

Document No. 001NO CHANGE in Class. ~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

IM-37

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

29 June 1948

Date: 19/10/77 By: 011

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cominform resolution denouncing Marshal Tito and the other top Yugoslav Communists may represent a desperate attempt by the Kremlin to discipline Tito and restore strict international Communist control over the more nationalist Yugoslav Communist Party. For the first time, the Kremlin has been obliged to discipline a national Communist Party which controls all the instruments of power in the state. Normal Communist Party channels apparently have proved ineffectual and the Kremlin has been forced to the distasteful necessity of airing publicly a Soviet-Satellite disagreement. Moreover, through its public denunciation of Tito, the USSR has confronted Yugoslavia with the immediate necessity of determining its future relationship with the Soviet bloc.

Although the possibility exists that Tito and his associates are in Soviet custody and that the Cominform resolution was designed to explain his fall from power and complete the destruction of his prestige, the best available information indicates that Tito and his clique are still in control in Yugoslavia. It is unlikely that the Kremlin would have called upon the Cominform if it could have disposed of Tito from within. Moreover, such a coup within the Yugoslav Communist Party would probably not have been preceded by any publicity.

In determining their reaction to the Cominform action, the accused Yugoslav Communists are faced with the realization that they can make no statement which will permanently heal the breach between them and the Kremlin. Complete admission of guilt by Tito and his lieutenants would not only do little toward lessening the Kremlin's determination eventually to eliminate them but would probably accelerate the process. On the other hand, Tito is probably reluctant to risk at this time a complete break with the Kremlin by flatly denying the Cominform accusations.

Consequently, Tito's most probable immediate reaction will be to issue a temporizing statement in order to postpone a final decision. In the interim, Tito can be expected to (1) take steps to consolidate his position within Yugoslavia; (2) extend cautious feelers to determine Western reaction if Yugoslavia should withdraw from the Soviet bloc;

JUN 29 1948  
ORE-9By hand TB  
TB Dir 29/6~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

and (c) attempt to drive a bargain with the Kremlin which will grant Yugoslavia greater autonomy within the Soviet bloc while simultaneously delaying effective Soviet retaliation.

The Tito-Stalin rift will probably have no significant effect on the other Satellites immediately. The Communist regimes in eastern Europe are firmly under Moscow control and are dominated by old-line Communists trained in Moscow. In Yugoslavia, however, the Communist Party has its roots within the country and has no internationalists of the stature of Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Pauker in Rumania, Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, or Berman in Poland. These "internationalists" can effectively control any attempts by "nationalist" elements to emulate Tito. Moreover, the Kremlin will probably tighten its security controls over the other Satellites in order to prevent a recurrence of Tito's deviation.

R. H. HILLBROOKETTER  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

17095