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THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

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AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

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THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

An Analysis of Communist Strategy and Tactics

". . . 'We are devoting all our efforts so that Mongols, Persians, Indians, and Egyptians should draw closer to us and merge with us. We consider it our duty and in our interests to do this, otherwise Socialism in Europe will not be stable.'* Our Party and its Leninist Central Committee abide strictly by this advice."

E. M. Zhukov, Member,
USSR Academy of Science,
July 1957; Member of Soviet
Delegation, Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference.
(Extract from speech
published in International
Affairs, Moscow, September
1957, page 43)

*Lenin, Collected Works,
Volume 32, pages 457-458.
(Also quoted by K. Bakdash,
Secretary General, CP-Syria and
Lebanon, in article in Pravda,
14 November 1957.)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|-------|---|----|
| I. | INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| II. | THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE | 3 |
| III. | ORGANIZING THE CONFERENCE | 8 |
| IV. | THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS | 10 |
| V. | THE NON-COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION | 11 |
| VI. | THE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE | 14 |
| | A. The Non-Bloc Delegates | 14 |
| | B. The Bloc Delegates | 15 |
| VII. | THE ISSUES | 17 |
| | A. The Peace Strategy | 17 |
| | B. The Strategy of the Economic Struggle | 18 |
| | 1. The Role of National Communist Parties | 20 |
| | 2. The Role of Communist Trade Unions | 21 |
| | a. In the Independent Countries | 21 |
| | b. In the Colonial Territories | 22 |
| | 3. The Strategy Unified at Cairo | 23 |
| VIII. | INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AT THE CONFERENCE | 26 |

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| | | |
|------|---|----|
| IX. | COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS | 29 |
| X. | FUTURE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY THE SOLIDARITY COUNCIL | 29 |
| | A. Economic Study Organizations | 29 |
| | B. Mass Organization Conferences | 29 |
| | C. Trade Organizations | 30 |
| | D. Cultural Bodies and Conferences | 30 |
| | E. Education, Research, and Investigative Bodies | 30 |
| | F. Other Professional Bodies | 30 |
| XI. | COMMUNIST GAINS FROM THE CONFERENCE-- A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT | 33 |
| XII. | THE PROSPECTS | 36 |

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A GENERAL SURVEY

OF THE

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A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE CONFERENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference which convened in Cairo on 26 December 1957 brought together a reported 476 delegates from 43 countries of Asia and Africa, as well as observers from Europe and Latin America. Most of these "observers" represented Communist international front organizations. Ostensibly dedicated to the idea of bringing together African and Asian peoples to provide coordinated support for colonial struggles for independence, for peaceful economic development, and for cultural growth, the gathering mainly served the interests of Soviet Communism, by endorsing programs long carried out by the traditional Communist international fronts, by accepting the USSR as an Asian state, and by providing a basis, in its resolutions, for future Communist propoganda and agitational activity throughout Africa and Asia.

The primary Communist objectives at the Conference were to enlist Afro-Asian support for the peace campaign, to generate pressure for adoption by the independent states in the area of the Soviet/Communist methods of "building socialism", to promote economic struggle between the West and the Afro-Asian world, and to pave the way for the gradual economic integration of the Asian and Near Eastern nations with the Soviet bloc.

The Conference cannot be considered a complete success from the point of view of any of the elements involved in it.* Whatever the advantages the USSR and national Communist parties may be able to derive from its resolutions, the alienation of a significant number of the Free World delegates, the disappointing of others who went to the Conference with high hopes, and the exposure of Communist aims and methods which

*For Communist gains from the Conference, however, see Section XI.

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took place at the Conference--all constitute potential if not actual setbacks for the Communist cause. There is evidence of some polarization among Conference delegates--some have moved toward closer identification with the Soviet bloc, while others have retreated from their erstwhile uncritical endorsement of the Communist's concept of peaceful coexistence.

However, as in other such instances involving the traditional international fronts, the failure of dissenting and opposition forces to take conclusive steps to counter Communist initiatives gives the International Communist Movement the time and opportunity to adjust to changed conditions, and exploit to the full the tactical advantages it has undoubtedly gained.

-2-

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II. THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE

A prime objective of Communist strategy since the end of 1953 has been to win over to the "Socialist bloc" the nations and peoples of Africa and Asia. Confronted with the accumulated distrust, resentment, and hatred engendered by the destructive, deceptive, and often violent campaigns waged by virtually all the Communist parties of the area from 1946 until at least 1952, the new Communist campaign to gain acceptance and organize unity of action against the West was begun with difficulty. Steps such as the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952 were taken by the USSR even prior to the death of Stalin, but it was not until the end of 1953 that a coherent program began to emerge.

The Soviet Union then began its efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The Cominform, under Soviet control, conveyed the essentials of the policy to the Communist parties of the Free World. Communist China, disengaged from its unsuccessful aggressive war in Korea, began its conciliatory campaign to gain acceptance among the peoples of Asia. The World Peace Council, in which the Communist parties of the bloc combined with national front groups sponsored by the Communist parties of the Free World, launched its campaign for the lessening of international tensions. The first stage of this campaign in Asia culminated in April 1955 with the Conference for the Lessening of International Tensions held in New Delhi and, one week later, with the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Here Communist China was afforded an opportunity by a group of independent Asian states to demonstrate its ability to act as a responsible state, willing to make and honor solemn commitments in its relations with other states. It subscribed there to the now well-known "Bandung principles", foremost among which was a solemn commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

But such interference was already in progress and continued thereafter without visible interruption. National

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Communist parties remained responsive to directions from Moscow and Peiping, and the traditional international Communist fronts continued their attempts on the national scene to create and organize popular pressure for acceptance of Communist policies.

A new instrument, the Asian Solidarity Committee, emerged from the New Delhi Conference. At about the same time in the Near East a parallel effort resulted in the convening of the second Arab People's Conference. Both of these gatherings were designed to serve as vehicles for Communist unity campaigns in the respective regions, but in the two years that followed neither venture registered any politically significant gain. The de-Stalinization and liberalization campaigns within the Soviet bloc failed to dispel the distrust of these Communist-inspired and dominated groups, and until the end of 1956, neither had succeeded in finding a theme with sufficient attraction to overcome this distrust.

But in December 1956 the decision apparently was made to exploit the Middle East crisis as the basis for a merger of both these unity campaigns. The attention which had previously been directed--without visible success--at enlisting the cooperation of the South Asian countries was now shifted to the Arab countries. With the endorsement by Egypt in January 1957 of the proposal that an Afro-Asian people's conference be held in Cairo, the stage appeared set for another step forward. But again the movement lost momentum. For six months no concrete steps were taken to organize the projected conference. No date was set, no preparatory body was organized, no local campaigns to organize delegations or generate interest in the gathering took place.

However, the small group of persons who had taken the earlier initiatives in the campaign continued to work diligently. Plans and preparations were made for exploiting the Conference once it was organized. Reliable cadres and easily manipulated Communist sympathizers already active in the Peace Movement and other fronts could be brought together with comparative ease. But again it appeared that

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the indispensable attractive theme which could invoke widespread interest and participation had not been found.

Eventually it was in the creation of the European Common Market in March 1957 and the announcement of plans for a major European program of economic development in Africa, that the organizers recognized their opportunity. For more than a year authoritative Communist publications such as the CPSU theoretical journal, Kommunist, had been stating that the main future efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle were to be centered in the economic field; and Marxist politico-economic doctrine was peculiarly suited to sustain such a campaign. The Soviet bloc, national Communist parties, and international fronts promptly attacked these Eurafrikan plans as part of their anti-colonial agitation, alleging among other things that the plans involved

a. a decision by the Western states to reduce their economic dependence upon, and commitment in, the independent countries of the Near East and Africa;

b. a Western determination to use punitive economic measures instead of armed aggression against those countries which persisted in adhering to neutralist policies and in expanding their relationships with the Socialist bloc;

c. a Western decision to strengthen their hold over the resources and peoples of colonial Africa, to compensate for their losses elsewhere.

-5-

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Again, as was the case with the Communist reaction to the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, the UN action in Korea, the European Defense Community, etc., constructive and defensive measures taken by Free World nations in response to aggressive Soviet bloc initiatives were maligned, denounced--and then promptly adapted to serve Communist ends.

It now appears that the most significant factors exploited to generate maximum participation by responsible citizens of the independent countries of Afro-Asia in the Solidarity Conference in Cairo were

a. the fears generated by Communist-inspired interpretations of the significance of the Common Market and Eurafrikan plans, and

b. the hopes and interest connected with proposals for the creation of an Afro-Asian common market, development fund, combined marketing systems, etc. In this regard it was anticipated and inferred--although never authoritatively stated--that participating countries of the Soviet bloc would be major contributors of aid, profitable trading partners, and willing participants in equitable multilateral commerce. The arguments advanced in support of the European programs were, by analogy, equally attractive when transferred to an Afro-Asian context.

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With such participation provided for, the appeal to individuals from the colonial territories of Africa was virtually assured of some success. These groups, together with dissident opposition elements from a number of the Middle Eastern states, made up the bulk of the participation at Cairo.

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III. ORGANIZING THE CONFERENCE

Once the chances for winning non-Communist participation in the Conference looked promising, preparatory work began. An Egyptian Committee was set up under the leadership of Anwar Sadat. This group, working closely with the Egyptian Government, issued the formal invitations to a preliminary meeting to organize the Conference. At this meeting a preparatory committee was set up, an agenda was drafted, financial arrangements for handling the costs of the actual Conference were made, and formal invitations were sent out asking that national delegations be organized.

But the preparatory meeting in fact did little more than approve the activities and proposals of the original organizers and vest them with authority to act in the name of a multinational body. Attempts by some participants--particularly the Turkish delegate--to take up substantive questions at the preparatory meeting were rapidly defeated. Once the preparatory meeting was over, the main responsibility for preparations fell upon the original organizers. The Asian Solidarity Committee figures took primary responsibility for organizing in the Soviet bloc and in South Asia, while the Egyptian group took on the task of organizing in Africa and the Arab World.

Three types of local effort were noted. First, in India, Japan, Burma, and the Bloc the national Asian Solidarity Committees approached selected individuals and receptive groups, including in most instances political parties in opposition to the existing governments or at least to some policies being carried out by those governments. Second, in a number of instances contact was established with national affiliates of the World Peace Movement, which were asked to organize national preparatory groups. This type of effort was noted in colonial territories and also to some extent in the cases of Iraq and Jordan. Third, where no Peace Partisan groups existed, travelling representatives of the Egyptian body made personal contacts, advised and assisted by the Egyptian Government, with national governments or local personalities, requesting that they undertake the organizing task.

In a number of instances Peace Partisan groups cut back their organizing initiatives when it became apparent that non-Communist parties and personalities had accepted the Egyptian proposals. In

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some instances they withdrew entirely from the organizing work when they realized that they might alienate other interested parties who were suspicious of Communist motives. In others, they supported or joined with the organizers in selecting delegations. In Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan there were disagreements over the composition of the delegations; but in every case a settlement was achieved. In many instances participation was assured only when the Egyptian representatives made the concession demanded by those non-Communists whose cooperation they sought.

In the course of this effort, one of the more interesting developments was the placing of a significant new topic on the agenda--the question of the European Common Market. There is no evidence that this addition--which was first revealed by one of the travelling Egyptian representatives before the Conference--had been approved in advance by the full preparatory committee.

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IV. THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

When the Conference convened, the program called for

a. An initial series of plenary sessions, at which leaders of national delegations were to deliver addresses, and conference procedure was to be agreed upon.

b. The organization of commissions to deal with each major section of the agenda. It was apparently originally intended that the commission work would involve first a series of speeches; then a presentation of a draft report and recommendations by a predesignated national delegation; thereafter draft resolutions embodying the recommendations were to be approved.

c. A final series of plenary sessions to endorse the draft resolutions.

Problems arose in the two main commissions, the Political and Economic Commissions. In spite of opposition, subcommittees were formed, within each of which specific draft resolutions were worked out. The subcommittee question appears to have been introduced in both instances by Arab delegates. The argument advanced by those who favored subcommittees was, in the Political Commission, that special attention had to be given to the problems of Palestine and Algeria. In the Economic Commission it was argued that the distinction between the economic problems of the independent nations and those of the still-dependent countries had to be recognized and provided for. Although the Soviet, Chinese, and pro-Communist delegates all appeared to oppose the creation of subcommittees, they adjusted effectively to the situation. In fact the creation of the subcommittees enhanced the influence of individual pro-Communist Arab delegates upon the specific language of the final resolutions, prevented coordinated action by the proponents of such proposals as those advocating the creation of a common bank, a common market, a common development fund, etc., and reduced the effectiveness of potential sources of opposition to the general trend of the Conference. The fact that the Conference resolutions fitted neatly with the Communist programs for action in both the independent countries and the dependent territories is also a reflection of the work of the subcommittees.

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V. THE NON-COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION

Available evidence strongly suggests that other forces besides those under Communist control did in fact make a contribution to the size and apparent impressiveness of the gathering. But it is also clear that none of these forces were capable of preventing Communist control of the gathering or were able to exploit it to serve their own purposes. Three other evident forces were

a. Arab nationalists who support President Nasser's policy of positive neutrality, but at the same time appear to oppose Communist control and manipulation of local movements.

b. Elements, largely centering around Japanese and Indian non-Communist nationalists, whose participation was motivated by their interest in maintaining peace and generating cooperative effort in economic and political development of Africa and Asia.

c. Nationalist forces, particularly in colonial territories of Africa, which sought tangible aid and support for their efforts to win political independence.

The failures of these elements were directly related to the effectiveness with which Communist instrumentalities gained control of key positions, dominated the deliberations, coordinated their activities at the Conference, injected reports, organizational proposals, and well-prepared draft resolutions, and in general successfully applied, at a major international popular gathering, the time-honored and effective techniques that Communist parties in the Free World have employed for thirty years.

But Communist tactics were by no means the only factor. Many participants were disappointed at their failure to accomplish their own ends, but at the same time many of them have publicly demonstrated their satisfaction with the "moderate" nature of many of the Conference resolutions. What criticisms they have made of Communist actions at the Conference dealt mainly with the fact and character of Soviet participation. Some of the more observant have also criticized the absence of substantive discussion and the obviously prearranged procedures by which prefabricated resolutions were

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run through the Conference. In one instance a leading delegate-- Kamal Jamblatt of Lebanon--withdrew from his delegation and denounced the Communist seizure of control of the national group, but this unique event was brought on largely by the nature and strength of the Lebanese Communist effort to win control of the delegation.

There is convincing evidence that most of these delegates lacked (and still lack) an appreciation of the Communist objectives at Cairo. Equally important, they appear to lack an appreciation of the role which the CPSU expected the Cairo Conference to play in its general global strategy. There has been no acknowledgment by this element that their mere participation aided Communist exploitation of the Conference. The Japanese delegation alone-- the second largest group after that of Egypt--accounted for over 10 per cent of the attendance. Only fifteen of the fifty-eight in the Japanese group subsequently extended their travel to include a visit to the USSR and China, while the remaining forty-three, who can be reasonably assumed to represent the bulk of the non-Bloc oriented element, returned directly to Japan. The failure of the Conference to endorse any substantive proposals for multilateral economic organization has also gone unchallenged by those delegates whose primary motive in attending was to gain acceptance of such proposals. Above all, so far as their immediate interests are concerned, these elements failed to recognize or acknowledge the relationship of the Conference to the actions of their national Communist parties and front groups.

In fact, few of the non-Communist delegates demonstrated any critical interest in the resolutions which did not directly involve their own national interests. There was very little contact and cooperation between non-Communist delegations, although a few individual delegates did seek to establish personal contacts with others who might later prove worthwhile. Sightseeing and organized entertainments in general kept these people occupied outside of the formal sessions of the Conference, while the Communist delegates used the free periods purposefully and to good advantage, consulting with others of their kind on matters relating to the Conference itself and cultivating non-Communists. Scholarship offers, invitations for trips, gift-giving, and flattering interviews by Bloc press representatives were all extended during such periods.

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In spite of the presence of many individuals with parliamentary or legal experience, there was no indication that the glaring weaknesses in the constitution and charter of the secretariat were challenged. Contradictions between the Conference's resolutions and the domestic and foreign policies of the respective governments of the participants were also ignored, except in one or two instances.

In relation to the international front participation, the "honored guests" were officially identified in Conference publicity material only by the countries of their origin, and their identification as leading functionaries of the whole range of international Communist fronts was never brought under open discussion. The absence of observers from the United Nations organizations dealing with non-governmental activity of international significance, who logically should have been extended an invitation by a body which professed its support for the concept and organization of the UN, was nowhere remarked--nor, for that matter, was the absence of delegations from a significant number of Afro-Asian states.

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VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE

The Communist forces comprised the delegations (and unofficial participants, such as translators and journalists) from the participating countries of the Soviet bloc--the USSR, China, North Korea, Mongolia, Viet Nam. They also included, however, more than ninety members of the delegations from non-Bloc countries. The identified total group susceptible to at least some degree of Communist control amounted, therefore, to 140, or over 30 per cent. This group was supplemented by an additional twelve Soviet nationals, who, accredited as journalists and translators, participated in the activities of the Conference.

The members of the non-Bloc group, whose reliability and witting devotion to the interests of the International Communist Movement varied widely, included on the one hand a number of fully indoctrinated, dedicated, and competent members and leaders of national Communist parties, and on the other hand a number of individuals who have participated in the past, at the national or international level, in more than one identified Communist front organization. Some of the latter cannot and should not be classed as Communists; but whatever their motives have been, their witting and repeated participation in such activities, in more than one context, and under widely varying circumstances, suggests that in the opinion of the Communist movement at least, they are characterized as "objectively progressive elements" whose cooperation has proved productive in the past. Their participation at Cairo suggests strongly that their cooperation has also been of appreciable current value, and there are no indications to date that any of them have significantly modified their attitude toward such cooperation since the Conference ended.

A. The Non-Bloc Delegates

All the non-Bloc Communist and pro-Communist delegates have been active in front and unity of action programs in the past. Bloc friendship societies, the Peace Movement, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), and bodies for the promotion of Bloc trade were the main areas of their earlier activity. Not all of them played leading roles at the Conference, however. Virtually none of the lawyers' contingent were prominent.

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On the basis of available evidence, it seems likely that Communist-inspired initiatives were taken mainly by about ten persons, distributed more or less evenly among the Egyptian, Syrian, Sudanese, and Japanese delegations. Most of these individuals had been involved in solidarity activity as far back as early 1955. Another four or five, drawn mainly from the Indian and Egyptian delegations, appear to have concerned themselves mainly with organizational and procedural questions--guiding the selection of presiding heads of subcommittees, serving as rapporteurs, guiding discussions, etc. The balance of the group appears simply to have made appropriate speeches and voted properly on procedural points and resolutions.

One of the most interesting facts about the Communist and pro-Communist delegates was that the most significant Communists among them did not engage in any newsworthy activity--or concealed their activity very well. Mustafa Amin of Syria, Fuad Nasser of Jordan, Abd al-Qadr Ismail of Iraq, Romesh Chandra of India, Tokusaburo Dan of Japan, all of whom are at least of Party Central Committee stature, remained completely in the background. Of this group, only A. K. Gopalan of the CP India was named in reports of the Conference. He participated in the Drafting Committee of the subcommittee on Imperialism in the Political Commission.

B. The Bloc Delegates

The Soviet delegation included four persons with records of extensive front activity in the past. Of these, only two-- E. M. Zhukov and A. V. Sofronoy--played significant roles. Zhukov, who has long been a leading authority on Communist party strategy in the Afro-Asian area, worked closely with Arzumaniyan; and Sofronov participated in the work of the Political Commission and of the Organizational Commission which was composed of the heads of delegations. The head of the Soviet delegation, Sharaf Rashidov, was present at the latter gathering, but Sofronov carried the burden of the activity. Both Rashidov and the much better-known Soviet Moslem front personality Mirza Turzun Zade bore no major responsibility for Conference tactics.

The Chinese delegation, which took virtually no initiatives except in the Cultural Commission, was quite impressive. Most of the group had participated in international front activity in the period since 1950 (the fields of peace, women's activities,

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youth, labor, culture, friendship, journalism, and trade promotion). Of equal if not greater interest is the fact that at least seven of the delegates, in spite of well-documented records of collaboration with the International Communist Movement and the Chinese Communist party going back well before World War II, both in China and abroad, have never publicly acknowledged their membership in the Chinese Communist party. Most of this group in fact were active in Nationalist China up until 1949, when at critical moments they "defected" to the Communist regime. All of them have had long and varied experience in clandestine activity.

The Mongolian and Viet Nam delegations appeared to have merely representational duties; and only one man, Han Sul Ya, in the North Korean delegation was noteworthy for his activities in the Algerian subcommittee.

A leading figure in the Chinese delegation, Burhan Shahidi, of the China Islamic Association, stayed in Cairo for several weeks after the Conference and participated in the creation of a new Chinese-Egyptian Friendship Society. The Soviet delegation also remained for at least two weeks exploiting contacts opened up at the Conference and visiting universities, government offices, the National Science Council, etc.

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VII. THE ISSUES

The two primary interests of the Communist initiators and participants in the Conference were

- a. to tie the aspirations and campaigns for national liberation of colonial territories to the Soviet peace campaign;
- b. to guide the Afro-Asian preoccupation with national economic development into channels and courses of action which would both complete the breaking of ties with the West and lay the groundwork for eventual integration of Africa and Asia into the economic system of the Soviet bloc.

The relevant issues were dealt with in the Political and Economic Commissions of the Conference.

A. The Peace Strategy

Both the declaration issued by the twelve Communist parties of the Soviet bloc in November 1957 and the Peace Manifesto endorsed at the same time by sixty-four Communist parties state that the "struggle for peace is the foremost task" of these parties-- but the Twelve-Party Declaration makes it abundantly clear that the peace campaign is a stratagem, not an objective, when it states that the "tasks confronting the Communist parties of the world necessitate closer unity . . . rallying the working people and progressive mankind, the freedom and peace-loving peoples of the world." The purpose of the strategy emerges promptly in the succeeding text. After portraying Communist parties as "loyal defenders of the national and democratic interests of the peoples of all countries," it is pointed out that in many countries "still confronted with the historic tasks of struggle for national independence the struggle against war is spearheaded against the big monopoly groups of capital as those chiefly responsible" for the threat of war. In independent countries, the declaration states, "objective conditions are being created for uniting under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary parties, broad sections of the population to fight for peace." Here, and in the subsequent discussion of the Communist interest in seeking power by "peaceful" means, the role of unity of action in the peace struggle is clearly shown to be that of facilitating

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the Communist party's gaining of power--and the alternative presented is violent struggle. As the declaration states: "In this case [violent struggle] the degree of bitterness and the form of class struggle will depend . . . on the resistance put up by reactionary circles, on these people using force at one or another stage of the struggle for Socialism."

The Peace Manifesto, on the other hand, is a less fundamental document which is aimed at promoting unity of action in pursuit of short-range objectives--the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing and unconditional prohibition of the manufacture and use of these weapons. It is toward these objectives that the peace struggle activity in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was directed, as the Political Commission agenda, deliberations, and resolutions show. The immediate aim was to promote participation by Afro-Asian elements in World Peace Council-sponsored projects such as the Stockholm Congress for Disarmament and Peaceful Coexistence in July 1958 and the Fourth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (August 1958).

B. The Strategy of the Economic Struggle

As far back as February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in discussions concerning the character of the struggle to advance the cause of Communism outside the Soviet bloc, attention was focussed on the importance of the economic area. But in January 1957 in a Kommunist article entitled "The Disintegration of the Colonial System of Imperialism and Questions of International Relations," the Soviet view of this matter was further clarified. Starting from the premise that the winning of political independence is only the first major step toward complete independence, it states:

" . . . Now that the overwhelming majority of the nations of the East have . . . ended the hateful colonial bondage, new tasks await them.

"Imperialism, colonialism stand as a barrier on the path to accomplishing plans for economic and cultural advancement. . . .

"The disintegration of the colonial system . . . is an entire stage of acute conflicts, numerous battles over all

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questions of economics and politics. . . . At the moment the center of the struggle has moved to the economic sphere. The disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism is entering a new and higher stage."

The article later made the point that although "the domination by finance capital could not have been eliminated in the past by any changes in the sphere of political democracy," the ability of the Soviet Bloc to provide powerful economic support to these countries "has fundamentally changed the objective situation of the countries of the East fighting against colonialism." The article makes it clear that this assistance is justified insofar as it aids the extension of state-owned economic enterprise, development programs, and the elimination of foreign capitalist controls, and emphasizes that it supports the already existing trend in the East toward socialism.

The article also comments on the role of Communist parties in these countries. Calling for national unity campaigns on economic issues, it states, "The experience of China shows that development of the countries of the East toward socialism is fully possible within the framework of a coalition of political parties. . . . Peaceful development does not at all preclude, but on the contrary, presupposes class struggle, the struggle of the supporters of social progress against the reactionary and exploiter forces seeking to go back to agreement with imperialism!"

Soviet Bloc aid is nowhere described as the main element in this economic struggle or as a substitute for local action. Nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise has long been a policy advocated by such mature Communist parties of the area as those of India and Syria; and as early as the summer of 1956 the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a small but highly significant Communist front organization, made the propriety of nationalization one of its central themes. In November 1957 the IADL Conference in Moscow claimed credit for having issued a report endorsing nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise prior to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

It is now clear that this IADL campaign played a part in laying the groundwork for the economic deliberations at Cairo. In May 1957 a conference was organized in Italy by the IADL which dealt

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exclusively with this question, and Syrian and Egyptian representatives participated in the deliberation. Again in early November 1957 the topic was a major theme of the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Damascus, where its significance had been enhanced by the Indonesian steps to nationalize Dutch-owned enterprise as a part of its campaign for the annexation of West Irian. It is interesting to observe that two of the Egyptian lawyers who played key roles in these activities-- Mahmoud el-Hinnawi and Salah Abdel Hafez--went to Moscow to attend the IADL Conference in mid-November 1957 and subsequently were members of the Egyptian delegation to the Cairo Conference. At Moscow too the Egyptian Ali Badawi, an ex-Minister of Justice, was "elected" a vice president of the IADL.

The role of the IADL in the Cairo Conference is further suggested by the statement, made by IADL president D. N. Pritt at Moscow in November 1957, that he had had an opportunity to "strengthen relationships with Indonesian, Indian, and Syrian lawyers" at a meeting held in China in September 1957. Pritt was one of the "guests" at Cairo, and was, therefore, in a position to exploit these "strengthened relationships" both with long-standing colleagues in the World Peace Movement and members of the Lawyers Association, many of whom were key figures in the national delegations.

1. The Role of National Communist Parties

Perhaps the best description of the current Communist program for exploiting the economic issue at the national level in the independent countries of Afro-Asia is that written by Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary General of the CP of India ("For A Mass Party", in New Age, February 1958). Under the subtitle, "Crisis of the Second Plan" (referring to the second Indian Five-Year Plan for economic development), he wrote:

"Conditions are getting created for the establishment of proletarian hegemony in our national movement. . . . Our Party, while supporting the aims and objectives of the plan, while declaring itself in favor of the emphasis on industrialization and extension of the public sector, laid bare the contradictions between the aims of the plan and the methods by which they were sought to be implemented. . . . But the most menacing feature of the situation is the activity that is being

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conducted by extreme reactionary circles. . . . They seize upon the difficulties of the plan with a view to pushing their own anti-national policies. . . . The campaign against our foreign policy, the campaign against the progressive features of the second Five-Year Plan, the campaign against the Kashmir Government-- all these campaigns are not unrelated. The driving forces behind these campaigns are in the final analysis the same. The imperialists, the landlords, the big anti-national monopolists, and extreme reactionary circles who fear the people and hate democracy. . . . It is the patriotic duty of every Indian, irrespective of the Party to which he belongs, to unite against these forces, to unmask them, to wage a determined battle against the path along which they want to push the country. Our Party has to play a major role in achieving this unity."

A. K. Gopalan, a member of the Politburo of CP India, a delegate to the Cairo Conference, and deputy leader of the Indian Communist Parliamentary bloc, is one of the prime figures in this national campaign, which was intensified in August-September 1957. The relationship between this program, which is reflected in the activities of national Communist parties throughout the Afro-Asian world, and the resolutions of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference is obvious. In the article quoted above the Secretary General of the Indian Party stated that it was "necessary for Party units to move into action in a big and effective way on such big developments as the historical Cairo Conference."

2. The Role of Communist Trade Unions

a. In the Independent Countries

Another major step in the elaboration of this strategy was set forth in October 1957 in the speech delivered at the Fourth Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig by S. A. Dange, another leading Indian Communist and international front figure for many years. Elements of this speech, "Trade Union Tasks in the Fight Against Colonialism", were subsequently accepted at the annual session in late December 1957 as the basis for the current policy of the All-India Trade Union Congress. The speech focussed attention, as did Ghosh's article, on defending the aims of the

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second Five-Year Plan, and on criticizing the methods used to carry it out, but added, necessarily, a further point. "The trade union movement, while cooperating in genuine plans for development that would benefit the people, and allowing legitimate gains to the bourgeoisie, should refuse to give up its claims for a just share of the national income for wage increases, for better working conditions, and democratic rights."

Dange also called for trade unions to participate in the struggle for peace and to agitate for support for the liberation struggle in colonial territories.

b. In the Colonial Territories

But Dange's speech at Leipzig differentiates clearly between the program to be followed in independent countries and that applicable in colonial territories. The following excerpt reveals the plan for work in the colonies:

"The problem for the colonies as such is markedly different. Naturally for these countries the fundamental task is to achieve national independence. At present many of them are faced with brutal wars and armed repression. Under such circumstances, the economic and social problems of the workers are extremely serious.

"In these countries the big enterprises all belong to foreign monopolies--the greater part of the cultivatable land has been seized by foreign colonialists.

"In many of these countries the colonial authorities carry out so-called economic development plans which are in fact intended to increase profits for the monopolies and to intensify the exploitation of the peoples.

"Their (the workers) single most urgent demand is for the improvement of their hard living conditions. The source of their hardships is in the common scourge--colonialism. Consequently the trade union movement is confronted with the double task of fighting against the direct political rule of the colonialists and in defense of the workers' interests."

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Perhaps the most interesting phrase in this excerpt is S. A. Dange's term "direct political rule"--which cannot be construed as a simple alternative to the terms "right of self-determination" or "independence" which have long been well-established as Communist slogans. The introduction of this term suggests that in some circumstances a mere loosening of the ties between a colony and its controlling power may be the proper tactical policy for a Communist trade union to advocate, rather than calling for immediate and complete independence. This interpretation gains in credibility in view of the recent endorsement by the Communist-infiltrated trade union organization in French West Africa of a plan for a federal union between France and the territories of French Africa.

3. The Strategy Unified at Cairo

The main elements of the strategy were finally and clearly brought together by the speech of the Soviet delegate Arzumaniyan at Cairo. Although he continued to call attention to Soviet willingness to give aid "within the capabilities of the Soviet economy," the main emphasis in his presentation was on the proper methods for carrying out a national economic development program and for financing it in large part through the Soviet techniques used in "building socialism" in the USSR.

The Conference resolutions did not incorporate many of the Arzumaniyan proposals, but they reflected his basic assumptions, endorsed the propriety of nationalization, and provided a basis for Communist agitational and unity programs at the national and regional levels.

The main points of the blueprint for internal economic development presented by the USSR were published almost verbatim by the Communist Party of Tunisia in its newspaper, Al Taliya, on 22 December 1957, before the Conference convened, as the program which it advocated for the nation.

Another anticipation occurred in a commentary on a book, Development in Free Asia, in the October-December 1957 issue of the Asia-Africa Review. Dr. Gyan Chand* in his article focussed

*Dr. Gyan Chand, an erstwhile economic adviser to the Government of India, was a delegate to the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952, deputy leader of a peace delegation to Peiping in 1952, and a leading figure in the creation and activities of the India-China Friendship Association from 1952 on.

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attention on the same problems and tasks of national economic policy that the Soviet delegate's speech subsequently explored. This discussion was introduced with the statement, ". . . . The Asian countries have to face the stark fact that resources for their economic development would have to be made available through their own almost unaided exertions; state trading, nationalization of foreign enterprise, development of state-financed cooperatives, balanced development of industry, etc."

In summary, the general strategy for exploitation of economic issues which emerged during the period of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference appears to involve the following main elements:

In the Independent Countries of Africa and Asia

- A. Continuation of Soviet aid, "within limits."
- B. Pressure on economic issues by the Communist parties and fronts, especially for the adoption of socialist (i.e., Soviet) techniques for achieving national economic development, including the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise.
- C. Exposure and discrediting of national elements which oppose the socialization of the economy, the modification of governmental economic structure along socialist lines, and ever closer identification with the Soviet bloc policies in the foreign trade sphere.
- D. Pressure for active governmental support of colonial liberation movements.

In the Colonial Territories

- A. Organization of trade union unity on purely economic grounds (wages, etc.).
- B. Extension of trade union influence in the national liberation movement, based on opposition to colonial development plans and to foreign ownership of major sectors of the local economy.

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C. Development of a propaganda campaign addressed to nationalist leaders and local businessmen based upon the rosy prospects for future aid and profitable trade--if these territories succeed in freeing themselves from the economic control of the "colonialists".

It was in fact observed that at Cairo the Soviet economic delegation at one point informed a group of the delegates from Black Africa that a billion dollars worth of aid could be made available to them by the Soviet Bloc; the precondition for getting such aid was, of course, obvious. The impact of such "offers" is clearly propagandistic only.

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VIII. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AT THE CONFERENCE

There was extensive participation in Conference delegations of persons long identified with the numerous international Communist fronts (see attachments A and B, which identify such delegates). But, in addition, most of the central organizations of these fronts sent representatives to Cairo as observers. This observer group was composed of key figures from the fronts, who had many contacts among the delegates.

The following list identifies these individuals:

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| James G. Endicott of Canada | Vice President of the World Peace Council |
| D. N. Pritt of England | Member of the Bureau of the World Peace Council President, International Association of Democratic Lawyers |
| Mrs. Jorge Zalamea of Colombia | Secretary of the World Peace Council |
| Carmen Zanti of Italy | Secretary, Women's International Democratic Federation President of the Youths' Federation |
| Renato Mieli of Italy | Delegate of the Anti-Colonial People's Conference |
| Cheng Chi Ming of China | Secretary of the International Union of Students |
| Saadati Babak of Iran | Secretary, Colonial Bureau of the International Union of Students |
| Bruno Bernini of Italy | President of the World Federation of Democratic Youth |
| S. Majumdar of India | Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. |

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Near the end of the Conference Kamal al-Din Bindari, ex-Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR and chairman of the Egyptian Peace Committee, gave a reception which was attended by active participants in the Peace Movement. According to Tass (3 January 1958) persons attended from the delegations of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, USSR, India, Camerouns, Zanzibar, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Chad. D. N. Pritt, Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, M. I. Kotov, George Hanna (Lebanon), and Dr. Felix Mounie were singled out for special mention among the guests. This gathering is particularly noteworthy because for some time the Egyptian Peace Partisans have been maintaining pressure on the Egyptian Government in order to win official recognition. Prior to this reception, however, they had had little visible success. The organization in fact remains without official governmental recognition, although the activities of its leading figures are not significantly hampered.

Little is known of the activities of these observers, but Mr. Babak, secretary of the Colonial Bureau of the IUS, circulated extensively among students in the various delegations. Mr. Renato Mieli, who represented the Anti-Colonial People's Conference which convened in Athens in late October 1957, presented a message from the president of the Greek Anti-Colonial League, Mr. Nikos Pouliopoulos, the character of which is clearly reflected in the following extract.

"And in this sense, I am sure that the Congress will not only condemn slavery, terror, and the tortures of British colonialism against liberation fighters, but that they will legitimize armed struggle for liberation...."

This organization, in which a number of West European Left Socialists are active, has never endorsed Soviet actions. But the Yugoslav Communist-controlled Socialist Alliance participated in the October 1957 gathering, together with a number of other proponents of unity of action between Communists and Socialists. Mr. Mieli himself is a member of the Communist party of Italy and in the past has served on the editorial staff of the party's newspaper, L'Unita.

Since the close of the Conference virtually all the international Communist fronts have given international publicity and approval to its resolutions, declared their intention of supporting

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and aiding its programs and initiatives, and welcomed its support of their activities. In fact, the bulk of the publicity given to the Conference since the end of January 1958 has emanated from the international fronts and their national affiliates.

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IX. COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In spite of the participation of impressive delegations from five of the countries of the Soviet Bloc, the main Communist initiatives at the Conference were taken by Syrian, Egyptian, Indian, and Japanese representatives with Communist and pro-Communist records, whose proposals received endorsement and support from the Soviet bloc delegates. Only the Arzumaniyan speech and the invitation to the Writers' Conference in Tashkent in October 1958 can be construed as major initiatives by Soviet bloc delegates. Specific condemnations of colonialism, regional pacts, racial discrimination, and unfair economic practice proposed by other non-Soviet delegations to the Conference were endorsed and supplemented by general expressions of Afro-Asian support for national liberation movements and for the territorial claims of independent Afro-Asian countries. But the truly significant resolutions of the Conference, from the Communist point of view, were those which

- a. endorsed activities of the international front organizations (the World Peace Council's Congress of Peoples for Disarmament, the Fourth World Conference Against Atom and Hydrogen Bombs, August 1958);
- b. embodied proposals for future organization and action; and
- c. dealt with economic questions.

X. FUTURE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY THE SOLIDARITY COUNCIL

The following activities were called for in the resolutions endorsed at the Conference

A. Economic study organizations

1. An Afro-Asian Economic Committee--to pool data and facilitate economic relations between independent countries of Africa and Asia.

2. A committee within the Cairo Secretariat, to study the economic problems of dependent countries.

B. Mass organization conferences

1. A joint cooperative and trade union conference.

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2. Youth organization conference.
3. Student organization conference.
4. Women's organizations conference.

Note: In the case of the women's group, the creation of an Afro-Asian Feminists' Union is envisioned. In other instances proposals for the creation of Afro-Asian bodies already are circulating.

C. Trade Organizations

1. A Chambers of Commerce Conference (announced for Cairo, December 1958).

D. Cultural Bodies and Conferences

1. A Committee on Cultural Exchanges (within the Cairo Secretariat Bureau).
2. National bodies to support cultural exchanges.
3. Writers' Conference - Tashkent, October 1958 (endorsed).
4. An Afro-Asian Artists' Conference.

E. Education, Research, and Investigative Bodies

1. An Afro-Asian university.
2. An Afro-Asian historians group.
3. An Afro-Asian educators group.

F. Other Professional Bodies

(Lawyers, doctors, scientists, etc.)

The very number of bodies and gatherings called for may suggest that these projects were merely gestures; but a glance at the composition of the main Communist-controlled and influenced delegations

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suffices to demonstrate that the nucleus of a competent Communist fraction existed for virtually every endeavor named. Further, the honored guests of the Conference included key representatives of all the major international fronts except the World Federation of Trade Unions. Only the Chinese affiliate of the WFTU was represented, in the person of Tung Hsin.

These individuals in a number of instances already have specific projects, sponsoring groups, and tentative dates toward which to work, in which further Egyptian or Afro-Asian initiative is not required. For example

1. The Soviet offer to held the Second Asian Writers' Conference in Tashkent in October 1958 was endorsed at the Asian Writers' Conference in New Delhi, December 1956. Modified to include African participation, it is now being sponsored by the Union of Soviet Writers, in which A. Sofronov of the Soviet delegation to Cairo is a key figure. The Progressive Writers' Association in India, dominated by the CP India, and parallel organizations in Japan and other Afro-Asian countries are equipped to cooperate in the campaign, using the Solidarity Committees as a vehicle. A preparatory committee is to be established in Tashkent in August; until then preliminary work is being carried on by a small group which convened in Moscow, 2-4 June 1958.

2. The Second Afro-Asian Student Conference was scheduled to be held in Japan in the summer of 1958, under joint sponsorship of the Communist-infiltrated Japanese National Federation of Students Self-Government Associations and the All-China Students Federation. However, it has now been announced that a youth and student conference is to be held in Cairo in February 1959. A preparatory committee is to be set up in Cairo in late 1958.

3. The Women's International Democratic Federation has convened its first congress since June 1953 and has included support for the main themes and results of the Cairo Conference in its program. This meeting was held in Vienna in June 1958.

4. Other Afro-Asian gatherings (such as the Afro-Asian Women's Conference which was held in Ceylon in February 1958) are tentatively scheduled. They provide, like the first

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Asian Writer's Conference held in India in December 1956, a target for Communist attempts to infiltrate and dominate the proceedings. Even where such meetings successfully resist Communist attempts to dominate them, the inclusion of Soviet Bloc delegations permits them to be exploited effectively as opportunities for cultivating new acquaintances and contacts who may subsequently be willing to abandon opposition to Communist desires and designs.

5. Other regional gatherings, such as the African Popular Conference scheduled for October 1958 in Accra, a newly-projected Arab Popular Conference planned for September 1958, the Festival of African Youth scheduled to be held in Bamako, French West Africa, in September 1958, and many other less inclusive meetings are also exploitable in the development of the Communist version of Afro-Asian solidarity.

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XI. COMMUNIST GAINS FROM THE CONFERENCE--A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

Although the extent to which the permanent organization created at Cairo will serve Communist ends remains unclear, the Conference itself appears to have rendered the following services to current Communist objectives:

a. It endorsed the claim of the USSR to acceptance as an Afro-Asian state, entitled to participate on a basis of equality with other states of the area.

b. It provided in its resolutions a formal identification of the main enemy, a statement of aspirations, and proposals for future action which, while ostensibly enjoying widespread popular Afro-Asian support, in fact constitute a well-tailored framework within which Communist parties and international front affiliates of the area (particularly in the independent countries) can carry on the programs and national unity strategies to which they are already committed.

c. It provided the Communist parties of the Soviet Bloc countries with extensive propaganda ammunition which can be and has been used in a deceptive manner to convince their own nations of the successes achieved through current Bloc foreign policy, the extent of popular support and endorsement which Communism enjoys in the Free World, and the weak and disorganized state of the opposition to the further growth of Communism.

d. It provided a basis upon which the Communist parties and peace movements of the principal Western states can mount pressure campaigns against the unity and determination of democratically constituted Western governments.

e. It further complicated, by encouraging intransigence, the orderly, equitable, and peaceful solution of problems existing between Western states and the peoples of the Afro-Asian area.

f. It interposed new problems which tend to inhibit and complicate the working out, by the independent countries

-33-

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of the area, of valid and effective forms of cooperation and mutual support which are consistent with both national interests and the peace and stability of the world community.

g. It recorded Afro-Asian support for major programs being developed by the traditional international Communist front organizations.

h. It provided an organizational framework for future solidarity activity, which, because of its form and character, is particularly susceptible to subversion and eventual domination by the International Communist Movement.

The Soviet Union itself has openly acknowledged a number of the points set forth above as accomplishments of the Conference. In Izvestia of 3 January 1958 an article filed from Cairo by S. Kondrashov and V. Kudryavtsev stated that the important results of the Conference were

- a. Its "determination of the common enemy."
- b. Its concrete statement of the tasks of the peoples in relation to individual countries.
- c. Its recognition that the economic problems of the already independent countries are of even greater importance than those of the countries struggling for liberation.
- d. Its highlighting of the importance of nationalization and agrarian reform as stimuli for national economic development.
- e. Its treatment of issues "in the spirit of the struggle for peace."
- f. Its acceptance of Soviet participation.

Soviet bloc news treatment of the Conference addressed to Western Europe and the Americas particularly emphasized the link between anti-colonialism and the peace campaign:

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"The speeches of the delegates clearly showed that the question of national independence of the Afro-Asian peoples is indissolubly linked with the fate of world peace." (K. Zakharov commentary--in German-European Service, 3 January)

"The enormous service rendered by the Cairo Conference, Pravda emphasizes, is the fact that it rallied the people of Africa and Asia under the banner (of peaceful coexistence). It is precisely for this reason that the results of the Conference have been welcomed by all peace-loving nations both in the East and in the West." (Russian Hellschreiber to Europe--3 January)

"Counteracting the Cairo Conference means opposing peace. Don't Americans want peace?" (Moscow-English to North America, 4 January)

This central thesis of the current Communist "peace" campaign is certain to be extensively developed in the months ahead, with an ever-increasing emphasis being put on the idea that those--whether Afro-Asian, European, or American--who refuse to accept the Cairo programs do not want peace.

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XII. THE PROSPECTS

Over eight months have elapsed since the Cairo Conference was held; and in spite of the burst of energy originally expended, the organization created there has done virtually nothing. The majority of the secretariat members have not been designated, and the Egyptian committee continues to carry out what activity is being undertaken. Even at the organizing level there is little evidence that Free World national affiliates are particularly active or that international liaison is well-developed. The USSR is clearly still interested in exploiting Afro-Asian solidarity, but what Bloc activity has been noted is centered largely in the European states, which did not in fact participate at Cairo. East Germany and Rumania have both organized Afro-Asian Friendship bodies. In April, the racial discrimination theme of the Conference was given an anti-American orientation in East and West Europe (as well as India) through the organization of Paul Robeson Birthday Committees. At least one Bloc committee is known to have sought to stimulate a parallel effort in Black Africa.

Cautious but persistent efforts are being made to induce Afro-Asian governments to endorse the Cairo Conference; where these efforts are resisted, an attempt is made to create the impression that such endorsement has been given.

In mid-April, in connection with the Pan-African Accra Conference, a number of the international fronts (and the USSR itself) revived their laudatory treatment of Cairo and linked it to the Accra gathering of African states. Further, significant mentions of Cairo were contained in the speech delivered by Nikita Khrushchev at a dinner of welcome for President Nasser of Egypt in mid-May 1958 and in the final communique of the visit. In describing the common views and shared aims of Egypt and the USSR, Khrushchev stated: "The USSR has endorsed the resolutions of the Cairo Conference." This the Government of Egypt had not as yet officially done.

In the final joint communique, in the section describing the identity of the views of Egypt and the USSR, it was recorded that both governments "support the principles of Bandung which have been reaffirmed by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference

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held in Cairo in 1957, which expressed the hopes and aspirations of these two continents." For a Communist propagandist, this statement can easily be manipulated to convey the idea that the Cairo resolutions were endorsed, rather than the Bandung principles, to which the Cairo resolutions in fact pose serious challenges.

However, the chances for successful exploitation of a regional organization have been substantially reduced during the past months by three developments of major concern to the International Communist Movement. First, the sharp Soviet bloc criticism and the Chinese Communist denunciations of Yugoslavia and its Communist party have created serious strains with the Afro-Asian groups heretofore most willing to engage in joint activity with the Soviet bloc, and have disabused many who considered Chinese Communism significantly different from--and less aggressive than--that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Second, the abrupt Chinese suspension of efforts to develop trade with Japan and its subsequent vigorous denunciation of the Japanese Government represent a fundamental reversal of policy which will tend to cripple the original Afro-Asian solidarity concept as applied in Japan. Third, the hardening policy of the Communist Party of India on domestic issues and the unenthusiastic, stubborn response of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon to the creation of the United Arab Republic have created new national tensions which compromise the "solidarity" approach and reveal, all too clearly, the objectives of the Soviet Union.

It may prove, within the next few months, that the Solidarity Council and Secretariat cannot enlist active participants from the independent Afro-Asian states who are not subject to international Communist discipline. They may, however, continue to exist and operate, either as Soviet/Communist-Arab instruments or at a minimum as an essentially Egyptian-operated facade. In the latter event, the next annual meeting of the Council may prove of great importance.

The Conference resolutions and the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity will probably continue to be exploited as far as possible by the traditional international fronts as bases for continued unity efforts. Only well-publicized failures to gain such support or open repudiations of these efforts by leading figures identified with the Conference are likely to thwart this effort.

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National Communist parties and key Communists of the area are certain to expend considerable effort in attempts to put into effect on the national scene the ideas expressed by the main Communist spokesmen at Cairo. As long as their ideas remain unrepudiated by responsible Afro-Asian leaders and governments, the Communists will be able to exploit the Cairo Conference in order to conceal the true origin of the ideas, to exploit the fiction that they represent the Afro-Asian "wave of the future" in their appeals to the uncommitted, and to press attacks upon their most important local enemies.

Only a major and spectacular shift of Soviet bloc policies toward the Afro-Asian area, a new crisis in the area, or an abrupt change in the attitude of the independent governments of Africa and Asia is likely to invalidate the prospects outlined above.

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ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC EVENTS AT THE CONFERENCE

A number of facets of the Conference activities merit scrutiny in some detail. The following have been selected for such treatment:

- I. The deliberations of the Political, Economic, and Cultural Commissions.
- II. The permanent organization created by the Conference.
- III. The role and reactions of delegates from Black Africa.
- IV. Highlights of the Soviet bloc propaganda exploitation of the Conference.

These analyses are by no means exhaustive, but they do substantiate and shed additional light on a number of critical points covered briefly in the preceding general study.

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Japanese Dele-
gation (Cont'd)

Akira Sunabori
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Kunitugu Yagi
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Tadasi Mijusaw
Tasuku Asano
Sima Kai
Toshio Akinwa
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|------|--|----|
| I. | DELIBERATIONS OF THE MAIN COMMISSIONS | 1 |
| A. | The Political Commission | 1 |
| 1. | The Palestine Subcommittee | 4 |
| 2. | The Algeria Subcommittee | 7 |
| 3. | The Subcommittee on Imperialism | 9 |
| 4. | The Racial Discrimination Subcommittee | 11 |
| 5. | The Nuclear Warfare Subcommittee | 11 |
| B. | The Economic Commission | 12 |
| 1. | Economic Struggle Against Colonialism - The Soviet Program is Presented | 15 |
| 2. | The Question of Colonial Territories | 17 |
| 3. | The Final Resolutions | 18 |
| C. | The Cultural Commission | 19 |
| II. | STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT | 21 |
| III. | THE CONFERENCE AND BLACK AFRICA | 26 |
| IV. | TREATMENT OF THE CONFERENCE WITHIN THE SOVIET BLOC | 33 |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| APPENDIX I. - KEY NON-BLOC PERSONALITIES ATTENDING THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE, CAIRO | 37 |
| APPENDIX II. - KEY BLOC PERSONALITIES ATTENDING THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE, CAIRO | 44 |
| APPENDIX III. - OFFICIAL LIST OF DELEGATES | 48 |

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I. DELIBERATIONS OF THE MAIN COMMISSIONS

A. The Political Commission

Under the organizing guidance of Dr. Anup Singh, this commission selected Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru as president (Egyptian nomination), although Dr. Singh himself originally favored an Egyptian president. A Sudanese delegate (nominated by Ethiopia) was then elected first vice president, although the Iraq delegate "saw no need for vice presidents." The squabble that followed suggested that the Egyptian delegate was, in the Communists' view, the proper person to steer the commission's work. Discussion of this question ended when the Chinese delegate suggested that there be two vice presidents, nominated Egypt for the second vice presidency, and proposed that the vice presidents head two subcommittees.* This proposal was supported by the Japanese, the Ghanians, and Indians. It was accepted as far as the vice presidencies were concerned, but the subcommittee question still caused trouble.

*There is no firm evidence of the contemplated division of labor between the proposed two subcommittees. However, according to a public statement by Khalid Mukhi al-Din, the aim was to permit separate treatment of the problems of "new" and "old" imperialism. The former was to deal with colonial territories, which he characterized as "survivals of the old form of imperialism"; the latter was to deal with manifestations affecting independent countries, such as the Eisenhower doctrine, etc. He gave credit for this justification to a member of the Jordanian delegation; but it is clear that such a division of labor would have fitted neatly into the Communist plan of campaign.

- 1 -

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As in other commissions, some delegations obviously desired to prevent the creation of many subcommittees. But, on a Tunisian motion, supported by the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and apparently, Egypt, a decision was made to create five subcommittees, with specific attention directed toward dealing with the Algerian and Palestinian questions. Just prior to the vote (which showed only four delegations opposed), Dr. Singh again appealed for the creation of no more than two subcommittees, endorsing the original Chinese suggestion. When the vote went against his proposal, Dr. Singh prevented the recording of the identities of the four delegations which had supported him. It is possible that moderates from Japan, Ethiopia, and Ghana supported India on this vote and were the four involved; but it is equally possible that the Chinese and two of the other four Communist delegations present may have voted with the Indians. In the latter event Dr. Singh's concern over the identification of the minority could be easily understandable, for it would have raised questions concerning the votes of the other two Communist bloc delegations, and perhaps exposed a difference of opinion among Communists over a question of operating tactics.

This breakup into subcommittees, in fact, tended
(a) to highlight the issues of Algeria and Palestine,
(b) to dilute possible opposition to such prefabricated reports and resolutions as those presented by the Egyptian delegate in the subcommittee on imperialism, and
(c) to permit such single-minded pro-Communist delegates as the Japanese YASUI Kaoru to make the maximum impression.

The five subcommittees eventually approved covered

a. Imperialism

-2-

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- b. Algeria
- c. Racial discrimination
- d. Nuclear weapons
- e. Palestine

The Conference resolutions which emerged from the Political Commission supported virtually all national liberation and irredentist struggles in Asia and Africa. They also

a. Gave explicit endorsement to the central thesis which the Communist movement is currently propagating throughout the world, that the problems of the colonial areas and newly independent countries as well as the threat to world peace are due solely to "imperialist ambitions."

b. Devoted most attention to the Algerian conflict.

c. Made what appears to be the Conference's most significant statement on the question of Palestine.

Only one major Afro-Asian liberation problem--that of Kashmir--was not discussed.

The most inflammatory statements made at the Conference by self-styled representatives of national liberation organizations were those of the persons

-3-

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who spoke in the name of the Chad and of Kenya. Both called for Afro-Asian arming of their peoples and promised that, with arms, the national liberation forces would expel the colonial powers from their territory. Neither of these "spokesmen" is known to have had Communist contacts or to have demonstrated pro-Communist attitudes in the past; both in fact have apparently been resident in Cairo for some time and appear to be Egyptian-sponsored. However, the Kenya delegates were cultivated by the Soviet delegation to the Conference and proceeded to the USSR after the end of the Conference, where they were given very flattering treatment and publicity.

1. The Palestine Subcommittee

The endorsement by the Cairo Conference of a special resolution incorporating a demand for the "recognition of the rights" of Palestinian refugees is of considerable interest. As was pointed out earlier, the proposal that a special subcommittee be created to deal with Palestine caused some trouble in the political committee meeting.

The Arab-Israeli issue was in fact a subject of discussion at the April 1955 New Delhi Conference, where the Asian Solidarity Movement was created; and resolutions were passed there which objected to "pressures exerted through Israel and Turkey to force Arab states to join military blocs" and denounced the "aggressive policy of ruling circles in Israel." These clearcut positions taken in April 1955 are interesting contrasts to the World Peace Council's inability, since the initiation of the Soviet program of military aid to the Arab World, to pass resolutions on Arab-Israeli relations, and suggest that on this critical issue the Solidarity Movement is more responsive to Communist desires than is the World Peace Council.

-4-

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The full import of the Cairo resolution can only be recognized, however, when it is viewed against the background of authoritative Communist statements on the Arab-Israeli issue made during the latter half of 1957. The most relevant is a policy declaration by the Congress of the Israeli Communist Party made in mid-1957, which called for "recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs--including the right of self-determination, and if they so desired, their right to secession." The Cairo resolution, proposed by the Palestinian delegation with Egyptian aid and encouragement and with explicit Soviet support, encompasses the first part of this declaration, and reiterates the April 1955 New Delhi condemnation of the Israeli Government as an aggressive imperialist tool. The "moderate" nature of the resolution is, therefore, in fact deceptive; it is better characterized as a cautious step forward by international Communism, in a typically deceptive long-range campaign, to exploit an exceedingly complex and explosive issue to its own ends. R. Palme Dutt, who for many years has been the most accurate and authoritative spokesman of international Communism on the strategy and tactics to be employed in the colonial world, made this clear in an exhaustive article on Israel published in August 1957 in the British Communist magazine, Labour Monthly. Approving the above-quoted policy statement of the Communist Party of Israel, he pointed out that the political conditions for such a settlement "are not yet ripe, but are gathering." The Cairo resolution is a significant step toward the creation of the "ripe political conditions" envisioned by Dutt in this plan, from which only the Soviet bloc and international Communism would derive major benefit.

Resolutions endorsed on 1 February 1958 by the Communist Party of Israel reveal the extent to which the Cairo resolutions are consistent with its domestic program and objectives:

"RESOLUTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ISRAEL
30 January - 1 February 1958

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel [Maki] held its seventh plenary session at Tel Aviv from 30 January to 1 February. Comrade Meir Wilner, member of the political bureau, outlined the party program for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the state. [Editorial Note: Meir Wilner is also a leading figure in Israeli Peace Committee delegations to the World Peace Council.]

"An agreement of the great powers on the disarmament question and other international problems--among which are those of the

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Middle East--would serve the cause of peace in general and would represent a great contribution towards a relaxation of today's dangerous tensions. It would create more favorable conditions for the solution of the Palestinian problem and the Israel-Arab conflict, which is intentionally aggravated by the imperialists and their servants.

"V. THE AFRO-ASIATIC CONGRESS IN CAIRO

"The Cairo Congress, by manifesting the solidarity of all the peoples of Asia and Africa, has made a great contribution to world peace.

"The resolutions concerning economic, social, and cultural questions, as well as the resolutions relating to the development of the national economies of the Asian and African countries are all part of a general program for the fight against imperialism from abroad and against reaction at home.

"The resolution concerning Palestinian problems declares that Israel serves as an imperialist base which threatens the security and development of the Middle East and represents a danger to world peace. The main reason for this conclusion is chiefly due to Ben Gurion's anti-national and pro-imperialist policies. All patriotic forces of the people who have their hearts set on assuring peace, security, and the future of Israel must redouble their fight for a radical change in Israeli policies in the direction of peace, independence, and neutrality. Such a change would open the way for regularizing peace with the neighbor countries by taking into account the legitimate national interests of the people of Israel as well as those of the Palestinian Arab people.

"VI. ON THE EVENT OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

"Our party, concerned for the fate of the people and the homeland, will issue the following essential demands on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of Israel:

"A change of Israel's policies towards neutrality, independence, and peace. Solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa. Improvement of relations with the USSR. Recognition of the national rights

-6-

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of the Palestinian Arab people. Equality of democratic rights and liberties for the Arab population of the country. Total suppression of the military government which dishonors Israel. Solicitude for the working people and broadening of democratic liberties."

2. The Algeria Subcommittee

Algeria, like Palestine, was given separate treatment and special emphasis in the final resolutions. As has been pointed out earlier, the demand for the creation of this subcommittee on Algeria caused some confusion in the political committee. The Arab delegates were most active in the subcommittee, but a Ceylon delegate served as chairman.

In spite of the fact that the resolution on Algeria fully endorsed the aspirations of the Algerians, its "moderate" proposals for action dealt principally with diplomatic support, humanitarian aid for the people, and assistance to refugees, and agitational expressions of solidarity. It did not, as FLN propaganda had predicted, promise or call for "immediate, massive, and unlimited aid" to the Army of National Liberation.

The emphasis of Soviet bloc and Communist speeches in the subcommittee was on the necessity for cessation of hostilities and negotiation between Algeria and France, based on prior French acknowledgement of the Algerian right to independence. In contrast, Arab bloc speeches, draft resolutions, and the final resolution as well demanded immediate recognition of Algerian independence.

This distinction, which may appear to be little more than hairsplitting in the light of the seriousness of the Algerian struggle, is considered of considerable importance by the CPSU for it seeks primarily to promote an Algerian formula which will enhance its global influence and be useful in both the Afro-Asian and European communities. It seeks to exploit the general "threat to peace in the Mediterranean"--to promote neutralism in Europe and at the same time to use the Algerian hope for Communist bloc diplomatic and material support to strengthen the influence of Algerian Communists vis-a-vis the National Liberation

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movement. Here, as elsewhere, it is reluctant to commit itself openly and unreservedly to one side of such a dispute.

It is noteworthy that the North Korean delegation was the main Soviet bloc voice on Algeria. Their position on other issues at Cairo was completely intransigent; their report on Algeria was noteworthy for its comparison of the much-publicized atrocities attendant upon French actions in Algeria with the accusations long levelled against Japanese and American "imperialism" in Korea (such as the "germ warfare" charges so energetically cultivated during the Korean conflict). It also advanced the thesis that "the colonial war by the French imperialists in Algeria is but part of the aggressive provocations of international reaction led by the U.S. imperialists." But the policy they endorsed was that generally advocated by the USSR and its disciplined adherents throughout the world.

Insofar as the final resolution carried the demand that "the independence of Algeria be recognized without delay," and called for countermeasures against countries supporting the French military effort in Algeria, it would appear that the Conference supported the position of the Arab states rather than the more cautious known Communist position. But the resolution also characterized the Algerian struggle as "a threat to the security of the African people and international peace," and thus contributed effectively to the Communist campaign to tie in the peace movement (particularly in the West and Afro-Asia) with the Arab national liberation movements and Communist efforts to increase their influence therein. This objective is made clear, for example, by a joint statement of the Moroccan and Italian Communist Parties, published in L'Unita of 8 February 1958:

"The Italian Communist Party should consider as its most important task today the struggle for the relaxation of international tensions and peace. It is completely in accord with the Moroccan Communist Party in their judgment that the struggle of the Moroccan people and of all Arab people or their independence constitutes an essential element of world peace. . . . The two Parties declare themselves in conformity with the recent Conference in Cairo."

This same thesis was stated in Pravda (7 January) in an article on unity of action by Shevlyagin, a leading CPSU theoretician:

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"The international duty of all parties of the working class and the interests of peace demand unconditional support of the national liberation movement against old and new forms of colonial domination."

The evidence of lack of complete agreement suggests, nevertheless, that the Communist movement still faces serious problems in its attempts to exploit the Algerian issue.

3. The Subcommittee on Imperialism

The subcommittee on imperialism attracted the participation of at least two of the key Communist figures at the Conference--Khalid Mukhi al-Din of Egypt served as chairman of the subcommittee; A. K. Gopalan of India, together with V. K. Dhage of India, served on the resolution drafting committee of the subcommittee.

Little is known about the deliberations of this body, but its draft resolution incorporated the main points of the current Soviet assessment of the aims and objectives of the West in the Afro-Asian area and of the Soviet "struggle for peace" thesis.

Resolution on Imperialism

"The Afro-Asian Peoples Conference firmly believes that imperialistic ambitions lead to interference in the affairs of other countries, to military and political pacts and alliances directed against world peace.

"These ambitions lead to conspiracies against national governments; to the creation of continued tension in international relations; to usurping of the natural rights of smaller nations to freedom, sovereignty and independence.

"They lead to incitement of cold war and to bolstering up of the armament race. Such factors may act as a trigger to start a shooting war that will be disastrous to mankind.

"Because of this belief and in the spirit of Bandung, it condemns:

"(a) imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;

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"(b) foreign interference in the affairs of other countries;

"(c) military and political pacts and alliances that create overriding spheres of influence, endanger world peace and suppress the peoples' aspirations;

"(d) military aid to one country or group of countries, which constitutes threat to neighbouring countries and compels them to increase their military budgets, thus retarding their peoples' economic development;

"(e) treaties that encroach upon national sovereignty of nations;

"(f) exploitation of the national economy in other countries for the benefit of imperialistic powers;

"(g) conspiring to overthrow national governments in the interest of the imperialists;

"(h) aids on conditions detrimental to the interests of smaller countries that ultimately jeopardise their sovereignty and independence;

"(i) establishment of foreign military bases and forces on the territories of other countries;

"The Conference sees in the policy embodied in Pancha Shila and the ten principles of Bandung best means to alleviate international tension and to end the cold war.

"Therefore it declares that it gives its full support to the rights of the peoples:

"(a) to freedom, self-determination, sovereignty, and complete independence;

"(b) to settle their internal problems by themselves;

"(c) to choose forms of their governments according to their desires."

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4. The Racial Discrimination Subcommittee

In this subcommittee, discussions centered upon condemnation of alleged discriminatory practices of a political and economic nature in Black Africa. The leading role was played by the Indian delegate, although the delegates of the independent countries in or linked with Black Africa were equally vocal. The policy of apartheid adopted by the Union of South Africa was subjected to particular condemnation.

The resolution drafted in the subcommittee "politicalized" the issue by attributing these practices to the desire of the colonial powers to perpetuate and strengthen their control and exploitation of the native populations and to repress and harass liberation movements.

An attempt was made to introduce a condemnation of racial discrimination in the United States into the resolution, but it was not successful. The allegedly "moderate" action taken to reject this addition merits closer scrutiny, however, in light of the actual objectives of the resolution. Broadening the condemnation of discrimination to include its manifestations in the United States would have diluted and to some extent obscured the particular political interpretation which was of primary interest-- i.e., racial discrimination as a manifestation of colonialism. The campaign subsequently launched in connection with the celebration of the birthday of Paul Robeson appears more effectively designed to generate anti-American sentiment based on alleged racial discrimination.

5. The Nuclear Warfare Subcommittee

In this body the Japanese pro-Communist YASUI Kaoru encountered little opposition to his diatribe against the West, which further propagated the well-known denunciations of Western preparations for launching a nuclear war, accused the Western powers of using Afro-Asian territories by preference for weapons testing at the risk of injuring local populations, and condemned them for their unwillingness to accept Soviet proposals for the banning of tests and nuclear war.

The speech by Mr. YASUI and the supporting remarks by Syrian, Indian, and other World Peace Council regulars were clearly

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intended to support the "atomic blackmail" strategy now being applied by the CPSU in the Free World through the peace campaign. This "struggle for peace," which is an extension of the well-known WPC program, has taken on new features since the publication of the Peace Manifesto signed by sixty-four Communist parties in November 1957 at Moscow. It demands acceptance of Soviet-initiated or supported proposals on many matters, including those on colonial territories, as the only alternative to increased international tension, and ever-increasing possibilities of nuclear war. Subsequent Soviet commentary has emphasized that the Conference "endorsed and supported Soviet policy on nuclear warfare."

It is interesting to note, in connection with the drafting of the nuclear warfare resolutions, that the Soviet delegation flatly refused to permit the inclusion of the USSR as a recipient of the proposed appeal for banning tests. The sensitivity of the USSR on this point becomes understandable when it is realized that the USSR refuses to permit any propagation inside the Soviet bloc of the scare-mongering used by men such as YASUI, a tactic which they enthusiastically endorse and repeat abroad. This posture seems dictated by their concern over the possible impact of such arguments upon the Soviet people. The basis for this concern was made clear as far back as early 1955, when then Premier Malenkov was accused by the CPSU of succumbing to "imperialist atomic blackmail" and contributing to "defeatism" when he stated that nuclear warfare would lead to the destruction of civilization. Malenkov was obliged to restate his position for the Soviet people and to affirm that "in spite of widespread destruction, the Soviet Communist society would emerge victorious from a nuclear war." This remains the official domestic line in the Bloc today.

Yugoslav attempts to criticize the USSR as well as certain Western states for contributing to the heightening of tensions have, since early May 1958, drawn virulent denunciations from the Soviet bloc.

B. The Economic Commission

The organization of the work of this commission was carried out with a speed and incisiveness not encountered elsewhere and control appeared to remain firmly in Communist hands. The problem of subcommittees arose, as in the political commission, but it did

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not seriously affect the course of events. At the first meeting the Egyptian delegation nominated a Syrian Communist, Nazim Mousli, a professor from Damascus who had been a member of the predominantly Communist delegation to New Delhi in April 1955, to head the commission. Having assumed control of the proceedings, Mr. Mousli proposed, as soon as he took the chair

- a. the election of two vice presidents and a secretary;
- b. the nomination of the Japanese delegate as secretary;
- c. the nomination of an Egyptian delegate and the Soviet delegate to the vice presidencies.

These nominations from the chair were accepted. The Egyptian delegate was then recognized and promptly read a series of sixteen recommendations. The Sudanese delegate then proposed that the reports by the USSR and Japan be presented. The chairman, who obviously wished to give the USSR delegate the advantage of making the final presentation and reacting to proposals made by others, stated, "In this meeting we only hear recommendations from all sides," and then called upon the Ceylon delegate to present his recommendations. As the Ceylon delegate himself stated, "My proposals bear very close resemblance to those advanced by Syria and Egypt." He first highlighted as a "basic problem" the question "how can the strangle-hold of economic imperialism be broken?" This question he proceeded to answer promptly by proposing adoption of the concept of regional as contrasted with national industrialization. His recommendations dealt with the central questions of (a) sources of capital; (b) sources of technical knowledge; (c) relationship between consumer and capital goods production; (d) state sponsorship of industry; (e) the need for "political similarity" of participating governments, all of which topics were dealt with in the subsequent Soviet presentation. After a short comment from the Tunisian member, a second Syrian delegate, Maruf Dawalibi (who also was present at the New Delhi meeting in April 1955) then sought to prevent the introduction of other ideas and to steer the organization of the deliberations.

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He proposed a plan of work, suggesting that "the written* and verbal reports so far presented were quite adequate as a basis for defining the agenda of our committee." He suggested that an agenda subcommittee of the whole be created and also introduced a new topic, calling attention to the need to deal with the case "of the people who are still colonized." The chairman, after having heard and passed over comments by an Egyptian delegate and the Burmese delegate, reiterated the observation of his Syrian colleague concerning the commission's need to consider the problems of peoples still in colonial status, and again recognized his colleague.

Returning again to the question of organizing the committee's work, Mr. Dawalibi repeated his proposal that the committee operate as a unit, thus opposing the Egyptian and Sudanese proposals for the creation of subcommittees. After further inconclusive discussion on whether one, three, or four subcommittees should be organized, the chair finally recognized the Russian delegate, who proposed (a) a general discussion on the following day with the whole committee in attendance; (b) a decision in principle on the creation of subcommittees; and (c) a postponement of the decision of need for and number of subcommittees necessary until after the general discussion. His "suggestions" were promptly supported by the Chinese delegate, Chi Tao Ming, and thereafter by Palestine, the Sudan, and Egypt. In this manner the entire committee was held together (as had been originally proposed by the Syrian delegation) to hear the Soviet report, and an opportunity was created for the real discussion on convening subcommittees to take place outside the formal meeting. Four subcommittees (again a reflection of the Syrian delegate's insistence on a special consideration of the dependent countries) were in fact formed

*The most elaborate and lengthy reports presented at the Conference were those presented by Egypt and Syria to the Economic Commission. The Egyptian report had been prepared as far back as October by Adel Amin, an Egyptian Communist. The authors of the Syrian report are not known, but its content clearly reflects the close link which the writers must have had to the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Damascus in November. Significant similarity to the Egyptian and Syrian reports have also been noted in detailed and lengthy reports presented by individual members of the Ceylonese and Japanese delegations.

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on the following day: (a) the Commerce Exchange Subcommittee; (b) the Industrial and Agricultural Subcommittee; (c) the Labor and Cooperatives Subcommittee; and (d) the Dependent Countries Subcommittee.

1. Economic Struggle Against Colonialism - The Soviet Program is Presented

On the second day of deliberations, the Soviet delegate, Arzumaniyan, in his speech to the Economic Commission presented a Communist blueprint for economic development in Afro-Asia, repeating the usual Soviet offer of disinterested aid without strings to independent countries in Africa and Asia. Other aspects of his speech merit closer and more immediate priority attention.

First, he spoke in a curiously ambiguous manner. When proposing courses of action, he spoke as an Afro-Asian, exploiting the basic advantage offered by the admittance of the USSR to the Conference as a full and equal participant. At other points, particularly when making offers of assistance, he spoke as a representative of the Soviet bloc addressing Afro-Asian peoples. The significance of this dualism emerged later when the economic commission produced for all Afro-Asian countries resolutions on commerce, labor, and industrial development which were consistent with Mr. Arzumaniyan's recommendations, and a separate group of resolutions directed to the dependent countries, which called for struggle against inclusion of dependent African territories in the European Common Market program, condemned existing colonial development schemes, Colombo Plan, etc., and advocated acceptance only of such aid as was offered without strings.

Second, basing his presentation on the Soviet example, he suggested the essentials of a national economic development program which each Afro-Asian country could profitably adopt. The principal elements of this program were

a. Financing of industrial development through nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise.

b. State control of all foreign trade, with severe restriction of non-essential imports, to ensure direction of profits and benefits to productive purposes.

-15-

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c. Central economic planning, with emphasis upon the priority development of productive industrial capacity rather than upon consumer goods.

d. Maximum exploitation of raw materials exports in foreign markets to help defray costs of internal development.

In view of his offer of Soviet aid and technical assistance, "within the capabilities of the Soviet economy," it is interesting to note that he emphasized in this portion of his speech that economic development could be achieved, as he claimed it was in the Soviet Union, without foreign aid, if the proper techniques were employed.

Third, he suggested a cooperative economic program, to be undertaken by all Afro-Asian countries in concert, which would further contribute to economic development of the whole area. This cooperative program would involve the acceptance by the Afro-Asian group of such concepts as complementary national economies, the use of preferential and protective tariffs, and joint pricing of raw materials exports outside the Afro-Asian area to maximize profits. The program, which he related to the need to protect the Afro-Asian countries against unfair pressures of "new colonialism" of the European Common Market and the threat of plans for Eurafrikan development, contained what was in effect an endorsement in principle of the Egyptian call for the creation of an Afro-Asian common market, within which the USSR and its Asian satellites presumably would be included. But it went far beyond those ideas by calling for the integration of national economies in Africa and Asia. It was clear from the proceedings that the USSR was not disposed to commit itself in advance to such enterprises as were envisioned in the detailed Syrian, Egyptian, Japanese, and even Moroccan proposals.

Also, in this section of his speech, the Soviet delegate said that the Afro-Asian countries, "being dedicated to the principles of anti-colonialism naturally could not themselves indulge in the techniques of colonial plunder." This interesting statement, which followed his description of private investment of capital abroad as "the main imperialist device for plundering colonial territories," is a clear indication that in Communist opinion such operations by private capital are unacceptable even

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if carried out by the more advanced independent countries of Asia and Africa, such as India and Japan. Together with a statement of Mr. Sadek,* it makes clear that Soviet opposition to real Afro-Asian economic cooperation at this time will persist so long as the exclusion of the West from Afro-Asian economic affairs is not complete, and that it does not envision the assignment of any role in such development schemes to private capital.

Both the speech and the final resolutions on economic questions, which the Soviet delegation accepted, laid the groundwork for the piecemeal development of a system of economic cooperation, with the USSR in a position to control the pace and extent of the development.

Against this background, the emphasis placed on regionally integrated industrialization, with its acceptance of the interdependence of the participating states, clearly suggests the line along which Leninist "unity" is to be developed between the Soviet bloc and the free nations of Asia and Africa, as the slogan of "national self-determination" ceases to be valid.

2. The Question of Colonial Territories

The denunciation by the commission of the European Common Market and the related Eurafrika development plan had also

*Note: An informative illustration of the Communist capability to deal gracefully with problems which arise in such conferences is provided by a statement made on 28 December by an Egyptian delegate, Abd al Aziz Sadek (a long-time Egyptian Peace Partisan). When it appeared that the question of an Afro-Asian Common Market was getting too much attention, this man issued a statement that Egypt did not favor the creation of a common market because:

"1. The non-recognition of Communist China by certain countries constituted an obstacle to the common market.

"2. There was a possibility that certain Western powers would their control over certain territories in Asia and Africa to 'intrude' on the common market."

He then gently directed discussion into what the USSR considered proper terms at this time, by "proposing" that "African and Asian countries cooperate closely in the economic field through individual bilateral agreements."

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been foreshadowed elsewhere by Communist statements as far back as September 1957, when the World Peace Council publication, Horizons, published an article by Pierre Cot on "The Illusions of the Common Market." Joint declarations issued on 29 November and 5 December by the French Communist Party, together with leading representatives of the Communist parties of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, both incorporated this same attack on the Eurafrica plan. Other Moscow attacks on the Eurafrica plan were also made earlier in 1957. The Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow in fact made a contribution to this campaign at the end of the year by publishing a "Symposium" which contained articles from sixteen countries--all devoted to criticism of the Common Market program.

An important point which gradually emerged during the Cairo deliberations was that the question of the Eurafrican plan was viewed from two different aspects

- a. The unfavorable impact of the Eurafrican plan on the economic development of the independent countries of Afro-Asia, outside the plan area, whose economies would encounter competition from Eurafrica.
- b. The equally unfavorable impact of the plan on the African territories to be directly affected (e.g., North Africa, Black Africa) whose present subjugation to colonial domination would be enhanced by the operation of the plan.

3. The Final Resolutions

A comparison of the final proposals of the economic commission with the recommendations submitted by the various participants reveals the following. The Syrian recommendations on the propriety of nationalization, on encouraging governments to work for the development of joint plans and programs for economic development, plus the recommendations for support of colonial peoples struggling for freedom and independence, were incorporated in the final resolutions. The resolutions on economic, agricultural, and industrial cooperation and on action affecting labor and cooperatives reflected primarily the Egyptian submission. The recommendations concerning commercial exchange as finally presented to the Conference reflected the arguments presented by both the

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Egyptians and Syrians and incorporated specific secondary recommendations made by both of them, such as the need for a joint consultative body to deal with economic planning, proposals for exchange of commercial data, and support for a Cairo Conference of Chambers of Commerce (an Egyptian proposal).

However, all specific recommendations for such measures as the creation of a common economic development fund, a common market, a central bank (Moroccan proposal), an Asian-African payments union, etc., simply vanished. These very concrete proposals which had considerable support from members of the Japanese and Indian delegations, among others, appear to have been dropped without any significant discussion after the unenthusiastic Soviet attitude toward these recommendations was made clear in the speech delivered on the second day of the Conference.

Although many of the delegates came to this Conference, in spite of misgivings, because of their hope that one or more of these proposals might be endorsed, their failure to achieve anything tangible appears to have gone unnoticed.

But this was not merely a failure to achieve a desired end. It was, even more importantly, a major victory for the International Communist Movement which is now in a position to exploit for agitational purposes the alluring and generalized resolutions of the Conference, which define aspirations that are universally appealing, and courses of action which appear desirable. The movement can accept this wholeheartedly and yet remain free to maneuver and agitate over methods and specific steps to the advantage of its own cause.

C. The Cultural Commission

This commission functioned as a single body with Dr. Taha Hussein of Egypt as presiding officer and an Indian delegate, Professor R. V. Oturkar, as rapporteur. In this coherence it differed from the Political and Economic Commissions, which broke into subcommittees in spite of the desires of some delegations. The heads of the Chinese and Ghanian delegations participated in its deliberations, as did Dr. Louis Awad, the rapporteur of the Egyptian delegation. Proceedings went forward smoothly and consisted mainly of hearing proposals from many delegates. There was virtually no debate.

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The original Egyptian proposals were discussed and minor amendments were offered by the Ceylon, Indian, Japanese, and Burma delegations. These, however, were taken up with the rapporteur rather than in open discussion. The Syrian delegate offered at the second meeting a modifier of the preamble to the Egyptian resolution. This statement which "politicalized" the entire content of the recommendations highlighted "the role played by culture in the development of political, economic, and social solidarity."

The Soviet delegate on the commission extended the invitation to Afro-Asian writers to participate in the second Asian Writers' Conference to be held in Tashkent in October 1958.

The final meeting of the commission adopted the original Egyptian recommendations with the addition of only the Syrian amendment described above and a proposal for the creation of national translation bureaus.

Four additional recommendations were approved--one on teaching of the major languages of Africa and Asia, one on scholarships for Algerian students, one calling for an annual Afro-Asian cultural prize, and one calling on governments to combat illiteracy.

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II. STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT

The Organization Commission of the Conference comprised the heads of all national delegations. However, in a number of instances--as in the USSR delegation, for example--less prominent delegates were present who either directed the actions of delegation leaders or were authorized to speak for them.

Little is known about the deliberations of this commission, but the results of its actions merit close study. The final resolution on organization approved the creation of an Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council and a permanent secretariat. This is the culmination of an organizing effort which began three years ago. These bodies, which have not to date (August 1958) been completely staffed, have not yet begun to function. In the interim the Egyptian committee is operating in their stead and appears to be concentrating on the translation and dissemination of some of the Conference speeches. Preparation of material for the vitriolic "Voice of Free Africa" is also being carried out.

On the basis of data so far received, the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and its permanent bodies are, roughly, regional equivalents of the World Peace Movement and its organs, the Executive Bureau and Secretariat.

It is like the WPC in that

a. It encompasses all kinds of people, as distinguished from the other major fronts, which specialize in appealing to one specific group--trade unionists, youth, lawyers.

b. It has espoused as one of its primary tasks the same basic program to which the WPC is dedicated, i.e., the campaign for peace--on Soviet terms.

c. There is no evidence that the Council and Secretariat are constitutionally responsible to the Conference which authorized their creation. (In the WPC the Secretariat is self-perpetuating and not responsible to the World Peace Council; the Executive Bureau of the WPC is nominated by the

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Secretariat; there is no mechanism or procedure for direct nomination by the Council.)

It differs from the World Peace Movement--and avoids a major defect of that organization--in one essential. It has a second positive mission, through which it can reach and influence others who are not Communists. This mission is its support of national liberation movements. In this it can serve as a focus and coordinating center, bringing together all Communist front activity in the Afro-Asian area, whether it be in youth, labor, professional fields, women, etc. The organization of "Algeria Day" programs on 30 March throughout the Afro-Asian area was its main project so far, and at the national level Communist parties have invariably played key roles in these programs.

The organization and charter of the Council is still unclear. All that is known is that every country in the two continents is entitled to have one member of the Council, to be nominated by the national committee. The Council will convene when called by the Secretariat and will meet at least once each year. From this limited information it seems clear, however, that the principal function of the Council will be that of a rubber stamp, to approve in retrospect the actions of the Secretariat. The provision for individual nominations to the Council is also of interest, because it facilitates Communist control of the body (through the close-knit international party mechanism) and inhibits joint action by the free nations of Africa and Asia, which lack any equivalent device.

The Secretariat, composed of a Secretary General and ten secretaries, is given virtual carte blanche so far as its mission and internal structure is concerned. The Egyptian committee was given the right to select the Secretary General (for one year!); the ten other national committees authorized to designate one secretary each were Cameroons, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, the Sudan, Syria, the USSR, and Ghana. There has been an unexplained delay in the selection of secretaries. The Soviet secretary, Abd al Ghaffar Abd al Rashidov, the first to arrive in Cairo, did so in early March. The Chinese member, Yang Shuo, arrived in Cairo 5 May.

Both the method of selection and the specific countries selected are of critical importance in determining the future of Communist control of this strategic body.

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a. A precedent has been established by which, at a second conference, the key post of Secretary General can be handed to a Communist, from either a Bloc country or even a Free World country where CP domination of the national committee is complete.

b. The precedent has been established by which any country not considered a reliable ally by the Soviet Bloc can easily be prevented from gaining a seat on the Secretariat.

Two seats on the Secretariat are already Communist-controlled. For other seats Communists or crypto-Communists are likely to be designated, although the decisions have not as yet been made. The countries to be represented are India, Syria, and the Sudan. In at least one of these, however, there is already evidence that the national committee is deadlocked in making its choice. It is impossible at present to determine whether Communist influence in the national committees of the Cameroons, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, and Ghana is sufficiently strong to lead to the designation of an individual who is, overtly or covertly, subject to Communist party discipline or to control by a clandestine arm of a Soviet Bloc government.

The question is not, however, being left completely to chance, if the Secretariat follows a reported plan for the internal division of labor and the specific assignments of the individual country secretaries.

Four main committees have in fact been provided for

- a. Political
- b. Social
- c. Economic
- d. Liaison.

It is reported that within these main committees specific assignments for country secretaries have been distributed as follows:

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- a. Ghana (Social Committee) - Youth and Social Services
- b. India (Economic Committee) - Labor and Cooperatives
- c. Japan (Political Committee) - Nuclear Weapons
- d. Indonesia (Liaison Committee) - Asian States
- e. Iraq (Liaison Committee) - Arab States
- f. Sudan (Liaison Committee) - African States

On the basis of the activities of the Conference itself, and of general knowledge concerning the activities of the national Communist parties of the Afro-Asian area, these assignments cannot be considered fortuitous. Rather, they reflect a particularly apt division of labor from the Communist point of view, in which a particular strength or special function of the respective national Communist party would tend to improve its chances for exerting influence.

a. In Ghana the youth groups are the bodies to which local Communists and pro-Soviet extremists have directed their main efforts.

b. In India, Communist Party mass organization is strongest in both labor and peasant bodies, and major unity campaigns are being conducted in both fields. It is, further, enlightening to note that A. K. Gopalan, the leading Communist in the Indian delegation to Cairo, is a member of the Politburo of the CP, president of the Party's peasant organization, and a formulator and leading spokesman for the current Party policy of aggressive unity campaigns in both the labor and agricultural cooperatives fields. The main points of the Cairo resolutions on these matters followed closely the main lines of a key speech he made in August 1957 to the Conference of the Party's peasant movement--the All-India Kisan Sabha.

c. Again, the Japanese Communist Party has had major success in developing and dominating the front campaigns on the nuclear weapons issue. The speech by YASUI Kaoru

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at Cairo on the topic was the most intemperate address delivered by any Japanese delegate, and it faithfully echoed the Soviet, Chinese, and World Peace Council line on the topic.

d. The designation of Sudan to handle liaison with the African countries is also enlightening. In this regard, the statements made by the Sudanese Communist Izzal Din Amer, quoted elsewhere in this paper, reveal that this function is precisely the one which most closely fits the capabilities of the Sudanese party.

e. The designation of Indonesia and Iraq to equally critical liaison tasks is also significant. The Iraqi delegation to the Conference was drawn from the Left-Nationalist opposition at home and in exile, in a country in which official policy was, at least at that time, contrary to that advocated by the Conference. Such elements, which have heretofore accepted the cooperation of the Iraqi Communist Party, are admirably suited to serve as a bridge to dissident elements in the other Arab states, and at the same time, as a channel through which Iraqi Communists can exert influence by providing clandestine communication links, introductions to Party members in other countries, advice, and other useful services.

In Indonesia the strength, international contacts, and favorable position of the Communist Party, which has succeeded in identifying itself as a leading element in the campaign for recovery of West Irian, again would tend to give it considerable leverage in gaining control of and exploiting this position.

It remains to be determined what functions will be assigned to the secretaries from the USSR and China, the Cameroons, and Syria, all of which are of critical importance to Communist control of the Secretariat. It also remains to be seen what individuals actually are designated to these positions.

On the basis of the events at the Conference it appears likely that either the USSR or the Syrian member would head the Economic Committee, with the other designee taking responsibility for a subcommittee on commercial relations or national economic policy. China is a logical candidate to head the Social Committee. It is impossible to envisage the function likely to be assigned to the Cameroonian secretary.

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III. THE CONFERENCE AND BLACK AFRICA

With the exception of the Ghanian and Ethiopian delegations, which attended primarily as observers with the approval of their respective governments, and the Cameroon delegation, which represented an undeniably significant (although illegal) political element, the numerous "delegations" which claimed to represent Black Africa at Cairo were largely composed of individuals currently residing in Cairo. These, as well as others such as the representatives of the French Sudan, have at best very dubious bases for their claims to be representative of politically significant groups. Many, such as the Kenya representatives, are in fact students in Cairo whose education is being subsidized by the Egyptian authorities.

Few such "representatives," however, have been repudiated by the groups or countries they claimed to represent; and there is a hazard that they may in course of time be considered "representatives approved by default".

One such self-designated representative who was openly repudiated was Joseph Garang, native of the Southern Sudan. He nevertheless went to Cairo and was officially listed as a member of the Sudanese delegation, as a representative of the Southern Liberal Party. Prior to his departure from Khartoum, however, the secretary general of the Southern Liberal Party had publicly disavowed him and announced that he represented no one except himself--and the Communist Party, of which he has been a member for some time. It is also interesting to note that he was not included in the list of official Sudanese delegates released in Khartoum by the all-Party committee which chose the official Sudanese delegation.

The caliber and character of most of the Black African "representatives" is clearly revealed in the following items based on official transcripts of representative speeches and statements:

- a. John Kamwidhi (allegedly a student resident in Cairo), self-styled "leader of the Kenya delegation," delivered a strange parody of the American Declaration of Independence, incorporating praise for such degenerate Mau Mau terrorists as "Marshal" China, "Field Marshal" Kimathi and "Marshal" Mathenye, and repeated denunciations of the British security

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practices. He also described Kenya political organizations, identifying Mr. Arquings Khodek as president of the Nairobi District African National Congress, "the only strong body," and listed as three other "repressed" bodies, the North, Central, and South Nyanza African Associations.

b. A Nigerian delegate (speaking in the subcommittee on imperialism on the question of choosing a president for the committee): "I propose we elect alternatively different presidents from Africa and Asia."

Chairman pro tem: "This is not very clear; if I understand properly, everyone would become president."

c. The spokesman for the Chad delegation aroused considerable apprehension at the Conference when he called for the provision of arms to a "United African Army" which, he said, would then carry out the war to eliminate colonial oppression.

There is, however, evidence which suggests that considerable effort was expended without success by the Egyptians in attempts to bring more competent and impressive delegates from Black Africa to the Conference. Invitations were conveyed to such prominent personalities as Tom Mboya of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, and Diallo Seydou of French West Africa, but all of them failed to attend. It seems likely that their non-appearance resulted either from their own lack of enthusiasm or, more significantly, from the disfavor with which their organizations viewed the gathering. Other figures from East Africa, according to Egyptian broadcasts, allegedly received clandestine invitations and offers of aid for clandestine travel to Cairo via the Sudan. But in spite of such "opportunities" to evade the travel restrictions certain to be imposed by colonial administrations, virtually all East African invitees appeared to find it less compromising and politically more profitable to follow the normal procedures of applying for passports and official permission to travel, knowing full well that permission would be denied. These executive actions they--and the Egyptian radio as well--have since exploited in post-Conference propaganda. This course was adopted by a five-man delegation from Zanzibar, three men from Kenya, and two from Tanganyika.

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Communist participation from Black Africa was in fact very limited; but this fact may have been the outgrowth of local political problems with which these elements are currently concerned.

Perhaps the most interesting and enlightening reaction to the Conference by the Communist-oriented elements in Black Africa was the treatment given the Conference in the 27 December issue of the South African New Age weekly. A factual and generally favorable half-page story concerning the opening of the Conference was published side by side with a reprint of the manifesto issued by the Egyptian Communist Party in July 1957, which was published at that time by Humanite and Unita, the newspapers of the Communist Parties of France and Italy. This manifesto, which states clearly (for a Communist audience, at least) the reservations and limits conditioning Communist endorsement of the Nasser regime, seems likely to have been published in this way to aid the Communist reader to understand the true character and significance of the Conference and the cautious enthusiasm with which the paper treated the event. The 8 December issue of CP India's New Age used precisely the same device, printing the manifesto on one page along with a CP Egypt criticism of Nasser's domestic policy; a report concerning the Cairo Conference was on the adjacent page.

In spite of the existence of significant Communist-oriented elements among the nationalist groups in French Equatorial and West Africa, and the issuance of invitations to local affiliates of the World Peace Council, their participation at Cairo was minimal. Travel difficulties alone cannot be held responsible, for paid passages were made available by the Secretariat of the Conference, and Communist student and trade union personalities from the area have usually managed in the past to overcome this obstacle when the event was considered important. But a number of Black African Communists decided to forego attending even such major activities as the Vth World Youth Festival in Moscow and the WFTU Congress in Leipzig in 1957 to avoid exposing themselves to local denunciation. On the basis of information gleaned earlier in 1957 it is also considered likely that this most mature component of Communism in Black Africa is well-aware of the fact that many non-Communist and anti-Communist nationalists, as a result of their experiences with Arab residents in their own countries, also find Egyptian pan-Arabism and expansionism distasteful. It is also likely that some Communists share this

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attitude and do not yet fully understand and/or enthusiastically accept the Soviet-inspired strategy of collaboration with Nasser-Arab nationalism in advancing the anti-colonial struggle in Africa. This general problem is reflected in the speech delivered by Firmin Joseph Abalo, delegate from Togo, which reflects this attitude of Central African nationalists:

"There is finally a problem which should not escape us, and with which Central Africa will request that the Conference concern itself, to try to find possible solutions. It is the attitude of the Syro-Lebanese.

"You no doubt know (at least the Central African delegations) that Syrian and Lebanese citizens are engaged in commerce in our countries. Their behavior toward the local population is like that of the European colonialists, and they are in general allied with them to exploit our people. On the political level as well they side with the imperialists.

"Our masses have difficulty understanding us when we explain to them that all the countries of Africa and Asia--including the Syrians and Lebanese in consequence--are united in the same struggle for their liberation from imperialist domination. These masses, we say, cannot understand how their Asian friends continue to fight against us in the camp of our aggressors."

There is in fact no reason to believe that in its choice of means of influencing Africa the USSR and International Communism are placing undue emphasis and reliance upon the Afro-Asian Solidarity organization and support for Nasser's aspirations. Trade union and youth groups throughout Africa have long been cultivated directly, and the problems attendant upon simultaneously exploiting African nationalism and strengthening Communism in Black Africa have already been recognized within the International Movement. An article by A. Zusmanovich, published in August 1957 in the second issue of the new Soviet academic publication on Afro-Asia, Contemporary East, sheds light on this aspect of the Soviet attitude toward Africa. While it grants that "at the present stage of development the liberation movement in the African colonies is headed by the national bourgeoisie," the

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main emphasis in the article is on the developing strength of trade unionism and the need to integrate that strength into the anti-colonial effort.

"The African working class must clash with the colonizers because the basic enterprises using hired labor belong to foreign corporations. Therefore the struggle of the working class is becoming an integral part of the all-people, national, anti-imperialist movement."

This "assessment" is clearly not a new one; but in the past it has been largely restricted to trade union circles. From the abundant proof that an intensive campaign has been carried out by the WFTU and its African offshoots since 1955 to involve non-Communist African trade unionists in united front arrangements at the national level two conclusions emerge.

(a) The USSR continues to place high priority on establishing Communist domination of African trade unions as the main instrument for influencing and dominating the national liberation effort in the area.

(b) Because the efforts made between 1946 and 1955 to pull African labor bodies directly into the Communist camp by working through Communist trade union bodies in the mother countries have largely failed, the current intent is to exploit unity of action in economic struggle against colonialism at the local and national level as a different route to the same end.

Communist-dominated African unions have in fact been permitted to disaffiliate from the WFTU, as a tactical measure only, in order to make their unity proposals more palatable locally, and they have been accepted in some national and regional bodies as a result. But their ability to exploit these gains is limited as long as the trade unions do not become (a) involved in violent conflict with local government, (b) identified with the extremist elements of the national liberation movement, and/or (c) combined in broader regional bodies and thus open to Communist exploitation of the opportunity to manipulate their organizational skills, common perspective, and parallel lines of coordination and direction which operate through the International Communist Movement.

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The Afro-Asian solidarity strategy is obviously viewed as a means of encouraging and controlling this rapprochement, while keeping the nature and extent of the Communist influence in the process concealed. But the holding of the Cairo Conference and the establishment of the Council and Secretariat are by no means adequate organizational measures in themselves.

Other measures are being taken. These measures appear likely to involve the assumption by the Communist Party of the Sudan and its cadres of an important task--that of becoming a bridge, intermediary, buffer, and source of support, between the pro-Communist movement in the Arab World and at least some of the national liberation forces of Black Africa. A post-Conference speech by a leading Sudanese Communist broadcast from Cairo to the Sudan deals with this extremely significant question:

Broadcast Interview with Dr. Izzal-Din Amir, Secretary of the Sudanese Delegation to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference - 29 December 1957

"The AASC is an extension of the Bandung Conference of 1955. . . . The present Conference represents a bigger force as it represents the people. . . . The Conference is of greater importance to the African countries whose case has not been considered on an international level. There are several African nations struggling for independence, the peoples of the Cameroons, Tanganyika, Uganda, and others The leaders of the peoples represented after reaching an understanding can exert pressure upon their governments so as to present a united front in the United Nations, thus forming an international bloc which may save the world from the dangers of war."

Question: "What is the role to be played in the Conference by the Sudanese delegation?"

Answer: "The Sudan by its own geographical and political position constitutes a bridge between the Middle East and the Arab League on the one hand, and the heart of Africa which is still under the yoke of imperialism, on the other. The Sudan should be spokesman of the African nations which are waging a bitter struggle against imperialism. Furthermore, it has its role which it must play in the support of the Arab cause"

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and the Arab liberation trends led by Egypt and Syria. The Sudan as a newly independent and an uncommitted country is more capable of acting than some other Arab or African countries which have joined certain alliances.

"The Sudan did not achieve independence until two years ago. . . . However, in spite of the short period available, the Sudan has made important contacts with the African countries. The latest example is that of the Cameroons. The Sudan was able to reach some liberation movements in Tanganyika and Uganda. It also worked to facilitate the travel of some of these countries' delegations to Cairo to attend the present Conference. . . . There are several close links between the Sudan's cause and that of the African countries. The Sudan had experience with imperialism. The methods used by the imperialists in Tanganyika or in Uganda are very similar to those used in southern Sudan to isolate it, and to keep it in a primitive state. . . . The Afro-Asian countries should take action against this European common market or the alleged free trade area."

Key figures among the Communist-influenced African nationalists, such as Felix Moumie, are now active in Khartoum as well as Cairo. There is evidence of cooperation between Sudanese Communists and Egyptians in attempts to bring people to the Conference clandestinely from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and other central African territories. These factors increase the likelihood that the Sudan will in fact fill the role outlined above. Further, the ability of the Communist movement to coordinate Black African activities of the international fronts with those of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council is enhanced by the introduction of Sudanese nationals into leading positions in the executive bodies and secretariats of most of the major international fronts.

Some post-Conference broadcasts from Cairo to Black Africa strongly suggested that the Egyptians at least were sensitive to the possibility that their appeal to Black Africa was being adversely affected by charges that the Conference was Communist-inspired and dominated. They have tried to refute these charges by pointing out the contradictions between the repressive measures generally taken by Communist governments and the demands for freedom of speech, assembly, etc., for which the Conference called in its resolutions.

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IV. TREATMENT OF THE CONFERENCE WITHIN THE SOVIET BLOC

It was apparent as the Conference convened that the countries of the Soviet bloc were eager to exploit it as a topic for domestic propaganda as well as for foreign output. Such domestic propaganda efforts have in the past been made in connection with the activities of the international Communist fronts, but with the possible exception of the VIth World Youth Festival no single such event has in past years received as extensive and enthusiastic treatment by both the USSR and China.

The processing for Chinese audiences was noteworthy for the following reasons:

- a. Delegates upon their return to China inflated the statistics concerning attendance: Kuo Mo-jo on 9 February said to a 1,500-man Peiping rally that 508 delegates representing fifty Afro-Asian countries were present (actual participation was forty-three countries).
- b. The Conference was described to Chinese audiences, who were already familiar with the 1955 Bandung Conference, as "a continuation and development of the Bandung Conference," "unity (reached) at a higher level," and as having produced a "common program of action." This line was echoed by the Japanese CP and by Soviet broadcasts in Japanese.
- c. The resolutions of the Conference were represented as "a powerful support to the Peace Manifesto of the sixty-four Communist and Workers' Parties at Moscow." This line was again echoed by the Japanese CP and replayed by Moscow in Japanese.
- d. The theme most insistently reiterated was that the Conference represented "two-thirds of the people of the earth"; "more than one billion, 600 million people"; the slogan "The Wind Blows From the East" was hammered in press and radio treatments. This thesis the USSR also propagated.
- e. To heighten the impression of the strength and determination of the Black African participants, the Chinese also published and broadcast dramatic (but false) stories concerning delegates travelling to Cairo on foot from Black Africa.

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f. China also placed considerable emphasis upon evidence of her close rapprochement with Egypt. New China-Egypt and Egypt-China Friendship Societies launched simultaneously in both countries in January 1958, were linked with the Conference in propaganda output.

In general, the primary Chinese emphasis was directed at demonstrating, even through direct falsification, the strength and vitality of the Afro-Asian response to the Solidarity Conference. Even Free World commentaries which, while generally unfavorable to the Conference, stated that the event had to be taken seriously were quoted extensively to Bloc audiences to prove this thesis. The Chinese also were more ready to acknowledge the relationship of the Conference to the future of Communist parties throughout Africa and Asia, and less interested in highlighting the Moslem-Arab role in the Conference.

Treatment for Soviet Audiences

Moscow's treatment of the Conference differed in emphasis from that of the Chinese. Although it too emphasized the weight and size of the forces allegedly represented, and predicted that "the weapon of solidarity will be used even more frequently in the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa" (Leontyev, Soviet Home Service, 2 February 1958), it emphasized even more the following themes:

- a. The peoples of Afro-Asia have become convinced that the USSR is the true friend, mighty ally.
- b. The West was stunned, confused, and alarmed by the Conference.
- c. The "slandering" by the West of the Conference as Communist-inspired and dominated has failed to impress the Afro-Asian countries.
- d. New plots and countermeasures are being drummed up to counter the effects of the Conference.
- e. The "colonialists'" attempts to prevent delegates from attending the Conference failed.

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The Soviet domestic treatment placed emphasis upon the value of the Conference as an aid to the campaign for peace and incorporated the Conference in its ever-growing list of targets for future "imperialist plots." It also showed the higher level of Soviet sensitivity to the exposure of the Communist inspiration and domination of the Conference and its concern over the reactions of Afro-Asian governments which it so assiduously seeks to cultivate. The USSR also publicized the Conference resolutions on the rights of the Palestine Arabs and concentrated, more than China did, upon the extent of Moslem participation in the gathering.

One broadcast on the Soviet Home Service, made during the period of greatest concentration on the Conference, is of particular interest. In this broadcast the speaker, Eugene Gusarov, placed his emphasis upon a description of the extent to which "the young African proletariat has entered the path of the national liberation movement." Statistics on the growth of the trade union movement in Nigeria and French West Africa were presented; Nigeria, the Cameroons, and Kenya were the main territories credited with "significant advances" and described as the scenes of the "severest struggles".

The broadcast strongly suggests that it is to these countries and this proletariat that the USSR looks for the organization and leadership of effective national liberation movements in the area, but it is noteworthy that there was virtually no representation of this "African proletariat" at Cairo.

Perhaps the most interesting fact concerning the propaganda treatment was the virtually complete omission, from both the Soviet and Chinese early domestic output, of any extensive description of the Soviet delegate Arzumaniyan's suggestions to the Afro-Asian countries about the organization of their domestic economic programs. Both treat his description of the extent and disinterested nature of Soviet aid, his description of the evils attendant upon acceptance of Western imperialist aid, and his endorsement of nationalization of foreign enterprise as a source of capital. His blueprint for effective economic development was finally reported at some length in the Soviet journal Contemporary East in March 1958.

Another fact worthy of note was the extent to which the Soviet outlets quoted, as the authoritative voice of the Egyptian hosts

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on key questions, statements and interviews with Khalid Mukhi-al-Din, the leading Egyptian Communist active at the Conference, and other Egyptians closely associated with him, such as the Foreign Editor of his newspaper, Al Masaa, and Yussuf Hilmi of the Egyptian Peace Partisans. Mukhi-al-Din's address on imperialism was reported at length in the Russian language magazine, Contemporary East, in March 1958.

The USSR also insured the widest distribution possible of the resolutions adopted at the Conference by issuing a special supplement containing all the resolutions as an enclosure to issue No. 3 (16 January 1958) of its publication New Times.

Polish output concerning the gathering was limited, but it did contribute two special notes:

- a. It acknowledged the existence of "differences separating Afro-Asian countries," and "serious obstacles to the convening of a second official Conference of the countries of Afro-Asia."
- b. It characterized the resolutions as "condemnation of the opportunism of some Afro-Asian countries which show a lack of consistency in their statements in the international area."

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APPENDIX I

KEY NON-BLOC PERSONALITIES ATTENDING
THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE, CAIRO

Note: This list identifies, by country, those delegates from non-Bloc countries who are of particular interest because of their past activities in or association with Soviet and/or Communist activities. The numbers following their names indicate their classification as follows:

- (1) Suspect Soviet collaborators
- (2) Communist Party members
- (3) Crypto-Communists
- (4) Fellow-travellers and sympathizers.

Japan

DAN Tokusaburo - (1); (2); General Secretary of the Japan Asian Solidarity Committee; Japan Peace Council; World Peace Council.

NAGASHIMA Masao - (2); President of the Organ Papers News Agency.

HONGO Shin - (2).

*KOYAMA Itoko - (2).

YAMADA Chokichi - (3)

OGATA Shoji - (3); member Japan Peace Council.

HATANAKA Masaharu - (3); journalist.

ABE Masao - (2); Japan Asian Solidarity Committee; interpreter.

KAI Shizuma - (4); Middle East expert and adviser; interpreter.

YASUI Kaoru - (4); Director General of Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

*Not included on official Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Secretariat lists of delegates, but otherwise reported attending.

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SONODA Sunao - (4); Member of Parliament; vice-chairman of Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Preparatory Committee.

YOSHIMURA Hiroyuke - (4); Japan Teachers' Union functionary (SOHYO affiliate); pro-Communist, liaison to Peace Movement; advocate Afro-Asian trade union conference.

Sudan

Izz-al-Din 'Ali AMIR - (2); Anti-Imperialist Front.

*Joseph GARANG - (2); lawyer in Sulayman's employ; Southern Liberal Party member.

Abd-al-Majid Muhammad ABU-HASABU - (2); may be an "ex-Communist"; "ousted" by Communists as member of Executive Committee of Graduates Union in 1954.

Ubayd Hasan HAMID - (2); self-professed former Communist; leftist; now member of National Liberation Party.

Ahmad SULAYMAN - (1); (2); key Party leader; lawyer; member of International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL).

*Abd-al-Majid Abd-al-MAHAB - (2); lawyer; partner of SULAYMAN.

Abdullah RAJAB - (4); editor of CP newspaper al-Sahara.

Ali Muhammad IBRAHIM - (2); lawyer.

El Sayed Abd-al RAHMAN - (4); Minister of Interior.

**Mohammed Uthman MAHJUB - (4); Sudanese-Russian Friendship Society; brother of Secretary General Sudan CP.

Abdullah UBAYD - (1); (2); also reported to be Egyptian and Yugoslav agent.

*Not included on official Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Secretariat lists of delegates; but otherwise reported attending.

**Listed as delegate in official Secretariat document; attended, but not official member of delegation as originally constituted.

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Egypt

Khalid MUKNI-AL-DIN - (2); Editor, al-Masaa, alleged prospective Secretary General of unified Egyptian Communist Party.

Note: Not named in the final official list of delegates, although he chaired the subcommittee on imperialism.

Zakariya Lutfi GOMAA - (1); probably (2); member Egyptian National Assembly; Conference "advance man" to Africa.

Muhammad HANAFTI - (4); Peace Partisan; Conference "advance man" to Far East.

Lutfi AL-KHURI - (2); Peace Partisan; journalist, al-Masaa.

Louis AWAD - (2); journalist, Shaab.

Fuad MUHYI-AL-DIN - probably (2); physician.

Ibrahim RASHAD - probably (2); (4); Peace Partisan; former Under Secretary of State.

Fathi KAMEL - (4); labor leader; attended WFTU Congress, Leipzig; associate of Chinese and Soviet labor leaders; advocate of Afro-Asia Labor Conference.

Salah ABD-AL-HAFIZ - (4); attended IADL meeting, Italy, May 1957; Afro-Asian Lawyers' Conference, Damascus, November 1957; IADL meeting, Moscow, November 1957.

Mahmoud AL-HINAWI - (4); attended IADL meeting, Italy, May 1957; Afro-Asian Lawyers' Conference, Damascus, November 1957; IADL meeting, Moscow, November 1957.

Note: Fifty-Five other persons were members of the Egyptian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Of twenty-nine identified on this committee, ten are known or probable Communists.

Ceylon

Eva RANAWEERA - (2); secretary of delegation.

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Ceylon (Cont'd)

K. L. V. ALAGIYAWANNA - (4); teacher; leader of delegation.

Ian VANDERDRIESEN - (2); lecturer at University of Ceylon.

Indonesia

*Bintang SURADI - probably (1), (2); leftist writer; on editorial board of PKI publication; wife member PKI women's front.

SUROSO - (4); Secretary General Indonesian Peace Committee.

Siradjuddin ABBAS - (4); Deputy Chairman of Indonesian Peace Committee.

Mohammad PADANG - (2); Peace Partisan.

Syria

Mustafa AMIN - (2); Secretary General Syrian Peace Committee; member of Central Committee CP Syria.

Nasim EL-MOUSLI (MUSALI) - (2); professor; Peace Partisan; attended Conference for Relaxation International Tensions, New Delhi, 1955.

Fakhir AL-AQIL - (4); professor at university; attended Conference for Relaxation of International Tensions.

Ihsan EL-JABRI - (4).

Miss Amal JAZAIRI - (4); Syria-USSR Cultural Committee. President, Arab Women's Federation.

Fouad KADRI - (4).

Mohammed Kheir FARES - (2).

Mustafa BADAOUI - (4); Peace Partisan.

*Late arrival--not shown in official list, but actually present.

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Syria (Cont'd)

Maruf DAWALIBI - (4); former Minister; has participated in several WPC-sponsored conferences, including Conference for Relaxation of International Tensions.

Zafir AL-QASIMI - (4).

Ali BUZU - (4); Peace Partisan; Kurd; Deputy and ex-Minister.

Hussein MURAYWID - (4); Member of Parliament; has visited Moscow; attended Conference for Relaxation of International Tensions (1954).

Lebanon

Georges HANNA - (4); President of Lebanese Peace Committee.

Ali JABER - (2).

Mohammed EL-KHATTAB - (2); Peace Partisan; lawyer.

*Hussein SEJ'ANE - (4); Peace Partisan.

Raif KHURI - (2); writer.

Salah EL-ASIR - (4); writer and poet.

Emile EL-HAYEK - (2).

Jibran MAJDALANI - (4); Peace Partisan.

Dr. Ali SAAD - (4); Peace Partisan.

*Hussayn MURUWWAH - (4); Peace Partisan.

India

Mrs. Rameshwari NEHRU - (4); Peace Partisan; president of Indo-Soviet Cultural Society; president of Indian Asian Solidarity Committee; leader of delegation.

*Not included on official Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Secretariat lists; but otherwise reported attending.

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India (Cont'd)

Dr. Anup SINGH - (4); Vice Chairman of Indian Asian Solidarity Committee; Peace Partisan.

A. K. GOPALAN - (2); Member of Parliament and Politburo, CP India.

V. K. DHAGE - (4); Member of Parliament; in 1953 Vice President of Friends of Soviet Union, Hyderabad.

M. KALIMULLAH - (4); member of Secretariat of Indian Association for Asian Solidarity.

Mrs. Perin CHANDRA - (2); member of Secretariat of Indian Association for Asian Solidarity; wife of member of Central Committee of CPI; Peace Partisan.

Romesh CHANDRA - (2); member Central Committee, CPI.

Burma

U Thein Pe MYINT - (4); Member of Parliament; confirmed Communist-liner on international issues.

U Hla GYAW - (4); Secretary of Burmese Asian Solidarity Committee.

U Khin NYUNT - (4); leftist student leader; recently delegate to WFDY Conference, Kiev; Joint Secretary of Burmese Asian Solidarity Committee.

Cameroons

Felix R. MOUMIE - (4); Peace Partisan.

Mme. Marthe EKEMEYONG - (4); Chief Editor of publication of Democratic Union of Cameroon Women (WIDF affiliate).

Mme. Marthe EDING - (4); Joint Secretary General of Democratic Union of Cameroon Women.

Iraq

Abd-al-Wahab MAHMOUD - (4); ex-Minister.

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Iraq (Cont'd)

Qasim HASSAN - (4); lawyer.

Aziz SHARIF - (2); journalist; lawyer; resident in Syria; leading Iraqi Peace Partisan; close associate of Khalid Bakdash.

Hussein GAMIL - (4); ex-Minister.

Abdul YASRY - (4); lawyer; Peace Partisan.

Jordan

Youssef al-BANDAK - (4).

Fouad NASSER - (2); leader of CP Jordan.

Yehya HAMMOUDA - (4); secretary of Jordan Solidarity Committee.

Zeidan YOUNIS - (4); labor leader.

Abdel Rahman SHOUKEIR - (2).

Kuwait

Ahmed al-KHATTIB - (4).

Somalia

Ahmad Omar al-AZHARI - (4); attended VI World Youth Festival, Moscow.

French Sudan

Diallo ALIOU - (4); Vice President of (French) Sudanese Peace Committee.

Sow ABDOULAYE - (4); Vice President of (French) Sudanese Peace Committee.

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APPENDIX II

KEY BLOC PERSONALITIES ATTENDING
THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE, CAIRO

Note: This list identifies delegates from the countries of the Soviet bloc.

USSR

1. Rashidov, Sharaf Rahidovich - Chairman of Presidium of Uzbek Supreme Soviet; Deputy Chairman, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
2. Mirzo, Tursun Zade - Chairman, Tadzhik Republic Peace Committee; Chairman of Board of Union of Soviet Writers of Tadzhikistan.
3. Sofronov, Anatoly Vladimirovich - Chief editor of newspaper, Ogonek.
4. Abasov, Kurban Abas-Kuliogli - Member Central Committee of Oil Workers Union; Deputy to Supreme Soviet.
5. Azimov, Pigan Azimovich - Rector of University of Turkmenistan; Deputy to Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan; Deputy to Supreme Soviet of Turkmen, SSR.
6. Aldabergenov, Nurmolda
7. Arzumanyan, Apushavan Agafonovich - Director of Economic Institute of Academy of Sciences; member of staff of Problems of Economics.
8. Babakhanov, Ziyautdin - Chairman of Religious Board of Moslems of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan.
9. Bultrikov, Balzham
10. Bazanov, Nikolai Ivanovich - possible corresponding member of USSR Academy of Sciences.
11. Zhukov, Yevgeny Mikhailovich - Director of Pacific Institute; Deputy Director of Institute of History; corresponding member of USSR Academy of Sciences.

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12. Zulfeija
13. Kenjebayev, Salibakas
14. Kotov, Mikhail Ivanovich - Secretary of Soviet Peace Committee; suspect member of CPSU Foreign Section.
15. Murtazayev, Kayum
16. Novgorodsky, Yuri Vladimirovich - Assistant Responsible Secretary of Soviet-Asian Solidarity Committee.

North Korea

17. Han Sul Ya - President, North Korean Association of Writers; Chairman, North Korean Peace Committee.
18. Ju Chang Joon - Vice Chairman, Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
19. Do Yoo Ho - Director of Institute of Archeology and Ethnography of Academy of Science, K DPR.
20. Whang Boung Koo

Mongolian People's Republic

21. Shirindyb
22. Ochir Damdindakje
23. Amgaguin Zubsandendel
24. Puntsaguin Iseren Isvodol
25. Vandanguin Gamma

Chinese People's Republic

26. Kuo Mo Jo - Vice President of World Peace Council (WPC).
27. Burhan Shahidi - Member of WPC Bureau; President of China-Islamic Association.

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Chinese People's Republic (Cont'd)

28. Chu Tu-Nan - Chairman, Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; member of World Peace Council.

29. Liu Ning-Yi - Member WPC Bureau; Vice President of WFTU; Vice President, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Vice President, All-China Federation of Trade Unions; member of CPIT.

30. Chang Jui-Fang

31. Chao Pu-Chu

32. Cheng Sheng-Yu - Secretary of WPC; member, Executive Committee of International Institute for Peace; Joint General Secretary of Chinese-Asian Solidarity Committee.

33. Chi Chao-Ting - Attended WPC meeting, Colombo; head of Economic and Technical delegation to West Europe.

34. Chin Chung-Hua

35. Chu Tzu-Chi - Attended WPC meeting, Colombo.

36. Han Yu-Tung

37. Hsieh Ping-Hsin

38. Liu Liang-Mo

39. Muhammed Makien

40. Majnour

41. Sheikh Nur Mohammed

42. Tang Ming-Chao - Member Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; attended WPC meeting, Colombo.

43. Teng Kuang

44. Tung Hsin

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- 45. Wang Kuang-Ving
- 46. Wu Han - Member, Central Committee of China Democratic League;
member of Budget Committee of WPC.

47. Yang Yu

48. Yang Chung-Sung

North (DRV) Viet Nam

49. Dr. Xuan Thus Amp

50. Bui Thai Cam

51. Tran Van Luan

52. Nguyen Xuan Tran

53. Nguyen Viem Hai

54. Do Xuan Oanh

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APPENDIX III

OFFICIAL LIST OF DELEGATES

The list given below is the final official list of delegates issued by the Secretariat of the Cairo Conference.

Names have not been corrected, but are reported as given in the official list.

El Bahrain Delegation

Mr. Nasser El Said
Mr. Youssif El Rois

Algerian Delegation

Dr. Mohamed Al Amin
Mr. Ahmed Tawfic El Madani
Mr. Yousseff Ben Kada
Mr. Ahmed Ben Katat
Mr. Saad Dahlab
Mr. Mohamed Ben Yahia
Mr. Mostafa Ben Mohamed
Mr. Mohamed Jaj Hamo
Mr. Mohamed El Habra
Mr. Nafea Rajati
Sheikh Hamed Rouehia
Mr. El Arabi Damaa El Atrous
Mr. Moustafa El Akhal
Mr. Ibrahim Rffah
Mr. Abou Raghida Ismail
Mr. Ibrahim Abou El Akram
Mr. Ayat Hassan
Shekh Omar Dardour

Burma Delegation

Mr. Uthein Pe Myint
Mr. Uhla Gyaw
Mr. Thakin Kyaw Sein
Mr. Unyar Na
Mr. Ko Khin Nyunt
Dr. Than Tun

Ceylon Delegation

Mr. K.L.F. Ala Gounana
Dr. J. H. Faden Drisen
Miss Eva Rata Wera
Mrs. Kukilan Sbiah
Mr. B. Z. Sarofoudin
Mr. A.A.N. Fernando

Chinese Delegation

Mr. Kuo Mo Jo
Mr. Burhan Shahidi
Mr. Chu Tu-Nan
Mr. Liu Ning-Yi
Mme. Chang Jui-Fang
Mr. Chao Pu-Chu
Mr. Cheng Sheng-Yu
Mr. Chi Chao-Ting
Mr. Chin Chung-Hua
Mr. Chu Tzu-Chi
Mme. Han Yu-Tung
Mme. Hsieh Ping-Hsin
Mr. Liu Liang-Mo
Mr. Muhammed Makien
Mme. Majnour
Sheikh Nur Mohammed
Mr. Tang Ming-Chao
Mr. Teng Kuang
Mr. Tung Hsin
Mr. Wang Kuang-Ving
Mr. Wu Han
Mr. Yang Yu
Mr. Yang Chung-Sung

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Korean Democratic
Republic Delegation

Mr. Han Sul Ya
Mr. Ju Chang Joon
Mr. Do Yoo Ho
Mr. Whang Bounng Koo

Cyprus Delegation

Mr. Savvas Soizides
Mr. N. Pissas
Mr. Cl. Papaellinos
Mr. S. Patsalidis
Mr. V. Canavattis
Miss A. Nocolaidis

Ethiopian Delegation

Mrs. Tesfi Luli
Mr. Marsi Gaber
Mr. Desta Hild
Mr. Moltod A.
Mr. H. Mikasha
Mr. A. Gimbir

Ghana Delegation

Mr. Amoa Awnah
Mr. Bediako Poka
Mr. Mabel Dove
Mr. C. A. Duncan
Mr. D. D. Duncan

India Delegation

Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru
Mr. Kalimullah Mohammed
Mr. Malvia Chatur Narein
Mr. Chandra Romesh
Miss Sen Amya
Mr. Singh Amp
Mrs. Pande
Miss Dike

India Dele-
gation (Cont'd)

Mr. Singh Tirlok
Mr. Malik Choudhury
Mr. Chatterjee Kali Kuma
Mr. R. Otukar
Mr. Reddy Govenda Mukangi
Mr. Goplalan Ayilliath
Mr. Wovkavi Saishin Jaganinvas
Mr. Tivedi Vaikunthrai
Mr. Dhage Venkat Kruhna
Mrs. Teh Minabai
Mrs. Gupta Prehlata

Indonesian Delegation

Mr. Anwar Tjokroaminoto
Mr. Rastid Radjoemas
Mr. Mohamed Padang
Mr. E. Siradjuddin Abbas
Mr. Sumito
Mr. Surodjo

Iraq Delegation

Dr. Mohamed Hadeed
Mr. Mohamed Sadeed Shinshel
Mr. Abdel Wahab Mohamoud
Mr. Karim Hassan
Mr. Faak El Samirai
Mr. -- Amin El Rahmani
Mr. Hadeeb El Haj Mahmoud
Mr. Taleb Moushtak
Mr. Abdel Wahab El Beani
Mr. Abdel Shaheed El Yasry
Mr. El Sheikh Ahmed El Gazaari
Mr. Aziz Sherif
Mr. Eussein Gamil
Mr. Gamil Amin
Mr. Gabir Omar
Mr. Moussa Sabar
Mr. Adel El Yasri
Mr. Kadri Mahmoud Ezzat

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Cameroon Delegation

Mr. F. R. Moumie
Mr. Kamen Sakeo
Mr. Ernest Ouandie
Mme. Marthe Ekemeyong
Mme. Marthe Eding
Mr. Sengat Kuo
Mr. Dicka Akwa

Jordan Delegation

Mr. Shafik Arshidat
Mr. Abdallah El Rimawi
Mr. Youssif El Bandak
Mr. Saeed El Azza
Mr. Bakr Dirwaza
Mr. Ahmed Tawalbah
Mr. Ali Abu Nawar
Mr. Fouad Nassar
Mr. Yahya Hamouda
Mr. Odah Butros Odah
Mr. Nafiz Atout
Mr. Zidan Younis
Dr. Abdel Rahman Shukayr

Kenya Delegation

Mr. Hassan Wanis
Mr. John Shawidi
Mr. George Siwida

Lebanon Delegation

Mr. Hussein El Eweini
Mr. Emile El Khoury
Mr. Aly El Bizzi
Mr. Monah El Solh
Mr. Jubran El Majdalani
Mr. Rashid Karame
Mr. Ahmed El Assaad
Mr. Kamal Junbulat
Mr. Maarouf Saad
Mr. Shafik Mourtada
Mr. Takey El Din El Solh

Lebanon Delegation (Cont'd)

Mr. Kamel El Assaad
Mr. Nasim Majdalani
Mr. Hashem El Hussein
Mr. Fouad El Burt
Mr. Mohammed Takey El Din
Mr. Fouad Ammoun
Mr. Aly Gaber
Mr. George Hanna
Mr. Abdel Maguid El Rafei
Mr. Mohammed Khatab
Mr. Adnan El Hakeem
Mr. Hussein Sagaan
Mr. Raaif Khoury
Mr. Salah El Aseer
Mr. Abdalla El Liyafi
Mr. Emil El Hayik
Mrs. Hissim Maddalani
Mrs. Hashim El Hossieni
Mrs. Adnan El Hakim

Laos Delegation

Mr. Ouvoravona
Mr. Sokamitot
Bong Souvana Fong
Shamba Fomashan
Kamoul Femfong

Libya Delegation

Mr. El Zaglaei
Mr. Mohamed Koushier Elfirgani
Mr. Bashir El Moughrabi
Mr. Mahmoud Sobhi
Mr. Moustapha Ben Amer

Madagascar Delegation

Mr. Prof. Rajaofera Maurice
Miss Gizelle Rabesahala
Mr. Rajawinson J.
Mr. Jaozandry Joseph
Mr. Razanat Sehen Henry

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Malaya Delegation

Mr. Tengku Indra
Mr. Devasor
Mr. Dato Yahaya
Mr. Kong Chi Keen
Mr. Tangaleen Andia

Mongolia Delegation

Mr. Shirindyb
Mr. Ochir Damdindakje
Mr. Amgaguin Zubsandendel
Mr. Puntasaguin Iseren Isvodol
Mrs. Vandaguin Gamma

Morocco Delegation

Mr. Mohamed Hassan El Wizani
Mr. Mohamed El Maki El Nasri
Mr. El Tuhani El Wizani
Mr. Aly El Kinani
Mr. Abdel Hay El Iraki

Nigeria Delegation

Mr. Gidy Kwedri
Mr. M.A.B. Auton
Mr. A. H. Abou Bakr
Mr. A.R.A. Mangala

Palestine Delegation

Mr. Mounir El Rayes
Mr. Abdallah Abou Sitta
Mr. Hieder Abdel Shafi
Mr. Mahmoud Nigim
Mr. Farouk El Hussein
Mr. Mohamed El Sharif
Mr. Farag El Sarraf
Mr. Fayez Abou Rahma
Mr. Wafa El Sayegh
Mr. Khalid Bashreti
Mr. Abdel Karim El Koumi
Mr. Abdel Rahman El Najdi
Mr. Amid El Imam

Kuwait Delegation

Mr. Ahmed El Khattib
Mr. Hasem El Koutani
Mr. Soliaman Khalid Elmotwaa

Senegal Delegation

Mr. Sherif Hidar Baba
Mr. Keta Mohamed El Amin
Mr. Komara Mori

Somali Delegation (British)

El Sayed Ahmed Sheikh Mossa
El Sayed Mohammed Mahmoud
El Sayed Ahmed Youssef
El Sayed Abdallah Adam

Somali Delegation (French)

Mr. Zakaria Nimr Youssef
Mr. Mohamed Omar Aly
Mr. Mohamed Taher Saleh
Mr. Omar Hassan Tag El Din
Mr. Mohamed Inan

Somali Delegation (Independent)

El Haj Sharif Mohamed Hussein
El Mohamed Haj Abou Bakr
El Mouradi Wilio
El Haj Sheikh Ainy
El Osman Iman
El Jilani Shiekh Aly
El Ahmed Omar El Azhari
El Moussa Islam Farah
El Abdel Aziz Nour Hiaras

Sudan Delegation

Mr. Aly Abdel Rahman
Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub
Dr. Izz El Din Aly Amer
Mr. Obied Kassar Hamid
Mr. Mohamed Ben Bikhet

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Sudan Delegation
(Cont'd)

Mr. Sadek Abdallah
Abdel Maguid
Mr. Abdallah Abdel
Rahman
Mr. Ahmed Soliman
Mr. El Fateh El Badr
Mr. Abdallah Ragab
Mr. Abdel Maged Abou Hasbo
Mr. Mahgoub Osman
Mr. Mirghani El Nasrah
Mr. Abou El Maali Abdel
Rahman
Mr. Youssef Mourafik
Mr. Aly Mohamed Ibrahim
Mr. Ahmed Zeen El Abdine
Mr. Abdallah Obied

Sudan Delegation (French)

Mr. Diallo Aliou
Mr. Sawa Abdallah

Syria Delegation

Mr. Ihsan El Gabri
Mr. Fakher Akel
Mr. Maarouf El Dawalibi
Mr. Mounir Shouri
Mr. Nazim El Mosalli
Mr. Moustaph Amin
Mr. Michel Aflak
Mr. Abdel Karim Zouhour
Mr. Hussein Marud
Mr. Aly Bouzo
Mr. Hassan Marud
Miss Amal Cazaeiri
Mr. Zafer El Kassemi
Mr. Fouad Kadri
Mr. Nehad Le Ghadri
Mr. Mahdi El Zaeim
Mr. Mohamed Kheir Fares
Mr. Gaber Omar
Mr. Moustapha Badawi

Thailand Delegation

Mr. Nay Dib Gonjogot
Mr. Sater Sofarat
Mr. Karim Maden
Mr. Bodurn Taban Sousout

Togoland Delegation

Mr. Abalo Joseph Firmay

Tunisia Delegation

Mr. & Mrs. Ali Balhawani
Mr. Mohamed Saleh Ben El Hag
Mr. Moaweyah

Uganda Delegation

Mr. Ali Omar Ali
Mr. Abraham Abdel Wahab
Mr. Ibrahim Lix
Mr. Mohamed Ismail Hood
Mr. Omar Youssef Saleh

Oman Delegation

Mr. Mohamed Amin
Mr. Faisal Ali
Mr. Mohamed El Harthi

Zanzibar Delegation

Mr. Zalikha Mahfouz
Mr. Ahmed Shad Ali

USSR Delegation

Rashidov Sharaf Rahidovich
Mirzo Tursun Zade
Soferonov Anatoly Vladimi-
rovich
Abasov Kurban Abas-Kuliogli
Azimov Pigan Azimovich
Aldabergenov Nurmolda

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USSR Dele-
gation (Cont'd)

Arzumanyan Apushavan
Agafonovich
Babakhanov Ziyautdin
Bultrikov Balzham
Bazanov Nikolai Ivanovitch
Zhukov Yevgeny Mikhailovich
Zulfeija
Kenjebayev Salibakas
Kotov Mikhail Ivanovich
Murtazayev Kayum
Novgorodsky Yuri
Vladimirovich

Viet Nam Delegation

Dr. Xuan Thu Amp
Bui Thai Cam
Tran Van Luan
Nguyen Xuan Tran
Nguyen Viem Hai
Do Xuan Oanh

Yemen Delegation

Mr. Hassan Ibrahim
Mr. Ahmed El Shamy
Mr. Mohamed El Mansour
Mr. Abdullah El Elawy
Mr. Saleh Mohsen
Mr. Abdul Karim El Amir
Mr. Ahmed Saber
Mr. Ahmed El Khazzan

Egypt Delegation

Mr. Anwar El Sadat
Mr. Ihsan Abdel Kadous
Mr. Ihsan Abeid
Mr. Ahmed Alaam
Mr. Ahmed Shawky
Dr. Ahmed Aly Hassan

Egypt Dele-
gation (Cont'd)

Mr. Ahmed Moukhtar Kotb
Mr. Ahmed Abdel Ghaffar
Mr. Ahmed Elaa El Dine
Mr. Ismail Azaah
Mrs. Amina Choukri
Mrs. Om Kalsoum
Mrs. Amina El Said
Mr. Anwar Salama
Hassan Abbas Zaki
Helmi Abdel Rahman
Ibrahim Rachad
Hussein Fahmi
Hamed Ammar
Dr. Dawlat Sadek
Rifaat Mahgoub
Dr. Ragab Fahmi
Mr. Zakaria Loutfi Gomaa
Mr. Salama Moussa
Soueileim El Eimari
Dr. Souheir El Kalamawi
Mrs. Siza Nebarawi
Mr. Salah Abdel Hafez
Mr. Salah Abou Seif
Sabri Abou El Magd
Dr. Taha Hussein
Abdel Moeiz Nasr
Abdallah El Arabi
Abdel Razek Hassan
Ali Ali Eileiwa
Abdel Fattah Ismail
Abdellah Zein El Abbidin
Aicha Abdel Rahman
Abdel Salam Cherif
Addi Taher
Mrs. Aida Fahmi
Abdel Khalek Allam
Abdel Kader Hatem
Abdel Aziz Sadek
Abdel Ghaffar El Charkawi
Abdel Rahman El Rafei
Ezzat Mohamed Mohamed Gheidan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Egypt Dele-
gation (Cont'd)

Abdel Aziz Moustafa
 Abdel Azim Chehata
 Fouad Mohy El Dine
 Ez El Dine Zou El Fokar
 Mme. Faten Hamama
 Fathi Kamel
 Loutfi El Kholi
 Loutfi Waked
 Dr. Louis Awad
 Dr. Moufida Abdel Rahman
 Dr. Moustafa Mocharafa
 Mr. Mohamed Ali Kassem
 Mr. Mohamed Fathi
 Mohamed Chafik Ghorbal
 Mohamed Hassanein Hekal
 Mohamed Fahmi El Sayed
 Mohamed Zaghloul Hefni
 Mohamed Mahmoud Nasser
 Mariette Boutros Ghali
 Mounir Hemaya
 Mohamed Said El Eiryan
 Mohamed Rouchdi
 Mahmoud Younes
 Mr. Mahmoud El Henawi
 Mme. Nefissa El Ghamrawi
 Naguib Mahfouz
 Yehia Eweis
 Dr. Yehia El Khachab
 Mohamed Charaf

Kamal El Henawi
 Dr. Abdel Razek Sedki
 Mohamed Soliman El Zoheiri
 Ahmed Talaat Mohamed Aziz
 Dr. Ibrahim Ragab Fahmi
 Dr. Baligh Selim
 Dr. Ali Eiweida
 Dr. Mahmoud El Kaysouni
 Mr. Youssef El Sebai
 Yehia Haki

Japanese Delegation

Tokutaro Kitamura
 Choku Sonoda
 Toshiwo Komoto
 Osamu Inaba
 Minoru Tachibana
 Hiromi Nakamura
 Jiro Muto
 Kan Hideshima
 Gtsuji Goto
 Shigeyasu Sakata
 Kaocoru Yasui
 Shoji Ogata
 Tokusaburo Dan
 Masaharu Hatanaka
 Mrs. Yooko Nuida
 Matao Nagashima
 Kisuke Miyagoshi
 Yoshihisa Kajotani
 Tagao Koda
 Tokubel Hanayagi
 Toshikaju Sueda
 Shoichi Shimada
 Shigeru Tamura
 Akira Yoshii
 Takindo Makinouchi
 Hirowo Miyagawa
 Yuuzo Futagami
 Shoichi Mano
 Goro Takeshita
 Jichi Higuchi
 Hyosuke Kujiraoka
 Matao Morimoto
 Kazuo Miyata
 Kohei Saito
 Kenji Mimura
 Lehide Kadowo
 Chookichi Yamada
 Tozo Ktada
 Tokuwu Akiyama
 Kiroyuki Yoshimura
 Sanhichiro Miyakita

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Japanese Dele-
gation (Cont'd)

Akira Sunabori
Takatomi Ichinose
Kenichi Kooyema
Suzu Kuboyama
Giichiro Ynaiyama
Haimo Sujiki
Kunitugu Yagi
Sinichi Okubo
Takio Nisikawax
Masao Abe
Kokichi Nakaiose
Sejoi Matuise
Tadasi Mijusaw
Tasuku Asano
Sima Kai
Toshio Akimwa
Tchiro Suitugu

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