

AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM'S CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS

SUMMARY: The recent flurry of Soviet diplomatic notes and letters to various governments and leaders of the free world raises questions about the aims and the course of international communism in the year ahead. Has the USSR adopted a harder and bolder line following the meeting of Communist Party representatives in Moscow last November? Presented here is a careful, dispassionate analysis of the subject, based in part on information not previously available.

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### INTRODUCTION

In recent months, the unusual degree of activity shown by the leaders of the international Communist movement has raised questions in the minds of observers concerning the course to be taken by the movement in the near future. The measure of this activity is to be found in the formal diplomatic notes and letters sent by the Soviet government to various governments and leaders of the free world, in the less formal but authoritative texts of interviews granted by Soviet leaders to correspondents and publishers of free-world newspapers, and even in the offhand and apparently spontaneous comments of Nikita Khrushchev at diplomatic cocktail parties. These various statements, while full of claims, contentions, and even threats, have not always been consistent on such matters as the conditions under which the Soviet leaders would participate in a "summit conference." For the non-Communist observer it is important to determine whether the marked activity of the Communist leadership of late, despite apparent confusions, falls into any definite pattern indicating the objectives to be sought and the tactics to be used by the international Communist movement in the months ahead.

Tentative conclusions on this problem can be drawn from a careful analysis of the circumstances, the proceedings, and the outcome of the meetings of the Communist Party representatives from around the world held in Moscow last November in connection with the observance of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Two basic documents issued from these meetings: a Twelve-Party Declaration adopted at a meeting on November 14-16 of representatives of the Communist Parties in power -- Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union (the Yugoslav party did not join in this action); and a Peace Manifesto adopted at a meeting on November 16-19 of the entire body of Communist parties represented in Moscow for the anniversary celebration. Both these documents, but particularly the Twelve-Party Declaration, deserve close study in the context of what is known about the Moscow meetings which produced them and the subsequent activities of Communist Parties around the world.

It is standard practice with the Communists, of course, to publish only partial and frequently misleading accounts of international Communist meetings. For example, statements published after the founding meeting of the Cominform (September 1947) concealed completely the severe criticism to which CP Italy and CP France had been subjected by the Soviet, Yugoslav, and other delegations. The general direction prescribed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the international Communist movement was,

however, clear: the Free World Communist parties were to organize maximum pressure and violent assaults on local political structures while, at that period, the Soviets were about to complete the subjugation of Eastern Europe and the Chinese Communists aimed at gaining total power in China.

In the case of the Moscow meetings of November 1957, reliable information indicates that the Communist leaders had agreed not to publish detailed accounts of the meetings. However, points of general significance are clearly discernible in published statements by Communist leaders. Based on these statements, the following provisional observations may be made.

#### THE MEETINGS IN PERSPECTIVE

The Declaration and Peace Manifesto issuing from the Moscow meetings reflect the intention of the CPSU and the bloc Communist parties to efface the after-effects of Khrushchev's secret (de-Stalinization) speech to the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, the events of June and October 1956 in Poland, and the uprising in Hungary. The evident aim is to integrate more closely the activities of the entire international Communist movement in the Free World with Soviet and Bloc policies and interests.

The need for countering a trend toward disintegration in the Communist movement was evident well before the Moscow meetings of Party leaders last November. There were reports from mid-1956 on indicating that several Communist parties repeatedly requested the Soviets to improve procedures and techniques for the coordination of the movement. In March 1957 Communist circles rumored consistently that the CPSU would render a decision on international problems. On 1 July 1957, prior to the announcement of the Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich purges, various Communist parties abroad were given, through the local Soviet ambassadors, the CPSU version of the purge. This unusual procedure suggested that the CPSU recognized the need for improved international coordination.

It is not unlikely, however, that the Soviets postponed attacking this complex and thorny problem on an international scale until they were in a position to galvanize the international Communist leadership into action with announcements of their achievements in rocketry and space travel. The November meetings were apparently staged to deal with the problems of coordination, as well as the confusion and ideological dislocations created by the 20th CPSU Congress and its aftermath, in an atmosphere benefiting from these scientific achievements and from the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The line of action laid down at the November meetings complements current Soviet Bloc efforts to achieve a shift in the balance of power. The general direction prescribed for the international Communist movement in the documents of the November meetings is intended to contribute to and accelerate this shift through a variety of united front tactics. Depending upon local circumstances, these tactics may include, for example, direct action or political maneuver, insurrection or parliamentary methods, united action or popular fronts. In adjustment to a new set of circumstances, the movement's general directive line is aimed militantly at increasing disunity, conflict and

polarization within the Free World. The tempo of this increase obviously will be contingent upon local factors, such as the strength and status of the local Communist party, as well as the aid received from the Bloc. It is precisely to conceal the militant and aggressive character of the Communist action line that the full minutes of the November meetings have been kept secret.

The November meetings did not, of course, solve all problems and disagreements with which the international Communist movement has had to cope since the 20th CPSU Congress. However, they were first, and exceedingly important, steps toward achieving real unity and effective international coordination. Their effect has been to formalize the basic outlines of global Communist tactics and to create the foundation of a new structure for the international Communist movement within and outside the Communist bloc -- in brief, to weld together the Communist movement in the spirit, although not in the form, of the prewar Third (Communist) International, or Comintern.

#### MECHANICS AND AGENDA OF THE MEETINGS

Available data on the mechanics and organization of the meetings suggest, first, that the problems of international Communism received a thorough airing, and secondly, that the CPSU had distributed key roles to reliable delegations and leaders in order to maintain its own control and keep the meetings on the desired track.

The preparatory stage took place in Moscow. Prior to the formal sessions a "comprehensive exchange of opinions within and among delegations" was held for about one week. Communist accounts also refer to "commissions established by Communist and Workers' Parties" in connection with the meetings. According to Communist practice, these "commissions" may have concerned themselves with the drafting of the documents published. They may also have dealt with more specific problems of doctrine and organization.

For example, it is reliably reported that a conference of all Latin American delegates was held under the chairmanship of the Soviet specialist for Latin American affairs of the CPSU, and attended by Chinese Communist delegates. The conference permitted the representatives of significant Communist parties in the area to discuss their problems. Those selected to speak were delegates from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, and Guatemala, the latter also representing the Communist movement in Mexico and the Caribbean.

This conference well illustrates the thoroughness with which Communist area problems were discussed. The Soviet chairman laid before the meeting a specific action program for the Latin American Communist parties which was accepted. It included requests for: (a) increased efforts to fan and exploit anti-U.S. sentiment; (b) revival of the Communist-controlled peace movement through a Latin American peace conference to be held in Argentina in 1958; (c) renewed efforts to attack the Organization of American States through a Communist-controlled conference in defense of culture to coincide with the next OAS conference; (d) support for the Communist movement in Cuba through organizing a week of solidarity with the people of Cuba; and (e) promotion of the Soviet economic offensive in the region through organizing a Communist-controlled conference on the regional economy. At the same time, the

Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) came in for some criticism, and ways and means of strengthening or reorganizing the CTAL were discussed.

The chairman of this meeting also requested that the Latin American Communist parties improve and intensify the coordination of their activities. Specifically, he requested that a Northern Conference be held to include Communist parties from Canada to Panama. CP Mexico and CP Cuba were charged with the organization of this secret regional conference which, it was believed, could be held in Canada. A secret regional conference of Communist parties in southern Latin America had been held previously in Brazil.

As the Latin American conference, among others, illustrates, the preparatory work for the plenary meeting of Party representatives was under the control of the CPSU and the Bloc parties, which in this fashion assumed policy-making powers. According to the account of Friedrich Ebert, politburo member of the East German Communist Party (SED), the "sister parties from the capitalist countries" (i.e., from the Free World), were only "consulted" at this stage, even though these discussions centered around the drafting of the Twelve-Party Declaration, which contains a general directive for the Communist parties in the Free World.

The meeting of the twelve Communist parties in power was opened by Khrushchev. Mao Tse-tung was the first speaker on the draft of the Declaration, which had been prepared jointly by the CPSU and CP China. Walter Ulbricht closed the debate. The Declaration was adopted unanimously, although Gomulka, and possibly Kadar, may have had reservations on language concerning the leading role of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia did not attend this meeting. The twelve-party meeting represented in effect the session of a small but powerful policy-making executive -- an international Politburo or Presidium.

The meeting of Communist representatives from sixty-five countries was a plenary session on the order of an international Central Committee. It met "a few hours after" the conclusion of the twelve-party meeting, "in the same place." It was again Khrushchev who opened the meeting with a speech which emphasized that "consolidation and preservation of peace (is) a principal task of the present time." Suslov welcomed the meeting briefly. Allotments of speaking time were reduced to twenty minutes, but not all the delegates were permitted to speak, while others, such as the French and Italian delegates made lengthy speeches. Mao Tse-tung talked for two to three hours, apparently about the internal problems of China.

The meeting centered about the draft of the Peace Manifesto which according to Ebert had been drawn up "upon the initiative of the CPSU and the Polish Workers' Party," though Gomulka himself, in a 28 November speech to the Warsaw Aktiv, claimed exclusive credit for the initiative.

The meeting of representatives of sixty-five countries also discussed the Declaration "decided upon by the representatives of sister parties of the socialist countries." Again, there are no indications that it was brought to a formal vote, but it may be presumed that at least a majority of the Communist parties of the Free World represented there accepted the Declaration.

A bulky written report by Suslov had been circulated prior to the meeting in order to speed up the discussion, and may have been considered by the earlier twelve-party meeting. This report must obviously have been discussed at the larger meeting also. Available references suggest that it dealt, among other topics, with an assessment of the strength of the Communist movement in the Free World. The report appears to have contained some frank admissions of existing weaknesses and damages sustained. Judging from Ebert's account, the latter included admissions of "some damages at individual points of the Communist movement" as a result of the Korean War, the events in Egypt, and the Hungarian revolt. This admission points to Europe, since the report claimed that "in Asia and Africa, however, and also in some Latin American countries, some of the sister parties have considerably grown."

The difficult situation of non-Bloc Communist parties, which was referred to in the Suslov report, was apparently elaborated upon in speeches made by representatives of those parties. Ebert stated, "their reports on their parties' struggle show the full impact of the difficult stand they have fac[ing] the imperialist rulers." Ebert referred particularly to needy Communist parties in Latin America and the Near and Middle East, and the small European Communist parties were also considered by Moscow. The result appears to have been an acknowledgement of the needs of the weak Communist parties of the Free World. Ebert postulated: "It appears to be a matter of greatest urgency to devote more attention to the sister parties which are working under such difficult circumstances and above all to grant them more moral and political help within the framework of the cooperation of the Communist and workers' parties of all the world." The implementation of this policy is bound to increase security problems in many countries in the Free World where Communist parties are outlawed or have lost ground.

One of the most important items on the agenda, a subject extensively discussed, was the problem of the organizational integration of the Communist movement under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc parties. The position taken on this subject, and its implication for the CPSU and the Communist movement as a whole, are worth noting in detail.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEETINGS FOR THE CPSU

The pattern for the integration of the Communist movement under CPSU control was defined as early as 1920 in Article 14 of the "Conditions of Admission to the Comintern," which stated, "Each Party desirous of affiliating with the Communist International should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics, in their struggle against counter-revolutionary forces." The Moscow Declaration of the twelve parties provides a modernized version of this position, taking into account the enlarged area now under Communist control:

"At bedrock of the relations between the countries of the world socialist system and all the Communist and workers' parties lie the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the principles of proletarian internationalism which have been tested by life. Truly the vital interests of the working people of all countries call for their

support of the Soviet Union and all the Socialist countries, who, pursuing a policy of preserving peace throughout the world, are the mainstay of peace and social progress." (Underlining supplied)

Within the bloc of Communist-controlled countries, the Soviet Union continued to be singled out for the leading position. The Twelve-Party Declaration refers to "the indivisible camp of Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union." There are some indications that the Polish party leader, Wladislaw Gomulka, who has had an aversion for using the term "the Socialist camp led. . . " or "headed by the Soviet Union," may have objected to this language of the Declaration. However, Friedrich Ebert, in his report on the twelve-party meeting, related that Mao Tse-tung defended the assignment of the leading position to the Soviet Union and its party, on the grounds that the Soviet Union was powerful, could protect the other Communist countries, and had, since Stalin's death, improved its working methods. Mao is reported to have said, "From all this results the leading role of the CPSU in the community of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the leading role of the Soviet Union at the head of the states of the Socialist camp."

Aside from its implications for the discipline and effectiveness of the international Communist movement, the adoption of this position seems intended to have the effect of strengthening the position of the CPSU within the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's aim has been to replace the one-man dictatorship of Stalin by the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which is also the basis of his personal strength. The propagandistic treatment of the November meetings in the press and radio of the Soviet Union indicates that a strenuous effort is being made to "sell" the CPSU and to strengthen its authority internally on the grounds of the increased international stature and prestige gained at the November meetings.

At the meeting of the Moscow Party Aktiv (leading Party functionaries) on 26 November the CPSU Presidium member Furtseva, stressed this point at least five times. As reported in Evening Moscow of November 27, she contended that Soviet leadership of the world movement "is very important to emphasize because revisionists in certain foreign Communist parties applied much effort to discredit the successes of the Soviet Union, undermine the authority of our party. . . This is why the position put on paper in the Declaration about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the family of Socialist countries, about the need to defend and support the Soviet Union as the first and most powerful Socialist power, is so important for further strengthening of the whole Communist movement."

The purported increase in prestige which resulted from the November meetings was likewise publicized by a number of other leading Soviet figures. The Soviet writer Korneychuk spoke in this vein at the 2 December plenum of the Central Committee, CP Ukraine. At the same meeting Soviet Marshal Chuikov stressed that "Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals of the Okrug are studying the Declaration and Manifesto with a feeling of great pride in the dear Communist Party. . . ."

The internationalization of CPSU internal propaganda for the purpose of raising the prestige and authority of the Party is only one aspect of the "leading role" of the Soviet state and the CPSU in international Communist affairs. The other is the commitment inherent in the claim to leadership, i.e., to guide, assist, and strengthen Communist parties abroad. The CPSU is now irrevocably committed to undertake actions which are bound to conflict with the posture of "peaceful coexistence" and non-interference in the internal affairs of the Free World countries.

#### SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

As previously noted, the November meetings represented only the first stage in the organizational integration of the movement. The Declaration stated tersely, "After exchanging views, the participants in the meeting arrived at the conclusion that in present conditions it is expedient besides bilateral meetings of leading personnel and exchange of information, to hold, as the need arises, more representatives' conferences of Communist and workers' parties to discuss current problems, share experience, study each others' views and attitudes, and concert [i.e., coordinate] action in the joint struggle for the common goals -- peace, democracy and socialism." From the documents issued by the meetings and from Gomulka's speech of 28 November to the Warsaw Aktiv and Ebert's report to the SED, only a few tentative conclusions can be reached at this time concerning the organizational principles and procedures laid down at the meetings. Among the more important are:

1. Agreement in principle has been reached to the effect that the CPSU, as head of the international Communist movement, will give due consideration to the views of Communist parties, especially of those in power. Both Mao and Gomulka expressed their satisfaction that the CPSU leadership would behave properly.
2. For the time being, the CPSU is willing to be correct in its dealings with foreign Communist parties and to foster the impression that "collective leadership" prevails in international affairs. Furtseva, in her report to the Moscow Party Aktiv, emphasized that the documents issued by the meetings had been "collectively worked out."
3. Instead of creating a "central management" (i.e. another Comintern) for the international Communist Movement, a coordination procedure was adopted. The main vehicle for coordination will be "conferences of a large number or even of all Communist and workers' parties." According to reliable data these meetings will apparently be of two kinds:
  - a. International (or plenary) meetings of all (or a great majority) of Communist parties, on the model of the meeting of Communist party representatives from sixty-five countries, which would be able to pass decisions binding for all. Such meetings are scheduled to be held at least once a year. The CPSU will convoke these meetings.
  - b. Regional meetings of Communist parties with common problems. Such meetings would apparently not have policy-making powers and would deal only with "practical problems" on an informal, ad hoc basis. Ulbricht,



at the November meetings, emphasized the need for regional consultation and coordination of the anti-NATO campaign within the Bloc. Prior to the November meetings indications pointed to increasing regional consultations on the NATO problem between CP France and other European Communist Parties. Regional consultation meetings between Scandinavian Communist parties were held twice in 1957. In the future such regional meetings should increase on the basis of need.

4. This coordination procedure complements but does not supersede bilateral relations and meetings. The CPSU, therefore, can, as before, coordinate directly with those Communist parties which are more subservient or dependent than others.
5. Some constitutional and procedural terms apparently agreed upon in connection with the international (plenary) meetings, would be designed to provide guarantees for protecting the authority of Communist parties. The following points emerged from Gomulka's 28 November address: (a) "As a rule, such conferences must be participated in by Party leaders" (thus preventing the CPSU from manipulating secondary leaders in order to put pressure on the top). (b) "The questions to be discussed must be known in advance to all its participants" (ensuring that national CP leaders would be able to anticipate and reply to criticism and other pressure). (c) "The problems existing in the internal policy of each party. . . cannot be decided by interparty conferences" (although this restriction is not to apply to the internal problems common to all parties if they can reach the same views on these problems).

These affirmations suggest that Communist parties will accept plenary conference decisions as binding only with their consent. The Declaration itself has already been formally accepted by Central Committees and party Aktivs in the Bloc. Outside the Bloc the Declaration has been accepted by CP France and CP Italy, among others. The significance of these procedural safeguards remains to be tested by practice, however.

6. The principle of subordinating the interests of Communist parties in capitalist countries to the anti-colonial struggle was also discussed, as illustrated by the debate on the Algerian question. The French representative, Maurice Duclos, defended, with little success, the CP France position that the rebellion in Algeria was counterproductive. Ali Yata, Secretary General of the Moroccan CP, speaking in behalf of all Arab CPs, objected. The Syrian delegate appears to have recommended strongly that the interests of the Communist parties in imperialist home countries, and in France in particular, be strictly subordinated to the interests of the struggle against colonialism. This position was supported by the Dutch delegation. In subsequent meetings with CP Morocco, the French CP apparently accepted Ali Yata's position and can be expected to render more aid to the Communist-supported insurgents.

Among the other organizational and procedural questions discussed were the problem of speeding up and improving content of propaganda about the Bloc in the Free World in order to increase the appeal of the Communist system, and the right of the international body to criticize member parties publicly. It is

likely that the question of organizing illegal CP apparats for the eventual overthrow of governments came up. There is also good reason to assume that the CPSU discussed its subsidization of foreign Communist Parties. According to standard practice some delegates returned with secret funds, as usual in small U.S. bills. There are also firm indications that even small and politically insignificant Communist parties were given secret communication channels with the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China, and made arrangements for the training of their leaders in those two countries.

As to the establishment of a permanent headquarters and the publication of an official organ for the movement, the action taken at the meetings is not yet fully known. Thus far only the issuance of a "theoretical journal" for the Communist and workers' parties has been announced as agreed upon. Contributions to the journal will be submitted on a voluntary basis. As a preliminary step to issuing the journal a press agency may be set up, probably in Prague.

Whether there will be a permanent international headquarters organization is not clearly discernible at this moment. A more permanent organization is bound to emerge from the pattern of plenary and regional meetings, if for no other reason than to conduct business between sessions. According to some reliable sources the CPSU objected to the creation of an international headquarters organization because it desired to remain the sole organizational center. If so, the Foreign Section -- or, as it is sometimes called, the International Department -- of the Central Committee of the CPSU may assume increasing significance.

The emergence of future regional coordination centers acting on behalf of the CPSU can be anticipated, although evidence is not yet firm. It stands to reason that certain Communist parties will assume a more formal and dominant position in regional affairs because of their strength and experience and, in certain areas, because of their legal status. (A legal CP could better control communications than could an illegal CP.)

The Communist Party of China is sure to be one such regional coordination center. It is known to maintain training courses for Communists from South Asia and Latin America. The Communist parties of East Germany and Czechoslovakia will be similarly used by the Soviets. Outside the Bloc it would be advisable to observe closely CP France (for its activities in Western Europe), CP Italy (for its activities in the Middle East), CP Finland (in Scandinavia), CP Mexico, Cuba, and Brazil (in Latin America), CP Indonesia, and obviously, CP Syria.

A most important trend, however, in the regional pattern will be the further development of contacts between Communist parties in "capitalist" and "colonial and semi-dependent" countries. Some Bloc Communist Parties (for example, those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Soviet Armenia) have shown great interest in international problems and may channel their support through Communist parties outside the bloc. As for the CPSU, its increased activity in the field of international coordination has become apparent. A large delegation composed of CPSU propaganda specialists was sent to Italy, and a top Soviet trade union organizer was dispatched to Cairo in January 1958.

TACTICAL PROGRAM FOR FREE WORLD PENETRATION

In line with previous estimates by the Soviets, the Declaration reflects the view that opportunities exist particularly in "colonial and dependent" countries (i.e., in the underdeveloped areas), whereas "relatively good economic activity" in a number of "capitalist countries" (i.e., industrialized areas) reduces the effectiveness of Communist leverage there for the time being.

In order to increase the opportunities the Declaration puts in the center of Communist tactics the exploitation of a threat which, it alleges, derives from "the presence of military danger created by imperialism, and primarily by the imperialism of the United States of America, which has now become the center of international reaction." By fanning war hysteria and anti-Americanism the Communist movement will seek to mount increasing political and other pressures on the local governments and political structures. The exploitation of this issue could, in the Communist estimate, effect a change in the balance of power in the country in which the party is operating, and therefore, internationally.

The operational method selected for this purpose is the promotion of united front on the broadest possible basis. "The Peace Manifesto clearly defines the position of Communist and workers' parties, which consists of offering support to every step taken by a state, a party, an organization, a movement, or an individual for the preservation of peace and against war, for peaceful coexistence, for the establishment of collective security in Europe and Asia, for reduction of armaments, and for banning the use of atomic weapons and the carrying out of atomic tests." This position permits and demands manipulation not only of "left" political groups but also, and in some areas preponderantly, of "right" and nationalist forces.

This tactic of building up pressure in the Free World is, of course, not a new one. In the postwar period such attempts were intensified, particularly in periods when the Soviet expansion drive was frustrated. The Cominform-endorsed tactic of direct assault was adopted following the loss of goodwill which the Soviet Union and Communist parties had accumulated during World War II in many countries. When the aggression in Korea was halted, the Cominform tactic of direct assault was transformed into the tactic of the United National Front which closely corresponded to the current line, inasmuch as it was also based on marshalling all anti-American forces on a minimum platform. The current action line stems mainly from the frustrations suffered by the Bloc as a result of internal pressures developing after the 20th Congress and in the wake of the Hungarian revolt.

The fact that this action line is being re-emphasized indicates that internal pressures are still operating in the Bloc. The emphasis of the Declaration on the need for strict conformism with orthodox Communism and on the priority of the need for combatting revisionism strengthens this impression.

Not for internal reasons alone, however, does the Soviet Union resort to this artifice of the "war threat" -- itself a paradox in a period when the "world system of socialism" proclaims superiority. This device also permits the Bloc to provoke the U.S. and its allies into positions which can then be "exposed" as proof of the thesis. For example, the Bloc can place the onus on

the U.S. and its allies for failure to negotiate on Soviet terms; it can maintain a climate of political pressure on Free World nations, and especially on underdeveloped countries to alienate them further from the more developed and stronger Free World countries. It can also make use even of the paradox implicit in the "war threat" device, by alternately emphasizing the war threat and the peaceful posture of the Soviet Union and the bloc.

As an artifice, the "war threat" issue is in constant need of artificial stimulation. It is probable that the Communist leaders assembled in November were exposed to fabricated or distorted evidence of alleged "imperialist plots." Since the events in Hungary in 1956, Bloc and Communist media in the Free World have used this tactic in order to keep their followers properly agitated about the alleged "threat of war."

As an operative directive, the war threat as the central issue for the United Front tactic is a signal for intensified disruptive action in the Free World. This signal appeared previously in the August 1957 (#12) issue of Kommunist in an article by Ponomarev, and was apparent in the "Theses" issued in September by the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

For "colonial and dependent" countries the Declaration prescribes a united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front exploiting peasant unrest and the grievances of the middle class, as well as aspirations of "patriotic democratic forces." That the Declaration calls for increasing pressure emerges from its position on neutralist governments of underdeveloped countries --- the "zone of peace." It defines as "the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa" those "taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming together with the Socialist countries, a broad peace zone." In this definition there is no longer, as there had been in the Khrushchev statement to the 20th CPSU Congress, any reference to "peace-loving European states." More important, the "anti-imperialist stand" is emphasized as the chief criterion. "Non-participation in blocs" is no longer mentioned as a chief characteristic of a neutralist country. This language suggests that the Soviet Union now requires a closer alignment on the part of neutralist governments prior to considering them as useful adjuncts to its foreign policy aims. Local Communist parties may therefore exert greater pressure on their governments to force their alignment, or to bring them down.

Pressure on the more developed capitalist countries can also be expected to mount. This is indicated in the Declaration by the call for attacks on the "big monopoly" groups -- the traditional signal for intensification of infiltration and unrest in labor and other fields.

For those "capitalist" countries which are closely allied with the U.S., the Declaration also prescribes the foundation of a broad united front, based on unity of the working class (i.e., united action with Socialists) in order eventually to "overthrow the rule of the monopolies who betray national interests." The Democratic Socialists, particularly in the Far East, remain a key target for the united front attack.

The 40th Anniversary Theses flatly declared that without a Communist-Socialist united front "the working class cannot win power." The Declaration, however, is not so strongly worded and emphasizes the incompatibility of (Democratic) Socialist and Communist doctrine. It is entirely possible that Khrushchev and the CPSU considered that opportunities exist for a "united front from above," i.e., agreement with Socialist leadership, whereas leaders of Communist parties abroad, especially those from Europe, pointed to the practical difficulties involved. The Declaration suggests that the tactic of the "united front from below" (i.e., infiltration and splitting of the rank and file from the Socialist leaders) has been agreed upon as the most practical one, especially in Western Europe.

The Declaration also makes perfectly clear --- clearer, perhaps, than the 20th CPSU Congress --- that the purpose of the united front tactic is the gaining of state power. Reviving Dimitrov's formulae of the 7th (Comintern) World Congress, it permits a variety of "transitional forms" to this end, i.e., a "popular front" based on "a united working class" (unity with the Socialists), or "other workable forms of agreement and political cooperation between the different parties and public organizations." The latter formula obviously pertains to situations such as in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia or any other country where political fermentation is spearheaded by nationalist ("anti-imperialist") forces. It is a formula which permits Communist parties in the Bloc or the Free World, as well as the Soviet espionage services engaging in covert political action operations, to suggest and make deals with any individual or opposition group which could weaken a government unfriendly to or insufficiently committed to the Soviet Union.

The Declaration restricts the "parliamentary road to Socialism" to "a number of capitalist countries," and postulates that a Communist majority in a parliament must be employed so as to "smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the Socialist revolution." In case of resistance to this scheme, the Declaration warns, "the possibility of non-peaceful transition to Socialism should be borne in mind." The intensification of the united front pressures in the Free World will, of course, vary from country to country.

Generally, however, Communist parties in Free World countries will, for the time being, pose as "defenders of peace and constitution," as "patriots" interested only in reforms, and as nationalists who are more nationalistic than non-Communist nationalists. Under such cover Communist parties can be expected to build up their potential for subversion and disruption.

Undoubtedly one of the reasons the proceedings of the November meetings have not been made public is an operational one. The meetings evidently succeeded in establishing a preliminary program and a procedure for the tactical integration of the Communist movement. The programmatic statement issued in the Declaration shows that the CPSU considers that opportunities for increasingly aggressive action have improved since last year and that, given increased discipline and unity, these opportunities can be exploited. Publication of the proceedings would be certain to reveal that international Communism, in concert with the Bloc, has been called upon to mount

a political offensive, and would expose the Peace Manifesto signed by the Communist parties from 65 countries as propaganda. The true significance of the Peace Manifesto lies in the simple fact that Communist parties have been instructed to act more independently of the international Communist front group, the World Peace Council, and that the latter organization, criticized at the meetings, is in for overhauling. The current flurry of Soviet notes and letters illustrates the intensification of the "peace" campaign which can be expected from all Communist parties.

#### OUTLOOK

The November meetings of Communist leaders in Moscow perpetuated and generalized the hardened and bolder line of the CPSU and Soviet foreign policy which has been characteristic of the period following Khrushchev's victory in the June Plenum of the Central Committee. They resulted in a first step toward increased organizational unity within the international Communist movement.

Various intra-bloc conferences, held after the November meetings, in the field of ideology, science, and particularly, long-range economic planning indicate the determination with which the CPSU pursues its objective of increasing cohesion in the Bloc.

Whether the current tactical line of the world Communist movement will be maintained depends, of course, on its success, particularly on the ability of the Soviet Party and government leaders to dramatize convincingly their claims for the total superiority of the Soviet system on the basis of partial successes in the field of rocketry, and to play up at the same time their allegations of a war threat to such an extent that masses of people will be activated to join the Communist movement in one way or another.

Mao's long speech at the plenary session was organized around the war threat and the superiority of the Bloc. He contended that the imperialist powers were moving toward atomic war, and called upon the Communist delegates to do their utmost to disarm the Free World completely. Khrushchev in confidential discussions with foreign CP leaders in Moscow, also appears to have imbued them with a fighting optimism.

Whether or not Khrushchev and Mao divulged their true estimates of the strength of the Bloc to the international Communist leadership cannot be ascertained. In any case their talks were clearly designed to strengthen Communist morale and to inspire action designed to create serious trouble in the Free World.

For the moment the official Soviet prognosis is extremely optimistic. The Soviet writer and Khrushchev protege, Korneychuk, addressing the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on 2 December, spoke of the great increase in the prestige of the Soviet Union abroad "since our country launched the artificial earth satellite," and made the claim that "new hundreds of millions of people" would be "organized around the invincible banner of peace." His statement clearly indicates an expectation that the Communist movement, in stirring up the fear of war, can ride in on the coat-tails of increasing Soviet prestige.

The year 1958 should provide the Soviets with a series of tests. An intensive and apparently well coordinated action program of Communist front organizations is unfolding. Its main targets are in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The Permanent Council and Secretariat, left behind by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, is to breathe new life into, and expand the chain of local Afro-Asian Solidarity committees and energize Afro-Asian youth, labor and women fronts. The World Federation of Democratic Youth has announced that it will concentrate on Arab youth. The International Union of Students will attempt to revitalize its activities looking toward the holding of its fifth Congress in Peking in September. The Communist-controlled International Federation of Democratic Women has convoked its fourth Congress for June, in Vienna. The World Peace Assembly scheduled for mid-1958 (and sponsored by the Communist-front World Peace Council) will be preceded by strenuous efforts to enlist a great number of new faces.

The next plenary meeting of the international Communist leadership may well be held under the cover of one or the other of these major front gatherings, possibly the World Peace Assembly. On such an occasion the Soviets may be expected to carry out a general review of their tactics -- and possibly to revise their estimates.