

1. The current Cheng Feng (Party Reform Movement), set in motion by Mao's February and March speeches is a reflection of Mao's apprehension over possible failure of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962): CCP popularity may be severely tested in the course of selling and implementing the Plan.

2. Facing China's demography (population of 600,000,000) and the relatively small size of CCP, Mao is concerned with possible mass pressures on the regime, particularly in the light of the "Hungarian tragedy" during which CP Hungary disintegrated rapidly.

3. Mao's recent theses on contradictions are consistent with his traditional attempts to implement Marxism-Leninism with proper considerations of Chinese realities. His position as "independent" interpreter of the Bolshevik Bible has been acknowledged by Stalin and the Khrushchev regime.

4. In the theses ~~are~~ that contradictions exist in a "Socialist" society are no innovations or revisions of Marxism-Leninism. They merely dramatize the possibility that such conflicts may explode and alert the entire Party apparatus not to aggravate the situation which may result from anticipated economic and cultural frustrations of the people. Fully enclosing the use

Adding

of force internally when necessary, Mao plays up the "persuasive" aspects of the dictatorship as a preventive-defensive measure.

5. Mao's dramatization of the alleged "liberality" of a Communist regime may become a showpiece of Communist propaganda and fits surprisingly well into the design of the renewed Soviet line for peaceful coexistence and coincides with the international line. In view of Hungary the Soviets are in no position to dramatize the issue themselves and may appreciate the general propagandistic benefits of Mao's theses for which there are ideological precedents in their own theoretical writings. Nevertheless, there should be Soviet sensitivity on the point of leadership.

6. No uniform acceptance or assimilation of Mao's theses should be expected in the Bloc since this would conflict with the prevailing propaganda pattern of tactical independence of Communist Parties. Limited assimilation in order to absorb fermentation processes is already indicated in the attitude of CP Czechoslovakia.

7. Assimilation in the Bloc is facilitated by the limitations inherent in Mao's approach:

- a) No dilution of Marxism-Leninism.
- b) Right to criticize confined to units already controlled by CCP.

c) "Destructive" (i. e., uncontrolled) criticism not permitted.

d) Intellectuals to be brought under strict Party control.

e) "Weeds" permitted in order to expose "enemy's" propaganda
and aims.

f) Reliance on and eventual use of force internally indirectly
acknowledged in concept that "non-antagonistic contradictions" may blow
up.

g) Evaluation of an "antagonism" i. e., threat to regime remains
arbitrary.

8. Vulnerabilities of Mao's thesis stem from fact that Party must
explain to "people" hard facts of Chinese economic troubles.