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With Para numbers

1. Three times, at crucial turning points in the development of the Communist Party of China, Mao Tse-tung^{has} put Party and non-Party cadre through an intensive ideological indoctrination program in order to enforce a unified leadership approach to the task ahead.

2. The first and most intensive of these programs (Chen Feng or Party Reform Movements) which lasted from 1942 to about 1944, consolidated the Chinese Communist Party as well as Mao's leading position and readied the leadership corps for the post-war showdown with the Kuomintang. The second--and less known--Chen Feng (Three Seasons Reform) was initiated in the summer of 1950 following the consolidation of state power in 1949 and appears to have been geared to the ensuing class struggle period which culminated in 1955-56 with the drastic and rapid communization of China's agricultural and industrial base.

3. The current Chen Feng, which was set in motion by Mao's report to the Supreme State Conference (27 February to March, 1957) and

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his 12 March speech to the National Conference of Propaganda
Work, can readily be linked with the emerging Second Five-Year
Plan which is to run from 1958 to 1962. Held against the background of
the dislocations and dissatisfactions created by the rapid communisa-
tian program of 1955 and 1956, success or failure of the Second Five-
Year Plan could well determine the future course of events within
China. A note of apprehension is discernible in the 7 June announce-
ment of the "national conference of design" at which the guiding
principles of the ^{2nd} Second Five-Year Plan were discussed. According
to a New York Times despatch from Hong Kong, 7 June, "the
announcement said that the factors that guided the principles of the
Second Five-Year Plan were the realization that China was still a
big agricultural country with a meager industrial foundation, that
it had a huge (⁶⁰⁰ 6,000,000,000) population with a low living standard and
that its economy and cultural development was uneven." Thus, a
period beset with many knotty problems is seen ahead for China.
The current Party Reform Movement is an alert to the entire
Communist Party of China as well as its governmental auxiliaries and
fronts, that its leadership and popularity will be severely tested in its

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efforts to sell and implement the Second Five-Year Plan.

4. What is Mao's fundamental approach to the leadership

problem? Although his February and March speeches have not been

published as yet, his thoughts have clearly emerged in a variety of

and in a summary of his remarks, including textual excerpts,
CCP pronouncements sufficiently broad in scope to ^{show} that Mao's

acquired and published by The N.Y. Times through contact with [unclear]
position today is remarkably consistent with those propounded openly

in years past. ("On Contradiction", 1937; key note addresses in the

First Cheng Feng Movement, 1942; Report to the Third Plenum of the

Central Committee, June 1950; etc.).

Mao posed the problem sharply in his February 1942 Cheng

Feng speech when he asked "How can Marxist-Leninist theory and the

reality of the Chinese Revolution be united?" The body of thought

called "Maoism" is but the sum total of answers to this simple

question. ~~Unquestioning acceptance of the basic concepts of Bolshevik~~

~~doctrine (earlier referred to by Mao as "Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalinism")~~

~~is combined in "Maoism" with what amounts to an obsession with~~

~~Chinese reality.~~ Hence, it is no accident that the common theme of all

three Party Reform Movements is an attack on "subjectivism" which

is Party jargon for insufficient recognition of, and ^{tactical} adjustment to

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See N.Y. Times 1/13/50

Chinese reality. "Subjectivism" among the leadership ~~is the root~~
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~~of all our accounts for all the incorrect of other harmful~~
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of all our accounts for all the incorrect of other harmful
"dogmatism" and "doctrinarism", i. e., mechanical
application of Marxist-Bolshevik doctrine; "formalism", i. e.,
reliance on Party jargon in propaganda; "sectarianism", i. e.,
counterproductive friction within the Party or between the Party and
the "outside"; "bureaucratism, commandism" which are subjectivism
in administrative and executive management, i. e., the attitude based
on the erroneous notion that reality is changed by issuing orders.

In the February 1942 speech cited Mao seems to express the
practical reason for his abhorrence of subjectivism: the demography
of China. Visualizing an eventual Party strength of about 4,000,000
he pointed out that the Party would, at best, represent only one per cent
out of a population of ~~4,000,000,000~~ 4,000,000,000 and therefore could not afford to
antagonize the people unnecessarily. Today the Chinese Party
claims about 12,000,000 members out of a claimed population strength
of 400,000,000. The Party, then, ~~will~~ *even now* represents only two per cent
of the total population.

Mao's concern with China's demography is also evident in his
recent speeches. Introducing the concept of birth control--in itself a
staggering innovation in the social and cultural pattern of China--he
cites the inadequacy of agricultural production in feeding a ~~g~~^rowing

population as well as the limitations of primary educational facilities.

If, as appears indicated, the Second Five-Year Plan may not live up to expectations, Mao's concern with possible mass pressures on the regime is understandable--particularly in the light of the events in Hungary. The "Hungarian tragedy" (as Mao terms it) emerges clearly as the immediate cause for Mao's current ideological and practical deliberations, ^{from concern} ~~stemming~~ ^{and out of}

~~from concern~~ over the popular uprising
but also ~~from~~ over the rapid disintegration
of CP Hungary.

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5. Mao's is the approach of an eminently practical, self-made, revolutionary who deals with specific situations and people--and accepts formulae only when and if they apply. Lest it be misinterpreted as a disposition toward breaking away from the ~~Soviet model~~ ^{the} Soviet Union, ^{It must be} emphasized that the principle of "unity of theory and practice" is a standard tenet of Marxism-Leninism and was one of Stalin's pet phrases. Students of Mao's thought have repeatedly reported their inability to find any trace of conceptual heterodoxy. In particular were they unable to discern any deviationism in the Party indoctrination material issued during the first Chen Feng (1942) which is the model for the current Party "rectification" campaign. Neither can there be found any deviations from fundamental Bolshevik thought in the available materials ^{Mao's speeches and} on the current Chen Feng. What is evident currently, as it was in 1942, is Mao's insistence ^{up} on expressing and unfolding ^{the} Marxist-Bolshevik principles ^{of the dictatorship of the proletariat} in terms of Chinese reality.

In 1942, the first Chen Feng was accompanied by the demotion and loss of influence of ^{a small group of} ~~the~~ Moscow-trained Chinese Communist leaders who had held key positions in the Central Committee of the CCP ^(common) on the grounds of their inability to adopt Moscow-taught Marxism-Leninism to China's specific conditions. Today much--too much--is made of the unorthodoxy of Mao's thesis

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on "Contradictions within the Ranks of the People", particularly as an indication of a Sino-Soviet ideological rift. Mao as an interpreter of the Bolshevik Bible has always insisted that he needs no middleman in matters Chinese. Stalin acknowledged this position through the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, ~~thinking~~ and the Khrushchev regime consistently enhanced the prestige of the CCP.

6. Mao's thesis that there continue to exist in a "Socialist" society a variety of non-antagonistic contradictions is based on Marx and Lenin, and has even been acknowledged by Stalin and other Soviet leaders and theoreticians. (Mao first expounded this thesis in his essay "On Contradiction," written in 1937). In plain language Mao's ~~pk~~ position can be summarized as follows: In order to achieve power the Communist Party must use force to crush the class enemy and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat i. e. , solve the "antagonistic contradictions" of the class struggle. After the Communist Party has achieved full state and economic control, there is, theoretically speaking, no more class conflict since classes have been abolished. The "class enemy" is now mainly represented by the external threat from the imperialists. Nevertheless,

the "class struggle is not entirely over."

Internally there still may develop socio-economic-political conflicts, Since

problems and pressures.

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Since there are no more hostile classes, these conflicts, problems and pressures are theoretically speaking "non-antagonistic contradictions", i. e., capable of solutions by means other than force, principally by persuasion, discussion and education. If not correctly handled, however, these contradictions may become "antagonistic", i. e., threaten the power position of the regime as they did in Hungary, necessitating the use of force. Through his thesis, then, Mao addresses himself in greater detail than any other Communist theoretician to a fundamental, practical proposition, i. e., under what circumstances the "dictatorship of the proletariat" should bring into play its repressive forces internally. It needs to be emphasized that Mao does not now and never has repudiated the use of force or terror per se. Concerning the use of force against the

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"external enemy" Mao has never expressed any modifying or qualifying positions. Concerning the use of force internally his current positions do not question the principle, but merely the *author's sub. let's use* ~~usefulness and productivity~~ of terror under certain circumstances.

In this Mao is no innovator. He merely follows overt Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine (although not Stalinist practice) when he attempts to establish a balance between the *the* coercive and paternalistic aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The following statement from a report by A. A. Zhdanov to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 21 February 1937, illustrates the point. Zhdanov said:

"Leninism teaches: The dictatorship of the proletariat has its periods, its special forms and diversified methods of work. During the civil war, the coercive aspect of the dictatorship is especially conspicuous.... On the other hand, during the period of socialist construction, the peaceful organizational and cultural work of the dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc., are especially conspicuous. But here again it by no means follows that during the period of construction, the coercive side of the dictatorship has fallen away, or ~~it~~ could do so... The

organs of suppression, the army and other organizations are as necessary now, in the period of construction, as they were during the civil war period..."

The Stalinist regime paid lip service to the paternalistic aspects of the dictatorship ^{but} ~~that~~ perpetuated the terror system. ~~of~~

Mao, although emphasizing the "peaceful" and persuasive aspect of the dictatorship for the time being, disguises by this very emphasis the fact that the "organs of suppression" in China continue to exist with their functions unchanged. Nor could Mao afford to let "the coercive side of the dictatorship" "fall away" since by definition his thesis admits that "non-antagonistic contradictions" may become

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"antagonistic" if not properly handled, and, ~~further, even appears to acknowledge the existence of current "antagonisms."~~ Given the

press of the huge population mass of Chinese, the low level of economic and educational development, the realization that the Second Five Year Plan may carry social-economic progress only ^{two} small

~~shall~~ a step forward. Mao's defensive use of the persuasive aspects of the dictatorship ^{represents} ~~are~~ valid Communist tactics, and is

"orthodox" at that.

7. The defensive ^{and} preventative nature of Mao's thought ,
underlying his emphasis on "persuasion", "correct handling of
contradictions" and the Cheng Feng Party training program, emerges
^{also} clearly from a recent Peking broadcast (26 April 1957) on "Why are
there contradictions within the ranks of the people?" which
unmistakably reflects Mao's position. The broadcast answered the
title question thus: "First of all we must understand that the
main contradiction [Emphasis supplied] in our country now are the
contradictions between the people's desire to build an advanced
industrial nation and the reality of a backward agricultural nation,
between the people's demand for rapid economic and cultural growth
and the present economic and cultural conditions that thwart their
DEMAND [Emphasis supplied] Anticipating continued frustration of
"the people's demand" Mao enjoins his Party apparatus, especially
through the Cheng Feng campaign, not to aggravate the situation
unnecessarily by "bureaucratic" working methods since the long -
term plans of the ^{regime} regional and the short term desires and aspirations
of the "people" may conflict. This, in essence, is the meaning of the
maoism which reads that "at present the contradictions between the
masses of our country and the leaders result mainly from bureaucratic
leadership in work." *Imposed*

In short, if anything goes wrong (i. e. , if non-antagonistic contradictions become antagonistic) the Party apparatus will bear the blame but not Mao.

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8. Khrushchev's negative reply to the question on the 1 June

CBS television interview "whether these contradictions i. e., between the leaders and the masses DO NOT EXIST IN THE Soviet Union today" raises the question of the impact and applicability of Mao's theses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In his opinion, the Soviets have no reason for rejecting the substance, and every reason for accepting the positive propaganda value of Mao's theses. The timing and propaganda content of ~~the~~ Mao's speeches with their conspicuous emphasis on the "liberality" of a Communist regime, fit surprisingly well into the design of the renewed Soviet "peaceful coexistence" drive through which they apparently hope to compensate for their loss of prestige suffered as a result of the crises in 1956. The Soviets could hardly afford to dramatize the "respectability" of the Communist system at this time, both in view of their previous bungling (secret Khrushchev speech) and in view of their intervention in Hungary. If not actually co-ordinated with the Soviets, Mao's February and March fully speeches are compatible with current Soviet tactics and may become an important showpiece of Communist propaganda, especially in underdeveloped areas. Even the minor-- disagreements between Mao's and Soviet positions as well as Mao's--minor--criticisms of the Soviet regime represent attitudes fully compatible with the current international Communist party

leader, William Z. Foster (Daily Worker, 12 June) who is a

"conservative" Communist and still enjoys Soviet trust. This is his formula:

"for a less dogmatic approach to applying and developing Marxism-

Leninism,

for a more critical attitude towards other Communist Parties and

the countries of socialism,

and for an all out struggle against bureaucracy."

Mao's speeches meet all three requirements. The built-in proviso that

the Chinese method of "solving problems" does "not apply to every

other country" also agrees with the general formula developed during

last year's ideological crises, i. e., provided ~~the~~ Soviet experience

serves as a fundamental model, local ~~variations~~ ^{adjustments} in implementation are

permissible although they are not binding on other Communist Parties

or regimes.

~~In ~~contrast~~~~ ^{that propagandistically}, therefore, Mao's speeches offset the ^{harsh} effects of the Soviet

line against "national Communism" which was developed under the impact

of last year's ideological and disciplinary crisis. "International solidarity"

has been largely restored and factionalism in the world movement is subsiding.

A limited ideological rapprochement ^{with} Tito is in the making.

Mao's speeches are a ~~step~~^{shot} in the arms of the abortive campaign started by the 20th CPSU Congress to give the international Communist movement a new look of greater decentralization.

In this opinion, therefore, a uniform official reaction to Mao's speeches and theses is not to be expected in the Soviet Bloc. The extent of or assimilation of official endorsement ~~would~~^{will} depend entirely on the

correlation between fermentation processes and the regime's ability to control them. Gomulka, e. g., would have to contain Mao's views if they were used by the radical liberals to exert pressure on the regime.

The Kadar government, ~~forxxx~~ faced with the need for overcoming large-scale disaffection, may yet make controlled use of the Chinese method.

The Soviets, in addition to appreciating the general benefits from Mao's dramatization of the alleged respectability and liberality of the Communist system, should also be able to appreciate the "orthodoxy" of Mao in view of sufficient parallels and precedents in their own theoretical writings *

[?]
* Past and precedent precedents are numerous. In 1946, an obscure Soviet student of philosophy Tsolak Aleksandrovich Stepanyan (in the Young Bolshevik, No. 3-4, June-July 1946) postulated a contradiction in the USSR between the growth of public demand... and the relatively unsatisfactory level of the continually growing material production," and predicted that this contradiction would continue to exist under Communism.

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This formulation bears a striking resemblance to what Mao now postulates as China's main contradiction/.

In 1947 A. A. Zhdanov, Stalin's propaganda Chief and Malenkov's competitor, launched a campaign for the solution of non-antagonistic contradictions through criticism and self-criticism. Zhdanov's death in 1948 appears to have halted this campaign. In 1954, however, his thesis was revised, and Soviet theoreticians have dealt with the solution of non-antagonistic contradictions, admitting conflicts between social groups, and more recently (Komunist #5, April 1957) conflicts within the Party. Pravda, (26 December 1956) criticized the Soviet journal "Questions of Philosophy" for inadequate study of "real" or "concrete" contradictions. It would ^{although} require a detailed ~~comparatx~~ comparative study of Soviet and Chinese treatment of this ideological problem, ^{is not even possible,} At this writing, ~~however,~~ no Soviet reference admitting a conflict between "the leaders and the masses" has become evident, although, of course, Soviet attacks on bureaucracy in leadership and on attitudes ~~xxx~~ isolating the Party from the masses have been standard themes.

(end of footnote)

The latter, however, are distinctinly inferior in quality and depth, a fact ^{Mao said} which permits/the Chinese Party to point out, with some justification, that in Mao's writings Marxism-Leninism is being "creatively developed." One could easily imagine that the Soviet leaders, while praising the Chinese for their orginal ideas, could administer ~~xxxxxx~~ severe dressing down to their own theoreticians and propagandists for their inability to produce "creative" think pieces. With all their emphasis on international

decentralization, the Soviets still are sensitive on points of leadership .

This may be the reason for Khrushchev's almost automatic rejection of

the idea that in the USSR conflicts exist between the leaders and the

masses. In general, however, the Soviets should be satisfied with

the limitations which Mao built into his concepts on how to handle

potential conflicts in a "socialist" society. These limitations, less

conspicuous than ^{the propagandistic} ~~the propagandistic~~ emphasis on "persuasion"

and "democracy" are briefly discussed below.

Notes
and that it does not apply to every other country." This formula may prove to be a face-saving device all around. At a time when the international Party line provides for "a less dogmatic approach to applying and developing Marxism-Leninism, for a more critical attitude towards other Communist parties and the countries of socialism, and for an all out struggle against bureaucracy,"* emphasis on the non-applicability of specific national characteristics and methods of a given CP to other areas also serves to strengthen the illusion of the "independence" of national Communist Parties.

10. The limitations imposed by Mao on the applicability of his theses to other areas are paralleled by the limitations inherent in his *speeches* position as well as *in* the current Cheng Feng in respect to their domestic application.

These limitations are:

- a) Mao's theses and the Cheng Feng are preventative in nature;
- b) The preventative objectives require a stronger CCP both in terms of ideological purity and organizational control.

~~* This valid formulation has been made by the veteran Communist-CPUSA leader, William Z. Foster in the Party Daily Worker of 12 June 1957. Foster still enjoys the trust of the Soviet leadership.~~

c) The use of terror or repressive measures is governed by the success or failure of ^{preventive} preventative measures.

11. The purpose of the current Cheng Feng is to ensure that the Communist Party's ~~leadership~~ be so oriented and deployed as to prevent "non-antagonistic contradictions" from becoming unmanageable and explosive. Hence, the far-reaching categorization and definition of all "problems", large and small, as if by identification alone a solution could be achieved. ~~the~~ the fixing of responsibility for the solution of the problems on the entire Party apparatus. ~~the~~ the exhortations warning against "bureaucratism" and "subjectism."

On the other hand, the current Cheng Feng is not to dilute "Marxism-Leninism." Hence, the proposed further tightening of ideological and organizational discipline, and the particular emphasis on the education of intellectuals in 'Party spirit', i. e., traditional Marxism-Leninism as opposed to "liberalism."

12. ~~the~~ Mao's concept of persuasion is the persuasion of the "masses" by the Party and not persuasion of the Party by the masses. Criticism is therefore limited.

Organizationally it appears from pertinent references that the right of the "masses" to criticize pertains only to the Communist controlled "units" or organizations (political, semi-governmental, agricultural

cooperatives, etc.) which were created during the period of
communization (1955, 1956). This form of organizationally controlled
criticism and self-criticism keeps discussion in channels.

Substantively criticism must be "constructive", i.e., compatible with
general CCP programs and policies. As early as June 8--three months
after the Chang Feng campaign was launched--¹⁶² Peking People's Daily
found it necessary to put the brakes on "criticism of a destructive nature."
Using language reminiscent of that previously used at the time of intense
and coercive drives against counter-revolutionaries, the party organ
said:

"There are persons who are trying to use the Cheng Feng movement
of the CCP as a means to carry out severe class struggles....
Although the large scale class struggle in our country has largely
subsided, it is by no means finished. This is particularly true on
the ideological front [i.e., where it really matters]... There are a
very small number of people who have outwardly expressed support to
socialism but are still secretly longing for capitalism and the type
of political life in Europe and the United States. These persons
form the right-wing groups today."

The next day People's Daily made it crystal clear that the Party
cannot afford to indiscriminately regard all criticism as helpful and
beneficial to the ~~socialist construction~~ people. While the

editorial says "all views and opinion beneficial to the socialist undertakings should 'bloom' in full," it characterizes as "of a destructive nature" all criticism which "aims at undermining the socialist undertakings, the People's Democratic Dictatorship and the unity between the Party and the people." Singled out for attack are "those who publicize the view that the leadership exercised by the Communist party should be abolished."

It is significant that the ~~xxxxxxx~~ news organ of the Polish CP, Trybuna Ludu, published a report of its Peking correspondent on 13 June on these People's Daily articles.

14/ 13. The indoctrination of intellectuals forms an effective limitation on the application of the much-publicized slogan "Let all flowers bloom, let all schools of thought contend." As the President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences put it on 16 May 1957, it was only thanks to "the movement of ideological re-education carried out in recent years in China" that the "hundred schools of thought" movement is possible now, and "the free debates [now] taking place among the intellectuals aim at bringing the professors and scientists of China still closer to the Party and at improving the Party's direction."

This is the 1957 echo of Mao's theme of the 1942-44 Cheng Feng movement. "There is in reality no such thing as art for art's sake....

The Party's artistic and literary activity occupies a definite and assigned position in the Party's revolutionary work and is subordinated to the prescribed revolutionary task of the Party in a given revolutionary period."

Mao himself, in the version of his speeches reported by Sidney Gruson, added an interesting interpretation to the slogan. "There need be no fear that the policy of 100 flowers will yield poisoned fruit. Sometimes it is necessary even to have this poisoned fruit to know what we are fighting against. For this reason, too, it has been decided to publish the full works of Chiang Kai-shek and even a volume of some of the Voice of America ~~Wyd~~ broadcasts. It is not enough to attack reactionaries. We must know exactly what the reactionaries want and what they represent."

The use of provocation as a means of weeding out "poisoned flowers" is, of course, good Bolshevik practice. In full control of the Party apparatus and the repressive state organs, Mao can well afford to say "Marxism-Leninism is not afraid of criticism and does not fear discussion." He controls the machinery to ensure that Marxism-Leninism will win out.

14. Although Mao places conspicuous emphasis on the persuasive aspects of the dictatorship at this stage, he endorses without qualifications the "use of force against the enemy." * ^{His} criticism of Stalin parallels ^{the} position of the 20th CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's secret speech according to which Stalin used force unproductively, especially against the Communist Party.

If it is accepted that Mao's concept of the dictatorship is to establish a correct balance between the persuasive and repressive aspects of the dictatorship, the question arises as to when Mao would consider the use of terror justified. On the basis of the available materials on Mao's February and March speeches, the answer is obviously that Mao would use repression and terror internally ^{whenever} ^{was} the power position of the regime ~~were~~ threatened. This is evident from his renewed endorsement of Soviet intervention in Hungary and from his position on strikes. Rejecting ^{all} [✓] the ~~concept of strikes in general;~~ ^{strikes as being "more beneficial to the working class,"} ^{Mao} he considers small strikes as useful [✓] symptoms of a malady to be ~~correct~~ ^{cured} but does not consider "big general

* Mao admitted the liquidation of 800,000
~~counterrevolutionaries prior to 1954.~~ [★] The figure is open to question, and probably reaches into several million. Mao's statement that terror has not been used since 1954 is also open to question.

strikes" the same way because "they are directed against the regime."

It is interesting to speculate on how big a strike in China would have
in order
to be to be considered a threat to the regime. In the light of past
experience, it is fair to assume that the determination of what constitutes
a threat to the regime would be made arbitrarily.

For example, it may be useful to recall that in September 1952

Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security, announced that "through the
campaign for suppression of counterrevolutionaries with fanfare" from
December 1950 onwards, "we succeeded basically in clearing up the
remnant influence of counter^orevolution on the mainland of China."

Nevertheless, within eighteen months (February 1954), Liu
~~Shao-ch'i~~ Shao-ch'i announced, in connection with a Party purge, that
the regime and the masses were increasingly threatened by counter
revolutionaries from within, the rationalization being that "the more we
advance in our economic construction, the more vicious will be the sabotage
of enemies at home and abroad." * The Minister of Public Security, who

* This formulation is reminiscent of Stalin's "mistaken" concept that the
intensity of the class struggle increases as socialism progresses.

had in 1950 announced completion of the "basic" suppression of counter revolutionaries, in 1955 blandly explained that those previously suppressed were overt counter revolutionaries and that "under-cover" counter revolutionaries were the target of the intensive 1955 drive.

These leaders' statements show how arbitrarily their characterization of the situation has changed in the past, and raises questions as to how many years the present policy will last.

The new line is again that "the remnants of the counter revolutionaries have been basically eliminated." These are almost exactly the same words ~~used~~ used by the Minister of Public Security in 1952. Within two years he modified his statement to allow for a new, brutal counter revolutionary drive.

Three months after the initiation of the 1957 Cheng Feng, Peoples' Daily

ominously
~~repeatedly~~ pointed out that the class struggle continues. Given this

pattern of flexibility the "persuasive" aspects of Maoism which are

currently being emphasized cannot be projected into the future.

The 1957 Cheng Feng represents Mao's realization that
15. ~~The~~ The Chinese Revolution has collided with the hard reality and

problems of constructive planning and building at a time when the Soviet

Union and the Eastern European Satellites are beset with internal

political-economic difficulties. ~~Nevertheless,~~ ^T the fundamental weakness

in Mao's ostensibly realistic and Sinified approach to the leadership of

a) that no amount of "brainwashing" can change or affect the "main" contradictions "between the people's demand for rapid economic and cultural growth and the present economic and cultural conditions that thwart this demand."

b) that no amount of free or ostensibly free discussion of non-antagonistic contradictions and their reasons can change the hard facts of China's economy. The price of consumer goods is not determined by ideological considerations.

c) that an "unbureaucratic" Party leadership may listen to criticism but is not obligated to accept. Since it still is bound by "democratic centralism", i.e., by policy decisions of higher Party echelons, it can arbitrarily reject and brand as "unconstructive" any criticism which conflicts with Party policies and programs.

d) that the slogan "Let many flowers bloom" is watered down by the fact that the intellectuals have been brought under tight Party discipline through their mass organization or in government agencies where they work.

e) that the slogan of long term coexistence and mutual supervision of and by non-Communist Parties is meaningless since the non-Communist Parties are manipulated by the Communist Party.

f) that the policy of "building the country on industry and thrift"

which is to be propagated is a euphemism for an austerity program.

16. A Pravda report of 9 June (see N. Y. Times, 10 June, page 6) illustrates clearly the built-in contradictions inherent in the Cheng Feng campaign. The Chinese Communist Party is being brainwashed and retrained in order to steel itself for a propaganda job which may yet turn out to be counterproductive. According to the N. Y. Times account, "Party officials in Sian [in Northwest China] told Pravda they had appointed their best men as propagandists to help the people understand the contradictions that arise in the course of socialist constructions and to make them see more clearly the wonderful tomorrow of our homeland and thus consolidate the forces of our people." Pravda also illustrates how the CCP is forced to deal with the problems of today. According to the ^{work} N.Y. Times version "party propagandists directly and candidly and in detail tell the masses why consumption of cotton textiles had to be cut, why prices went up on certain goods, why there was a substantial shortage of housing space, why propaganda to limit births had begun in China, and why queues for street cars, buses and in butcher shops were still inevitable."