established a protectorate. Britain itself, however, was finally obliged to recognize the strength of this same Egyptian nationalism by granting Egypt nominal independence in 1922.

In other parts of the Ottoman-ruled Arab world, nationalism also appeared as a potent force from about the middle of the nineteenth century. Aspirations for independence, nurtured through succeeding years by various secret societies, culminated during World War I in the Arab revolt against Turkish rule. Sherif Hussein of the Hejaz, his hopes bolstered by involved correspondence and protracted conversations with British representatives, raised the standard of revolt against the Turks in the belief that the British would install him as the ruler of an independent Arab state which would include most of the Arabian peninsula and the Arab regions north of it. Since, however, Arab ambitions conflicted with secret agreements subsequently made between Britain and France on the disposition of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs

north of the peninsula were given mandate status under the League of Nations instead of the independence that they had expected. Thus the existence of the Arab northern states as separate entities stems from the mandate divisions decreed by the Allied and Associated Powers. In Arabia local dynasties assumed supreme authority after the collapse of Ottoman power, while the UK continued to "protect" the semi-independent sheikhdoms on the eastern and southern shores of the peninsula.

With the distribution of the mandates, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was completed. France, which claimed a long-standing "historic right" to the Levant in the role of protector of the Christian minorities, received the mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria. Britain, which had maintained active interests in the Persian Gulf region for over three centuries, received the Iraq mandate. The disposition of Palestine was not so simple, especially since many of the powers favored internationalization of the territory. The British, however, who were in occupation of Palestine and who had promised in the Balfour Declaration to help the Jews establish "a national home," were awarded the mandate. This mandated territory included the Amirate of Transjordan, which, however, the British detached in 1922 and in which they set up a semi-independent government under Amir Abdullah.

In establishing the mandates, the League envisaged early independence for the Arab areas, but actual independence was obtained only as a result of the pressures engendered by World War II, except in the case of Iraq, which the British made independent in 1932.

The political structure which evolved in the Arab countries varies considerably. Of the seven states comprising the Arab League, two (Syria and Lebanon) are republics, three (Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan) are constitutional monarchies, and two (Saudi Arabia and Yemen) are absolute monarchies. Aden is a

British colony, and the numerous independent sheikhdoms and sultanates along the Arabian coast between Aden and Iraq are allied by treaty with the UK and are under direct British influence. In Palestine, where the British gave up their mandate in May 1948 and where the Jews have gradually asserted their military strength in the face of the challenge presented by the surrounding Arab armies, the new Jewish state of Israel is apparently well established, even though the final disposition of the remainder of the old mandated territory of Palestine has not yet been determined.

Despite the variety of governmental forms in the Arab countries, political power, whether in Yemen or Lebanon, for example, rests largely with a few acknowledged leaders. Even in Egypt, which has the strongest political parties of any of the Arab states, it is the man—much more than the party platform—that attracts the votes of the people. Political activity, therefore, generally consists in a struggle for power among the ruling sovereign (if there is one) and various family, tribal, and sectional leaders, who constitute the wealthy "pasha" class in the Arab world. The illiterate mass of the population has almost no influence on the internal political affairs of each country, except when skilled agitators succeed in arousing popular unrest and in bringing mob pressure against whatever faction is in power. It is this type of incident in Iraq, for instance, which in 1948 prevented the government's acceptance of a revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty. In Egypt, too, fanatical agitators, like those in the Moslem Brothers, have caused occasional outbreaks to challenge the political domination maintained by the upper-class leaders. In general, political irresponsibility and economic destitution result in chronic internal instability, although this instability rarely reaches dangerous proportions because of the depressed and usually lethargic state of the mass of the people. Nevertheless, while it is generally true that the fall of an Arab cabinet merely brings a reshuffling of old faces, social revolution poses a constant threat to control by the upper-class leaders and may, intensified by the Palestine problem, lead to upheavals within the Arab world.

## 2. Egypt.

### *a. Genesis of the Present Political Situation.*

Turkish rule over Egypt, which was successfully challenged by Mohammed Ali's vigorous regime in the first part of the nineteenth century, disappeared in all but name in 1882 when British troops landed in Egypt during a revolt against the reigning khedive and occupied the country not only to restore public security but also to bolster the country's shaky finances. The last vestige of Ottoman control was eliminated by the British in December 1914 after the ruling khedive had shown his sympathies for Turkey, an ally of Germany; and Egypt was then proclaimed a British Protectorate. With the end of the war there was a resurgence of Egyptian nationalism under the leadership of the great patriot, Saad Zaghlul, and loud demands were made for Egyptian independence from the British. Nationalist agitation increased so much that the UK finally yielded to local pressure and granted Egypt nominal independence in 1922, raising the sultan to the position of king with the name of Fuad I. By the constitution adopted the following year, Egypt became an hereditary monarchy with a representative bicameral parliament.

In granting Egyptian independence, the UK reserved its right both to protect the Suez Canal and to continue its administration of the Sudan, which the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of 1899 had technically placed under the joint control of the UK and Egypt. Having won a political victory over the British in 1922, the nationalists, again under the strong leadership of Zaghlul, concentrated their criticism on monopolistic British authority in the Sudan, which the Egyptians insisted belonged solely under the sovereignty of Egypt. The British were adamant, however, and while the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, by terminating British occupation, marked the beginning of Egypt's real independence, the UK claimed that the Sudan was adequately covered by the 1899 Condominium Agreement (which, in effect, assured continuance of the *status quo* in the Sudan) and still asserted British rights in the defense of the Canal Zone. British recognition of Egypt's independence was in

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fact demonstrated when the British High Commissioner was replaced by an ambassador and when Egypt was admitted, in 1937, to membership in the League of Nations, primarily on the basis of the UK's recommendation.

One of the prime movers in Egypt's struggle for independence was Nahas Pasha, who succeeded Zaghul in 1927 as Egypt's foremost nationalist and leader of the Wafd, the largest Egyptian political party. Nahas was Prime Minister when the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed, and it was his cabinet which aided by the good offices of the British, sponsored during the following year a convention signed at Montreux abolishing the hated capitulations (the practice of granting special privileges to foreign powers in Egypt). The Montreux Convention not only abolished the consular courts but provided for the elimination, in 1949, also of the Mixed Courts, which have jurisdiction over civil cases involving foreigners.

The antagonism which developed between King Fuad, a bitter opponent of democracy, and the Wafd Party continued when Farouk, Fuad's son, succeeded to the throne in 1937. In the recurrent struggle between the Palace and the Egyptian political parties, particularly the Wafd, King Farouk won an initial victory at the end of 1937 when the Nahas Government was dismissed. In 1942, however, when German forces were threatening British troops in the Western Desert, the King was obliged by the British to permit Nahas and the Wafd to return to power. The feud between the King and Nahas, which was exacerbated during the war, has continued, with the result that since the war, Egypt has had a series of minority coalition cabinets appointed by the King. While Farouk has so far been able to keep Nahas from regaining the premiership, the latter has refused to allow Egypt's largest and most voluble party to enter any government not headed by the Wafd.

Following the assassination of Nokrashy Pasha in December 1948, there were indications that the King would relent and allow the Wafd to participate in a new cabinet if Nahas remained outside the government. There were also signs that certain leaders in the Wafd itself were eager to have their party in the gov-

ernment again and to by-pass Nahas' long-standing demands that a new election be held with the Wafd heading any cabinet which might be chosen. Since the King's newly appointed premier, Abdel Hadi, could not accept the Wafd's conditions for participation in the government, the stalemate has continued, and the prospects for a well-balanced government in Egypt within the immediate future are dim indeed.

*b. Present Governmental Structure.*

Egypt's form of government—a constitutional, hereditary monarchy—was established by the Constitution of 1923, which gives considerable power to the sovereign while providing checks through the assigned functions of the cabinet and Parliament. Both the King and Parliament may propose constitutional revisions.

While executive power is vested in the King, it is exercised through the cabinet, which the former appoints and which he may also dismiss. Because of the personal power of the King, the Prime Minister or other cabinet ministers do not often initiate policies which oppose royal wishes.

The Egyptian Parliament is composed of an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies. The cabinet is responsible to the latter for the general domestic and foreign policies of the nation. The Senate is comprised of 147 members. Two-fifths are named by the King and three fifths are elected by indirect universal suffrage. The generally conservative character and pro-Palace leanings of the Senate are readily understandable in view of the fact that the Constitution limits those eligible for election as Senators to men over forty who have held high political, religious, or military office, and also because the president of the Senate is appointed by the King. The 264 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected by direct universal male suffrage.

Laws may be initiated by the King or either House. Royal decrees which do not violate the constitution and which receive parliamentary sanction become laws. Any bill rejected by the King, who sanctions and promulgates the nation's laws, may still become legal if it is subsequently approved by a two-thirds ma-

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majority of both houses. While the King may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (at which time the Senate session must be suspended), dissolution of the Chamber requires that summons for a new election to the Chamber be simultaneously issued.

The Egyptian judicial system is still in the process of gradual reorganization. The Mixed Courts (or Tribunal), consisting of Egyptian and foreign judges and having jurisdiction over civil matters which involved foreigners, will be abolished in October 1949. After that time the Court of Cassation (which is the court of highest authority for both civil and criminal cases) and the National Courts (which try less important civil and criminal cases) will extend their jurisdiction to include cases involving foreigners. In matters of personal status the Moslem religious courts have jurisdiction over Egyptian Moslems; other religions have their own religious courts.

The constitution grants equality in legal, civil, and political matters to all Egyptians regardless of race, language, or religion. Except when the national security is in jeopardy, Egyptians enjoy freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Too often in practice, however, party leaders in power have used the excuse that there is a threat to the national security to ban the publication of opposition newspapers or to arrest political opponents.

### *c. Political Parties and Current Issues.*

The five major political parties in Egypt all advocate, in addition to social reform, the elimination of British treaty rights in the Suez Canal zone and the supplanting of British with Egyptian control in the Sudan. They differ mainly in the vociferousness with which they make these demands as well as in the personality of their leaders.

Paradoxically, the majority party, the Wafd, has not been represented in the government (except by its 45 members in the Senate) since 1944 because of the long-standing personal feud between its leader, Nahas Pasha, and the King. The Wafd, which is well organized and has a strong press, appeals to all classes, including the politically apathetic fellaheen or peasant class, through its ardent nationalism and the strong somewhat demagogic per-

sonality of Nahas Pasha. The Wafd has consistently refused to join in a coalition government and demands immediate free elections, which would result in a Wafd government's coming into power. The Wafd is violently critical of the government, uses every possible means to discredit it, and through its political strength can on occasion paralyze governmental action. Although it has been very anti-British at times, the Wafd is realistic in its approach to current problems, and a Wafd government or a coalition government with Wafd representation would probably work toward a treaty with the British and would be better able than any minority coalition to make the Egyptian people face the unpleasant reality of Egypt's failure in Palestine and the necessity for making peace with the Jews.

The Saadist Party was formed in 1936, as a result of a split in the Wafd; it is reported to be growing in strength and has the approval of the Palace. In the 1945-46 elections the Saadists won 123 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 18 in the Senate. The party stands for Egyptian independence (but favors an alliance with the UK) and pays lip service to the desirability of decreasing illiteracy, improving public health, and raising the general standard of living. Abdel Hadi Pasha, who succeeded the assassinated Nokrashy as Saadist leader, is the present Prime Minister. His cabinet is similar to his predecessor's but has been broadened to include several Independents. It consists of six Saadists, six Liberal-Constitutionalists, and five Independents.

The Liberal-Constitutionalist Party, which has upper-class support, is also reportedly increasing in strength. Currently it has 74 Chamber seats and 28 in the Senate. Like the Saadist Party it advocates complete independence and the usual social reforms. The Liberal-Constitutionalist Party is generally moderate in its demands and willing, on occasion, to cooperate with the British.

The Kutla Party, composed of dissident Wafdists and led by the well-known Copt, Makram Ebeid Pasha, preaches moderate nationalism and, as usual, social reforms. Its parliamentary representation is not strong (29 deputies and 9 Senators), but the party has some Palace support.

The Nationalist (Watani) Party is the oldest in Egypt. It is influential because of the calibre of its leaders but is numerically weak, having only seven Deputies and two Senators. The party is ultra-nationalist and anti-foreign. It demands complete independence for Egypt and the retaking of certain territories which were once Egyptian.

Two of the most critical issues in Egypt are the Palestine problem and relations with the UK. A rigorous censorship has prevented the Egyptian people from knowing about the seriousness of Arab defeats in Palestine. When the actual military situation is publicly known, there will probably be a critical test of the strength of the government, particularly that of the King. Meanwhile, the political opposition, which will not enter a coalition, holds the government responsible for the debacle in Palestine and will make all possible political capital of it.

All Egyptian parties are united in demanding abolition of the 1936 Treaty, under which the UK is allowed to station troops in the Canal Zone and is co-administrator in the Sudan (although actually in control). The primary demands of Egyptian nationalism are the eviction of all foreign troops, and exclusive Egyptian control over the Sudan; and yet Egypt's military failure in Palestine has made it abundantly clear that Egypt needs a strong ally. Most Egyptian political leaders have come to realize this and privately admit the necessity for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty. It is reported that preliminaries to a renewal of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, in abeyance since January of 1947, are taking place in London.

Economic development is another of Egypt's problems. The Egyptian density of population is one of the greatest in the world (over 2,000 per cultivable square mile), and 90 percent of the people are dependent upon agriculture. Yet there is a policy to cultivate cotton for export at the expense of cereals, some of which must be imported to supply local needs. All of the parties advocate social and economic reforms: expansion of industry, alleviation of unemployment and disease, and reduction of illiteracy. The chief difficulties in formulating and implementing economic development programs are the lack of capital,

enterprise, and skilled technicians; and the apathy of the 15,000,000 fellaheen (out of a total population of 20,000,000) as well as the opposition of some of the wealthy landlords. Although the annual speech from the throne takes cognizance of the need for reform and though a five-year plan for economic improvement has been drawn up, the government has taken no effective measures to cope with the economic situation.

*d. Other Influential Groups.*

(1) The Ikhwan-al-Muslimin (Moslem Brothers) are the most powerful non-party pressure group in Egypt. They began as a Moslem religious and reforming movement and now claim 500,000 members and wield considerable political power. The Ikhwan are fanatically religious, ardently nationalist, violently anti-foreign, and terrorist in their methods. (Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha's assassin was an Ikhwan student.) Although the Ikhwan were outlawed by Nokrashy last November when they had perpetrated bombing outrages and when their plans for city-wide violence throughout Cairo were found, they are still powerful and may become more dangerous and insidious from being driven underground.

(2) Communism in Egypt is illegal and appears to have little power. It has been unable significantly to penetrate labor groups, and the activities of its adherents (alleged to number 1,200) are confined largely to weekly meetings and the reading of Communist literature.

Active Soviet agents are attached to the satellite legations. Although they publish and distribute press bulletins and attempt to take advantage of labor unrest and political dissatisfaction, their efforts have done little to further the cause of Communism. Soviet propaganda, which concentrates on attacking Western imperialism, has helped to promote the strong anti-British (and, to a less extent, anti-US) feeling of the Egyptian nationalists.

(3) The lot of the various religious and racial minorities in Egypt may become increasingly hard as the rising nationalistic Moslem consciousness of the people increases. The position of the Christian Copts, who are descendants of the early Egyptians, predating

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the Arab admixture, is increasingly precarious largely because, as the largest and most influential minority in Egypt, they are the most obvious target for the ultra-nationalists.

The 80,000 Jews who form four percent of the population, live mostly in Cairo and Alexandria. Their position has been made very difficult and often dangerous by the Palestine war, and although the Egyptian Government has made a sincere and determined effort to prevent violence against them, anti-Semitism has increased in the press and among the people; attacks are made on Jewish property, and a number of Jews have been attacked by mobs and killed.

The large foreign population of Cairo and Alexandria (which includes French, British, US, Greek, and Italians, as well as representatives from almost every other country) may also find itself increasingly threatened by nationalist violence. The Mixed Courts to try non-Egyptians are about to be abolished, and recurring waves of xenophobia endanger the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt.

### 3. Syria.

#### *a. Genesis of Present Political Situation.*

After World War I the Arabs, anticipating the establishment of an independent Arab state, established a provisional government in Damascus with Emir Feisal (a son of Sherif Hussein of the Hejaz) as King. The French, who considered the territory within their sphere, crushed the Damascus government by force in 1920 a month before the mandates were assigned. With the elimination of this provisional Arab government, no barrier existed to the assignment of the mandates for Syria and Lebanon to France.

Following a policy of "divide and rule," France split the Levant into the semi-autonomous states of Lebanon, Latakia (the Alaouite region), Damascus, Aleppo, and the Jebel Druze. Aleppo and Damascus were later consolidated. Despite the mandatory provision that the region should be administered with a view to the eventual attainment of independence, the Syrians revolted in 1925. For the next three years the country was torn by fighting. Order was finally restored, but Syrian hatred against the French continued to smolder.

With the outbreak of World War II the position of Syria and Lebanon across Middle East communication lines became increasingly important, especially because both of these countries remained under Vichy control after the fall of France. To eliminate the possibility that the Levant might be used as a base for Axis penetration of the Middle East, Allied troops invaded the area in 1941 and, in effect, proclaimed both Syria and Lebanon independent. The Free French, however, proved as reluctant as their predecessors to surrender what they considered to be the traditional French position in the Levant. Following serious disturbances in 1945, the question of the withdrawal of French troops became a matter of international concern, and it was only after the matter had been brought before the UN Security Council that the French agreed to withdraw. The removal of all foreign troops in 1946 brought to an end the last physical restraints upon the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon.

#### *b. Present Governmental Structure.*

Syria is a parliamentary republic, whose organization is patterned in most respects on that of the French Republic. The President is elected for a five-year term by an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. By a recent amendment engineered by the present President, who was elected in 1944, he is eligible for immediate re-election. He need not be a Deputy, but he must be a Moslem. Theoretically his powers are strictly limited, but in practice Syria's current President, Shukri Quwatli, has dominated the Syrian political scene through his personal influence.

The Prime Minister is selected by the President, who also appoints the other ministers on the Prime Minister's nomination. The Prime Minister may be either Moslem or Christian, and both faiths have been represented in that office. The ministers represent their departments in the Chamber, but are not required to be Deputies. They may not exceed seven. They are jointly responsible for the general policy of the government, and disapproval of that policy by the Chamber expressed in a vote of non-confidence is sufficient to cause their fall.

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The Syrian legislature is unicameral. The Chamber of Deputies contains 139 members elected by universal male suffrage (twenty years or over) for a four-year term, on a regional basis, and on a proportion of one Deputy for every 6,000 electors. Any literate citizen over twenty-five is eligible for election. The Chamber is the supreme legislative body of the state and meets in ordinary session once a year; it may, however, be convened by the President, who also has the power to dissolve the body and call for new general elections.

The judicial system comprises two types of courts. The civil courts handle all penal, commercial, and civil cases. The religious courts deal with matters of personal status, divorce, inheritance, religious trust, property, and similar questions. These matters are also handled by the confessional courts of the other religious communities. The Mixed Courts, created under the mandate to try cases involving foreigners and presided over by foreign judges, have been abolished as incompatible with Syria's independent status.

The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, press, and communication, subject to limitations provided by the law. Although the government sometimes uses press control as a means of strengthening its political standing, the press in Syria is freer now than it ever has been before.

In general the people in Syria, like those in the other Arab states, are highly individualistic by background and temperament. The general public has not yet adjusted itself to parliamentary procedure, because under the French Mandate the people had had little opportunity to acquaint themselves with alien governmental practices. Examples of their misuse of this form of government are thus the result of their lack of education and experience. Nevertheless, in the four years since Syrian independence became more than nominal, the country has made rapid strides in internal affairs and has consolidated its position among the nations of the world.

*c. Political Parties and Current Issues.*

Political organization in Syria is based on strong personalities rather than on established political programs. It is therefore generally misleading to speak of political "parties"; the

loosely coordinated groups so designated undergo periodic change as influential leaders realign themselves, carrying their followers along with them. The basic goals of these groups are identical: maintenance of independence, development of a strong nationalistic spirit, and preservation of Arab interests in Palestine. On other issues, principally matters of internal policy, they differ.

At present, political alignment falls roughly into three groups. The Nationalist Party consists mainly of henchmen and proteges of President Quwatli, who as leader of the old National Bloc spearheaded the long struggle for Syrian independence. The Republicans comprise the personal following of Jamil Mardam, former Prime Minister. The clash between these two groups hinges almost entirely on personalities; there is little divergence in their aims. The main preoccupation of each is political dominance. Further, both are interested in restricting control of the government to the old-line politicians who have always enjoyed this monopoly. The third group, the Popular Party, has based its political activity upon the principle that the people should have greater voice in their government and that their interests should receive greater consideration. The leaders, notably Rushdi Kikhiya and Nazim Qudsi, former Minister to Washington, are from Aleppo, whose inhabitants have long been resentful of the air of superiority assumed by Damascus and its politicians. During the interregnum which followed the resignation of the government of Jamil Mardam on 1 December 1948, the chances of the Popular Party to be represented in the new cabinet appeared good. This prospect proved illusory, however. The present cabinet of Prime Minister Khalid Azm is composed largely of nonentities with no strong political ties but generally conservative in outlook. Azm's government was announced as having been selected on a "business" basis, pledged to put the country on a sound economic foundation—a task which is probably beyond its powers.

Prior to December 1947, the Syrian Communist Party operated openly with the tacit consent of the Syrian Government. During the demonstrations which followed the passage of

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the UN-Palestine partition resolution several demonstrators were killed. The government placed the blame for these deaths upon the Communists, outlawed the party, and issued a warrant for murder against the leader, Khaled Baghdash. Communist activity has continued underground, however. Its primary aims have been to foster a condition of unrest throughout the country and to undermine the stability of the government by any methods that seem expedient. While these activities are annoying, it is doubtful that the party can muster sufficient strength in the country to alter Syria's fundamentally Western sympathies.

All political thinking in Syria today is conditioned by Palestine. Governments can remain in power only by proclaiming their determination to continue the struggle against Israel, a position which precludes a reasonable approach to the question. Syria's problems in the fields of economy and foreign relations, which are discussed elsewhere, suffer from the inability of the government to consider them with detachment.

Although the country's forward progress has been retarded by the campaign against Zionism, the years of independence have recorded some tangible accomplishments. The differences between the central government and the Druze and Alaouite minorities have been for the most part resolved. Syria has become a member of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and other world organizations. Foreign experts have been employed to analyze the prospects for agricultural expansion and development and to advise the government in the implementation of approved projects. In summary, while Syria's present position, both economically and politically, leaves room for substantial improvement, the omens are favorable for the eventual attainment of reasonable stability, provided always that a stable relationship can be established between Israel and the Arab world.

#### 4. Lebanon.

##### *a. Genesis of the Present Political Situation.*

See corresponding section under Syria.

##### *b. Present Governmental Structure.*

The governmental structure of Lebanon parallels that of Syria, with minor differences. The President is elected for a six-year term and may be either Christian or Moslem. It is unlikely, however, that a Moslem would be elected in view of the present official Christian majority in the country. The Prime Minister is traditionally a Sunni Moslem. The present Chamber of Deputies is made up of 30 Christians and 25 Moslems; eligibility requirements and the method of election are the same as in Syria.

##### *c. Current Issues and Problems.*

Lebanon is the only Arab country which has no state religion. Officially there is a slight Christian majority, and representation in the Chamber of Deputies is allocated on this basis. It is not unlikely, however, that an unbiased census would now show a Moslem balance. For this reason, it is improbable that such a census will be authorized. This nearly even division between the two religious groups tends to promote an unstable situation which is reflected in the country's political life. The Christian elements are fearful that the Moslem states which surround Lebanon will eventually swallow it up, converting the Christians into a small minority in an enlarged Arab state. The remaining Arab countries, on the other hand, view with misgivings the close ties which still exist between Lebanon and France in the religious, educational, and cultural fields despite the political break between the two countries. As a result of these tensions, Lebanon's relations with its Moslem neighbors, both within the councils of the Arab League and directly, have been correct but not cordial.

Lebanon's internal political affairs are similarly complicated by the presence of these varied pressure groups. In addition to the pasha-peasant problem which exists throughout the Arab world, there is the pro-French faction, Moslem youth organizations, the Maronite Church, and other special interests. The inability of these elements to agree upon a common program, together with the difficult economic problems which the country must face, have resulted in a series of short-lived cabinets and remain a threat to Lebanon's attainment of political and economic stability.



Beirut has become the center of Communist activity in the Middle East.\* Lebanon's trade union organization, more highly developed than in the less industrialized Arab states, has been used as a center for subversive penetration. Despite their numbers, however, and their ability to foment disturbances, it is not considered that the Lebanese Communists represent an imminent threat to the framework of the Lebanese state. Possibly, of course, the large numbers of homeless and disillusioned refugees who have crossed the border from Palestine may provide fruitful material for Communist agitators. In any case, their presence creates another difficult problem for the government.

## 5. Iraq.

### a. *Genesis of Present Political Situation.*

When Iraq became a British mandate in 1922, the nationalists were aroused by what they considered a denial of promised independence. A widespread revolt had to be reduced before the UK was able to install the mandatory regime and set up a constitutional monarchy under the Hashimite rule of King Feisal, son of King Hussein of the Hejaz and former ruler of the abortive Kingdom of Syria. A treaty defining the relationship between Iraq and the UK was concluded. Again the nationalist elements were bitterly disappointed with this instrument which safeguarded British interests and ensured British control. The treaty, however, allowed enough latitude for the development of local institutions.

In 1930 the treaty was revised to provide steps for termination of the mandate and for the entrance of Iraq into the League of Nations. The treaty, which was to run for twenty-five years, came into effect in 1932 when Iraq was admitted to the League. Iraq was the first of the mandated territories to gain independence.

In 1933 King Feisal died and was succeeded by his son, Ghazzi, who proved to be a much less effective ruler than his father. After King Ghazzi's death in 1939, the throne passed to his four-year-old son, Feisal II, who rules at

\* Since this report was written, Haifa has superseded Beirut in this capacity.

the present time through the regency of his uncle, Abdul Illah. The absence of an effective ruler in Baghdad after 1933 encouraged the growth of dissident groups. These groups increased in boldness, particularly after the beginning of World War II, when the UK was unable to exercise control. In 1941 a *coup d'état* was engineered by a group of pro-Axis Iraqi officers under the leadership of Rashid Ali al-Gailani. British installations were attacked, and British military operations were required to remove the Rashid Ali group. The pro-Axis government was replaced by one under the leadership of the veteran statesman, Nuri Said, a man whose loyalty to the UK was well established. Rashid Ali fled to Germany and was later granted asylum by Ibn Saud.

Since World War II, in spite of growing nationalism and increasing economic difficulties, conservative forces have retained control of the Iraqi Government. Although cabinets have risen and fallen with surprising frequency, their programs have differed little. The Regent continues to dominate the political scene; the British continue to exert a modest, if declining, influence; and the members of the traditional ruling class continue to fight among themselves for political powers. The fact that over thirty different cabinets, recruited from a group of about sixty men, have held office since 1921 gives some idea of the chaotic, yet basically unchanging, character of Iraqi political life. Nuri Said, the present Prime Minister, has held that office seven times since 1930.

### b. *Present Governmental Structure.*

Iraq is a constitutional monarchy currently headed by a boy king who is ruling through a regent. The constitution, drawn up in 1924 with the aid of British advisers, provides for "a constitutional, representative, and democratic government limited by law."

The Prime Minister is appointed by the King and may be removed by him. The other members of the cabinet, also appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies and may be removed by a majority vote of that body. The King confirms laws and orders their promulgation, issues orders for the holding of general elections to the Chamber of

Deputies, appoints the members of the Senate, and confirms the election of the President and Vice President of both bodies. When Parliament is not in session, the King may issue ordinances, but these require later confirmation by Parliament.

The legislative branch consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the latter body being elected according to a two-degree electoral system. The suffrage is restricted to males over twenty years of age. There is one deputy for every 20,000 males over twenty. In the March 1947 elections, a total of 138 deputies was elected. The number of senators must not exceed one quarter of the Chamber membership. The King may open, adjourn, or prorogue the Parliament, and may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.

The fusion of religious and secular law is reflected in the organization of the four kinds of courts: civil, criminal, religious, and tribal. On the basis of the judicial agreement of 1930, British judges are available for trials in which Europeans, Americans, or Japanese are involved.

By the terms of the constitution, Iraqi citizens are guaranteed basic civil rights, e.g., equality before the law regardless of race or creed, and freedom of speech, press, and assembly. In practice, the Iraqis enjoy a large measure of personal freedom, but certain restrictions exist which would seem to contradict the constitutional guarantees. The press is restrained by censorship, the threat of suspension, actual suspension, and the withholding of government advertising from recalcitrant journals. Government reprisals do not have the effect of producing a submissive press, however. The same newspapers are suspended time and again but reappear at the end of the suspension period. A comprehensive curb on political liberty is the law which makes it necessary for a political party to gain the permission of the government to operate. Finally, certain minorities suffer despite constitutional guarantees against discrimination.

In practice, Iraq is dominated by the crown and a well-intrenched clique of veteran politicians, although the government is subject to popular pressure in matters of foreign policy, particularly the Palestine issue. Iraqi

elections are customarily rigged, and venality is generally prevalent in public life. This corruption may be accounted for by the low educational level of the populace and the lack of vigorous, honest, and intelligent leadership.

### *c. Political Parties and Current Issues.*

Recent Iraqi governments have been confronted with three major problems: Palestine, financial solvency, and internal security. The Palestine issue has severely strained Iraq's financial position. Not only has the Iraqi Government been burdened by heavy military expenditures, but it has also lost a substantial share of its oil royalties as a result of the decrease in production consequent on the closing of the southern (Haifa) branch of the IPC pipeline. Moreover, the ultra-nationalism and xenophobia aroused by the Palestine issue have complicated the problem of internal security, since no Iraqi government has been able to carry out successfully the nationalist demand that the Zionists be defeated. Recent governments have attempted to "talk" a strong Palestine policy while at the same time seeking British financial assistance. These half-measures, which can be pursued only because of the existence of martial law, will not solve Iraq's dilemma. With rival political leaders ready to raise the nationalist cry against any moderate government action, no Iraqi government is in a position to pursue the only policies which can extract Iraq from its present difficult situation: withdrawal from Palestine and close cooperation with the US or the UK for the purpose of building up the national economy.

In addition to these immediate factors, internal security is chronically endangered by numerous dissident elements within the country. Although the majority of the people are adherents of the Shia branch of Islam, leading government figures have traditionally been Sunnis. Shia influence is largely concentrated among religious leaders and certain tribal sheikhs, who are in general reactionary, xenophobic, and clerical in outlook. Fortunately for the more cosmopolitan and westward-looking Sunni leaders, there is neither cohesion nor common purpose among the Shias.

The second great dissident group in Iraq is the Kurdish minority. The Kurds, who are concentrated in the northeastern part of Iraq, are considered by the Arab majority as an inferior people. Although they have representation in Parliament, they are discriminated against in many ways and are administered as a potentially rebellious minority, which they are. Kurdish revolts have occurred periodically since World War I but have been suppressed by the Iraqi Army with more or less ease. Feuds and jealousies among the various Kurdish tribes prevent the establishment of a unified movement for Kurdish autonomy or independence.

The third important minority group in Iraq is Jewish. Concentrated in Baghdad and Basra, Iraq's Jews, numbering over 100,000, play a significant role in the commercial life of the country and took a modest part in its political life until the intensification of the Palestine issue after World War II. In spite of determined attempts by the Iraqi Government to prevent anti-Jewish activities in Iraq, the Jewish community is at present in a precarious position. It is being discriminated against commercially and is politically ostracized.

Until very recently, one of the most important elements lending stability to the Iraqi Government was the presence of the British; although British troops have been largely withdrawn, the UK still enjoys a special position under the terms of the Treaty of 1930 (due to expire in 1956). British advisers in the principal government departments have exerted a steadying influence and endeavored to inculcate in the local politicians a sense of responsibility.

Recent events indicate, however, that this influence is now on the wane. Popular clamor, led by the extremely nationalistic Independence Party, forced rejection in January 1948 of the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and compelled the resignation of the government which had negotiated it. A further example of this trend is the withdrawal of the British Military Mission in 1948.

There is at present one legal political party, the Independence Party or Istiqlal. Two additional parties, the National Democratic and

the Liberal, announced their voluntary dissolution in December. The Independence Party is of the extreme right, and contains a hard core of the formerly dissident pro-Rashid Ali elements. The People's Party and the National Unity Party, both of the extreme left, have been banned as seditious. Despite their present illegal status, however, they still exert some influence largely as a result of disaffection among the masses.

The Communist Party in Iraq, which was known to have been in contact with the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties and the Tudeh Party in Iran, was outlawed in 1938. In 1947 its leaders were imprisoned, its secret presses confiscated, and many of its subversive activities revealed and suppressed. Although it continues to work underground and attempts to take advantage of internal unrest to undermine the ruling group and British influence, its effectiveness at the present time is very limited.

## 6. Transjordan.

### *a. Genesis of the Present Political Situation.*

The territory now encompassed by Transjordan was originally part of the Palestine mandate that was awarded to the UK by the League of Nations in 1922. The British, however, always considered the area east of the Jordan River as separate from Palestine proper, and in the mandatory settlement the clauses relating to the establishment of a proposed National Home for the Jews in Palestine were expressly excluded from application to Transjordan. The separation of Transjordan from Palestine was foreshadowed in 1921 when Amir Abdullah, a son of King Hussein of the Hejaz, was designated administrator of the country. In 1928 Abdullah's regime was recognized as an "independent government," although in his foreign relations, financial policy, and jurisdiction over foreigners he agreed to be guided by British advice. In 1941, a supplementary agreement gave the UK the right to maintain troops in Transjordan and to raise and control armed forces for the defense of the country. Transjordan demands for treaty revision led to a new Treaty of Alliance in 1946 and the proclamation of Transjordan as an independent and fully sovereign kingdom. In effect, however, the UK continues to

exercise effective control over Abdullah through advisers stationed in Amman and an annual £2,500,000 subsidy to the Transjordan Arab Legion, without which Abdullah's influence in the Arab world would be negligible.

*b. Present Governmental Structure.*

Transjordan is a constitutional monarchy governed according to a constitution adopted in 1947. Executive authority resides in the King, who is assisted by a ministry responsible to him. Theoretically, legislative power is vested in a bicameral legislature consisting of an elected Council of Representatives and an appointed Council of Notables. Because of his authority to issue decrees, summon and dissolve the legislature, and appoint and remove ministers, however, King Abdullah is the absolute head of the state. Basic civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution, but in practice no active opposition to the government is permitted.

*c. Political Parties and Current Issues.*

The only officially recognized party in Transjordan at the present time is the al-Nahda (Awakening) Party, which pursues policies acceptable to the King. So long as the UK supports Abdullah, there is little chance that any disaffected group could depose him. A certain amount of disaffection does exist because of Abdullah's autocratic practices and his Greater Syria agitation. (See Chapter III.) The chief opposition movement operates out of Damascus under the leadership of Dr. Abou Ghanimeh, but its influence is extremely limited. The most noteworthy demands of the Ghanimeh group are the removal of King Abdullah, the introduction of a new liberal constitution, and the abrogation of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. It also opposes King Abdullah's Greater Syria plan. Communist activity in Transjordan is negligible. Communist publications produced by the Communist parties in Beirut and Damascus are occasionally disseminated in the country, and from time to time Communist speakers from Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt give lectures at various private clubs in Amman. Although Transjordan undoubtedly contains a number of Communist sympathizers, there does not appear to be an indigenous Communist organization in the country.

The relief and resettlement of the Arab refugees from Israel constitute Transjordan's greatest domestic problem. The refugees in the areas of Palestine under Transjordan's authority as well as in Transjordan itself number approximately 280,000. Although the government has provided them with limited food and shelter, it is quite incapable of caring for them adequately for even a short time. The UN has set up a relief organization to cope with the problem and has asked its members to contribute \$32 million, little of which has so far been forthcoming. Similarly, the problem of resettlement will also have to be financed and organized on an international basis. In the meantime, the refugees are a potential threat to internal security in both Arab Palestine and Transjordan. The great majority still confidently expect to return to their former homes, now within the *de facto* confines of Israel, as soon as peace has been established. In view of Israel's stated policy of blocking their return, the refugees may well react violently when they realize the hopelessness of their situation. Because of its poverty, Transjordan can do no more at present than use the Arab Legion to maintain public order.

A second serious domestic problem for the Transjordan Government is the administration of those areas of Palestine under its military control. This problem is complicated not only by the Arab refugees but also because the future of this area has not yet been definitely determined. After the end of the UK mandate in May 1948, local government more or less disintegrated under the impact of war. The Arab areas continue to be occupied by the Arab Legion and the Iraqi Army (and the Egyptian Army in parts of the Negeb). Iraq has reportedly agreed to permit the extension of Transjordan's civil authority to the area occupied by the Iraqi forces, but in fact there is little civil administration in either the Iraqi or Transjordan sectors. Transjordan's failure to establish effective civil administration in Arab Palestine not only seriously complicates the responsibilities of the Arab Legion but may also, by antagonizing the local population, jeopardize Abdullah's plan eventually to incorporate the area into Transjordan.

## 7. Saudi Arabia.

### *a. Genesis of the Present Political Situation.*

With the exception of the Yemen, Saudi Arabia is the only Arab state that has never been subjected by a Western colonial power to some form of dependent status. Even under the Ottoman Empire, Ibn Saud's allegiance to Constantinople was no more than nominal; and after World War I, in spite of the UK's dominant influence around and to the north of the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Saud not only preserved his independence but also extended his authority to areas which the UK considered as falling within its sphere of influence.

The disintegration of Turkish power after the war left a tense political situation in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1917 Hussein, Sherif of Mecca under the Turks and nominal leader of the Arab Revolt, had, with British blessing, been proclaimed King of the Hejaz (roughly the western portion of the peninsula bordered on the north by Transjordan and on the south by Yemen). The centralization of power in the hands of Ibn Saud and Hussein resulted in constant conflict between them. Ibn Saud eliminated his rivals in the interior and girded himself for the inevitable struggle. When in 1924 Hussein set himself up as the spiritual leader of the Moslem world by assuming the Caliphate (left vacant by the deposition of the Turkish Sultan), Ibn Saud marched on the Hejaz. Within a few months he was in control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and Hussein and his family were forced to seek refuge abroad. The British, who had found Hussein to be an uncooperative protege, made no attempt to halt the course of events. Ibn Saud had long recognized the special interests of the UK in the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Principalities bordering on Saudi Arabia, and the UK had no wish to antagonize him by supporting Hussein in the Hejaz. As a result of these developments, Ibn Saud became the strongest ruler in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1928 he suppressed the last tribal uprising within the country and in 1932 climaxed his rise to power by uniting his dominions into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

### *b. Present Governmental Structure.*

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. Its

government, under the King, can be said to consist of: (1) a Privy Council of the King's close friends and advisers; (2) the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Justice, Interior, and Public Works; (3) the Viceroys of Najd and Hejaz and the Governors of Hasa and Asir; and (4) the Council of Ulemas, or religious notables. The latter, as interpreters of the Koran, which is the supreme law of the land, are theoretically in a position to check the King's authority. The others, however, have no independent authority and are directly responsible to the King. The Hejaz, because of its different historical background and greater commercial development, has a somewhat more sophisticated administration than the other three provinces of Saudi Arabia. However, in spite of a constitution, an Advisory Legislative Council, and an Advisory Legislative Assembly, the King, through his Viceroy, dominates all governmental activities. His authority in the direction of public affairs is further reinforced in that many of his ministers and leading advisers are Egyptians, Syrians, and Lebanese. Having no tribal loyalties within the country and no particular respect for the influential religious leaders, they are truly "the King's men" in the medieval sense. Furthermore, since the majority of provincial administrators, judges, and police come from the Najd, the King's native province and the core of the Kingdom, they can be relied upon to discourage symptoms of rebellion in the more recently acquired provinces of Hasa, Hejaz, and Asir.

### *c. Current Issues.*

Saudi Arabia has no political parties, pressure groups, or significant minorities. Ibn Saud's chief aim is the transformation of an aggregation of economically backward and largely nomadic Arab tribes into a united Arab nation. In pursuing this aim, the King has prohibited intertribal wars, has encouraged certain nomadic tribes to settle on the land, and through centralized police and communications systems is maintaining internal security. An ever-present problem for Ibn Saud is to obtain the sanction from the religious authorities for the introduction into Saudi Arabia of such revolutionary innovations as the telephone and airplane. Through astute inter-

pretation of the Koran, he has been remarkably successful in reconciling these aspects of Western civilization with the puritanical concepts of Wahhabism\* and thereby retaining the support of the only organized body of opinion in Saudi Arabia that could seriously embarrass him. In a sense it is the old medieval problem of church vs. state, and (as in Europe) it is likely to continue to be a primary internal issue for many years to come.

On a lower plane, the only potential area of disaffection is the Hejaz, which the Hashimite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan will not soon forget was taken from them in 1925. Discrimination against Hejazis in the higher government posts, which are filled as a rule by Najdis or outsiders, has caused unrest among the lower reaches of the bureaucracy in Jidda, Mecca, and Medina.

Corruption and bribery in Saudi Arabia are probably as prevalent as in any other Middle Eastern state, and inefficiency is chronic in a country that is attempting to superimpose the administration of a modern state on a people from whose ranks it is impossible to draw sufficiently educated persons to carry on even the most elementary governmental functions. The very backwardness of the people, however, precludes organized disaffection. Throughout the country Ibn Saud's power is so absolute and his authority so universally recognized that no problem of internal security really exists. Upheaval at the time of the King's death is a definite possibility but an ever diminishing one, as Crown Prince Saud, the Viceroy of Najd, gains prestige.

## 8. Yemen.

### *a. Genesis of the Present Political Situation.*

Yemen, geographically isolated from the rest of the Arab World, not only failed to join in the Arab Revolt but even sided with the Turks. A further strain on relations with neighboring countries was imposed by the sectarian difference which existed between the

\* The Wahhabi Sect is dominant in Saudi Arabia. It originated in the 18th century as a reaction to the legal, formal, and philosophical side of Islam, which had then reached a static stage. It was an attempt to re-establish primitive Islam.

Imam and the Houses of both Ibn Saud and Hussein. In 1934, war broke out between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, a conflict which was easily won by Saudi Arabia within a few months. Saud contented himself with this demonstration of superiority and allowed generous surrender terms. The Imam, however, began to look for new friends and subsequently, in 1936, allowed himself to be wooed by the Italian Government. The complete defeat of the Italians in East Africa during World War II, however, compelled the Imam to realize that his security was dependent on Ibn Saud to the North and the British in Aden in the South.

### *b. Present Governmental Structure.*

Yemen is a theocratic sovereign state headed by a ruler (Imam) who is both spiritual and temporal leader of the country. The Imam is assisted by a cabinet. Each of the four districts of the country is administered by a governor under whom are a number of sub-governors. Judicial process is based on religious and tribal law. Rule in Yemen has been autocratic. Government controls rest primarily on personal authority. Institutions, political and otherwise, have remained medieval. There is no written constitution in the Western sense.

### *c. Current Issues.*

In February 1948, the political life of Yemen was severely shaken by a *coup d'état*, wherein the late Imam Yahya, dictatorial and reactionary ruler of the country for over forty years, was assassinated. Abdullah al-Wazir, member of a rival household, and representative of factions demanding reforms, assumed the Imamate. His rule, however, was short-lived. Crown Prince Ahmed, designated by his father to inherit the throne, contested al-Wazir's assumption of power. A brief period of civil war ensued. In late March, the forces of Ahmed deposed al-Wazir, who was later executed, and the former dynasty was returned to power with Ahmed as Imam. Although order has been restored in Yemen, there are some indications that further unrest may occur. It is not yet known whether Imam Ahmed will undertake any program of reforms.

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## 9. Arabian Peninsula.

In addition to the countries described above, various types of principalities are found along the eastern and southern coast of the Arabian peninsula, all of which (except Muscat and Oman), are tied to the UK in matters of foreign relations. The legal basis for British control is found in the treaties which have been concluded with the various rulers and which bind the local ruler not to enter, without British consent, into any relationship with a foreign government. Such agreements were entered into with the Sheikh of Bahrein in 1880 and 1892, the Sheikh of Kuwait in 1899 and 1914, the Trucial Sheikhs in 1892, and the Sheikh of Qatar in 1916. The Sultan of Mus-

cat and Oman is a free agent with regard to foreign affairs. In this respect he differs from the other Arab Sheikhdoms and Sultanates.

Aden, captured by the British in 1839, was administered as part of India until 1937 when it became a crown colony under the British Government. The UK is also in effective control of the Aden Protectorate through a series of treaties concluded with the various sheikhs toward the end of the nineteenth century. The present and future stability of the area is assured so long as the UK, working principally through British political officers, continues to back the present regime, and Saudi Arabia continues to respect the UK's paramountcy in the area.

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## CHAPTER II ECONOMIC SECTION

### 1. General.

For centuries, the great powers have contended for economic privileges in the Middle East. Frequently, in the past, such economic advantages accompanied political control, and occasionally they have persisted after the establishment of politically independent Arab governments. For France and Britain particularly, the area has been a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods. Egyptian cotton and agricultural products from Lebanon, for example, have been exchanged for machinery, textiles, automobiles, and other industrial requirements.

With the exception of petroleum, the mineral resources of the Arab states are not significant. Control of the rich oil reserves of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, however, has been a matter of concern to foreign interests. The Iraq Petroleum Company concession of 1925 provided for the development of Iraq's resources by government-controlled British and French companies. As a result of US Government protests, a share was allocated to private American interests. In Kuwait, British and US interests share the concession. One of the most valuable concessions in the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia, was granted to private US interests in 1932. The history of Middle Eastern oil has been one of political, diplomatic, and economic jockeying by the greater powers, with the countries in the area themselves playing a somewhat passive role. The present concessions, however, should not for that reason be considered unfair, since these countries are thus enabled to capitalize through oil royalties and employment opportunities on a natural resource which they are not capable of developing by themselves. Statistics indicating the interests of different countries in the oil concessions, reserves, and production will be found in Appendix F.

The Arab states are handicapped by inadequate transportation facilities. While there

is a fair network of hard-surfaced roads in the Egyptian Delta and the eastern Mediterranean coastal belt, the vast desert stretches (with the exception of one paved road from Haifa to Baghdad) boast only sandy trails for the most part impassable to motor vehicles not specially equipped for such travel. Harbor facilities are generally poor. Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Beirut, and possibly Basra are the only ports which might be considered suitable by western standards, however, new deep-water facilities are being constructed in Ras Tanura, Dammam, and Fahahil. The increasing use of the airplane throughout the area has been of some help although cost considerations limit its usefulness for the movement of goods. The railroads suffer from a multiplicity of gauges and insufficient and obsolescent equipment.

In the last few years, US commercial interest in the Middle East has been steadily increasing. With the exception of investments in petroleum, however, no concentration of US capital exists in any individual Arab country, since the more active enterprises such as airlines cut across national boundaries. Incidentally, Arab resentment over US-Palestine policy has hurt US business in the area and may have still more serious effects in the future.

The Arab economic system has traditionally inclined toward a policy of laissez-faire. During the war, however, the government controlled imports, exports, and foreign exchange, and limited the acreage of various crops like Egyptian cotton. Many of these restrictions are still in effect as a result of present unsettled world conditions. It can be expected that, when conditions permit, these controls will be gradually relaxed and the Arab peoples will return to their preferred individualistic methods. Indications are that controls over foreign exchange will necessarily remain for some time.



The greatest problem facing the Middle Eastern economy today is that of underdevelopment. Social and economic standards are extremely low, and the rapid growth of the population threatens to depress these standards still further. Technical equipment is limited and obsolete, especially in agriculture. The social stratification of the Arab countries is an additional bar to progress. At the top are a few extremely wealthy families, the middle class is almost nonexistent, and at the bottom are the vast peasant masses dependent for the most part upon agriculture for their livelihood. The wealthy are interested in maintaining their position and care little about bettering the condition of the masses, a step which would destroy their source of cheap labor. Reforms are urgently needed, but the process will be slow and difficult.

The economy of the Arab states is predominantly pastoral and agricultural; between 70 and 80 percent of the peoples in the Arab states obtain their livelihood from the raising of livestock or cultivation of the soil. In times of normal harvest there is barely enough food and if there is a disaster such as a poor harvest or war, famine conditions result. The high mortality rate is more than offset by the high birth rate, with the result that the danger of overpopulation is a very real and imminent one. The area does, however, contain great undeveloped agricultural regions which if adequately exploited could produce sufficient food to support a greatly increased population.

Industrialization in the Middle East has not reached any significant point of development. During the interwar period, progress in that direction, which might have accompanied political growth, was frustrated by the inability to compete with the cheap commodities then flowing from more industrially advanced countries. The advantage of a cheap labor supply was more than offset by the necessity of training it, and by the initial high overhead costs connected with the building of new industries. A serious problem in all the Arab countries was the lack of local capital.

A further deterrent to industrialization was the mandatory status until recently of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan

which prevented these countries from making advantageous bilateral agreements. The mandatory powers, moreover, preferred to keep these countries as sources for raw materials and markets for their finished goods.

In relative terms, the Arab states have traditionally enjoyed financial stability. Budgets are normally balanced, and adverse balances of trade offset by receipts from a variety of sources—oil royalties, emigrant remittances, and internal loans. Wartime and post-war dislocations, particularly in the fields of foreign trade and international exchange, have produced problems of finance which in several countries have reached serious proportions. Widespread inflation, the result primarily of large allied military expenditures, has increased the complexity of the domestic economy. A satisfactory solution to the question of the "sterling balances" \* built up in London during the war will probably also be necessary before the financial position of several of the Arab states can be stabilized.

An increasing volume of foreign trade has accompanied the recent political growth and development of the Arab states. An awakened consciousness of the western world has brought with it a growing demand for manufactured goods which the area did not require under its previous primitive way of life. A need has made itself felt for such commodities as machinery, chemicals, hardware,

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\* In view of the prominent role which has been played by the pound sterling in the financial setup of several of the Arab states, it may be advisable to sketch briefly the significance of such terms as "sterling area" and "sterling balances." The pre-war sterling area (or "bloc") was a loose association of countries accustomed to keep the major portion of their official reserves in sterling; the external values of their currencies were fixed in terms of sterling, and a large proportion of their trade was with the UK and other sterling area countries. There was no exchange control and no dollar pool.

Following the outbreak of war, the picture was completely changed. Most of the non-British nations left the bloc. Exchange controls were imposed on trade with outside countries, although trade within the sterling area remained free. All gold and dollar exchange earned by the member countries was pooled in London; allocations were made to member countries for their essential needs. The UK attempted thus to obtain dollars for necessary war purchases outside the scope of Lend-Lease,

and the like. An accompanying demand for such luxuries as automobiles, cosmetics, and fancy textiles, has further increased imports from abroad. Imports of food from outside the area are limited for the most part to tea, coffee, and sugar.

With the exception of the Levant, where French influence has been dominant, the British have enjoyed the most favorable trade position. Before World War II, Japan was becoming an important source of finished goods, particularly cheap textiles; during the war, India captured a large part of this trade.

The greatest trade problem now facing the Arab states is the obligation to increase exports to obtain the foreign exchange necessary to pay for desired imports. The principal difficulties are that, except for oil, the area is limited in natural resources; also, high production costs hinder the development of markets for exportable agricultural surpluses.

Particularly since the war, the Arab states have become acutely conscious of the need to develop their resources. Petroleum reserves are, of course, already being exploited, but much remains to be done in other fields, such as the harnessing of water supplies for power and irrigation. This would raise the low living standards of the people and lessen their dependence upon foreign sources of supply. As a primary step in this direction, the local governments have within the past few years

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while maintaining at the same time the basic economy of the countries involved.

The "sterling balances" represent credits built up during the war by individual countries. They accrued partly from the sale to the UK of food and raw materials and partly through the sale of local currencies needed by the UK for the maintenance of troops in the several countries. At the end of the war, these balances amounted to between 3 and 4 billion pounds; it was obviously impossible for the UK in its serious economic position to release unrestrictedly or to guarantee the convertibility of any such sums. Discussions of the problem have been held, and arrangements have been made with some individual countries for a partial release of these assets. A complete solution, however, is not yet in sight and will doubtless require several years to work out.

Among the Arab states, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine were members of the wartime sterling bloc. The effect upon their financial position is discussed under the individual countries.

obtained the aid of technical experts from the US and Europe in making surveys and reports outlining projects that might profitably be undertaken. These will be discussed when the several countries are considered individually. Present currency difficulties, the unsettled world situation, and the instability of local governments, including the omnipresence of nepotism and graft, may make their plans for the future uncertain, but eventually many of their goals may be attained.

## 2. Egypt.

### *a. General.*

Egypt's strategic location inevitably made it an objective in the struggle for power among European nations. With the establishment of British political control in 1882, the economic life of the country came under the same influence. The basic pattern remains the same today, despite Egypt's present independent political status. Cotton, the principal export, is largely taken by the UK, which customarily sends in return machinery, finished textiles, and other manufactured goods. British capital has played the major part in the development of Egypt's industry; the Egyptian pound is largely backed by pound sterling Treasury bills; and the sterling balances built up during the war will still further necessitate the financial reliance of Egypt upon the UK, despite political disagreements.

Egypt's recently intensified nationalistic policy, exemplified by the Company Law restricting the investment of foreign capital and the employment of foreign workers, does not alter the fact that Egypt, with a fundamentally agricultural economy, must obtain from foreign countries the technical skills and equipment to implement development programs.

The position of the US in Egypt's economic life was relatively unimportant before the war. During the war and in the postwar years, however, Egypt was obliged to obtain from this country essential requirements which could not then be obtained in the sterling area. This condition still exists, with the result that Egypt's dollar needs have increased, with little commensurate increase of dollar

earnings. Another factor which may in the future have its effect upon the economy of the country is the growing importance of Cairo as a center of international air traffic. Development of this traffic may well give Egypt another resource which could be exploited for the country's benefit.

*b. Agriculture.*

As in the other Arab states, agriculture forms the base of Egypt's economy. The cultivated land, which is less than three percent of the total area, is one of the most intensively farmed regions in the world. Egypt is normally self-sufficient in food production. The most important trade crop is cotton, which is the only significant export and makes up about 80 percent of the value of Egypt's export trade.

The Nile is the life of Egypt. All arable land (with the exception of a few unimportant oases) is located in a narrow strip along the river's 800-mile length and in the Delta region, the area roughly contained by the Cairo-Alexandria-Port Said triangle. Except along the coast, the land is irrigated by a complex system of canals and wells. Up to 1890 the Nile floods in late summer regularly covered great areas of farmland, bringing with them a deposit of rich silt which helped to restore the fertility of the intensively cropped soil. But perennial irrigation has more recently interfered with this natural process, as a result of which large amounts of nitrate fertilizers are also needed, however, to maintain a high level of production.

It is estimated that the cultivable acreage of Egypt cannot be increased by more than 20 or 25 percent. If production is to be built up beyond this point, it will have to be the result of more adequate fertilization, the year-round use of acreage now idle part of the time, and the introduction of modern scientific practices.

*c. Industrialization.*

Although further advanced than in the other Arab states, industrialization in Egypt is, by western standards, still in its formative stage. While some facilities exist for the processing of local products—cotton ginning, textile manufacture, cottonseed oil extraction,

soap making, and sugar refining—the organizations are small and the products, for the most part of mediocre quality, are saleable in local markets only. Upon the completion of the latest Aswan Dam project, Egypt hopes by the development of hydroelectric power to stimulate industrial growth. Egypt also hopes for the release of sufficient amounts of sterling balances to permit purchase of the necessary machinery and equipment.

There is a sufficient quantity of manpower available for Egyptian industrial expansion, but the quality is poor. Disease, poverty, and illiteracy are the lot of the peasant; there is no reserve of trained technicians on which to draw. Even if training were made available, output per man-hour would be small in comparison with that of highly industrialized countries, with resultant high labor costs raising the price of the finished product to a level which would be non-competitive on a world market.

It can be assumed that, under the present Company Law, the future participation of foreign firms and foreign capital in Egyptian industry will be limited. This law provides, among other things, that any foreign company incorporated in Egypt must offer 51 percent of its shares for sale in Egypt for at least one month; that 40 percent of the board of directors must be Egyptian; that 75 percent of the technical and clerical employees and 90 percent of the workers must be Egyptians; that foreign specialists and supervisors may be engaged only with government approval. If Egypt is to obtain the foreign aid it needs, the present restrictions will have to be changed.

*d. Finance.\**

Before the war, Egypt had no serious problems in either its internal finances or foreign payments accounts. Exports of raw materials, principally cotton, were nearly adequate to pay for imports of needed manufactured goods. The currency was freely convertible into sterling, and a balanced budget financed through customs, railroad income, and land taxes was the rule.

\* Note that one Egyptian pound (£E) = \$4.127.

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During the war this picture was radically changed. Large British military expenditures in Egypt were financed by Egyptian currency issued against British Treasury obligations. The great increase in currency circulation, coupled with a scarcity of consumer goods, inevitably caused domestic price inflation, throwing the local economy out of gear.

It was Egypt's plan that this British war debt, which reached a peak of approximately £450 million, would be available after the war for development projects in industry and agriculture. The UK's postwar financial difficulties, however, made it necessary for the two countries to negotiate; another factor to be considered was the convertibility provision of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement. After lengthy arbitration, an agreement was signed between the UK and Egypt on 30 June 1947. This provided for the release to Egypt of a portion of the UK's balances in convertible sterling, and released also a sterling working balance.

Feeling that this arrangement would supply its exchange needs, Egypt withdrew from the sterling bloc. On 20 August 1947, however, the UK suspended convertibility of pounds sterling into dollars. Despite hurriedly promulgated exchange controls, Egypt's dollar position rapidly became serious. An interim dollar allocation was made by the UK, and negotiations resumed in December 1947 resulted in the conclusion of a new agreement the following month, effective for one year. Its terms provided for the release of additional sterling credits, and made available a fixed hard currency allotment. Negotiations for a new agreement are now (January 1949) going on. Despite the rejection of an application in 1947, Egypt again unsuccessfully sought a dollar loan from the US. While such a credit would ease many of Egypt's immediate exchange problems, it is difficult to see how such a loan could be repaid. Present and anticipated dollar earnings give little indication that funds would be available for liquidation payments.

#### *e. Foreign Trade.*

Egypt's 1947 exports, including re-exports, amounted to some £E 90.6 million, of which cotton accounted for about 75 percent, fol-

lowed by rice (6.7 percent), onions, calcium phosphate, cottonseed cake, barley, and sugar. Of the total exports approximately 37 percent went to the UK and other sterling area countries, and about six percent to the US.

Imports amounted to £E 104 million, consisting mainly of textiles (12 percent), petroleum products (6.5 percent), fertilizers (5 percent), wood and wood products, metals, machinery, tobacco, paper, and automobiles. Of these imports some 36 percent came from the UK and the sterling area; about 11 percent were supplied by the US.

Roughly the visible adverse balance of Egypt's foreign trade for 1947 amounted to more than £E 9 million for the hard currency countries, viz., the US, Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium; the deficit with the sterling area was about £E 2,400,000; that with other countries £E 1,600,000.

During the second quarter of 1948 there was a marked shift in Egypt's balance of trade position, with the result that figures for the first six months of the year showed a visible favorable balance (for the first time since 1937) of £E 14 million. This favorable balance was, however, regarded with some concern by Egyptian authorities, since it was almost entirely in the form of additional sterling credit and had no effect on the continued unfavorable balance with hard currency countries. Preliminary statistics covering the entire year indicate, however, that the annual trade balance will as usual be unfavorable.

#### *f. Development Factors.*

The keystone of Egypt's future economic planning is the development of the Aswan Dam hydroelectric project at an estimated cost of \$40 million. Contracts for its construction were awarded in October 1947, and completion of the plant is expected to take several years. The power thus generated, increasing Egypt's present output fourfold, will be used primarily to operate one or possibly two fertilizer plants which would supply a large portion of Egypt's needs, and conserve scarce foreign exchange. Tentative suggestions for other uses of this power have been: (1) manufacture of steel from Aswan iron deposits (investigation has indicated that the exploitation of this ore would be unprofita-

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ble); (2) electrification of Upper and Lower Egypt, with concomitant increased industrial development; and (3) expansion of irrigation facilities.

Crude oil production in Egypt has been increasing and may eventually supply the country's basic petroleum requirements. Additional refinery capacity, however, will have to become available before the country can be self-sufficient.

### 3. Syria and Lebanon.

#### *a. General.*

In contrast to the British influence in Egypt and Iraq, the economy of Syria and Lebanon has been historically more closely linked to France. French commercial interest in the Levant dates from the sixteenth century, when the first capitulatory privileges were extended. As Mandatory Power during the years subsequent to the first world war, France achieved what was tantamount to economic dominance of the region. Since the termination of the Mandate, both the British and French have made concerted efforts to capture Levant markets. A French Government-sponsored organization known as SYRIAC has been set up to encourage the importation of French goods; several British trade missions have toured the area to urge the superiority of British manufactures. Despite the personal antagonism of the Syrians and the Lebanese for the French, the fact that the Syro-Lebanese pound was linked to the franc gave French trade an advantageous position. The Syrian decision to sever this tie may cause a change in the situation.

Although Syria and Lebanon are independent republics, the area, with a common currency and a customs union, has always been considered as a single economic unit. Their economic background will be sketched from this point of view; possible results of the breaking of the close economic ties between the two countries will be discussed in the section dealing with finance.

#### *b. Agriculture.*

Bread is universally the most important item of the Arab diet. Syria normally pro-

duces sufficient wheat for Syrian needs and in addition is able to make up the deficit in Lebanese production. All meat consumed (lamb is the most common) is locally produced. In addition these countries are net exporters of legumes, onions, fruits, and olive oil. All tea, coffee, sugar, and most of their rice must be imported.

The importance of grain in the economy of the Levant is demonstrated by the fact that all purchasing and selling of grain in Syria is handled by a government organization, MIRA. Officially, all collection and distribution is made through the MIRA office, but large quantities of wheat are sold on the more or less open black market or smuggled from Syria to Lebanon to benefit by the higher prices there. Some dissatisfaction has been expressed by Lebanon in the past over the price at which MIRA-delivered wheat was made available; the Lebanese have felt that Syria was taking advantage of its favored position to make unreasonable profits.

#### *c. Industrialization.*

Syria and Lebanon, particularly the latter, have because of their geographical position traditionally served as a center for entrepôt trade. Industry in the western sense is very new and consists solely of light industries. Lebanon's leading manufacture, silk textiles, has suffered considerably from the public demand for synthetics. Other Lebanese products are shoes, glass, and cardboard, all of second-rate quality and locally consumed for the most part. Cement and asphalt are also produced, but not in significant quantities. Lebanon is the principal tourism center of the Middle East, but this business has suffered from high prices, the failure to improve facilities, and the lack of publicity.

The main industry of Syria is textile manufacture, centered principally in the Aleppo area. Wealthy Syrians, however, have of late interested themselves in exploring the possibilities of other fields. One group has recently purchased from Skoda machinery to set up and equip a beet sugar factory near Homs and has also purchased in the US a complete glass factory which will be located near Damascus. Another syndicate in the Aleppo district is interested in the establishment of

an olive oil refinery. Should Syria's dollar difficulties be eased, additional industrial progress may be anticipated.

*d. Finance.\**

The basic economic problems faced by Syria and Lebanon are similar in many respects to those of other Arab states—a fundamentally agricultural economy, widespread inflation, great undeveloped areas, and a proportionally large peasant population beset by disease, poverty, and ignorance.

In its financial structure, however, the Levant is now at grips with a problem peculiarly its own. During the French Mandate, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was established as the Bank of Issue. This bank, which issued and maintained the cover for the Syro-Lebanese currency, is French-owned, French-managed, and has its headquarters in Paris. Thus, although Syria and Lebanon are now politically independent, their economic life has been subject to a large measure of French financial control.

Dollars and pounds sterling, badly needed by the two countries to purchase essential materials and consumer goods, were allocated by the French against franc balances on a short term basis and allotted to importers through an Exchange Control Board consisting of one Syrian, one Lebanese, and one Frenchman. This financial dependence upon the French was extremely distasteful to Syria especially, but until recently it could take no measures to change the situation. The matter came to a head during discussions in Paris between French and Syro-Lebanese representatives regarding French claims that costs incurred by the previous French occupation army should be borne by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. A French threat to seize a portion of the cover for the Syro-Lebanese currency to satisfy French demands highlighted the vulnerability of the Syro-Lebanese position.

The devaluation of the franc in December 1947 brought the problem into sharp focus. The Monetary Agreement called for the pro-

\*Note that one Syro-Lebanese Pound (LLS) = \$0.45. (Current transactions are taking place at one unofficial rate of \$0.33.)

tection of the sterling value of the Syro-Lebanese franc reserves against franc devaluation. When the franc was earlier devalued (in 1945), the French restored the value of the reserves vis-à-vis sterling by additional franc deposits but announced that they did not consider the agreement as covering future devaluation. Accordingly, following the subsequent French action, financial discussions took place between French and Syro-Lebanese representatives. It was apparent from the first that agreement would prove difficult, particularly as far as the Syrians were concerned.

The French eventually offered a ten-year agreement whereby a substantial portion of the Syro-Lebanese franc reserves would be guaranteed against future franc devaluation, and the most recent devaluation would be similarly covered. Other clauses dealt with the disposition of French property in the Levant and the provision of limited amounts of foreign exchange. These provisions were accepted by Lebanon. Syria, however, rejected the agreement, announcing that the Syrian pound would be established as an independent currency. The cessation of interchangeability of the two Levant currencies has complicated local commercial transactions. The customs union has been continued on a temporary basis, but local jealousies and irritations have prevented the ratification of a new permanent accord.

For Lebanon, always dependent on Syrian foodstuffs, this weakening of economic ties promised to have serious consequences. The internal economy, already strained by inflation and wartime dislocations, became a matter of increasing concern. In an effort to attain a more independent position, Lebanon has recently contracted to import wheat from abroad, a move which has lessened its reliance upon Syria but has placed an additional strain on Syro-Lebanese relations.

Syria, although a viable unit from the point of view of food, has also been plagued with difficulties. Foreign exchange resources are now almost completely exhausted; a petroleum shortage has developed as a result since Soco, the supplier, demands dollars in payment. Continued inflation has forced an in-

crease in the price of bread, thereby stimulating popular unrest. Syrian dependence upon the Lebanese port of Beirut gives rise to many disagreements regarding the handling of Syrian shipments, presenting a further obstacle to Syro-Lebanese economic cooperation.

While it is probable that eventually some basis for agreement will be attained, there will no doubt be considerable bickering before that point is reached.

*e. Foreign Trade.*

Since Syria and Lebanon are joined in a customs union administered through the Common Interests Council, no separate foreign trade statistics are available. Levant foreign trade has for years shown a consistently unfavorable balance; official figures \* for 1947 show imports of some 363 million Syro-Lebanese pounds (\$163,350,000) and exports of LLS. 84 million (\$37,800,000). Trade with the US for 1947 shows an unfavorable balance of some LLS. 91 million. Preliminary 1948 figures indicate no improvement in this trend of Levant trade.

A portion of these adverse balances is financed through such invisible exports as emigrant remittances, tourism, and transit trade earnings. The drain on foreign exchange assets has been so heavy, however, that the dollar resources of the two governments are now practically exhausted. Both countries are making efforts to develop other sources of dollars and to limit importation of luxury items from hard currency areas.

*f. Development Projects.*

The Syrian Government is sharply aware of the tremendous irrigation potentialities of the Euphrates River, which runs through the Jezireh (northeastern Syria). Records and ruins dating from the Roman era indicate that at that time the country was capable of supporting a population of eight million in contrast to its present population of three and one half million. Under government sponsorship, a survey has been carried out by the British firm of Alexander Gibb, which has now sub-

\* The accuracy of all Syro-Lebanese statistics is open to question.

mitted detailed plans for an irrigation network in the Jezireh, a project to pipe water from the Euphrates to supply the city of Aleppo, and a tentative plan for the development of the port of Latakia. An agricultural survey was also carried out by an American Agricultural Mission in 1946, which submitted recommendations to both Syria and Lebanon looking toward the improvement of current agricultural and forestry practices.

In addition to the Euphrates, Syria also hopes eventually to develop the irrigation possibilities of its other rivers, the Khabur, Nahr el Kebir, and Orontes. A dam across the Orontes was built by the French; the increased area thus brought under profitable cultivation gives an indication of what might be done on a greater scale.

Surveys have also been made of Lebanon's resources, and recommendations submitted for their development. To re-establish the vanishing tourist trade, a chain of modern hotels and an intensive publicity campaign are necessary. In the agricultural field, there are projects for irrigation and swamp drainage. The Ministry of Public Works has drawn up a program which calls for increased road construction, the piping of drinking water to outlying districts, the building of offices and schools, and the construction of a large international airport near Beirut.

Projects such as these, however, cannot be carried out without foreign technical and financial help; until a final settlement is reached in Palestine, it is probable that the greater part of these development plans will remain pigeonholed.

4. Iraq.

*a. General.*

Although the present standard of living in Iraq parallels the low level of that in the other Arab states, Iraq has two potential sources of wealth which could revolutionize the country's economy—undeveloped agricultural resources and petroleum. Its proved oil reserves are estimated at 8 billion barrels. The Iraq Petroleum Company, operator of the principal concession, paid the Iraqi Government some \$9 million in oil royalties in 1947; implementation of the company's plans for increased pro-

duction may increase these royalties to \$24 million by 1950. Exploitation of the country's other great asset, the undeveloped water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, is now under study.

British economic influence in Iraq, which dates from the activities of the British East India Company around Basra in the seventeenth century, is well established. Under the Mandate, it was inevitable that political control should be accompanied by economic dominance. Today the most lucrative agencies for foreign goods are in the hands of British businessmen, and an outsider would encounter difficulty in cracking this commercial monopoly. In addition until very recently, British advisers were attached to principal government departments, and the inclusion of Iraq in the sterling area means that fiscal policies are subject to a measure of British control.

*b. Agriculture.*

Despite the unscientific use of its land, Iraq has always been a leading food producer in the Middle East. Aside from tea, coffee, and sugar, which are imported, the country is a surplus producer of all essential foodstuffs. Principal exports are cereals (particularly barley and wheat), dates (the leading money crop), and livestock. Under the pressure of the world-wide shipping shortage during World War II, this trade increased with India, Iran, and the other Arab states.

*c. Industrialization.*

Always with the exception of the petroleum installations, industry plays a relatively minor role in the Iraqi economy. Industrial development has been hampered, among other things, by a lack of trained manpower and technical advisers. The government has attempted to encourage manufacture by grants, reductions in taxes, tariff concessions, and credits made available through the Government Bank for Agriculture and Industry. Government subsidies to the textile industry, for example, are the principal factor that has prevented its collapse. Other products locally produced, but not in sufficient quantity, are cigarettes, building materials, and matches. At present, new industrial projects are hampered by hard currency scarcities at home and

production difficulties abroad, which prevent the acquisition of needed machinery and equipment.

*d. Finance.<sup>1</sup>*

Prior to World War II, Iraqi public finances, like those of Egypt, were on a reasonably satisfactory basis. The country enjoyed a balanced budget, a negligible public debt, and a note issue fully backed by gold or foreign exchange assets (sterling).

The war years and those which followed, however, have witnessed a progressive deterioration in the country's financial stability. Principally because of large allied military expenditures during the war, the index of notes in circulation rose from a January-July 1939 base of 100 to a fantastic 998 in June 1945. Since then there has been a slow but steady decrease, but the problem is not yet solved. This increase of currency circulation was accompanied by an upward spiral of prices which the government made little effort to check. The cost of living index rose more than 600 percent in relation to the prewar level. This inflation was not the result of fiat money or uncovered fiduciary notes but the increased circulation of a currency fully supported by sterling.

An acute shortage of dollars and other hard currencies has led Iraq, as a member of the sterling area, to attempt to reach a settlement with the UK regarding Iraq's sterling balances, amounting to an estimated £60 million. An agreement reached in August 1947 became inoperative almost immediately when the UK was forced by its financial position to suspend convertibility. An agreement concluded on 17 November 1947 provided for the release of a portion of Iraq's balances to cover current transactions.

The greatest stabilizing factor in the Iraqi economy is oil royalties, which in prewar years have provided as much as 30 percent of the total revenue. Under the present inflated budget, about 10 percent of the revenues come from this source.<sup>2</sup> It was formerly possible to finance large-scale expenditures from this

<sup>1</sup> Note that one Iraqi dinar (ID) = \$4.03.

<sup>2</sup> These royalties have in addition been cut by 50 percent since the shut-down of the Haifa refinery in April 1948.



income; the present inability of British production to meet Iraqi orders, however, has led the Iraqi Government to approach IPC with a demand that a portion of these royalties be paid in foreign exchange other than sterling and that the Royalty rate (presently quoted at 4 shillings gold per ton) be renegotiated.

*e. Foreign Trade.*

British influence and Iraq's adherence to the sterling bloc have inevitably resulted in the directing of Iraqi foreign trade toward the UK and other sterling countries. For essential purchases outside the sterling area, the UK under the Anglo-Iraqi financial agreement of 1945 has allocated approximately \$14 million annually, which is released through the Exchange Control Board and debited against Iraq's sterling balance.

Iraq's principal exports consist of agricultural products, including cereals (42 percent of total exports in 1946), dates (19 percent), and wool (10 percent). These are all marketed through British monopoly arrangements and yield only sterling. Principal imports are manufactured goods. Accurate figures are difficult to obtain, but a rough balance of payments estimate for 1947 indicates that total payments of \$86 million are only partially offset by receipts of \$74 million (including \$9 million in oil royalties). This \$12 million deficit was financed through the release of part of Iraq's sterling credit which had been blocked by the UK.

It may be predicted that implementation of Iraq's ambitious projects for internal development will make foreign credit in the form of foreign exchange necessary. With the projected increase in oil production, however, royalties may possibly approach \$50 million within a few years. Such receipts should more than suffice to secure any credits extended.

No significant increase in Iraq's trade with the US is looked for until the UK's financial position is sufficiently stable to permit the resumption of the convertibility of sterling. The UK's favored commercial position in the country will also continue to hamper any expansion of US trade.

*f. Development Projects.*

Besides the Iraq Petroleum Company's plans for a large increase in oil production in the

near future, other expansion projects are also being considered, development of which would be under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Government. Experts have estimated that, through the implementation of a large-scale irrigation project, Iraq could become a vast food-producing area and thus contribute to the relief of famine conditions such as those which plague India. It is considered probable that the land under irrigation could be increased from its present approximately 6½ million to 20 million acres.

At the invitation of the Iraqi Government, a group of British experts has been making a survey and is now engaged in drawing up a report to recommend a suitable plan for agricultural development. A project patterned after the TVA is envisaged wherein an extensive irrigation scheme drawing upon the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates would be combined with subsidiary programs directed toward raising the general standard of living of the population. For the accomplishment of this plan, the government is willing to pledge its future oil royalties.

Other tentative capital development schemes covering a four or five-year period include: construction and extension of railroad lines; erection of railway bridges; improvement of the port of Basra; completion of certain irrigation projects already begun, such as the Habbaniya Flood Relief Scheme; and water and electricity services.

5. Transjordan.

*a. General.*

The economy of Transjordan is almost entirely agricultural and pastoral. There is, moreover, little prospect of future economic development, since there are few natural resources, large desert areas unsuited for exploitation, and little capital and skilled labor. Its principal strategic importance is its position athwart present and projected oil pipelines.

*b. Agriculture.*

With the exception of rice, sugar, tea, and coffee, which are imported, Transjordan ordinarily produces a surplus of foodstuffs. Principal crops are cereals (wheat, barley, and millet), fruits, and vegetables. Sheep and goats are raised in quantity.

*c. Industrialization.*

Industry in Transjordan cannot be said to play any significant part in the country's economy. A few small factories produce consumer goods for local use, but the volume is negligible.

*d. Finance.\**

Transjordan has no independent monetary unit, but uses the Palestinian pound as its currency. One of the significant features of past budgets is the fact that the UK has subsidized the country, directly or indirectly, since the Mandate was established in 1922. Before the war, some 30 percent of Transjordan's revenue came from the British Treasury; about half of this was earmarked for the support of the Arab Legion, Transjordan's Army. During the war years, approximately 70 percent of Transjordan's revenue consisted of British grants-in-aid. Following the establishment of Transjordan as an independent country in March 1946, a budget balanced at LP 1,126,000 was submitted for the 1946-47 year. Defense costs, with the exception of the police force, were not included; it is assumed that these will continue to be borne by the UK.

The unpromising economic outlook for Transjordan as at present constituted is undoubtedly one of the reasons for Abdullah's advocacy of the "Greater Syria Plan"; the resources of such a state would probably be adequate to enable it to maintain independent economic status.

*e. Foreign Trade.*

Transjordan's position in the foreign trade field is of little significance, and trade is not of great importance to the economic life of the country. The principal export trade is with neighboring countries, with Palestine normally absorbing more than 75 percent of the total. Imports, principally textiles and luxury goods, come mainly from the UK. Official figures indicate an unfavorable trade balance, but in recent years widespread smuggling of luxury items to Palestine and Syria has made official reports meaningless.

*f. Development Projects.*

Although no projects are under considera-

tion by the government itself, concessions granted by the government to outside interests may redound to Transjordan's future financial advantage. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company has obtained an oil exploration concession which provides for a substantial payment to the Transjordan Government. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities would, of course, change the financial picture completely.

There is also the possibility of increased revenue from transit taxes on oil passing through the country in pipelines. In addition to the present IPC Kirkuk-Haifa line, the Trans-Arabian pipeline is scheduled to cross Transjordan. An agreement has been signed which provides for the payment of substantial transit fees when the line is in operation. The projected Middle East pipeline from Iran may be an additional source of revenue.

These prospective increased revenues from oil are, however, in the somewhat indefinite future. Meanwhile, the government will be faced with a real challenge to obtain revenues sufficient to meet its operational requirements.

6. Saudi Arabia—Yemen—Kuwait.

*a. General.*

Before the development of its oil resources, Saudi Arabia's economy was based on an agriculture of the most primitive type. Government revenues depended mainly upon income from the annual pilgrimage of Moslems to Mecca. Sums realized from this source were used to finance the import from neighboring countries of Saudi Arabia's few requirements from the outside world.

In 1933, King Ibn Saud granted a sixty year oil exploitation concession to the Standard Oil Company of California, which subsequently joined with other American companies to form the Arabian American Oil Company, known as Aramco. This company has already invested some \$125 million in Saudi Arabia and contemplates a further investment of \$300 million. Royalties received by Ibn Saud as the result of expanding production have already vastly altered the country's economy, with still greater changes probable in the future. Indeed, it is not unlikely that more will be done within the next twenty years to raise

\* Note that one Palestine Pound (LP) = \$4.03.

the standard of living of the population than was done in the previous twenty centuries.

In the Sheikdom of Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf, the oil concession is held by the Kuwait Oil Company, jointly owned by Anglo-Iranian and Gulf. This company employs an estimated 90 percent of the Sheikdom's labor force, and provides sufficient income to keep Kuwait reasonably happy and prosperous.

Yemen, in the southwestern highlands of the Arabian Peninsula, has until recently followed a policy of maintaining a position of isolation from the outside world. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's new-found prosperity and the country's need for development, however, have of late caused some modification of this stand.

#### *b. Agriculture.*

Historically, the economy of the Arabian Peninsula is predominantly pastoral and agricultural of the most primitive type. Lack of transportation dictates that food be marketed within a fifty-mile radius at the maximum. Each family, tribe, and village supplies itself; larger urban areas import food which is paid for either by the proceeds from the annual pilgrimage or the products of the local craftsmen. The ability of the people to feed themselves in the desert areas is thus directly dependent upon weather conditions. Drought means that the Bedouin and the inhabitants of the small settlements require outside sources of food. In 1947 Ibn Saud made use of some of his oil royalties to furnish food to a large number of tribes which would otherwise have been faced with the prospect of starvation. The coastal towns are dependent upon food imports.

In contrast to the other Arab states, rice is a more important part of the diet than wheat. Traditionally rice was imported from the Far East, but when these shipments were cut off during the war, wheat replaced rice. The most important food crop produced locally is dates, which grow abundantly in the Tihama and on scattered oases. The principal cereal crop is millet.

In Yemen, the comparatively dense population has by much labor and skill made intensive farming possible. Dry farming is carried on by means of an intricate terracing system and the collection and control of water run-

ning off uncultivated slopes. Crops include coffee, fruits, and cereals. Rice from India and dates from Iraq are the chief agricultural imports; coffee is the leading export.

#### *c. Industrialization.*

With the exception of the oil installations (which are constructed and operated by foreign concession holders), industry in the Arabian Peninsula may be considered as non-existent. There are a few native handicrafts, such as weaving and metal working, but they play no significant part in the area's economy.

#### *d. Finance.*

The financial problems of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the remainder of the peninsula are somewhat different from those in the other Arab states. These primitive countries do not have central banks, intricate budgets, and the other financial hallmarks of the modern state. So long as they maintained their traditional isolation, financial problems were few, but increasing contact with the outside world has exposed the inadequacy and weakness of their financial structure.

On the basis of a simple pastoral and agricultural economy, coupled with pilgrimage receipts, Saudi Arabia was for the most part self-sufficient, albeit at a bare subsistence level. A drastic revision has been necessitated, however, by the King's desire to undertake large-scale public works such as irrigation projects, railroad construction, and port improvements. It is contemplated that these projects be financed from oil royalties, but income from this source is not sufficient to cover such expenditures at present. Royalties should be considerably increased, however, following the completion of the Trans-Arabian pipeline and the resultant facilitation of oil marketing. Meanwhile, an Export-Import Bank credit of \$10 million was made available in 1946 to bolster the Saudi economy.

Presently circulating in the country are British gold sovereigns, Turkish gold pounds, Egyptian pounds, Indian rupees, Maria Theresa thalers, US dollars, and Saudi Arabian riyals. Relationships between these currencies constantly fluctuate, thereby complicating financial transactions, especially in the field of foreign trade. The Saudi Government

has asked the US for help in clearing up the confusion and during the latter part of 1948 two financial experts were giving the question serious study. Their suggestions were recently submitted to the Saudi Arabian Government.

Until recently Yemen, like Saudi Arabia, found that its largely self-contained economy, coupled with a system of primitive barter, sufficed to solve its financial problems. However, efforts to implement modernization projects, to obtain aid from abroad, and to purchase surplus property from the US have created payment difficulties. At present, Yemen has received a \$1 million surplus property credit and is attempting to obtain a loan from the Export-Import Bank, but the devising of a satisfactory method of repayment is presenting difficulties. The only possible method would now be by the shipment of coffee or the sale of bullion. In the future it may be that income from foreign concessions will provide Yemen with needed exchange.

*e. Foreign Trade.*

In contrast to the other Arab states, Saudi Arabia must import food, principally to supply its urban population. In addition, textiles and other manufactured articles must be imported. Necessary food ordinarily comes from India, Egypt, and Iraq, although during the war Ethiopia became a source of supply for wheat. Finished goods come for the most part from the US and UK, with some textiles being supplied by India.

No foreign trade statistics are available. Exports may, however, be considered negligible. Recently, oil royalties have been the most important factor in offsetting the adverse trade balance.

The foreign trade of Yemen is limited. The country is largely self-sufficient, and such trade as does take place, consisting principally of exports of coffee and imports of minor manufactured essentials, mainly textiles, is handled through the Aden entrepôt.

*f. Development Projects.*

The development of an agricultural economy for Saudi Arabia is an avowed policy of King Ibn Saud. Evidence of ruined dams and decayed irrigation systems indicates that the

country's agricultural wealth and the size of its population were at one time much greater than they are today. In 1942 the Al Kharj projects were begun under the supervision of a US Agricultural Mission, and later turned over to Aramco for management. Recent reports indicate that results thus far have been encouraging although the experiment is still on a small scale. In addition, the royal family and high officials have demonstrated by scientific cultivation of their own lands that the agricultural yield of the country could be greatly increased. Other similar projects are now under consideration.

Another of the King's projects is the construction of a railroad from the capital at Riyadh to Dhahran and Damman, with the concomitant development of Damman into a first-class port. Construction of this railroad is under the charge of Aramco and has already been completed as far as Abqaiq. The Saudi Government, however, is to defray the expenses. Although foreign advisers have almost unanimously urged a motor road as a more economical method of connecting Riyadh and the Persian Gulf, the King is adamant in his demand for a railroad, which is expected to cost around \$33 million.

Originally the Hejaz Railway ran from Damascus to Medina and played an important part in the handling of pilgrimage traffic. During World War I, however, the section of the line below Ma'an, Transjordan, was wrecked, and this lower section is now derelict. The Saudi Government hopes to restore this section, then to extend the line to Jidda and Mecca. The plan is that eventually the two railway systems will be connected, thus providing service from the Mediterranean to Dhahran.

In January 1948, the Legislative Council recommended that additional development projects amounting to some \$15 million be undertaken during the year. Construction would be handled by Bechtel International on a cost-plus basis. The most important of these projects are: (1) improvement and modernization of the port of Jidda, to permit the berthing of large ships; (2) electrification of Riyadh, Jidda, Mecca, and Medina; (3) modernization of the airports at Jidda and Riyadh;

also construction of a hotel at Dhahran; (4) improvement of the Mecca-Taif road; and (5) completion of the Jidda water distillation plant. The expansion of educational facilities is also planned. During 1948, some progress was made in carrying forward these projects. The Mecca-Taif road has been surveyed, although no construction work is planned immediately owing to unavailability of funds. The Jidda airport has been largely completed, and some work has been done at Riyadh. The Riyadh powerhouse is now operative, and considerable progress has been made in the Jidda port modernization program.

The above program will mean an investment by American industry of perhaps \$300 million during the next five years, plus an investment of about \$100 million by the Saudi Arabian Government. Implementation of these plans would of course be extremely effective in the amelioration of the country's living standards; results will undoubtedly be watched carefully by the entire Moslem world.

Yemen to date has been able to do little more than consider development plans for the indefinite future. Among these still somewhat nebulous projects are the improvement of the harbors of Ras Ketib and Hodeida, road construction, establishment of city water and electricity systems, and the erection of a textile mill. At present, however, Yemen does not have the requisite foreign exchange to enable it to hire experts or purchase materials and equipment. Tentative foreign negotiations for development concessions may provide a means for obtaining this needed exchange.

## 7. Aden and Persian Gulf Sheikdoms.

### a. Aden.

Aden's economic importance stems from the fact that it is a distribution and transshipment point. Its good harbor and shipping facilities have made it a focal point for the surrounding area, including Yemen, Ethiopia, and the Somalilands. Since Aden is a British colony and within the sterling bloc, the greater part of the overseas trade is with the UK; considerable trade is also carried on with India, particularly in cotton textiles. Principal com-

modities passing through the port are cotton goods, grain, coffee, tobacco, and skins.

### b. Bahrein.

The two principal industries in Bahrein are petroleum development and pearl fisheries. The Bahrein Petroleum Company produces some 35,000 barrels per day of crude; the refinery has a capacity of 146,000 barrels per day, handling in addition to the local production approximately 110,000 barrels per day sent from Saudi Arabia by submarine pipeline.

The traditional occupation of Bahreinis is pearling. In recent years the importance of this trade has declined, owing to the growth of the Japanese cultured-pearl industry and the deterioration of the pearling fleet. Pearl exports in 1946 amounted to some \$220,000.

Bahrein also serves as an entrepôt for the Arabian states in the Persian Gulf, filling a role similar to that of Aden on the other side of the peninsula. The main trade is in cereals and other foodstuffs.

### c. Muscat, Oman, Qatar, Trucial Coast.

The economies of these Persian Gulf Sheikdoms are based primarily on subsistence agriculture and small-scale fishing. The Indian rupee is their basic coinage and the greater part of their foreign trade (with the exception of Qatar) is with India.

Petroleum concessions for these Sheikdoms are held by subsidiaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Oil has been found in Qatar, whose reserves are estimated at one billion barrels. Exploratory work only has been carried out in the other areas.

## 8. Economic Stability of the Arab States.

Although the war and its aftermath have seriously disrupted the economy of the entire Middle East (together with that of a large part of the rest of the world), the economic position of the Arab states under what might be called normal conditions—such as existed prior to 1939—is basically sound. Agricultural production throughout the area is usually sufficient to supply the basic food needs of the population. Although industrial development is primitive and backward, the vast majority of the people require little in the way of manufactured goods.

**SECRET**

It must be emphasized, however, that the Arab states' resources are only sufficient to maintain the area on a bare subsistence level. The current efforts of the governments to improve the lot of the people through the development of industry and agriculture are bringing with them problems of finance and procurement.

One of the most effective steps that could be taken by the countries themselves toward the improvement of their economy would be united action toward the relaxing of tariff and customs barriers between countries and the consideration of economic affairs on a regional basis, with the possible goal of the eventual establishment of a customs union. For such a move, present feelings of nationalism and jealousy will necessarily have to be subordinated to the general good of the area as a whole. Certainly there are enough natural barriers and difficulties restricting the free flow

of goods in the Middle East without the setting up of artificial hurdles at the gateway to each small country.

It is possible that, if the Arab states maintain their freedom from foreign political pressures, they may eventually work out their economic difficulties. After so many years of foreign domination, they are still unsure of themselves and will inevitably make some mistakes. Nonetheless, projected increases in oil production will bring increased oil royalties, many economic dislocations attributable to the war slowly becoming readjusted; surveys with a view to future exploitation of the area's resources have been made; and foreign technical advice has been obtained. It is probable, however, that some assistance from the Western Powers will still be needed before the area can stand firmly upon its own economic feet.

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## CHAPTER III

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### 1. Bases of Arab Foreign Relations.

##### *a. General.*

The complexities of Arab foreign relations result from the interplay of two sets of conflicts. The most fundamental conflict is between the East and the West; between the reviving, but still feeble, Arab civilization and the dynamic Western civilization; between the newly created and relatively weak Arab states and such world powers as the US, the UK, and the USSR, which feel that the Arab area is of vital strategic importance. This East-West conflict is implicit in most of the vital issues affecting Arab foreign relations. To all Arabs, the Palestine issue is primarily one of Western Zionist aggression. Saudi Arabians and some Syrians accuse the British of sponsoring the Greater Syria plan to advance British ends. The Sudan question and the Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi treaty disputes are further isolated examples of the conflict between the Arab world and the West.

The second set of conflicts affecting Arab foreign relations is inter-Arab and reflects the national, dynastic, and personal rivalries of various Arab groups. The major conflict in this category is a dynastic one between the Hashimite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. All the Arab states are involved in the dispute in one way or another.

##### *b. Great Power Influence.*

The foreign relations of the Arab states are intelligible only against the background of the influence of non-Arab countries in the area. In the inter-war years, the foreign relations of the Arabs, if not directly controlled, were completely circumscribed by the UK and France. Syria and Lebanon were French mandates; Iraq (until 1932), Transjordan, and Palestine were British mandates; Egypt, nominally independent, was economically and militarily closely tied to the UK; the sheikhdoms

and principalities of the Persian Gulf and along the eastern and southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula were, in one form or another, under the protection of the UK; and Saudi Arabia and Yemen were so encircled by British influence that they had little freedom of action vis-à-vis the outside world.

World War II changed this situation in important respects. As a result of the fall of France, French prestige suffered severe damage, and the attempts of General De Gaulle to reassert French authority after the defeat of the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon were so greatly resented that French political influence in the Levant was completely dissipated. Syria and Lebanon became independent republics, and the last French troops left the Levant in 1946. Because of the substantial part played by British troops and advisers in the liberation of Syria and Lebanon, first from Vichy control and later from the overzealous machinations of the Free French, the prestige of the UK in the Levant markedly increased. However, the governments of Syria and Lebanon are today free to formulate their own foreign policies.

The influence and prestige of the UK in the Near East also diminished significantly after World War II as a result of the intensification of Arab nationalism and the UK's economic and imperial difficulties. Demands for treaty revision were raised in Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan, and the UK's traditional position as adviser, protector, and arbiter was continuously challenged. Nevertheless, the UK is still the most influential power in the Arab world. British troops are stationed in the Suez Canal Zone, and British colonial officials direct the Sudanese administration. The UK strongly influences the actions of King Abdullah of Transjordan, maintains officials in the Iraqi Government, and is legally entitled to station troops and maintain military bases in both countries. The British position

in the Persian Gulf, Muscat, and Hadramaut principalities is still paramount; Aden is still a colony; and Saudi Arabia and Yemen continue to recognize the UK's ubiquitous influence and to respect British political experience throughout the area.

The effect of the Palestine issue on UK-Arab relations is at present difficult to gauge. The inevitable increase of nationalism and xenophobia has built up strong pressures against any kind of non-Arab influence. Since UK influence in the Near East is greater than that of any other non-Arab power, the UK is generally the victim of xenophobic agitation. At the same time the UK, alone of the great powers, has concurred in the Arab view that Israel represents a threat to the peace of the Near East, and the consistent British policy of thinly veiled opposition to Israel (as opposed to US support of Israel) has tended to counteract the ground-swell of anti-British feeling in the Arab states. There is even a possibility that some sort of UK-Arab defense system may grow out of the Palestine issue. However, if the UK is to re-establish its influence and prestige in the Near East, it will have to deal more sympathetically with Arab nationalist susceptibilities than in the past and abandon its imperialist approach.

Before World War II US influence in the Arab world was confined for the most part to the sociological field. Educational and missionary establishments gave the US a wide reputation for disinterested service to the welfare of the Arab peoples. However, with the assumption of world-wide responsibilities during and after World War II, the US could not avoid entering the political arena of the Arab world. US diplomatic assistance in the liberation of Lebanon and Syria was the first direct intervention and convinced the Arabs that the US possessed the high principles of many US missionaries and educators. The tremendous Arabian-American oil project in Saudi Arabia inevitably led to ever closer US-Saudi relations, relations which in no way impaired the high reputation of the US in the Near East. However, US initiative in the UN action recommending the partition of Palestine committed the US to policies violently opposed by all the Arab states. Because of the Arab fear of Com-

munism, however, and the material assistance that the Arabs would like to get from the US in the future, US influence is potentially very great.

Soviet influence in the Arab world is at present negligible and will continue so unless the political and social order of the Near East, already severely strained by the Palestine issue and economic difficulties, is overturned and US and UK influence ejected.

### *c. Arab Aspirations.*

The foreign policies of the Arab states reflect not only foreign influence but also several powerful (although confused) Arab aspirations. These aspirations are represented by such terms as Pan-Arabian, Independence, and Nationalism, which not only contradict one another but which also bring the Arab states into conflict with outside powers. Nearly all Arabs cherish the ideal of Arab unity, but because of personal ambitions, long-standing dynastic rivalries, and vested interests which have developed in the separate countries since 1920, few individuals in the governing classes actively support federation. King Abdullah in his Greater Syria plan, proposes the amalgamation of Lebanon, Syria, Arab Palestine, and Transjordan. This is opposed by many leaders in Syria and Lebanon because of their vested interests; by Saudi Arabia because of the traditional enmity between the Saudi and Transjordan ruling houses; and by Egypt because of King Farouk's jealous claim to pre-eminence among Arab rulers. The only concrete evidence of Arab unity has been the Arab League, which was formed in 1945 by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Its purpose is to strengthen relations between the member states, safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and in general foster cooperation in commercial, communications, health, and cultural matters. The chief organ of the League is the Council, in which representatives of the member states discuss and take decisions on matters affecting the whole area. Although the Pact of the League of Arab States provides that unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding on all member states and that majority decisions shall be binding on those states which have accepted them,



the member states have, in effect not always felt bound by League decisions. The League has a Secretariat General, and Azzam Pasha, an Egyptian, has been its Secretary General during its first four years. Although the League has achieved little on specific issues, it has until recently had some success in coordinating the policies of the Arab states toward the Palestine issue. The complete failure of the Arab campaign against the Zionists, however, has seriously undermined the Arab League, and its continued existence is at present problematical.

When Arabs speak of independence, they mean complete liberation from the influence of the Western Powers, primarily the UK. It is a motive which plays a considerable part in Arab foreign policy but one which no Arab government is able to implement completely. The poverty and weakness of the Arab states compel them to accept Western assistance and protection. All are committed to policies of economic development which require a large investment of foreign capital and the aid of many foreign advisers. Communism is anathema to the Arab ruling classes, which know that only the Western Powers can defend them from the USSR.

Nationalism plays a part not only in Arab relations with the non-Arab world but also in inter-Arab relations. It too, however, conflicts with other Arab interests, for by supporting the desire for freedom from "imperialist domination," it blocks badly needed foreign aid and alliances. The intensified nationalism aroused by the Palestine issue, for example, has very seriously impaired relations between the Arab states and the Western Powers. In inter-Arab relations, nationalism acts as a centrifugal force, and it tends to exaggerate the differences between the various Arab states rather than the similarities. In spite of strong racial, linguistic, and cultural ties, the Arab states have shown little capacity to work together for common economic and political ends, as the Palestine war has so clearly indicated.

## 2. Relations of Individual States.

### *a. Egypt.*

Since World War II the primary aims of Egyptian foreign policy have been to: (1) pre-

vent the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine; (2) negotiate the withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian soil; (3) supplant the UK as the "protector" of the Sudan; (4) prevent the establishment of a Hashimite Greater Syria; and (5) play the leading role in the Arab League.

Since the defeat of the Egyptian Army in the Negeb in October and December 1948, however, the Egyptian Government has been in no position to implement any of these aims. In February 1949 it reluctantly signed an armistice with Israel, and the Palestine Conciliation Commission is now attempting to negotiate a comprehensive peace treaty. Whatever the outcome of these negotiations, however, Egypt is unlikely to enter into diplomatic or economic relations with Israel and will attempt to strengthen its army and economy with the ultimate object of defeating the Zionists. In pursuit of this primary aim, the King and certain influential groups in Egypt are beginning to realize that Egypt cannot afford the luxury of strained relations with the UK. Consequently, although strong nationalist forces continue to clamor for the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone and British administration from the Sudan, a movement is growing for the resumption of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for a comprehensive mutual defense treaty. Such a treaty would not only act as a guarantee against Soviet aggression, the threat of which the Egyptian ruling class actively fears, but might also give Egypt the opportunity to build up an army to fight Zionism.

US-Egyptian relations are strained by US support of Israel. Like all the Arab states, Egypt wants economic and military assistance from the US, but it is reluctant to modify its attitude toward Zionism in order to get that assistance. US-Egyptian relations are not likely to improve appreciably until the Palestine situation becomes more stable and Egypt resigns itself to whatever settlement is achieved.

Soviet-Egyptian relations have long been merely formal and unproductive. Egypt's traditional distrust of the USSR was confirmed in the summer of 1948 when the USSR violated the terms of a cotton-wheat barter agreement

entered into in March 1948, by selling on the world market the Egyptian cotton it received at a price with which even Egypt could not compete.

Because of its size and wealth, Egypt is generally considered the leading member of the Arab League. As a result of the Arab defeats in Palestine, however, neither Egypt nor the Arab League now exerts much influence over the other Arab states. Similarly Egypt is in no position to prevent the establishment of a Hashimite Greater Syria.

*b. Transjordan.*

King Abdullah's personal ambitions, modified by his fear of public Arab reaction and by the control which the UK exercises over his purse strings, constitute Transjordan's foreign policy. Abdullah's greatest ambition has long been the amalgamation of Transjordan, Arab Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon into a kingdom of Greater Syria under his rule. With Iraq already ruled by Abdullah's great nephew, Feisal II, the establishment of a Greater Syria would place all the "fertile crescent" under the control of the Hashimite dynasty and might lead eventually to a single north Arabian kingdom. With the encouragement of his British advisers and the possible covert assistance of British agents throughout the Near East, Abdullah has wooed minority groups, as well as the general public, in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. In defiance of the Arab League, he has repeatedly urged the people of these countries to abandon their own governments and to support him in the formation of a unified Greater Syria, and he has covertly supported incipient revolts by the Druze, Alaouites, and tribesmen against the republican government of Syria. A ruler in the Arab world, however, must be a real leader with a substantial popular following. Largely because of his subservience to the UK, Abdullah has never had such a following. This fact and the determined opposition of politically vested interests in Syria and Lebanon as well as the opposition (for dynastic reasons) of Saudi Arabia and Egypt have prevented the Greater Syria scheme from ever maturing. Rumors of the invasion of Syria by the Transjordan Arab Legion recur periodically, but it is extremely unlikely

that the UK would ever sanction a move which might well lead to revolution and chaos throughout the area and weaken, if not completely destroy, the considerable influence which the UK still exerts in the Near East.

The Palestine issue, however, is providing Abdullah with the first real opportunity to implement a part, at least, of his Greater Syria scheme. Although the Arab Legion entered Palestine together with the other Arab armies ostensibly to defeat the Zionists and set up an independent Arab state in all Palestine, it was soon apparent, particularly after the poor showing made by the Arab forces, that Abdullah was willing to make peace with the Jews and incorporate into his own kingdom only those areas of Palestine allocated to the Arabs in the UN partition resolution of November 1947. Since then, Israel has taken over Western Galilee and most of the Negeb, but from developments at the end of 1948 it became apparent that Abdullah would be content with the remaining hilly areas of central Palestine now occupied by the Arab Legion and the Iraqi Army. In December 1948, a gathering of Palestinian Arab notables at Jericho requested Abdullah to proclaim himself king of Arab Palestine. The storm of protest from the rest of the Arab world has apparently had some effect on Abdullah, for he has not yet taken this final step. It is unlikely that he will do so until the UK, also concerned by the violent reaction in the other Arab states, is willing to support him in the move.

The US, which for some months had maintained an unofficial representative in Amman, extended formal recognition to Transjordan on 31 January. Both Abdullah and the UK had urged such recognition on the grounds that it would strengthen Abdullah vis-à-vis the other Arab states and make it easier for him to take the lead in negotiating a settlement of the Palestine issue with Israel.

Transjordan's relations with non-Arab states are extremely limited. Outside the Arab League, Transjordan is recognized only by the US, UK, France, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Of these, only the US, the UK,

France, Spain, Greece, and Turkey maintain permanent representation in Amman. Because of Turkey's potential influence in the Greater Syria issue, King Abdullah has made a point of establishing cordial relations with that country. He visited Ankara in 1947 and is planning another visit to Turkey in 1949. Transjordan's application for membership in the United Nations has twice been blocked by a Soviet veto. Because of the UK's dominant influence in the country, Transjordan's western alignment is secure.

*c. Syria.*

Since the withdrawal of the last French troops in 1946, the basic aims of Syrian foreign policy have been to: (1) destroy Zionism in Palestine; (2) prevent the establishment of a Hashimite Greater Syria; and (3) free Syria's economy from financial dependence on the West. In attempting to achieve these aims during the past year, Syria has become involved in manifold difficulties and has had to modify substantially its actual, as opposed to its declared, aims. The Syrian Army was badly mauled by Israeli forces in northern Palestine in May and June 1948 and is now licking its wounds behind the Syrian frontier, desperately hoping that Israel will be content with what it has already achieved. No Syrian government, however, that did not swear to carry on the fight against Zionism could long stand. Consequently, the government's major policy is to give the appearance of carrying on the struggle without, in fact, doing so, and Syria has accordingly gained the reputation of being the most vocal and least effective of Israel's opponents. Syrian delegates at the UN have played a prominent part in presenting the Arab case and have been conspicuously disassociated from all rumors of Arab-Jewish negotiations. Of all the Arab states bordering on Palestine, Syria is least likely ever to negotiate a settlement with Israel.

In inter-Arab affairs, Syria has strongly supported the Arab League. As the chief antagonist of the Greater Syria plan, Syria is highly suspicious of both Abdullah and the UK, and its fear of Transjordan aggression has promoted cordial relations with Saudi Arabia. It has consistently opposed the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Transjor-

dan and, for that reason, has backed the Palestine Arab (Gaza) Government (PAG). Syria's decision to free its currency from the French franc and its refusal to sign an agreement with Tapco for the laying of the trans-Arabian pipeline have strained its relations with Lebanon (see Chapter II), although these economic difficulties are not expected to lead to serious political differences between the two countries. Syria's relations with Turkey are not very cordial. Turkey's acquisition in 1939 of the Syrian city and province of Alexandretta (Turkish: Hatay), still rankles with most Syrians, and King Abdullah's friendly relations with the Turks arouse fears that Turkey might support the Greater Syria issue.

In spite of the present xenophobic attitude of the Syrian people, resulting largely from the frustrations of the Palestine issue, Syria desires cordial relations with the Western Powers, and particularly with the US. Syria's responsible leaders realize that the young republic must have outside assistance if it is to achieve economic strength and political stability. For this reason, Syria's relations with the US can be expected to improve as soon as a reasonably permanent settlement is achieved in Palestine. There has even been some diminution of Syria's distrust of France, and the French are being permitted to re-establish in an unostentatious manner and under close Syrian supervision some of their former cultural ties. Syria distrusts Soviet intentions in the Arab world; its relations with the USSR are, consequently, purely formal.

*d. Lebanon.*

Lebanon's foreign policy reflects the country's half-Christian, half-Moslem population. Although the Lebanese Government attempts to gloss over this religious division, to emphasize Arabism, and to support the Arab League, the divergent interests of the two communities constantly affect policy. There is a strong feeling among the Christians that a Jewish state in Palestine might prove a valuable potential ally for a "Christian" Lebanon against the Moslem Arab world. Largely as a result of this moderating influence, Lebanon's contribution to the fight against Israel

has been modest. Even though Israeli forces now occupy certain areas in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese Government, with an eye to its future relations with Israel, has refrained from complaining to the UN. Although Lebanon has, from time to time, assisted the Arab irregulars in Palestine and permitted Syrian Army units to operate in Lebanese territory, it has avoided insofar as possible getting involved in the fighting. There is little doubt that Lebanon would like to see the Palestine issue settled; and it would probably have no objection to Abdullah's taking over the Arab areas of Palestine, although in general Lebanon strongly opposes Abdullah's Greater Syria plan.

In inter-Arab affairs, Lebanon's only real difficulties are with Syria because of conflicting economic interests (see Chapter II).

Lebanon cherishes its newly won independence, but it is far more cosmopolitan and far less xenophobic than the other Arab states in its relations with the non-Arab world. Although its traditional ties with France were severely strained during its fight for independence and with the US over the Palestine issue during the past year, Lebanon's basic alignment is toward the West. Friendly relations with the US, the UK, and even with France can be expected as soon as some sort of settlement is reached in Palestine. Lebanon has an active distrust of the USSR and keeps a close watch over Soviet-sponsored activities in the Levant. In the UN, Lebanon has played an important role in cultural, social, and economic affairs.

#### *e. Iraq.*

The avowed aims of Iraqi foreign policy are: (1) to defeat the Zionists; (2) to reduce British influence in the Iraqi Government; and (3) to remain neutral in the Greater Syria issue. The first aim was dealt a severe blow during the first few weeks of the fighting in May and June 1948, when the Iraqi forces were unable to make any substantial headway against the Israeli Army. Since then they have shown no desire to resume the offensive, and the main preoccupation of the Iraqi Government now appears to be to devise a method of withdrawing the forces from Palestine without at the same time raising a storm of

protest inside Iraq. Because the Iraqi Government is under continuous and strong public pressure to renew the fight in Palestine, it dares not negotiate with Israel. The fall of the Pachachi Government in January 1949 was attributable primarily to its inability to resolve this dilemma. There is not much reason to hope that the new government of Nuri Said will have any greater success. However, because of his anglophile background, Nuri may be expected to cooperate with King Abdullah, and indirectly with the UK, in seeking a settlement in Palestine.

A fresh attempt may also be made to renew the 1932 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Iraqi ultranationalists would like to sever all ties with the UK, but the wealthy, landowning class that invariably controls the Iraqi Government realizes that British administrative and technical assistance is essential in certain departments of the government and that the UK alliance is a safeguard against the threat of Soviet aggression.

In inter-Arab affairs, the Iraqi Government, because of its Hashimite ties with Transjordan, is generally considered to sympathize with King Abdullah's Greater Syria ambitions. Abdullah, however, is generally distrusted by the Iraqi people, who accordingly oppose the Greater Syria scheme. As a result of this popular opposition, Iraqi leaders usually back the Arab League policy, which enjoins the member states to refrain from meddling in one another's internal affairs. Iraq's relations with Turkey are friendly but not very close; its relations with Iran consist primarily of bickerings over boundary rights in the Shatt-al-Arab.

From time to time Iraq, as both a charter member of the Arab League and a signer of the Saadabad Pact,\* has attempted to play a pivotal role between the Arab League and other Moslem countries of the Middle East. Neither group of countries, however, has encouraged Iraq's pretensions; and the general concept of an all-embracing Moslem bloc to contain the Soviets has never developed very far. Like the other Arab states, Iraq fears the threat of Soviet aggression, but at the

\* A pact of non-aggression signed by Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan on 8 July 1937.

same time it refuses to establish closer ties with the Western Powers because of their attitude toward Zionism.

*f. Saudi Arabia.*

Saudi Arabia's foreign policy differs radically from the foreign policies of the other Arab states. Free from the pressure of public opinion (which is not important in Saudi Arabia) and uninhibited by a colonial background (having been independent since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire), Saudi Arabia surveys with a less jaundiced eye the Palestine issue and the question of Western influence in the Near East. Although Ibn Saud recognizes in Zionism a threat to the Arab world, his fear of Soviet aggression is much deeper. To maintain his prestige among Arabs generally, he has supported the Arab cause in Palestine with token armed forces and funds, but he has not permitted the Palestine issue to undermine his close relations with the US. His primary aim is to conclude a defensive alliance with the US, which by committing the US to the defense of the Arab world would safeguard the Arabs against both Zionism and Communism. Ibn Saud is confident that the logic of the "cold war" will compel the US to recognize that containment of Zionist ambitions, stability in the Arab world, and close political and economic relations with the Arab states are vital to US security. The Saudi King loses no opportunity to present this thesis to US representatives.

Although Ibn Saud has made it plain that he is reposing his trust primarily in the US, his relations with the UK are friendly. Nevertheless, he distrusts the UK's close association with the Hashimite kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan and has staunchly opposed King Abdullah's Greater Syria movement, which he feels is largely British inspired. In order to obviate this threat, Ibn Saud has recently urged the conclusion of a tripartite defense alliance among the US, the UK, and Saudi Arabia. Such an alliance would have the triple object, as far as Ibn Saud was concerned, of warding off Communism, Zionism, and the danger of Hashimite aggression.

Although technically Saudi Arabia and the USSR recognize each other, no diplomatic rep-

resentatives have been exchanged for a number of years. Informal Soviet representations during the past two years concerning the reopening of the Soviet Legation in Jidda have been greeted coolly by the Saudi Arabian Government and have never been pursued by the USSR.

Saudi Arabia maintains friendly relations with a number of western nations, including France, Italy, and Belgium as well as with those Asiatic countries which annually send pilgrims to Mecca and Medina. Its relations with Iran, however, have been disturbed from time to time by conflicting claims to islands in the Persian Gulf. These difficulties between the two countries will almost certainly be increased as the search for oil spreads to the sub-sea areas of the Persian Gulf.

*g. Yemen.*

Although Yemen's foreign relations are extremely limited, there is increasing evidence that the present Imam (ruler) is cautiously breaking down the country's almost complete isolation from the outside world. In recent years US, UK, French, Italian, as well as numerous Arab, representatives have visited the country. In 1947 Yemen signed a \$1,000,000 surplus property agreement with the US, and more recently agreement was reached with the UK over the long-disputed question of Yemen's frontier with Aden. Nevertheless, Yemen does not permit the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions in the country, and its relations with the outside world are conducted almost entirely through the UN or the Arab League.

In inter-Arab affairs Yemen invariably follows the lead of Saudi Arabia. Its support of the Arab cause in Palestine has been negligible.

*h. Aden, Kuwait, and Peripheral Arab Sheikdoms and Sultanates.*

As a result of special treaty relations between these states and the UK, they can be considered British colonies insofar as their foreign relations are concerned. Aden and its Protectorate are under British administration, and in the other areas the Arab rulers have granted the UK the exclusive right to conduct their affairs with outside states. In Kuwait, US participation in the tremendous oil develop-

ments has raised the question of establishing US diplomatic representation there. Were such a development to occur, the UK's dominant position would inevitably be affected. Already the Sheikh of Kuwait has shown considerable independence from British influence in granting his half of the Neutral Zone oil concession to a US company. This trend can be expected to increase.

### 3. The Palestine Issue.

The establishment of the Zionist state of Israel in Palestine in May 1948 completely upset the equilibrium of the Near East and provoked an international issue which may have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. If Israel can become integrated into the political and economic pattern of the Arab world, it can contribute vitally to the development of the whole area. If, however, the present bitter antagonism between Israel and its neighbors continues, instability, revolution, and war will become chronic. The outcome of this issue will depend largely on the influence of the great powers.

In the light of historical analogy it is extremely unlikely that Israel and the Arab states, if left to themselves, would ever compose their fundamental differences and live as peaceful neighbors. Zionism is too dynamic and Israel too conscious of its present strength for the Jews voluntarily to foreswear the temptation to dominate the Arab world. On the other hand, Arab nationalism is too deep-seated and the Arab states too fearful of Zionist domination for the Arabs unresistingly to accept Israel into their community as an equal member. The basic claims of the two antagonists appear equally valid when a balance is drawn of the humanitarian, political, historical, and economic factors involved. Nevertheless, those claims are irreconcilable; and abstract justice is, therefore, impossible.

In the period since the UK abandoned the Palestine Mandate in May 1948, Zionism, as a result of its greater strength, has enforced most of its current claims. A national state has been created to fulfill the centuries' old dream of the Jewish people; a refuge has been afforded the destitute Jewish survivors of Europe; and revolutionary economic developments have been instituted which are poten-

tially valuable to an underdeveloped region. At the same time, however, the Arabs have been compelled to give up their hope for an independent Arab Palestine; 850,000 Arabs have been made homeless and destitute; and the Arab states find at their doorsteps an alien, dynamic, and aggressive state. Were Israel content with its achievements thus far, there is reason to believe that the Arab states would eventually lose their fear of Zionist aggression. Whatever the outcome of the present negotiations at Rhodes, however, it is extremely unlikely that the Jews will accept as final a settlement that does not include all Palestine in Israel. Many Zionists have long demanded such expansion on political and historical grounds; many more will demand it on economic grounds when the pressure of Israel's expanding population begins to be felt. In addition to the threat of continued Zionist expansion, the Arabs fear also that the Jews, centered in Palestine, will slowly come to dominate the economic life of the entire Arab world. For the time being, however, the Arab states are powerless and are, therefore, being compelled to acquiesce in Israel's existence. The Rhodes Conference is the first significant indication of such acquiescence. Because the fundamental Arab-Jewish conflict has not been resolved, however, Arab acquiescence will be purely passive; and Israel will remain ostracized until the threat of Zionist expansion ends and Arab fears are dispelled.

The influence of the great powers on this issue has been and will continue to be decisive. The UK, because of its vital interests and long associations in the Arab world, sees as clearly as the Arabs that Israel threatens the established balance of forces in the Near East. Consequently, although the UK is largely responsible for the success of the Zionist experiment in Palestine, it is now the greatest obstacle to Israel's further expansion. The UK's former attitude aroused the deep distrust of the Arabs; its present attitude has resulted in the avowed enmity of Israel. At the same time, the Arabs' distrust of the UK is decreasing, and unless in their defeat the Arabs take refuge in sullen xenophobia, the traditional ties between the UK and the Arab states can be expected to strengthen, although probably on less "imperialistic" terms.

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The support which the US has extended to Zionism during the past year and a half has been decisive in the establishment of Israel. The US, however, has also set a limit on Zionist claims, and its policy is to restrict Israel to the territory (or its equivalent) allotted to the Jews in the UN partition resolution of November 1947. Furthermore, the US is in a favorable position to put a brake on Israeli expansion because of its past support of Zionism and Israel's financial dependence on the US. Such a development would reassure the Arabs, permit the re-establishment of close relations between the US and the Arab states, and pave the way for political reforms and economic developments which are vital if the Near East is to defend itself (with the support of the US and the UK) from Soviet aggression or Communist infiltration.

It is unlikely that Communism will make much headway in the Near East so long as some measure of equilibrium is established and maintained between Israel and the Arab states. In spite of the severe strain placed on the political and economic structures of the Arab states by the Palestine issue, the traditional leaders, to whom Communism is anath-

ema, have maintained their authority. Similarly, although the dominant forces in Israel profess neutrality in the "cold war" between the US and the USSR, they are fundamentally Western in alignment. Although Soviet (or satellite) assistance to Israel during the Palestine war has been more spectacular, US financial assistance will be the chief prop of Israel for many years to come. If, however, the US and the UK are unable to settle the conflict between Arabs and Jews, the slow demoralization of the Arabs and the disintegration of their society will continue as during the past year. In the Arab states today, some of the younger intellectuals (not necessarily Communist) would welcome Soviet assistance in overthrowing the established order and evicting US and UK influence from the Near East. The possibility of such developments increases with every Arab defeat at the hands of the Jews. Consequently, it has been the consistent policy of the USSR to obstruct all attempts to reach a settlement in Palestine and to make Israel militarily strong, for a militant Israel is the Soviets' best means of inducing revolution in the Arab world.

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## CHAPTER IV

### MILITARY SITUATION

#### 1. General.

The armed forces of the Arab states are patterned on the historic ground force arms of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the usual auxiliary and service troops. Only Egypt has a navy.\* Several of these countries have air forces but their capabilities are negligible. Generally speaking, the armed forces of the Arab countries are small and very poorly equipped, trained, and led; they are designed primarily as defensive forces to aid the national police in maintaining internal security. The Arab world has neither the natural nor industrial resources to support modern military establishments. With the possible exception of the Transjordan Arab Legion, none of the Arab armies is capable of sustained operations outside its borders. None of the Arab states could defend itself from invasion by a major power or combination of small powers.

#### 2. Egypt.

The armed forces of Egypt, of which King Farouk is the Supreme Commander, consist of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Frontier Corps, Territorial Force, and Coast Guard. The estimated strength of the ground forces is 64,500. Conscription laws provide that all physically fit males between the ages of eighteen and thirty are subject to military service for a period of three years on active duty and nine years in the reserve. (Conscripts in the Territorial Force serve for a period of nine months and are then placed on reserve status for eleven years and three months.) Men over thirty are subject to military service in the event of a national emergency. Egypt could probably mobilize 100,000 men by M plus six months.

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\* Iraq has a river flotilla of only minor significance.

In general, the quality of the manpower in the armed forces is not high. The ranks are drawn primarily from the peasant and laboring groups, which are for the most part illiterate, impoverished, and diseased. The officers, who serve voluntarily, are men of higher calibre coming normally from the wealthier and better-educated families. The chief virtues of the Egyptian soldier are his loyalty, amenability to discipline, and fatalistic attitude.

The dominant service of the armed forces is the Egyptian Army, which is organized on the general staff basis. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the King and receives his orders direct from the Minister of National Defense. Egypt is divided into six area commands. Brigades, of which there are fourteen, are the highest tactical units. An infantry and machine gun brigade generally consists of three battalions, an antiaircraft brigade of one heavy antiaircraft regiment and a searchlight regiment, and a cavalry brigade of a tank, a reconnaissance and a horse cavalry regiment. For combat, an infantry brigade is usually supported by units from the other types of brigades and operates as a brigade group.

In spite of the presence in Egypt of a British Military Mission from 1936 to 1947, military training is unsatisfactory because of: (1) the poor quality of the average conscript; (2) the serious shortage of arms and equipment; and (3) the scarcity of capable officers and non-commissioned officers. The Egyptian Army's matériel is standard British equipment obtained from current or surplus stocks or from stores of obsolete and war-weary matériel. Although the UK is bound by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 to provide modern arms and equipment, most of Egypt's equipment falls into the obsolescent, or World War II class. This fault may be attributed chiefly to the fact that Egypt, a predominantly agrarian



country, does not have the industrial potential or technical ability to maintain modern heavy and highly technical equipment. Lacking plans for any significant industrial development, Egypt will have to continue to rely on external (probably British) aid to arm and equip its armed forces.

Egypt is, in effect, the only Arab country that has a navy. The navy consists of the following vessels:

- 1 LST
- 9 YMS (215 tons)
- 3 Yachts (YP) (1069, 1330, and 4561 tons)
- 20 LCM
- 1 Launch (65 tons)
- 3 Attendant Vessels (450 tons) Y.A.G.
- 1 Transport (2640 tons)
- 1 Trawler (618 tons)
- 1 Patrol Vessel (30 tons)
- 2 Patrol Vessels (20 tons)
- 1 Lighthouse Tender (1428 tons)
- 3 Training Ships (small)

Three frigates now on order from the UK may be delivered at any time. Egyptian naval personnel are poorly trained and are inexperienced.

Of all the Arab states Egypt possesses the strongest air force, but its capabilities are very limited. The Royal Egyptian Air Force (REAF) consists of about fifty-seven Spitfire fighter aircraft, eleven twin-engine aircraft which can be used either for transport or bombing duties, twenty-five single and twin-engine advanced trainers, and about seventy other miscellaneous and/or obsolete aircraft. Egypt also possesses 103 twin-engine transports donated by the US for ground mechanical instruction only, of which ten are believed to have been made operational. The REAF has a personnel strength of 396 officers, 310 of whom are pilots, and 2,896 enlisted men. The pilots range from poor to fair, have a low combat efficiency, and lack aggressiveness. It is believed that the REAF has sustained fairly heavy combat losses in the Palestine war. To replace the destroyed aircraft, Egypt ordered about fifty fighter aircraft, either Macchi or Fiat, from Italy. Five of these are known to have been shot down on their first mission. Egypt is also attempting to buy Stirling four-engine bombers from a Belgian

firm; an unknown number of these have been delivered. The operational efficiency of the REAF is probably less than 50 percent.

The anti-aircraft defenses of Egypt, which are completely ineffective by Western standards, are concentrated in the Alexandria-Cairo-Port Said triangle. The artillery and the fire-control and radar systems are believed to be obsolete, badly worn, or non-operational. The UK assumes complete responsibility for the air and ground defenses of the Suez Canal area under the provisions of the 1936 treaty.

All Egyptian forces which entered Palestine last year are in the Gaza strip or back in Egypt. Some reserve units have been reactivated and disposed in the Cairo area to assist the civil police in maintaining internal security. One Egyptian infantry battalion is permanently stationed in the Sudan, and all the remaining troops are garrisoned in the six area commands. The Royal Frontier Corps of 5,400 is organized into a light-car regiment and two camel-corps sections. Its normal mission is to police the Suez Canal, but currently units are stationed along the Israeli frontier as well. The Territorial Force of 2,000 is located primarily in the Western Desert and along Egypt's western and southern frontiers.

In summary, the reverses suffered by the Egyptian ground, sea, and air forces in the Palestine conflict clearly reveal their weaknesses: low morale, poor leadership, insufficient training, and inadequate equipment. Although the Egyptians dream of an armed force, modernly equipped and armed, they lack the human, natural, and industrial resources to fulfill their dream. Consequently, it appears that Egypt must depend for its defense on the UK and the US, although in the event of another major war, its armed forces, as in World War II, could probably secure Egypt's internal communications (the Suez Canal excepted), maintain internal security, and perform other guard and service functions.

### 3. Transjordan.

The armed forces of Transjordan consist primarily of the Arab Legion, which is at present commanded by a British brigadier responsible directly to King Abdullah. Two deputies, one (a Transjordanian) for Public

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Security, and one (a British brigadier) for Administration, constitute the staff of the Commander. All the key command positions are held by former British officers now under contract to the Transjordan Government. The terms of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty of alliance of 1946 provide for British financial and matériel support of the Arab Legion.

The estimated strength of the Arab Legion is 19,000, of whom 4,000 are police troops. About 9,000 are organized into combat units. (Transjordan's male population of military age was estimated in January 1948 to be 85,000; about half of this number can be considered physically fit and available.) The method of recruitment for the Legion is unknown, but the majority of the officers are Transjordanians who have received thorough training in British units, such as the Palestine Police, and the ranks are drawn from the Bedouin desert tribes, villages, and towns.

Under British top-level control and command, the Arab Legion has been developed into a well-trained and well-disciplined military force, with a fair degree of mechanization and some armor. In proportion to its size, it is substantially superior to the forces of the other Arab countries. Armament, equipment, and transportation and armored vehicles are primarily British and are nearly at full strength, in accordance with Tables of Organization and Equipment which closely follow those of the UK.

Currently, the Legion is disposed in central Palestine from Jenin in the north to Hebron in the south. It gave a good account of itself in combat with Jewish forces, wresting the Old City of Jerusalem from the Jews and, in the early stages of the fighting, maintaining a fairly effective blockade of the Tel Aviv-Ramle-Jerusalem road. Of the Arab armies, the Legion was most respected and feared by the Jews. Its operations indicate what the Arabs could do if they were properly trained, equipped, and led.

The Arab Legion is capable of effectively and efficiently maintaining internal security and defending Transjordan against any probable combination of Arab armies. It might even be able to conquer Syria, Lebanon, and northern Saudi Arabia, should King Abdullah

decide to establish a Greater Syria by force. However, its defensive capabilities against a modern army are severely limited.

#### 4. Syria.

The Syrian armed forces, of which the President is nominally Commander-in-Chief, consist of the Army (which includes a small air force), the National Police, the Gendarmerie, and the Desert Guard. The President's authority is delegated through the Prime Minister to the Minister of Defense, who heads the army, and the Minister of the Interior, who directs the other three forces. The estimated strength of the army is 22,708; of the National Police, 2,000; of the Gendarmerie, 5,000; and of the Desert Guard, 2,700. Most of these troops are volunteers. In a national emergency all males from 17 to 60 are eligible for service.

The army, which includes a very small air force, is headed by the Chief of Staff with a General Staff that follows the French pattern of four Bureaus: I—Administration, II—Intelligence, III—Training, and IV—Supply. Advising the Minister of Defense, however, is a former British officer, and it can be expected that British organization, tactics, and training will gradually predominate. The army is organized into five brigades. There are eighteen infantry battalions, one horse cavalry group (which approximates one US squadron), three artillery battalions and one battery, three armored battalions and one company; and three engineer companies.

Syria has almost no industry and must, therefore, rely solely on foreign sources for matériel. The bulk of Syrian equipment, which is obsolete and worn, is French, although since World War II small quantities of arms and equipment have been obtained from the UK, the US, France, Italy, Belgium, and Turkey. There is evidence that Syria's efforts to obtain German and Czechoslovakian equipment from Czechoslovakia are meeting with limited success. This admixture of matériel will further strain the prevailing poor and inadequate maintenance system of the Syrian armed forces.

The Syrian Air Force, an integral part of the Syrian Army, is all but valueless. It has

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forty-seven officers, twenty-five pilots, and 110 other ranks. There are fifty-four miscellaneous aircraft, most of which are in poor condition.

In summary, Syria's military capabilities are negligible, as the Palestine war has clearly indicated. An increase in Syria's military potential cannot be expected until a sound basis for the country's national life is established through systematic political, economic, and social reforms.

#### 5. Lebanon.

The Lebanese armed forces consist of an army under the Minister of National Defense and a gendarmerie under the Minister of Interior. The President is Commander-in-Chief and exerts his authority through the Prime Minister.

There are 2,500 gendarmerie troops and approximately 3,600 men in the army, all of whom are volunteers, as there is no compulsory military service. This force numbers about two and a half percent of the estimated 280,000 males of military age. Terms of service are for two years, and recruits must be single, literate, and between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

Because of French influence during the Mandate, French traditions and doctrines predominate in the Lebanese Army. It has a conventional General Staff organization, and operational control is divided into five Sector Commands: Mt. Lebanon, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Beirut, and Bekaa. The army is organized into six infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and a cavalry squadron. The infantry battalions contain three infantry companies, one heavy weapon support company, a machine gun platoon, and a signal platoon. The artillery battalion contains two batteries. The cavalry squadron contains two horse troops and an armored and motorized troop.

Possessing no indigenous munitions industry or other industries which might be converted to support the army, Lebanon is wholly dependent on foreign sources for armament and most of its military equipment. Armament and equipment, which are mostly of French origin, with some British and American thrown in, but are generally obsolete and

worn, in spite of fairly efficient maintenance.

The Lebanese Army is small but fairly effective for internal security purposes. However, its national defense capability is negligible as evidenced by its lack of resistance to the Jewish forces now occupying an area in southern Lebanon.\*

#### 6. Iraq.

Iraq's armed forces, of which the King is Commander-in-Chief, consist of the Army, the Royal Iraqi Air Force (RIAF), and a small river flotilla. The Minister of Defense, appointed by the Prime Minister, exercises control over the armed forces through the Chief of the General Staff. Under the administration of the Minister of Interior is a Police Force, which is tactically controlled by the army. A Defense Council, composed of high-ranking officers, advises the Minister of Defense on matters of general policy. Owing to the presence of a British military mission with the Iraqi Army until 1948, British influence has been paramount in Iraqi military affairs.

Iraq's armed forces number 63,000. Although there is a reserve system, it is largely inoperative. Iraq has a mobilization potential of 245,000 by M plus 180, but such a force could not be effectively organized or equipped. Most of the officers are drawn from the well-educated wealthy class and receive good theoretical military training, which, however, is later lost to the army when senior officers resign to accept civilian positions with the government. A proportionate share of commissions is not granted to the Kurds, who have the best fighting qualities. The Iraqi ranks are mostly illiterate volunteers; they must be between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Discipline is good and morale is generally good. The average soldier readily endures hardship and can subsist on little food. Whereas the Kurds have excellent soldierly qualities, the Iraqi Arab is not a very good soldier but has a higher aptitude for specialist duties. The *esprit de corps* of the army is impaired by the lack of real national spirit, for individuals are inclined to be more loyal to their religious and ethnic groups than

\* The Jewish forces were withdrawn from Lebanon at the end of March 1949.

to the state. However, if the Iraqi troops are convinced of the political or national justice of a cause, they can be a fairly effective military force.

The army, which numbers some 45,500 is organized into three divisions. The First Division is organized as a plains division to operate in the western and southern deserts. The Second Division is organized as a mountain division to operate in the northeastern mountainous regions. The Third Division, normally a training division in peacetime, is stationed near Baghdad. The theoretical organization of these divisions is similar to the British structure for like units, but inadequate equipment has necessitated considerable variation in the actual organization. In peacetime, the Third Division is responsible for basic recruit training and for specialized training of the engineers, artillerymen, and signalmen in the tactics and technique of their respective branches. Although British Army Manuals are used and an attempt is made to set high standards, the quality of training is mostly fair owing to poor facilities, inadequate equipment, illiteracy and the low physical standards of recruits, lack of qualified and able instructors, and the lack of interest of the bulk of recruits, who purchase their exemption immediately following the basic three months' course. This widespread practice has a detrimental effect on the morale of other recruits and the instructors.

The Iraqi armed forces have been equipped, armed, and supplied mainly by the British, since the country lacks an industrial complex and adequate natural resources. The High Command has been anxious to modernize the armed forces, and steps were taken in this direction when \$16 million worth of arms and equipment were bought from the UK in 1947. However, only part of the order reached Iraq before the British suspended deliveries because of the Palestine fighting.

Twenty thousand Iraqi regular troops, consisting of a mechanized force and four brigades, are entrenched in central Palestine.\*

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\* These troops were subsequently withdrawn into Transjordan and had returned to Iraq by the end of July 1949.

As they have seen relatively little combat, however, their effectiveness cannot be accurately estimated.

The Royal Iraqi Air Force is small and weak. It is manned by about 1,400 officers and men, including 105 pilots, and has an aircraft strength of thirty-one Ansons, five Gladiators in very poor condition, nine Sea Furies, and forty miscellaneous craft. From a military point of view both pilots and aircraft are of a low standard.

If the currently planned reorganization and re-equipment of the Iraqi Army is carried through with any degree of efficiency, its capabilities will be immeasurably increased. However, if Iraqi forces continue to be embroiled in Palestine and the General Staff continues to eschew British advice and assistance, the Iraqi Army is not likely to be improved. At present the Iraqi armed forces could offer only a limited defense to an airborne and ground invasion by a modern army. Strategic defense plans call for such a defense, although the early support of the UK and the US is predicated. Consequently, the real capabilities of Iraq's forces are the effective maintenance of internal security and the defense of Iraq against the other Arab states.

## 7. Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia's greatest military strength lies in the Bedouin tribesmen who are armed and trained in tribal warfare under the control of the tribal chiefs. There is also a small army consisting mostly of small garrison police forces, the personal retainers of the King and other leading personalities, and a small constabulary and Coast Guard under a Minister of National Defense. The tribal chiefs and the Minister of National Defense are responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and then to the King, who regards all of these forces as his personal army. The regular army is believed to number 8,000, with an additional 62,000 armed tribesmen who can be called upon by the King in case of emergency.

Almost all Saudi Arabian tribesmen are trained to use a rifle and to ride horseback and camelback. They are rough and hardy individuals, inured to desert conditions. The

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garrison units, composed mainly of volunteers, comprise the regular army and are stationed in the settled coastal regions and inland villages and towns, with the majority in the capital city of Riyadh. By contrast, the tribesmen, with the exception of the personal retainers to the leading Sheikhs in the King's court, are scattered throughout the country, barely eking out an existence from the meager

pasture areas around the scanty water supply.

Saudi Arabia's armed forces could offer little opposition to a modern army. Guerrilla warfare would be the extent of their capabilities. However, the inaccessibility of the interior, scanty resources, the dispersion of the population, and the absence of significant population centers constitute a natural defense of the country.

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## CHAPTER V

### STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY

For geographical, political, and economic reasons the Arab states constitute one of the most important strategic areas in the world. Geographically, the Arab world is the meeting point of East and West, a very important point of world communications, and a center from which influence can be exerted over large areas in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Politically, it is of strategic importance because the weakness and instability of the Arab governments invite infiltration and aggression. Furthermore, as the heart of the Moslem world, it has strong ties with the Moslem states of Asia and the Moslem peoples of Africa. Although the Arab world is economically underdeveloped, its petroleum resources and agricultural potential are very great and, therefore, vitally important because of the world's oil and food shortages.

All these strategic considerations have a direct bearing on US security. The US cannot permit an unfriendly power to obtain control of the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the airfields and ports of the Arab states. Such control would isolate the Arab world from Europe and the Far East, and it would block the development of world communications. The US also has a very important security in-

terest in the great oil reserves of the area. Middle East oil is necessary for fulfillment of ERP in Western Europe and, even in peacetime, is of major importance to the US defense establishment; in 1947 almost half of the oil used by the US armed forces came from this source. In view of these requirements and in view of expanding consumption within the US, loss of access to Middle East oil could seriously inhibit the peacetime economy of the US and might compel the US to utilize dwindling oil reserves which would otherwise be husbanded for periods of national emergency. The US security position would be further weakened if a potentially hostile power were to obtain control of the oil of the Middle East.

These strategic considerations, from the point of view of US global security, require stability in the Arab world. In spite of a low standard of living and semi-feudal political regimes, the Arab states are capable of developing strength, cohesion, and stability. In spite of the Palestine issue, the Arab states still look to the US and the UK, rather than to the USSR, for cultural, economic, and military assistance.

## CHAPTER VI

### POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY

US strategic interests in the Middle East will be continuously endangered unless some degree of political stability and economic prosperity can be achieved in the Arab world. Before this stability and prosperity can be achieved, Israel and the Arab states will have to compose their differences, and the ties that have traditionally bound the Arab states to the Western world will have to be strengthened.

The Arab states have only recently emerged as full-fledged members of the international community of nations; they are economically backward, socially unsettled, and politically immature. If the Palestine issue had not arisen, the process of political and economic development under Western influences, which has been going on since World War I, would have continued. Although the mandatory system left a legacy of bitterness toward the UK and France, the Arabs distrusted and feared the USSR more than the Western Powers; and responsible Arab leaders readily admitted that cooperation with the West (provided all evidence of political subservience were eliminated) was essential to the future well-being of the Arab world. The Palestine issue, however, checked this development. Since 1947, US support of Israel has embittered relations between the US and the Arab states; political extremism, both Communism and ultra-nationalism, has undermined the ability of the present Arab governments to rule effectively; and no serious attempts have been made to tackle the grave economic and social problems which are at the root of the Arabs' troubles. As a result of these developments the Arab states today constitute a very weak link in the defense chain being forged by the Western Powers to contain Soviet expansion.

From the point of view of self-interest the Arab states have no alternative but to continue to depend on the US and the UK for financial and technical assistance. Because of Western pressure and in spite of volatile nationalist opinion, they have accepted (even though tardily and grudgingly) the Zionist revolution. At the same time, however, they are preoccupied with Israel as representing the most direct threat to their political and economic independence; under the circumstances their ruling groups, though relatively moderate and more or less pro-Western, will tend to neglect the internal reform which is the long-range defense against Communism and to discount the usefulness of their Western ties so long as they provide no dependable checks on Israeli expansionism. If the threat of Israeli expansion into the territories of the Arab states should become immediate, US strategic security interests would face the ultimate danger that the Arab leaders might turn to the USSR for support or be replaced by extremists willing to do so.

The Arab states thus represent a liability in US global strategy. Because of their political and economic weakness, they could contribute only insignificantly to their own defense or to the defense of US strategic interests in the event of war between the US and the USSR. Before they can become strong and cooperative allies, a long process of political stabilization and economic development must take place. The development of a more stable and responsible form of political life would be encouraged by Western guarantees against further Israeli expansion and by Western assistance and advice. Economic development will almost certainly require Western initiative as well as material and technical aid.

## APPENDIX A

### TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

#### 1. Topography.

There are three main topographic features in the area of the Arab states: (1) the Egyptian, Syrian, and Arabian desert plateaus, which form part of the vast arid plateau that stretches from the Atlantic coast of northwest Africa to the steppes of Central Asia; (2) the mountain ranges along the Mediterranean coast, in northeastern Iraq, along the Red Sea coast and Gulf of Aden, and in the southeastern corner of the Arabian peninsula in Oman; and (3) the great river systems of the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates. The Egyptian desert is cut from south to north by the rich Nile valley, which broadens into a fertile delta north of Cairo. The Syrian and Arabian deserts form part of the great Arabian plateau which extends from the high mountains in Yemen and Asir along the Red Sea in a long gentle slope northeastward to the Persian Gulf and the Mesopotamian plains. It merges into fold mountains of Oman in the East, and further north into the coastal plain of the Persian Gulf. North along the Red Sea coast, on the Sinai Peninsula, and in the interior of Arabia the plateau is cut by wadies (dry river channels), but there are no perennial rivers. To the northwest, the plateau continues through Transjordan into Syria, its steep western edge a fault slope three thousand feet high in Transjordan and up to seven thousand feet in southern Syria and Lebanon. Between the western escarpment of this plateau and a lower range of hills running parallel to the Mediterranean a rift valley extends from the Turkish border to the Gulf of Aqaba, sinking at the Dead Sea to 1,200 feet below sea level. The Jordan River, which forms the boundary between Palestine and Transjordan, flows through the southern part of the valley and empties into the Dead Sea. In Lebanon, the Litani flows south and then west around the southern end of the Lebanon mountains.

The Orontes flows north through Syria to Antioch in Turkey and then turns west. Both cross the narrow coastal plain and empty into the Mediterranean.

East of the valley, the plateau slopes down to the Mesopotamian plains, which stretch east and south to the head of the Persian Gulf and which are bounded on the north and east by the mountains of Turkey and Iran and on the west and south by the Syrian and Arabian deserts. Through this "fertile crescent" flow two great rivers, the Tigris, which rises in central Turkey and flows in a southeasterly direction through eastern Iraq; and the Euphrates, which rises in eastern Turkey, flows west and south through southern Turkey and northeastern Syria, and continues on down through Iraq parallel to the Tigris. The two rivers meet in southern Iraq, at a point near Basra, in the Shatt-al-Arab, which then flows into the Persian Gulf.

The struggle between the deserts and the rivers is the most vital geographical conflict of the Arab world. The soils of these for the most part desiccated lands are potentially fertile; the future of the Arab peoples depends in large part on their ability to exploit this possibility.

#### 2. Climate.

As with almost everything connected with the Arab world, the climate is one of extremes. On the high desert plateaus, days are hot and nights cold, and the average annual rainfall is less than two inches. On the other hand, Palestine, Lebanon, and coastal Syria have a Mediterranean type climate with warm, moist winters and hot, arid summers. The central, southern, and eastern areas of the Arabian Peninsula suffer under arid north-east trade winds, while the southwest highlands of Aden and Yemen are subject to the Indian summer monsoon.



## APPENDIX B

### COMMUNICATIONS

#### 1. Harbors.

With the exception of Aden and the three major Egyptian ports (Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez), it may be said that the harbor facilities of the Arab states are generally poor. Capacity is limited, equipment is in a dilapidated condition, and communications with the interior are inadequate. While these deficiencies create difficulties in the handling of shipments from overseas, a great deal of the coastal shipping is carried on by means of native dhows, which do not require extensive port facilities. The Arab countries, however, realize that their growing trade with the West is placing an increased burden upon their harbors, and are consequently including port modernization in their development plans.

*Alexandria* is one of the largest ports in the Mediterranean. As Egypt's "summer capital," it has long received the lion's share of port improvement funds allocated by the Egyptian Government. Its semi-natural harbor is protected by an elaborate system of breakwaters; it provides wharfage berths for 55 ships, and its harbor anchorages can accommodate an additional 85 vessels. Much of the equipment, however, is obsolete and in need of replacement. The Egyptian Government has announced a program of improvement which will cost some \$12 million, but no positive steps have yet been taken.

*Port Said*, before the war, was used principally as a service port for ships going through the Suez Canal. During the war facilities were expanded to permit its use as a discharge port as well. Although the harbor is adequate, wharfage berths are lacking, necessitating discharge into lighters. Upon the completion of the projected modernization of Alexandria, it is probable that Port Said's use as a discharge port will decline.

*Suez* was the orphan child of Egyptian ports before the war. The principal ships using the

port were small vessels engaged in Red Sea trade. During Rommel's campaigns, however, with the Mediterranean closed to shipping, the full burden of supplying the Allied armies in the Western Desert fell upon Suez, which was unequipped to handle the flood of tonnage. Additional quays and facilities were speedily built, with the result that discharge capacity rose to 15,000 tons a day. With the present expanded capacity and with Suez Bay capable of providing anchorages for some eighty ships, Suez may be expected to continue to play a significant part in the handling of Egyptian shipping.

Other Egyptian ports, of local importance only, include *Matruh*, west of Alexandria, and *Safaga* on the Red Sea.

*Beirut* is the principal port of the Levant, and handles by far the greater part of the Syro-Lebanese trade. It can handle about twenty vessels at one time, but much of the equipment is obsolescent and in need of replacement. A Free Zone has been established; plans have been under consideration for its expansion, as well as for the modernization of the port as a whole.

*Tripoli*, as a terminus of the IPC pipeline, is concerned mainly with oil shipments. There are no wharves and only a minimum of port equipment.

*Latakia* is the only Syrian port of any potential significance. At present its facilities are limited, but the Syrian Government, in an effort to lessen the country's dependence on Beirut and Alexandretta, has been considering plans for its development.

*Aqaba*, Transjordan's only port, has little to recommend it other than its strategic location at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.

*Jidda* is Saudi Arabia's chief port on the Red Sea. Its equipment is primitive, and cargoes are discharged into dhows in open roadsteads,

partially sheltered by reefs. It is primarily a port of entry for pilgrims bound for Mecca.

*Hodeida* is the largest coastal town of Yemen but can hardly be dignified with the name of port. For some years, however, there has been talk of developing it, and if the country is ever opened up to trade with the outside world, Hodeida would be the logical gateway to the interior.

*Aden* is the major port of southern Arabia. It is a free port, handles entrepôt trade for the Arabian Peninsula, the Somali Coast, and India, and acts as the chief port for the Aden and Yemen hinterland. It is also a bunkering and fueling port.

*Basra*, Iraq's only port, is located on the Shatt-al-Arab at the head of the Persian Gulf. It has a daily capacity of some 2,000 tons but like all the Arab ports is in need of modernization.

*Kuwait* is a lighterage port, and unloading cargo is difficult and costly. It has no port facilities. A deep-water pier with breakwaters is being constructed at this former roadstead at Fahahil. It will serve as the principal supply port and oil outlet for the Kuwait Oil Company within a year or two.

*Ras Tanura* is the oil port for the Arabian-American Oil Company. As the operations of the company expand, it can be expected that the port will be enlarged to meet increased demands.

*Dammam* will serve as the principal port of entry for supplies as well as another tanker port for export of petroleum (along with Ras Tanura) when the Saudi Arabian Government finishes the deep-water pier which it is building there.

*Manama* (on Bahrein Island) is the native port and has no facilities. Goods are lightered in from a distance of 1½ to 2 miles. Actual port of entry and export is Sitrah pier, which is joined to Sitrah Island by a causeway. All tankers and supply ships load and unload there.

## 2. Railroads.

The railroads in the Arab states suffer from a lack of uniformity in gauge, insufficient double trackage, and antiquated equipment.

Rolling stock is obsolescent and terminal facilities require modernization.

In Egypt the main system, which is standard gauge, operates double track lines from Cairo to Alexandria and Zagazig, and from Cairo south along the Nile to Shellal, near Assuan. Single lines run from Cairo to Suez, from Zagazig to Port Said, and from Alexandria along the coast to Matruh. During World War II this latter line was extended to Tobruk. Supplementary lines, principally meter gauge, connect the main towns in the Delta, and serve also the Fayum area and the Oasis of Kharja. The standard gauge system is owned and operated by the Egyptian Government.

From Qantara on the Cairo-Port Said line, a standard gauge single track follows the eastern Mediterranean coast as far as Tripoli in Lebanon, passing through Haifa and Beirut. The Lebanese section of this line is owned by the Lebanese Government; the Palestine section, formerly owned by the Palestine Government, has now been taken over by Israel. From Tripoli the line turns inland through the mountains, meeting the main north-south Syrian line at Homs. This main railroad starts at Rayak and proceeds northward through Homs and Hama to Aleppo, where one branch turns northwestward into Turkey. The other branch follows the Turkish-Syrian border to Nusaybin, then dips down through Mosul to Baghdad. These lines are operated by a French company (Damas, Hama et Prolongements) under a concession arrangement.

This standard gauge pattern in the Fertile Crescent is supplemented by several narrow gauge systems. One of these lines (105 cm., operated by D.H.P.) crosses the mountains from Beirut to Damascus, passing through Rayak. Another 105 cm. line runs south from Damascus, sends a branch to Haifa and has its terminus at Ma'an in Transjordan. This Damascus-Ma'an line, now owned and operated by the Syrian Government, is part of the old Hejaz Railway which formerly carried Moslem pilgrims to Medina. Trackage south of Ma'an, however, was destroyed during World War I and this lower section is now derelict.

In Iraq meter gauge lines operated by the

Iraqi State Railways supplement river transport where navigation is difficult and center on Baghdad. From Baghdad one line runs north to the oil field at Kirkuk, with a branch to Khanaqin near the Iranian border. Another branch of this line runs south from Baquba along the north bank of the Tigris to the Kut Barrage. This section was built to bypass the barrage and the difficult stretch of the river north of Kut. South from Baghdad a line runs to Basra, the country's only port. A short branch extends south from Basra to Jebel Sanam; another branch runs from the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates to Karbala.

The only railroad in the Arabian Peninsula is the line from Dammam to Riyadh now under construction for the Saudi Arabian Government. This line is being built more to enhance King Ibn Saud's prestige than as a constructive contribution to the country's economy.

To attain maximum effectiveness, the entire railroad network of the Arab states needs a thorough overhauling. Under the present system of diversified ownership there is no attempt to pool efforts to improve rail transport throughout the area as a whole. Principal needs at present are competent technical advice, modern equipment, and a long-range development program. In view of current economic stringencies in the Arab world, substantive improvement in its rail transport cannot be anticipated for some time.

### 3. Roads.

World War II was a great stimulus to the improvement of road communications in the Arab states. For military reasons, the British Army carried out a substantial construction program in strategic areas which resulted in a network of hard-surfaced roads in the Egyptian Delta and the coastal belt along the eastern Mediterranean. Beyond the Lebanese and Syrian coast ranges, a good road connects Damascus and Aleppo. Numerous connecting roads link this with the coastal highway. In general it may be said that while these roads are by no means super-highways they are adequate to meet the needs of this area.

One all-weather road crosses the desert, running between Haifa and Baghdad; from Baghdad paved roads follow the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to Basra on the Persian Gulf. Other good roads run north from Baghdad to Kirkuk, Erbil, and Mosul. For the most part, however, road travel through the vast desert stretches is dependent upon tracks or trails unsuitable for motor traffic and in many cases impassable for vehicles not specially equipped, such as the built-to-order buses of the Nairn Bus Lines which operate a remarkably efficient service across the desert between Damascus and Baghdad.

With the exception of the few surfaced roads that have been constructed by the Arabian-American Oil Company in the oil area of eastern Saudi Arabia, and the pilgrimage road from Jidda to Mecca, there are no first-class roads anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula. The centuries-old desert tracks are adequate for the camel caravans that still roam the sandy wastelands, while the airplane is assuming increasing importance in linking the main population centers.

### 4. Navigable Waterways.

Navigable waterways in the Arab states are limited to the Suez Canal and to parts of the three great river systems of the area, the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates. The Suez Canal is one of the world's most important waterways, extending from Port Said on the Mediterranean through Lake Timsah and the Great and Little Bitter Lakes to Suez Bay at the head of the Red Sea, a distance of 87½ miles. During 1947, 5,972 ships passed through, totaling over 49 million gross tonnage, and flying the flags of 26 nations. The Suez Canal Company, which operates the canal under the provisions of the International Convention of 1888, is now considering a large-scale development plan which will permit a substantial increase in this traffic.

The Nile is navigable throughout the year from the Delta Barrage below Cairo to the Assuan Dam, where boats connect with the shallow draft steamers to Wadi Halfa on the Sudanese border. These steamers provide the only good connection between the Egyptian and Sudanese railway systems. Below the

Delta Barrage, navigation on the river is possible during high water only, from August to January; the rest of the year the water is diverted into the irrigation canals. The most important of these canals are the Mahmoudiya Canal linking the Rosetta branch of the Nile with Alexandria, and the Ismailia Canal connecting Cairo with Ismailia. These canals are used by small sailing craft and play a useful role in the country's inland water transport system.

In Iraq the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their adjuncts, the Shatt-al-Arab and the Shatt-al-Gharraf, are all navigable under certain conditions. The Shatt-al-Arab, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, is navigable as far as Basra by any vessel able to cross the bars at the entrance. The deepest channel has a minimum depth of 23 feet, increasing to 33 feet at high water springs. The Tigris is narrow with numerous bends, but navigable as far as Baghdad by steamers of four-foot draft. Small steamers of three-foot draft can continue with difficulty as far as Mosul in the high river season from December to May. The Euphrates and the Shatt-al-Gharraf (which links the two main rivers) are too shallow for steamers, but are extensively used by native sailing craft.

##### 5. Airlines.

The Arab states are a crossroads for world air transportation routes from the Western Hemisphere and Europe to Africa and the Far East. These international routes are supplemented by local airlines whose development has done much to increase the accessibility of the interior regions.

Among the foreign lines which serve the area are Trans World and Pan American, British Overseas Airways, Air France, KLM, and SABENA. All these lines (with the exception of Pan American) stop at Cairo, the center of the Arab states air network. Other principal airports equipped to handle large planes are at Damascus, Baghdad, Basra, and Dhahran. Lydda, formerly used by many lines, is now closed to civil air travel as a result of the Palestine fighting. Local lines use many smaller airfields.

The Arab airlines are Misr (Egypt), Iraqi

Airways, Middle East Airlines (Lebanon), Compagnie Generale de Transports (Lebanon), Arab Airways Association (Transjordan), and Saudi Arabian Airlines. (Syrian Airways, formerly a civil line, is now operating as a military transport system.) These companies provide internal services and fly regular schedules between points in the Arab states and nearby countries. In organizing, the local lines depended heavily upon foreign capital and technical assistance. Most of this aid came from British sources, although the Syrian and Saudi Arabian enterprises were organized under the aegis of US airlines. The Compagnie Generale de Transports has had the assistance of Air France. While this outside aid was necessary to launch these ventures, the Arab states expect local capital and personnel to play an increasingly significant role in the development of these lines.

Although the Arab states extend fifth freedom privileges to each other, they have been chary of negotiating such agreements with outside countries. The US has attained the most conspicuous success in this field, having concluded agreements with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Iraq has also signed agreements with Turkey and the UK. Airlines of other nationalities which operate in the area do so under the authority of special temporary agreements entered into pending the negotiation of permanent pacts.

It can be expected that the Middle East will play an increasingly important role in civil air development during the next few years. New airports are being built (e.g., Beirut) and many of those already in existence are being modernized and improved (e.g., Jidda).

##### 6. Telecommunications.

Most of the cities and major towns of the Arab states have internal telephone systems, but with few exceptions they are poorly equipped and the service is generally slow. Since the war the governments have taken steps to improve this situation. Some surplus war equipment has been bought, and Syria and Lebanon are preparing to install new country-wide networks.

The principal towns are connected by telegraph lines, and the entire area is linked with

**SECRET**

the world cable system, one of whose main branches runs between Egypt and Aden through the Red Sea.

All the countries have radio broadcasting

stations. The most important of these are located at Cairo, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Beirut, Baghdad, and Aden. Another international station is now under construction at Jidda.

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## APPENDIX C

### POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND STATISTICS

#### 1. Population.

The term Arab, apart from its restricted meaning of an inhabitant of the Arabian Peninsula, may be applied to most of the approximately 70 million people occupying a broad territory extending from the Atlantic coast of North Africa to the shores of the Indian Ocean. These people are characterized in general by a basically common physical type, a common language, the same religion, and the same integrated cultural tradition. This discussion, however, is limited to the populations of the Arab states proper and does not include the many Arab groups outside those countries.

#### 2. Physical Type.

Despite some local variations the Arabs in general are fairly homogeneous representatives of the physical type designated anthropologically as "Mediterranean."\* This type is characterized by medium stature, slender build, delicate features, dark eyes and hair and moderately long heads. Outside of the Arab countries it is predominant in Spain, Portugal, southern Italy, and other Mediterranean borderlands.

Survivals or intrusions of non-Mediterranean types are found in many parts of the Arab world. In southern Arabia a "Veddoid" element is present which appears to have affinities with the aboriginal inhabitants of India. In parts of western Arabia there is a strong Negroid strain derived from slaves brought from Africa. Negroid characteristics are also common in Egypt and especially so in the Sudan. The Kurds of northern Syria and Iraq (who are not Arabs) represent a broad-headed type rather similar to that of

\* A generally accepted, though oversimplified classification, divides the Caucasoid or "White" race into three major groups: Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic.

the Turks but with some trace of a Nordic admixture. A broad head form also predominates among the Druze and Alaoui of Syria.

#### 3. Language.

The practically universal language throughout the Arab states is Arabic, one of the Semitic family of languages which includes in addition Hebrew, Ethiopic, Aramaic and ancient Babylonian, Assyrian, and Phoenician. Arabic was spread over its present extent by the conquests of the successors of Mohammed and gradually supplanted the indigenous languages of the subjugated regions. Despite local dialectic variations in spoken colloquial Arabic, the common classical Arabic descended from the Koran forms a strong unifying bond between all Arab peoples. The principal non-Arabic languages used by minority groups and communities of the area are Kurdish (related to Persian), Armenian, Turkish, and in northern Egypt, Greek. A knowledge of European languages is widespread among urban groups and educated classes.

#### 4. Religion.

The second great unifying factor of the Arab world is religion. (Here it may be noted that, while practically all Arabs are Moslems, by no means all Moslems are Arabs. Thus Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, while Moslem countries, are not Arab countries.)

*Islam*, meaning resignation to the will of God, is the name applied to the religion believed by his followers to have been divinely revealed to Mohammed and whose truths are embodied in the Koran. The principal doctrines are that there is one God, one true religion, and a Day of Judgment. Much of the theology of the Koran was borrowed from Judaism and to a lesser degree from Christianity; Christ was accounted by Mohammed as one of the great prophets of the faith. The

practices enjoined upon its followers by Islam include prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage. *Prayer* means the five daily prayers, particularly those at sunrise, noon and sunset, accompanied by certain gestures of the body which must be made clean by ceremonial ablutions. Public prayer is offered in the mosques on Friday. *Fasting* from both food and drink is performed throughout the lunar month of Ramadan between sunrise and sunset, a very trying feat when Ramadan falls in a hot month; it is not, however, incumbent upon those in military service or on travellers or the sick. *Charity* includes fixed obligatory alms and voluntary ones. *Pilgrimage* means not only the great pilgrimage to Mecca but also voluntary pilgrimages to local and national shrines. There are also prohibitions against alcoholic drink and the flesh of the pig. Dogs are generally regarded as unclean.

The Moslem clergy, which is not in the strict sense a priesthood, consists of the village religious leaders who often hold the village schools, and of the clergy of the town mosques of whom the more senior are called *Imams*. *Qadis* are teachers or theologians who act as judges of the religious law (*sharia*). They refer disputed points to the authority of a *Mufti* who is the leading Imam of a principal mosque. The senior theologians are known collectively as the *Ulema* or Wise Men. (These terms may vary somewhat in application between one Arab country and another.)

The two major sects within Islam are the *Sunni* and *Shia*. They resulted from a schism in the 7th century over the question of who were the rightful successors of Mohammed. Further differences of belief and practices have subsequently developed. In general terms the Shias may be described as heterodox, the Sunnis as orthodox, conservative and much more numerous. In most Arab states the Shias are insignificant in numbers but in Iraq they comprise 60 percent of the population. (Iran is almost solidly Shia.)

There are numerous lesser sects. Among them may be mentioned the ultra-puritanical Wahhabis of Arabia, and the Druze and Alaoui

of Syria who may be considered as Moslem though their religions have many extraneous and esoteric elements.

Non-Moslem religions are sparsely represented in the Arab states except in Lebanon where approximately fifty percent of the population are Christians of a bewildering variety of sects, chiefly Maronite and Greek Orthodox. The former, though in communion with Rome, has its own liturgy and its priests are permitted to marry. In Egypt the Coptic Church comprises some eight percent of the population. Other and smaller Christian communities, many of them preserving ancient rites, are found in Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan. There are Jewish communities in many of the large Arab cities, the largest of them being in Baghdad.

##### 5. Cultural Tradition.

The common cultural tradition of the Arab world derives to a great extent from the Arab conquests during the first centuries following the death of Mohammed. As a result of these conquests Islam was imposed upon, or accepted by, most of the peoples from Spain to India. Together with the purely religious aspects of Islam there was inextricably bound up in it a whole pattern of life, which colored all philosophy, law, science, and art and pervaded every aspect of society. Although the original Arab culture was that of a simple desert people, it soon absorbed many of the elements of the more advanced civilizations of Persia, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Byzantium. The political unity of most of the Islamic world under the Caliphate facilitated the spread of this cultural amalgam and permitted a flourishing of art, science, and philosophy during the Middle Ages far superior to that of Europe at the time.

##### 6. Social Structure.

A further unifying factor in Arab culture is the essentially similar form of social organization which prevails throughout the area. Arab society, whether among the pastoral nomadic tribesmen (*bedouin*) or the sedentary agricultural villagers (*fellahin*) is based upon the patriarchal family.

The tribe is an extension of the family. The bedouin belong by birth to a section or sub-section of a particular tribe. In a small tribe the section may be but a single family with its collaterals; in a large tribe there is further sub-division within the section. Many tribes are associations of unrelated sections for offense or defense and the tribes themselves are often grouped into confederations for similar reasons. Thus the tribal system is fluid. Sections can change their allegiance or become independent tribes, dependent tribes may come to be regarded as part of the protecting tribe and confederations may be regrouped in fresh patterns. Within the tribe authority rests with the chiefs of the sections (*sheikhs*) and with the paramount sheikhs of the whole tribe or tribal confederation. The sheikhs of the larger units are chosen as a rule within a single family by the tribal council, which selects the fittest and most experienced man without special regard to primogeniture. Disputes are submitted to the local sheikhs or to a tribal council of all the sheikhs. But the last resort is murder and the ensuing blood feud.

The tribal system is naturally stronger among the bedouin nomads than among the semi-settled nomads and the sedentary fellahin who are brought more closely under the external influence of government officials and urban landlords. The unit of village life is the family in the extended sense to include collaterals, and is often a group of households living in one house or collection of houses. Life for the villager means family life; without the co-operative effort of parents, children, and grandchildren, all would end by starving.

#### 7. Psychological Characteristics.

It is obviously difficult and dangerous to generalize concerning the mental characteristics of some 40 million people. As in any population, no two individuals are alike. In general however, the Arab mind is lively, imaginative, and subtle. Arabs of all classes show remarkable powers not only of discussing subjects within their experience but of grasping new and difficult facts and theories.

They are quick to follow arguments and sensitive to vivid phrases, have a great love of oratory, and are generally talkative and genial. But they are non-inventive and slow to put theories into practice; they find it hard to depart from traditional methods. They often seem to Europeans to be incompetent and lazy, lacking in constructive ability, and skillful mainly in avoiding hard work. Contempt for manual labor is common both to bedouin and to townsmen, particularly of the upper class. The ideal of Arab behavior includes courtesy, dignity, hospitality, and generosity. Often, however, the Arab will evade the spirit while observing the letter of the moral obligations which he recognizes. External politeness is greatly valued and Arabs are very sensitive to bad manners and rudeness. They have a remarkable capability for intrigue, and their loyalty is tempered by time-serving; on occasion they commit astonishing acts of treachery and dishonesty, but it is to be remembered that political motives are taken very seriously and supersede other loyalties. Within the family there is a high standard of personal morality, breaches of which are sharply punished, often by death, and the countryman, whether peasant or herdsman, is noted in ordinary transactions for simplicity and honesty.

#### 8. Cultural Outlook.

The impact of European civilization, particularly its political and economic systems, upon Moslem culture has had a disruptive effect, especially during the twentieth century. It has proved difficult to integrate European concepts of government, of education, and of industrialization into the traditional pattern of life in the Arab world. Attempts to do so have led to frequent clashes between "progressive" and "conservative" or "reactionary" elements. Young Arab leaders, many of them trained in European or American universities where they acquired an admiration for Western ideals, have sought to impose those ideals upon a society frequently unprepared or unwilling to assimilate them. This cultural conflict has now become further complicated by the disillusionment of many of the same lead-



ers over what they conceive to be the betrayal by the western democracies of their own professed ideals on the Palestine issue. Faced by the apparent cultural bankruptcy of their own world, disillusioned with the West and fearful of Communism, some thoughtful Arabs have yielded to apathy and despair. Others seek to cast out all foreign influence, to isolate Moslem culture, and, through such reactionary and ultra-nationalistic organizations as the Moslem Brothers (Ikhwan al Muslimin), to bring about a purification and renaissance of Islam. Some, though not as yet in large numbers, will turn to Communism. The majority, however, despite their loss of faith in the democracies, will probably be forced by necessity and as the least of several evils to seek a reconciliation and new understanding with the West.

#### 9. Population Statistics.

In Moslem countries, particularly those that have been under Ottoman rule, the population seeks to avoid registration and census officials because they are the precursors of conscription and taxation, and the officials tend to rely on estimates made by the local administration or by the sheikhs themselves. Population statistics vary greatly in reliability and quantity from one country to another and in many instances are completely lacking. Any attempt to present them in tabular form would give a spurious appearance of accuracy and comparability.

*Egypt:* The population of Egypt (excluding the Sudan) in the census of 1947 was 19,000,000. It is almost entirely concentrated in the narrow Nile Valley and Delta. Of Egypt's total estimated area of 386,000 square miles, only some 10,000 square miles is cultivable land. There the density of population is over 2,000 per square mile. Approximately 75 percent of the population is agricultural; with the exception of a small number of nomads and semi-nomads, the remainder is urban. Moslems make up 91.40 percent of the population, and Christians (mostly Copts) 8.19 percent. There are over 150,000 foreigners, chiefly Greeks, whose great center is Alexandria, as well as Italians, British, French, and Levantines.

*Syria:* The estimated population of Syria in 1946 was approximately 3,000,000 and its area 54,300 square miles. Sunni Moslems (1,970,000) comprise nearly two-thirds of the population. Important minorities are the Alaouis (325,000), Greek Orthodox (137,000), Armenian Orthodox (101,000), Kurds, mostly Sunni Moslems (120,000), and Druze (87,000). Nomads are roughly estimated to number 400,000. Some 75 percent of the population is rural. The districts of Aleppo and Damascus are the most densely populated areas.

*Lebanon:* The total population of Lebanon has been estimated at 1,160,000. Its area is some 3,600 square miles. The largest single group consists of the Maronite Christians (238,000), followed by Sunnis (235,000), and Shias (209,000). There are some 110,000 Greek Orthodox and numerous members of other Christian sects. The Maronites are primarily an agricultural community in the Mount Lebanon area with a smaller group of townsmen in Beirut. The Moslem group includes the greater part of the proletariat but also many commercial and professional families.

*Transjordan:* The estimated population of Transjordan (area 34,740 square miles) is 400,000, of whom 330,000 are Moslems. The sedentary groups number about 150,000; some 200,000 are semi-nomadic and about 50,000 are completely nomadic tribesmen. There are about 50,000 Arab Christians, largely engaged in agriculture. Some 20,000 Circassians are descendants of those who lost their homes in the Caucasus and were moved to Transjordan as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.

*Iraq:* The estimated population of Iraq is between 4 and 5 million; its area is 175,000 square miles. Very roughly 60 percent of the population is Shia and 40 percent Sunni. The largest ethnic minority is the Kurds, estimated at some 500,000. There are about 100,000 Jews. A rough approximation places the nomadic population at 600,000.

*Saudi Arabia:* Estimates of the population vary from three to six million; its area is roughly 350,000 square miles. The population is predominantly nomadic and follows the strict Wahhabi sect.

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*Yemen*: The heterogeneous population has been estimated from less than two to over four million. Its area is approximately 75,000 square miles. Its inhabitants are primarily

sedentary agriculturalists. There are numerous communities of Jews.

*Kuwait*: The population is about 100,000 and the area 1,950 square miles.

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## APPENDIX D

### SIGNIFICANT BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Egypt—King Farouk I	Iraq—King Feisal II
Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha	Amir Abdul Ilah
Mustapha an-Nahas Pasha	Nuri Pasha al-Said
Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha	Muhammad Mahdi Kubba
Palestine—Haj Amin al-Husseini	Transjordan—King Abdullah
Syria—Shukri Bey al-Quwatli	Tawfiq Pasha Abu al-Huda
Faris Bey al-Khuri	Samir Pasha al-Rifai
Jamil Mardam Bey	John Bagot Glubb Pasha
Ahmad Sharabati	Saudi Arabia—King Ibn Saud
Lebanon—Sheikh Bisharah Khalil al-Khuri	Amir Saud
Riyad Bey al-Sulh	Amir Feisal
Kamil Himah Shamun	Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman
Hamid Franjiyyah	Sheikh Yussef Yassin
	Yemen—Imam Ahmed
	Amir Abdullah

#### EGYPT

##### KING FAROUK I

Place and Date of Birth: Cairo; 1920.

Education: Private tutors in Palace; Royal Academy, Woolwich, England.

Occupation: King of Egypt.

Religion: Sunni Moslem.

Remarks: King Farouk, who ascended the Egyptian Throne in 1937 (after coming of age) is personally ambitious and has constantly tried to increase his own power both in Egypt and in the Arab world generally. While the King's personal life is not above reproach, Farouk is politically clever and strong. His power alone has kept the present type of minority party coalition in the government since 1944, because he refuses to allow a free election which would bring back the majority Wafd Party of his enemy Nahas Pasha. At present, the majority of police and army are loyal to him. He identifies himself strongly with the Arab cause when it is going well, but considers himself more as the monarch of a westward-oriented Mediterranean power when that is to his advantage. King Farouk is fearful of Communism and the USSR. Although he publicly follows the nationalist anti-British line, he realizes the necessity for close Anglo-Egyptian ties and mutual defense arrangements. In 1938 he married Farida Zulfikar, divorcing her in November 1948. He has three daughters, but no son and heir.

**IBRAHIM ABDEL HADI PASHA**

Place and Date of Birth: Beilbeis, Egypt; 1898.  
 Education: Faculty of Law, University of Cairo.  
 Speaks English and French.  
 Occupation: Prime Minister of Egypt.  
 Political Affiliation: Saadist.  
 Religion: Sunni Moslem.  
 Remarks: Abdel Hadi has risen from humble origin via a successful law career and numerous nationalist activities to his present position as Prime Minister. He is considered a capable lawyer and a forceful speaker. Ardently nationalist, he is anti-foreign, but at present appears to realize the need for Anglo-Egyptian ties. Having been chief of the Royal Cabinet, he is presumably in the King's confidence. Abdul Hadi's political strength and his desire or ability to put across the much-needed economic reforms in Egypt are as yet unknown. Early in his legal career, appointed lawyer for Bank Misr. 1919, joined independence movement led by Zaghloul. 1920-24, imprisoned for anti-British attitude. 1938, active in founding Saadist Party; until then member of Wafd. 1938, Vice-President of Parliament. 1939, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs. 1940-42, Minister of Commerce and Industry. 1944-46, Minister of Public Health. 1945, delegate to UN San Francisco Conference; Vice-President Saadist Party. 1946, member of Egyptian Negotiating Body for Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Revision; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidky Cabinet (September); Minister of Finance (December). 1947, appointed Chief of the Royal Cabinet of Advisors to the King. December 1948, succeeded assassinated Nokrashy Pasha as Prime Minister. 1949, President of the Saadist Party.

**MUSTAFA AN-NAHAS PASHA**

Place and Date of Birth: Egypt; 1879.  
 Education: Nasriah School; Khedivial School of Law.  
 Occupation: Lawyer; politician.  
 Political Affiliation: Wafd Party Leader.  
 Religion: Sunni Moslem.  
 Remarks: Intelligent, ambitious, clever, and an intense nationalist, Nahas is leader of the major political party in Egypt. Prior to 1942 he was extremely anti-British and won part of his popularity with the lower classes by arousing anti-British feeling. In 1942, during the critical North African campaign, the British realized that Nahas was the strongest single force in the country and forced King Farouk to make him Prime Minister. Farouk has never forgiven Nahas and in spite of Wafd pressure for free elections has kept a minority coalition in the government since 1944 in order to keep Nahas out. 1904, lawyer; then judge. 1918, joined Wafd. 1923, returned to Egypt after two-year exile. 1925, Minister of Communications. 1927, assumed leadership of

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Wafd upon death of Zaghoul. President of Chamber of Deputies. 1928-1930, Prime Minister. 1936, head of Egyptian delegation to the League of Nations Conference. 1939, engaged in anti-British and anti-Palace propaganda. 1942-44, Prime Minister. 1944 to date, leader of Wafd Party in opposition to government.

**ABDUL RAHMAN AZZAM PASHA**

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Occupation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Egypt; 1892.

Studied medicine at St. Thomas' Hospital London, but did not graduate. Speaks English, French, Turkish.

Secretary General of the Arab League.

Sunni Moslem.

Azzam Pasha, one of the ablest and most far seeing of Arab leaders, has long been struggling to bring about his ideal of Arab unity. Honest, sincere, energetic, and religious, he has been the guiding force of the Arab League and has considerable influence with other Arab leaders. The failure of the Arab League's Palestine venture has been a serious blow to Azzam's prestige, and the Arab League, if it continues to exist in its present form, may be forced in the future to concentrate more on social and cultural rather than political problems. Azzam is generally pro-American and anti-Soviet, although very bitter toward Britain and the US for their Palestine stand. 1911, military leader against the Italians in Tripolitania. Wafd member in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies until 1932, when he resigned from the Wafd. 1932-1940, Egyptian Minister to various Near Eastern countries. 1940, Minister of Waqfs in Ali Maher Cabinet. 1944, Minister Plenipotentiary, Foreign Affairs Ministry; in charge of Arab Affairs. 1945, made Secretary-General of the Arab League when it was formed. 1947, to UN and tour of Arab League States to organize the fight against the UN Palestine Plan.

**PALESTINE****Haj Amin al-Husseini**

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Occupation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Jerusalem; 1893.

Educated in Jerusalem and Cairo; speaks Arabic, Turkish, French, English.

Mufti of Jerusalem. Chairman of the *Arab Higher Committee*.

Sunni Moslem.

Haj Amin is a ruthless, ambitious man. Clever and unscrupulous, he will use any methods, including terrorism, and any ally to further his aims of Arab nationalism and personal power. During World War II he worked with the Axis, and there are current rumors of a possible flirtation with the USSR. Although the Mufti is at present in ill repute among most Arabs because of the failure of his *Arab Higher Executive* to organize a successful war against Zionism, he has long been the foremost religious and politi-

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cal leader of the Palestinian Arabs and will continue to do all in his power to hold or re-establish that control. The fact that his bitter enemy, King Abdullah of Transjordan, whose troops now occupy the Arab section of Jerusalem and the surrounding territory, has appointed a new Mufti for Palestine makes his present position somewhat ambiguous. The Mufti is anti-British and anti-US, but his Great Power orientation is opportunist and liable to any sort of change. 1920-1929, he engaged in a bitter feud with the members of the Nashashibi family for leadership of the Palestine Arabs. 1921-1937, Haj Amin was made President of the Supreme Moslem Council, which was set up in 1921 by an Arab Assembly with the approval of the High Commissioner, to govern the religious affairs of the Moslem community. With it went control of the Moslem religious courts and the funds of the Moslem Waqfs. 1920-34, the *Palestine Arab Congress* was held as a result of the growth of the joint Moslem-Christian association led by the Husseinis. 1935 the Mufti became chairman of the *Arab Higher Committee*, formed by the leaders of the six Arab parties as the mouthpiece of the Arab national cause. The AHC, which directed Arab policy during the 1936 disturbances, was dominated by the Husseini-led *Palestine Arab Party*. 1937, the Mufti was removed by the British authorities from the Council and Waqf offices for using funds and prestige for nationalistic activities, and the AHC was declared illegal. 1938, the Mufti directed a terrorist campaign against the Nashashibis and a revolt against the British from his exile in Lebanon. 1939-46, the Mufti engaged in pro-Axis propaganda in Iraq, Berlin, and Rome. He influenced the Rashid Ali revolt in Iraq in 1941. 1946, the Mufti escaped from France to sanctuary in Egypt from where he directs the *Arab Higher Committee*.

## SYRIA

SHUKRI BEY AL-QUWATLI

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Occupation:

Political Affiliation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Damascus; 1886.

Elementary School, Damascus; Secondary School and College of Civil Service, Istanbul. Speaks Arabic, Turkish, French, some English.

President of the Republic of Syria.

National Party.

Sunni Moslem.

Old Damascus commercial family of Turkish origin; not wealthy but fairly prominent merchants and landowners. Stabilizing force in Syrian politics and core of national activity. Active nationalist for over 25 years. Friendly to US, but wary of all foreign influence; anti-Zionist; anti-Greater Syria in any form save a republic. 1904-13; Ottoman Civil Service official. 1913; imprisoned by Turks for membership in secret Arab nationalist society. 1919; at-

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tached to court of King Feisal of Syria. 1920-22; exiled by French for nationalist activity—lived in Egypt. 1922; cooperated in formation of Dr. Shahbandar's People's Party. 1925-31; a leader in the Syrian revolt—sentenced to death in absentia—fled to Egypt. 1931-47; member of the National Bloc, its Secretary-General in 1936—its President from 1943. 1936-38; Minister of Finance in Mardam Cabinet and Acting Prime Minister during Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations in Paris. 1936-39; member of Chamber of Deputies—its Vice Speaker 1936-37. 1943-date; President of the Republic of Syria, having been reelected to a second five-year term in 1948.

**FARIS BEY AL-KHURI**

Place and Date of Birth:  
Education:

Hasbayah, Lebanon; 1877.

BA, American University of Beirut, 1897; LLB, Universite Saint Joseph, Beirut. Speaks Arabic, English, French, and Turkish.

Occupation:  
Political Affiliation:  
Religion:  
Remarks:

President of the Chamber of Deputies; lawyer.

National Party.

Anglican.

Descended from Greek Orthodox family. One of the most responsible politicians in the Near East, respected by Christians and Moslems alike. A leading Syrian patriot since Ottoman days, working successively with Young Turks, and with Amir Feisal and Col. Lawrence. Since 1928 has been one of the leading members of the National Bloc. Believes in secular nationalism and the overcoming of religious and minority barriers. Well-known legal authority in the Near East and author of several books on legal subjects. At Special Session of UNGA was unofficial chairman of the Arab Delegations in pleading the Palestine case and represented the Arab states in Security Council Palestine discussions. 1897-1902; Teacher in Beirut and Damascus. 1902-09; Interpreter—British Consulate, Damascus. 1909-date; law practice in Damascus. 1914-15; member Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, Istanbul. 1916-18; imprisoned by Ottoman Turks for Arab nationalist activities. 1919-41; Professor, Damascus Law School. 1925-26; exiled by French for nationalist activities. 1926; Minister of Public Instruction. 1932; member of Chamber of Deputies. 1936-date; President of the Chamber of Deputies except while Prime Minister (1944-45). October 1944-September 1945; Prime Minister. 1945-48; Chairman of Syrian Delegation to UNGA—Syrian delegate to Security Council.

**JAMIL MARDAM BEY**

Place and Date of Birth:  
Education:

Damascus; 1898.

Secondary School, Damascus; study in Switzerland; LLB, University of Paris. Speaks Arabic, French, and Turkish.

Occupation:  
Political Affiliation:  
Religion:

Political leader.

Republican.

Sunni Moslem.

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**Remarks:** Family of Turkish origin; well-known in Damascus for 300 years. Active nationalist since his youth, but interested in personal advancement and would ally himself with any successful group. Considered a shrewd and unscrupulous politician, but respected for his great ability as a diplomat and negotiator. Has considerable popular support. Has acquired considerable wealth since his rise to power, leading some to question his honesty. 1911; one of the founders of al-Fatat, a secret Arab nationalist society in Paris. 1913; Secretary-General of Arab Congress, Paris. 1919; with King Feisal at Versailles Peace Conference. 1920-21; in Egypt following collapse of Feisal's Syrian kingdom. 1921; cooperated with King-Crane Commission. 1921-24; nationalist activity in Syria—exile in Egypt and Europe. 1925; one of the founders of Dr. Shahbandar's People's Party—participant in 1925 revolt—banished. 1928; member of Constituent Assembly. 1928-39; Deputy from Damascus. 1932-33; Minister of Finance. 1934; exiled by French—one of negotiators of peace between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya of Yemen. 1936; member of Syrian Treaty Mission to Paris. 1936-39; Prime Minister. 1943; re-elected Deputy. 1943-45; Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1945-46; Minister to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 1946-48; Prime Minister of Syria.

**AHMAD SHARABATI**

**Place and Date of Birth:** Damascus; 1906.

**Education:** Private schools, Damascus; American University, Beirut; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1929. Speaks Arabic, English, French, German, and Turkish.

**Occupation:** Politician and entrepreneur.

**Political Affiliation:** National Party.

**Religion:** Sunni Moslem.

**Remarks:** Son of a rich merchant. Combines superior ability, fervent nationalism, and business acumen. Strong personal loyalty to President Quwatli, though he sometimes acts with the opposition. Reasonably honest, although he has been accused of using his position to advance his commercial interests. Pro-US, but has also been rather friendly toward USSR. 1932-37; exiled by French Mandatory authorities for nationalist activities. 1937; returned to Syria under general amnesty. 1938; fled to Iraq after dissolution of national regime by French. 1941-43; engaged in local politics and acted as vegetable contractor to British Army. 1943-date; member of Chamber of Deputies. 1945; Minister of Education—in succeeding cabinet, Minister of Education and National Economy. 1946; again Minister of Education. 1946-48; Minister of National Defense—forced from government after military failures in Palestine.

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**LEBANON****SHEIKH BISHARAH KHALIL AL-KHURI**

Place and Date of Birth: Bashmayah, Lebanon; 1890.  
 Education: Graduate, Universite Saint Joseph, Beirut; studied law in Paris. Speaks Arabic, French.  
 Occupation: President of the Republic of Lebanon.  
 Political Affiliation: Constitutionalist Party.  
 Religion: Maronite.  
 Remarks: From well-known, respected Maronite family. Has maintained an important position in Lebanese politics for many years; enjoys good relations with various opposing groups; follows policy of conciliation with nearly all elements in the government. Friendly to US. Opposed to Greater Syria plan. Suffered severe mental breakdown in 1945, but after three months in seclusion recovered and resumed duties. 1915-19; practiced law in Cairo. 1920; Secretary General of Lebanese Government. 1922-26; President, Council of Ministers. 1930-39; member, Chamber of Deputies. 1943-date, President of Lebanon.

**RIYAD BEY AL-SULH**

Place and Date of Birth: Sidon, Lebanon; 1893.  
 Education: Universite Saint Joseph, Beirut; University of Istanbul Law School. Speaks Arabic, French, Turkish.  
 Occupation: Prime Minister of Lebanon.  
 Political Affiliation: Independent.  
 Religion: Sunni Moslem.  
 Remarks: Member of influential Sunni Moslem family of South Lebanon. One of outstanding politicians in Lebanon and rallying point of Lebanese Arab nationalists. Disclaims membership in any party, but maintains effective political machine and strategic alliances with various political groups. Champion of Arab unity and Lebanese participation in Arab affairs. Supports Moslem cause but seeks friendly relations and cooperation between Moslems and Christians. Practiced law in Beirut. Official in Ministry of Justice, Istanbul. Commissioner of Railroads under Ottoman Government. During World War I, deported to Anatolia for conspiracy against Turks. 1920; twice exiled by French for nationalist activities. 1937; General Chairman, National Arab Congress, Bludan. 1943-date; member, Chamber of Deputies. 1943-45; Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. 1946; member, Lebanese Delegation, UNGA. 1946-date; Prime Minister.

**KAMIL NIMAH SHAMUN (Camille Chamoun)**

Place and Date of Birth: Dayr al-Qamr, Lebanon; 1900.  
 Education: College des Freres, Beirut; LLB, Universite Saint Joseph, Beirut, 1924. Speaks Arabic, French, English.  
 Occupation: Political Leader.  
 Political Affiliation: Constitutionalist Party.  
 Religion: Maronite.

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Remarks: From prominent South Lebanon family. One of most promising of younger Lebanese politicians, and a possible successor to the presidency. Friendly to US. At present is in opposition to the Sulh Government. 1934-date; law practice. 1934-39; member, Chamber of Deputies. 1938; Minister of Finance and Public Works. 1943-44; diplomatic representative to Allied Governments. Minister of Interior and of Posts and Telegraphs in Riyad Sulh Cabinet; delegate to International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago. 1944-46; Lebanese Minister to Great Britain; delegate to UNGA, second part of first session, New York. 1946-47; Minister of Justice. 1947-48; head of Lebanese delegation to UNGA. 1947-48; Minister of Interior and of Hygiene and Public Welfare.

**HAMID FRANJITYAH**

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Occupation:

Political Affiliation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Ihdan, Lebanon; 1907.

Preparatory School, Antura College; graduate of Universite Saint Joseph, Beirut, and of University of Paris Law School. Speaks Arabic and French.

Lawyer. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education.

Constitutionalist Party.

Maronite.

From prominent Maronite family. One of leading Lebanese Christian politicians. Notwithstanding his affiliation with some dubious political colleagues, he is reputed to be both able and honest, industrious in carrying out his obligations, and trustworthy when dealing with other nations. Vigorously opposed French mandate, and is believed to be pro-British and friendly to US. Has been an ardent worker for the success of the Arab League and favors an economic federation of the Arab states. Strongly anti-Zionist. 1934-39; member of Chamber of Deputies. 1938-39; Minister of Finance. 1941-42; Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1943-date; member of Chamber of Deputies. 1944-45; Minister of Finance. 1945-46; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education. 1946; Chairman of Lebanese Delegation to first half of first session of UNGA, London. 1947-date; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education.

#### IRAQ

**KING FEISAL II (Feisal ibn Ghazzi  
ibn Feisal al-Hashimi)**

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Occupation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Baghdad; 1935.

Private tuition.

King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Iraq, under regency of his uncle, Abdul Ilah.

Sunni Moslem.

Grandson of King Feisal I. Son of King Ghazzi. Grandnephew of King Abdullah of Transjordan. Ascended the throne in April 1939.

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**AMIR ABDUL ILAH (ibn Ali ibn Husein al-Hashimi)**

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Occupation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Mecca; 1914.

Private school, Jerusalem; Victoria College, Alexandria, Egypt. Speaks Arabic, English, Turkish, and French.

Appointed Regent and Crown Prince of Iraq in 1939 for his nephew King Feisal II.

Sunni Moslem.

Only son of late ex-King Ali of the Hejaz. Came to Iraq when his father was expelled from the Hejaz in 1925. Spent considerable time in Turkey. A conservative royalist, he has concentrated most political power in Iraq in his own hands. Considerable influence in Iraq. He is pro-British and pro-Turkish. Close friend of Nuri Said. Said to aspire to the throne of a greater Syria. In 1945 visited US, UK, France, and Turkey.

**MAJOR GENERAL NURI PASHA AL-SAID**

Place and Date of Birth:

Education:

Political Affiliation:

Occupation:

Religion:

Remarks:

Kirkuk, Iraq; 1888.

Baghdad Military School; Turkish Military College. Speaks Arabic, English, Turkish.

Supports the Regent.

Prime Minister of Iraq.

Sunni Moslem.

Of Kurdish descent. Able politician, good strategist, genuine nationalist. Friendly toward US, pro-British, pan-Arab, anti-Zionist. One of principal advocates of Arab unity and instrumental in formation of Arab League in 1945. 1908; commissioned in Turkish Army. 1916; joined Arab revolt. 1918-20; accompanied King Feisal I to Paris negotiations. 1921-22; Chief of General Staff and Director General of Police. 1922, 1926, 1930; Minister of Defense. 1930-32; Prime Minister during negotiations for Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and IPC concession. 1933; Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1938; Prime Minister briefly and member of succeeding cabinet. 1939; represented Iraq at London conference on Palestine and was largely responsible for severance of relations with Germany at outbreak of war. 1941-44, following Rashid Ali rebellion became Minister to Cairo and shortly afterward Prime Minister until 1944. 1946; elected President of the Senate. 1946-47; Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. 1947; appointed chief of Iraqi Delegation to UNGA. 1949, Prime Minister.

**MUHAMMAD MAHDI KUBBA**

Place and Date of Birth:

Occupation:

Religion:

Political Affiliation:

Remarks:

Unknown; 1906.

Politician.

Shia Moslem.

Independence Party.

Kubba owes his present cabinet position to the increasing importance of his right-wing Independence Party. He is ardently nationalist, anti-Hashimite, and anti-British. Vigorously opposed to British and American policy in Pal-

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estine. He made a plea to the USSR to prevent Palestine falling into Zionist hands. His party may be plotting a coup d'etat against the Hashimite rulers of Iraq to bring back Rashid al-Gaillani. Member pro-Nazi, anti-British "al-Muthanna Club." 1946-date; President and founder of Independence Party. 1946; called general strike on anniversary of Balfour Declaration. 1947; signed Manifesto demanding that the US take action favorable to the Arabs in Palestine. 1948; Minister of Supply. 1949; Minister of Justice.

**TRANSJORDAN****ABDULLAH IBN HASEIN AL-HASHIMI**

Place and Date of Birth:

Mecca; 1881.

Education:

Private tutors. Speaks Arabic and Turkish.

Occupation:

King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.

Religion:

Sunni Moslem.

Remarks:

Second son of Sherif Husein, King of Hejaz; descendant of the prophet Mohammed. Great-uncle of King Feisal II of Iraq. Clever, courteous, ceremonious, and ambitious. Abdullah is considered a puppet of the British by most Arab nationalists. Great bitterness toward Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, who deposed Abdullah's brother from the throne of the Hejaz in 1925. Abdullah's greatest ambition is to become King of a Greater Syria and the other Arab states regard his expansionist tendencies with the deepest suspicion. In his efforts to establish a Hashimite monarchy in a Greater Syria, he works closely with his nephew, Regent Abdul Ilah of Iraq. 1909; appointed deputy of Mecca in the Ottoman Parliament. 1914-15; served as liaison between his father and the British politicians in Egypt. 1915-16; active in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks. 1916; appointed Foreign Minister in his father's new Arab Government. Upon the conquest of Syria by the French, fled to Amman. 1921; met Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, and was appointed Amir of Transjordan. 1928; signed treaty of friendship with Great Britain. 1945; signed Anglo-Transjordan Treaty granting Transjordan independence. 1946; proclaimed King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.

**TAWFIK PASHA ABU AL-HUDA**

Place and Date of Birth:

Acre, Palestine; 1898.

Education:

Law Degree from Istanbul.

Occupation:

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

Religion:

Sunni Moslem.

Remarks:

Abu al-Huda has a strong, severe character and is reputed to be an excellent lawyer. He is reported to be a partisan of the Greater Syria scheme. His basic policy is one of not permitting an open break between Transjordan and other Arab states. Unlike Abdullah, he is inclined to believe that Transjordan would be better off without additional terri-

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tory. After receiving a Law Degree at Istanbul, al-Huda had various kinds of employment, the last of which was Director of the Agricultural Bank. 1934; he sued and won a case against the powerful Ibrahim Pasha Hashim. 1937; he formed the Transjordan Cabinet which lasted until 1945. 1947; he became the head of the Council of Notables. 1947; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

**SAMIR PASHA AL-RIFAI**

Place and Date of Birth:

Safad, Palestine; 1899.

Education:

Secondary education, Safad. Speaks excellent Arabic, Turkish, and English.

Occupation:

Politician.

Religion:

Sunni Moslem.

Remarks:

From Sunni family of moderate circumstances. One of chief spokesmen for Greater Syria, which he staunchly supports. Favorably inclined toward the US and the UK. Suspected by some of being still connected with British intelligence, for which he worked for a short time in the early 1920's. Long a favorite of King Abdullah. 1922-25; clerk in Palestine Civil Service. 1925; entered Transjordan Civil Service. 1929; Chief Clerk, Department of the Interior. 1933-37; Secretary to Prime Minister. 1937-42; Director of Education. 1942-44; Minister of Interior. 1944-45; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1947; Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Defense.

**JOHN BAGOT GLUBB, BRIGADIER,  
O.B.E. D.S.O.**

Place and Date of Birth:

England; 1897.

Nationality:

British.

Occupation:

Commander Arab Legion.

Education:

Cheltenham and Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Speaks several Arabic dialects.

Religion:

Anglican.

Remarks:

With the assistance of other British officers, Glubb has succeeded in making the Arab Legion the finest native fighting force in the Arab countries. His knowledge of Arabic, his close personal contact, particularly with the desert tribes, and the high prestige of his Arab Legion account for his personal popularity among the Arabs. 1915-20; First World War military service. 1920; service in Iraq. 1921-24; General Staff Officer, Iraq Command. 1926; Administrative Inspector, Southern District, during Nejd Rebellion disturbances. 1930; appointed Second-in-Command, Arab Legion. 1939; Commander of the Arab Legion.

**SAUDI ARABIA****IBN SAUD (Abd-al-Aziz Abd-al-  
Rahman al-Feisal al-Saud)**

Place and Date of Birth:

Unknown; c. 1880.

Occupation:

King of Saudi Arabia.

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Religion:  
Remarks:

Wahhabi Moslem.

Ibn Saud is of pure Bedouin stock and distantly related to President Quwatli of Syria. As absolute monarch, he holds in his personal control a sparsely populated area of about one million square miles comprising some of the world's greatest oil deposits. Although he accepts the technical innovations introduced by the American oil companies such as telecommunications, aviation, and railroads, Ibn Saud has tried to discourage the advance of western social philosophy among the Arabs. Except with the Hashimite kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan, Ibn Saud maintains good relations with other Arab nations, and is a supporter of the Arab League. Between Ibn Saud and the Hashimites (Abdullah of Transjordan and the Regent of Iraq) there is mutual distrust and fear of aggression. Ibn Saud is vehemently anti-Zionist but has not permitted the Palestine issue to interrupt his friendly relations with the US. He is definitely anti-Russian and anti-Communist. 1900; retook Riyadh, from which Saudi clan had been exiled. By 1912; was recognized by Arab tribes as head of a state. 1913; invaded Hasa on Persian Gulf and seized Turkish garrison at Qut; appeased by Turks and enemy tribal leader Rashid. 1915; signed treaty of friendship with the UK which relegated him to position inferior to that of Rashid and Hussein, the Hashimite King of the Hejaz. 1918-25; engaged in hostilities with the latter and by 1925 occupied entire Hejaz, driving Ali, son of Husein from throne. 1926; called pan-Islamic Conference, Mecca. 1927; recognized by British as independent ruler, King of the Hejaz, Nejd, and their dependencies. 1927-32; quelled series of revolts in his domain; abolished dual kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and renamed it Saudi Arabia. 1933-date; leased oil concessions to California Arab Standard Oil Company; Texas Company admitted to 50 percent partnership in 1936. 1940; established diplomatic relations with the US. 1945; declared war on Germany and Japan. 1945; met with President Roosevelt at Bitter Lakes in Suez Canal. 1946; assailed Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry report on Palestine as "injustice without precedent" to Arabs.

AMIR SAUD (Ibn Abd-al-Aziz  
al-Saud)

Place and Date of Birth:

Kuwait; c. 1901.

Education:

Unknown.

Occupation:

Viceroy of the Nejd.

Religion:

Wahhabi Moslem.

Remarks:

Amir Saud lacks the magnetic personality and spectacular abilities of his younger brother, Feisal. However, his reputation as a warrior and his physical resemblance to the King have increased his prestige among the Bedouin who comprise the strength of the country, and his membership

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in the strict Wahhabi sect enhances his influence with the predominantly Wahhabi population. It is believed that Saud's chances of becoming King and avoiding a civil war are good. He is expected to improve the internal administration of Saudi Arabia, accelerate the gradual modernization of the country, and continue the policy of friendship with the US. 1913-26; participated in campaigns of King Ibn Saud. 1933; proclaimed heir to throne. 1934; General in the Yemeni (seven weeks') war. 1935-36; traveled through Europe; represented Saudi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee of King George V of England. 1935; Viceroy of Nejd; placed in charge of tribal affairs. 1937; represented Saudi Arabia at coronation of King George VI. 1940, visited Italy. 1946; represented King Ibn Saud at the Conference of Arab Rulers, Inchass, Egypt. 1947; paid official visit to the United States.

**AMIR FEISAL (Ibn Abd-al-Aziz  
al-Saud)**

Place and Date of Birth:

Riyadh, Arabia; 1906.

Education:

Privately tutored. Speaks some English.

Occupation:

Viceroy of the Hejaz; Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Religion:

Sunni Moslem (not Wahhabi sect).

Remarks:

Prince Feisal's position and prestige in Saudi Arabia and his popularity in the Hejaz, are such that in the event of the King's death he may oppose his elder brother Saud's claim to the throne. Whoever rules Saudi Arabia, however, must have the allegiance of the tribes of the Nejd, and since the tribesmen are not only closer to Saud, who handles tribal affairs, but also suspicious of Feisal for his western manner and for his popularity in the more worldly Hejaz, the outcome of a possible conflict between the brothers has been a matter of speculation for several years. Of Ibn Saud's sons, Feisal is probably the friendliest toward the western nations, and except for what he considers an attitude favorable toward Zionism, which he violently opposes, his admiration of the US is said to be fervent. He has expressed regret that the Palestine issue may prejudice even slightly the good relations between the US and Saudi Arabia. 1919; headed political mission to Europe. 1919-25; participated in campaigns leading to consolidation of Hejaz and Nejd. 1926; headed diplomatic mission to European countries which had recognized Ibn Saud's kingdom. 1926-date; Viceroy of Hejaz. 1932; headed diplomatic mission to Europe. 1934; participated in Saudi-Yemeni war; conducted negotiations with British and Italian naval forces which might have intervened. 1934-date; Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1939; headed Saudi Arabian delegation to Palestine Conference, London. President, Hejazi Council of Ministers; President, Hejazi Legislative Council. 1945; headed delegation to first meeting of the Arab League, Cairo. 1946; headed delegations to Arab League; meeting

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of Arab rulers; UN General Assembly, New York; Palestine Conference, London. 1947; headed delegation to UNGA, Special Session on Palestine, New York.

**ABDULLAH, SHEIKH SULEIMAN  
AL-HAMDAN**

Place and Date of Birth:

Nejd; unknown.

Occupation:

Minister of Finance.

Religion:

Sunni Moslem.

Remarks:

A Nejd by origin, Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, is probably the most influential man in King Ibn Saud's Cabinet. So long as he remains in good health he is likely to maintain undiminished control of the Ministry of Finance and of the public works program. Suleiman, however, is addicted to the bottle, and is resorting to it more and more. His financial policy is the subject of dissension between British and American oil interests. The British maintain that Suleiman is incompetent and that he squandered about 20 million dollars during the first eight months of 1947. Americans support him because he is pro-American and because they feel he is probably as capable as anyone who might succeed him. But they agree with the British that he may spend several million dollars annually for no useful purpose. According to the story of an American officer, Suleiman tried to make a deal with the American Military Mission which was disposing of surplus army stores, in order that he and they might profit at the expense of Ibn Saud and the Saudi Arabian Government.

**SHEIKH YUSSEF YASSIN**  
Place and Date of Birth:

Latakia, Syria; c. 1898.

Occupation:

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Religion:

Wahhabi Moslem.

Remarks:

Sheikh Yussef Yassin has for many years retained a position of influence within King Ibn Saud's small group of advisers. Politically, he is the King's man and his actions closely reflect the King's will, but within these limitations he exercises considerable authority. Most Saudi Arabians look on him (some with amusement, others with disgust) as an opportunist ready to proclaim adherence to whatever precepts are most acceptable. Americans and British who have worked with him generally consider him obstructive, delighting in complicating simple procedures. Despite these propensities, however, he is a clever man, and, because of his influence with the King, an important one. He is anti-Hashimite, but about his attitude toward the US there is a difference of opinion. He had only one wife, who is supposed to exert considerable influence over him. Served under King Husein in the Arab revolt, 1918. Started "Umm al Qura," only paper published in Saudi Arabia; rose to present position as Deputy Foreign Minister through posts in the Foreign Ministry and as private secretary to Ibn Saud.

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**YEMEN****AHMED BIN YAHYA, SEIF-EL-ISLAM****HAMAD AL-DIN****Place and Date of Birth:**

Unknown; 1895.

**Occupation:**

Imam of Yemen.

**Religion:**

Shia Moslem.

**Remarks:**

Ahmed's sense of power and his ruthlessness are proverbial in Yemen. He is known as the "she Leopard," which refers to his perverted sexual habits. Ahmed has undoubtedly many good qualities and, save for his love of war and capriciousness of nature, he might well make a good Imam. However, his activities have given rise to doubts as to whether he could ever be counted on to maintain a reasonable or consistent policy. With the exception of Abdullah, Ahmed is the strongest willed of any of the sons of the late Imam. His relations with his brothers are not good. He is perhaps even more an opportunist than other Yemen officials. It is believed that he has a basic liking and respect for the US. According to his Italian personal physician, Dr. Tofflon, a strong adviser can influence him to follow a fairly consistent course of action, and if a favor is asked of him he is unable to refuse it. Whether or not sound advice given to him by Americans or others would suffice to prevent him from undertaking military adventures in Arabia is an open question. 1932; designated by the Imama Yahya as Crown Prince of Yemen. 1934; led troops the war with Saudi Arabia. 1937-47; Governor of Province of Taiz. 1948-date; following assassination of his father, 17 February, he drove out Abdulla al-Wazir and was proclaimed Imam in March.

**AMIR ABDULLAH BIN YAHYA****HAMAD AL-DIN****Place and Date of Birth:**

Yemen; unknown.

**Occupation:**

Minister of Education.

**Religion:**

Shia Moslem.

**Remarks:**

Of all the princes, Abdullah is probably the most intelligent and well-balanced and has shown himself to be a good administrator and negotiator. His control over the port of Hodeida enabled him to accumulate a fortune of several million dollars. The Prince's attitude toward the US is most friendly, and it is believed that he will continue to be a beneficial influence in strengthening relations between the two countries. He apparently shared his father's distrust of the British, and although he has enjoyed friendly relations with the French representative, it is not believed that he is as pro-French as Ahmed is said to have become. His attitude toward other Arab states is undoubtedly the traditional one of Yemen aloofness, except when joint action will advance Yemen's interest. 1928; made Governor of the Hodeida Province. About the time of the outbreak of the second world war, he was made head of

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the central government in Sana'a. He was sent to Cairo as the Imam's representative in the Arab League and he remained abroad for a period of nearly two years, during which he traveled to England and France.

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## APPENDIX E

### CHRONOLOGY

- 1914**  
18 December  
**1915**  
British Protectorate over Egypt established, ending Turkish suzerainty. British signed Treaty of Uqayr with Ibn Saud, recognizing independence and territorial integrity of Nejd.
- 1915 to 1916**  
14 July 1915 to  
30 Jan. 1916  
**1916**  
16 May  
Hussein-McMahon correspondence on disposition of Arab territories following Arab aid to Allies against Turks.
- 1916**  
5 June  
**1917**  
2 November  
Sykes-Picot Agreement dividing Arab territories into British and French spheres.  
Beginning of Arab Revolt against Turks.  
Balfour Declaration by British Government, favoring Jewish National Home in Palestine.
- 1918**  
3 October  
Turkish resistance broken; Damascus occupied by British and Arabs. An independent Arab state in Syria and Transjordan established by Amir Feisal with British consent.
- 1920**  
20 March  
Congress of Arab notables at Damascus offered crown of Syria and Palestine to Feisal, who accepted; and a similar congress in Baghdad proclaimed Abdullah Amir of Iraq.
- 1920**  
24 July  
July to October  
**1921**  
March to April  
French Army entered Damascus after defeating Feisal's forces.  
Iraqi revolt against British domination.  
British decided to create an hereditary Kingdom of Iraq, offering the crown to Feisal, and the Amirate of Transjordan under Amir Abdullah. Feisal formerly proclaimed King of Iraq.
- 1922**  
23 August  
**1922**  
28 February  
25 April  
Egypt declared independent by Great Britain; Fuad became first King. The League of Nations assigned the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France, and Palestine (including Transjordan) and Iraq to the UK.
- 1925**  
July  
Outbreak of revolt against French in Syria which spread widely and was broken only in June 1927.
- 1926**  
8 January  
Ibn Saud proclaimed King of Hejaz after successfully ousting Sharifian Hashimite family.
- 1927**  
20 May  
In Treaty of Jidda British recognized absolute independence of Saudi territories.
- 1930**  
30 June  
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, establishing independent status of Iraq, signed, to come into force when Iraq became a member of the League of Nations in 1932.

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1932  
September Ibn Saud unifies his principalities into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
3 October Iraq admitted to League of Nations, ending British Mandate.

1933  
8 September King Feisal of Iraq died; succeeded by his son Ghazzi.

1934  
May War between Saudi Arabia and Yemen concluded in favor of former by Treaty of Taif, disputed territory incorporated into Saudi Arabia.

1936  
28 April King Fuad of Egypt died; regent ruled for young King Farouk.  
22 August Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance concluded.  
9 September Franco-Syrian Treaty concluded; never ratified by French Parliament.  
13 November Franco-Lebanese Treaty concluded; never ratified by French Parliament.  
1936 to 1939 Periodic disturbances by Palestinian Arabs seeking stricter government policy toward Zionists.

1937  
26 May Egypt admitted to League of Nations.  
19 July King Farouk ascended throne of Egypt.

1939  
4 April King Ghazzi of Iraq died; succeeded by his son, Feisal II under the Regency of his uncle Abdul Ilah.  
May UK White Paper on Palestine restricted Jewish immigration and sale of land to Jews.  
23 June Franco-Turkish agreement signed, ceding Syrian province of Alexandretta to Turkey.

1940  
27 June French in Levant accepted Vichy rule.

1941  
March Rashid Ali al Gailani coup d'etat in Iraq; suppressed by British; armistice signed 31 May.  
8 June At beginning of British and Free French operations in Levant, Free French declared Syria and Lebanon independent.  
14 July Vichy French in Levant signed armistice.  
27 September Independent and sovereign status of Syria proclaimed by France as an established fact, fulfilling promise of 8 June 1941.  
26 November Parallel statement regarding Lebanon.

1943  
17 August Shukri Quwatli elected President of the Syrian Republic.  
21 September Bisharah al Khuri elected President of the Lebanese Republic.  
11 November French in Lebanon arrested President, Prime Minister, whole cabinet and 48 (of 55) deputies in displeasure at Chamber of Deputies' elimination of references to mandate in constitution.  
22 November The above officials returned to their posts following severe international repercussions. (22 November is now officially designated as Independence Day in Lebanon.)

1944  
25 September Arab states met at Alexandria to plan establishment of an Arab League.

1945  
22 March Pact of the League of Arab states promulgated; League came officially into existence on 10 May 1945 with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi

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- Arabia, Transjordan, and Yemen as members: Palestine permitted to delegate an observer.
- April Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia among original members of UN at San Francisco.
- May - June Franco-Syrian hostilities resulted from crises over transfer of powers to Syria and Lebanon by France; British intervened to end armed warfare following French bombardment of Damascus.
- 1946
- 2 January Syro-Lebanese case for withdrawal of French and British troops submitted to UNSC; taken up on 5 February 1946.
- 22 March British-Transjordan Treaty of Alliance put into effect, establishing Transjordan as an independent kingdom under Abdullah.
- 17 April Last French and British troops left Syria.
- 31 December Last of French and British troops left Lebanon.
- 1947
- 28 April Special session of UNGA convened at request of UK to determine future of Palestine. Special Committee (UNSCOP) set up to investigate.
- 11 July Anglo-Egyptian dispute submitted by Egypt to UNSC.
- 18 August Yemen voted membership in UN.
- 31 August UNSCOP report recommending partition submitted to UNGA.
- 29 November UNGA, by a 33-13-10 vote, recommended the partition of Palestine.
- 5 - 17 December Arab reaction to partition resulted in attack on USIS office in Iraq; anti-Jewish riots in Aden in which over 100 people killed; and sporadic demonstrations and rioting in all Arab states.
- 1948
- 15 January Portsmouth Treaty between Iraq and Great Britain signed, but subsequently repudiated by Iraqi Regent.
- 31 January Syria, in breaking away from French franc bloc, proclaimed independence of Syrian pound from any foreign currency.
- 2 February Saleh Jabr Cabinet fell as result of violent Baghdad demonstrations against Portsmouth Treaty; Mohammed as Sadr formed new government.
- 15 March Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of Alliance signed.
- 19 March US resolution in SC that partition be suspended and a special session of GA be called to set up temporary UN Trusteeship.
- 25 March President Truman reasserted US support for partition.
- 16 April Special Session of UNGA called to reconsider Palestine partition.
- 18 April Quwatli elected President of Syria for second consecutive five-year term.
- 23 April Truce Commission for Palestine established by UNSC.
- 15 May British Mandate over Palestine terminated.
- 16 May US granted *de facto*, and USSR *de jure*, recognition to Provisional Government of Israel. Troops of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan entered Palestine.
- 18 May Dr. Chaim Weizmann elected President of Council of State, Ben-Gurion Premier of the Provisional Government of Israel.
- 23 May US Consul General Wasson killed by sniper in Jerusalem.
- 24 May UNSC ordered a four-week truce with Count Folke Bernadotte acting as Mediator. Neither Arabs nor Jews permitted to import arms or men during that period.
- 27 May Bisharah al Khuri elected President of Lebanon for second consecutive six-year term.
- 28 May Old city of Jerusalem captured by Arab Legion.

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11 June Four-week UN truce accepted by Arabs and Jews. Jews in control of partition area but cut off in Jewish Jerusalem.

19 June British Governor General of Sudan promulgated the Sudan ordinances establishing an Executive Council and an elected Legislative Assembly.

24 June Resignation of Sadr Cabinet in Iraq; Pachachi formed new government.

9 July Fighting resumed in Palestine at expiration of truce. Israeli opened road to Jerusalem and took Lydda and Ramle.

18 July Second UNSC truce accepted by Arabs and Jews.

25 July Increased public demonstrations and riots in Egypt against Palestine policy. American citizen stoned to death in Cairo.  
UN truce observers arrived in Palestine.

17 September UN Mediator Count Bernadotte assassinated by members of Stern gang, his deputy, Ralph Bunche, becoming Acting Mediator.

23 September Bernadotte Plan for Palestine submitted to UNGA in Paris.  
Arab Palestine Government at Gaza formed under the sponsorship of Arab League and backed by Grand Mufti.

29 September UNGA postponed action on Bernadotte Plan in spite of strong US and UK support for its immediate consideration.

18 October Israeli forces in Negeb opened full-scale offensive against Egyptians, who retreated to Gaza-Beersheba line. Egyptian brigade cut off in Faluja.

27 October Egypt and Israel accepted UN cease-fire order in Negeb.

30 October Israel launched offensive in Northern Palestine to complete Jewish control of Galilee and area in southern Lebanon.

4 November UNSC ordered Negeb evacuation; subcommittee set up to study sanctions if Israel refused to withdraw.

16 November UNSC ordered Palestine armistice.

17 November Third General Meeting of UNESCO opened in Beirut.

19 November Egypt accepted UNSC armistice order; Bunche satisfied with Israeli answer, although it was highly qualified as to withdrawal of Israeli troops from Negeb.

30 November Arab Legion-Israeli cease-fire agreement signed in Jerusalem.

1 December Resignation of Mardam Government caused by mob riots throughout Syria.  
At Jericho conference, Palestine Arabs proclaimed Abdullah "King of all Palestine."

4 December US Ambassador to Egypt Griffis appointed Director of UN Relief for Palestine refugees with Bayard Dodge as his adviser.

8 December Egyptian Government dissolved the Moslem Brothers.

11 December UNGA established Palestine Conciliation Commission to seek settlement of all outstanding differences between Jews and Arabs.

17 December Khalid al Azm formed cabinet in Syria after seventeen days of governmental crisis.

22 December Israel launched second offensive against Egyptian forces in Negeb.

28 December Egyptian Premier Nokrashy Pasha assassinated by Moslem Brothers student; Abdel Hadi formed new government.

29 December UNSC ordered cease-fire in Negeb and withdrawal to 14 October positions. Israeli forces advanced into Egypt, threatening El Arish.

1949

5 January Pachachi Cabinet in Iraq fell; Nuri Said formed new government.

6 January Egypt and Israel accepted cease-fire.

7 January Five RAF aircraft shot down by Israelis near Rafah.

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8 January                   Approximately a battalion of British troops arrives in Aqaba.  
14 January                  Egypt and Israel opened armistice negotiations at Rhodes.  
19 January                  Export-Import loan of \$100,000,000 to Israel announced.  
25 January                  Mapai Party won large plurality in Israel's first general elections.  
29 January                  UK granted *de facto* recognition to Israel.  
31 January                  US granted *de jure* recognition to Israel and Transjordan.  
3 February                  First full meeting of UN Conciliation Commission in Jerusalem.  
7 February                  Franco-Syrian Monetary Agreement signed.  
12 February                 Sheikh Hassan el Banna, leader of Moslem Brothers assassinated in  
                                  Cairo.  
13 February                 Israeli Constituent Assembly opened in Jerusalem.  
17 February                 Constituent Assembly elected Weizmann first President of Israel and  
                                  adopt an interim Constitution.  
24 February                 Egypt and Israel signed armistice agreement at Rhodes.

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## APPENDIX F

## OIL IN ARAB LANDS

Despite the fact that intensive exploitation of Middle East petroleum resources has been carried on only within the last few years, the proved reserves of that area are estimated to be at least as great as those of the Western Hemisphere. This development is especially important at the present time, when world oil consumption is increasing and the requirements of Europe are particularly heavy. Oil is a vital factor in the success of the Marshall Plan, and it is improbable that the overstrained resources of the Western Hemisphere can provide these supplies. Present planning anticipates that by 1952 over 80 percent of Europe's needs under ECA will come from Middle Eastern wells.

With the exception of the Iranian developments, all main sources of Middle East oil lie within the Arab states. Income from this great natural asset can, if wisely used, finance many development projects which would be instrumental in providing a substantially higher standard of living for the entire area.

The following schedules represent a brief statistical summary of petroleum resources and development in the Arab states. Since the whole industry is undergoing rapid expansion throughout the Middle East, all fig-

ures are outdated almost as soon as published. The attached tables give the picture insofar as it could be determined at the end of 1948.

A word of caution is necessary regarding the figures given under the heading of "reserves." Any estimation of reserves is at best an educated guess, based upon an expert knowledge of petroleum engineering and the results of borings already made. Thus, while the reserves of Kuwait are shown as 9 billion barrels and those of Saudi Arabia as 6 billion, it is probable that additional exploration in Saudi Arabia will result in a greatly increased estimate of reserves for that area. In Kuwait, on the other hand, the Burghan field is probably the only field in the Sheikdom.

Current production is limited by the present capacities of transportation facilities and refineries. If the projected pipelines can be built (or adequate tanker fleets obtained) and additional refinery capacity can be constructed, there is little doubt that production of crude can be stepped up to keep pace with the increased demand. The effect of US Palestine policy upon American projects for such continued commercial expansion in the Arab states is dealt with elsewhere in this report.

## IRAQ

CONCESSIONARY COMPANY:	Iraq Petroleum Company	
OWNERSHIP:	a. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd.	23¾ %
	b. Shell Oil Company	23¾ %
	c. Compagnie Francaise de Petroles	23¾ %
	d. Near East Development Corporation *	23¾ %
	e. Mr. Gulbenkian	5 %
	* Standard Oil of New Jersey	50 %
	Socony-Vacuum	50 %
CONCESSION AREA:	Iraq east of the Tigris	
TERM OF CONCESSION:	75 years from 1925	
RESERVES: (All Iraq)	8,000,000,000 bbl.	

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	<i>Fields</i>	<i>No. of wells</i>	<i>Daily production (barrels)</i>
PRODUCTION:	Kirkuk (Baba Gurgur)	31 Producing 48 Observation	92,000 (limited by pipeline capacity)
	<i>Location</i>		<i>BPD capacity</i>
REFINING:	Haifa, Palestine		90,000
Present:	Tripoli, Lebanon		4,800
Projected:	Baiji, Iraq (An Iraqi Government project.)		12,000
	Haifa, Palestine (It is planned to double present capacity.)		90,000
	Tripoli, Lebanon		4,800
	<i>Location</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>BPD capacity</i>
PIPELINES:	Kirkuk-Haifa	12"	48,000
Present:	Kirkuk-Tripoli	12"	48,000
Under construction:	Kirkuk-Haifa	16"	102,000
	Kirkuk-Tripoli	16"	102,000
Projected:	Kirkuk-Banias, Syria	30"	350,000
TANKER FACILITIES:	None.		
PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION:	Excellent.		

## IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY SUBSIDIARIES

OWNERSHIP: Same as Iraq Petroleum Company.  
 (1) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Mosul Petroleum Company, Ltd.  
 CONCESSION AREA: All Iraq west of Tigris north of 33° latitude.  
 TERM OF CONCESSION: 75 years from 1933.

	<i>Field</i>	<i>No. of wells</i>
PRODUCTION:	Jawan	5
	Najmah	22
	Qaiyarah	34
	Qasab	5
	Aim Zalah	7

The oil from the Mosul area has not been commercially developed because of its high sulphur content.

- (2) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Basra Petroleum Company, Ltd.  
 CONCESSION AREA: All of Iraq not covered by IPC and Mosul concessions.  
 TERM OF CONCESSION: 75 years from 1938.  
 Oil was discovered in late 1948 at Nahr Umr and Zubair. Additional drilling is now taking place.
- (3) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Syria Petroleum Company, Ltd.  
 CONCESSION AREA: All Syria except for the Jebel Druze. Exploration is in progress. Some drilling has been done north of Palmyra and in the neighborhood of Aleppo, but no oil has yet been discovered.
- (4) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Transjordan Petroleum Company, Ltd.  
 CONCESSION AREA: All Transjordan.  
 Exploration has begun in the eastern part of the country.

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- (5) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Lebanon Petroleum Company, Ltd.  
 CONCESSION AREA: North Lebanon.  
 One well is being drilled at Jebel Terbol, near Tripoli. No oil has as yet been discovered.
- (6) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Petroleum Development, Ltd. (Palestine).  
 CONCESSION AREA: All Palestine except for the northeast section. Unsettled conditions in Palestine have interrupted exploration and test drilling.
- (7) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Petroleum Development, Ltd. (Trucial Coast).  
 CONCESSION AREA: All the Trucial Coast (a strip about 50 miles wide along southeastern shore of Persian Gulf). Exploration is in progress.
- (8) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Petroleum Development, Ltd. (Oman and Dhofar).  
 CONCESSION AREA: All Oman and Dhofar (coastal area from Trucial coast around to approximately 53° east longitude). A geological survey party is planning to go into the area.
- (9) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. (Hadhramaut).  
 CONCESSION AREA: All Hadhramaut and Aden Protectorate.  
 No activity so far as is known.
- (10) CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Petroleum Development, Ltd. (Qatar).  
 CONCESSION AREA: Qatar Peninsula south to Saudi Arabian frontier.

	<i>Field</i>	<i>No. of wells</i>
PRODUCTION:	Dukhan	3 (additional wells being drilled)
	This field is probably of major importance. Plans are made to build a 40-mile pipeline across the peninsula so that the oil may be shipped from the east coast. Pending construction of this line the field is shut in.	

In addition to the operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries, the Khanaquin Oil Company (wholly owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) produces oil in the Naft Khaneh field in eastern Iraq. From this field there is a pipeline to a company-owned refinery at Khanaquin, of 6,500 BPD capacity.

## KUWAIT

CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Kuwait Oil Company.  
 OWNERSHIP: a. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 50%  
 b. Gulf Oil Company 50%

CONCESSION AREA: All Kuwait.  
 TERM OF CONCESSION: 75 years from 1934.  
 RESERVES: 9,000,000,000 bbl.

	<i>Field</i>	<i>No. of wells</i>	<i>Daily production (barrels)</i>
PRODUCTION:	Burghan	39 (additional wells being drilled)	189,000
REFINING:	None.		
PIPELINES:			
Present:	Burghan-Fahahil 22".		
Projected:	Kuwait-Mediterranean 34"-36". (This line may be tied into the projected AIOC Mediterranean line.)		
TANKER FACILITIES:	Fahahil.		
PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION:	Excellent.		

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## SAUDI ARABIA

CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Arabian American Oil Company.  
 OWNERSHIP: a. Standard Oil Company of California 30%  
 b. Texas Oil Company 30%  
 c. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 30%  
 d. Socony-Vacuum 10%  
 CONCESSION AREA: Northern, eastern, and southern Saudi Arabia (approximately 440,000 square miles).  
 TERMS OF CONCESSION: 66 years from 1933.  
 RESERVES: 6,000,000,000 bbl.

	<i>Fields</i>	<i>No. of producing wells</i>	<i>Daily production (barrels)</i>
PRODUCTION:	Abqaiq	18	520,000
	Dammam	32	
	Qatif	1	
	Abu Hadriya	0	
	<i>Location</i>	<i>Capacity</i>	
REFINING:	Ras Tanura	117,000 BPD	
	Bahrein	146,000 BPD	(30,000 for Bahrein oil)

	<i>Location</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Length (miles)</i>	<i>Daily capacity (BPD)</i>
PIPELINES:	Dhahran-Ras Tanura (ref.)	10"	33	63,000
Present:	Dhahran-Ras Tanura (term.)	12"	23	123,000
	Dhahran-Bahrein	12"	34	117,000
	Abqaiq-Dhahran (2)	14"	40	205,000
	Abqaiq-Ras Tanura	22"	61	326,000
Under construction:	Abqaiq-Mediterranean	30"-31"	1,100	300,000
	(Work on this line has been begun at Dhahran)			
TANKER FACILITIES:	Ras Tanura.			
PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION:	Excellent.			

## BAHREIN

CONCESSIONARY COMPANY: Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd.  
 OWNERSHIP: a. Standard Oil Company of California 50%  
 b. Texas Company 50%  
 CONCESSION AREA: Bahrein Islands (250 square miles).  
 TERM OF CONCESSION: 55 years from 1940.  
 RESERVES: 700,000,000 bbl.

	<i>Fields</i>	<i>No. of producing wells</i>	<i>Daily production (bbl)</i>
PRODUCTION:	Awali	66	30,000
	<i>Location</i>	<i>Daily capacity (barrels)</i>	
REFINING:	Sitra	146,000 (116,000 from Saudi oil)	
PIPELINES:	Local.		
Projected:	None.		
TANKER FACILITIES:	Sitra.		
PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION:	Moderate.		

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## EGYPT

CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES: Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, Ltd.  
Standard Oil Company of Egypt.  
Socony-Vacuum.

CONCESSION AREAS: Red Sea Coast and Sinai Peninsula.

RESERVES: 100,000,000 bbl.

	<i>Fields</i>	<i>No. of wells</i>	<i>Daily production (bbl)</i>
PRODUCTION:	Ras Gharib *	103	42,000
	Hurghada *	62	
	Ras Sudr **	6	
	Asl **	4	

\* Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, Ltd.  
\*\* Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields—Socony-Vacuum joint project

REFINING:	<i>Location</i>	<i>Daily capacity (BPD)</i>
	Suez: Anglo-Egyptian Refinery	35,000
	Suez: Government Refinery	7,700

PIPELINES:		<i>Capacity</i>
Present:	Suez-Cairo	8,500 BPD
Projected:	Asl-Ras Sudr-Suez	Transport for Asl-Sudr oil when developed.

TANKER FACILITIES: Tas Gharib, Hurghada, Ras Sudr.

PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION: Poor.

## KUWAIT-SAUDI ARABIA NEUTRAL ZONE

In June 1948, the American Independent Oil Company (AMINCO) obtained from the Sheikh of Kuwait a concession covering Kuwait's undivided half interest in the Neutral Zone. Negotiations by several companies for the concession to the Saudi Arabian half interest are now in progress (January 1949).

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SUPPLEMENT

ADDITIONAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA COVERING THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY  
1949 (DATE OF INFORMATION FOR THE MAIN REPORT) TO SEPTEMBER 1949


1 March	Armistice talks between Israel and Lebanon began at Ras en Naqura.
3 March	Ben-Gurion organized MAPAI-led coalition cabinet in Israel. MAPAM stayed out.
5 March	Transjordan-Israeli armistice talks opened at Rhodes. Security Council approved Israeli-UN membership application by 9-1-1 vote. (Egypt opposed; UK abstained.)
9 March	Israeli troops attacked Arab Legion post at Gharandal across Transjordan border; another Israeli force reached Umm Reshresh on the Gulf of Aqaba.
11 March	Israel and Transjordan signed cease-fire agreement at Rhodes.
16 March	Transjordan and Israel agreed on Jerusalem armistice line.
19 March	In Iraqi Cabinet reshuffle Jamali became Foreign Minister; Omar Nahdmi, Deputy Prime Minister; and Tawfiq el Naib, Minister of Interior.
21 March	PCC held first meeting with Arab states representatives at Beirut to discuss Arab refugee problem.
23 March	Israel and Lebanon signed armistice agreement at Ras en Naqura.
24 March	President Truman signed bill authorizing \$16,000,000 for Palestinian refugees.
30 March	Syrian Col. Zaim seized power in Damascus in bloodless military <i>coup d'état</i> .
31 March	UK and Egypt signed financial and commercial agreement in Cairo.
3 April	Transjordan-Israeli armistice signed at Rhodes.
15 April	UK granted £1,000,000 interest-free loan to Transjordan to resettle refugees.
16 April	Zaim formed new Syrian Government with himself as Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs, and Minister of Defense.
27 April	PCC opened negotiations with Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon at Lausanne.
7 May	Transjordan Cabinet reformed to include Palestinian Arabs.
11 May	UN General Assembly admitted Israel to UN (37-12).
16 May	Tapline agreement ratified by Syrian legislative decree.
18 May	Transjordan officially named "Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan."
30 May	UK agreed to release £7,000,000 of Israel's blocked sterling over next six months.
20 June	Syria ratified Middle East Pipeline Company Agreement.
23 June	Dhahran Air Base Agreement extended for one year.
25 June	Zaim elected President of Syria.


\* This supplement has been provided in order to bring the chronology up to date since the preparation of the report. It has not been coordinated with the IAC Agencies.

6 July Paul Porter appointed to succeed Ethridge as US member of PCC.  
18 July PCC conference, adjourned since 29 June, reopened.  
20 July Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement signed.  
25 July Abdul Hadi Cabinet resigned in Egypt.  
26 July London Middle East Conference opened.  
Sirry Pasha, an independent, formed coalition government of major Egyptian parties including Wafd.  
5 August Israel offered to take back total of 100,000 Arab refugees.  
27 July Superior Oil Company granted subsea rights to Qatar seabed in Persian Gulf.  
11 August Near East arms embargo lifted by Security Council.  
14 August Zaim assassinated and his regime in Syria overthrown by military coup; leaders promptly returned government to civilian hands; coalition cabinet formed.  
20 August Sheikh of Qatar abdicated in favor of his son, Ali Abdullah al Thani.  
22 August Conversations opened between Abdullah of Jordan and Bevin in London.  
24 August PCC adopted Economic Survey Mission (ESM) for Near East.  
26 August UN appointed Gordon Clapp (of TVA) ESM Chairman.  
29 August PCC adopted Jerusalem Statutes.

PROVISIONAL

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
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
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# EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN





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