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# The Communist Party Underground

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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The international Communist movement has not merely survived but has actually flourished, in the face of difficulties which have ruined political forces with less constancy of purpose and with less practical a technique. It has maintained itself as the "vanguard of the proletariat" through Tsarist and totalitarian suppression, armed intervention, two world wars, and a decade of general "bourgeois" prosperity. In large measure, Communist successes can be explained by the organizational adaptability of the Communist Party and its mastery over a mass of practical techniques. The Party knows what it must do and how to go about doing it, in any given circumstance. This competence was responsible in the first place for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, and since then, for the endurance of the Party as a continuing threat to all "bourgeois" states. Whatever the political climate, the Party goes on, working openly and legally where it can, secretly and illegally where it must. It is this latter capability for "conspiratorial" work which largely accounts for the survival and success of the international Communist movement in the face of adverse conditions.

The scope of the "conspiratorial" activities of the Communist Party encompasses defensive and offensive purposes. As an organization of professional and practical revolutionaries bent upon the eventual achievement of revolution, the Communist Party is enveloped by an atmosphere of hostility. Realizing this, the international movement has naturally developed a system of defensive measures designed to protect the Party against the police, intelligence agencies, hostile groups and the hostile public, and has been normally organized so as to keep knowledge of the most significant aspects of Party activity restricted to a minimum of individuals. For similar reasons, the Party has made it a general practise to conceal as thoroughly as possible the mechanics of the political controls through which it extends its influence beyond Party confines. The Communist Party is generally designed and able to operate under any conditions of opposition, hostility and outright suppression. It is capable of going totally underground when outlawed, and it is sufficiently security-conscious, even under normal conditions, to conceal many of its "normal"

activities. The "conspiratorial" practises of Communist Parties operating in hostile societies are largely defensive in nature and are designed to preserve political and organizational gains made by the Party.

The defensive side of the Party's conspiratorial behavior can be extensively illustrated by its organizational and operational methods when proscribed. This study deals extensively with this subject -- the general patterns of underground organization are presented, based on information available as of early 1949.

Defensive measures are normally adopted also by Parties which function more or less openly and legally. "Legal" Parties give their program a maximum publication and expose a great number of functionaries as well as parts of their organization to the public eye. However, even when admitted to the political scene, the Party usually acknowledges the hostility of the society it lives in, and attempts to submerge, automatically and by virtue of its organizational principles, the more significant areas of Party work.

Every Communist Party is a centralized and centrally-directed mechanism controlled by a comparatively small group of professional, paid and full-time functionaries -- the cadre. Within this cadre-hierarchy the functionaries at national headquarters occupy the central position and have a monopoly on policy-making and organizational direction. Accustomed to strict semi-military discipline, the lower Party cadre and the rank and file are mere instruments of the Party center. By virtue of its leadership function the Party center normally guards the professional secrets of the Party, not unlike the management of a business enterprise. The Party center, then, puts the stamp of secrecy on such matters as Party finances, particularly on the origin of funds not derived from normal sources; intra-Party communications of more than normal administrative significance; relations with other fraternal Parties exceeding the normal interchange of Party literature, and other routine communications and relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or representatives of the Soviet Government and the Cominform, which are likely to compromise the Party. Experience has further shown that Soviet intelligence agencies frequently channel their recruitment of Party members through individual functionaries in national Party

headquarters -- operations which require secure and secret handling. Thus, even under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of Party work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries and are tightly sealed off from the rest of the Party and the outside world.

Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department and the Control Commission. These agencies are organizational corollaries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon its cadre, it is essential for the center not only to train, protect and properly assign the professional personnel, but also to preserve constant ideological and security control. Thus, most Parties maintain a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who must often perform counter-espionage duties such as the identification of police agents infiltrated into the ranks of the Party, and "illegal" support functions such as the procurement of false papers and passports for the cadre. Clearly, the existence of such a Party police force must be concealed, not only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons.

On the level of "normal" Party operations, secrecy is also unavoidable. Considering the smallest operative Party unit, the individual Party member, it is a well-known fact that many Communists operate without ostensible connection with the Party. This apparent lack of connection may be aimed at personal protection or at safeguarding a particular, often secret, mission. In any case, the secret Party member shows up in almost every Party --

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The Party, however, needs not only secret Party members -- it is bent upon the manipulation of non-Communist groups and organizations in order to establish "mass support" as a prerequisite for revolutionary action. The approaches to this organizational problem

obviously vary from Party to Party, and the extent of secrecy with which they are handled is determined by the political climate prevailing in the particular country. In general, however, the Party will attempt to surround itself with a solar system of front organizations in order to attract accessible groups, and will further direct its fractions into non-Communist mass organizations -- for example, labor unions and political movements in colonial countries -- in order to expand Party control. In all these cases, it will be a problem of concealing Party control over fronts and fractions, a problem which becomes increasingly difficult to solve as the manipulative techniques of the Party are exposed in public.

Clearly, however, as a revolutionary organization, the Party cannot confine itself to defensive tactics alone. No matter what its status, whether legal or proscribed, the Party must at least plan such activities as will weaken the coercive power mechanism of the "capitalist" state, as well as hostile groups and political parties, in concrete operational, rather than in general political terms. No matter what its tactical shifts, the Party can never neglect its fundamentally military-revolutionary character and it must attempt to organize support functions directly or indirectly related to future revolutionary action. This concept, which is by no means clear-cut and free from straight political considerations, involves what amounts to the setting up of intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations and/or operations, with all their operational ramifications. The general operational program of the Communist Party provides for the organization of secret Party nuclei in the armed forces, the police, the navy, the government, and occasionally also within opposition groups in order to specialize and concentrate upon a) the procurement of information which would clarify the organization and capabilities of the hostile power mechanism; b) clandestine subversion within "the citadel of the enemy," particularly in the armed forces. The program may also at times include the organization of clandestine nuclei operating in strategic plants and enterprises to provide industrial and economic information systematically -- the productive capabilities and facilities of the hostile society are clearly related to the problems of revolutionary action. Party security in its widest sense may also require a more aggressive approach, particularly when the physical liquidation of hostile individuals and traitorous or insecure Party members is concerned. Finally, when a revolutionary situation approaches, the Party must provide for a paramilitary organization to form the executive core of revolutionary



action -- action, however, which sets into coordinated motion the entire Party mechanism and the social forces allied with it.

Such and similar clandestine action auxiliaries of the Party have been occasionally observed in operation. These offensive clandestine Party operations probably represent the most significant area of Party work. They perform functions which transgress the area of "normal" political action and they may constitute an acute threat to the existing social order. However, it is not possible to generalize too far on the subject. While the normal aspects of Party organization follow a pattern anywhere, it is by no means certain that every Party organizes clandestine action auxiliaries in the same fashion.

On the basis of evidence available at present, it appears that Leninist action theory applies practically to the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries as it applies to any other aspect of Party work. Thus, the actual organization of clandestine military auxiliaries prior to the all-out revolutionary effort depends not only upon such factors as availability of trained manpower, leaders and arms, but also upon the making of a clear-cut policy decision that a revolutionary situation, which may be successfully exploited by the Party, is near or at hand. While it may be expected that all Parties include individuals or even groups who are specialists in military matters, it would be futile for example, to search for a facsimile of the Military Revolutionary Organization of the Bolshevik Party (1917) in the Communist Party of Great Britain at present. Incipient or underdeveloped Parties are more likely to concentrate upon political action in order to achieve mass influence. Parties which have reached a stage of relative mass proportions may find it practicable to organize secret military cadres and formations. Again, however, policy considerations and the degree of expectable opposition will affect planning, timing and organization.

Similar considerations apply to the organization of counter-intelligence, intelligence, sabotage, liquidation and other clandestine action agencies. Materials studied indicate that a stepping-up of such activity and its formalization in special auxiliaries occurs during critical periods considered by the Party favorable to aggressive,

revolutionary action in general, such as the middle Twenties and the early Thirties when the "relative stabilization" of capitalism was estimated as coming to an end. It is considered, therefore, that a definite relation exists between the particular phase of the action-philosophy governing the Party at any given time and the incidence of well-defined clandestine action auxiliaries. Informally, however, and in a less pronounced fashion, the Party will naturally never pass up any chance for clandestine work in the power apparatus of the State or in hostile groups and organizations.

In focussing upon the organization of underground Parties as well as on the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries, this paper attempts to clarify the problem in terms of both past and current Party experiences. Again however, this paper must be examined against the totality of the Party's work in a given society -- over-estimation, as well as underestimation, of clandestine Party operations may dangerously distort the terms on which each national Party must be appreciated.

## II. POLICE AND PARTY

On general principles, the Party prefers to assume the form of a "legal" political party, in order to achieve more easily a mass basis. Under "legal" conditions, the entire propaganda and agitation apparatus can be employed overtly; front organizations can be set up at will; the Party's drawing power can be demonstrated at the polls; Communists can operate with greater ease in labor unions, and enter the government by way of democratic processes.

The Party will therefore fight desperately and until the last minute to maintain its legal status. It will marshal public opinion with the aid of liberal sympathizers and fellow-travellers. It will employ for its defense sympathetic or crypto-Communist lawyers, who are frequently pooled in international or national front organizations. It will receive the moral assistance of foreign CP's and the Soviet party-government, making an international propaganda issue of the Party's case.

In any case, the Party will seek to delay its transfer to illegality as long as possible, realizing that its organization and operations will be severely hampered by the loss of legal status. Once driven underground, it will make every effort to become "legal" again.

The Party knows that it can be paralyzed by an efficient police. The primary concern of the Party underground, therefore, is with the law enforcement agencies, for these can control the fate of the Party and its leaders. It is often extremely difficult for the Party to protect itself against police penetration, arrests, and searches. Even in areas where the police are not particularly efficient, the Party must spend considerable effort and time on defensive measures.

The over-all success of the police, however, is conditioned by several factors, some of which may work to the Party's advantage.

1. Geographical Factors. In large countries and in countries with inaccessible territories (mountains, marshland, jungles, vast forests), the surveillance and border-control problems are difficult

for the police. The experience of the Bolshevik Party before 1917 shows how great distances favor individual escapes and illegal border traffic. More recent events in Brazil, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, et. al., illustrate the same point.

2. Population Density. Overcrowded metropolitan areas with vast slums, as well as port cities, also enhance chances for survival. It is comparatively easy for the underground Communist to shake off pursuit in highly populated street-mazes and among the wharves.

3. Political Factors. Police action against the Party may be hindered or encouraged by public opinion. Under a totalitarian anti-Communist government, police persecution of the Party will obviously be far more effective than under the relatively mild, legalistic approach of democratic governments. Mussolini, for example, took a great personal interest in police and intelligence operations against the Italian Communist Party, and frequently directed them himself -- a factor which clearly increased the efficiency of the Italian security agencies.

On the other hand, a loosely controlled police force may grow lax and seek only to make occasional arrests for publicity purposes, without seriously affecting the Party's operations. A precariously balanced political situation, such as obtains particularly in countries near the Soviet borders, may also affect police operations. A shaky "liberal" government may be forced by increasing pressure from rightist parties to soften its attitude toward the Party, which might become an ally in case of need. The individual police official, too, fearful for the future of his position, may feel it unwise to be too strict and choose rather to straddle the fence.

4. Mass Support for Police. If there is mass support for the regime and its punitive policy, as in Nazi Germany, police operations against the Party may prove extremely effective. Under such conditions, the police are able to procure a great number of informers and penetration agents, as well as disaffected Party members who remain in the Party as police agents. Large-scale cultivation of disaffected elements and the development of penetration opportunities have been favorite police tactics since the early days of the Bolshevik Party.

Whenever it has been feasible to put these methods into practice, they have produced astonishing results. The Tsarist police, for example, were able to recruit Malinovsky, who for a time was second in importance only to Lenin in the Bolshevik wing of the underground Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

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The greatest danger which the Party underground must face is often not the police itself but the psychological impact of the anti-Communist movement upon the population and upon the morale of the Party members themselves. Nevertheless, various Parties which have undergone this persecution, such as the Bolshevik Party and the European Parties in the Fascist period, have managed, in one form or other, to survive. While the drawing-power of Communist ideology may partially account for the Party's durability, the adaptability of Party organization to illegal conditions is an important additional factor in the struggle between Party and police.

### III. ADAPTABILITY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION TO ILLEGAL CONDITIONS

The model pattern of Party organization, developed by the Bolshevik Party during more than a decade of illegality, was grafted, through the Comintern, upon all foreign Parties. Thus, the basic forms of Party organization, as encountered today, have been pretested under illegal conditions. Consequently, when a Party is declared illegal, there is no need to alter its basic structure. All that is necessary is an adaptation of organization to illegal conditions. The specific advantages inherent in "normal" Communist Party organization, may be summed up as follows:

- a. The Party preserves its continuity in terms of organization and personnel.
- b. The Party emphasizes discipline and security even in legal periods.
- c. Communist doctrine acts as a morale-builder in illegal periods, and may become attractive to the non-Communist leftist in times of general suppression of all "progressive" movements.
- d. The basic cell organization of the Party, practiced at all times, facilitates underground operations.
- e. More than any other "normal" political party, the Communist Party has acquired a backlog of "illegal" experience, even under legal conditions.

1. Organizational Continuity. By its nature as a revolutionary organization, the Communist Party will operate under any conditions, legal or illegal. On the basis of its theory, it considers the transition to illegality an extremely undesirable but otherwise "normal" consequence of the class struggle.

This advantage is not enjoyed by the evolutionary Marxist parties (Social Democrats) which operate strictly by legal, parliamentary -

democratic methods. When ostracized and suppressed, such parties often undergo severe morale and organizational crises. Because of their fundamental inability (so often attacked by the Communists) to conceive of a revolutionary approach, they interpret their ostracism as "failure of the leadership", "failure of doctrine", and begin to disassociate themselves, psychologically and organizationally, from their past. "In all Fascist countries," states a leading Social Democrat, referring to events in the thirties, "there grows this idea within the illegal (Socialist) cadre: We are something new! We are not a mere continuation of the old party!... The old is dead -- something entirely new must develop now."

Behind the security of its prefabricated doctrine, the Communist Party does not, as a rule, need to scrutinize its basic philosophy or raison d'etre under illegal conditions. Party continuity is taken for granted by the Communists. When the Party is outlawed it does not waste precious time and energies wrangling over basic theory and metaphysical issues. It does not have one form of organization for legal and another for illegal conditions. The underground Party is the Party underground.

2. Cadre Continuity. A further guarantee of continuity is the fact that the Party is at all times a "cadre Party". As many executive and administrative positions as possible are occupied by trained, experienced, full-time and salaried functionaries or "professional revolutionaries". While the size, reliability and capabilities of the cadre obviously vary from country to country, the Party habitually, and as a matter of principle, creates a caste of functionaries who are entirely dependent upon the Party center in financial, personal and ideological terms, and who can therefore be depended upon to follow the center underground.

The extent to which the individual cadre-man is tied to the Party by personal interest is ably described by A. Rossi (Physiology of the French Communist Party, Paris, 1948).

"The role played by personal interest in this faithful adherence to the Party is greater than one might think... The Party functionary cannot become a functionary without quitting

his factory, his office, his profession -- he takes on new habits and lives differently. He sheds his roots, he becomes a sort of outcast.... He has entered a new social class, a class sui generis it is true, but still elevated as only the salaried class of industry and commerce.... To quit (this class) means to be thrown back into the limbo from where he came, "

As an added incentive for its cadre, the Party also dispenses power, which Rossi describes as frequently greater than that of high-level government officials. Having tasted this power, the functionary is reluctant to give it up.

A party run both at the center and at the periphery by a well-trained and disciplined cadre-bureaucracy has the advantage of a concrete and specific approach to the problem of going underground. It can prepare and provide for the event in terms of cadre protection and replacement. Whatever action potential a Party may salvage in illegality depends less on the extent to which it can protect its rank and file from arrest, than on the success it achieves in salvaging or replacing its entire cadre. The disadvantage of the system, however, is that if the cadre fails, the Party fails. The Party underground is the cadre underground.

3. Discipline and Security. The stress on strict discipline which is required under illegal conditions constitutes no problem for the Party. The cadre will have been trained already and conditioned to depend on the instructions of the center in any circumstance. The center will therefore encounter little resistance in strengthening its control over the cadre, and will be able to dispense with those features of "democratic centralism" which permitted the rank and file to participate, however minimally, in the selection of the cadre during legal periods. Instructions issued by the illegal CP France of 1940, for example, stated specifically that the election of functionaries was out of the question, and that only Centralism was to be conserved. While this relationship has the definite operational advantage of permitting co-ordinated action even under hazardous conditions, the dependence of the cadre on the center can choke the initiative of the individual cadre-man and impede the efficiency of the Party.



Discipline under illegal conditions means not only strict adherence to the political and organizational direction of the center, but also rigorous conformity with underground security rules governing the conspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants. A functionary who has "betrayed" Party secrets under severe police pressure is punished by the competent organs of the Party for a "breach of discipline", with no regard for the circumstances in which the betrayal occurred.

The maintenance of discipline and security by special Party organs (Control Commission, Cadre Commission, and other specialized sections) is a traditional feature of Party organization which can be conveniently adapted to underground conditions. The main factor, however, which endangers the successful preservation of discipline and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of extremely severe police action, morale may disintegrate and result in factionalism, mass defections and penetrations.

4. Doctrine as Morale-Builder. Efficient underground organization and conspiratorial skill are, of course, the decisive elements in the Party's struggle to maintain itself when illegal. The demands of underground life on the underground Party worker, however, are frequently extremely taxing, and good morale becomes an operational necessity. No matter how much opportunism, adventurism, or lust for power go into the make-up of the individual functionary or activist, a willingness to sacrifice everything for the sake of the Party demands a stronger motive than these. This motivation is furnished by the Party, ready-made, in the form of its doctrine, the Marxist-Leninist ideology. As a morale-building element, doctrine stands in the first line of defense of the Party underground. Thorough indoctrination (which is, of course, a continuous and well-organized process in legal as well as illegal periods) appears to induce the following psychological habits in Communists:

a. Superiority Complex. The doctrine is dispensed as "absolute truth", providing the believer with a set of answers for every political, social and philosophical problem. The sincere individual Communist, in possession of "absolute truth", considers himself a crusader, a fighter for a "new world". The longer he stays in the Party, the less he is able

to think in un-Communist terms. He feels eternally misunderstood by non-Communists and, when ostracized, feels victimized. In brief, his indoctrination produces the conviction that he is fighting for a just cause -- a definite morale asset.

b. Hostility, Based upon the idea of class struggle, the doctrine systematizes and cultivates hostility generated by social conflict, frustration and maladjustment. The doctrine is one of hatred directed at the "class enemy", the latter being anyone who does not share the Party's point of view. Such indoctrination, required by the revolutionary-military nature of the Party, pays off during periods of illegality. Hostility grows with the increasing pressure exerted by the "class enemy" and, added to the instinct for self-preservation, leads to vigorous resistance.

c. Optimism. Communist doctrine has a strong morale-building element in its "scientific" certainty of the inevitable doom of capitalist society. Defeat can be rationalized as a temporary setback, a deficiency in organization, or the result of the work of traitors. But it can never be accepted as definite and final. Optimism is prescribed as the Communist's basic attitude, and pessimism becomes a heresy. In this outlook there is a modicum of religious strength, an asset not to be underestimated during a period of underground activity.

5. Attraction of Doctrine. In situations where repressive measures are applied to the non-Communist evolutionary Marxist, liberal and progressive parties, as well as to the Communist Party, Communist doctrine may actually extend beyond its defensive function and further the growth of the illegal Party. When repression becomes total, as under the Fascist regimes, the peaceful-evolutionists and liberal democrats may lose their faith in moderate tactics and join the Communists, who always maintain that socialism cannot be established by legal methods alone. Under Nazi control, the Austrian working class felt that the Socialists' democratic methods had brought about their defeat and began to place their hope in Communist objectives. CP Austria became a significant organization for the first time in its history during the term of Nazi suppression; it declined when suppression was lifted.

6. Cell System. Under illegal conditions, when security considerations demand the atomization of Party organization, the Party need only adjust its cell system, through which basic operations are effected. The grouping of the rank and file into small nuclei at the place of work, at the place of residence, and in non-Communist parties and organizations ensures the systematic exploitation of the cell member's normal outside contacts for propaganda and recruitment purposes. This is an all-important task in the underground when other Party activities may be curtailed. The importance of illegal cell activity is intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons are usually reduced to skeletons; hence, for practical purposes the Party underground often consists only of the center and the numerous "front line" cell organizations. There is inherent in this system, however advantageous, a considerable risk of isolation. When communications break down, as they frequently do, the basic Party organizations become ineffective or detached from the Party line. If the breakdown is prolonged, as it was in Germany under Hitler, the Party is reduced to a multitude of isolated nuclei, which can do little more than maintain their clandestine existence for the day when the Party may be revived. It is at this point that the extent to which the Party has accumulated and transmitted lessons learned from conspiratorial experience becomes effective.

7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience. Through the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational policy of all foreign Parties, and has passed on its own considerable experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its existence, the Comintern exhorted and obliged its sections to prepare adequately for periods of illegality. By means of its Organization Bureau, headed until about 1936 by Ossip Piatnitzky, a leading organizer of the Russian underground, the Comintern furnished specific advice on underground operations and problems. Terms used in the Russian underground, such as "technical apparatus" for illegal printing and distribution facilities, have consistently found their way into the nomenclature of foreign Parties. The Greek Party, for example, currently uses a Russian word, "Yavka", meaning a clandestine reporting center. The "groups of three" upon which illegal Party organization appears to be based so frequently, have their equivalent in the Russian underground term, "troika" (team of three).

The fundamental problems of illegal activity are now widely understood by the various Parties. The practical experiences of many Parties, accumulated during underground periods and pooled by the Comintern prior to 1943, have increased the conspiratorial competence of the movement. There is hardly a significant Party which has not gone through illegal or semi-legal phases. While first-hand experience probably remains the best task-master, it is evident that a pattern at least exists in general outlines, and that a Party faced with illegality acts on it. To what degree this pattern has been created by a centralized effort, or by the appearance of identical problems treated in a similar fashion by different Parties, is a minor point. It is more important to recognize and understand the basic Communist approach to the organizational and operational problems of the Party underground.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS: ADJUSTMENT TO ILLEGAL CONDITIONS

The fundamental organizational problem faced by the Party going underground is: How to combine maximal security with maximal activity -- how to expose its agencies and functionaries to the police as little as possible. Therefore, the primary concern is with a realistic and practicable streamlining of the bureaucratic apparatus.

1. Reduction of Party Apparatus. The extent of the streamlining process is determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of repressive action against it, and general policy considerations. A small or underdeveloped Party apparatus cannot be drastically reduced; a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organization. Within the limits of such considerations, action may be taken along the following lines:


a. Consolidation of territorial organizations. The territorial organization of the Party, particularly in a large country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. This makes it possible to utilize staff personnel with greater economy, and to concentrate communications with the Party center. All levels of territorial organization (region, district, subdistrict and section) may be reduced simply by unifying the various staff commands, and combining their original areas of jurisdiction. The twenty-eight regional organizations (Bezirke) of the German Communist Party before 1933, for example, were consolidated after the advent of Nazi suppression into eight inter-regional organizations (Oberbezirke); other territorial organizations were apparently also reduced in number while their jurisdiction was extended.

The Party center itself may be less affected by the process of consolidation: a large Party may need a large central organization. On the cell level, however, consolidation is not practical. For security reasons, cells must be broken up into small units if they are to escape

police attention. Hence, at the same time that territorial organizations may decrease in number or disappear altogether, the cell organizations in the Party underground may be atomized and grow in number.

b. Reduction of staffs. In addition to the consolidation of territorial organizations, the number of staff positions throughout the Party is normally reduced in the underground. The territorial Party committees are apparently strongly affected in this respect. According to a Comintern instruction, the committees of illegal Parties should, as a rule, consist of no more than five people, and a secretary should take the place of the executive bureau. In practice, the composition of illegal Party committees appears to be more elastic, depending on prevailing conditions. The extent to which the membership of the Central Committee may be reduced is also determined by the actual situation. Members of the Central Committee are elected at the national Party Congress or Party Conference, and their tenure of office is valid for both legal and illegal periods. Over and above the losses sustained by a Central Committee through arrests and other operational mishaps, there is, however, no general indication of how numerical composition is affected by illegal conditions. It may be as large or as small as conditions warrant.

There seems to be a general tendency to eliminate Party Committees during illegal periods, and to assign actual organizational and political work to the executive-administrative apparatus of the Party. CP Chile, for example, simply eliminated all Committees and transferred the direction of the Party to its executive agencies, as follows:



Insofar as the executive-administrative apparatus of a Central Committee is concerned, practical security reasons obviously recommend the paring down of staff personnel. If the actual work-load is too heavy to permit reduction, the Secretariat and the various Departments or Commissions of the Central Committee (such as Cadre, Organization, Youth, Agit-Prop, etc.) may continue, while new commissions may be created for technical services, relief for interned comrades, and the like. In some Parties, the personnel of these Departments may be reduced. In others, the staff may continue or be replaced. One Central Committee may dissolve its Politburo and transfer its functions to the National Secretariat. Another may enlarge its membership in order to make up for expected losses in executive positions. There is no general rule except adaptability to the situation at hand.

2. The Command Function: The Triad System. Consolidation of territorial organizations and reduction of staff personnel can, in some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command function observable only in underground Parties. According to this system, at all echelons, from the national down to the cell level, groups of three functionaries may be established with two-fold responsibilities: the over-all direction and supervision of Party work at their level, and maintenance of vertical liaison with each other. In the latter capacity these triads represent the live chain of command in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, these triads have consisted of a) a specialist for political work, b) a specialist for organizational problems, and c) a specialist for agitation and propaganda, mass work, or for labor union work.

The triads, however, do not necessarily replace whatever other Party organizations may remain effective. They are sometimes merely superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to monopolize direction. Triads at national and territorial levels have been known to direct the work of the various administrative and executive departments and commissions of the Party. However, it cannot be clearly determined at present to what extent the national triad may combine executive command with policy-making functions. Theoretically it remains responsible to the Politburo, but in fact it may well become the actual leadership of the Party. The triad principle may even be applied to cell organization. Cells can be constituted as three-man groups, each member recruiting and directing another group of three who are not cell members and who comprise sub-cell basic units.

The triad represents an effective concentration of the command function in the hands of a comparatively few individuals. It permits greater centralization and compartmentalization.

3. Compartmentalization. Tight compartmentalization is an organization and security problem of the first order, since it is necessary to prevent the police from learning too much when Party members or functionaries are arrested. Compartmentalization is applied to Party operations as follows:



a. Party and military branch. Whenever an underground Party is in the position to create a military organization, the latter's staff composition is kept distinct from the Party's political mechanism. The two structures merely coordinate on policy and recruitment problems at their highest echelons.

b. Party and auxiliary (front) organizations. As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries (youth organizations, women's organizations, sport clubs, etc.,) remain connected with the Party through interlocking staff personnel only. They function on their own, as independently as possible.

c. Party and auxiliary illegal organizations. Party organizations, or teams for the performance of such specialized tasks as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of police and other government agencies, liquidation and terror groups, etc., are established as largely independent and self-contained groups even in legal periods. They are maintained on this basis in times of illegality.

d. Internal Party compartmentalization. Within the political mechanism of the Party proper, the desired effect can be ideally achieved by the following measures:

1) Elimination of horizontal liaison. No cell and no territorial organization is permitted to maintain contact with any other Party organ operating on the same level. Liaison may only be conducted vertically with the designated functionary of the superior Party organization, whose task it is to direct the lower organizations under his jurisdiction.

2) Restriction of contacts. The fewer comrades a functionary or activist knows and meets in the course of his work, the better. This principle is sound if applied realistically. It can, however, be formalized to an extreme degree. CP France in 1941, for example, applied the triad system not only to the organization of the command function, but apparently also, as a security measure, to all Party activities.

No comrade was to know more than two other Party workers. It is questionable whether the French principle can be put into practice rigidly. Even CP France frequently had to threaten disciplinary action in order to push its compartmentalization program to the extreme.

3) Functional restrictions. "The comrades of a group of three must not know anything but (what refers to) their work proper," states an instruction of CP France (1941). More than ever, it is incumbent upon the directors of illegal Party work to define the job of each functionary and activist clearly, so that he does not stray beyond security limits. It is not always possible, however, for the individual functionary to "stick to his guns". Nothing is less permanent than an underground organization, and shifts from one job to another occur often. As a result, a functionary may learn more than is good for the Party.

4. Election of Party Committees. The streamlining process applied to the illegal Party organization may not always be extensive, and the direction of the Party may actually lie in the hands of the national and territorial committees and their administrative organs. When this is the case, the illegal election of Party committees represents an organizational problem. The Comintern advised its member Parties that in an underground situation illegal Party elections were possible, though they must take place in restricted conferences and the elections themselves handled in such a way that even the conference members would not know who was elected. It is not certain whether this advice has been generally heeded, as the problems of illegal Parties are never identical.

a. Election of Central Committees. Electing a Central Committee at a conference abroad is one way of circumventing security restrictions at home when the Party is underground. In this way, the Bolshevik underground elected its Central Committee at conferences abroad, attended by delegates who travelled illegally from the interior of Russia.

In 1949, the Party conferences of CP Greece were held abroad for practical purposes (in the rebel area). This is also true of CP Spain at present. On the other hand, conditions prevailing in a particular country may permit the holding of large illegal meetings at home. For example, the illegal Central Committee (38 members) of CP Yugoslavia was elected in that country at a national conference of more than 100 delegates in October 1940.

The Party may not be able to hold a national Party Congress for the election of the Central Committee, but may be able to convoke the smaller national conference. Again in the case of CP Yugoslavia, special dispensation was granted by the Comintern in 1940 to allow the election of a Central Committee at a national conference instead of a congress.

b. Territorial Party committees and electoral commissions. Special electoral commissions have sometimes been created for the purpose of electing members of territorial Party Committees. A Comintern document refers to two types of such commissions:

1) An electoral commission chosen by the Party conference for the counting of secret votes cast. The commission checks the votes but does not announce election results to the conference.

2) A small electoral commission, elected by a Party conference, together with a representative of the next higher Party committee, actually "elects" (i. e., appoints) the new Party committee. In this case, the Party conference does not cast votes for candidates. It merely elects the commission.

c. Co-option. Elections of Party committees at all levels can be replaced by or combined with "co-option" -- i. e., appointment to its membership by a specific Party committee. This practice, however, appears to be regarded as an interim solution. Under

normal conditions, all members of Party committees are supposed to be elected. One of the most severe of the criticisms directed by the CP Soviet Union against CP Yugoslavia in 1948 was that the latter had carried over a disproportionate number of co-opted Central Committee members into the legal post-war period. Administrative-executive positions may also be filled by co-opting responsible functionaries.

5. Party Organizations Abroad. When repressive measures become severe, the central Party organs, as well as special support centers, often have to be established abroad, working from the outside into "illegal" territory. This method of salvaging and maintaining centralized leadership abroad has been traditional with the movement since the days when Marx and Engels wrote in exile, and when Lenin and his staff abroad laid the foundation for the CP of the Soviet Union. The types of central organizations commonly transferred to, or created upon, foreign soil are the following:

a. Central Committee and Central Departments. The Central Committee and its administrative-executive apparatus (Politburo, Secretariat, Departments, Control Commission) may be transferred, either in their entirety or in their salvageable components. Such was the case with CP Germany under the Hitler regime. At present (1949), the central organs of CP Spain and CP Greece are functioning in the same manner. The freedom of action enjoyed by centers outside the home country obviously varies with the attitudes of the government and police of the host country. Party centers abroad are often forced to operate illegally or semi-illegally and are therefore not always effective. The current solution to this problem lies, when practical, in transferring the center to the Soviet Union or to satellite areas.

The central organs abroad, as well as performing a command assignment, must also provide the Party at home with propaganda and indoctrination material, printing equipment, funds, specialists in underground work, a central repository for files and archives, training facilities for the illegal cadre, communication services, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and financial

support for exiled Party workers. In short, the central Party organization abroad becomes the chief operational support center for the home Party. It must therefore frequently create new types of auxiliary and administrative organizations.

b. Foreign Bureau. The Bolshevik Party abroad and the Italian Party during the Mussolini era (the Ufficio Estero in Paris) are known to have established Foreign Bureaus. This organization represents a central administrative-executive agency charged with the direction of support functions, such as communications, production and distribution of press and propaganda, etc. Theoretically, the supervision of the Foreign Bureau rests with the Central Committee, but in the cases at hand, the Bureaus have been the real directing centers.

c. Regional support centers. The apparatus of the Central Committee abroad may prove unable to handle all its workload, particularly when it must operate into a country with long frontiers. Consequently, the command and support function may have to be decentralized, and several support centers, operating from various countries into sectors of the homeland, may be created. The central organization of CP Germany, established abroad in the thirties, created such regional support centers in the form of regional command posts (Abschnittsleitungen), which operated out of several countries bordering on Germany. Coordination with the Central Committee was effected through the assignment of Central Committee members to the regional centers.

d. Party organizations for emigrants. Special Party organizations for exiled Communists, such as the "Emigrantenleitungen" of the German Party organization abroad, may be created. They do relief work and carry out the indoctrination and training functions of basic Party organizations. They also furnish personnel for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides, etc.).

Party organizations for emigrants should not be confused with front organizations created by the Party abroad. The latter, sometimes set up instead of special Party organizations for emigrants, serve political propaganda purposes from which the home Party may benefit. They are convenient money-raising instruments for the Party under the pretext furnished by the front's ostensible purpose. The far-flung organization of the Free German Movement during the war was such a front constituted abroad. The German Central Committee in Moscow practically merged with the Free Germany center in the USSR; other Party nuclei abroad, particularly in Latin America, Great Britain and the United States, followed suit.

e. Special service organizations. The Party Center abroad usually has to create special organs to facilitate communications with the homeland. Communications may be expedited through a border-crossing mechanism, either under direct control of the center or manipulated by a regional support station. The production of printed materials and their distribution via special communications routes may have to be entrusted to a separate organization, usually referred to as a Technical Service or Apparatus. These groups, indispensable for the effective functioning of the illegal Party, will be discussed in greater detail below (see V, 3), as they are characteristic not only of Party organizations abroad, but appear in the home country as well.

Party organizations abroad fulfill extremely necessary and sensitive support functions. Their efficiency is frequently raised by the assistance obtained from the CP of the host country in the shape of funds, living space, safe houses, courier personnel, etc. Their operational problems, however, merge with those of the Party at home. Failure to solve these problems may spell the death of the Party.

V. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY UNDERGROUND.

While the Party is legal, it normally exposes most of its cadre to the public eye. Once it is outlawed, therefore, a certain number of functionaries and activists have to be withdrawn from active duty. Those ranking functionaries who are indispensable must be safely housed or otherwise protected from the police. The compromised cadre must be replaced, and new personnel has to be trained for the various new functions which are characteristic of underground work. In view of the hazardous conditions which prevail in the underground, a special type of cadre must be developed: self-controlled, self-sacrificing and intrepid. More than ever, able cadre selection and supervision become the problems of the Party's personnel agencies (cadre departments and commissions). Numerically, a balance must be struck between a cadre which is too large -- and therefore in danger of exposure -- and a cadre which is too small -- and therefore incapable of mass work, shrinking into insignificant study and discussion circles.

1. The Cadre Problem.

a. Replacement of the cadre must be undertaken as a preparatory measure before the Party is actually outlawed. Sensitive functions may be secretly transferred to an "invisible cadre" of comparatively unknown individuals. The Comintern strongly advised the creation of an invisible cadre, an "illegally directing core", which must be kept distinct and separate from the Party Committee's legal apparatus, and thus ready to take over numerous supervisory functions when the Party goes underground. This cadre, according to the Comintern, was to be formed from those Communist leaders who were comparatively unknown to the police and the rank and file of the Party, but who were well trained in practical Party work.

According to the Comintern, the process of developing and bringing into play an invisible cadre should be applied to the entire Party structure and its auxiliaries, within trade unions and other legal "revolutionary" organizations. If, by the time

the Party is outlawed, these invisible cadres have been strategically placed and properly trained, the most sensitive functions of the Party apparatus, as well as Party documents, can be handed over to them. Hence, when the police seize Party premises, very little of the Party's activities and few of its personnel will be revealed.

It also becomes necessary to deceive the police further by divesting ostensibly important functions of their significance. The Secretary of a Party committee, normally the most important functionary, may, in the underground, be degraded from political leader to administrative officer. The Comintern instructs on this point as follows:

"Not only is it not necessary for the secretary of the Committee of a Communist Party to be the political leader of the Committee, but as a rule he should not be its political leader. . . . Why is such a rule essential? It is important because the secretary of the Party Committee in illegal or semi-legal conditions is the person upon whom, above all, the blow of action will fall. If that person is the political leader of the Party Committee, his arrest will affect the work of the entire Committee. . . . The political leader of the Party Committee should not be connected with the technical functions of the Party apparatus."

Whether or not this principle has become general practise is not known; it would certainly need revision in the case of small Parties with insufficient cadre material. There are, however, past and recent indications that Parties expecting to go underground do prepare invisible cadres for underground work. In 1927, for example, when central records of the illegal CP Italy were seized in Genoa, none of the regional leaders whose names were revealed had previous records as Communists or Party members. In January 1949, Togliatti, Secretary General of CP Italy, reportedly instructed a leading functionary to make a tour of the regional organizations in Northern Italy and to nominate new regional secretaries, who would operate under illegal conditions if the Party should be outlawed.



The extent to which an invisible cadre may be created appears in practice to depend largely upon the availability of a reserve of trained but unknown Party workers and crypto-Communists.

b. An adequate cadre reserve must be maintained by the Party underground in order to have the means for re-constituting the Party. It is not always possible, however, to defer good workers from active duty, especially as the Party becomes progressively decentralized. Larger numbers of active functionaries are required in an illegal than in a legal situation. "The cadre requirements of our Party are unlimited," the CP France organ Vie du Parti stated in late 1941. The discovery of new cadre material, so necessary for replacement purposes, is no bureaucratic affair in the underground. This responsibility does not rest exclusively with the personnel (cadre) officers. A. Rossi (op. cit.) points out that the CP France in 1941 recognized the fact that the recruitment of cadre personnel must preoccupy the entire Party and could not be left, as in legal times, to individual (cadre) functionaries. The French Communist functionaries were instructed, at that period, to give up bureaucratic methods applicable to legal activity; only through an over-all Party effort could a new and capable cadre be developed.

c. Ideological and practical training of the new cadre must also be de-bureaucratized in the underground. This is necessary for the simple reason that it becomes extremely hazardous to run Party schools, and not very practical to send large numbers of militants out of the country to attend courses arranged by Party organizations abroad. Only specialized technical training, such as radio operation, is occasionally conducted abroad. Ideological training may be acquired in the course of cell work, simply by reading and discussing the illegal press, and the standard works of Communist literature. Functionaries, who are well-versed in theoretical matters, may merely pass on their knowledge to small groups of other comrades (sometimes no more than two), and create "within the Party a multitude of small schools whose students may, in their time, become teachers of other Communists." (Rossi, op. cit.)

On the whole, however, ideological training is likely to be pushed into the background by more pressing operational problems. The recent emphasis of the Cominform on the ideological re-training of the Eastern European Parties was based, at least partially, upon the neglect of ideological matters during the illegal war years.

The Party underground does afford considerable opportunity for practical, on-the-job training. In the course of its decentralization (for example, CP France with its multitude of basic three-man units), the Party may require more low and medium level functionaries than usual. It may be forced, as a result, to assign Party workers to responsible positions without regard to bureaucratic considerations. Although admittedly low in the hierarchy, this new cadre may in the long run receive better and more valuable practical training than it could obtain in formal Party schools. Similarly, the Party's special underground services (communications, housing, production and distribution of printed matter, etc.) must be established ad hoc and require new personnel who must receive their training on the run. Thus, an illegal period, if it can be successfully weathered, may prove beneficial for the Party. Upon emergence from the underground, the Party may have a cadre larger than in the normal legal period and possessed of practical experience not previously available.

d. The protection of the illegal cadre must be given top priority. Defensively, the cadre (and with it the entire Party) must be protected against infiltration by police agents and unreliable elements into Party positions. Obviously, this is not a special problem of the underground, and it may be effectively handled by the national and territorial cadre departments and/or control commissions which are normally charged with the investigation and loyalty program of the Party. In Communist terms, however, loyalty is an elastic word. Deviations from the Party line, factionalism, lack of discipline, foolhardiness, breach of security rules, and lack of initiative constitute acts of disloyalty as reprehensible to

the Party as the actual work of a police agent. Consequently, the cadre department or control commission may also be charged with the political supervision of the Party functionaries. During the war years, when CP France was illegal, the "Cadre Responsible" of the Paris Inter-region attended certain meetings of the responsible regional triad, and reported to the political "responsible" at national headquarters on the political conduct of the regional functionaries. Disciplinary action, including expulsion, based on the investigation of the Cadre Commission or the control commission, rests with the National Control Commission in legal as in illegal periods. In operational terms, however, cadre protection in the underground requires the provision of false papers, as well as the maintenance of an adequate number of safe houses and apartments where the functionary may live or hide out from the police and make his professional contacts securely. This is an elementary underground requirement, especially since functionaries and militants must frequently change their domicile.

2. The "Housing" Problem and Communications. The provision of safe shelter for illegal Party functionaries and fugitives constitutes merely one aspect of a much larger problem. The Party underground requires numbers of safe houses or apartments for a variety of administration and operational purposes. Archives, files and Party correspondence can no longer be kept at "legal" premises, and bank deposits cannot be maintained in the Party's name. In fact, the entire process of "going underground" and of sustaining an illegal Party machine can be reduced to the prosaic but intricate search for safe space: homes of unsuspected sympathizers, shops and offices of crypto-Communists, houses and farms in the country, and the like. Particularly important is the safe housing of communications.

a. Internal communications. Liaison between the illegal national and territorial organization -- whether constituted on a "normal" basis or reorganized as triads -- requires safe meeting and contact places for representatives of the higher and lower echelons.

Reporting points. The Comintern advised Parties underground to establish special addresses or flats where at appointed times representatives of the cells and fractions of the mass organizations

could meet representatives of the Party committee for consultation and instruction. Such reporting points may be established at all echelons of the Party underground. Even a legal Party may find it useful to create clandestine reporting points whenever the legal Party premises become insecure. Protective measures include the establishment of safety signals and special passwords for verification purposes. At the central reporting point of the Bolshevik underground Party, for example, different passwords were used for rank and file workers, for district functionaries, and for functionaries of the central apparatus.

Letter drops and contact points for couriers. Written communications between higher and lower echelons presuppose the existence of safe addresses where "mail" can be delivered and picked up. The Comintern's instructions specify that such safe addresses must not coincide with those of reporting points. By the same token, special addresses may be established for the use of intra-Party couriers carrying verbal messages.

b. External communications. Communications with the Party organizations abroad pose special "housing" problems.

Border-crossing mechanisms. There must be established on the borders special conduct points and safe houses (such as overnight stations) for the use of couriers, instructors, and the various special services of the Party, as well as for fugitives. In practical terms, the Party must either use the homes of "safe" Party members or sympathizers in the border regions, or buy the services of non-Party individuals who may be helpful by virtue of their experience. In the Bolshevik underground it was common practice to hire smugglers operating in border areas. Recruitment or bribery of individuals employed by border-control authorities may also be attempted. Fishermen, barge-owners, and maritime workers may be utilized when the crossing of waterways and maritime frontiers is required. The connections of Danish fishermen with their German friends in the Hamburg area were exploited in the thirties

by the regional support station of the German Party in Denmark for the infiltration of liaison personnel.

Security considerations demand that border-crossing mechanisms remain specialized and compartmentalized. The Party must create as many of these as possible: special border-crossing points for couriers, for Party emissaries from abroad, for the transportation of propaganda material, and for escapees. They may exist side by side. So long as they are separate, if one mechanism is discovered, the others will not be endangered.

c. Reporting points for liaison personnel from abroad.  
The success of liaison personnel sent by the foreign support station into the homeland hinges upon a very simple requirement: the man must know where and to whom to report securely. In the CP Germany underground during the Hitler regime, such liaison personnel (referred to as "instructors") were assigned the addresses of trusted Party workers (Vertrauenspersonen) inside Germany. The provision of adequate shelter for such liaison agents from abroad adds to the numerous housing difficulties of the underground.

3. Technical Apparatus. Maintaining and distributing illegal Party newspapers, information sheets and propaganda material necessitates the establishment of additional safe space for production, storage and distribution. Since considerable security risks are involved in the running of an illegal production and distribution machine (or "technical apparatus"), the importance which the Party attaches to this work merits attention.

The function of the Party press in the underground is, in Lenin's words, that of a "collective organizer". As such, it not only organizes the mind of the reader along Party lines, but also groups the readers around the distribution personnel in loose, but nevertheless important, nuclei. In some cases, the Party may be reduced to just this level of operations: an illegal newspaper and several circles of readers connected with the center through the workers who bring the sheet to the house or factory. Further, the Party press tangibly demonstrates the

strength of the suppressed Party. In highly organized Parties, the press serves the center as a vehicle for political direction on a mass basis. The abilities of Parties to maintain illegal publications vary. On the one hand, the illegal CP France was able to produce large numbers and many editions of national and regional newspapers, leaflets, factory papers and reviews within France. On the other hand, CP Germany under Gestapo suppression had to rely almost exclusively on the production of its foreign support centers. In general, however, an attempt will be made by the Party to follow Comintern instructions:

"All Communist Parties must without fail have an extensive apparatus for the publication of illegal Party literature, printing plants, various kinds of rotary machines, copying machines, mimeographs and simple hectographs in order to publish illegal literature, newspapers, leaflets, etc. In particular it is absolutely essential that the local Party Committee guarantee the publication of the factory paper for the factory cell...."

In addition to the production apparatus a special distribution mechanism must be set up. For security reasons, the technical apparatus of the illegal Party must be divorced from the center and compartmentalized on all levels; it may assume the character of a semi-independent Party section. According to Comintern instructions, special personnel must be brought in for this purpose; special addresses are needed for the safe-keeping of literature from the press and for passing it along to all levels of the underground; and only one member of the Party Committee should be made responsible for publication and distribution.

The production process itself is dependent on the availability of paper, equipment and trained personnel. The acquisition of paper is often a troublesome problem. At times it must be stolen or pilfered by a Communist employee from his place of work. Equipment must frequently be improvised. However, when production is on a professional scale, as it was in France, the process may be broken up into as many component parts as possible; decentralization of the production of a leaflet provides better security. Depending on the scale of production and its decentralization, the number of persons engaged in technical work may vary. Three

types of personnel, however, can be distinguished: 1) the responsible functionaries who supervise and direct production and distribution, 2) the skilled technicians (typesetters, printers, etc.), and 3) liaison and distribution personnel. The function of the supervisors appears to be restricted to technical problems; the writing and editing rest with the political functionaries. Liaison personnel may be needed in increasing numbers when the production process is decentralized. Six liaison agents, for example, were reportedly involved in the production of an illegal French leaflet, taking the text from the editor to the typesetter, and so on, down to the central storage place and distribution point.

Final distribution of the product apparently is undertaken by the political organization (local Party committee, etc.). The technical apparatus merely brings the product to the political section. If the center of the technical apparatus is abroad (as in the case of the German "Reichstechnikum"), it must provide its own courier and border-crossing service. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the technical apparatus ends when the product is delivered. Special functionaries of the local Party organization may be in charge of the ultimate storage places and distribution to the rank and file. The distribution process itself, according to the capabilities of the technical apparatus, may be put on a mass or on a selective basis. If there are only a few copies of a paper available it is obviously essential to distribute them among persons with good contacts, capable of passing on the information to wider circles. In any case, it can readily be seen that the housing of the technical apparatus constitutes a major problem. Homes must be rented for the keeping of equipment (even if only a handpress and a typewriter). Paper must be stored. Central and local distribution points must be established. Couriers must be sheltered. The component operations of the production process must be safely installed.

There has not so far been any evidence to indicate that there is a pattern which various Parties follow in treating the housing problem. Each Party organization, whether political or special, national or regional, appears to handle the problem according to its own needs and capabilities.

4. The Security Problem. The severe impact of security considerations on the organization and operations of the outlawed Party has been amply demonstrated in the preceding sections. Two special aspects arise to be treated: personal and administrative security.

a. Personal security. Functionaries and members alike must adhere to certain "conspiratorial rules" if their security is to be protected. All Parties evolve a set of practical regulations affecting the member's entire way of life under illegal conditions. These cover such details as alcohol consumption; behavior in case of arrest, threatened or actual; private correspondence; selection and change of apartments; storage of letters, notes, newspaper clippings and literature in general; attitudes towards wife, girl friend, children, unreliable comrades, etc. Provision is also usually made for the use of fictitious (Party) names. In the CP Portugal, for example, members in close contact over a long period knew each other only by such pseudonyms. Some Parties advocate the creation of a "Party language", prohibit the use of telephone or mail for Party communications, advise the frequent changing of clothes and coiffure, and even of posture and gait. Particular attention is paid to security at meetings which should, as a rule, be attended by small numbers and should not last long. Playing cards may be displayed on the table to give the meetings a social appearance. Resolutions taken at meetings should be as succinct as possible.

A breach of security constitutes not only a breach of discipline but also a major political crime: "To be a good Communist under the present circumstances means above all to apply strictly the rules of illegal work, it means to understand that each failure in this respect represents a danger for the Party and a veritable crime against the working class." (Vie du Parti, 1941)

b. Administrative security. Over and above the need for safe storage space, special security measures may be introduced to protect Party records. Paper work is necessary even in the underground, although its reduction to minimal proportions is a constant prescription.



Membership records. Preparatory to going underground, functionaries will usually destroy membership lists and records indicating the affiliation of individuals with the Party. Some Parties may stop their recruitment program altogether, or for a certain period of time. During illegal periods, the issuance of membership cards or books and dues stamps is often discontinued. In some cases, the responsible personnel functionary may simply rely on his memory to keep track of the members. The consequences of failing to carry out such an elementary security measure are illustrated in the case of CP Germany. The Gestapo was able to seize voluminous central records, which had been allowed to remain stored at Berlin headquarters.

Intra-Party communications. Written reports from lower to higher echelons and instructions from above, when permitted at all, will be as brief as possible. They should not contain any specific details of police interest, such as names of functionaries, cities, villages, and addresses. Confidential communications may be composed in code or ciphers, and written in invisible ink. Documents will generally be forwarded by a trusted courier, and delivered at special reporting points. In case of arrest, the courier must attempt to destroy the communication by all possible means. In the underground, Party functionaries will not, as a rule, sign with their names: they may use their initials or assigned numbers.

Biographical documentation. The Cadre Commissions (or Departments) may find it necessary to increase their bureaucratic activities. Cadre control in the underground is essential, and detailed biographical statements may be requested of each functionary and militant, particularly replacements. Such biographical reports may be transmitted by special couriers of the Cadre Commission, which may be in charge of safe-guarding these records.

The actual volume of administrative paper work will depend chiefly on the size of the Party. A mass Party will not be able to function effectively without substantial administrative records.

5. The Financial Problem. Operating underground is much more expensive than operating legally. What is more, the "normal" sources of income dry up. On the one hand, illegal conditions impose a new and often heavy financial burden on the Party. As a consequence of the atomization of Party organizations and the specialization of personnel, cadres must be increased -- and payrolls with them. Functionaries and militants must be constantly on the move, either to escape the police or to minimize the risks of their work. They may have to change their domicile, sometimes at the slightest alert, and must not be handicapped by a lack of money. Rentals of safe houses and apartments, storage places, etc., may be considerable; one individual may frequently have to rent several apartments, each under a separate false identity. Printing and distribution costs rise; equipment is constantly being seized by the police and must be replaced. Further, the Party must aid the families of arrested functionaries and members, an expense which may be extremely heavy in the event of mass arrests.

On the other hand, the collection of dues is hampered. Contributions from sympathizers dwindle; front organizations, through which fund-collecting campaigns are channeled, may wither; the sale of Party literature decreases; and commercial ventures of the Party may fail.

Thus, Party finances frequently become a priority operational problem. Preoccupation with financial questions is shown in the instructions of the (illegal) CP France, calling for a discussion of finances at the beginning of every cell meeting. Tight budgeting can partially solve the dilemma, but essential costs cannot be eliminated. CP France in 1941 considered the following categories as essential; a) propaganda material -- paper, equipment; b) travel expenses; and c) couriers. The same Party further advised all echelons to budget as follows: 50% for propaganda costs (paper, machinery, etc.) and 50% for organizational expenses (salaries, indemnities, travel expenses, rents, etc.).

In view of the scarcity of funds in the underground, the Party must frequently look for support from abroad. Party centers in foreign countries, or Party auxiliaries with foreign connections, such as maritime Party units, are particularly suited to collecting funds with the help of fraternal Parties and their front organizations. Prior to the

dissolution of the Comintern, underground Parties could also present their case to the Budget Commission of the Communist International. While it is difficult to estimate the current financial policy of the CP Soviet Union towards foreign underground Parties, it is probable that if a significant Party should be forced underground in the near future (CP Italy or CP France, for example), direct or indirect financial support from the Soviet and satellite Parties would be forthcoming.

Whatever the origin of underground funds, their administration poses a critical security problem. Party funds, in possession of the national and territorial finance departments or finance functionaries, can in some cases simply be placed with trusted Party workers. Again, security considerations recommend decentralization of hiding places. When practical, dummy accounts and dummy corporations can be created. The administration of funds may also be taken out of the hands of territorial organizations and centered upon the national Party treasury, when the latter operates in safe territory -- a procedure recently reported to be followed by CP Greece.

6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem. The Party's financial difficulties may be overcome, and the Party machine may be salvaged to a certain extent. Even so, deprived of its legal outlets, the Party's basic strategy of developing into the directing force of the entire working class and other susceptible strata, will be severely hindered under illegal conditions. Fronts and auxiliaries fall by the wayside in a state of political suppression, and the entire propaganda and agitation apparatus must restrict its operations. The strength of the Party as a political force is based upon free access for its propagandizers and organizers to wide masses of workers, farmers, intellectuals, minority groups, etc. The legal Party can obtain a maximum of mass support; the illegal Party may fall far short of this basic objective. "The fundamental deficiency of every illegal Party," in words of the Comintern, "(is) that an illegal Party apparatus makes contacts with the masses difficult - and yet the fundamental task of the Communist Party is to have close contact with the masses." There are several methods by which the Party may attempt to surmount these obstacles.

- a. Penetration and control of legal non-Communist parties representing workers and related class elements. This approach has only limited possibilities. In the first place, during severe repression all "progressive" or "liberal" parties may be outlawed, and another illegal party is not worth penetrating because it is itself restricted. In the second place, Communist efforts to take over a non-Communist "Workers' Party" will meet with considerable resistance wherever these parties are controlled by Socialists. The attempt made by CP Austria to take over the Austrian Social Democratic Party as a whole, through a tactical alliance made by the two parties during the middle thirties, met with failure in this way.
- b. Penetration and control of legal trade unions. This is a tactic recommended by the Comintern. Even if control cannot be achieved, Party fractions working in legal trade unions can exert a certain degree of political influence. Illegal trade unions are clearly less valuable than legal outlets. The penetration process of the trade union movement is a permanent requirement, no matter what the political status of the Party may be.
- c. Creation of dummy front organizations or parties. As a rule, this method has little chance of success because it is usually too transparent. Exceptions may occur when suppression is not severe (such as currently in Brazil) or when the Party is in a position to exploit a national emergency (such as foreign occupation or colonial unrest) and to marshal national or colonial "liberation" movements.

The fact remains that no matter what political alliances the Party underground may conclude, or what additional strength it may gain in illegal membership, it still is not a legal Party and cannot fully develop its potential strength. The "combination of legal and illegal methods" is never adequate; ultimately the illegal Party must attempt to become legal. The passing from illegality into legality, however, may only be possible in acutely revolutionary situations. The Party may have to organize military-revolutionary action (as in Russia, China and Greece), or it may have to wait for such an international crisis as World War II, during which the regime suppressing the Party is destroyed.

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