

Scope

The third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization took place in Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963. Attached is a working paper which describes the events and results of the conference emphasizing the position of the AAPSO in the international Communist movement and particularly the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict on its policies and organization. It should be noted that the scope of ~~the~~ AAPSO interests and activities now extends to Latin America as well as Africa, the Near East and the Far East.

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The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference

I. Introduction

Delegations representing 54 anti-imperialist nationalist movements and revolutionary parties from the countries of Asia and Africa, along with 72 observers including European and Latin American members of international Communist fronts, met at Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963. This was the third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The Organization's first conference, held in Cairo (December 1957-January 1958), legitimized the Sino-Soviet presence in the ^{Near}~~the~~ East and Africa. The second conference, which met in Conakry, ~~Guinea~~ in April 1960, assured Communist control of the organization. This third conference at Moshi brought a confrontation between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets in their respective efforts to dominate the AAPSO. This confrontation, however, was effected within the framework of a common mutual determination to hold the organization together and to a shared desire to maintain solidarity - at least in the short run - on the basis of a least common denominator - the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and Western imperialism led by the United States. But ^{the} ultimate determination of each to control ^{the organization} was equally evident. ^{Instances} ~~Evidences~~ of Sino-Soviet conflict were most obvious in those issues which bore on the relative importance of peaceful coexistence and militant liberation, anti-colonial struggle in the war against the imperialists, particularly regarding the World Peace Council's relation to the AAPSO. This conflict was ^{also apparent} ~~equally evident~~ - if much less obvious - in proposals for organizational changes by which both the Chinese and Soviets attempted to add to their supporters on the two major policy-making bodies of the organization, i. e. the Executive Committee and the Permanent Secretariat. On these issues both the Chinese ^{the} and Soviet delegations initially took strong positions from which they retreated

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to compromise stand~~ing~~ whenever it became apparent that an open breach and organizational ~~confrontation~~^{split} might develop. In general the final resolutions and organizational changes reflected a substantial net gain for the Chinese in ^{the} AAPSO leadership and program lines.

~~Evidence~~^{Signs} that ~~lines~~^{preparations} were being ~~drawn~~^{made} for a Sino-Soviet ~~confrontation~~^{struggle} were apparent from the earliest ~~preparations~~^{my days} for the ~~coming~~ conference. Not only was it important to find a suitable locale but also to convene the conference at a time acceptable to both of the major Communist participants. During the 13 months taken up in preparing for the conference both the Chinese and the Soviets were actively working to bring about conditions which would prove advantageous to their respective positions and add strength to their respective support among the ~~participating~~ delegations.

II. Preparations for the Conference

Preparations for the conference had been under way since the Gaza meeting of the AAPSO Executive Committee in December 1961. First, difficulties were encountered in finding a suitable locale for the meeting. Casablanca was initially suggested because of the importance of the Algerian situation. However, this ~~proposal~~^{proposal} was at the request of Mehdi Ben Barka, who felt that the presence of the King, "an ally of imperialism" would be embarrassing not only to the UNFP and the UMT but to the conference. Ben Barka was undoubtedly aware at this time (June 1962) that a confrontation between the UNFP and the King was inevitable. Moreover, increasing Communist interest in the liberation movements of East Africa made ~~it~~^{that} desirable ~~the holding of~~^{to be held} the third AAPSO conference in that area. Serious consideration was given to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Dar es-Salaam as possible locations, and missions from the AAPSO Secretariat were dispatched in early 1962 to all three cities. In Addis Ababa the AAPSO emissaries were at first given encouragement by Mekasha Getachew, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ethiopian government, who had

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been a Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1, higher authorities of the Ethiopian government turned down the proposition to hold the conference in Ethiopia, and Addis was eliminated. The governments of Somalia and Tanganyika both approved the holding of the conference in their countries. The final choice of Tanganyika, however, was apparently based primarily on the active support given to the AAPSO planners by Oscar Kambona, Secretary General of TANU and Home Minister of the Tanganyika government. Other factors which probably influenced the decision were the strategic location of Tanganyika adjacent to the most important colonial territories left in East Africa and recognition of the difficulties that might easily arise if the conference were forced to take a stand on the controversial "greater Somalia issue", a virtually inescapable problem if the conference were held in Mogadiscio.

Formal approval from the Tanganyikan Republic for the holding of the conference was received in Cairo in July. Although the conference was originally scheduled for the summer of 1962 in order to comply with stipulations of the AAPSO by-laws directing a conference to be held "every two years," further delays occurred. Long-drawn-out negotiations ensued between the host party, TANU, and AAPSO officials over technical arrangements. These delays were welcomed if not encouraged by the Soviet contingent within the AAPSO, who had been vigorously attempting to forestall Chinese and Japanese demands for an early June-July conference date. In retrospect it seems likely that the Soviet reluctance for an immediate confrontation with the Chinese in the framework of the AAPSO was inspired in part by their hopes of outflanking the Chinese by enhancing the influence of the WPC in the national liberation groups of Africa and Asia through the Moscow Disarmament Conference in July. A number of new peace committees in Africa were in fact formed; the WPC claimed nine in October. Furthermore, Soviet preparations for the Cuban venture were certainly under way at this time. It is therefore likely, particularly in view of their previous experience with the Chinese and Albanians on the Berlin issue, that the Soviets were concerned that the Chinese might exploit the projected Russian maneuvers over Cuba in the infighting within the Communist movement and its fronts.

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Although a mid-November date for the AAPSO conference had tentatively been set, the Russian withdrawal from Cuba and the Sino-Indian border war ^{in July} were accompanied by ^{forced} further postponements, and it was not until 4 February 1963 that the conference actually convened.

During the summer months ^{of 1962} the invitation list for the Tanganyika conference was the source of repeated dissension within the AAPSO Secretariat. The bone of contention was the question ~~of~~ whether or not to include observers from the World Peace Council and Eastern European groups. The Tanganyikan government had stipulated that observers ^{should} not be invited from European countries. This policy was in complete agreement with the Chinese position ^{in favor} of eliminating observers from both the Soviet-backed World Peace Council and European bloc countries. The issue was hotly argued in the Secretariat, where sides were taken, with the Chinese supported by Japan and Indonesia lined up against the USSR, UAR, and India. The latter group was given some support by the secretaries from Cameroun, Uganda, Algeria, and Iraq. The ^{result} ~~argument~~ ^{was} ~~resulted~~ in an uneasy compromise whereby 12 WPC observers were invited but all Eastern European representatives were banned. (An East German group eventually turned up at Moshi where they had no official status but occupied themselves busily making contacts with African leaders).

In contrast to the dissension over the question of Eastern European representation at the conference, proposals ^{for} Latin American observer representation caused little trouble. Invitations were dispatched to Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party of British Guiana, and to Cuba via the Cuban Ambassador in Cairo. Other Latin American observers from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil were included in the WPC delegation.

There was little disagreement concerning invitations to delegates who had attended previous AAPSO conferences. In fact, the only major problem ^{in this category} concerned Osende Afana, Cameroun Secretary at the AAPSO Secretariat, who had recently

been denied a re-entry visa by the UAR, ^{and whose} ~~his~~ seat in Cairo was being filled on a temporary basis by Aloys-Marie Ndjog. Inasmuch as Ndjog represented the Accra ^{-based} pro-Soviet wing of the UPC and Osende Afana the Conakry-based pro-Chinese UPC faction, the Chinese supported Osende's accreditation to the Tanganyika conference while the Soviets sponsored Ndjog. A compromise ^{first} suggested by the UAR, was finally reached ^{with the} ~~to~~ decision to invite both. Invitations to new applicants for AAPSO membership were separated into two categories; those who represented countries not heretofore represented at AAPSO meetings and those who applied from countries already represented at AAPSO meetings by other organizations. ^(candidate list in) The first group roused little friction; ^{decisions} ~~action~~ concerning the second group ^{were} ~~was~~ deferred for ^{consideration by} ~~attention of~~ the credentials committee at the conference.

III. Conference Management

With the conference actually under way the Chinese and Soviet leadership immediately started jockeying for position. It was apparent to each group that the mechanics of the conference, i. e. the make-up and responsibilities of committees, the methods of reaching decisions, and the accreditation of delegations and observers, would have a substantial bearing on the relative success of their respective positions on major issues. It is not surprising therefore that conflicts arose from the first day.

When the conference opened at Moshi on 4 February, problems of accreditation caused the first on-the-spot confrontation between the Chinese and Soviet delegations. In all cases, even when Soviet supporters outnumbered the Chinese bloc, the Chinese ^{were apparently successful in exercising a veto.} ~~position won out.~~

The first case concerned the Turkish representative Nazim Hikmet. His application for accreditation was supported by the Soviet Union, Egypt, and India but was strongly opposed by Communist China, Japan, and Indonesia. The Chinese refused even to grant observer status to Hikmet. Later, when the issue of observer participation at committee meetings was raised at the

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political committee, India again proposed that Hikmet be allowed to participate. The Chinese, however, opposed this too, and it was apparently ^{on this precedent} for this reason that no observers were allowed at committee meetings.

Another problem of accreditation was caused by the arrival of Samin Khan of Pakistan in place of Miraj Khalid, Secretary General of the Pakistan Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Samin Khan, a known friend of China, was also under suspicion by the Indians as having been sent ^{by the Pakistani} government to raise the Kashmir issue at the conference. Strong Chinese pressure, however, prevailed against a Soviet-Egyptian-Indian coalition, and on the third day of the meeting Samin Khan was allowed to take the floor.

The last accreditation issue concerned the Singapore-Malaya delegation. This group, led by C. Devan Nair, on arriving at Moshi submitted an application for AAPSO membership and delegate status at the conference. The Chinese ^{apparently} realized that the Nair contingent was planning to oppose conference condemnation of the projected Malaysian Federation, ^{decided to oppose} their ~~any~~ appearance at the conference, ~~of the Malaysians~~. Although the Malayan application was sympathetically received by the Soviet, Egyptian, Indian, and Tanganyikan representatives, the Chinese forced a rejection of the Malayan application.

Problems of accreditation finally having been resolved, the conference got under way with a membership completely under Communist control. The most significant difference, however, between the situation at Moshi ^{and} ~~as~~ ^{at} ~~against~~ previous conferences lay in the relatively small impact on the conference of all delegations save those from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Although some of the African and Asian groups favored one or the other of the two giants, and even were used by them, all important issues were fought out by the Soviet and the Chinese. Moreover, it soon became clear that Chinese intransigence in most instances ^{was} forcing ^{ing} the Russians to retreat in order to prevent an open breach in the organization.

The make-up of the national delegations was generally similar to that of the first two Afro-Asian conferences, i. e. leaders of national revolutionary anti-imperialist parties. There were, however, several significant differences. In view of the great number of countries which gained independence since the Conakry meeting of 1960 many of the delegations, e. g. Cameroun, Niger, Nigeria, represented parties in opposition to their own governments. Another notable change was the weakening of ~~a few~~ ^{some} delegations due to death or illness of strong leaders. (For example, John Kale of Uganda died in 1960, Felix Roland Mournie of Cameroun died in 1960, and Fouad Galal of the UAR was unable to come because of illness.) There were also notable absentees from countries ^{whose} ~~where~~ ruling parties are (either strongly pro-West or ~~discourage~~ discourage participation in Communist-controlled meetings, e. g. Afghanistan, Bahrein, Burma, Cambodia, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Upper Volta, Laos, Libya, ^PPhilippines, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand, and Togo.

Conference business was conducted through plenary sessions and meetings of: ^(a) the council, composed of heads of delegations; ^(b) the 5 special committees, i. e. political committee, economic committee, social committee, cultural committee, and organizational committee; ~~the~~ executive ^(c) bureau and the drafting committee.

The council met twice. Its first session, on the eve of the conference, elected Oscar Kambona, secretary general of the host political party, TANU, ~~the~~ chairman of the conference. It approved the agenda, elected a drafting committee, and approved applications for AAPSO membership of the National Liberation Front of Bahrein, Bechuanaland People's Party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique, Mauritius People's Progressive Party, Swaziland Progressive Party, South Vietnam Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, and the French Somaliland Party of the Popular Movement.

The council met again on the last day of the conference, when it approved (the resolutions submitted to it without discussion). Finally it elected three new members to the executive committee: South Africa, Ceylon, and Tanganyika.

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The election of the drafting committee was particularly important. This committee was originally intended to be responsible only for final drafting of resolutions passed by other committees but in actual fact it was here that all major issues were fought out and resolutions put into final form. It is noteworthy in this connection that the drafting committee at the Moscow Disarmament Conference (July 1962) was similarly used as a device for blocking the submission of ~~committee-approved~~ resolutions to the plenum, apparently to avert a series of ~~confrontations~~ in the plenary meeting. The following delegates were elected to the drafting committee:

Tanganyika	Oscar Kambona
	Bhoke Munanka
Guinea	Abdoulaye Diallo
	Camara Mamady
South Africa	Oliver Tambo
	Tennyson Makiwane
Morocco	Mehdi Ben Barka
Egypt	Yussuf el-Sibai
	Mursi Saad al-Din
Indonesia	Sunito
	Ibrahim Issa
India	Chaman Lall (on the Sino-Indian issue only)
	Romesh Chandra
China	Yang Chi
	Yang Chou
North Vietnam	Ton Quang Phiet
Soviet Union	D. Dolidze
	Anatoli Sofronov
	Murzo Tursun Zade

The significance of this committee to the council leadership is apparent from the membership, which, in addition to representatives of the Soviet Union .

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and China, includes the staunchest supporters of the two major participants.

(E. g. Indonesia, Guinea, North Vietnam for China; India, Egypt, South Africa for the USSR. Inasmuch as the tenor of the final resolutions generally followed the Chinese desires it is probable that Morocco and Tanganyika also supported the Chinese on occasion in this committee.) Subsequent events suggest that the Soviets were satisfied if the language of a resolution gave them a basis for "interpreting" the resolution later to their advantage. This was the case with WPC's exploitation of the general resolution in ^{The WPC's general resolution adopted in} March ^{at Moscow, Sweden.}

The 5 regular committees were also tightly controlled by the conference leadership. Theoretically, participation in committee meetings was open to all delegates but in practice only the major delegations took part. It is also notable that no votes were taken at committee sessions and although initial drafting of resolutions was supposed to be done by an executive group selected by each committee, it was actually accomplished by the committee chairman and the two members of the permanent secretariat assigned to each committee.

The plenary sessions and meetings of the five conference committees took up the bulk of the conference time. In the course of these meetings the areas of differences and solidarity were pinpointed. It became apparent that while there was in fact unanimity concerning the final objective, i. e. liquidation of neo-colonialism and western imperialism sparked and headed by the United States, the conflicts of Sino-Soviet opinions were here as elsewhere over the choice of methods and the proper allies to achieve this end. In the confrontations on key issues where differences between the Chinese and Soviet viewpoints were apparently not negotiable, it is significant that while a few delegates uncritically supported either the Chinese or Soviet position at all times, there were obvious efforts on the part of many active delegates, e. g. those of Morocco, Tanganyika, North Vietnam, to mediate and "paper the cracks" in order to hold the organization together.

The plenary sessions were devoted almost entirely to speeches by heads of delegations. For the most part these speeches combined the well-known themes of anti-neocolonialism and Afro-Asian solidarity with appropriate diatribes against western imperialism. However, some exceptional ones treated key issues seriously and meaningfully.

IV. Significant Speeches

The opening speech of the conference was delivered by President Nyerere of Tanganyika. It was intended to be a keynote address but apparently it failed to provoke any visible reaction. In fact it seemed to appeal to no one. To most of the Africans, who either represented parties in opposition to their own governments or supported such parties in other countries and who have long looked to the AAPSO for assistance, such phrases as "no one of us should try to do what we so justly accuse the Imperialists of doing, intrigue with dissident groups," were unacceptable. This same group, ^{Although familiar with Marxist propaganda} ~~in spite of their familiarity with Marxist propaganda and ideological writings,~~ ^{seemed to find} ~~ostensibly found~~ such anti-Marxist concepts as "we shall find a division with capitalist and socialist countries in both sides of the conflict" strange and incomprehensible. These thoughts clearly at odds with Communist doctrine were also anathema to the sophisticated delegates who are members of African and Asian Communist Parties, as well as to the Chinese and Soviets but no protests were offered. Certain anti-Soviet statements, e. g. "Socialist countries themselves are now committing the same crime as was committed by the capitalists before... They are now beginning to use wealth... for the acquisition of power and prestige" were certainly infuriating to the Russians and their allies, although the Chinese bloc may have derived some satisfaction from them. In any event the visible impact of the speech was minimal. Representative Africans claimed not to have heard any attack on the Communist bloc and suggested that such an interpretation was merely an attempt of the imperialists to misinterpret Nyerere. Both the Chinese and the Soviets greeted the address in silence and quietly swept it under the rug. It contrasted sharply with the speech delivered by Mehdi Ben Barka of Morocco which was more in tune with the organization's mission and the conference aims. Ben Barka's speech can therefore be considered for practical purposes the true keynote address.

This address attempted to "draw the lines of action and to define the precise objectives' of the AAPSO role in the struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialism. It suggested tactics for the AAPSO necessitated by the

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"new strategy of neo-colonialism" i. e. Western efforts to maintain economic control over politically independent states. (Ben Barka) emphasizing the urgency of drawing a sharp line between the true revolutionaries and all others in the national liberation movement, pointed out the vital importance of giving international support to progressive forces on the national level and called for unity of progressive organizations in each country engaged in the battle for "complete" independence. "The role of an organization such as ours," he said "... is to allow a confrontation to take place." Furthermore he pointed out that in view of current imperialist tactics in newly independent countries "it is necessary to know if the holders of the power are the expression of national will or the stooges of colonialist interests." He concluded that the fundamental question of any national liberation movement is that of who controls political power. "It deems necessary in order to guarantee independence that power be immediately translated by an effective and immediate transference to the authentic representatives of the national revolution of the said country, even if this leads to the resumption of armed struggle."

"The AAPSO" he continued, "in its capacity as a movement for solidarity among Afro-Asian peoples, must pay special attention to the daily struggle underway to educate and teach the people, raise their political consciousness, and build up among men such a revolutionary potential that, at the right time, they could seize power."

Ben Barka clearly set the primary objective of all tactical operations in the national struggles when he said that the common struggle of popular organizations against all forms of colonial, capitalist, and feudalist exploitations was through struggle to "develop this common political consciousness and establish new international relations."

The Chinese and Soviet delegates in their addresses to the plenary session made statements that showed clearly the points upon which what solidarity exists in the organization is based. They also raised issues,

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however, which were mutually unacceptable and which ^{are} ~~must~~ inevitably ^{be} ~~lead~~ ^{confrontations} ~~to~~. The consistent statements related generally to the objectives of the organization, i. e. , bringing about of complete independence under the leadership of the "progressive forces" at the national level and the liquidation of neo-colonialism in all its forms. The inconsistent areas of Sino-Soviet statements, however, concerned primarily questions of ^{general strategy} ~~tactics~~ and methods of operations.

For example, Mirza Tursun Zade said, "peace between nations and states - peaceful coexistence - creates especially favorable conditions for development and successful completion of the national liberation movement of colonial and dependent countries." LIU Ning-yi on the other hand declared: "In order effectively to defend world peace we must carry on ^{resolute} ~~resolution~~ struggles against imperialist policies of war and aggression. Peace cannot be obtained by begging... only by resolutely struggling against imperialism will we be able to pave the way for the realization of disarmament."

Both these addresses were well received by the conference but the wildest acclaim went to Dr. José Carrillo who ended his fiery speech with a reiteration of the much publicized Castro slogan, "Cuba Sí... Yankees no. Fatherland or Death. We shall win."

Although this emotional outpouring drew the most enthusiasm, it was in fact the Ben Barka address which was basically the blue print which guided the work of the five conference committees.

V. Conference Committees

These committees dealt with ~~Political, Economic, Cultural, Social, and Organizational~~ questions. On the whole, the successful deliberations were confined to issues on which the entire conference was in agreement, i. e. , the general problems caused by neo-colonialist maneuvers. The political committee endorsed strong resolutions in support of individual liberation movements; the economic committee recommended the establishment of a special committee composed of economic experts from the Afro-Asian countries to study, plan,

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advise, and provide technical assistance to countries embarking on economic planning; the Cultural Committee issued a list of 21 suggestions for Afro-Asian cooperation in the fields of art, literature, science, and other cultural affairs. The most important of these was the proposal to establish, in Tanganyika, an Afro-Asian Solidarity University.

The Committee on Social Questions adopted a number of resolutions on the position of women, including a recommendation that the 2nd Afro-Asian Women's Conference be convened in early 1964. This committee also voiced strong criticisms of the inactivity of the AAPSO in the labor field. The All-African Trade-Union Federation was ~~also~~ criticized for failing to extend its influence. A suggestion that the AAPSO should set up its own labor organization in Africa was vetoed ~~because~~ ^{on account of} the duplication of effort involved, but it was decided to recommend that the AAPSO should support an adviser to supervise the management of the AATUF. (This latter move was rather surprising inasmuch as the AATUF has never acknowledged affiliation with the AAPSO.)

The Committee on Organization passed a number of resolutions concerning the internal organization of the AAPSO, ~~etc.~~ It authorized an increase in the number of secretaries on the Permanent Secretariat from 12 to 14; it nominated the first vice-president of the Solidarity Fund Committee, Mehdi Ben Barka, as co-ordinating secretary between the Fund Committee and the Permanent Secretariat; and it accepted the invitation of Cyprus ^{to play host to} ~~as the locale for~~ the forthcoming session of the Executive Committee.

VI. Sino-Soviet Conflict

There were, however, two ^{specific} problems which arose, one in the Political Committee and one in the Organizational Committee, that opened wide the rift between the Chinese and the Soviets.

Both the Chinese and the Soviets obviously regarded proposals for the settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue as a matter of the greatest

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significance, not only because of the issues involved in the border dispute itself but because of its ^{significance} ~~relevance~~ in the broader context of their differences concerning the global policy to be pursued by the international Communist movement vis-à-vis such governments as that of India. The Chinese and the Soviets, prior to the opening of the conference, had both realized the disruptive potentials of this issue and at times ~~both~~ had hoped to avoid bringing it into the open. Indeed this possibility had caused at least one of the postponements of the opening of the Moshi meeting in the vain hope that a settlement could be reached before the conference convened.

The Indians, however, forced the issue at the first meeting of the political committee when they submitted a draft resolution calling on the conference to approve the Colombo recommendations "without reservation." The Chinese immediately opposed the resolution and contended that the matter should be dropped from the agenda. The Soviets were still loath to have a confrontation on this issue at the conference and it was only when the Indians threatened to walk out that the Soviets took a strong position in favor of the Indian stand. The battle lines were ~~now~~ drawn. Support for the Indians came from the Soviet Union, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Tanganyika. The Chinese were backed by Japan, Indonesia, French Somaliland, Pakistan, Nepal, Angola, Mali, North Korea, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Ceylon and Kenya. The Guinea delegation was divided - Abdoulaye Diallo, a long-time activist in international Communist-front circles, stood with the Soviet bloc, and Camara Mamady, Guinea member of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat, with the Chinese. The Chinese and Indians exchanged strong words, the Chinese contending that if the Indians insisted on raising the issue, they should be prepared for a full discussion ^{including} ~~including~~ the question of Indian acceptance of American and British arms. After lengthy wrangling, the Chinese became silent and this was interpreted as tacit agreement that the resolution go

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through. At the next meeting, however, the Chinese raised the issue again and strongly re^{stated} ~~iterated~~ their ^{view} ~~stand~~ that discussion of this issue had no place at the conference. After further violent argument, the chairman of the Committee, Bhoke Munanka of Tanganyika, suddenly announced that he had withdrawn the draft resolution. In reply Chaman Lall of India challenged the ruling of the chair. He was summarily overruled whereupon he left the room declaring that India was leaving the conference and the organization.

Corridor activity began immediately to bring India back and thus to avoid an open break in the organization. The first to act was Aziz Ben Miloud of Algeria who begged Lall to return and not expose to the world the division in the movement. Chaman Lall and Gopal Singh rejected the Algerian request outright. At this point the conference chiefs were brought into play - Oscar Kambona and Yusuf al-Sibai had a series of conferences with Chaman Lall after which Lall circulated the news that, through the mediation of Kambona and Sibai, the Chinese had agreed to accept the Indian resolution with deletion of the words "without reservation." No confirmation of this agreement, however, came from any other source, although the Egyptians repeatedly insisted that the rift was patched up. The Chinese, on the other hand, were busy during this interval in gaining support for their side and apparently their intransigent position convinced at least the Soviets, Egyptians, and Tanganyikans that should the Indians' stand win, the Chinese would break the conference wide open. It is noteworthy that during these feverish maneuverings Romesh Chandra and Kallimullah, the Indian Communist Party delegates, remained aloof from the whole proceedings.

The compromise formula reportedly devised was a promise to the Indians that a recommendation would be issued by the conference chairman to be distributed separately from the conference resolutions after the closing session.

Whether or not the compromise had been ^{made} in good faith, ~~evidently~~ Lall ^{seemingly} believed it, as he returned to conference activities. When the final resolutions

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were passed, however, the recommendation on India was not among them. Apparently the Chinese forceful tactics had forced the Soviet bloc to retreat.

While this struggle was going on in the political committee an even more significant ~~confrontation~~ ^{dispute} was taking place in the organization committee. The specific issue of this controversy concerned preparations for coordinating the activities of the AAPSO with similar Latin American organizations, and particularly the position of the World Peace Council, in this effort. The fundamental issue, however, was a far broader one involving, in fact, the hegemony of the Soviet Union in the world complex of international Communist fronts.

The confrontation on this issue, in contrast to that of the Sino-Indian border dispute, was not forced upon the conference. It was on the official agenda and both the Chinese and the Soviets were prepared. There had already been two bouts in the struggle, both of which had ended in stalemate.* It is also noteworthy that the chairman of the organization committee at Moshi, Mehdi Ben Barka of Morocco, had led the "mediating" forces at both Gaza and Stockholm.

Ben Barka opened the discussion by reviewing the difficulties encountered at the previous meetings which actually centered on one problem - whether or not the WPC and its affiliates were to sponsor Latin American participation in a projected three-continent conference. He recalled particularly the discussions between the AAPSO delegation and representatives of the WPC, including Latin Americans, at Stockholm which had led to an impasse of 13 months.

*The question of WPC sponsorship of a three-continent conference was fought out at the AAPSO Executive Committee meeting in Gaza (1961) and at the WPC conference in Stockholm (1961).

Ben Barka then offered a compromise device to break the deadlock. He proposed that all previously suggested sponsoring organizations should withdraw their sponsorship. He indicated that the WPC had agreed to withdraw and asked the committee to agree formally to the withdrawal of the AAPSO ~~from~~ sponsorship. He then suggested as an alternative that a preparatory committee, free from all outside patronage and influence, should be set up consisting of representatives from six countries on each continent.

This proposal was apparently accepted by the committee. The chairman suggested that the Afro-Asian delegates when elected should negotiate concerning Latin American participation with General Cárdenas of Mexico. Ben Barka pointed out that inasmuch as the Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace, a meeting of Latin American National Liberation and Peace Organizations which took place in Mexico in 1961, had not established a Permanent Secretariat, General Cárdenas as President of that conference was the logical spokesman for the group.

At this juncture the Soviets pointed out that a group of prominent Latin Americans who attended the Mexico Conference were present at Moshi and should be invited by the organizational committee to take part in discussions concerning the three-continent conference. The fact that this group comprised ^{main members of the} the WPC delegation to Moshi was enough to set off a violent interchange.

The Chinese objected strongly to any participation on the part of the WPC contingent, who, they claimed, "represented no-one." The Soviets, backed by India, Lebanon, Mongolia, and South Africa, repeatedly insisted on a hearing for the WPC delegates. The Guinea delegate suggested inviting José Carrillo of Cuba to consult with the committee inasmuch as he had already been given the right to speak at the conference and was more representative of Latin America than the WPC group. This suggestion was supported by Cameroun and Japan. The Chinese again attacked the WPC, which, they said, "had refused to support the fight for National Independence", and said that China was "unalterably" decided

against letting the WPC speak at an AAPSO gathering. China, however, proposed that the AAPSO should send a delegation to Cárdenas, and Fidel Castro as well, to discuss the three-continent conference. They also offered to allow the Latin Americans at Moshi, who included Jose and Delia Venturelli, currently residing in Peiping, as well as the WPC team) to appoint a delegate to accompany the AAPSO delegation. Further violent arguments ensued during which the Chinese representative insisted that the WPC was attempting to infiltrate the AAPSO for the sole purpose of creating dissension. China was supported throughout by delegates of Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan, Cameroun, and Guinea.

Finally Mehdi Ben Barka called for unity and proposed that he, as chairman of the committee, the South Vietnamese vice-chairman of the committee, and Yusuf^{al-}Sibai, AAPSO Secretary General, should consult the Latin American WPC group unofficially. This compromise was accepted and the following additional decisions were adopted regarding the three-continent conference:

- a. The principles of Gaza were to be maintained*
- b. The preparatory committee of the three-continent conference to be free from outside sponsorship
- c. 12 Afro-Asians to be named as delegates to the preparatory committees
- d. The Latin Americans Casella, Poblete, Kowder, and Varela to be consulted privately at Moshi
- e. The chairman to report these discussions to the council meeting
- f. The committee "welcomed with joy" the invitation of Castro to hold the three-continent conference in Havana

*It was stipulated at Gaza that the sponsors and preparatory committee to the three-continent conference should represent all the anti-imperialist forces within the three continents.

Although these decisions represented ~~the~~ compromise in order to maintain unity formula, they were weighted in favor of the Chinese. The WPC as such was eliminated from three-continent conference planning; Cuba was inserted into a key spot and Cárdenas was boxed into a position of having either to ^{cooperate with} ~~support~~ Castro on conference preparations or openly ^{to} ~~oppose~~ oppose him.

A final meeting of the council was the only business scheduled for the last day of the conference. This meeting, however, was postponed from hour to hour, ^{owing} ~~due~~ primarily to a last-minute Soviet effort to force reconsideration of the WPC role regarding the three-continent conference. In conjunction with this effort the Soviets circulated a letter to all heads of delegations, signed by the WPC observers who were participants at the Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace (Mexico, March 1961). The letter noted "with deep regret the lack of proper attitude of cordiality shown towards the representatives of the Latin American countries... by not being afforded the opportunity of presenting their viewpoints to the 5th Committee on the question of the proposed conference of Latin America, Asia, and Africa."

A meeting hurriedly called by Oscar Kambona was attended by Soviet, Indian, and Moroccan representatives, as well as by Yusuf Sibai, AAPSO Secretary General. The only concession made to the Soviets at this ^{meeting} ~~meeting~~, however, was an agreement that Mehdi Ben Barka would announce to the heads of delegations (i.e. the council) meeting that the eighteen-man preparatory committee ^{of} ~~and~~ the three-continent conference would consult unofficially with WPC representatives. Moreover, Ben Barka emphasized that this was an unofficial arrangement which would not be ^{incorporated} ~~incorporated~~ in the minutes of the conference.

The meeting also considered the demand of the Tanganyikans that the resolution on Sierra Leone and Cameroun be withdrawn, as the government of Tanganyika had friendly relations with the governments of those countries **and** could not permit resolutions offensive to those governments to be passed on Tanganyikan soil. These resolutions were finally withdrawn. ~~It is noteworthy that the Chinese~~ ^{Key} ~~apparently sure of their position~~, did not attend this special meeting.

* This letter - minus the paragraph quoted here - was published in the WPC Bulletin. The edited version is in the file.

VII. Organizational Changes

The last council meeting was uneventful. The resolutions, submitted by the drafting committee which was solely responsible for their preparation, were not read out. Approval was given in the form of an acclamation for the complete text of all resolutions. Finally, the council approved the addition of representatives of South Africa, Ceylon, and Tanganyika to the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee meeting, held also on the last day of the conference, made the following organizational changes in the AAPSO permanent machinery:

1. Mehdi Ben Barka drew the attention of the Committee to the recommendation of the 5th committee that the Permanent Secretariat should be increased by the nomination of two additional secretaries to be chosen from dependent countries still fighting for their freedom. The following countries were chosen to be represented on the new secretariat: Algeria, UAR, Angola, Guinea, Kenya, Tanganyika, South Africa, China, USSR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Iraq, and South Vietnam. The new appointments included representatives from the two dependent countries, i.e. Angola and Kenya, as well as secretaries from South Africa, Tanganyika, and South Vietnam who replaced representatives of Congo (Leopoldville), Uganda, and Cameroun who were dropped.
2. The Executive Committee agreed that the headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat should remain in Cairo.
3. The Committee confirmed that Yusuf al-Sibai should remain as AAPSO Secretary General.
4. The Committee appointed delegates from Morocco, Cameroun, North Korea, and Iran as members of the Financial Control Committee.

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5. Representatives of the following countries were

designated to the AAPSO Fund Committee

Guinea (President)

Morocco (Vice President)

China (Vice President)

India

UAR

USSR

Tanganyika (Secretary General)

6. The next meeting of the Executive Committee was
scheduled for Cyprus in the summer of 1963.

VIII. Conclusion

When the conference ended at Moshi on 11 February it was apparent that the top bodies had been strengthened and that the changes tended to enhance Chinese prestige and influence. The gain in strength can be attributed to several factors. The inclusion of Tanganyika on the Fund and Executive Committees and the Permanent Secretariat brings another ruling African party - and with it Oscar Kambona's radicalism - into play. The entry of South Africa, Kenya, and Angola, into the Permanent Secretariat adds militant activists and advocates of armed struggle from East and Central Africa to the machinery of the organization. Moreover, Ceylon's accession to the Executive Committee brings into policy-making one of the most aggressive of the member units, a strong Chinese supporter. And the appointment of Mehdi Ben Barka as liaison officer between the Fund Committee and the Secretariat places in a key position a leader who is avowedly determined to support the "true revolutionaries" in the national liberation movements and who at the same time has been proved an effective and cohesive force within the organization.

The adoption of concrete plans for coordinating the Afro-Asian liberation struggles with those of Latin America has given new prospects and renewed vigor to the movement.

4-20
~~SECRET~~

The organization showed that it could resist the disruptive impact of Sino-Soviet dissension and its own well established internal inconsistencies. It probably can continue to develop as a combat organization as long as both its main Communist-bloc members refrain from a final showdown and continue to show active interest in developing joint action with the political opposition in Asian and African countries. The USSR, inhibited by its long standing interest in enhancing ^{and} ~~its~~ exploiting ^{its} influence with Asian and African anti-Colonial governing parties, is more and more at a disadvantage in the maneuvering within the organization. Soviet setbacks on such questions as the sponsorship of the three-continent conference tend to enhance the importance of both ^{the} political oppositionists like Ben Barka, and ~~the~~ the Chinese, whose support for aggressive national liberation struggles is appreciated and sought ^{by thousands of people}.

On the other hand, some of the developments strengthening the militant character of the AAPSO can hereafter be divisive. Representatives of single-party-controlled independent African governments are finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile the demands laid on them by the organization for support of opposition activity elsewhere in Afro-Asia with their need for diplomatic acceptance by anti-Communist governments in the area. They also are finding it difficult to get the organization to pay more than lip service to some national demands. Notable illustrations of this were Tanganyika's insistence on the withdrawal of the resolutions in opposition to the governments of Cameroun and Sierra Leone and Kambona's statement to the press at the end of the conference in which he made it clear that the TANU government of Tanganyika would honor only those resolutions with which it agreed, which did not include the ones on Israel or the United Nations.

Another latent source of trouble remains in the unresolved conflict between the Chinese and the Soviets. Although the Chinese won considerable ground at Moshi these gains were essentially tactical. Sino-Soviet differences on the relative importance of peaceful coexistence and violent struggle are still unresolved. In fact, as preparations for the three-continent conference go forward renewed disagreements between China and Russia seem inevitable.

Finally, although Julius Nyerere's opening address was given little play at the conference, his warnings against Communist imperialism, now on record in the AAPSO, could, if brought up and debated at a later date, embarrass either or both of the major Communist participants in the AAPSO.

A basic source of trouble, however, remains in the conflict between the Chinese and the Soviets. Although the Chinese won considerable ground at Moshi, these gains were on the tactical level. Sino-Soviet differences on the role of the African and Asian peoples in the peace and national liberation struggles are still unresolved. In fact, soon after the close of the conference the polemics were resumed.

Characteristically, press comments on the results of the Moshi conference poured out of Peiping hailing the meeting as an unqualified success for the solidarity of militant liberation movements throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, Soviet sources gave the conference very little coverage and this was limited almost entirely to the speeches of Soviet delegates and to publicity for some excerpts from the final documents that indicated endorsement of Soviet peace and total-disarmament formulas.

At the Malmö Peace Conference on 2-3 March, the Soviet-dominated peace council, evidently ignoring the Chinese opposition at Moshi, approved a resolution that hailed the "success" of the Moshi conference; but, in accord with Soviet desires, it declared that "the unanimous approval won by the General Declaration and other resolutions, testifies to the hopes and fervent desire of millions of people of those two continents for national liberation, universal disarmament, and peace."

The Chinese, who had protested at Malmö but to no avail, returned to open conflict with renewed vigor on 7 March when Liu Ning-i addressed a Peiping rally celebrating the Third Afro-Asian Conference. "A small minority of delegates at the conference," he said, "did not face the reality of the Afro-Asian peoples' struggle. . . . In their speeches, they once again distorted the current major tasks of the Afro-Asian peoples, departed from the anti-imperialist struggle, made empty talk of peace, and resorted to the terror of nuclear war to threaten the Afro-Asian peoples." Furthermore, he added to the Chinese bill of particulars another and serious open charge against the Soviet faction in the international fronts when he said, "Those who are unwilling or who do not dare to oppose imperialism but who are accustomed to manipulating and giving orders to international democratic organizations and international conferences are not very happy about this resolution. They are now conspiring to distort the spirit of this resolution in an attempt to manipulate or undermine the conference." The Malmö resolutions tend to bear this out.

With the increasing bitterness of both the Chinese and the Soviets over the AAPSO and the general line to be followed in the underdeveloped world, the best opportunity for the Chinese to win a victory over the CPSU in the mass-organization field seems to be the projected Three-Continent Conference. While in Latin America the old-line CP leadership and the pro-Soviet peace struggle cadre appear strong enough to resist pro-Chinese tendencies, ~~the~~ Chinese supporters from Asia and Africa may be strong enough to tip the scale in China's favor. In any event,

The Soviets retorted forcefully to this accusation in the 30 March letter sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The letter stated: "the militant call⁶ proletarians of the world, unite³ advanced by Marx and Engels, means that at the basis of such a union lies class anti-imperialist solidarity, not nationality, color, or geographical principles. Cohesion of the masses for the struggle against imperialism only on the principle of belonging to this or that continent, whether it is Africa, Asia, Latin America, or Europe might do harm to the struggling people. It would not be a union but a dispersal of the strength of a single anti-imperialist front." Apparently the three-continent project is no longer an appropriate tactic.

With the increasing bitterness of both the Chinese and the Soviets over the AAPSO and the ~~projected Three Continent Conference~~ ^{General line to be followed in the Third World}, it seems probable that the Afro-Asian-Latin American anti-imperialist front, which has been in the making since December of 1957, may well founder in the turmoil of the Sino-Soviet conflict. ~~However, the AAPSO as a going international front organization~~ ^{cannot be ignored or liquidated by Soviet fiat like the mass organizations that were grouped around the old Comintern and therefore will probably continue to exist and to provide a major battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Sino-Soviet maneuvers affecting this organization may well provide insight into the future of the whole array of such organizations, which the Sino-Soviet dispute has played since 1960.}

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