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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

**INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 288**

**9 May 1950**

**SUBJECT: Political Alignments and Major Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in the Event of War before July 1951**

**Note:** This memorandum was prepared at the request of the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff as a summary estimate of political alignments in the assumed event of war before July 1951 and a preliminary analysis of salient psychological warfare vulnerabilities. A more comprehensive analysis of psychological warfare factors is in process.

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**SUMMARY**

1. The outbreak of a general war before July 1951 is assumed for the purposes of this estimate.
2. In the assumed circumstances, the immediate Soviet purpose in resorting to war would be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the Western Powers and to ensure the security of the USSR by military occupation of Western Europe and the Near East.
3. The USSR regards political and psychological warfare as integral rather than incidental in the waging of war. Not only would considerable Soviet capabilities in this respect be exploited to the utmost to facilitate military operations, but the military operations themselves would be designed to support and facilitate political revolution.
4. In important respects the USSR is itself vulnerable to political and psychological warfare, but these vulnerabilities are latent and could not be exploited fully until the mechanism of Soviet police control had been disrupted and effective Allied support of disaffected elements was at hand.
5. The allies of the USSR would be the European Satellite States (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania), Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and China. Several of these Soviet allies are vulnerable to psychological warfare, and their proximity to Western base areas increases the potentialities for exploitation.

**Note:** The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report.

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6. Several nations are at present and still in 1951 probably will be aligned with the West, but either their firm adherence to the West is subject to doubt or their ability to maintain their position is uncertain. Communist-led insurgents already are well established in Indochina and Burma. These countries may be brought under Soviet control before July 1951, jeopardizing other parts of Southeast Asia. Other areas whose alignment is comparatively precarious are Yugoslavia, Western Germany, Austria, and Japan.

7. The nations allied or aligned with the United States would be:

- a. The North Atlantic Treaty States: Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Portugal, with their overseas possessions.
- b. Other recipients of US military aid: Greece, Turkey, Iran, Southern Korea, and the Philippines.
- c. Other members of the British Commonwealth, not signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty: South Africa, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand.
- d. The British Arab allies: Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.
- e. The other American republics.

8. All other nations would probably be initially neutral. None would be sympathetic with the USSR or likely to join it in aggression. Most would be disposed to resist Soviet attack, and would look to the United States for aid in that case. A few might eventually be persuaded to become belligerent allies of the United States, even if not attacked.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
VULNERABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF WAR BEFORE JULY 1951**THE USSR1. Assumptions.

The outbreak of a general war before July 1951 is assumed for the purposes of this estimate. Such an occurrence is conceivable only as the result of Soviet initiative. The assumption of a Soviet decision to resort to war within the period under consideration implies the further assumption of conviction on the part of Soviet leaders that: (a) the progressive economic recovery, political coalescence, and military rehabilitation of Western Europe, in alliance with the United States, posed an intolerable threat to the security of the USSR; (b) it had become imperative to act before the relative strength of the West had been further enhanced; (c) the trend toward the strengthening of the West could be reversed by a war envisaged as limited in time and scope; and (d) the USSR had sufficient military power to win such a war.

2. Soviet War Aims.

In the assumed circumstances, the immediate Soviet purpose in resorting to war would be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the Western Powers and to ensure the security of the USSR by military occupation of Western Europe and the Near East. Corollary objectives would be to seize and convert to Soviet use the resources of the conquered area, thus greatly enhancing the potential strength of the USSR in relation to that of the surviving capitalist states, and to reconstruct the states of Western Europe as Satellites on the Eastern European model.

3. Capabilities for Political and Psychological Warfare.

In the Soviet concept, a state of political and psychological warfare is the normal relationship between Communist and capitalist states. Armed conflict is merely the employment of additional means in the conduct of this continuing struggle. Thus, even in the event of a resort to military aggression, political and psychological warfare would be regarded as integral and basic rather than incidental to the business of waging war.

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In conducting political and psychological warfare, the Kremlin has at its disposal not only the apparatus of the Soviet state, but also that of the international Communist movement, in which every disciplined Communist is required to pay primary and undeviating allegiance to the interests of the USSR.

The agencies of Soviet propaganda, Soviet diplomacy, and Communist agitation are constantly at work trying to spread disillusionment and disaffection in the non-Soviet world, discredit non-Soviet governments, create antagonisms among them, and undermine the will and capacity of non-Soviet peoples to resist in the event of war. Thus the way would have been prepared for presenting the USSR in time of war as the invincible champion of the peace-loving and oppressed masses, compelled by the machinations of capitalist warmongers to act in self-defense for the secure establishment of peace and democracy. The USSR would seek to paralyze resistance by inciting labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, and rebellion. Its particular targets would be industrial labor, the idealistic intelligentsia, self-conscious minorities, colonial populations, and the armed forces.

The USSR would also seek to cripple resistance through sabotage of military installations, transportation and communications facilities, other public utilities, war industries, and stocks of essential commodities. Communist penetration of industrial labor has been conducted with this end in view and, despite all precautions, would present a serious threat.

In areas under direct Soviet attack the hard core of militant Communists must also be expected to provide active fifth-column support for Soviet military operations. The strongest capabilities in this respect exist in Italy and France.

Finally, in the wake of the Soviet advance, the surviving Communists would emerge as collaborators in the establishment of police control and civil administration. Despite the absolute power of the USSR as military conqueror, every effort would be made, as previously in Eastern Europe, to present conquest as liberation and the resultant Communist regime as the product of a genuine popular revolution. The purpose would be to convert the conquered communities into allies as quickly as possible through the familiar device of the Satellite state.

#### 4. Psychological Readiness for War.

The Russian people's recent experience of war has given them reason to dread it, despite the ultimate triumph of the USSR. They have been

taught, however, to expect attack by the capitalist world and are prepared to resist such attack. Whatever the actual case, the USSR would attribute the war to capitalist aggression, and few Soviet citizens would be in a position to know better. Under the supposition that successful prosecution of the war was essential to their national survival, reinforced by the coercive power of their totalitarian state, the Soviet people would support the Soviet war effort.

#### 5. Potential Sources of Disaffection.

In addition to the reluctance of the Soviet people to undergo the rigors of a new war, three principal bases of potential disaffection exist in the USSR:

a. General disillusionment, and resentment as a result of the exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of the Soviet state. Despite the fact that the Russians have never known liberty and are inured to despotism, no other people in modern times have been so closely controlled and systematically exploited for so long.

b. The peasants' resentment of collectivization. The German Army found that the rural population would support even a foreign invader in anticipation that he would abolish the collective farms and distribute the land on a basis of private ownership.

c. The hostility of minority nationalities toward great Russian domination. For instance, resistance efforts still occur sporadically in the newly annexed western Ukraine. The main areas of potential disaffection are the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia.

#### 6. Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.

These potential sources of disaffection normally are kept under effective control through isolation of the Soviet people, internal propaganda, economic coercion, Communist monopoly of political power, and, above all, police terrorism. However, the unrepresentative character of the government, its high degree of centralization, and its ultimate dependence on police coercion are specific weaknesses of the Soviet system. Should the mechanism of close governmental control be broken, by atomic bombardment for instance, disintegration would set in.

So long as Soviet military operations appeared to be meeting with complete success and the internal security mechanism remained intact, no serious hindrance to the Soviet war effort would result from the latent disaffection within the USSR. If Soviet internal propaganda were dis-

proved by events—especially if Allied capabilities proved greater than expected, and Soviet capabilities less—Soviet morale would be adversely affected, but the effect would not be decisive. The latent disaffection existing within the USSR could bring about a crippling disintegration of the Soviet war effort only if the Soviet control mechanism were thoroughly disrupted and if effective Allied support of disaffected groups were immediately at hand.

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## SOVIET SATELLITES

7. The European Satellite States.

At the outset of war, and so long as Soviet operations were successful, the European Satellite governments would of necessity support the USSR. Wholesale defections from the Satellite armed forces would be unlikely to occur in these circumstances, but the reliability of the forces would be questionable, and their utility would be strictly limited.

The vast majority of the people of the Satellite States, however, are thoroughly hostile toward the USSR and the Communist regimes imposed on them. Many of them would welcome war in the hope of eventual liberation. The outbreak of hostilities might occasion sporadic acts of open resistance, which would, however, be ruthlessly suppressed. In the circumstances, most popular resistance would be passive, consisting of slowdowns, concealment of produce, draft-dodging, and other forms of non-cooperation. Active resistance for the most part would take the form of clandestine counter-propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and acts of terrorism. Substantial guerrilla resistance could be expected only in Poland, where a large security force would be required to keep it within bounds.

This situation would be radically altered if the USSR were to appear to be losing the war and if advancing Allied forces were in a position to render effective support to popular resistance in the Satellite States. The Satellite armed forces, and even the rank-and-file of Satellite Communists, would become increasingly unreliable. Defections and popular insurrection would occur wherever there was prospect of immediate Allied support and early liberation by Allied armed forces. The Satellites in proximity to Allied base areas and to the lines of approach of Allied armies would become distinct liabilities rather than assets to the Soviet war effort. In the face of the rising tide of patriotic anti-Communist reaction, however, Satellite officials would perceive no future for themselves apart from the fortunes of the USSR and would accordingly try to maintain a desperate resistance as long as possible.

8. Vulnerabilities.

The Soviet position in the European Satellite States is vulnerable to psychological warfare aimed at exploiting the deep-rooted resentments that exist in varying degrees throughout the Satellite area. First among these is resentment against the enforced subordination of Satellite national welfare to Soviet interests. Even in Communist circles there is some discontent over the forceful transformation of the economic structure of Eastern Europe to fit into Soviet master-plans, the lowering of standards of living, and the failure of the USSR to meet the industrial needs of the Satellite economies. In addition, there will be for many years lasting resentment on the part of leaders and members of the various religious organizations (particularly on the part of the Catholic Church) currently under attack in the Soviet campaign to neutralize religious influence through-

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out the Satellite States. A third form of strong anti-Soviet feeling is the resentment of the peasantry against the initial steps that have been taken and especially against the blueprint for eventual widespread collectivization of agriculture. All these sources of dissatisfaction with Soviet domination blend in with the strong undercurrent of national sentiment that opposes foreign control simply because it is foreign. Moscow-managed purges of the Satellite Communist parties indicate the Kremlin's awareness of the dangers inherent in Eastern European nationalism, but the basic causes of discontent will be augmented rather than eradicated in this control-tightening process. A rupture of Soviet controls, therefore, would permit widespread anti-Soviet activities.

Albania, by virtue of its exposed geographical position and the relative instability of the present regime, is the most vulnerable of the Satellite States to Western efforts to loosen the Soviet grip in Eastern Europe. Poland, with 95 percent of its population Catholic, and with the unquenchable nationalism of the Polish people making itself felt even in the highest councils of the local Communist Party, probably is most vulnerable to psychological pressures and may well be the most enduring source of disaffection in Eastern Europe. On the other side of the scale, Rumania, where Soviet control already is virtually complete, is least likely to break away from the Soviet yoke until liberation is a fact rather than a hopeful prospect.

#### 9. The Far Eastern Satellites.

Outer Mongolia and northern Korea are proof against any outside pressure short of clearly impending Soviet defeat. In that extremity, Korean nationalism might assert itself, but only under the protection of Allied forces.

#### 10. The Position of Communist China.

The Chinese Communist regime is in a position to pursue a comparatively independent policy, but it is firmly aligned with the USSR and would prove a reliable ally in the event of war during 1950-51.

Mao Tse-tung and his group have come to power mainly by their own efforts in a "revolutionary situation" (not as a result of Soviet military occupation and police control, except in Manchuria). The regime has been able, initially, to capitalize upon the force of Chinese nationalism, and in China proper it still controls the armed forces, the police, the media of internal propaganda, and the machinery of administration. In such outlying areas as Manchuria and Sinkiang, however, Soviet influence is strong. The influx of Soviet technical advisers in time may establish effective Soviet control over the whole of China. Nevertheless, the process cannot move too rapidly or too obviously without arousing Chinese national resentment and encountering serious resistance, including resistance from the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists are genuine



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Communists. They respect the revolutionary leadership of the Kremlin and the powerful support of the USSR. They are pledged by the terms of the 1950 treaty of alliance to support the USSR in war. In all probability China will remain through 1951 a willing ally of the USSR.

On this basis, the resources and facilities of China would be freely available to the USSR in the event of war, and China would become the belligerent ally of the USSR if Soviet policy were to require it. Strictly strategic considerations would not necessarily lead to such a requirement, particularly if Soviet strategy in the Far East were defensive. Given the nature of Soviet control in Manchuria and North Korea, the USSR already holds an adequate defensive position confronting Japan. In fact a friendly, non-belligerent China would serve to cover an extensive Soviet front, while a co-belligerent China might prove a strategic liability.

Despite these considerations, the USSR probably would require China to enter the war as a categorical act of political loyalty. Moreover, the Chinese themselves might be tempted to engage in imperialistic adventures, particularly in Hong Kong, Macao, and Southeast Asia, aiming to take advantage of the attenuation of the anti-Communist military position in the Far East that would probably develop as a result of war in Europe.

In this event, the actual benefits the USSR would gain from Chinese belligerency might be severely limited by the vulnerability of the Peiping regime to external propaganda attack, which might well be supported by internal subversive activities. The most profitable theme for such an attack on the Peiping regime would be the contention that China's involvement in war was a result of the Peiping regime's subjection to foreign control. Popular acceptance of the Chinese Communist regime has been based in part on the promise of peace to an utterly war-weary people. There are already suggestions of dissatisfaction with the degree of Soviet control in China, particularly in the Chinese border areas of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. The combination of war-weariness and powerful anti-foreign sentiment on the part of the Chinese populace would constitute a serious weakness in the event China found itself at war on the side of the USSR. This weakness could be exploited effectively to neutralize the Peiping regime's war effort, especially if, in the meantime, Soviet economic relations with China had operated in such a way as to convince the Chinese that they were being exploited for the advantage of the USSR.

The facts of economic life in the USSR and China will strongly incline the Kremlin to drive hard commercial bargains, as it has in Eastern Europe, and to sacrifice Chinese domestic welfare to long-range Soviet plans. At the same time, the Peiping regime itself will have incurred considerable hostility from the peasantry, on which its strength hitherto

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has been based, if it proceeds seriously with Communist schemes for industrialization and the development of an urban proletariat. As a result of all these factors, China probably would be one of the most vulnerable elements in the Soviet camp in the event of war in 1951.

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## NATIONS PRECARIOUSLY ALIGNED

11. Southeast Asia.

The situation in Southeast Asia is precarious, particularly so in Indochina and Burma. A Communist triumph in either of those countries would have repercussions throughout the region. Conversely, a stabilization of the situation in those countries would have stabilizing influence elsewhere.

The situation is most critical in Indochina, where a nationalist insurrection under Communist leadership is well established. If the Vietnamese can be convinced that the Bao Dai regime can achieve a real rather than a counterfeit independence, and that the Communist alternative involves subservience to the USSR or to China, that situation may yet be saved. The time for action is short, however, and the possibility remains that all or most of Indochina will have passed under Communist control by July 1951.

In Burma there is complex civil strife verging upon anarchy, a condition propitious for the advancement of Communism regardless of the outcome in Indochina. Thailand probably will accommodate itself to the prevailing force, whether Western or Soviet, but would hesitate to take any action involving risk and probably would not become an active belligerent in any case. The status of Malaya will depend mainly on the status of British power in the area, but police control of the local Communists would become much more difficult if Communist influence became entrenched in Thailand.

The most powerful political force in Southeast Asia, however, is not Communism, but an intense nationalism directed initially against European imperialism. Communism has flourished mainly because of its identification with this force. By the same token, were Communism to become identified with Chinese imperialism, or, more remotely, with Soviet imperialism, the force of nationalism could be turned against Communism.

12. Yugoslavia.

The Tito regime in Yugoslavia occupies an awkward and precarious position as the only Communist regime to reject the role of Satellite and survive. In political theory and to some extent in foreign policy, Yugoslavia exists in a limbo between orthodox Stalinist-Communist society and the capitalist world.

The USSR is seeking actively to overthrow the Tito regime, having hammered home in its propaganda the theme that Tito has become a "Fascist tool" of "Western imperialism." Probably the USSR will be able to prevent the spread of the Titoist heresy to other areas within the Soviet sphere, but if defection threatened to spread, especially in the Satellite area, where the theory of independent Communism would have considerable appeal, the USSR might resort to extreme measures to destroy the Tito government. It is more probable that the USSR will stop short of direct military aggression, and that Tito will succeed in maintaining and consolidating his position against all subversive efforts.

Even though it has become an anathema to Moscow, the Tito regime still finds that ideological considerations prevent open alliance with the Western Powers. Tito's aspiration ultimately to establish an independent Communist power-grouping is reflected in recent Yugoslav preoccupation with the status of Mao Tse-tung in China and Ho Chi Minh in Indochina.

An outbreak of general hostilities probably would find Yugoslavia still trying to follow a policy of neutrality, but Soviet pressure and Yugoslavia's need for economic assistance probably would have brought Tito into a comparatively close association with the West. In any event, if attacked by the USSR, the Yugoslavs would offer stubborn resistance.

### 13. Germany.

The German people in general, including those in the Soviet zone of Eastern Germany, are strongly anti-Communist. Nevertheless, they are acutely conscious of the partition of Germany, the subordination of their national interests in the current great-power conflict, and the exposed position Germany would occupy in the event of war. Distressed by these circumstances, many Germans are inclined to play the USSR and the Western Powers off against one another in an effort to reunite Germany, restore its strength, and achieve a relatively independent position in international affairs.

Despite the considerable popular appeal of a policy openly directed toward rebuilding a strong, independent Germany, the present West German Government, probably because Rhineland-Catholic influence is dominant in it, is predisposed to participate fully and cooperatively in the Western European community. Moreover, the main (Socialist) opposition group also is irrevocably anti-Soviet. This common inclination toward a Western alignment is reinforced by dependence on the United States for dollar aid and for protection against Soviet aggression. Integration with the West, however, presents difficult problems, particularly in relation to French apprehensions regarding a resurgent Germany. In these matters -- control of the Ruhr and the Saar, level of industry, freedom of trade, rearmament -- the Germans will demand equality of consideration as free and equal members of the community.

Few Germans have any illusions regarding the puppet character of the East German Government. On that account it cannot compete with that of West Germany as a means of achieving national independence. The USSR, however, holds potentially important leverage in its power to bargain more effectively than the West regarding the reunification of Germany. It can also offer access to former German markets in the East. Few Germans would willingly pay the price of subservience to the USSR in order to gain these benefits. Some, however, are capable of entertaining the illusion that a reunited Germany could hold its own in partnership with the USSR. To the extent that the West Germans are frustrated and disillusioned by their relations with the West, and are unable to solve pressing economic problems, the number willing to take this gamble will increase.

The fate of Berlin has important bearing on the general situation. So long as the Western Powers remain there, they will retain some identification with the concept of Germany as a whole. Moreover, their stand in Berlin has become a symbol of their will and ability to protect Western Germany. Regardless of the actual situation, Western withdrawal from Berlin probably would be taken to signify not only that the partition of Germany was final so far as the West was concerned but also that the West lacked the will or ability to protect even Western Germany. Such conclusions would be a powerful stimulus toward accommodation with the USSR for the sake of personal and local security as well as national unity.

In sum, the probability is that the West German Government will remain aligned with the West, and the East German Government with the East. The alignment of the German people, however, will depend on their confidence in the eventual acceptance of Germany into full membership in the Western community and in the power of the West to protect them from the USSR. German opinion as a whole in the event of war is likely to be disorganized and semi-paralyzed in the effort to calculate national and personal interests under the stress of wartime.

#### 14. Austria.

Communism is a less effective force in Austria than in Germany. The only serious vulnerability of the fundamental Austrian inclination toward an open alliance with the West would be the considerable sense of hopelessness concerning the possibility of military resistance to the USSR.

#### 15. Japan.

In the event of war before July 1951, the Japanese, acutely conscious of the vulnerability of their position, would be forced to look to the United States for protection. If assured of effective support, they would willingly take an active part in the war in the hope of regaining their position as a major power. If denied such a role, their attitude might become passive.

ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS16. The North Atlantic Treaty States.

The nations adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Portugal, with their overseas possessions) would honor their commitments in the event of war although most of them will press the US to make every reasonable concession to avoid war. The effectiveness of their resistance would depend upon considerations of morale as well as organization and armament. The morale factor is likely to be critically weak with respect to the continental states directly exposed to Soviet attack in force. For the short term under consideration, the means of resistance available to them will be strictly limited, and they will be acutely conscious of their vulnerability. Their determination cannot be sustained by promises of eventual liberation and ultimate victory, but will depend on confidence in prompt and decisive military support.

Militant Communist elements in these states must be expected to serve as an active fifth column supporting the Soviet attack. Their strength is estimated at approximately 200,000 in Italy, 70,000 in France, 13,000 in Belgium, and 9,000 in the Netherlands. The numbers who could be expected to engage in open violence, however, would be less, and, unless they received prompt Soviet military support, they could probably be controlled. With respect to Norway and Denmark, local Communist capabilities are limited to espionage and sporadic sabotage. In Portugal the Communist organization is small and ineffective.

Except for Indochina (see 11 above), the colonial territories of the North Atlantic Treaty powers are generally secure, although Communist guerrilla activity continues in Malaya and there is some unrest in French North Africa, British West Africa, Cyprus, Eritrea, Madagascar, Macao, and Hong Kong.

17. Other Recipients of US Military Aid.

As recipients of US military aid, Greece, Turkey, Iran, southern Korea, and the Philippines look to the United States for support and protection against Soviet aggression. In common discretion, however, none would be willing to take any action on behalf of the United States deemed likely to precipitate an otherwise avoidable Soviet attack upon itself. Thus, if the USSR chose to direct its offensive effort elsewhere, each would wish to remain non-belligerent. The Turks, however, who strongly believe in the inevitability of Soviet attack or envelopment, could be expected to be cautiously cooperative with the West. In all probability each of these nations (with the possible exception of the Philippines) would be attacked immediately on

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the outbreak of war, in which case each would defend itself as best it could while calling for US aid. Military weaknesses, not psychological weaknesses, would determine the duration of resistance.

18. The American Republics.

The other American republics would be aligned with the United States in various degrees of effective cooperation. The Rio Treaty requires: (1) immediate assistance to an American state attacked in the Western Hemisphere as defined, the form of assistance to be whatever each other state deems appropriate; (2) consultation regarding appropriate action in the event of an attack on an American state outside of the Hemisphere. Thus co-belligerence is not required, and wide variation may exist in the action taken by various states. Some (e.g., Brazil) would be disposed to accept active military roles. None of the American republics would favor the USSR.

19. The Arab States.

The British treaties of alliance with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq would be operative in the event of war before July 1951. Egypt and Iraq have shown, in the past, a disposition to repudiate this alliance, but in any case, the British would utilize their bases and forces actually in the three countries as the occasion required. There might be popular disturbances in Egypt and Iraq, but it is probable that those governments could control the internal situation and that they would render at least passive support to Great Britain. There is no question about Jordan, which is dependent on the British for its existence. Saudi Arabia would expect the United States to defend Dhahran and would cooperate to the limited extent that Arabian capabilities permitted. Syria and Lebanon are too weak to pursue an independent policy and probably would adopt a passive role in alignment with the West. The Arab states in general would provide comparatively little military strength for the area under any circumstances, but they would align themselves with the West in preference to the USSR.

20. Commonwealth Nations Other than India and Pakistan.

Although the other Commonwealth governments are not committed in any way by the adherence of the United Kingdom and Canada to the North Atlantic Treaty in the event of Soviet military aggression, prompt belligerent support of the UK probably would be given by Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ceylon.

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NATIONS INITIALLY NEUTRAL21. India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan probably would remain non-belligerent for the time being, although otherwise cooperative. They would expect Commonwealth support if they should be themselves directly threatened, and would resist Soviet or Chinese attack.

22. Indonesia.

Although the solution was long delayed and its viability has yet to be tested fully, Indonesia, like India, appears to be working toward a constructive solution of the Asiatic colonial problem. Had Indonesian nationalism been frustrated as in Indochina, Indonesia probably would have been rendered as vulnerable to Communism. Indonesian aspirations being satisfied, the continued alignment of the area with the West is probable, if not assured. Indonesian policy will probably parallel that of India, for similar reasons rather than because of Indian influence. In both countries, the fundamental weaknesses are economic rather than psychological. The basic drive is toward an independent status, wherein the urgent problems of national economic development can be worked out.

23. Finland.

The Finnish people are stubbornly anti-Soviet, but Finland is in no position to defy the USSR. The Finnish Government, therefore, without repudiating the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance treaty, would seek to remain neutral, or at least to avoid Soviet occupation of Finnish territory. The Finns would not willingly assist the USSR, and, if Soviet forces entered their territory without express permission, they would fight. In any case, Soviet forces entering Finland would be in hostile territory.

24. Other European Neutrals: Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, and Spain.

Sweden and Switzerland are ideologically anti-Soviet, but both cling to a traditional neutrality in the hope of avoiding Soviet attack. If attacked, both would resist to their utmost ability.

The government and people of Ireland are strongly anti-Soviet in sentiment, but the government is disposed to make any formal alignment with the North Atlantic Treaty Powers conditional upon the cession of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland.

The Franco regime is conspicuously anti-Soviet, but is ideologically unacceptable to Western Europe. In the event of war, Spain, having no wish or hope for accommodation with the USSR, would seize any occasion to escape from isolation and enter a defensive alliance with the Atlantic Powers, but might remain non-belligerent unless attacked.



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25. Israel.

Israel's position is one of deliberate neutrality between the East and West. Western ties are actually predominant, however, and, if Israel were compelled to take sides, it would align itself with the West.

26. Afghanistan.

In dangerous proximity to the USSR and remote from succor, Afghanistan would remain neutral unless attacked, in which case effective resistance could not be prolonged.

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