


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AN INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF RECENT SPANISH HISTORY

SUPPLEMENT TO SR-11 (SPAIN)



Published 15 November 1948

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NOTE: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this Supplement to SR-11.

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1. Introductory.

For a century and a half the Spanish people have struggled against oppression. Their history during this period is a record of poverty, insurrection, administrative incapacity, class warfare, declining world influence, and determined resistance to foreign domination: above all, a conflict between authoritarians and liberals, between the desire of the Church, the Army, and the propertied classes to preserve the medieval Spanish Catholic tradition by the discipline of a powerful State machinery, and the wish of anti-clerical intellectuals and impoverished workers to free Spain from misgovernment and mass ignorance. Since 1800, the Spanish people have undergone much brutalizing violence; they have fought two of the bloodiest civil wars of modern times. Although they stood apart from both the world wars of this century, they had more years of fighting in the 19th century than any other people in Europe. Since 1800, five monarchs (from three different dynasties) have been obliged to quit their thrones and leave Spain. Two liberal republics have been short-lived and unsuccessful experiments. Military dictators, such as Espartero (1840-43) and Primo de Rivera (1923-30), have had to abandon power and take refuge

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abroad. Stability has thus at best been measured by decades, rather than by generations, and instability has gone so far that in one year (1873) Spain had five chiefs of state.

This record of changing governments is the outward manifestation of deep maladjustments. Spain has never recovered from the economic and political dis-equilibrium of its past. The Emperor Charles V (1517-1556) laid down a sceptre that had swayed the greatest empire of his age -- an empire assembled in part by dynastic accident, enriched by gold inpouring from the Americas, and governed by principles of power politics that were the undoing of territorial Spain. Spain did not have the resources to maintain this fortuitous eminence. The Emperor's son, Philip II (1556-1598), with his armies and his wily statecraft, was a power and a threat in Europe, but from the end of the 16th century Spain rapidly declined. Its monarchs were inferior in capacity, the Inquisition abated intellectual vigor, foreign enemies were numerous, the machinery of the state was corrupt rather than competent, and the rich colonial revenues were lavished upon court and church luxury rather than applied to basic commercial, industrial, and agricultural developments.

2. The Nineteenth Century

The Spain which the armies of Napoleon invaded in 1808 was mis-governed, impoverished, and at the nadir of international authority.

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Yet the common people of Spain, rising spontaneously against the invader, revealed a remarkable vitality. Napoleon could not subdue them. Their constant harassments, aided by British forces under Wellington, drove the French out of the Peninsula in 1813. The promise shown by this popular determination to maintain Spanish independence dwindled away, however, during the 19th century.

A major responsibility for Spain's failure to emerge more quickly from its backwardness is attributable to the Bourbon monarchs. Ferdinand VII, returning to Spain from captivity in France, forswore his oath to uphold the liberal constitution which had been drawn up in 1812 during his absence by the Cortes of Cadiz. Arbitrary rule and fanatical vengeance against the liberals who had framed the constitution marked Ferdinand's reign. On his death, Spain was torn by a damaging civil war (1833-1839), fought ostensibly on the issue of dynastic succession but in reality a conflict between liberals and reactionaries. The latter, misdoubting the attitude of the Queen Regent, rallied behind the claim of Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlos, that he, as the nearest male heir, was rightfully the sovereign in place of his niece, the baby Queen Isabel II.

Although the reactionary Carlists were defeated, nothing in the reign of Isabel II gave aid to the growth of representative institutions, efficient government, popular education, or economic

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opportunities for the poorer classes. The Army was the one stable institution, aside from the domineering Church, and until Isabel was forced to leave Spain in 1868, the country was run by clerics and rival generals in conjunction with the tyrannical and immoral queen. The arbitrary intervention of Army officers in national affairs became a habit.

The confusion and instability of the brief first republic (February 1873 to January 1874) reflected the political inexperience of the Spanish people. Spain had fallen behind the general progress of Europe. The Industrial Revolution was very late in affecting Spanish economy. Medieval attitudes and institutions persisted, impervious to the radical notions of a few Spanish intellectuals. The restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875 represented a settling down after a confused, unsuccessful effort to try something new and different in government -- first a semi-liberal military dictatorship, then a different dynasty, a republic, federalism, anything but the tyranny of Isabel. Isabel was not personally restored to the throne. Her son, Alfonso XII (1874-1885) had the fortune to be guided toward constitutional rule by a relatively enlightened conservative, Canovas del Castillo.

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The comparatively stable decades which followed were in part the result of a private arrangement between the Conservative and Liberal parties to alternate power between them. These parties differed little in program. The electoral system was so arranged that the government in office, through the Interior Ministry and bosses in the municipalities, absolutely controlled the elections. No government in office ever lost an election. This system conveniently eliminated from politics the peasants and the laboring classes in the growing urban centers, while voluntary rotation afforded the appearance of change and gave politicians a technique of escape from awkward responsibilities.

Spain was dealt a rude shock by the Spanish-American war in 1898, which arose out of the restlessness of ill-governed, mistreated colonials and the vigor of the United States' interest in neighboring remnants of Spain's colonial empire. The loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines awakened the younger generation in Spain to critical analysis of their country's plight. "The Generation of '98" produced the first large group of distinguished, progressive intellectuals and writers Spain had known since the great epoch.

Meanwhile two industrial areas were developing, the populations of which were to expand considerably in the present century: the area

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in Catalonia centering on Barcelona, in which grew up a large textile industry, and the Bilbao area in the Basque country, where an iron and steel industry developed. As both these regions were progressing more rapidly than the rest of Spain, they tended to develop, on the basis of ethnic and language differences, Basque and Catalan movements for autonomy. In Catalonia, moreover, the anarchist ideas of Bakunin found wide response among the uneducated workers attracted to Catalonia from less prosperous provinces. In Madrid, at the same time, Pablo Iglesias, influenced by Karl Marx, was founding the Spanish Socialist movement. Both the anarchists and the socialists developed trade unionism.

3. The First World War to the Republic.

The 1914-1918 war, although it did not directly involve Spain, affected Spanish life because it provided an artificial stimulus to industry. An expanding industrialism widened the influence of the anarcho-syndicalists and the socialists, and accentuated the contrasts in Spanish society. Leftist intellectuals began to point out that the monarchy rested on three pillars of reaction: the Church, the Army, and the aristocracy. These groups, they said, governed the country in their own interest. The people received neither education nor good wages. Capital was squandered abroad by

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rich ne'er-do-wells, while Spain was economically exploited by foreigners, and the Spanish wealthy classes devoted neither time nor enterprise to the utilization of Spain's resources. Property inheritance was very unequal. One per cent of the population owned 50% of the land, while two million agricultural workers (40% of the total) owned no land at all.

These problems were intensified by the economic bad times which followed the war boom. Matters were made even worse by the drain upon the treasury from the war against the Riffs in Spanish Morocco. The Army, top-heavy with officers since the loss of the American colonies, wanted to exploit Morocco. Campaigns against the Moors satisfied Spanish traditions of military honor and provided officers opportunities for graft. However, the war in the 20's was fraught with disaster for Spanish arms, and the people were angered by the high casualties. A parliamentary investigation into the catastrophe at Annual in 1921, when 20,000 advancing Spaniards were massacred by the Moors, was apparently about to implicate King Alfonso XIII (1885-1931) for having personally ordered the fatal march. The incriminating parliamentary report was squashed by a quick political maneuver. General Miguel Primo de Rivera, Captain General of Catalonia, with the King's connivance, took control of the

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government in September 1923 from the constitutional prime minister. This marked the end of the parliamentary system established by the Constitution of 1875. Hitherto during his reign, Alfonso, an interfering, rather astute authoritarian politician, had had thirty-three ministries. Alfonso's refusal to summon a new Cortes three months after the coup d'état opened him to the charge of having violated his coronation oath.

The Primo de Rivera dictatorship had a certain success. During the world boom Spain was prosperous. New highways were built. Like Mussolini, Primo de Rivera got the trains to run on time. With the military help of the French he made peace in Morocco. Being a dictator, he handled Spain's fundamental problems by eliminating opposition criticism and imprisoning subversive elements. The great CNT anarcho-syndicalist trade union, for example, formally dissolving itself in anticipation of forcible suppression, maintained its existence only in secrecy.

But although this Andalusian general had a flamboyance and moral laxness that somewhat endeared him to the people, he had no constructive political ideas. The intellectuals attacked and ridiculed him. The Spanish Army upon which he relied was no proper vehicle, with its deplorable record in Morocco, for governing a

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country with problems requiring the highest quality of imaginative statesmanship.

The world economic depression destroyed the prosperity which had buoyed up the Dictatorship. The Army deserted Primo de Rivera, who in January 1930 was dismissed by the King and departed for exile in Paris. King Alfonso was now in an unenviable position. For over a year he struggled to rule with different ministers. But by this time many of his former ministers and friends had become republican. Opposition to the monarchy was strengthened in August 1930, when the republicans entered into a pact with the advocates of Catalan autonomy (rigidly opposed by the Dictatorship), whereby Catalonia was to be allowed to establish its own government in the event of Alfonso's overthrow. On April 12, 1931, the royal government, feeling its way cautiously toward more representative government, held elections in several important municipalities. A coalition formed by the socialists and republicans was victorious. The King thereupon sent an emissary to the leader of the republicans, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, who had formerly been a royal minister but already looked upon himself as head of a provisional government. Alcalá Zamora replied to Alfonso on April 14 that he must leave Spain at once. To avoid bloodshed, the King departed immediately. Meanwhile

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in Barcelona the leader of the major Catalan autonomy party proclaimed a Catalan state, which he intended should have independence within a federation of Iberian peoples.

4. Pressure on the Republic.

Spain thus abruptly became a republic. The masses were hardly prepared for their new responsibilities because they had never experienced a genuinely free election and had always been ruled from above either by an individual, a clique, or a governing class. The Provisional Government had the weakness of a coalition that contains unharmonious elements, for in it were conservative Catholics, Socialists, and anti-clerical republicans.

Nevertheless, on December 3, 1931, a liberal constitution was promulgated which created two legislative chambers, enfranchised both sexes, recognized Spain's obligations to the League of Nations, and provided for compulsory free education, freedom of opinion, freedom of worship, and the disestablishment of the Church. The first president under the new constitution was Alcalá Zamora; the first prime minister was Manuel Azaña.

The full promise of the Constitution could not be realized. Almost immediately the Government issued a Law for the Defense of the Republic which allowed a minister at discretion to cancel constitutional

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guarantees of freedom. The Government was pressed for reform on all sides. It made an attempt to solve the basic agrarian problems and to provide for the autonomy insisted upon by Catalonia. Parliamentary discussion was interminable. The situation was troubled, moreover, by strikes and insurrection. In 1932 both leftists (anarchists and Trotskyists) and rightists rose against the authority of the Government. The abortive attempt of General Sanjurjo to get the Army to overthrow the Republic was a forerunner of his more elaborate and successful effort in 1936. Azñna was personally determined that the moderate Republic should show no weakness. Both monarchists and anarchists were alternately the victims of the Government's drastic powers. The prisons filled; the armed police were overnumerous; censorship was applied. Despite its progressive intentions, the Government was antagonizing large sections of the middle class without satisfying the peasants and factory workers. The full force of the world economic crisis contributed to its troubles as it tried to withstand the importunities of extreme radicals while defending the young Republic against rightist intrigues.

The general elections of 1933 reflected the unpopularity of the Government. The Electoral Law of the Republic was designed to facilitate the formation of two main groups in the Cortes, inimitation of

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the English party system. It thus tended to give the victorious side a representation in the Cortes out of all proportion to its actual vote. As a result, the number of rightist deputies in the Cortes increased after the 1933 elections from a previous 42 to 207. The defeat of the leftist parties was due partly to the new vigor and careful organization of the rightists and partly to leftist dissensions. The Socialist Party, having achieved only a tiny fraction of its program, refused to collaborate with the Left Republican Party of Azaña, thereby sacrificing the advantage it might otherwise have enjoyed as a big political grouping under the new electoral law. The anarchists, moreover, ordered their followers to abstain, thus withholding a large proletarian vote from the Left. They and their followers had been antagonized by censorship, the remoteness of the social revolution, and the administration of the Republic's labor program by a Socialist, Largo Caballero, in the obvious interests of the Socialist trade union, the UGT, at the expense of their own trade union, the CNT. The Left thus failed to achieve its maximum strength in the Cortes, and two years of rightist rule followed which were to be known as the Bienio Negro, or black period, because the management of the Republic was in the hands of men and parties opposed to proletarian interests.

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The CEDA, a party financed by the landlords and devoted to the interests of the Church, had obtained the greatest quantity of deputies in the Cortes, although lacking a majority. Its leader was José Maria Gil Robles, student of Hitler techniques at the Nuremberg Rally, protégé of the Jesuits and of a rich father-in-law, authoritarian and a reactionary, but not at the time a monarchist. The President of the Republic, Alcalá Zamora, although a conservative Catholic himself, determined never to entrust power to Gil Robles, because he doubted Gil Robles' loyalty to the Republic. The conduct of government was thus placed in the hands of the Radical Party, a corrupt, illiberal political organization headed by the demagogue Alejandro Lerroux. Within a few weeks after taking office, the Government, which had to depend on the good will of Gil Robles, either repealed or allowed to lapse all the legislation fixing wages and conditions of employment that had been passed by the previous Cortes; it dropped the guarantee to tenants against unjustified eviction, and some 19,000 tenants were evicted from big estates in Extremadura where they had been settled; educational expenditures were sharply reduced; and anti-clerical legislation was withdrawn as far as possible. The Government likewise prepared an amnesty bill granting full pardon and restoration of rank and property to those convicted of conspiring against the Republic, the purpose of which

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was to liberate everyone arrested in connection with the monarchist revolt of August 1932. This amnesty bill was adopted in April 1934 and led to Sanjurjo's release and an influx into Spain of royalist self-exiles. Among these was a brilliant and forceful debater, Calvo Sotelo, who became the recognized leader of the monarchist faction, and pushed Gil Robles hard for control of the Right.

These rightist measures provoked an early reply from the extreme Left. The anarchists, who had counseled abstention from voting, felt that the rightist electoral victory required revolutionary counter-action. In villages in Aragon a rising occurred in December 1933 on behalf of libertarian Communism. The Government suppressed the insurrection in four days.

The regime's next trouble came from the Catalans and Basques. Moderate leftist elements had control of the Catalan Autonomous Government, whose powers had been recently established through the Statute for Catalan Autonomy pushed through the Cortes by Azaña. It was well known that the Spanish Right had no sympathy for such concessions to regional autonomy. In June 1934 a high Madrid court, many of whose judges were rightist appointees, annulled a law passed by the Catalan Parliament. This act led to Catalan charges of Madrid despotism and to a wave of strikes and disorders. The national Government was meanwhile antagonizing the Basques by forbidding them to

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hold an assembly in Bilbao to discuss their regional grievances.

5. The Left in 1934 Fights the Extension of Rightist Power,

Gil Robles now withdrew his support from the Radical Prime Minister of the day, Ricardo Samper, who resigned at the beginning of October 1934. The next cabinet, Gil Robles demanded, should contain a majority of ministers from his CEDA party. This proposal was intolerable to the leftist parties, who had watched the gradual sabotage of all their social legislation and now feared that the Constitution itself would be destroyed. They warned the President of the Republic that they would consider the inclusion of a single CEDA minister as a declaration of war upon them. The President, however, rejected their recommendation that the Cortes should be dissolved and instead asked Alejandro Lerroux to form a government containing three unimportant CEDA members. This decision cost Alcalá Zamora the sympathy of the Left. It was also the signal for a nationwide general strike called by the Socialist trade union, the UGT, on the following day, October 5.

A revolutionary movement broke out in three separate areas in Spain: in Barcelona, Madrid, and in the northern mining area of the Asturias. The Madrid rising was a complete fiasco. In Barcelona,

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Lluís Companys, the President of the Catalan Autonomous Government, prematurely yielded to pressure from the extreme separatists of the Catalan nationalist movement. He proclaimed the independence of the Catalan state. This was rash because the anarchic-syndicalist masses in Catalonia had been antagonized by the separatist leader who forced Companys' hand. They consequently did not rise to provide support for the independence move. It was thus an easy matter for the local commander of the Civil Guard, who remained faithful to the national Government, to surround Companys and his councillors and carry out Madrid's order for their arrest.

In the Asturias there was no such ignominious failure. For several years 35,000 Asturian coal miners had been reduced nearly to starvation by the paralysis which had overtaken heavy industry in Spain. Aided by the difficult nature of the terrain, their armed resistance to the Government now developed into a savage and protracted fight. Not until the central Government sent in reinforcements, including the tough Foreign Legion and semi-savage Moorish troops brought from North Africa, were the Asturian miners overcome. Under the command of General Francisco Franco the Government forces, behind a screen of strict censorship, systematically and cruelly mopped up the revolting strikers. Demands for the death

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penalty for all the leaders were made by many rightists, but the Government acted more leniently. The Army's dissatisfaction with this leniency gave rise to strong rumors that it would establish a military dictatorship under General Franco.

Despite dissensions among the rightists, the Army had no need yet to intervene. After the October revolt the Lerroux Government enforced a "state of alarm" over Spain until the spring of 1935, and a "state of war" in the Asturias. Many of the principal republican leaders, such as ex-premier Azaña, were imprisoned, and of the 56 Socialist deputies, sixteen (including Largo Caballero) were put in jail on charges of treason. The stern press censorship practically eliminated political activity by groups professing republican sympathies. Gil Robles, acclaimed by the Right, ranged about the country making provocative speeches insulting the Republicans. His pressure for greater power never relaxed.

The brutal action of the Government in repressing the Asturian revolt, plus its attempt, for which there was inadequate evidence, to incriminate Largo Caballero and Azaña, tended to swing popular feeling away from the Right. The sentencing of President Companys of Catalonia to 30 years imprisonment in a convict prison was unpopular. The courage shown by the miners had thrilled the working

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classes, who were particularly impressed by the fact that in the Asturias all three working class organizations, the Socialist UGT, the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, and the Communists had united in a Worker's Alliance a few days prior to the uprising. The Asturian revolt had great significance because it sharpened the conflict between the classes, prematurely eliminated a body of men prepared to die for the Republic, and yet pointed out the way of cooperation to the leftist groups.

A rebirth of leftist political activity was carefully watched by Gil Robles, who had obtained for himself the Ministry of War, where, with General Franco to assist him as Chief of the General Staff, he set about weeding from the Army all officers suspected of leftist sympathies and obtaining volunteers of rightist sympathies from the ranks. In the spring of 1935, Azaña, no longer a prisoner but now a great popular hero, reopened the republican campaign by a speech to 100,000 in Valencia attacking Lerroux for "opening all the doors of the Republic to the enemies of the regime."

Economic conditions meanwhile had worsened. Spain's unfavorable trade balance for the first eight months of 1935 had risen from 94 million pesetas during the corresponding period of 1933 to 196 million pesetas. Strikes and civil disturbances had their hampering effect upon commerce and industry, while the failure to develop foreign

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markets seriously affected agricultural production. These economic difficulties caused Lerroux to resign in September 1935. His Finance Minister, Chapaprieta, replaced him as premier for the purpose of balancing the budget, Lerroux accepting the Ministry of State. However, the coalition between the Radical Party and Gil Robles' CEDA, which had controlled Spain since the 1933 elections, was suddenly flung upon the rocks by the disclosure of two scandals involving corruption and bribery in high places. The leaders of the Radical Party, the two ex-premiers Lerroux and Samper, were implicated. Lerroux resigned; the Radical Party was discredited. The moment might have seemed logical to ask Gil Robles to form a government, but two things militated against this; the antipathy of President Alcalá Zamora for the CEDA leader, and an attack upon Gil Robles by Calvo Sotelo, who denounced him for having endangered the rightist program by his connections with Lerroux.

6. Appearance of the Popular Front

With the break-up of the CEDA-Radical coalition, the Cortes became unworkable. A parliamentary dissolution and a general election early in 1936 seemed the only solution. The President of the Republic selected a progressive with rightist connections, Portela Valladares, to form an extra-parliamentary cabinet to prepare for the general elections that would be held within 60 days

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after the dissolution of the Cortes. Alcala Zamora hoped that his new prime minister would be able to construct a broad center movement and eliminate the increasingly dangerous cleavage between the Right and the Left. Attacked from all sides, however, Portela Valladares' efforts were unsuccessful. The electoral law, being unfavorable to minority parties, worked against him.

In advance of the elections the left-wing parties -- Republicans, Socialists, anarcho-syndicalists, and Communists -- formed a pact by which they agreed on the distribution between them of the seats in the Cortes that would accrue to their Popular Front ticket. By means of a Popular Front coalition, they intended to avoid the error made in 1933 and this time obtain the maximum benefit from the electoral law. To a certain extent they agreed upon a common legislative program in the event of victory, but there was no mention of forming a Popular Front government. Gil Robles, for his part, persuaded the leaders of the right-wing parties that they must make common cause with the CEDA and the monarchists. He launched a tremendous propaganda campaign to convince the propertied classes that a victory of the Popular Front would lead to Communism. The Catholic clergy joined in urging the faithful to vote for the Right.

Portela Valladares' efforts to control the elections of February 16, 1936, failed. The Popular Front gained 4,700,000 votes, the Right

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3,997,000 and the Center 449,000. This meant a catastrophic defeat for the Right, because the Popular Front obtained 267 deputies and the Right only 132. The elections on the whole had been orderly, yet both the Right and the Left could claim that in certain districts their supporters had been intimidated or bribed. The triumph of the Left appeared remarkable in view of the open hostility of the Church, the large sums of money spent by the Right, and the Government's support in many provinces of Rightist candidates. Growing unemployment, the Government's refusal of amnesty to the political prisoners taken in the Asturian revolt, and the scandals in which the Radicals were involved no doubt contributed considerably to the rightist defeat.

Two days after the election, the leader of the Left Republicans, Manuel Azaña, became premier for the third time. His cabinet contained no Marxists. He at once freed the 30,000 political prisoners and dismissed all 50 incumbent provincial governors. General Franco, who, according to testimony later offered by Portela Valladares, had proposed a military coup to the outgoing premier before the new Cortes could meet, was hastily ordered to the Canary Islands, and General Goded, Inspector General of the Army, was sent to the Balearics. The native Moroccan troops garrisoned in the Asturias by Gil Robles were sent back to North Africa. Further evictions of

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farm tenants by landlords were stopped. The educational program was resumed and autonomy was restored to Catalonia and promised to the Basque Provinces.

On March 16 the new Cortes convened. It plunged at once into an expose of the evils of the previous rightist regime. Socialist demands for vengeance on the military created resentment among Army officers. The Civil Guard, afflicted by the political uncertainty, became hesitant about taking action against violators of the public order lest it be rebuked and punished by the new republican authorities. The general populace, made heady by the leftist victory and irritated by frequent rumors of a possible military coup, got more and more out of hand. Churches were burned. While the police stood by, disinclined to interfere, bomb throwings, murders, and other outrages were increasingly committed. Fights between the Civil Guard and the Socialist-Communist Youth gangs multiplied. The Government seemed supine in the face of these disorders.

The Cortes was meanwhile absorbed in vengeful politics. One of its first acts was to impeach the President of the Republic, who was removed from office on April 7. Alcalá Zamora had antagonized both rightists and leftists. His removal made necessary, under the terms of the Constitution, an election of presidential electors

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within a certain span of days. The holding of additional elections (on May 10) further stimulated political passions that were already dangerously high. Many well-to-do Spaniards fled abroad, fearful that the revolutionary wing of the Socialists would seize the government. The Popular Front was unable to agree upon a presidential candidate. At the last moment Azaña consented to be a candidate and was elected almost by default. The Government was thus deprived of the active leadership of one of the ablest men in Spanish public life, for the Presidency of the Republic offered limited opportunities to control the course of events. A member of his party, Santiago Casares Quiroga, succeeded him as Prime Minister.

7. The Conflict Between Right and Left Stimulates Violence.

Labor troubles had now spread like wildfire. The workers were even defying union leadership. Bloodshed increased. The growing violence shown by the leftist masses was matched by the calculated violence of a fascist body under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator. The Falange Espanola had been inaugurated in Madrid in the autumn of 1933. It was José Antonio's idea that Spain should effect a political revolution so radical that it would carry the nation beyond the entire experience of the liberal parliamentary age, whose characteristics José Antonio abhorred.

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Through this drastic revolution which he desired, a political machinery was to be developed, strong enough to ride the crest of the social upheaval that he, José Antonio, believed to be pending and inescapable. The strong-arm technique of fascism was needed to accomplish this end. In February 1934 the Falange joined officially with another organization¹ founded by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, an enthusiast for proletarian justice and deeply influenced by Nazism.

Ledesma was anticlerical, and thus, until the 1936 rising, the Falange considered the Catholic groups led by Gil Robles as competitors. The Falangist shock troops were dedicated to a battle against "decadent liberalism" and "corrupt capitalism", and sworn to kill two Socialists to every one of their numbers slain in street brawls. Despite financial contributions to the Falange from monarchists who were friends of José Antonio, the Falange, because of its revolutionary principles, was suspicious of and unsympathetic to the monarchists and the Army. Its main link to the traditional Right of Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo was its deadly antagonism to Marxism.

As the political situation deteriorated after the 1936 elections, the Falange's appeal grew. Between February and July 1936 more than

¹ Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (Councils of the National-Syndicalist Offensive). The new name became Falange Española y de las JONS.

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50,000 new recruits joined its ranks. The leadership of the Right, however, did not accrue to José Antonio, who for some months had been imprisoned on charges arising out of the murder of two Socialists in retaliation for the bombing of fascist headquarters in Madrid. The Falange remained a conspicuous but minority organization. Gil Robles, as a result of the elections, had so lost prestige that Calvo Sotelo became the leader upon whom most rightist hopes were pinned.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Army officers were busily laying the groundwork for a military rising. They had decided to terminate the Republic with its constant strikes and projects of reform. General Sanjurjo, anxious for greater success than in 1932, was among the more active plotters. Preliminary soundings in Berlin and Rome were favorably received. Franco and other generals were brought into the scheme, which did not include any large-scale prolonged warfare. The military leaders believed that they could quickly gain control of the country with the exception of Barcelona and perhaps Madrid.

A deed of violence unexpectedly precipitated the rebellion. On July 13, in retaliation for the murder of a leftist by the Falangists, men in police uniforms took from his home and murdered Calvo Sotelo. Four days later, on July 17, the Army mutinied in

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Spanish Morocco under the leadership of General Franco, who had flown there from his post in the Canary Islands.

8. Civil War Begins.

The revolt spread at once to the mainland. Garrisons throughout a large part of Spain rose on July 18 against the Republic. Most of the Civil Guard joined them, and so did the Requetes, or Carlist militia. But only in the traditionally Carlist province of Navarra did the rising become a popular movement. Although the Government was caught unprepared and could scarcely find a hundred loyal officers in the Army, the proletariat swarmed to its defense. In Madrid the barracks of the rebel General Fanjul were stormed by armed trade unionists, who thus extinguished the revolt in the capital. In Barcelona two days of fighting ended with the victory of anarcho-syndicalists over the garrison. The rebellion succeeded in a wide swathe of Spain from Galicia on the Atlantic through León, Old Castile, to Navarra and part of Aragon. But to the north of this area, a strip along the Biscayan coast, including the conservative Basque provinces, was loyal to the Republic. Central Spain, from Badajoz on the Portuguese frontier across to Valencia on the Mediterranean, was loyal. So was all of Catalonia, but it was flanked by Majorca in the hands of the insurgents. Most of Andalusia remained loyal, but not its principal cities, Sevilla, Granada and Córdoba.

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The ill success of the rising astounded the Army; it found itself faced with civil war. Passions flamed up, and the resentful people murdered and pillaged with terrifying fanaticism. In both the Republican and Nationalist zones, untold crimes were committed. Casares Quiroga promptly resigned as Prime Minister. President Azaña hoped to heal the breach in the nation by entrusting a moderate republican, Diego Martínez Barrio, with the formation of a new government. The extremists of the Left would not consent, however. José Giral, a Left Republican, thereupon formed a republican government which proved itself incapable of restraining the aroused people. The war was in full swing: the Army, the wealthy classes, the Church, the monarchists, and the fascists allied themselves against the Popular Front, which had numbers, small arms, and zeal, but lacked discipline, organization, and training.

To the rebels it was evident that they had to act quickly. An emissary from General Franco flew to Germany, where he speedily obtained from Hitler a fleet of planes with which the Moroccan troops under Franco's command could cross to the mainland and thrust north to effect a junction with troops under the command of General Mola, coming from the north. The surrounding and capture of Madrid was a main objective.

The military details of the Civil War need not be treated here. Fighting lasted from July 18, 1936 to March 29, 1939 and aroused the

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utmost bitterness throughout the world. Enough mob crimes were committed in the Republican zone to convince conservative people that the Spanish "Reds" were nothing but criminals. So obvious, on the other hand, was the Nationalist effort to substitute tyranny for democracy, and divert Spain from progressive social reforms, that everywhere liberals joined to condemn Franco and pledge faith in the Republic.

Foreign intervention soon became a major issue. From the outset Hitler and Mussolini were unqualifiedly on the side of the rebellion. The astonishing defense of the capital by the plain people of Madrid converted what might have been a short campaign by the generals into a protracted war. The German and Italian Governments had to increase their commitments. Hitler sent the Condor Legion, sample new weapons, and technicians in rotation to give them field experience for the international war he knew was coming. The value of the debt to Germany contracted by Franco was later set at 400 million Reichsmarks. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, once complained to Hitler that originally Franco had told the Italians that "if he received 12 transport planes or bombers, he would have the war won in a few days. These twelve airplanes became more than one thousand airplanes, six thousand dead, and 14 billion lire." Such was the contribution of the Axis to the war against the Spanish

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Republic. For the defense of the Republic, the USSR sent officers, political commissars, and arms, using the Spanish Communist Party as the vehicle of its aid. Thus this party, which had numbered only a few thousands when the rebellion broke out, became increasingly powerful and rapidly more numerous in the Republican Zone. Volunteer International Brigades were recruited abroad by Leftist sympathizers. France, Great Britain, and the United States, largely blind to the strategic implications of the conflict, pursued governmentally a policy of non-intervention which might have been unobjectionable if the Axis Powers, although giving lip service to this policy to which they officially subscribed, had not flagrantly flouted it in practice. The consequence was that the Government of the Republic, well-stocked with gold, could not buy arms or munitions for its defense against a foe constantly being fortified by German and Italian aid.

9. Francisco Franco Heads the Right; the Left Becomes More Revolutionary.

In all probability the leader of the rebellion would have been General Sanjurjo, but as he flew from his exile in Portugal to take command, he was killed in the crash of his plane. A subsequent plane crash took the life of General Mola. The ranking generals conferred supreme authority upon Francisco Franco, whose Moroccan forces were of

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vital importance to the campaign. Franco assumed formal headship of the rebellion on October 1, 1936.

Aside from fighting the war, he had to construct a government. To serve as an intermediary between the people in the Nationalist zone and the Army leadership, he selected the Falange Party, which became the organization through which the new bureaucracy was built up. The Falange's acceptability to his German and Italian allies no doubt influenced Franco in this choice. It is doubtful that he thoroughly grasped the Falangist political philosophy beyond seeing that it was in line with the totalitarian trend in Europe. By the Act of Unification of April 19, 1937, he welded the Falange to his Carlist supporters, whose reactionary politics and militant Catholicism made them strange bedfellows with the radical revolutionaries of the Falangist nucleus. The execution in the Republican zone of the captive José Antonio and the deaths or captivity of many other original Falangists very likely facilitated the transition of the Falange from a revolutionary minority to the sole official party of Franco's new state. José Antonio, instead of a rival for political leadership, became of the utmost value to Franco as a martyr and symbol of the "Glorious Movement." The assignment of organizing and controlling the party Franco placed in the hands of his brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, a former supporter of Gil Robles.

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As the war progressed, the politics of the Republican side exhibited a growing radicalism, culminating finally in the near dominance of the best organized and outside-supported group. Giral's cabinet of republicans had given way after a few months to a Popular Front Government headed by Largo Caballero, who had been hailed in Moscow as the Spanish Lenin. The influence of President Azaña shriveled to nothing. In the Largo Caballero Government were representatives of the anarcho-syndicalist trade union, the CNT, which hitherto, for doctrinaire reasons, had refused direct participation in politics. The unruly, individualistic anarchist masses were among the most enthusiastic wagers of class warfare, but their indiscipline and violence complicated the conduct of the war and shocked the middle classes. Although Largo Caballero had been the most provocative and pro-Communist of the Socialist Party leaders and had fought tenaciously within the party against the two more conservative Socialist leaders, Indalecio Prieto and Julián Besteiro, his experience as premier turned him more and more against the growing Spanish Communist Party and the representatives of the USSR. In the end he could not play ball with them. Nor was he capable of directing the war efficiently. In May 1937, he was eased out of the premiership by a joint effort of his party rival Prieto and the Communists. The Finance Minister, Dr. Juan Negrín, a well known medical man who

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was a Socialist but had not had a political career previous to the war, became Prime Minister. Negrin was a man of resourcefulness and energy, who relied increasingly upon Communists for the conduct of the war, especially as the Communists stood for discipline and order, two qualities greatly needed in the Republican zone. The much better known Prieto, Negrin's Minister of National Defense, grew increasingly suspicious and opposed to this Communist infiltration. It shocked him and others that Soviet agents often overrode the decisions of Spaniards. Negrin accused Prieto of defeatism. The break between them led to Prieto's embittered withdrawal from the Government. Henceforth Negrin was the driving force of the Republican side.

Although Madrid did not fall to Franco until the last day of the war, the Nationalist armies gradually spread more widely over Spain. By December 1937 they held all the Spanish territory bordering on Portugal, whose Government sympathized with and aided them; they had conquered the Basques and thus held all the Atlantic and Biscayan coasts. Burgos, their capital, could communicate through their territory with Andalusia, an area governed by the picturesque General Queipo de Llano, who shouted fiery threats over the microphone and brought both disrepute and publicity to the Nationalist cause. The Republic still held the greater part of the Mediterranean coast and a considerable quantity of the interior as far inland as besieged Madrid.

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Between April 1938 and March 1939 the Franco forces made a distinctly important advance. Recovering the ground they had lost in the Ebro offensive launched by the Republican Army, which had by this time developed into a real military machine instead of the disorganized workers' battalions of the early days of the conflict, Franco's troops thrust forward with the aim of capturing Barcelona, now the seat of the Republican Government, and of splitting the Republican zone in two. Energetic action by Dr. Negrín, aided by new aircraft and armaments obtained through France, saved Barcelona for the time being. But by April 1938 the southern column of the Nationalist forces had reached the Mediterranean at Vinaroz and driven a wedge between Barcelona and Valencia. Eight months more ensued, with hunger mounting in the Republican zone and the weight of foreign armaments increasingly benefiting Franco, before Spanish and Italian troops marched into Barcelona on January 26, 1939 after a swift offensive of 34 days.

10. Collapse of the Republic.

The Nationalist occupation of the rest of Catalonia required but a few days. In the castle at Figueras, on February 1, a remnant (62 deputies) of the Cortes convened for the last time on Spanish soil. Dr. Negrín, still defiant of the enemy, was confirmed in office. He reiterated certain of the conditions for peace which he had first

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formulated in April 1938. But Franco, as before, was determined on nothing short of total victory. Amid a disorganized mass of hundreds of thousands of refugees, President Azaña, Companys of Catalonia, and the Basque President, José Antonio de Aguirre, crossed into France on February 5. The Republic was almost extinguished. Negrín was determined, however, to carry on the fight from the remaining central zone. It was his conception that the international situation would soon lead to a general war, through which the Spanish Republic would derive support from the allies opposing Germany. Azaña, Martínez Barrio, and many other moderate republicans favored an immediate peace. In Paris, on February 28, 1939, Azaña resigned as President of the Republic. Martínez Barrio, who, as President of the Cortes, should have been his constitutional interim successor, declined to accept the office, partly because of the impossibility of complying with the constitutional provisions for holding an election.

Negrín, with several of his cabinet officers, had flown from France to the central zone to continue the battle. With the disappearance of the Presidency, it was contended by many that Negrín's mandate of power had automatically expired. Negrín took the contrary view that he and his cabinet were the legitimate heirs of the executive power. In the central zone, war-weariness and despair had gained

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ground, however. Communist insistence on continuing the struggle increased the unpopularity of a party whose tactics, police methods, rigid discipline, and foreign connections made it naturally irritating to the Spanish temperament.

The focus of the discontent with the Negrín resistance policy was the commander of a Republican army, Colonel Casado. Judging that the war should end, and considering that Negrín no longer had legal authority, Casado refused Negrín's promotion of him to be a general. By a coup d'état he took over authority. Threatened with arrest, the Negrín Government was obliged to flee the Republican zone by plane. In Madrid, a week of heavy fighting occurred between the Communists and Negrín's supporters against anarcho-syndicalist, socialist, and Army elements. This civil war within a civil war was won by Casado. On March 5 a Defense Junta had been established, of which General Miaja, the hero of the earlier defense of Madrid, was made President. Several prominent Socialists joined the Junta. It was this body, rather than any constitutional organ of the Republic, which surrendered unconditionally to Franco. Casado's efforts to secure a political amnesty from Franco failed. On March 28 the Nationalist troops marched into Madrid. The ending of the Civil War was announced by Franco on April 1, 1939.

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RESTRICTED11. Franco Consolidates His Victory.

The effects upon Spain of this conflict, which has lasted for two years and 254 days, were immeasurably serious. Over a million Spaniards had lost their lives. Half a million had gone into exile, and nearly as great a number were in prisons and concentration camps. There was hardly a family in the country which had not experienced death and destruction. The transportation system was badly afflicted. Industrial and agricultural production had been disastrously affected. Madrid and many other cities and towns had undergone devastating physical damage, the repair of which was to be handicapped by material shortages and the loss of skilled labor.

Benevolence and charity at the seat of government were needed to heal an exhausted country. It was not General Franco's intention, however, to forgive his enemies. The man who had overwhelmed the Asturian strikers with Moorish troops was essentially a soldier trained in the primitive conditions of Morocco. He was prepared to lead, not restrain, Nationalist demands for revenge against the "Reds," and based many acts of his regime on that policy. The Army had begun the war to safeguard its interests and to suppress all who wanted to smash the old class prerogatives and reduce the Army's power. The harsh terms of Franco's Law of Political Responsibilities of February 1939 call for no surprise. Every political party which had opposed

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the Nationalists was outlawed. Seventeen distinct categories of "criminal acts" were established, with penalties even for such vague guilt as arose from "acts contributing to the anarchy prevailing before the Nationalist Movement." Punishments for the politically responsible included death, imprisonment, fine, exile, or loss of citizenship, as determined by military law, together with permanent disqualification for holding public jobs or executive posts in private business, thus shutting the defeated out of all but minor white-collar positions or menial work. A Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism completed the outlawry of political dissidence.

The purpose of these decrees and of the elaborate police machinery created to enforce them was the eradication of the Spanish Left. One of the most tragic consequences of the Civil War is the setback Franco's victory has given to the development of political experience among the Spanish people. The persecution of every Spaniard favoring modern representative government, the elimination of every liberal, the abolition of free expression, and the perversion of history, have been tasks the Franco regime has set itself. In consequence the slow, upward struggle of the Spanish people toward economic independence and political maturity has been dealt a rude shock. The leaders who might guide Spaniards toward

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moderate progressivism are now absent or muzzled. Franco had purposely kept alive two antagonistic Spains: his Spain and "Red Spain". "In every sphere," as an authoritative student of the Franco state has put it, "it has been the consistent policy of the Spanish regime to extol itself as the victor of 1939, to evoke all the loyalties and passions and fears which the Civil War aroused."¹

Simultaneously with this smothering of the Left, Franco has worked incessantly and astutely to hold together the divergent forces which supported him in the Civil War. This has been a difficult task. The militant Falangists, with their radical totalitarian point of view, have often greatly angered the old-fashioned officer class and the aristocracy. Control of education has been contested between the Falange and the Church. From time to time the prospect has loomed that the Army, which conferred the office of Chief of the Government of the State upon Franco, would move to take it from him. Franco has surmounted these difficulties by outmaneuvering his enemies. He has mollified the Army by privileges, promotions, and opportunities for black market profits, has prevented any other general from emerging as his serious rival by timely shifts of command, and has never relinquished his unique advantage in relation to the other generals of being the head of the only authorized political party in

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Emmet John Hughes, "Report from Spain", p. 148. New York 1947

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the state. The Church has been kept in line by demonstrations of piety, the conferment of privilege, and protection against the anti-clericals. The severe repression of all subversive elements, although it has kept hatred alive in the country, has served to reinforce Franco's great propaganda theme: that Spain must obey him or be submerged by Asiatic Bolshevism.

12. The Spanish Government's Partiality for the Axis.

The outbreak of the second World War in September 1939, only five months after fighting ceased in Spain, unquestionably complicated Franco's task as ruler. The Spanish Catholic rightists were enormously shocked by the understanding reached by their German allies with the USSR. The Falangists from the start were pro-German. In the first few months of the war, Spain's official neutrality was the obvious policy for a nation already devastated. Spain needed peace for her recovery and could contribute little to Germany. But after Germany's rapid conquest of France, the arrival of German forces at the Spanish frontier in June 1940 altered Spain's strategic relationship to the war. On June 12, two days after Italy's entrance into the war, Franco adopted for Spain an ambiguous new status, non-belligerency. Like most Spaniards, Franco was convinced of the certain defeat of the Allies. For the next several years he held the conviction that Germany could not be militarily defeated. Thus,

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no matter what the sympathies of Spaniards and the Government, the German presence at the Pyrenees frontier called for a policy that would avoid provoking a German invasion, against which the Spanish Army could not hope to resist successfully. Franco and his collaborators went far beyond this, however, because most of them desired a German victory, and were favorably disposed toward contributing to it militarily. The occupation by Spanish troops of the International Zone of Tangier on June 14, 1940, indicated the temper of the Spanish Government. This was a violation of an international agreement. An excuse was offered in advance to the French, that it was a temporary measure to forestall Tangier's seizure by Mussolini, but the Falangist press chauvinistically trumpeted the move as an Allied defeat and a forerunner of the expansion of Spain's African empire. The Falangists simultaneously began to demand Gibraltar from the British. In June also the Spanish Government notified Germany that it was ready, under certain conditions, to give up its position as a "non-belligerent" and enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy. The conditions Spain mentioned were unenticing, because they involved Spain's acquisition of Gibraltar, French Morocco, and Oran, plus the donation by Germany of considerable military and economic assistance to enable Spain to carry on the war.

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Through the remainder of 1940, discussions took place between the German and Spanish Governments concerning a prospective attack on Gibraltar. The relations between Berlin and Madrid were drawn closer by Franco's dismissal on October 17, 1940 of a Foreign Minister who personally detested the Nazis. Serrano Suñer, the incoming Foreign Minister, a month before his appointment had discussed with Hitler the problems involved in an attack on Gibraltar.

Although the Spanish Government was never loath to express its spiritual union with Germany, the Spaniards had a tendency to maintain that they had already made a substantial contribution to the common cause through their Civil War sacrifices. They did not hesitate, therefore, to make their belligerency contingent upon a very considerable amount of assistance from Hitler. The Fuehrer viewed with considerable misgivings their demand for French Morocco, which he thought would be better defended against the British if it remained in the hands of the French. Hitler suggested that he and Franco should meet for a personal discussion. This conference took place on October 23, 1940 at Hendaye. According to a letter Hitler subsequently wrote to Franco, "at our meeting we agreed that Spain declare its readiness to sign the Three-Power Pact and enter the war. In setting the date, periods in the far future were never considered or even mentioned, but instead the conversation always was

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concerned with a very short time limit within which you, Caudillo, still believed that you could carry out various economic measures favorable for your country.....Germany was ready to furnish supplies to the Spanish Government at the moment when the final date for entering the war was determined."

On December 7, 1940 a representative of Hitler informed Franco personally of "Germany's wish to undertake attack upon Gibraltar within a short time in connection with which German troops are to march into Spain on January 10." Franco replied to Hitler's emissary that Spain could not enter the war so soon, and he confessed that he could name no definite date when Spain would be prepared. A letter written by Hitler on February 6, 1941 reproached Franco for his refusal, charging that it was not until the request to begin the march against Gibraltar on January 10 had been made that "for the first time our negotiators were unequivocally informed that such an early date could not be considered and this was again motivated by economic factors." Franco replied that he was unshakably loyal to "the common historical destiny" which he shared with Hitler, but that Germany had only recently begun to make effective her offers of food supplies, and the time was not propitious to ask further sacrifices of the Spanish people. He also stressed that, although the closing of the Strait of Gibraltar was undoubtedly necessary to improve Italy's position and perhaps to end the war, it was also essential that the Suez

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Canal be closed at the same time. If it were not, and the war should be inordinately prolonged, the situation in Spain would become extremely difficult. Franco's procrastinating attitude on this and later occasions reflected his native caution, the war-weariness of the Spanish people, Hitler's unwillingness to promise him North Africa, and the further fact that the populace did not share the Government's pro-Germanism.

Since the Allied victory, Franco has tried to capitalize on his statesmanship in keeping Spain out of the conflict. It is probable, however, that this achievement was largely accidental. Lord Templewood, British Ambassador in Spain during the war, has written:

"With the warning of Mussolini before his eyes, Franco was always reluctant to act. Being incredibly complacent and believing himself infallible, he remained convinced that he could choose his own time for intervention. The doctrine of perfectionism lost him his chances. When Hitler wanted him in, he wished to be out, and when he was ready to move, Hitler's fortunes were so much in the ascendant that Spanish help became a matter of indifference to the Axis."¹

Hitler's decision to attack the USSR in June 1941 lessened the probability of a campaign against Gibraltar and reestablished the anti-Comintern alignment that fitted so well with Franco's policy. The Falange at once recruited "volunteers" to fight against the USSR. The Spanish Blue Division, expecting perhaps to earn easy glory in

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Sir Samuel Hoare, Viscount Templewood, "Ambassador on Special Mission", p. 95. London, 1946

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another of Germany's blitz campaigns, was instead terribly mauled by the Russians. Through 1941 and 1942, however, the position of Germany, despite the unexpected difficulties in Russia, continued to seem unassailable to the Spanish Government. Consequently, in its propaganda and in its diplomatic relations with the Allies, it never wavered from support of the Axis. The US and UK Governments had to keep constantly in mind the possibility that Franco would open the Iberian Peninsula to Hitler, or that Hitler, disregarding Franco's wishes, would march in anyway.

After Japan had attacked the United States, Franco adopted a curious line of argument with American diplomats to the effect that there were two distinct wars. In the Far Eastern war, despite congratulating Japan's puppet in the Philippines, Franco claimed that Spain's sympathies were with America, but he unequivocally insisted that in the European war the true enemy of Christendom was "barbarous and oriental, communistic Russia." He denied the Allied contention that Germany was a threat to the independence of other nations.

For strategic reasons the US and UK Governments adopted a policy whose primary principle was to keep Spain out of the war. It was considered inadvisable to seek the overthrow of the Franco regime. Allied diplomacy was therefore directed at persuading the existing Spanish Government to resist to the utmost any German attempt to

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occupy the Peninsula. Competition was constant with the Axis for influence in Spain and for the material resources Spain possessed that might be of use in waging the war.

13. Serrano Suñer's Dismissal Diminishes German Influence

An internal struggle between the militant Falangists and the Army led to an incident in August 1942 that was accidentally to favor the Allied effort. The War Minister, General Varela, the chief opponent of the Falangists in the cabinet of Serrano Suñer, was the target of a Falangist-thrown bomb. He escaped harm. Inquiry revealed that the outrage was the work of intimate associates of the Foreign Minister. Two of Serrano Suñer's Falangist colleagues, unscrupulously determined to embroil him with Franco in their own interests, trapped the Foreign Minister into defending the organizer of the crime and then taking issue with Franco for refusing to commute the death sentence pronounced by a court martial. Franco met this dangerous crisis by a characteristic maneuver. He dismissed Serrano Suñer from all his offices to satisfy the Army hierarchy and simultaneously removed General Varela to appease the Falange. In the person of Serrano Suñer there disappeared from the Government, for purely domestic reasons, the leading Falangist, the most outstanding pro-German, the hated symbol of Party dominance, and the pliant friend of the German

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Ambassador. His successor as Foreign Minister was Count Jordana. Franco had apparently had no intention of changing the character of his policy toward the war, but he now had as his adviser an individual with a different approach to the international situation. Jordana was more experienced in foreign affairs than Serrano Suñer, and he had a reputation for patriotism, honesty, and common sense. He wanted, moreover, to keep Spain out of the clutches of Germany. He further had the capacity to inspire confidence in both the British and American Ambassadors, who soon established friendly relations with him that would have been impossible with his predecessor.

The importance of this change was appreciated on the critical occasion when Allied forces landed in North Africa on November 8, 1942. The US Ambassador was instructed to notify Franco personally on the eve of these landings and to convey assurances that Spanish territorial integrity would be respected. The danger existed that Spain would permit German forces to swarm through the Peninsula, or that the large Spanish armies in Spanish Morocco -- 150,000 strong -- would attack the Allied landing forces before they were firmly established. This was the crucial test of Spain's non-belligerency. Chance obliged the Ambassador to reveal the Allied intention to Jordana before it was conveyed to Franco. Jordana received the news quietly and prepared Franco for a similar complacent reaction. In the session of

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the Council of Ministers later that day, several Germanophil ministers argued for Spanish intervention. The British Ambassador has since expressed the conviction that if the discussion in the Council of Ministers had taken place a year previously, when Serrano Suñer was still Foreign Minister, and before the US and UK Governments had inaugurated their large-scale program of preclusive buying from Spain of commodities much needed by Germany, the interventionist ministers would have won the debate and influenced Franco¹ to declare war. Jordana's counsels of moderation, however, triumphed.

The consolidation of the Allied occupation of French North Africa marked another turning point in Spain's strategic relationship to the war. Henceforth Spain was situated between the contending forces. In the following six or eight months the Spanish Government winked at the passage through Spain of volunteers, chiefly Frenchmen, who sought active service with the Allies in Africa, the number of whom eventually reached 25,000. It allowed the evacuation through Gibraltar of several hundred force-landed Allied aviators. It turned over to Allied authorities the secret equipment of their crashed planes. It also countenanced the US-British economic campaign, highly profitable for Spaniards, to buy up wolfram, mercury,

¹ Viscount Templewood, op. cit., p. 182

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fluorspar, skins, woolen goods, etc., in order to prevent these commodities from being exported to Germany.

From July 1933 to May 1944 the Spanish Government moved from "non-belligerency" toward "neutrality", gradually increasing the facilities accorded the Allies. It modified somewhat the anti-Allied tone of the press, withdrew the mutilated Blue Division from the Eastern Front, permitted the commercial sale of American propaganda magazines (many a Spaniard had earlier been arrested and beaten up merely for reading the American Embassy news bulletin), granted the Allies control of all passenger traffic between Spain and Spanish Morocco, and withheld recognition from the Government Mussolini set up in North Italy after the Italian armistice.

These concessions indicated no fundamental change of heart. Behind the backs of the Allied Governments, the Spaniards made an arrangement whereby Germany undertook to send Spain immediately quantities of arms and war equipment, in return for which Germany obtained credits essential to her competitive effort to get strategic materials. The German and Spanish Governments on February 10, 1943 signed a secret protocol affirming Spain's determination "to resist every entry by Anglo-American forces upon the Iberian Peninsula or upon Spanish territory outside of the Peninsula -- and to ward off such an entry with all the means at its disposal." No such guarantee

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to resist a German entry had ever been given the US and UK Governments in return for permitting imports far more vital to Spain. On December 3, 1943, the German Ambassador complained to Franco of the concessions Spain was making to English and American pressure. The Caudillo replied that he "was hoping with all his heart for the victory of Germany", that he wished it to come as soon as possible, and that he knew that an Anglo-Saxon victory would mean his own annihilation. He pointed out, however, that Spain's recovery from the Civil War depended upon imports of gasoline and cotton, which he could procure only from the United States and with the permission of Great Britain. The Anglo-Saxons were making deliveries contingent upon Spain's discontinuance of matters "indisputably unneutral." The withdrawal of the Blue Division would not terminate Spain's continuing struggle against Bolshevism, Communism, Jewry, and Freemasonry. Despite a somewhat more neutral attitude in the Spanish press, he went on, the press "was still quite predominantly appreciative of Germany and sympathetic to Germany." Having defended one by one Spain's concessions to the Allies, Franco assured the Ambassador that Spain would not go beyond comparatively trivial concessions. He expressed the opinion that it was in the interest of Germany as well as of Spain that his Government should avoid a serious conflict with the Anglo-Saxons, because a neutral Spain

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could furnish valuable commodities, such as wolfram, to Germany, whereas, because of economic and military weaknesses, a belligerent Spain might become a liability.

14. Monarchist and Leftist Groups seek Franco's Removal

The growth of Allied might and the pro-Axis record of the Franco Government now enabled the Spanish monarchists to exert pressure on Franco for a restoration of the Monarchy. Alfonso XIII's son, Don Juan, was in exile in Switzerland, where he was critical of the "quality of partiality" displayed in the Spanish Government's attitude toward the war. The aristocratic, conservative group of monarchists in Spain had never shared the exuberant pro-Germanism of the Falangists. In July 1943 they therefore circulated a petition to the Caudillo requesting an immediate restoration of the traditional Catholic Monarchy which they argued would be "free from all foreign pressure and influence" and uncompromised by too close association with the Axis. Despite its sponsorship by the Duke of Alba, Franco's Ambassador in London, this monarchist effort to seize the political initiative from the Caudillo failed miserably. Franco learned prematurely of the petition and had it withdrawn from circulation. Of the 26 signatories, four disloyal Falangists were punished by expulsion from the party. Sympathizing Army officers were berated. But

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the monarchists had been fearful of the personal consequences of signing, so no really important general or prelate was compromised. The petition's argument was simply ignored, and because of his diplomatic usefulness the Duke of Alba was not even dismissed. In relation to the monarchial question Franco's policy was established to assert his own monarchist sympathies but to insist that the restoration should occur only when he judged it expedient.

The trend of concessions to the Allies was accelerated by the Allied liberation of France in the summer of 1944. Franco after this had his back to the wall, for he was physically cut off from his German friends, and Spain was surrounded by Allied forces. For all his hatred of the USSR and his declared sympathy for Germany, he could henceforth do little more than try to win tolerance from the Allies. "From July, 1944," the former US Ambassador has written, "the Spanish Government repeatedly indicated, by word and likewise by deed, that its policy toward us was one of 'benevolent neutrality.'¹" The concessions made under this policy scarcely need be detailed, although the effect of their success upon Spanish politics was noteworthy.

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Carlton J. H. Hayes: "Wartime Mission in Spain", p. 300, New York, 1945

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Scattered through many countries, the exiled leaders of the defunct Republic had been prevented during the war from easy communication with each other. Dr. Negrín resided in London with several members of his cabinet. Disposing of considerable funds belonging to the Spanish Republic, he maintained that he headed the legal Government of the Republic, and could not divest himself of authority because there was no one to whom he could submit his resignation. The majority of exiles disallowed his claim. In Mexico Negrín's determined enemy, the Socialist leader Prieto, also controlled large funds of the Republic. In 1942 he and Martínez Barrio, the ex-President of the Cortes, joined with other leading Republicans and Socialists to form a Spanish Committee of Liberation to serve as a focal point in the fight against Franco. This committee excluded the Communists and opposed Negrín.

Such Spanish leaders as had remained in France in 1940 were either taken prisoner by the Germans. (as happened to Largo Caballero), handed over to Franco for execution (the fate of President Companys of Catalonia), or forced into obscurity as was Rodolfo Llopis. Numerically France still contained the greatest body of exiles, persecuted and shut off from both Spain and their old leaders. The refugee colonies abroad in Mexico City, Havana, London, etc., contained many men whose Civil War prominence had made them afraid to

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linger on a Nazi-threatened continent. Their party differences and personal animosities multiplied in the vacuum of exile, where they had neither responsibilities to bear nor a public opinion to face. Their disunion was intensified by the Negrín-Prieto feud and the absence of a generally recognized and respected Republican Government. Ex-President Azaña had died. Only the Basque Autonomous Government existed in exile as an entity, largely because of the miraculous escape of President Aguirre from German-occupied Europe.

For reasons of Allied security and war pressure, the liberation of France was not followed for many months by the opening of communications between the scattered groups of leaders abroad and the hundred thousand or more Spaniards in France. These latter had suffered severely. Many of them had joined the French Resistance movement and fought valiantly against the Germans. When the Germans left, the one thought of a segment of these fighting elements was to take their arms, cross the Pyrenees, and overthrow Franco. Exaggerated stories of the number of armed Spaniards spread. Although border incidents occurred, Franco concentrated large enough forces near the frontier to prevent these sporadic incursions into Spain from becoming a serious threat. His position was actually strengthened by the alarm felt in Spain and many circles abroad at the thought of vengeful mobs of Spanish leftists penetrating into the Peninsula.

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Meanwhile in France the Communists had organized a much publicised Spanish National Union, advertising it as the medium by which Franco's downfall would be encompassed. They unscrupulously pretended that the other Spanish leftist parties participated. They linked it moreover with an equally spurious all-party underground organization inside Spain called the Junta Suprema, or Supreme Council of National Union.

Perceiving that the Spanish Communist Party was out to get control of the trade unions and the whole opposition movement, the Spanish Socialist, Republican, and CNT leaders in France hastily formed executive committees for their own organizations and also created a joint anti-Communist alliance, which they called the Spanish Committee of Liberation in France to signify its sympathy with the Prieto-Martínez Barrio group in Mexico.

15. The Franco Regime Survives the Jolt of Germany's Defeat

Although the belief was widespread among the exiles that Germany's defeat would be followed at once by Franco's collapse, the exiles overestimated Allied sympathy for the Republic and underestimated Franco's tenacity. So far as the US and UK Governments were concerned, the Spanish Government, by its new compliance, presented no obstacle to winning the War. Franco had broken relations

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with the Japanese. To attempt to force him out might create military liabilities. In preference to the support of any revolutionary movement aimed essentially at reversing the outcome of the Civil War, it seemed wiser to urge the current holders of power in Spain to liberalize their regime. The alternative to Franco was, moreover, far from clear. The Spanish Left did not appear at the time capable of obtaining power peacefully and maintaining it with unity. If the Left were to try to take over, some rightist groups were certain to resist. The tragedy for Spain was that no democratic middle group, uncommitted to victors or vanquished in the Civil War, existed with enough strength inside Spain to step forward at this crucial moment and bring Spain into harmony with Allied principles. Franco's brutal elimination of all opposition paid off at this crisis.

The Spanish Church also played a significant role in upholding the Caudillo. It controlled one of the few large organizations independent of the Falange -- Catholic Action, an efficient, ostensibly non-political organization to which 350,000 people owed allegiance. Its lay leader, Martin Artajo, might have spearheaded a rightist movement to change the regime. But already in 1944 the Church had had a showdown with the Falange over the educational law, and the Church had won. When, upon the eclipse of fascism, Franco found it politic to move the Falange into the background, Catholic Action stood

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ready to supply him with a new prop. With the approval of the Primate, Martín Artajo entered Franco's cabinet as Foreign Minister in July 1945. In September, the Primate issued a pastoral letter defending the legitimacy of the Franco regime and all its works.

In preparation for the day of Franco's fall, the exiles submerged their controversies to the extent of reconstituting the machinery of Republican Government in the late summer of 1945. A formula saved the face of Dr. Negrín, who formally resigned as Premier after it had been agreed in Mexico that Martínez Barrio should be elected President of the Republic. Proceeding as closely as possible along constitutional lines, Martínez Barrio consulted representatives of the various leftist parties, and then appointed a Left Republican ex-Premier, José Giral, to constitute a Government. Giral's coalition cabinet presented its program, which was approved, to a truncated meeting of the 1936 Cortes convened in Mexico City in November 1945. This was the first meeting of the Cortes since the deputies fled from Spain in 1939. The tone of the new Government was strongly anti-Communist, reflecting the majority feeling among the exiles and also designed to obtain Anglo-American sympathy. Despite this, no major power considered that Giral's Government-in-exile had sufficient backing from the Spanish people to be of serious consequence. The argument of the exiles that the Republic had been the first victim

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of Axis aggression and therefore had a moral right to be reinstated was ignored. Only Mexico and a handful of Latin American countries extended it diplomatic recognition.

That the Allied Powers disapproved of the Franco regime was already, however, of public record. During the Potsdam Conference, the USSR, UK, and US Governments declared on August 2, 1945 that they would oppose any application for membership in the United Nations "put forward by the present Spanish Government which, having been founded with the support of the Axis, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the necessary qualifications to justify such membership." The first session of the UN General Assembly endorsed this attitude.

16. The Internal Opposition Seeks to Organize

Opposition elements within Spain had meanwhile begun to make themselves more evident. Despite years of intensive police activity, the Franco Government had not succeeded in extinguishing any of the five broad movements of the Spanish Left; republicanism, socialism, anarcho-syndicalism, communism, or the demand for regional autonomy. Although the resistance council advertised by the Communists, the Junta Suprema, was largely fraudulent, a joint effort by the anarcho-

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syndicalists, socialists, and republicans had created clandestinely in October 1944 a political union under the name of Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democraticas (National Alliance of Democratic Forces). This organization was to work to re-establish the Republican order, create a democratic government to assume power until the people had expressed their will through universal suffrage, maintain the public order, revise the judicial system, and provide for the gradual extension of public liberties. Its organizers were handicapped by police persecution and by their own inability to communicate copiously with the Government-in-exile, despite the latter's transfer early in 1946 from Mexico to France. The customary rivalry for leadership between underground and exiled organizations has seriously plagued efforts for a coordinated leftist opposition program.

Despite the much increased post-World War activity of Franco's opposition, it has had singularly little effect on the stability of his regime. The primary reason is the size and loyalty of the Spanish Army. Just as it was the Army which organized the rebellion, so it has been the Army which sustained the Government through very trying post-war circumstances. Quite aside from the reviving activities of Spanish leftists and the intrigues of the monarchists, the Spanish Government has had to struggle with the seriously adverse economic effects of a several-year drought and with the badgerings of foreign

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governments insistently calling for a change of regime. The control, via the army and the police, of all force in Spain has been Franco's salvation. His adroitness has made this resource paramount, for he has known how to thrive upon the suspicions existing between his rightist and his leftist opponents, and he has converted a world-wide effort to denounce him through the United Nations into a rallying of rightist patriotic sentiment against what he has alleged was a Communist-inspired attack upon Spain itself.

The French, US, and UK Governments on March 4, 1946, publicly urged "a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange and the establishment of an interim or care-taking government under which the Spanish people may have an opportunity freely to determine the type of government they wish to have and to choose their leaders." This was coupled with a promise not to intervene. From it, therefore, Franco had nothing to fear, and he could even take comfort at its implied repudiation of the basis upon which the Government-in-exile had been established. The subsequent effort of the Polish Government to persuade the UN that the Spanish Government constituted a threat to international peace served in the end to fortify Franco's position, because the Spanish people well knew that they were in no position to launch a military attack on France or any other country, and the directing influence of the USSR behind the Poles was so

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visible that it tended to confirm Franco's thesis that Spain should unite strongly behind him to defend itself against Moscow. The UN's study of the Spanish problem was protracted and acrimonious. The US and UK Governments led a large bloc of nations unwilling to apply economic sanctions to Spain. The action finally taken by the UN in December 1946 consisted merely in a decision to keep Spain out of international organizations connected with the UN and to recommend to UN members that they withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. The decision of the Argentine Government, which had recently rescued Spanish economy by a large loan, to send a new Ambassador to Madrid almost simultaneously with the passing of the UN resolution enabled Franco to smother the international rebuff he had received under the effusive grandeur of his welcome to the Argentine envoy.

17. Franco's Monarchist and Leftist Opponents Search for a Basis of Cooperation

The fiasco in the UN brought to a head the dissatisfaction of many moderate leftists with the policies of the Giral Government-in-exile. Giral was accused of having neglected the underground. His failure to obtain recognition from important foreign Governments, the ill success of his arguments before the UN, and a discernible tendency of the Government-in-exile (which after its arrival in France

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had taken in a Communist minister) to draw closer diplomatically to the USSR, led to a revolt by the Socialist, CNT, and conservative Catholic ministers. Giral resigned. The new Government-in-exile was headed by Rodolfo Llopis, a Socialist leader distinctly unsympathetic to the Communists, although he felt impelled, partly because of the political atmosphere in France, also to take on a Communist minister.

The significance of this change in the Government-in-exile was its possible bearing upon the most important political problem facing Franco and the opposition in 1947. This was the problem -- the solution of which Franco had to forestall -- of drawing together elements from the leftist opposition and from the rightist (or monarchist) opposition in order to submerge the enmities of the Civil War long enough to create a moderate leadership capable of appealing to Spaniards from both sides: the building, in short, of a strong moderate center able to withstand pressures from the political extremities. Franco's strategy had always been to prevent this union of his enemies and to foster hatred between the monarchists and the leftists. The Communist Party's strategy is essentially the same, for Communism can succeed in Spain only if there is a head-on shock between the Right and the Left.

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Secret negotiations, as the Government-in-exile knew, had been going on for many months between representative monarchists and anarcho-syndicalists and socialist leaders inside Spain, belonging to the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democraticas. The doctrinaire republicanism of most of Giral's cabinet made it unsympathetic to a compromise with the monarchists. Llopis, on the other hand, represented a trend among the Socialists to favor a working arrangement with the monarchists provided no concession be made which would lead to the installation of a non-Republican regime prior to a free, open consultation of the Spanish people.

Don Juan, the Pretender, had transferred his residence from Switzerland to Portugal early in 1946. Although this had brought him under the influence of the reactionary Gil Robles, now a monarchist, the prince perceived that the monarchist cause needed bolstering by support -- or at least tolerance -- from strong labor elements.

Thus the growing awareness of both monarchists and leftists that neither grouping was strong enough alone to eliminate Franco tended to favor their rapprochement. The Communists made plain their opposition, with the result that negotiations took place, as far as possible, without their knowledge. For Franco the prospect of a genuine accord between rightists and leftists carried the most serious implications, as it would almost certainly lead to disloyalties in the Army, and thus to the first real threat to his power.

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Hitherto Franco had treated his monarchist opposition with a gentleness strongly contrasting to his suppression of the Left. This mildness resulted largely from his desire to retain the support of the vague pro-monarchists who, inattentive to the strained relations between the Caudillo and the Pretender, still believed Franco was sincerely preparing for a restoration. Now the possibility, however vague, that the monarchists might obtain a basis of proletarian support led to increased persecution of active monarchists by the Franco Government. Franco's next act was a brilliant maneuver to divide the monarchists and yet keep the loyalty of their following. He announced a Law of Succession which simultaneously declared Spain to be a kingdom (with himself as Chief of State), outlined a procedure for the succession which allowed some hope to the wishful that Franco would be replaced by a King, and yet ensured Franco full control of the state for as long as he desired. A provision of the law required Franco's successor, whether a king or a non-royal regent, to swear allegiance to certain "fundamental laws" incorporating the essential character of the regime as it has developed under Franco. Don Juan, who had for long made clear that he had no intention of accepting the liabilities of a direct inheritance from Franco, promptly issued a manifesto repudiating the succession law and asserting his dynastic rights to

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the throne. After this insubordination it became possible for Franco's propagandists both to applaud the institution of the monarchy and to attack Don Juan.

Franco culminated this maneuver by a concession to foreign democratic suggestions that he permit an election. For the first time during his rule he went through the motions of consulting popular opinion. A referendum, which gave no opportunity for a genuine test of the peoples' attitude, was held on July 6, 1947, the voter simply being asked whether he ratified the Law of Succession. The vote was rigged, and over 80% of the votes were announced to have been in favor of ratification. Even had the vote gone differently, the Franco regime would have continued unmodified.

In mid-summer 1947 Franco could congratulate himself on the apparent stability of his Government and the growing tendency abroad to overlook his faults and to view his country as a potentially useful strategic ally. The increasing embitterment of the Spanish masses, although it lay beneath the surface, nevertheless pointed toward an eventual upheaval.

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