

## PREFACE

The leading role and internal power position of the Communist Party of China (CCP) was defined by Mao Tse-tung in his opening address to the First National People's Congress in Sept. 1954 when he stated that "the core of our strength which leads us in our cause is the Communist Party of China." But what are ~~the~~ <sup>CCP</sup> objectives in Southeast Asia? At the Peking Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries in November 1949, Liu Shao-chi, vice chairman of the ~~CCP~~ <sup>CCP</sup>, advocated that "the path taken by the Chinese people to defeat imperialism and its lackeys" should be followed "by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy." While the Manifesto of this same conference advised the "workers of the oppressed countries of Asia" to adopt the China way of establishing a territorial base and an army "when you can no longer carry on your action in the cities under the white terror" there was no clear mention made of whether or not Peiping would assume direction of the national liberation movement. That the Chinese revolution is to be a model is however, indicated by two Communist announcements. The Cominform Journal in January 1954 accords Mao Tse-tung prestige as an original strategist who

CPYRGHT

"creatively and in a new way, characterized / the Chinese revolution / as a revolution of a special type, now typical for revolution in colonial and semicolonial countries."

The article quoted Malenkov's statement that the

CPYRGHT

"victory of the Chinese revolution opened up a new page, not only in the history of the people of China but of all the peoples of Asia."

The role of Chinese practice as the standard for Asian, African and South American Communist parties is given in a Daily Worker Article of 5 August 1955, entitled The Indonesian National Liberation Movement and

published for consumption in Indonesia.

In this article, William Z. Foster, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the U. S., describes

CPYRGHT

of

"Peoples China, co-partner with the Soviet Union, as the great leader of the world national liberation movement. With its world Marxist-Leninist fighter Mao Tse-tung at its head, it is the pace setter for the

entire colonial world. China is pointing the way to people's democracy

CPYRGHT

2

and Socialism, the road that all other peoples of Asia and eventually also of Africa and Latin America will finally travel."

Communist sources thus make it clear that whether the direction of Asian, African and South American CPs lies in Peking or Moscow or is divided between them, the role of the Chinese Party in Asia will be a large one, and its practices are to serve as the model which Asian "national" parties are expected to copy.

What sort of men do leaders of this influential Party want as their followers? What are some of the practices which the national parties of Asia and Africa are expected to follow?

A clue to both these questions comes from a study of the training and indoctrination given new party members and from examination of the standards, ideals, principles and practices expounded by present Party leaders for those on whom they rely to carry out their policies. The Chinese Communists are remarkably frank about the rigid uncompromising standards of performance and discipline which a party member is expected to attain, and this collection of articles describes also how they have perfected a technique which applied to ordinary human beings turns them into disciplined, militant activists, unquestioning in their execution of the Party Line.

Already Chinese Communist doctrinal exhortations are required study for members of such Asian parties as those of Japan and Indonesia; given the opportunity, the techniques used by the Chinese Communist Party, "pace setter of the entire colonial world" can be expected to become a part of the arsenal of organizational weapons of each Communist Party in Asia and Africa.

A note on the nature of this publication

This pamphlet is composed chiefly of a collection of three selections on Communist methods of recruitment, indoctrination and discipline which were prepared separately as parts of other works. They are brought together here for the light they throw on what is expected of a Chinese Communist Party member. The first selection gives a general description of <sup>CCP</sup> ~~CPC~~ methods of recruitment, training and discipline. In the next section are given the Party's ideals for the performance of individual members, as described in exhortations by two of the Party's leading theoretician-propagandists.

3

The final section is a description of how the Chinese Communist Party leaders brought ordinary men to fit the ideal during a critical period of Party history; just after coming to power. As such, it is in a sense a case study of techniques used to meet particular circumstances, but it has a broad application to the present and future.

NRH (4)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I Personnel Policies:

1. Recruitment
2. Promotions, transfers and assignments
3. Training and indoctrination
4. Party discipline and morale
5. Party reform and Party purge

II The Ideal Party Member:

1. "How to be a Communist Party Member", Ch'en Yun
2. "On the Training of a Communist Party Member", Liu Shao-chi

III Indoctrination of Cadres:

1. Techniques of Coercion: criticism and self criticism, physical control of trainees, fatigue, tension, uncertainty, use of vicious language.
2. Training Process: discussion groups, public confessions, isolation.
3. Indoctrination Themes: Power of the organization (party), old versus new, class consciousness, 'steeling'.

INTRODUCTION

RH

(3)

NIS p.

p. 30.

The first selection of this pamphlet describes the party's post-war approach to the problems of recruitment, training and reform. In reading this selection special attention should be given to the continuous process of ideological remoulding which is characteristic of CCP discipline and the various forms which this process takes at different stages of the party member's career.

p. 318

The next selection which is taken from the Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, describes the ideal of Communist behavior in speeches which were given by two of the party's leading theoreticians in 1939. Ch'en Yun, the author of How to be a Communist Party Member, is a member of Politburo and Secretariat of the <sup>CCP</sup> ~~CPC~~ and is also a vice-Premier specializing in economic affairs. Liu Shao-chi, who wrote On the Training of a Communist Party Member, is vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the <sup>CCP</sup> ~~CPC~~, in addition to being a member of the Politburo and Secretariat and the party's leading theoretician. The chief significance of these articles is that they reaffirmed the Leninist foundations of the party at a time when the propaganda line occasioned by the anti-Japanese United Front created the impression that the CPC, in attending to the more immediate national peril had compromised its ultimate of Communist aims. The articles were emphasized during that period and, after the switch in the party line, during the civil war in China and the intense "cold war" with the West. They continue to be used as major indoctrination tools, even though once again in 1955 the United Front tactic has been resurrected by many of the Asian national parties, peaceful coexistence is in vogue and violence has been temporarily shelved. The continuing

use of these articles through these different periods illustrates the uncompromising nature of party disciplinary requirements. The central theme of both articles is the need for members "to subordinate their individual interests to those of the party; to carry out party resolutions not only in the time of victory but also in the hour of defeat."

page 50

The final selection is taken from Richard Walker's, China Under Communism: The First Five Years and is concerned with the methods by which the Chinese Communists insure execution of their domestic policies through the use of "Psychological Control".

After assuming power in 1949, the <sup>CCP</sup> ~~CPC~~ found itself with a vast area to govern and few trained and disciplined people to administer it according to the rigid and tough-minded policies they had adopted. For this reason they established a series of camps and schools in which they segregated and indoctrinated almost one million potential cadres per year for over three years. The article which is based primarily on party documents and personal interviews in Hong Kong with refugees who had actually attended these schools, describes the indoctrination principles followed and the actual training process. The techniques of coercion beginning with physical control of the trainees and proceeding through progressive stages of physical and mental fatigue, tension, uncertainty, study of Marxist-Leninist documents etc., until an emotional crisis is reached, are described here in accurate detail. According to the testimony of these refugees, "the soul becomes public property" and ultimately the subject discards his "reactionary" past for an entirely new or Communist set of values. Thorough inculcation of absolute loyalty to the party and absolute acceptance of party discipline were placed ahead of any training in the practical arts of government administration.

Specifically designed to speedily indoctrinate large numbers of cadres during a period of tremendous party expansion and increase of responsibility, some features of the program may have been discarded, but it is assumed that the various techniques are still

7

a part of party indoctrination methods. It is known that the searching self and group criticisms and the unyielding emphasis on orthodoxy and party discipline continue to animate party practice.

Communist insistence on maintaining the United Front is based on a realization that it continues to have a number of useful functions. The maintenance of the United Front provides the CCP with a convenient means of masking the realities of one-party Communist rule, enables it to win greater popular support, and creates a channel for promoting broader popular involvement in the programs and policies of the regime. Moreover, the United Front serves as a useful symbol of national unity and solidarity at a time when the regime is trying to consolidate its newly won power at home.

Another reason for maintaining the United Front is the fact that the CCP, rather than rule directly, prefers to delegate the actual business of administration to a vast governmental apparatus staffed largely with noncommunist personnel, but controlled by strategically located party members. Thus, through the device of the United Front as applied to government, the CCP is able to retain its elite status while at the same time directing and supervising state activities.

The power relationships in the government of Communist China may be described as a series of agencies successively less powerful, deriving their standing and authority from a central party apparatus which supplies direction and momentum to the entire state machine (see the chart, FIGURE 53-1). Nearest to the center of power are the New Democratic Youth League (the party's junior auxiliary), the regular civil bureaucracy, and the armed forces, including a large regular army, a national militia, and the public security and police forces. A still smaller measure of power is delegated by the party to the various mass organizations and minor parties included in the United Front. For the most part, these groups serve as channels for Communist propaganda and as means of carrying out Communist policies and laws among the various social and economic groups in the population. The individual Chinese citizen is frequently subject to control from several different organizations.

#### The Chinese Communist Party

a. GENERAL FEATURES — The Chinese Communist Party has certain general features in common with other Communist parties. Like other Communist parties, it is a centralized and monolithic organization in which powers of policy decision and appointment are concentrated in a small group of top party leaders. Authority is transmitted downward through a pyramid of command to the smallest units of urban and rural control. The danger of individual aberrations is effectively minimized by the vesting of authority at each level in party committees rather than in individual leaders, and by the maintenance of an elaborate

system of checks and controls over party membership. The members of the CCP are carefully selected and trained, are firmly disciplined, and are expected to live up to a very high code of personal conduct. They are required to subordinate all personal ambitions to the interests of the party and make all sacrifices necessary for the furtherance of the party's revolutionary program.

Like other Communist parties, the CCP possesses a strong sense of mission and destiny. Party members are imbued with a conviction that they are taking part in a great historical movement of worldwide significance, the ultimate triumph of which is inevitable. This conviction has inspired the average party member with a fanatical zeal and has provided psychological compensations that offset the lack of material rewards.

Another trait which the CCP has in common with other Communist parties is the conspiratorial and semicovert nature of its operations. In the period before 1949 much of the CCP apparatus was underground, and the greatest secrecy was maintained regarding party membership and operations. Local party organizations were established vertically, with no direct contact between them. Information was carefully compartmentalized so that each party member knew only his own narrow sphere of operations. Following the Communist seizure of the China mainland, the CCP organization operated in a much more overt manner. Nevertheless, party plans and operations have remained shrouded in secrecy, and the identity of individual party members still is often concealed from the local populace.

Besides these characteristics, common to Communist parties in general, the CCP has certain unique features in connection with its rise to power: party membership, and relative lack of purges.

The significant factors with respect to the CCP's rise to power are: 1) its long and bitter military struggle against great odds, during which it was able to build up a professional army under its own control; 2) the establishment of territorial bases of resistance in rural areas during the 1930's, after earlier attempts to gain power in the cities had failed; and 3) the utilization of a strategy devised by Mao Tse-tung, which adapted Leninist principles to an indigenous Chinese scene and offered proof that an armed revolution based on peasant support and divorced from urban areas could succeed.

b. SIZE AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY — The CCP, with a membership of over 5,800,000, is the second largest Communist Party in the world, outnumbered only by the 6,900,000 members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The mem-

8

The CCP, with an official membership of six and one-half millions in 1954, and an estimated 6,800,000 members in 1955, is almost on a par in size with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ~~with~~ which has 6,900,000 members. Its membership comprises just over 1% of China's population.

has  
The party/experienced a tremendous expansion between 1945 and 1955, particularly during the first 6 post war years when membership rose from 1,200,000 to 5,800,000, or three-quarters of a million per year. Because of this expansion, the rank and file membership is composed largely of relative newcomers. Less than 20% have over 10 years service in the party. Assimilation of these millions of new members into the party has posed many problems for the party leadership. Many new members were poorly educated and many more politically unreliable. The task of ~~weeding~~ <sup>weeding</sup> out the politically undesirable, and of training and indoctrinating the remainder of the recruits has been given constant and recurring attention by the party <sup>from</sup> since 1951, when a three-year program of party consolidation and reform was begun, <sup>and has continued</sup> thru 1955, when ~~many~~ party organs were included among the groups into which counterrevolutionaries had found their way. (See below, under Party Personnel).

Another striking feature of the CCP is the high percentage of women and youth. As of June 1951, about one tenth of the membership was female and about 1 of every six was under 25.

In true orthodox fashion, the CCP claims to be the "organized vanguard of the working class", but most of its membership is derived from rural origins. As of 1948, over 90% of the rank and file membership consisted of persons recruited in rural areas. Even as late as July 1951, two years after taking over urban areas, almost 80% of the total were persons with peasant backgrounds, and the percentage has not dropped below 75%. Of the 1,300,000 non-rural members, <sup>at that time,</sup> about 1,100,000 were classed as intellectuals, and a mere 200,000 officially classified as urban industrial workers.

Because of the conflicts between the facts of the China situation with the classical Leninist standards for a party of the <sup>urban</sup> proletariat,  
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6

Chinese Communist theoreticians have resorted to many devious ~~methods~~ rationalizations to reconcile theory with reality. One expedient has been to describe the peasants ~~as~~ as members of the "rural proletariat". Another has been to discount social factors and emphasize ideological and organizational factors. Thus party leader Liu Shao-ch'i argued that:

"The social origins of party membership are not all-important. The true determining factors are our party's political struggles and its political and ideological leadership. Our party's program will guarantee the predominance of the proletarian outlook. " (On the Party, 1945).

For the past five years, party leaders have given increasing attention to building the urban-worker component of the party base.

Plans announced in July 1950 envisioned the gradual recruitment over a three year period of one-third of China's urban workers ~~(estimated by Communist statisticians as comprising 3,000,000 persons)~~ <sup>(estimated by Communist statisticians as comprising 3,000,000 persons)</sup>. ~~to total about 3,000,000, according to Chinese statistics.~~ During

1952 and 1953 there was some recruiting of skilled workers in urban areas, and official statistics of April 1953 ~~thereof~~ stated that 450,000 trade union members were enrolled as members of the CP.

By 1955, however, recruitment in the countryside--necessary to ensure success of vital agricultural programs--was being stressed.

military security. Party organizations in the schools and colleges determine educational policy and control the appointment and removal of faculty members; moreover, through branches of the party's junior auxiliaries—the New Democratic Youth League and Young Pioneers—the party is able to mobilize the student body for demonstrations and for indoctrination purposes. Party members scattered throughout various "mass organizations," such as peasant associations, cooperatives, and mutual aid teams, serve as "backbone elements" in such organizations, ensuring their obedience to party leadership and goading their members to even higher levels of performance.

The party's organizations in factories and labor unions, which give the party leadership a pervasive control over industrial production and over the industrial labor force, are taking on increasing importance as China moves into a new and more advanced phase of planned economic construction. Party committees and branches set up within factories and other industrial enterprises play leading roles in all phases of industrial management, including the formulation of production plans, the coordination of planning and production, and the supervision of personnel administration. In addition, they are responsible for enforcing all labor legislation issued by the government and for preventing sabotage. Party organizations within the labor unions control the selection and promotion of labor union leaders and review all resolutions and plans issued by the labor unions, including educational programs and amendments to union regulations.

#### PARTY PERSONNEL

(1) *General* — The personnel policies of the CCP have been governed by the particular needs of the party during various phases of its development. During the period from the early 1930's to 1948, the party was composed of a comparatively small group of revolutionaries who were engaged in almost constant military struggle for survival in isolated rural areas. In this situation there was little need for technical or administrative skills, and the primary requisites of a good party man were military ability and political reliability.

Following the party's rapid military victories in the period 1948-1949, the picture changed. Overnight, the party's territorial base was vastly enlarged, and embraced most of China proper. The party was compelled to move from the rural areas into the large cities, where it was confronted with new and complex administrative responsibilities. In this new situation the party's limited supply of administrative and technical personnel was severely taxed. Not only was the party elite too small to consolidate political control, but the older type of party member, with his limited horizons,

was unsuited to the new challenge. Recruits with greater education and technical competence were needed.

The party thus began a rapid expansion of its ranks, taking in large numbers of students and educated persons who, though less reliable politically, had useful talents to offer. The rapid growth of the party during the period 1948-50 necessarily involved some lowering of admission standards and some dilution of the party ranks with persons of dubious political backgrounds. Moreover, the task of trying to assimilate and indoctrinate the millions of new recruits was one which severely strained the party's existing training facilities.

The rapid victories of the CCP in 1948 and 1949 and its shift of operations to the urban areas also created new problems of maintaining party zeal and *esprit de corps*. The end of military operations and exposure to the unfamiliar comforts and luxuries of urban life produced, among many of the older party members, a tendency to relax and enjoy life and to lose sight of revolutionary goals. At the same time, the growing involvement of the party machine in the routine business of running a vast governmental apparatus created a very real danger that the party would soon become hopelessly bogged down in bureaucratic red tape and would lose its revolutionary momentum.

Since 1948 the party leadership has become increasingly aware of the magnitude of the personnel problems confronting it—an awareness revealed in speeches of party leaders, in directives issued by the party Central Committee, and in the convening of party conferences on organizational problems. As the party leaders doubtless realize, the strength and effectiveness of the party organization as a whole is dependent to a very large degree on the loyalty and performance of the rank-and-file party members, who are known as "cadres" or *kan-pu*.

Party Secretary Liu Shao-ch'i, speaking at the Seventh Party Congress (1945), declared that:

The problem of cadres is a problem of vital importance . . . the cadres of the party are the nucleus of the party's leadership in the Chinese Revolution. . . . The problem of cadres is virtually an all-decisive issue in the cause of the Chinese people. . . .

The term "cadre" as used by the Chinese Communists has both a generic and a more specific meaning. Used generically, it can refer to all party members, including those in the army and in government. Used more specifically, it may apply only to those party members who have definite responsibilities for some particular type of party activity, such as propaganda or organizational work. In general, the word "cadre" connotes political reliability, responsibility, and leadership.

(same para)

However, all cadres are not necessarily party members; both the account in Section III of this study and the Chinese Communist press refer to persons assigned jobs as government employees who are described as cadres. ~~however~~ Many of these cadres <sup>however</sup> are not party members.

Party members are divided into two major groups: the full or regular members, who enjoy all rights and privileges of membership (including the right to vote in party elections and to be elected to office), and the probational or "candidate" members, who have a voice in party councils, but no vote. Another important distinction is the fact that regular members have access to confidential documents, whereas the probational members do not.

In addition to these two broad categories, there appears to be a further classification of cadres according to party rank, and type of work assignment, although little information on this subject is available. Official Communist broadcasts have referred to such groups as "leadership cadres," "lower-level cadres," and "backbone cadres" (*kukan fen-tzu*). The "backbone cadres" are party members who provide "stiffening" within nonparty organizations, such as peasant associations and labor unions.

Party cadres are described as the "nucleus of leadership among the masses." They provide a vital link between the party organization and the various parts of the state apparatus, and between the party and government superstructure and the general populace. Party members scattered throughout the army, government, and mass organizations transmit party policy and directives and oversee their execution. Party members in the villages and city streets maintain liaison between the party and the people by publicizing and explaining party policy and gathering information on popular reactions to party programs.

Because of their position as connecting links between the party organization and other sectors of the society, the party cadres play a very vital role in party operations. They often constitute the strength or weakness of the party chain of command. The ability of the party leadership to have its orders effectively carried out depends on the ability of the local cadre to interpret them correctly and to explain them to others. Similarly, the ability of the party leadership to gauge the effectiveness and wisdom of its policies and to plan future programs depends to a large extent on its receiving honest and accurate reports from the field.

(2) *Party recruiting* — CCP leaders have repeatedly emphasized the importance of "party-building," which they view not as an isolated process but rather as a process which must be closely integrated with all aspects of the party's work. Two basic considerations underlie party recruiting activity—quantity and quality. On the one hand there is the desire to maintain party membership at a size adequate to meet current operational needs; on the other there is the need to safeguard the "purity" of the party ranks by screening out

all persons of dubious political reliability. To some extent, considerations of quantitative increase have at times taken precedence over considerations of quality; in general, however, the party has sought to reconcile the two, although not entirely successfully.

Because the party regards itself as an elite group, it has sought to restrict its membership to persons who meet certain definite requirements and standards. The party constitution of 1945 stipulated that:

Any person may become a member of the party who accepts the program and constitution of the party, belongs to and works in one of the party's organizations, observes party discipline, and pays party dues.

The party constitution also specifies certain duties a party member is expected to perform, as follows:

- 1) understanding the "fundamentals of Marxist-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung";
- 2) observing party discipline strictly;
- 3) participating actively in inner-party political life and in the revolutionary movement;
- 4) carrying out the policies and directives of the party;
- 5) fighting against everything inside and outside the party which is detrimental to the party's interests;
- 6) strengthening the party's relations with the masses by explaining party policy to them and reporting their demands to the party leadership; and
- 7) mastering a line of work and performing assigned tasks in an exemplary fashion.

Party recruitment policy since 1948 has shown two dominant trends: 1) a gradual tightening up of recruitment through the adoption of more stringent admission requirements; and 2) an increased emphasis on recruiting targets in urban industrial areas, and the gradual imposition of a restriction on recruiting in the rural areas.

During the period 1948 to 1950, when the dominant consideration was to effect a rapid increase in the size of party membership, admission standards were relaxed and a number of students and intellectuals of dubious "bourgeois" backgrounds were admitted to the party. From the middle of 1950 onward there was increasing concern among the party leadership that the relaxation of admission standards had created a threat to the "purity" of the party. Moreover, beginning in March 1949, when the Second Plenum of the Central Committee resolved to transfer the base of party operations to the large cities, there was a growing preoccupation with the need to emphasize the recruitment of urban factory workers and thereby to strengthen the influence of the party in urban areas.

One of the major landmarks in party recruiting policy was the address of Mao Tse-tung to the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, in June 1950. This speech heralded a tightening of re-

This restriction was lifted shortly immediately following the announcement of the general line for transition to socialism (Sept. 1953); the purpose being to establish party control over producer cooperatives.

recruitment in general and a greater attention to the recruitment of urban workers. In this address Mao stated:

We must now adopt a policy of more careful expansion. . . . Opportunists must be resolutely expelled . . . and attention must be paid to expanding the proportion of workers in the party. In the old liberated areas, the enrollment of party members from villages must be stopped. . . . In the newly liberated areas, the party organization should, in general, not be expanded in the villages. . . .

The resolutions passed by the Third Plenum called for a restriction on the recruiting of peasants and indicated that the party would attempt to absorb, by degrees, about one-third of China's 3,000,000 industrial workers over a three-year period. The figure of 3,000,000 industrial workers is the standard figure now used by Communist statisticians. While the Communists have never broken it down into specific components, it is believed to include not only factory workers (who number about 1,000,000 or slightly more) but also workers in mining enterprises, railways, and other forms of modern communications.

The basic policy line on recruiting established by the Third Plenum of the Central Committee was not actually implemented until many months later. One major step in this direction was the convening of a National Conference on Party Organization, which met in Peiping during March and April 1951. Although this conference was never discussed in detail in the Communist press, it is believed to have adopted new and more stringent requirements for party membership and also to have launched a three-year program of party reform aimed at raising standards of performance and purging "undesirable elements" from the party ranks. At the same conference a decision was reportedly made to recruit 1,000,000 factory workers and 500,000 handcraft workers into the party by the end of 1953, while at the same time restricting the recruitment of peasants through a fairly rigid quota system that would admit only 10 persons per township (*hsiang*) to party membership over a two-year period.

The most important recent pronouncement on party recruiting policy was an article by the deputy chief of the Organization Department, An Tzu-wen, published in the *Cominform Bulletin* for July 25, 1952. An stressed the need for raising standards for party membership, stating that:

In the future, the members we accept must be the elite of the workers and laboring classes. . . . The admission of new members must be viewed as the result of a long-term process of screening. . . . Recruiting must be coordinated with other party programs, for it is only in the course of mass struggles that we can spot and screen activists of pure ideological outlook.

In the same article, An set forth eight criteria for assessing the performance of party members. The criteria reformulated membership standards previously adopted, emphasizing the qualities necessary to improve the members' performance and outlook.

Party recruiting activity since the end of 1951 has been closely integrated with and shaped by two important developments on the domestic scene. The first of these, chronologically, was a nationwide reform campaign known as the "Three Anti Movement" (*san-fan yün-t'ung*), which was aimed at eradicating corruption, waste, and inefficiency in government. During this campaign, which reached its height in the spring of 1952, sizable numbers of party members holding jobs in government were expelled from the party, creating gaps which had to be filled through recruitment of new members from the ranks of "activists" (pro-Communist sympathizers in the various mass organizations).

A second major development having implications for party recruiting policy was the announcement, in August 1952, that China had completed the first stage of "economic rehabilitation" and would soon embark upon a new phase of "basic national construction," involving national economic planning, the building up of a modern industrial plant, and the gradual collectivization of agricultural production, through the expansion of such pro-collective forms of rural organization as the mutual aid team and cooperative. Party directives during the latter half of 1952 called for special emphasis on the recruitment of industrial workers having a high degree of technical skill, and urged that all members admitted to the party must be people capable of mastering industrial techniques, directing cooperatives and mutual aid teams, or assuming administrative responsibilities in government.

Published data on actual recruiting since July 1952, when the party membership was officially stated to be 5,800,000, are rather fragmentary. Unofficial figures on recruiting would suggest that the total number of new recruits added during the period from July to December 1952 was approximately 100,000—bringing the total party membership to 5,900,000. Recruiting during this period was largely confined to the large urban areas of North, Northeast, East, and Central-South China. Although the majority of new recruits were drawn from the urban worker class, members of the New Democratic Youth League and "activists" in rural cooperatives and mutual aid teams were also admitted.

(3) *Recruitment procedures* — Primary responsibility for supervising and directing the recruitment of new party members rests with the party's organization departments at all levels and

25X6A

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6

At intervals during his probation, the new member is given orientation courses to familiarize him with party organization, aims, policies, and procedures and is tested periodically to ascertain his progress. If he shows outstanding progress, his period of probation may be shortened upon the recommendation of the party branch and the approval of a higher committee at the level of the *ch'ü* or *hsien*. If he shows a complete lack of progress, the branch may either recommend an extended period of probation or may cancel his probationary membership.

At the end of his period of probation, the records of the new party member are transmitted by his branch to a committee at the *ch'ü* or *hsien* level. If the higher committee approves, the new member is then formally inducted into the party at a special ceremony in the *hsien*, at which time he takes his oath of allegiance to the party and receives his party membership card.

Party membership cards are issued by the organization departments of the provincial party committees after notification by the special district committee. The cards, which are numbered in series, reportedly include the party rules, the party oath of allegiance, and a table of vital statistics on the party member. When a party member is transferred from one party organization to another, he takes the card with him. If he goes on a secret or dangerous mission, however, he leaves it with the secretary of his party branch. Loss of party cards must be reported to the appropriate regional party bureau, which in turn reports it to the Central Organization Department.

On becoming a regular member of the party the new recruit theoretically enjoys certain new rights and privileges, including the right to vote in party elections and to run for party office, to participate in "free and full discussions" at party meetings, to criticize any party functionary, and to submit proposals and suggestions to higher level. In practice, elections and discussions are often predetermined affairs, particularly above the county level, and freedom of criticism and discussion is narrowly limited.

(4) *Promotions, transfers, and assignments of party members* — The shortage of trained and experienced cadres in the CCP has been further aggravated since 1950 by three developments: 1) the purging of lower and middle ranks of the party during the party reform movement, which began in March 1951; 2) Chinese involvement in the Korean war, which drained off additional cadres from the domestic scene; and 3) the decision to launch preparations for the beginning of a program of "planned economic construction" in 1952, which created an increased need for trained technical and administrative personnel. Reports on local party

organizations in Central-South China during the latter part of 1952 indicated that party organizations at the *ch'ü* and *hsien* levels in many areas were severely understaffed, with some cadres holding down 10 to 15 jobs at the same time.

The party leadership has attempted to make maximum use of talent and ability through a system of personnel ratings. The appraisal of party members is regarded as a two-way process, operating both from above and from below. Each party member is not only examined by his superiors, as to his ability, personal history, and performance, but he is also appraised by his colleagues and subordinates at periodic conferences during which he must defend himself against criticism. One important element in the appraisal of party members is the personal history record, which each member makes out on entering the party and again during periodic programs of party reform. This normally contains a full description of his social and political background and his motives for entering the party, as well as a frank confession of any doubts he may have concerning the party. This personal history record becomes a permanent part of the man's personnel file, along with an elaborate dossier with more than 40 different classifications and containing comments on his past performance, including any disciplinary violations. These dossiers are kept by the Department of Organization at each level of the party, and copies are also filed with the Central Organization Department.

Promotions and assignments within the party have been based on three major criteria. The first and most important of these is "*te*," which implies political reliability, high personal character, and willingness to accept responsibility. The second, "*ts'ai*," connotes ability and education, including administrative ability, technical skills, and knowledge of Communist theory. The third and least important is "*tzu*," involving length of service in the party, popularity, and ability to get along with people. Each party member is graded as to his fitness for promotion according to the above criteria, being rated "excellent," "good," "fair," or "poor" on each. When a vacancy occurs, a higher-level committee of the party will "nominate" a candidate for promotion, and this nomination is then confirmed at a still higher level. (In the case of *ch'ü* [subcounty] cadre, nomination would come from the *hsien* or special district and confirmation from the province.)

It is quite clear that CCP rating and promotion policies have tended to place primary emphasis on political reliability, loyalty, and actual performance of assigned tasks, and a much lesser emphasis on education and seniority (length of service in the party). Party leaders apparently feel that it is better to train reliable people than to utilize people

who are well-educated but politically unreliable. Party directives on promotion during 1951 and 1952 played down the importance of seniority as a criterion and emphasized the need to promote young cadres who had proved their worth, regardless of their length of service in the party. This new attitude toward seniority was part of a more general attack on the old cadres which began in 1950 and continued into 1951. During this period, the older cadres were scolded for their "arrogance" and warned that they would be judged by their performance, and not by the fact that they had many years of party service.

Very little is known about the rotation and transfer of party cadres, but it would appear that the cadres at lower levels are rotated fairly often. Party cadres in the army are apparently rotated every three years, and an attempt is made to have them serve both at the central and local levels. A similar policy may be followed in the party. Party directives during 1952, however, emphasized that cadres should be promoted from within local party organizations rather than transferred from other organizations. Excessive turnover of local personnel was also discouraged.

The transfer and assignment of party cadres in the government appears to be handled jointly by party organization departments and by government personnel departments at the corresponding levels of party and government organization. When the large-scale transfer of technical personnel was being carried out during the fall of 1952, joint party-government personnel offices were set up to "study and investigate available supplies of technical personnel and to expedite their appointment and reassignment." Recent reports indicate that the machinery for transferring and assigning technical personnel is not working well. In some cases local party organizations have attempted to retain their technical cadres and to circumvent attempts to transfer them—probably a reflection of the acute shortage of technicians and of the consequent need to retain existing personnel. Recent party directives have censured local party organizations for adopting a "too conservative" approach toward promotions, and have instructed them to promote deserving cadres from within their own ranks.

#### (5) Party training and indoctrination

(a) GENERAL FEATURES — There are three major types of party training: 1) indoctrination in Communist theory, policies, and procedures; 2) general education, including the development of literacy; and 3) specialized technical training. Of the three, political training is clearly the most important in terms of both time consumed and the number of party members involved. Party schools are largely concerned with political training; for administrative and technical training, the party

relies on other agencies, such as military and political institutes, and technical institutes set up under the various ministries of the central government.

The problem of political training is crucial for at least three important reasons. First, party membership is heterogeneous; it embraces people drawn from various social and geographical backgrounds and having widely varying levels of education. If party unity is to be maintained, there must be some means of creating a basic homogeneity of outlook, aims, and interests which will knit the various groups within the party together and keep all of them moving in a common direction. The unity of the party in fact, depends to a great extent on the ability of the party leadership to elicit a common adherence to a single orthodox body of principles and ideas, and to repress all tendencies that depart from that orthodox norm.

Second, the importance of party training is closely related to the problem of creating an effective chain of administrative command. Unless the rank and file party member is familiar with current party policies, he cannot correctly interpret or effectively carry out the day-to-day directives of the party leadership.

Third, party training plays a vital role in improving relations between the party and the "masses," including nonparty personnel in the government, army, and mass organizations. Party cadres at the local level have an important public relations function, and are expected to "sell" the policies of the party and to explain them to local nonparty people. Unless the local cadre himself has a sound grasp of policies, he cannot effectively carry out his public relations work, and may actually injure the party by alienating potential supporters.

The CCP views party training as a continuous process. Party education is regarded as being inseparable from the process of party discipline, as a constant and never-ending process of self-cultivation and self-discipline, designed to orient the individual party member both to his fellow members and to the party leadership. In this sense, it is both a unifying and a centralizing force; it promotes greater solidarity among the rank and file and at the same time makes the lower party membership more responsive to the will of the party high command. The normal, continuing process of political training in the party is often linked with, and reinforced by, special and more intensive programs of ideological remolding (*chên-feng*). These programs are aimed at eradicating any deviationist tendencies which may have crept into the thinking of party members.

Although the party was forced to rely on informal instruction rather than on highly formalized training programs during the post war period of expansion, there is evidence that a highly systematic indoctrination program (described in Section ~~XXXX~~ III of this pamphlet) was developed immediately following the Communist seizure of power. The intensity of the indoctrination program was presumably an outgrowth of the party's desire to compensate for the anticipated ad hoc nature of later on the job training during the party expansion period.

(b) PROGRAM DIRECTION — Responsibility for the direction of party training seems to have been delegated to regional and local party organizations. Party committees at each level have general responsibility for setting up training programs and for running party schools. Party secretaries often assume personal direction of important programs and brief their subordinates on aims and methods. In some cases the regional and provincial party committees set up special subcommittees on party education which draw up study plans and review progress made. According to directives issued in 1950, these committees were to be headed by full-time educational directors, but it is not clear whether this was actually done. Departments of propaganda at each level appear to have responsibility for determining the degree of progress made in study programs and for preparing and issuing study guides and manuals. Local party committees at the *hsien* and *ch'ü* levels are supposed to have one or two cadres permanently assigned to party training work. Much of the responsibility for party training devolves upon the party branch, which is the vehicle for training new members.

To date, the local party organizations appear to have considerable freedom to plan study programs and select study materials. However, there appears to be some review of study plans by higher levels of the party, and the central and regional party organizations assign special personnel to inspect the progress of training programs at the local level.

Since the middle of 1952 party leaders have been making an effort to develop more uniform methods and to set up more systematic political training programs. Directives issued in August 1952 by regional party bureaus called on all provincial and *hsien* party committees to organize systematic study of party policies and directives and to assign qualified party instructors to give lectures on party theory and policy. Party committees at the provincial and municipal level were instructed to set up "study rooms" and evening schools for political study work.

In an effort to facilitate the supervision of party indoctrination work by party committees, CCP leaders have attempted to establish a formalized system of inspection and verification. Party instructors in each local party branch are required to file with their local *ch'ü* committee a detailed report on each indoctrination session, including an account of the contents of lectures given, the number of party members present, and other observations. The various *ch'ü* party committees then prepare a monthly summary of such reports, adding comments on the reactions of the party members. The summary is then forwarded to the *hsien* (county) committee, which in turn prepares a summary for higher-level committees at the provincial level.

Little information is available on party schools and training facilities. From available data it would appear that party schools are principally concerned with political indoctrination rather than with administrative or technical training.

Formal party schools appear to exist only at the higher levels of the party—the national, regional, provincial, and the special municipal. At the national level, there is believed to be a Higher Party School, directly under the Central Committee. At the regional and provincial levels, there are party schools or party research institutes under the direction of propaganda departments or party educational committees. The Northeast Party Bureau, for example, is known to have a party school that gives eight months' training to cadres assigned to state enterprises. Provincial party schools give training courses for cadres from the *hsien* and *ch'ü*, who are selected for training by the provincial departments of organization and propaganda. Provincial and municipal party committees in some areas have set up "spare-time ideological schools," offering refresher courses in party theory; as of January 1953, there were over 800 such schools with a claimed enrollment of over 400,000.

Higher party cadres in the Peiping area have been assigned to two schools: the Marxist-Leninist Institute, which gives regular courses in Marxist theory, and the Chinese People's Revolutionary

University, which has evening classes for party cadres. Both schools are reported to have Soviet instructors.

At the local level party training media are more informal. Major emphasis is on general education rather than on theoretical studies. Ward committees in the larger cities have set up evening classes in reading and writing and general education for cadres from peasant and worker families. Hsien committees organize short-term training classes for new recruits and refresher training classes for cadres selected from the lower levels of the *ch'ü* and *hsiang* party units.

(c) TYPES AND CONTENT OF TRAINING — The type of training a party member receives depends upon such factors as his previous education, his length of service in the party, and his place in the party hierarchy. New party members are expected to acquire some familiarity with the party constitution and general program, as well as with party history and the requirements for party membership. Party members with a low level of general education are expected to concentrate on such basic subjects as history, geography, and current events; those who are illiterate are taught to read basic texts. Lower- and middle-ranking cadres with a fair amount of formal education are expected to familiarize themselves with basic policy documents having direct bearing on their work. Higher-level cadres, who have had considerable education and long periods of party service, are expected to master more advanced theoretical works by party leaders. Party cadres who are assigned to work in factories and state enterprises are expected to develop technical skills.

1) Political Training — New members of the party are required to take a basic orientation course in "General Political Knowledge." This course is based on a text issued in 1952 by the editors of *Hsüeh Hsi* (Study), a magazine, and involves instruction in party history, party organization, and party politics. More advanced beginners pursue individual study of assigned reading, with group discussions under the guidance of trained instructors. Less advanced students who are poorly educated, listen to lectures and are then examined on what they have learned. The length of this course varies with the individual's progress. After he completes this training, the party cadre is expected to continue his party studies on a regular basis. As a rule, two days a month are set aside for the study of basic party documents.

The materials most commonly assigned for study among party members fall into two broad categories: 1) basic theoretical works and 2) basic policy documents, directives, instructions, and laws. The theoretical materials include basic works by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin (brought to-

gether in a collection known as "Required Reading for Cadres" [*Kan-pu Pi-tu*]), as well as the selected works of Mao Tse-tung. The study of the more esoteric doctrinal works seems to be largely confined to the "leading cadres" (party secretaries and higher-ranking officials) at each level of the party.

Policy documents assigned for study include directives, resolutions, and reports of the Central Committee; important policy statements and speeches by party leaders; laws and administrative reports of the central government; and the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference—a compendium of basic policies. These documents are studied by party files and file as well as by the higher echelon. Through study-guides and lectures which furnish explanatory comments, an effort is made to relate these documents to actual problems of daily experience. Auxiliary study materials frequently used include those relating to party history and current events.

If the party wants a given set of policy documents studied by all members, the party Central Committee may issue a general directive to party organizations at the regional and provincial levels, ordering them to initiate study programs. The leading officials at the regional and provincial level then convene "cadre conferences" to explain the purpose and aims of the proposed study program and to establish the correct "line" to be followed. The study program is widely publicized in party newspapers and radio broadcasts, and detailed study instructions are issued by the regional bureaus and provincial committees to the various local units of the party. The documents are discussed in local forums and symposia under the guidance of party instructors. At various points during the study campaign examinations are held and tours of inspection are conducted by special personnel from the provincial and regional party organizations.

During 1952 a special campaign was launched in the party to promote a greater knowledge of party history. The standard history of the CPC by Hu Ch'iao-mu, was assigned as basic reading. Regional departments of propaganda set up special training courses for history instructors, who were selected from among members of provincial and municipal committees of the party and given three to four months of training.

During the early part of 1952 the party organizations in Peking conducted a survey of newspaper reading habits among party cadres and discovered a serious ignorance of current events. In order to remedy the situation, the party leadership instructed party committees at all levels to encourage newspaper reading and to set up a systematic

regular briefing on current events. Propaganda departments at all levels were to conduct periodic examinations to determine the effectiveness of such programs.

Since the middle of 1952 party training programs have been closely integrated with the current program of party reorganization and reform. Directives issued by various regional party bureaus in August and September 1952 decreed that "party reform studies" would constitute the most important part of all political study during the latter half of 1952. Plans announced at that time provided that eight hours a week would be spent in study and three more hours in group discussions. For study purposes cadres were to be divided into two major groups: group I, consisting of low-ranking party cadres and those with little political training, was to concentrate on mastering the basic tenets of the party constitution and the criteria of party membership set forth by An Tzu-wei in June 1952; group II, including higher-ranking party members of the *hsien* and above, was to study more esoteric documents on party policy.

2) Technical and Specialized Training — As Communist China embarks upon a new phase of "planned economic construction," involving the building of a modern industrial plant, it is confronted with a serious shortage of trained technical personnel. Estimates compiled in the spring of 1952 indicated that over 500,000 technical and administrative personnel would have to be trained to meet the requirements for proposed projects. China's existing training facilities, according to CCP estimates, are still inadequate for the job. Since the party intends to control the economic enterprises, it must have at its disposal a core of politically reliable technicians to be used as leaders and "shock troops" in the needed army of technicians. Speeches by party leaders during the latter part of 1952 placed increasing emphasis on the need for party members to acquire technical skills and to study industrial management.

Technical training for party cadres appears to be administered by joint committees composed of representatives from the party and government. Party cadres are usually assigned by such committees to one of the many technical schools now set up under the central government. One of the most important schools to which cadres have been assigned for technical or administrative training is the Central Institute of Finance and Economics, established in October 1952. This school, which has courses in trade, industrial management, finance, taxation, and economic planning, appears to have been created as the principal training center for top-level cadres in financial and economic branches of the government.

Since the middle of 1952 the CCP has established numerous other technical schools, most of them under central economic ministries such as the Ministries of Fuel, Railways, Heavy Industry and Geology. These schools are scheduled to give courses of training in forestry, engineering, metallurgy, water conservation, surveying, transportation, and navigation. Apparently many of the schools are still in the planning stage.

3) Party Training for Nonparty "Activists" — The CCP has assigned considerable importance to the training of "active elements" in both rural and urban areas. By such training the party apparently hopes to create a reservoir of politically reliable people who can be drawn upon as future members of the CCP.

In December 1951 the East China Bureau of the CCP announced a plan to indoctrinate all urban workers in the East China area by the end of 1953. The workers were to be rotated for training in party schools, New Democratic Youth League schools, government cadre schools, and revolutionary universities. Training materials were to be disseminated among the workers by propaganda departments. During 1952 party committees in several large cities in East China set up party schools and spare time classes for urban workers. Courses lasted from 3 to 6 months and were designed to familiarize workers with the requirements for party membership. In June 1952 party organizations in Kiangsu announced a plan to set up short-term training classes for urban workers in five major cities. Party schools in each of these cities were to conduct seven or eight classes with 300 to 500 students in each. One-third of the graduates of these classes were to be considered for party membership. In some of the larger cities, such as Nanking, classes have reported enrollments of over 1,200.

Party political training for activists has also been carried on in rural areas, but apparently on a smaller scale. In May 1952 a Central Committee directive instructed all *hsien* committees to set up short-term training classes for village activists to study the CCP. Students were to be selected by the *ch'ü* party committees and training was to last three to five weeks. Graduates were then to be interviewed by local party members, and those who showed promise were to be considered for membership.

4) Training Publications and Party Newspapers — The CCP provides a variety of publications for training purposes. Responsibility for preparing and distributing such training materials within the party ranks rests with the Central Propaganda Department and its branches at the various levels, including branches within the political departments of various army units.

In July 1953 the Central Committee of the party instructed all ~~xxxxxx~~ party cadres to study chapters IX through XII of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and selected works of Lenin and Stalin on Socialist economic construction in order to learn ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~the experiences of the Soviet Union~~ from the experiences of the Soviet Union. Study groups were expected to devote 4-6 hours per week to this assignment.

The most important single training publication issued by the CCP is a monthly journal called *Hsüeh-hsi* (Study), which was inaugurated in September 1949. This publication, which features articles on problems of doctrine and of study, was designed to assist cadres to gain a better mastery of party theory and to improve their study methods. Because of an incorrect "line" taken by editors of *Hsüeh-hsi* concerning the problem of the "national bourgeoisie," the magazine was forced to suspend publication in April 1952, and apparently did not resume publication until August 1952. One of the most influential Communists now connected with this magazine is Hu Sheng, a member of the Central Department of Propaganda. As noted before, cadres also study the eight-volume *Kan-pu Pi-tu* and the collected works of Mao Tse-tung.

For less advanced cadres there is a simplified study primer, (*hsüeh-hsi ch'u-chi pan*), which was first published in March 1951. This book seeks to explain party policies in simple language and to relate them to concrete problems of everyday party life. A political textbook for beginners, *General Political Knowledge*, was published in 1952, and contains information on the party's program, organization, and history.

In addition to these publications, there are training manuals for party cadres engaged in various types of administrative work, in the land reform program, propaganda, industry, agriculture, health, and other programs. Prepared and distributed by party propaganda departments at the central, regional, and provincial levels, these manuals outline and explain party policies and work methods.

Another important type of publication is the party newspaper, which usually contains important directives, speeches by party leaders, and "party life" columns discussing various features of party organization and activities. The most important party newspaper is the Peiping *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), the official organ of the Central Political Bureau of the CCP. Its editorials establish the official party line on all major issues and herald major party programs.

At least four regional party bureaus have had their own official newspaper. These are the *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (Southern Daily) in South China; the *Tung-pei Jih-pao* (Northeast Daily) in Northeast China; the *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Liberation Daily) in East China; and the *Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao* (Yangtze Daily) in Central-South China.

In addition to these regional newspapers, special party publications are also put out by the party committees in each of the larger cities. The Tientsin Party Committee, for example, issues a semi-monthly periodical called *Chih-pu Sheng-huo*

(Party Branch Life), which contains editorials defining the party line as well as short articles on party activities in various fields.

Party cadres in the armed forces also have their own newspapers, which are published and edited by special sections of the Political Departments at Army Headquarters. These contain items of general news interest as well as articles on military life. Higher-ranking party cadres in the armed forces are furnished with classified circulars, which give them a less distorted version of the news than is provided in the armed forces newspapers.

In addition to its training publications and newspapers, the party also uses the regular regional radio networks to transmit elementary lessons on political matters prepared by the party propaganda departments.

#### (6) Party discipline and morale

(a) THE PROBLEM—The CCP has long recognized the need for strict party discipline—discipline that would elicit prompt obedience to commands and enhance party unity by minimizing tendencies toward factionalism and separatism. Many important pronouncements of the party leadership during the 1940's laid heavy stress on the importance of discipline. In July 1949, for example, Mao Tse-tung listed discipline among the three major factors contributing to the CCP's rise to national prominence. (The other factors were the party's command of an effective army and the use of united front tactics.) Since the party assumed national power and now spreads its administrative talents over a broad territorial base, party leaders have been even more concerned with emphasizing the need for unflinching, iron-clad discipline among the rank and file. The rapid growth of the party's membership after 1948 created complex problems of discipline and morale. During the period 1948-50 there was a general lowering of admission standards and a consequent dilution of the party's ranks with people who were not always politically reliable and who often had only a vague concept of the party's program. A second major development which had important repercussions on party discipline and morale was the unexpectedly rapid victory of the Communist armies over the Nationalist forces in 1948-49. The shift of the party's base of operations from the countryside to the cities not only brought new and more complex problems of administration but also posed new obstacles to the maintenance of party *esprit de corps*. Party members who had lived a hard and ascetic life in rural areas were suddenly exposed to the comparative luxury of urban life, and were brought into close daily contact with the urban middle class. The dangers inherent in this situation were discerned by party leaders as early

in 1949. A resolution of the Central Committee warned that:

Now that we are victorious, it is possible that some party members may choose to indulge in a life of ease rather than live the old life of hardship. . . . It is possible that some of our members who were invulnerable to the real bullets of the enemy may now be vulnerable to the sugar-coated bullets of the bourgeoisie.

As later developments proved, these fears were not unfounded. During 1950 and 1951 there was increasing concern with the danger of "bourgeois corrosion" of the party. Party leader Kao Kang, speaking in January 1952, declared that:

Despite repeated warnings, the party has been increasingly corroded by bourgeois ideologies and influences.

The campaign against waste, corruption, and red tape in government launched during the winter of 1951-52 revealed fairly widespread corruption among middle-ranking party officials in many of the larger urban centers such as Tientsin and Wu-han.

The danger of "bourgeois corrosion" was not entirely an urban phenomenon; it had a counterpart in the villages. After the completion of land reform, the first stage of the agrarian revolution, there was a natural tendency for the rural party cadres to relax and to feel that "the revolution is over." The growing "complacency" and "apathy" of the rural cadres was bitterly attacked in editorials in party newspapers during 1951-52. Official CCP reports during January-April 1952 noted a widespread growth of "rightist tendencies" among rural cadres, including the exploitation of hired labor, money-lending at high rates of interest, a tendency toward soft living, and "arrogant attitudes toward the masses."

In addition to the dangers of "bourgeois corrosion," the party also had to face the personnel problems created by the establishment of a vast bureaucratic apparatus. Many party members developed "bureaucratic tendencies" that sorely perturbed the top leadership. Party leader Mao Tse-tung, in his address to the fourth session of the CPPCC National Committee in February 1953 noted that too many "leading cadres" in the central offices were content to sit in their offices and merely issue directives, without making any attempt to check upon their implementation. Other reports from party leaders noted that local cadres were using illegal methods to carry out party programs and were violating laws. The problem of eliminating such "bureaucratic tendencies" is viewed as a long-term struggle, necessitating constant attention.

One special aspect of the problem of eliminating bureaucratic trends in the party has been the increase in "empire-building" among local party organizations. While it is difficult to estimate the extent of such tendencies, it is apparent that there have been several isolated cases of insubordination involving the refusal of local party authorities to carry out orders received from central and regional party organizations. One example was the case of the Wuhan Committee of the CCP, which was accused of attempting to circumvent the orders of the Central Committee regarding the punishment of certain of its members. Another example was the case of Chou Chin-heng, Governor of Kirin (Chi-lin), who was alleged to have ignored orders from higher party authorities, leaving them unopened on his desk. Several other middle-ranking party officials purged during 1951-52 were accused of insubordination. An editorial in the Peiping *People's Daily*, official publication of the Politburo, on January 23, 1953, attacked local party leaders who were using their position to "set up an administration resembling an independent kingdom and who think they can do as they please."

Another aspect of discipline and morale causing the party leadership considerable trouble is the problem of the older cadres. These men, having borne the brunt of the party's long military struggles, feel that they deserve special consideration and resent the assignment of younger men to more desirable positions. Since late 1950, the party leadership has repeatedly warned these older cadres that they will not be given special concessions merely because of their long service in the party.

(b) INCENTIVES—In attempting to promote discipline and morale, the party leadership has at its command a number of methods for persuading or coercing the party rank and file into doing its bidding. These may be summarized briefly under the general headings of incentives and controls.

The incentives are both material and psychological. Although the tangible material advantages to be gained from membership in the party are not necessarily great, the individual Chinese by joining the party, gains access to an elite organization commanding a virtual monopoly of political power and patronage. He thereby greatly increases his chances of securing a desirable position and of obtaining promotions and special privileges. Although the average party member enjoys a certain degree of material security, he does not appear to have many material comforts, and in fact is expected to live a fairly austere and ascetic life. Party members who manage to live extravagantly run the constant risk of being denounced for "bourgeois decadence" and the frequency with which the party has punished cadres who have in-

dulged in material comforts has probably discouraged any open display of personal luxury. One of the reasons for emphasizing austerity is probably a realization that the type of fanatic zeal desired of the party member is best maintained through asceticism and will soon dissipate once the party members begin to live in material comfort. A large number of party members (at least 1,000,000 of them in 1950) have been placed on a "military supply system," under which they receive, instead of regular salary, a subsistence allowance in the form of food, housing, clothing, and some medical care. Subsistence varies according to rank. Lower-ranking party members eat "large kitchen" food, which is quite coarse; only a few high-ranking party members enjoy "small kitchen" food, which is of good quality. Similar distinctions are preserved with respect to housing. Lower-ranking party members live in dormitory style, often separated from their families; higher officials have private houses, cars, and sometimes servants.

In an attempt to compensate for the comparative lack of material incentives among the rank and file party members, the party leadership has attempted to develop a system of nonmaterial incentives to supplement the general political indoctrination programs. The party constitution provides that any party member or party organization may be commended for: 1) demonstration of absolute loyalty to the party cause; 2) display of exceptional initiative in carrying out the programs and policies of the party; 3) exemplary observance of party discipline; and 4) marked success in fulfilling party assignments and tasks. The evidence indicates that such commendations are actually given. Moreover, from time to time the party has launched a series of "emulation campaigns" within the party, aimed at improving levels of performance. In one such campaign, in 1950, a point system was set up, and each party organization was given a performance rating. Those units and members showing unusual zeal were awarded special commendations.

(c) CONTROLS—The CCP leadership maintains control over the membership of the party by several means, including: 1) a system of surveillance and informants; 2) formal disciplinary machinery; and 3) ideological discipline reinforced by a system of psychological controls. Through this control machinery, which permeates all levels of the party, the party leadership has been able to maintain tension among the rank and file, detect disloyalty and "deviationist" thinking, compel obedience, and enforce a rigid orthodoxy of thought and behavior.

Very little reliable information is available concerning the party's system of surveillance. The center of the party's internal security network probably lies in the Social Affairs Department (see

above, under Party Organization), which is responsible for detecting evidence of disloyalty among party members. This department maintains a vast network of informants reaching down into every unit of the party and army, and the activities of party members are thus thoroughly scrutinized. In addition, informants who report on party officials are believed to be scattered throughout the nonparty sector of the population. Under such a system party members know that any false move on their part will certainly be reported.

The formal disciplinary machinery of the party involves the party control commission, which has branches at the regional, provincial, and local levels (see above, under Party Organization). These agencies are subordinate to the various party executive committees; their functions are to investigate infractions of discipline by party organizations and by individual party members and to recommend appropriate punishment. The party control commission works in close collaboration with the people's control committee, which performs similar functions in the governmental hierarchy.

Disciplinary action against a party member ordinarily is initiated at the cell or branch level. An accused member has an opportunity to defend himself before a meeting of his cell. The cell members then make a recommendation to the branch committee, which reviews the report at a general meeting. In minor cases the party branch may take direct action, but in more serious matters the decision in the case must be referred to a higher party committee for "approval."

The party constitution outlines five types of disciplinary action which may be taken against individual party members: 1) private warning; 2) public warning; 3) removal from assigned work; 4) probation; and 5) expulsion from the party. In practice, these appear to be further refined into the following 10 degrees of punishment: 1) oral admonition; 2) oral warning; 3) public admonition; 4) public warning; 5) small demerit; 6) large demerit; 7) probation; 8) cancellation of membership; 9) temporary expulsion from the party, with the prospect of reinstatement; and 10) permanent expulsion, with no hope of reinstatement.

All punishments above "small demerit" appear to involve an automatic loss of all party offices. Cancellation of membership appears to be decreed for such offenses as failure to pay party dues and failure to participate actively in party activities over long periods of time. Probation appears to be prescribed for failure to meet party standards of performance. Expulsion from the party is supposed to be used with the greatest caution, and is reserved for grave offenses such as defection, deliberate sabotage of party policies, and insubordi-

nation. Capital punishment is not one of the regular sanctions used by the party itself; however, a member who has committed a serious offense against the state can be put to death, after trial and appropriate action by the People's Courts and other governmental agencies.

In addition to the sanctions that can be applied against individual party members, there are also collective sanctions that can be applied to party organizations as a whole. The party constitution of 1945 prescribes four types of collective punishment: 1) reprimand; 2) partial reorganization of the "leading body" (standing committee or executive committee); 3) dismissal of members of the "leading body"; or 4) dissolution of the entire party organization and complete reregistration of membership.

A party organization is usually disciplined by the party committee two levels above it in the party hierarchy; the action is "approved" by a party committee three levels above. For example, the decision to punish a *hsien* party committee would be taken by a provincial party committee, with the approval of the regional party bureau. In practice, punishment often extends to party organizations above and below the offending organization. Thus, if a *hsien* party committee is found guilty of a violation of discipline and punished, the *ch'i* committees beneath it and the special district committee over it may also be forced to engage in "self-criticism" or some other official form of repentance.

In many respects, the most effective control wielded over the party membership consists of psychological pressures brought to bear on the individual to conform to rigid patterns of thought and behavior. In the party as a whole, this disciplinary process takes the form of an "intraparty struggle." For the individual party member it is expressed in the form of group meetings in which the sins and defects of members are discussed by the entire group.

The "interparty struggle," as defined by party theoretician Liu Shao-ch'i, is a relentless struggle between the party ideologies and other ideologies, and between party interests and the interests of the individual. Its aim is to eradicate all tendencies within the party that tend to weaken the monolithic unity of the party and to create an attitude of mind among party members that will subordinate personal interests to those of the party. Theoretically the struggle is over principles and not personalities, and is supposed to be conducted in a spirit of "correcting mistakes" and not in a spirit of vengeance. Party members are exhorted to report to higher authorities all mistakes committed by their colleagues. Theoretically a party member

may be criticized by both his superiors and by his subordinates, but in reality, criticism of superiors appears to be carefully channelled and often repressed.

This practice of "criticism and self-criticism"—a continuous process within the party ranks—is viewed as one of the most characteristic features of the CCP and is constantly cited as one of the essential elements of "democracy" within the party.

In addition to the "normal" process of ideological discipline, the party from time to time inaugurates special reform programs aimed at raising general levels of performance, "consolidating" the party organization by purging those members who fail to measure up to the party's standards, strengthening the party unity, and making the membership more responsive to central direction.

(7) Party Reform and Party Purge - Periodic programs of party reform, often referred to as "ideological rectification" movements, are the equivalent for the party organization as a whole of self-criticism for the individual member. In contrast to the Soviet "blood purges," these reforms have emphasized the psychological approach; however they have made up in scope and intensity what they have lacked in ~~violence~~ violence. The reluctance of CCP leaders to carry out sweeping purges may be due in part to the urgent and constantly expanding need for trained party cadres.

Party reform movements seem to take place at critical points in the party's history. Each movement seems to be aimed at stiffening the moral fibre of the party by eradicating some ~~particular~~ particular defect in the party's operations and disciplining discipline. Since 1940 there have been ~~at least~~ at least five major reform movements - two predated the party's rise to national power and three have followed it. The first reform, launched in 1942 was aimed at the eradication of "dogmatic" tendencies among ~~the~~ the higher and middle echelons of the party; the second (1947-48) was directed primarily against "rightist" tendencies among rural cadres engaged in land reform. The third reform, launched officially in June 1950, followed closely on the party's rapid expansion of membership and

on the pa

(3)

and the shift of the party's base to the urban areas. It was aimed in part at eradicating certain defects in the work methods and outlook of the local cadres, including ~~harragaxx~~ "arrogance", "heroism" (selfish individualism) and "bureaucratic tendencies." This reform lasted until October 1950 and involved four stages: 1) the study of assigned documents, including reports by party leaders to the Central Committee; 2) the summarizing and review of past work and activities, with an eye to discovering mistakes; 3) ~~an~~ analysis of the current situation and of the ~~tasks~~ tasks ahead; 4) criticism and self-criticism.

In the course of the reform, special ad hoc committees were set up under the regular party committees to direct reform activities, and special instructors were trained by party committees at the higher levels. At the local levels party cadres were reformed through training classes set up by the hsien party committees. Higher level cadres attended "remoulding conferences" held under the auspices of the provincial and regional party organizations.

which

The fourth party reform, which was completed in the spring of 1954, was launched at a national conference on party organization held in March 1951. This reform movement was ostensibly designed to consolidate the party branches, to raise the general quality of party membership, and to strengthen the party organization as a whole for the forthcoming ~~tasks~~ tasks of industrialization. Other underlying considerations probably prompting the reforms were: 1) a desire on the part of the party leadership to prevent the rank and file from relaxing; 2) a desire to discipline those party veterans who were showing signs of discontent and insubordination; and 3) a concern with growing corruption among the party membership and a general falling off of revolutionary zeal.

The specific aims and objectives of this reform program varied somewhat from time to time and from area to area. One of the basic aims was to familiarize the membership with the new and stricter standards of performance adopted in 1951 and then to appraise each member in terms of those standards. Members who fell hopelessly short of meeting the standards were expelled from the party; those, however, who evidenced a willingness to reform themselves were given a chance to do so. According to 1952 party directives the reforms were also aimed at eradicating corruption and "rightist" deviations (such as usury and exploitation), improving party control over rural organizations, and ~~x~~ giving the rural party cadres a better understanding of Communist policies and objectives.

X According to official Communist statements, this reform movement passed through four major stages. In the first stage—preparation and mobilization—party reform cadres were trained through conducting "experimental" reforms in key areas, and reports in the Communist press during December 1951 indicated that experimental reforms in two or three large cities had resulted in the ~~disqualification~~ <sup>disqualification</sup> of 8% to 10% of party members. By early 1953 the preparation and mobilization stage had been completed in

34

most areas. ~~Following~~ This initial phase was followed by a "study" stage, in which party members received indoctrination on party objectives and goals and were expected to study assigned works on Communist theory and policy. The third stage was one of "reregistration," in which each party member made a detailed ~~statement~~ <sup>account</sup> of his political and social background and decided for himself whether he felt qualified to continue as a party member. The fourth and probably the most important phase was one of "appraisal," and it was centered in the party branch. The past history and performance of each party member was discussed individually by the branch meeting. Then, under the direction of specially assigned party reform cadres, the branch prepared a written report on each member, including recommendations for disciplinary action if needed. This report ~~is~~ was forwarded to a higher party committee, which decided whether or not the party member shall remain in good standing. These appraisals were supposed to be conducted in accordance with the higher standards of performance adopted in March 1951.

During the period from January 1952 to June 1952, the party reform movement was closely integrated with the so-called "Three Anti" movement, which was aimed at eradicating corruption, waste and red-tape from the ranks of the governmental ~~bureaux~~ bureaucracy. The "Three Anti" movement, which was directed by a national committee headed by party leader Po I-po, resulted in the expulsion or demotion of a fairly large number of party members holding middle-ranking positions in government and with about 10 to 15 years of service. Only about half the defendants were accused of "corruption." Other alleged crimes included insubordination, sabotage of party policies, nepotism, suppression of criticism from lower levels, empire-~~building~~ building, and "bourgeois decadence" (soft living).

Because of the paucity of available information, it is difficult accurately to gauge the effect of the "Three Anti" movement on the party organization. The number of party members actually expelled from the party appears to have been well under 5% of the total party membership, and perhaps as low as 1% or 2%. However, the sternness with which the reforms were conducted arrarently caused a considerable loss of morale among lower- and middle-ranking party bureaucrats. Information from fairly reliable sources has indicated that there was an epidemic of suicides among party members in certain areas of South China during the early part of 1952. Many party members have tried to avoid being assigned to responsible positions in government, ~~in~~ lest they become vulnerable to attack. The reforms may also have created a general inertia and apathy among the lower levels of the party, especially in urban areas.

As the "Three Anti" movement drew to a close after June 1952, the party reform campaign was increasingly oriented toward the party's national economic planning program and the development of precollective types of rural organization. An important editorial in the party press in July 1952 stated that "the work of consolidating the party must go hand in hand with the basic construction work of the state, and in

24A

particular with construction work centered on industrialization...." In September 1952 party organizations at the regional level issued directives stressing the need for ~~★~~ "strengthening party leadership in various fields of national construction and urging party members to master technical skills and industrial management procedures."

From about October or November of 1952, the tempo of party reform activity apparently increased, especially in rural areas. Official reports indicated that "a general adjustment of Party organization and of the ideological levels of Party members" was launched among rural ground-level organizations of the party in November 1952, and stated ~~xxx~~ that this had the result of "pushing the rural economy along the path of collectivization." Subsequent reports indicated that party reforms in rural areas of Northeast China would be completed by the spring of 1953. In January 1953 it was officially announced that the "streamlining" of party organizations in the northeast had been virtually completed in rural areas. In February it was announced that party organizations in North and Northwest China had "completed the first stages of party reform" and were starting on the second stage.

An important report by An Tzu-wen, Deputy Director of the Party Organization Department, released in February 1953, stated that party reform had been completed in 40,000 out of a total of 180,000 rural party organizations in China. Results to date, said An, indicated that about 90% of the total party membership measured up to standards set by the party leadership. Of the 10% who did not measure up, about 3% to 5% or less than 1% of the total party membership, had been expelled from the party as "undesirable elements." The remainder had withdrawn on the grounds that they had become "passive" or "backward".

25

Not long after the general line for transition to socialism had been announced the Central Committee of the CCP launched a Party Unity ~~drive~~ drive (February 1954

(the Party Unity drive)

The fourth and current ~~party~~ reform movement was launched at a Central Committee meeting in February 1954. The stated purpose of this drive

The fourth and current reform movement, the Party Unity Drive, was launched at a Central Committee meeting in February 1954. The general line for transition to socialism had been opposed by KAO Kang, head of the State Planning Commission, and other leading cadres who apparently split from the party ~~xxx~~ center's program of gradual transition. The Party Unity drive was aimed at eliminating <sup>what was described as</sup> this "despicable bourgeois individualism" although KAO Kang and his supporters were not announced as the offenders until March 1955. LIU Shao-chi ~~stressed~~ stressed the need for absolute conformity during the "official historical stage of ~~socialist~~ socialist transformation," and issued a stern admonition to those who "regard the region or department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent kingdom." The Communist press followed up with continual attacks of "local nationalism, unprincipled disputes and controversies over personal aims," all of which were regarded as serious threats to party unity. ~~These~~

At the National Conference of the CCP in March of this year KAO Kang and JAO Shu-shih, who had been director of the Organization Department, were identified as ~~the~~ the leaders of an "anti-party faction which undermined party solidarity and the resolutions of the National Conference provided for the establishment of unity." Central and local control committees, probably organized along the lines of to replace the Soviet model, ~~replaced~~ replaced the discipline inspection committees which were "no longer suited to the task of strengthening party discipline in new era of class struggle." Party organizations at all levels were directed to ferret out the "tendencies ~~xxxxxx~~ toward personal dictatorship and ~~fragmentation~~ fragmentation which undermine the principle of collective leadership."

~~Just prior to the announcement that of the KAO Kang purge, the Communists began launched a nationwide campaign against HU Feng and his "counter-revolutionary clique." In the autumn of 1954, HU Feng a Marxist writer, though not a member of the CCP, had made a vehement attack on communist exploitation of literature for political purposes, in a speech before a large gathering of leading literary figures. Many observers feel that the timing of the ~~drive~~ drive against counter-revolutionaries was a deliberate attempt by the CCP to propagandize the "sharpening of the class struggle" by some means other than a detailed and embarrassing expose of the KAO Kang-JAO Shu-shih "anti party alliance." ~~He was accused of directing a group of "factionists" to infiltrate the party and overthrow its leadership.~~ HU's crimes were <sup>described as being</sup> much broader in scope than those of~~

26

a universal and thorough educational program in government units, people's organizations, army units, schools, cooperatives and among the great masses of the urban and rural people. A Pravda/Peking dispatch of 12 June 1955 is even more revealing as to the targets for this educational program: "Existing evidence indicates that HU Feng's followers worked their way into certain state institutions, military agencies, cultural-enlightenment organizations, publishing houses, magazines and newspapers, economic agencies and the administrative bodies of public organizations such as the trade unions and the New Democracy Youth League. Official statistics reveal the intensity of ~~this program~~ <sup>this drive</sup> and its effect on those who were beyond reformation; from January 1954 to May 1955 the People's Courts had heard 364,604 cases involving counter-revolutionaries.

Why is it that ever since the CCP seized power in 1949 China has been in the grip of a series of nationwide drives to eliminate anti-Communist opposition? Is it because the Communist system itself does not admit of tranquility and that consequently the fine edge must be maintained even after the opposition has been eliminated or have the Communists failed to achieve the unity for which they have been given credit? Their own explanation for the frequency and intensity ~~for~~ of the reform movements is typically Communist: Since the goal of the present program is extinction of all who oppose socialist construction, violent reaction is inevitable; during this critical phase of development, the class struggle, far from abating, becomes even more intense. <sup>The problem is further complicated by the fact that ~~the Communists regard~~ counter-revolutionaries such as KAO Kang and HU Feng, ~~as~~ <sup>Communists' position</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~actually~~ agents of the imperialist aggressors. From an analysis of the ~~Communist position~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ obvious that regardless of whether or not they encounter any opposition to ~~this~~ <sup>their</sup> program, they intend to keep the pressure on the masses; the reform, in all its ~~devious~~ <sup>multifarious</sup> manifestations has become an essential ingredient of their system. ~~is~~</sup>

27

Section II: The Ideal Party Member: (~~to be inserted between sections I and II~~)

The articles which are included below <sup>were extracted from speeches which</sup> were written in 1939 by Politburo members Ch'en Yun and Liu Shao-chi. These articles appear here as they were translated from Cheng-feng wen-hsien (Documents on the correction of unorthodox tendencies) pp 67-82 and 83-121; edited by Chieh-fang she (The Emancipation News Agency), Yenan; published by Hsin-hua shu-tien (New China Book Company), Shansi-Chahar-Hopei branch, Kalgan, March 1946, 297 pp. (Harvard-Yenching Library); and reprinted in the Documentary History of Chinese Communism, by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, with commentaries by these three writers.

1. How to be a Communist Party Member, Ch'en Yun
2. On the Training of a Communist Party Member, Liu Shao-chi

p. 318  
344Section III: Indoctrination of Cadres: (~~to be inserted between II and III~~)

This article is presented here as it appears in Chapter III of Richard Walker's China Under Communism: The First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, under the title of Psychological Control. The description of the cadre training process which follows is based 1) interviews with 17 refugees who had actually been through the process (conducted in Hong Kong during the summer of 1952); 2) a general survey of Western and Chinese literature on the subject; and 3) a study of CPC documents.

p. 50-76

~~Section II~~

I. ~~Personnel~~ Party <sup>Personnel</sup> Composition and Policies

(Insert H) before II.  
Using different face

Article to be taken out  
a Doc Hist of China Com  
pages 318 - 344

IV. The Ideal Party member

III. Indoctrination of cadres.

Insert before III  
Using different face  
article to be taken out of  
China Under Com  
50 thru 76

kill footnotes

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6  
*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

11