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MALAYA

I. Status and Strength of the Malaya Communist Party

Outlawed since 1948, the MCP maintains a clandestine organization in Malaya, and its primary efforts as well as its best leaders have been devoted to armed insurrection carried on by the Malayan Races Liberation Army. The MRLA receives support (money, medicine, intelligence) from the Min Yuen (collective name of MCP front or "peoples" organizations) whose strength has been estimated at anywhere from 10,000 to 100,000. The MCP's membership is 95 per cent Chinese. Outside of the jungle, MCP organization is still relatively weak; its main strongholds are among labor unions and students, particularly those in the Chinese middle schools. Communism in Malaya derives its strength from basic problems common to many newly independent, underdeveloped countries: the breakup of traditional social patterns and the search for new replacements, unfulfilled economic aspirations, lack of leadership in depth. In Malaya these factors are further complicated by the communal problem, by the growing prestige of Communist China in the eyes of local Chinese, and by what the latter view as a threat to their cultural heritage from the political ascendance of Malaya in politics and government. The estimated membership of the MCP proper is 5,000; that of the MRLA, [REDACTED] is 1,800 to 2,000.

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The MCP decided at its Fourth Plenary Conference in March 1948 to resort to armed action to gain control of the country. The buildup to armed insurrection was to consist of intensified labor action and a campaign of sabotage and terrorism to harass and weaken the government. MCP was never able to advance beyond this first phase of aggression, which, however, extended over a period of several years and was still going on at the end of 1957.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

Two militant action groups were formed by the MCP, drawing their members from front groups in villages organized to give

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support to the MCP's armed force, MRLA. One of these groups, the Defense Corps, was a full-time action unit; the other, the Self-Protection Corps, was a part-time action unit. The main duties of the Defense Corps were: ambush, arson on estates, cutting power and telegraph lines, sabotaging rail lines; buying and manufacturing arms and ammunition. Additionally, they posted handbills and carried out other agitation and propaganda acts. The principal tasks of the Self-Protection Corps were sabotage of power, telegraph and railway lines, destroying rubber trees and plantation buildings. Also, the Self-Protection Corps had to post handbills, and to obtain and raise food and other supplies for the MRLA. MCP members of the leadership fraction in the People's Action Party and those in the illegal Chinese Students Anti-British League were apparently responsible for directing the serious student riots of 1954 and 1955 in Singapore.

III. Training Given Within Malaya in Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

There are no details available concerning the training of MCP men for sabotage and terrorism within Malaya.

IV. Training Given for Malayan Communists in Sabotage in Communist Bloc Countries

There is no information available about this topic.

V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. or Allies Personnel, Installations

During the years 1948 through 1957 there were thousands of incidents in many of which British plantation managers, British police and troops were ambushed and killed; train derailments resulting in many deaths and even more injuries took place. On 31 July 1952 Communist units attacked a U. S. tin settlement in Kinta Valley. On several occasions Communists attempted to capture arms from police or Home Guard supplies. In Singapore many clashes occurred between students and police in the spring of 1954-1955. In May 1955

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strike action by transport and brick workers in Singapore was coordinated with student disorders. The day of most violent action, 12 May 1955, the students set up roadblocks and staged simultaneous attacks on the police in several parts of the city. Students hurled stones, wounding policemen and forcing the latter to use tear gas. Students stoned, overturned or burned police cars.

b. Other Sabotage or Terrorism Targets

There were a few instances when civilians, travelling in groups, were attacked and murdered on the highways. In May 1956 Communists were held responsible for throwing a grenade into a restaurant in Ipoh and injuring ten persons.

Among terrorist acts carried out by the illegal Chinese Students Anti-British League before, during and after the student disturbances of May and June 1954 in Singapore were the following: (a) the shooting of Lee Chi Hua, retired inspector of schools (b) the disfigurement of Mme. Lui Wen San, headmistress of the Singapore Nanyang Girls' High School, by acid throwing (c) the shooting of Inspector San Siao Foo, Senior Special Branch Officer of the Singapore police. Additionally, several threatening letters were written anonymously to school teachers and officials and a plot to assassinate the principal of the Chung Chen High School was uncovered by police in time to prevent its execution.

During the student disorders of May 1955 in Singapore, among other injuries inflicted upon witnesses was the slaying of Gene Symonds, United Press correspondent who was dragged from a taxi and beaten.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

A former Australian Communist has stated that Australian Communist leader Lance Sharkey had been assigned to stop in Singapore to convey to MCP leaders decisions made during the

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Communist meetings of late February and early March 1948 in India. It is significant that shortly after Sharkey's stop at Singapore, the MCP decided to resort to insurrection. Moral support was provided by the Cominform; material support from CP's in British areas was organized. Reports of December 1952 stated that the underground MCP leader Chin Peng was travelling to Indochina, apparently to obtain advice and guidance. Support and guidance for the student riots in Singapore originating in the Communist bloc was apparently channeled through the Communist international front organization, the International Union of Students.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

Because of the MCP's restricted membership and its need for more effective, popular support it is probable that the scope of sabotage activity on the part of the MRLA and Min Yuen action groups will remain much as it was in 1957. The Party will not waste any opportunity to seize upon social or economic problems which can be exploited in order to try to convince the population of the MCP's good intentions as a protector of its interests. Use of militant action in the near future by the MCP probably will be governed by the present Soviet line--discreet and disciplined. No opportunity will be overlooked to weaken the new Malayan Government and to strengthen the MCP.

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BURMA

I. Status and Strength of Communism in Burma

The number of votes polled by the Communist-dominated NUF in the 1956 elections was much larger than is reflected in the parliamentary strength and than the estimated number of Communist party members or sympathizers would indicate. It is generally believed that many of the votes received by the NUF were cast by people who are not Communists but who wished to protest against the ruling party by voting for the only other party which has a nationwide organization and is in a position to provide any opposition.

Although the Communist insurrectionists have been reduced both in numbers and in fighting power, they are still able to raid villages and to attack and sabotage transportation and communications frequently and successfully enough to hinder economic development and to make many areas--even close to the capital city of Rangoon--dangerous for inhabitants and travellers. The legal and illegal CP's of Burma are estimated to have a total membership of approximately 4,000 - 6,000.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

Most of this sabotage has been carried out by military and paramilitary forces rather than special Party units of civilian cadres.

III. Sabotage Training Within Burma for Burma Communists

No information is available about indigenous training of Burmese Communists for sabotage and terrorism.

IV. Sabotage Training Given for Burma Communists in Communist Bloc Countries

No information is available about training of Burmese Communists for these activities in Communist bloc countries.

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V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. or U.S. Allies as Targets

There is no information available to indicate that the United States or any of its principal allies were objectives of Communist sabotage in Burma.

b. Other Sabotage Targets

Most violent action of the BCP has aimed at weakening the newly independent (since January 1948) Government of Burma. In general, the sabotage and violence have been manifested in the following types of action:

Blowing up water pipelines leading into Rangoon,
Blowing up bridges (Burma government statistics of August 1951 showed that 517 bridges had been blown up in the preceding year),
Attacking and burning of small towns,
Disrupting elections by intimidation of voters,
Attacking military convoys and mail trains,
Skirmishes with government troops and police,
Conducting raids against police outposts, telegraph and treasury offices.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China, or Other Communist Bloc Country

It is generally accepted that the BCP's militant action which was initiated in late March 1948 was in direct response to the CPSU call for such action expressed in the Zhdanov speech of September 1947 and by subsequent resolutions calling for aggressive tactics issued by the meetings in India in early 1948 which were attended by Burmese Communists. Proof of specific guidance supplied from Communists outside Burma for the BCP during this period, however, is lacking.

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Because of its need for weapons, funds and equipment, the BCP was inactive during most of 1953. When violent action was resumed in 1954 many Burmese were apparently convinced that Communist China supplied material aid to the local Communist underground. In October 1954 the Rangoon press was urging China to halt its aid to the Burmese Communist underground. There is evidence that some BCP leaders in 1950-1951 spent considerable time in China. Whether this involved training is not known. Probably attempts were made by these leaders to secure aid.

IX. Estimate of Threat

The amount of sabotage and terrorist action in the near future in Burma will probably continue to be of approximately the same frequency and scope as in 1957. If mass surrenders of terrorists continue, Communist sabotage may diminish.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

I. Status and Strength of the Communist Party of South Vietnam

Communist Party activity in South Vietnam is outlawed and there is no basis for an estimate of Party membership in the South. A possible figure of 1, 500 - 2, 000 has been offered by one source.

Communism in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) derives its strength from: (1) the continuing threat posed by the large and expanding regular armed forces of the Communist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" in the North; (2) a residual apparatus of trained guerrilla cadres and political agitators left behind in South Vietnam following evacuation of regular Communist forces from south of the 17th parallel in 1954-1955; (3) some opponents of President Ngo Dinh Diem who have shown themselves vulnerable to Communist agitation for "reunification" through direct North-South contact, nationwide elections, and formation of a new coalition government. Through propaganda and direct intimidation at the village level, local Communists seek to support any group that seems likely to develop an effective challenge to the growing strength and stability of the independent Republic of Vietnam.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

Ultimate direction of Communist sabotage and violence in South Vietnam has been provided by the Lao Dung Party (The CP of North Vietnam). Two militant action units which existed during the Indo-China War were reorganized after the withdrawal operations of 1955. Their special tasks during the war had been sabotage, subversion, espionage and terrorism. The reorganization of these units was carried out in order to prepare them for a new campaign in South Vietnam at a future date.

III. Sabotage Training for South Vietnamese Communists in South Vietnam

There is no reliable information indicating any such training takes place in South Vietnam.

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IV. Sabotage Training Given for Communists of South Vietnam in Communist Bloc Countries

All evidence available to date shows that training in sabotage and terrorism is given in special training centers in the North to Communists who operate in the South. Selected cadres receive intensive training in communications, espionage methods, black propaganda and terrorism in these centers. Only persons considered most capable are recruited for this training. Special groups are selected from among the trainees to act among the religious orders; others are to act among the army.

V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. and U.S. Allies Assets, Personnel

There is no reliable information to indicate that since the partitioning of the country Communists have engaged in sabotage or terrorism against U.S. or U.S. Allies targets.

b. Other Sabotage Targets

The primary aim of Communist subversion in the South is the undermining of confidence in the Diem government. Communist elements cooperate with dissident sects in their fight against the Diem government. The sects are forced to accept Communist aid because of their short supplies of arms and ammunition.

The Communists tried in late 1955 to persuade growers and distributors of rice to stop the flow of it into the cities and to turn over their supplies to rebel units or to ship it by clandestine routes to North Vietnam.

Communists tried to sabotage the March 1956 elections. During this terroristic action grenades were thrown near voting places, ballot boxes were burned or stolen, etc. There was a large increase in the number of assassinations in the last quarter of 1957. Most of these occurred in the provinces where

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the South Vietnam government's control was weakest and was directed for the most part against local government officials. Blackmail was also used against these persons.

Communists forced people in rural areas to pay their taxes and subscriptions.

Communists threatened young men conscripted for military service with harm if they complied with the conscription.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

As indicated in paragraphs I, II, and IV above, ultimate direction and support for Communist sabotage and terrorism in South Vietnam is supplied by the Communist government of North Vietnam.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

Communist elements in South Vietnam will probably continue to carry on a limited campaign of terrorism and sabotage to weaken the government of South Vietnam. From the pattern of violent action reported in 1956 and 1957 it seems probable that Communists will commit terrorist action while working as members of other opposition groups.

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INDONESIA

I. Status and Strength of the Communist Party of Indonesia

The PKI failed in its aggressive action to take over control of the Indonesian nationalist movement at the time of the Madiun Rebellion in 1948. Since early 1952 the PKI has followed a "united front" policy, selectively supporting several governmental coalitions. The PKI is not directly represented in the present government. It exerts political influence through mass demonstrations, front organizations, and appeals to national unity. It polled 6,000,000 votes in the general elections of 1955 and over 8,000,000 votes in the regional elections of 1957. Much of the strength of the PKI apparently lies in its control of a series of front organizations, most important of which is the largest of the labor federations, with a claimed membership of 3,000,000. The Party's voting strength lies in Java and North Sumatra.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

Acts of terrorist nature being carried out in January 1957 were under the ultimate direction of the PKI Central Committee. Immediately responsible for the execution of these acts by PKI groups was a functionary of PKI's fraction in the Communist-controlled veterans organization, PERBEPSI.

PKI sabotage/guerrilla units were being planned and organized in the Central Sumatra area about mid-1957. Members of PERBEPSI were to constitute the nucleus of these groups. The leader of each group was the person who normally served as head of the PERBEPSI committee for the given area. In some parts of Indonesia PKI-controlled Village Security Organizations (OKD) or Village Defense Organizations had been formed by approximately mid-1957 for future paramilitary action.

III. Sabotage Training Given Within Indonesia

Communist-controlled Village Defense Organizations (OPD) in Sumatra have received arms and training.

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IV. Sabotage Training Given for Indonesian Communists in Communist Bloc Countries

Negative.

V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. and/or U.S. Allies Personnel, Installations

Anti-British and anti-French demonstrations staged in Djakarta in 1956 with official government sanction were carried to an extreme by PKI elements, causing damage to properties of French and British diplomatic installations. Leading these actions were Communist-controlled veteran and labor groups. Of the seventy-seven organizations which participated, 95 per cent were Communist or Communist-dominated. In late 1957 PKI caused the anti-Dutch campaign to reach extreme portions.

b. Other Sabotage Targets

Acts of intimidation were carried out in January 1957 against leaders of the religious parties who had criticized the government.

It was planned that PKI guerrilla/sabotage groups which were being organized in the summer of 1957 in Central Sumatra would seize arms from given locations and would weaken the Banteng Council (the Administrative Council for the rebel army organization in Central Sumatra) by acts of sabotage against transport, communication routes, military installations and arms dumps; by withholding food supplies, destroying oil reserves and by carrying out guerrilla action against the Banteng forces.

In August 1957 PKI was planning paramilitary action to overthrow the administration of Military Territory II, South Sumatra. In October 1957 Communist-led Village Defense Organization (OPD) units attacked the headquarters of the

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Second Indonesian Regiment at Siantar, the second largest city of North Sumatra. After a battle lasting several hours, the OPD units retreated losing eleven of their men.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

There is some evidence that PKI was guided by officials of the Soviet Embassy of Djakarta in its moves to force the Indonesian government to step up the anti-Western campaign of 1957.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

The PKI has the best potential for executing violent action of all CP's in Asiatic Free World countries because of its strength and its control of major front organizations, especially the PKI-controlled veterans' organization, PERBEPSI, the members of which have received military training. PERBEPSI also has caches of arms. Additionally, Communist-controlled Village Defense Organizations in Sumatra have received arms and training and can be a direct threat to the U.S. and U.S. Allies' interests in the area. The large, Communist-controlled labor confederation, SOBSI, which is especially influential among government employees in Djakarta, among the estate workers and among maritime labor groups, has received tacit government sanction for some of the aggressive action it committed against Dutch installations in Indonesia in late 1957. Presumably the same tacit support of SOBSI violence would be accorded by the Indonesian government in the future. Another source of potential danger is presented by the fact that some elements of the Indonesian Army are under the command of PKI sympathizers or suspected members.

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PHILIPPINES

I. Status and Strength of the Philippine Communist Party

The Philippine Communist Party (PKP) has been illegal since May 1951. The total estimated membership is 1,000 - 1,500.

Since the capture in 1950 of important leaders of the Philippine Communist Party, government military and intelligence forces have reduced the Communist-led Huk rebellion to a small guerrilla operation in the mountains of central Luzon. Meanwhile, the Communists have turned to a "legal struggle" of subversion and infiltration by constitutional means. Although the government was successful in eradicating open Communist activities from the labor movement, PKP influence probably still exists in some labor unions, as well as in tenant farmer groups and youth organizations. In recent years the PKP has attempted to reactivate elements of its former membership.

The popularity of the late President Magsaysay and his program of economic expansion and social reform contributed to the effectiveness of the government's campaign against the Communists. Although previously declared illegal under the Constitution by court ruling, the Communist Party and Huk movement have been formally outlawed by the Anti-Subversion Act, signed into law in June 1957, which establishes specific penalties for Communist activities.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

All violence and armed action was under the ultimate direction of the Military Committee of the Secretariat. Decisions and resolutions when practicable were made known to lower echelons at Regional Committee/Command Conferences. Most acts of sabotage throughout the period 1949-1954 appear to have been committed by regular troops of the HMB, the Party's military unit.

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In addition to sabotage committed by the regular HMB troops as part of military action, provisions were made whereby sabotage would be carried out by strategically placed civilian Party members of the Sabotage Division of the Civilian Agencies of the National Intelligence Department, the PKP intelligence organization. The Sabotage Division existed mostly on paper only, although by October 1950 some units of it had been activated: an Arson Squad, Liquidation Squad and Labor Agitation Groups. It was to function mainly in the final state of the revolutionary activity, at the time of the general offensive against the existing order, and its work would supposedly be done by key men in industries, trusted men in government offices and technicians in laboratories. One of the goals of the Party in 1951 was the recruitment of technicians who could carry out sabotage missions when the proper moment came.

Key leaders of the Communist-dominated trade union organization, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), probably representing the leadership fraction within the CLO, were also involved in the campaign of violence and sabotage. Thirteen ranking CLO officers were indicted in June 1951 for having committed murder, arson and robbery and for involvement in a PKP plot to overthrow the government.

III. Sabotage Training Given Within the Philippines

Information showing Party planning and training for industrial sabotage was found in a PKP document captured in October 1950 which read in part as follows: "Based on this formulation of the strategic problem the following measures should be adopted:... Aggressive recruiting work among technological people to conduct researches on the manufacture of home-made weapons, and based on these researches, actually manufacture them. Send out to the field more technological cadres to advise the military technological problems of the armed struggle. Start training strategic and key workers in the art of industrial sabotage."

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IV. Sabotage Training Given for Philippine Communists in Communist Bloc Countries

There is no information available pertaining to this subject.

V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. and/or U.S. Allies Personnel, Installations

Sabotage and terrorist action against U. S. and Philippine government personnel and assets took form as follows:

Assassination or attempted assassination of key military figures,
Raids and capture of towns,
Cutting of communications,
Setting up of roadblocks,
Occupation of railroad, telephone and telegraph stations,
Sabotage of offensive and defensive operational plans of the Philippines Armed Forces (PAF), of PAF units and of strategic points,
Damaging of military vehicles,
Demoralization of draftees,
Plans for the organizing of worker's fighting detachments to begin riots against the government,
Sabotage of Manila water supply,
Confiscation of government supplies (arms, weapons, etc.),
Bank robberies,
Destruction of property by arson,
Kidnapping of American businessmen,
Attacks against U. S. Armed Forces units,
Attacks against PAF units.

In the event of an outbreak of hostilities against the Soviet Union PKP planned (according to captured Party documents) to initiate a program of sabotage in local industries manufacturing war goods.

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b. Other Sabotage Targets

**Killing of Communist renegades and of non-cooperative rural people,
Extortion of funds from individual citizens, especially from Chinese,
Confiscation of plantation crops,
Robbing bus passengers and burning buses.**

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

There is little evidence of foreign support and guidance of PKP's sabotage and terrorism campaign. It is significant, however, that the PKP's campaign was timed to begin almost simultaneously with militant action initiated by other Communist parties of Southeast Asia after the Communist meetings in India in February and March 1948. During 1949 PKP was enthused over Communist successes in China and was encouraged by the indications in Chinese Communist propaganda that aid to Communists in the Philippines would be forthcoming.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage

In view of PKP's present weakness of strength and influence, the likelihood that it may initiate a program of fullscale sabotage and terrorism is extremely slight. In case of an outbreak of international conflict involving the Soviet Union, PKP would, in common with all Communist parties, undertake any sabotage action which would hinder Soviet enemies.

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JAPAN

I. Status and Strength of the Japan Communist Party

The Japan Communist Party (JCP), a legally recognized political party, has since 1955 maintained the posture of an overt and peaceful political organization which professes to seek its objectives of "peace and independence" for Japan through "legitimate" political action rather than by violence and subversion. Its efforts have been directed mainly towards attacking the pro-Western policies of the government, winning popular support or sympathy for the Soviet bloc position on international issues, and extending its influence within non-Communist organizations, particularly the Socialist Party, trade unions, and farmers' organization. The main source of JCP strength is in the urban areas, and the JCP draws a larger proportion of its votes from this segment of the population than does any other party. The adverse publicity resulting from reports of intraparty discord and the illicit financial practices of the JCP, combined with further evidence of the Party's subservience to Bloc interests (for example, JCP's support of the Soviet intervention in Hungary), have tended to thwart JCP efforts to expand its membership. It is believed that the total membership of the Party has suffered a substantial decline during the past year. JCP's estimated membership is 60,000.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

The planning and directing of militant action is under the Military Affairs Committee. A unit called the Nuclear Self-Defense Corps, subordinate to the Military Affairs Committee, prepares for and executes any action decided upon. In the Party's terms this unit is "a military organization of fighting elements who organize movements and make all preparations for the people's taking up arms to protect themselves and attack the enemy at factories and farm villages".

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The Nuclear Self-Defense Corps must produce, acquire, maintain and distribute weapons, study military tactics, obtain information about the enemy's plans, subvert the enemy's forces and prepare the way for the organization of partisan forces among the masses. During the defensive phase the Party's armed action and self-defense organizations must: (1) link the immediate demands of the workers and farmers to the ultimate armed struggle against American "imperialists" and Japanese "reactionaries"; (2) deepen the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, and (3) obstruct the efforts of the enemy to construct military bases, produce and transport arms, oppress the people and deprive them of their rights. According to JCP planning, from these struggles of the defensive phase--conducted by means of a proper balancing of legal and illegal action--will arise the partisan forces that will be supported, aided and protected by the masses. Railway sabotage of 1949 was accomplished by JCP fractions in the trade unions. A Communist-dominated "Struggle Committee" of the Railway Workers Union was apparently responsible for organizing much of the damage.

III. Sabotage Training Given Within Japan

A Party document issued in November 1952--only four months after the Cominform Journal article calling for more moderation--furnished details on the manufacture of flame bottles, hand grenades, land mines, thermite bombs, and other explosive devices. In 1954, JCP issued instructions on the method of using potassium cyanide in air rifle pellets for use in anti-personnel action. These instructions, emanating from JCP's Military Affairs Committee, included instructions how to produce a "Concrete Bomb" composed of black powder, stones and pieces of glass or iron splinters within a concrete casing.

IV. Sabotage Training Given for Japanese Communists in Communist Bloc Countries

No information reported.

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V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. and/or U.S. Allies Personnel, Installations

Extensive sabotage of the Japanese national railways was carried out in 1949. One accident which resulted from this campaign caused 3 deaths and 30 injuries. In another serious accident 6 persons were killed, and about 12 injured.

A report of Japanese railway accident statistics covering the period April to July 1949 shows the following types of sabotage action:

- 148 cases of destruction of signals and other operating devices
- 59 cases of heaping stones on the tracks
- 16 cases of shooting at trains
- 5 cases of laying dynamite on the tracks.

Sabotage of the railways culminated in the murder of Shimoyama, Vice-Minister of Transport.

An anti-police campaign was begun in Hokkaido in early 1952. In that area the campaign was climaxed by the murder of a Police Superintendent in Sapporo on 21 January 1952. May Day violence was precipitated by Communists in 1952. Riots with the police in Tokyo resulted in several hundred casualties and damage to U.S. vehicles. Other minor instances of attack against Japanese defense or U.S. military personnel occurred.

JCP elements--particularly the Communist-dominated National Federation of Students' Self-Government Associations (ZENGAKUREN)--were involved in demonstrations against the extension of U.S. Air Force runways in order to permit the landing of jet planes. In 1956 nearly 800 persons were injured in riots against a survey team which was protected by 2,000 policemen at Tachikawa Air Base, and obstructive action occurred also at Sunakawa. In 1957 the students erected flagpoles which interfered with landings and departures of U.S. planes.

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b. Other Sabotage Targets

Negative.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

The Cominform Journal attacked the JCP in January 1950 for following a doctrine of "peaceful revolution". It accused JCP's policy of being anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet. The Cominform Journal in July 1952 accused the JCP of over-emphasizing use of violent tactics.

Rastvorov testified that the JCP received large amounts of financial assistance from the USSR. This aid was for the JCP's general activities and presumably some of the money supported the JCP's campaigns of sabotage.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

In view of its present "peaceful" posture and its desire to expand its membership and influence, the JCP probably will not initiate any widescale programs of sabotage and violence in the near future unless the international line and tactic change. It will undoubtedly exploit every local grievance (especially if involving a U.S. installation) to cause disturbances and to try to impress workers and farmers of the JCP's desire to protect their interests.

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SOUTH KOREA

I. Status of Communism in South Korea

Most South Korean Communist leaders have been in North Korea since 1948. Membership of South Koreans in the Korean Labor Party (the Communist Party of North Korea) has been illegal since October 1949. There is evidence in the Republic of Korea that a Communist underground organization continues to exist, particularly in urban areas. However, there is virtually no pro-Communist sympathy among the general population, and the government and all major political parties are vigorously anti-Communist. Active Communist guerrillas have been reduced to a negligible number by stringent Republic of Korea police measures.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Kidnapping or Terrorist Missions

The South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) organized and developed underground and paramilitary units in 1947. The guerrilla organization had headquarters offices in each of the provinces. Liaison was maintained through offices of the SKLP. The guerrilla organization had largely deteriorated prior to June 1950.

III. Sabotage Training Given Within South Korea

Negative.

IV. Sabotage Training Given for South Korean Communists in Communist Bloc Countries

South Korean Communists were trained in large numbers at Kangdong School and other schools in North Korea as saboteurs and guerrillas.

V. Sabotage Targets

a. U.S. and/or U.S. Allies Personnel, Installations

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Railroad sabotage and riots against police were instigated by Communists in 1946 even prior to the Cominform call for this type of action in 1947.

In August 1947 Communist plots for general rioting and resistance to government collection of grain were exposed.

In February 1948 Communists precipitated a wave of violence to protest the U. N. Commission's decision to place the Korean question before the Little Assembly. In the first night of action, forty locomotives were sabotaged and police communication with the provincial divisions was completely severed. In the ensuing violence the lives of at least 350 persons were lost.

Communists staged a mutiny within the ROK Army in October 1948. More railway sabotage was carried out in August 1949.

b. Other Sabotage Targets

Negative.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

The Communist Party/Government of North Korea has been the ultimate direction of all forms of militant action and subversion in South Korea for several years. The North Korean Party/Government is in turn under the close direction of representatives of the CPSU.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

Any Communist sabotage action undertaken in South Korea would probably be assigned to a professional intelligence agency of the North Korean government. It is not likely that such action would be undertaken unless an international conflict appeared imminent.