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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Aid

COMMUNISM

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

July 1954 **Copy No. 1**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	ix
PART ONE. THE COMINTERN: A MODEL FOR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR AFFILIATES	
Section I. Introduction	1
1. Master Plan for Exploitation	1
2. Progressively Closer Soviet Intelligence Domination of Comintern	2
3. Direct Assumption of Control	3
4. Role of Foreign Section of the Central Committee, CPSU.	3
Section II. Soviet Information Procurement via Comintern Facilities	5
5. Information Acquired through Comintern Org Department Activity	5
6. International Liaison Department (OMS): Its Acquisition of Information	5
7. Information (or Intelligence) Department	6
8. Press Section	6
9. Intelligence Procured through Comintern Auxiliary Organizations	6
10. Reporting Done by Special Comintern "Reps" and Observers	7
11. Party Intelligence Apparats of the Comintern Period	7
12. Whittaker Chambers' "Special Apparatus" and Its Base	8
13. Silvermaster-Perlo Groups	9
14. Channeling of Comintern Information to Soviet Intelligence Agencies	10
Section III. The Comintern: A Recruitment and Training Base for Soviet Intelligence	11
15. Comintern Schools: Personnel Bases for Soviet IS	11
16. Clandestine Action Departments of the Comintern: Recruitment Bases for Soviet Intelligence	12
17. Transfer from Comintern Org Department to a Soviet IS	12
18. Recruitment from Comintern OMS	13
19. Comintern Auxiliary Organizations as Recruitment Bases	13
20. International Brigade: Manpower for Soviet Intelligence	13

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Page

Section III. (continued)

21. Young Communist International (YCI) 14
22. International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) 15
23. Comintern Files: An Aid for Soviet IS Recruitment ... 15
24. Recruitment from Early Established Party Apparats 16

Section IV. Comintern Operational and Technical Support for Soviet Intelligence 17

25. Source of Documentation: The International Brigade .. 17
26. The ISH/OMS Passport Offices 17
27. Duplication of Comintern Delegates' Passports 17
28. Cover Provided by Comintern Auxiliary Organization ... 18
29. Transfer of Comintern Cover Firms 18
30. Comintern Communications Support for Soviet Intelligence 18
31. Provision of Meeting Places 19
32. Supply of Safe Houses 19
33. Sabotage Support: ISH Facilities and Personnel 19
34. Concluding Remarks about Soviet Intelligence Use of Comintern 20

PART TWO. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES IN THE EXPLOITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR PERIOD

Section V. Methods of Soviet Control Over the Espionage Potential 25

35. CPSU Controls Facilitate Intelligence Exploitation ... 25
36. Soviet Intelligence Role in the Development of Illegal Apparats 25
37. Covert Liaison System for Foreign Communist Party Control 25
38. Soviet Domination of the International Fronts: An Aid to Soviet Espionage 25
39. More Discreet Use of the International Fronts by Soviet Intelligence 26
40. Soviet Intelligence-Communist Party Liaison 26
41. Covert Liaison Work Allegedly Now Done by Soviet State Security 27
42. Security Accorded to Clandestine Liaison with the Parties 27
43. Party Liaison Agents 28
44. Statements of Defectors about Soviet Liaison Agents .. 28
45. Tasks of the Party Liaison Agent 29

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Page

Section VI. (continued)

67. Front Organizations: Instruments for Information Procurement 53
68. The International Front Organizations: Their Intelligence Import 54

a. World Federation of Trade Unions 54
b. The International Federation of Resistants, Victims, and Prisoners of Fascism (FIR) 55
c. World Peace Movement 55

69. National Front Organizations: Their Uses for Soviet Intelligence 56

a. Story of an American Communist Active in Front Organizations 56

(1) National Department for Work Among Scientists and Technicians 56
(2) The FAECT 56
(3) Scherer's Connections with Other Front Groups 57

b. "Scientific" Front Organizations 58
c. The Canadian Association of Scientific Workers ... 59

Section VII. The National Communist Parties and Their Auxiliary Organizations as Soviet Recruitment and Training Bases 61

70. Soviet Recruitment in the Communist Parties: Statements of Defectors 61
71. Front Organizations as Recruitment Bases 62
72. Study and Professional Groups 63
73. Talent Spotting 64
74. Vetting 65
75. The Approach 66
76. Test Period for Recruits for a Soviet Professional Network 66
77. Soviet Security Precautions in the Employment of Communists for Espionage 67
78. Present Restrictions and Security Precautions in the Recruitment of Non-Orbit Party Members 68
79. Current Restrictions in Soviet IS Use of Front Organization Members 69

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Page

Section V. (continued)

46. Organization Secretary Posts Held by Party Liaison Agents 30
47. Control Commission Posts Held by Party Liaison Agents . 31
48. Communist Party Parliamentarians 31
49. Party Newspaper Jobs 32
50. Leader of the Party Underground Section 32
51. Secretary General Posts 33
52. Leading Positions in National Front Organizations 33
53. No Regular Pattern for Soviet IS Use of Party Posts ... 34
54. Cut-Outs Between the Soviet Legal or Illegal Resident Agents and the Party Liaison Agent 34
55. Financial Provisions for Party Liaison Agents 35

Section VI. The Communist Parties: Auxiliary Soviet Information Procurement Agencies 37

56. Semiovert Methods of Information Procurement 37
57. Automatic Reporting of Information to Party 38
58. Specific Party Directives for Information Procurement . 38
59. Information Procurement and Party Propaganda Closely Correlated 39
60. Party and Front Organization "Research" Sections 40
61. Worker Correspondents 40
62. Communist Party Covert Methods of Information Procurement 42
63. Illegal Apparats Formed as Required 42
64. Apparats Frequently of More Than One Level 43
65. General Characteristics of Party Intelligence Apparats . 43
66. Intelligence Apparats of Various National Communist Parties 44

a. Labour-Progressive Party of Canada 44

(1) Ottawa-Toronto Group 45
(2) Apparats Organized by Fred Rose 46

b. Wartime Apparat in California 48
c. Norwegian Communist Party 48
d. Pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste 49
e. Greek Communist Party 50
f. Philippine Communist Party 51
g. French Communist Party (Post-World War II) 51
h. Tudeh Party 53

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Page

Section VIII. General Operational and Technical Support Furnished by the Communist Parties 71

80. Provision of Documentation 71
81. Party Assistance in Cover Arrangements: Business Cover 73
82. Front Organization Buildings as Meeting Places 73
83. Provision of Safe Houses and Other Accommodations 74
84. Party-Supplied Emergency Communications: Courier Service 74
85. Emergency Communications: Communist Party Radio Transmissions 75
86. Emergency Funds Supplied by a Communist Party 75
87. Communist Party Operational Support for Soviet Intelligence 76
88. Party or Front Organization Support for Soviet Sabotage Operations 77
89. Communist Party Support for Liquidation Mission 77

Section IX. Role of Satellite Intelligence Services Vis-a-vis Non-Orbit Communist Parties 79

90. Satellite Contacts in Non-Orbit Parties 79
91. Mutual Assistance Between Non-Orbit Parties and Satellite Intelligence Services 79
92. Satellite Services: Possible Indirect Soviet Intelligence Channels to Non-Orbit Communist Parties 80
93. Schools in the Satellites: Recruitment Bases for Satellite Intelligence Services 81

Section X. Soviet Intelligence Financial Contributions to Foreign Communist Parties 83

94. Factors Determining Soviet Intelligence Subsidization of Parties 83
95. Soviet Financing of Foreign Communist Parties 83
96. Vague Sources of Income Listed in Party Finance Reports 83

Section XI. Conclusions 85

APPENDICES.

A. The Soviet Intelligence Services 89
B. Early Established Party Apparats 93
C. The Comintern Schools 97

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 105

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Comintern organization, its national sections and international and national affiliates, the Soviets have had a well-conceived plan for effectively utilizing the entire body to promote their intelligence work. This plan has been carried out--with modification--to the present.

Each of the secret organizational units of the Comintern served Soviet espionage in multiple ways. In the main, however, the Comintern and its subsidiary organizations supported Soviet intelligence effort in three major aspects: (1) by serving as auxiliary information procurement agencies, acquiring information through overt and covert penetration systems; (2) by serving as recruitment and training bases for operatives who were eventually transferred to a professional Soviet network; (3) as sources of technical and operational support, such as documentation, safe houses and other facilities, operational information, assistance in liquidations, sabotage missions, etc.

b. Post-Comintern Auxiliary Agencies for Soviet Intelligence Services. Since the dissolution of the Comintern, the Soviet government has had four major auxiliary agencies or instruments which it has exploited for information procurement abroad: (a) the national (foreign) Communist Parties; (b) the national Communist-front organizations; (c) the international front organizations; and (d) the Satellite intelligence services, with their similar--sometimes parallel--links to non-Orbit Communist Parties and front organizations. Following the pattern of exploitation established during the Comintern period, these auxiliary agencies have supported Soviet intelligence in the three principal aspects outlined in the preceding paragraph. Modifications in the employment of foreign Communist personnel and facilities which have become necessary, mostly because of Soviet security considerations, will be discussed later.

c. The Role of the Soviet Intelligence Services as Liaison Channels for Moscow Political Directives and Secret Funds. It is an established fact that there was a close working relationship between the Comintern and the Soviet intelligence services. After the dissolution of the Comintern apparatus and the absorption of its clandestine communication components by a Soviet intelligence service, the function of directing and supporting the International Communist Movement was vested in the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[2] Recent information shows that the Foreign Section and the Praesidium of the CPSU have been using the services of Soviet State Security in order to conduct conspiratorial business with the

[2] The subject of the international control mechanism developed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be discussed in a separate paper.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

INTRODUCTION

Support for the promotion of Soviet policy, as it was to be provided by Communists the world over, was envisioned by Bolshevik leaders at an early date. In the Statutes and Conditions of Admission to the Comintern, organizational provision for foreign Communist assistance for the Soviet Union was made. Of particular significance to the Soviet intelligence program, an indispensable tool for the furtherance of Soviet aims, were Lenin's stipulations that the affiliated Parties must combine legal and illegal work, that units must be formed within each national Party to carry out the secret or illegal duties, and that illegal sections must have superior authority to the legal sections.

With Stalin's requirement, expressed in 1928, that the foreign national Communist Parties for a time were to forego preparations for world revolution and devote themselves to the defense of the one country of Communism, the order of precedence for Party activity became: Illegal work over the legal, with activity for a Soviet service having priority over all else. The Soviet intelligence services have taken full advantage of these postulates.

In accordance with Lenin's orders, there has always been a combination of legal and illegal work, and the two types of activity have been closely correlated. Soviet and the supporting Communist Party intelligence operations, for example, have been connected systematically with the Soviet political and propaganda program.

In 1952 or 1953, Soviet State Security functionaries abroad received a circular directive requesting them to collect information about points of difference between the United States and Great Britain. An undetermined amount of the product appears to have been used subsequently in Soviet and Communist publications, which speak, for example, of the "increasing obvious economic contradictions between them /the United States and Great Britain/, which in no small measure are linked with America's tough line of restricting the trade of the West European countries."[1]

a. The Comintern and Its Affiliates: Blueprints for Exploitation of International Communism. Soviet exploitation of the international Communist Movement for espionage purposes did not, therefore, evolve haphazardly or incidentally. Based on their methods of utilizing the

[1] For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, 29 May 1953, p. 2, quoting an article from Pravda of 24 May 1953.

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It is not known exactly how or by whom the Party liaison agent is selected. In one case the Party liaison agent of Soviet State Security was not selected by the legal resident agent in the country of operation. There are many indications that selection is effected by an undetermined Soviet agency during a period of training the Party member has previously had in the Soviet Union. Presently, in one known case, the Party liaison agent is used to conduct all the necessary covert business with Soviet State Security. He receives Soviet funds, instructions, and intelligence requirements and also provides information from Party operatives and/or Party intelligence apparats. He gives whatever operational support he is in a position to supply, and spots and checks prospective agents. When requested, however, the Party liaison agent, at least in the past, has organized or utilized secret Party penetration apparats and has directed these in operations against specific Soviet intelligence targets.

Exposed cases of Communist Party penetration work carried out for the Soviets have shown that the following Party positions are the ones frequently held by a Party liaison agent: Organization Secretary (on the national or regional level), Control Committee member, Party parliamentarian, Party newswriter or editor, and Party underground chief. There are at least two known cases where the Secretary General has been a Party liaison agent, but generally a less elevated Party office apparently is preferred. Also, a leading position in a front organization may be held by a Communist who concurrently is active for this unit and a Soviet intelligence service.

Recent Soviet defectors, as well as some who defected at a much earlier date, have described the secrecy in which the post of Party liaison agent (or contact, etc.) is held. Leon Trotsky, shortly before his assassination, wrote:

> "In every country where the local Communist Party is affiliated to the Comintern, the Party's Central Committee contains a responsible leader of the GPU. Generally the fact of his being a representative of the GPU is known only to the secretary of the Party and to one or two members of the Central Committee."[4]

e. Security Measures Now Observed in Liaison With the Non-Orbit Parties. In at least one non-Orbit country, any information pertaining to the covert contact with the local Communist Party is classified by Soviet State Security as top-secret information. Only the chief legal resident agent is knowledgeable of all facts relating to covert dealings

[4] Gen. Leandro A. Sanchez Salazar and Julian Gorkin, Murder in Mexico, p. 28.

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Communist Parties, e.g., transmit directives and funds, receive communications from the local Communist Party for transmission to Moscow, etc.

One knowledgeable source states that this liaison function was exclusively charged to Soviet State Security in or about 1951, when it was taken away from Soviet Military Intelligence. It is too early to say whether or not this single, exclusive liaison channel to local Communist Parties actually operates in every country at present. It is possible that the Foreign Section of the Central Committee, CPSU, may have parallel and special channels into the Communist Parties; therefore, it is not known how many covert links there are at present for any given Communist Party with Soviet services. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to show that Soviet State Security plays an important role as a liaison channel for the CPSU, and is not only concerned with the intelligence exploitation of Communist Parties but also with the conduct of clandestine political business originally charged to the Comintern apparatus.

d. Party Liaison Agents or Contacts. The Soviet legal resident agents in non-Orbit countries have sometimes worked through highly trusted Party members--to be called "Party liaison agents" indiscriminately throughout this study for purposes of simplification--who simultaneously are Communist Party (or national front organization) functionaries and act as agents for Soviet intelligence in that they provide any assistance possible for the Soviet service with which they have contact.[3] These may or may not have a formal affiliation with a Soviet intelligence service. In the past, both major Soviet intelligence services have been known to work through Party liaison agents in the employment of Party personnel and facilities.

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3 According to one defector, it is the policy of Soviet State Security to keep an illegal resident agent out of any business which would involve contact with the Communist Party. There are two principal reasons, however, to believe that his statement may not be generally applicable: (a) Another recent defector has related that presently there are special secret Party cells in one Western country which are responsible for giving any assistance possible to deep-cover Soviet agents. Obviously this indicates a covert contact between Party and Soviet professional intelligence personnel; (b) In the past, Party personnel performing secret work have had contact with Soviet illegal resident agents: J. Peters of the underground section of the Communist Party of the United States had direct contact for over a year with Hede Massing, professional Soviet agent. Whittaker Chambers, who served as the Party liaison agent even though he was on a Soviet payroll, had contact only with illegal Soviet resident agents. It is probable that local conditions and security considerations will be the determining factors in permitting an illegal resident agent to maintain contact with Communist Party elements.

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headquarters or in a Party newspaper or "research" office, constitutes secret intelligence information. In some countries where the Party and front organizations have reached mass proportions, automatic reporting and worker correspondence systems involve great numbers of informants--working at every level of the administrative, industrial, scientific, and military organizations--who contribute quantities of information to the Party. Any significant information culled from these "mass" reporting systems becomes available to the Soviet intelligence services through the Party liaison agents. Thus, the penetration of nearly every phase of human endeavor which a Communist Party has been able to carry out in any given country has been its most significant asset for Soviet intelligence.

g. Communist Party Intelligence Apparats. At present it is not known whether or not every non-Orbit Communist Party has formed an illegal apparat capable of performing espionage. It is known that several national Communist Parties have these--some of them are very loosely formed and hinge largely on a few trusted, key Party functionaries, while others are more professionally organized and operated.

Because of recent restrictions placed on the Soviet Intelligence Services concerning the employment of Communist Party members as sources for professional Soviet networks, it is probable that there will be a greater tendency--wherever it is desired to utilize Party members for Soviet intelligence--to use such persons as members of Party apparats and contact them only through the Party liaison agent. In this way, definite knowledge of Soviet interest in the intelligence target can be restricted to one or two key Party functionaries.

h. Tightening of Regulations Concerning Use of Communists for Soviet IS. The employment of Communist Party members as "sources" (agents) for professional Soviet espionage networks has been considered by the Soviet intelligence services under two aspects (a) whether the Communist Party member has access to vital information, and (b) whether it is secure to recruit him. The latter problem has become increasingly important to the Soviet intelligence services as their espionage operations have been exposed and as the alertness of the public and security services to the Communist threat in the free world has been increased. The practices of the Soviet intelligence services in employing Communist Party members fluctuate therefore between need for information and need for security.

Since at least the middle 1930's, Soviet agents have been instructed not to use Communist Party personnel and facilities. Traditionally, these directives have often been circumvented: Permission has been sought from Moscow to use a well-placed Communist, or one who had contacts in positions to procure information, and the request has been approved in Moscow--presumably because of the lack of alternative sources.

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with the Party. Other State Security staff personnel in that country are not even aware of the identity of the Party member serving as the liaison agent. Particularly sensitive information procured by the Party intelligence apparat in that country is apparently seen only by the highest ranking Soviet State Security officer, and by no one else on his staff. All enciphering and deciphering of messages sent to or received from Moscow and relating to business with the local Party is done by the chief legal resident agent himself. (See paragraph 78 for further information concerning present security practices pertaining to contact with and use of foreign Communist Parties.)

f. Ability to Penetrate: The Greatest Asset of the Auxiliary Agencies. The Parties' and front organizations' most valuable asset for Soviet intelligence has been their ability to effect overt or covert penetration into points where there is vital information. Covert penetrations may lead into: (a) governmental departments responsible for formulating policy--Alger Hiss and other Communist agents in key positions in the United States government, it will be remembered, were members of "special" Party apparats drawn from larger secret Party groups in Washington; (b) military installations and ammunition production plants--Prof. Raymond Boyer and others involved in Soviet operations exposed by Igor Gouzenko in Canada were participants in covert Party apparats contributing information pertaining to these targets, and more recently Per Danielsen, Asbjoern Sunde, and other Norwegian Communists have been members of secret Party apparats penetrating similar objectives; (c) industrial and scientific centers--J. Peters, former chief of the underground section of the Communist Party of the United States, had secret apparats in airplane factories, naval construction plants, etc. There are many known cases of Party penetration operations working against Soviet intelligence targets.

In addition to covert Party penetrations, a substantial amount of information is collected by penetration carried out by semiovert systems of information procurement: (1) the Party requires that all members report automatically any information of interest to the Party; this results in a large amount of reporting which is channeled to Party headquarters through cell, district, and regional secretaries along with other routine Party reports; much of this "automatic" reporting may terminate in the Agit-Prop Secretary's Office; (2) the workers' or people's correspondence system, constantly being expanded and now in use by both the Parties and the front organizations, provides opportunity for selected, qualified workers--Party members or sympathizers--who (at least theoretically) have special aptitude for observation and who are well informed about the Party's political policy, to report about activities in their places of employment.

These two systems of reporting sometimes result in the procurement of information which, when assembled at Party or a front organization

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In the past, security precautions affecting the Communist Party-Soviet Intelligence relationship have been variable: extremely strict regulations have applied in countries where the Party was under a certain amount of suppression or completely underground; less rigid security measures have prevailed where the Communist Party has enjoyed the same amount of freedom as that accorded to other political parties in the country.

The defection of Igor Gouzenko, former code clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, the revelations about Soviet intelligence practices made at the time of the Elizabeth Bentley defection, and the Alger Hiss trials have all undoubtedly contributed to Soviet awareness for the need of more secure methods in using foreign Communists.

It is possible that the reported transfer in 1951 of a large part (and possibly all) of the responsibility for covert liaison with the foreign Communist Parties from Soviet Military Intelligence to Soviet State Security may have been prompted by security considerations.[5] One source strongly believes that the transfer to Soviet State Security of this function was worldwide in application. The transfer allegedly took place due to the need for (1) skillful handling of the covert contact with foreign Communist Parties and (2) "to increase the scope and effectiveness" of foreign Communist Party activity. Implied in the latter is very likely the intent to exploit more effectively the intelligence potential of the foreign Communist Parties--particularly of their underground or secret sections. In both 1952 and 1953--that is, after the reported transfer of responsibility for covert liaison work to Soviet State Security--there has been unprecedented emphasis on restrictions concerning the contact with, and the use of, Communist Party personnel.

Recent information indicates that the employment of a Communist Party member must be cleared with the Central Committee of the CPSU in addition to the normal operational clearance to be granted by the Soviet intelligence service. Presumably, the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU has the authority to issue such a clearance. In important or especially sensitive cases, a higher authority in the Central Committee may be responsible for issuing an operational clearance.

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5 In at least one known instance, the transfer to Soviet State Security of covert contact with the foreign Communist Parties had been effected by the summer of 1951. It is possibly worth noting that this change occurred shortly after the involvement of the Norwegian Communist Party in the procurement of military and naval data for Soviet intelligence officers became generally known through the Per Danielsen case, exposed in April 1951.

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The employment of members of front organizations appears to be less restricted. According to acceptable information, no special clearance is needed from the Central Committee for their use. However, the field operatives of a Soviet intelligence service will usually weigh security risks involved in the recruitment of such individuals against the significance of the information which may be obtained, and will not overlook the fact that membership in a Communist front organization may make the prospective recruit suspect to local security services.

In view of the current Soviet stress on security and constant fear of hostile penetration, to which the Communist Parties are particularly vulnerable, it may be that the Soviet intelligence services now prefer that Communist Parties establish their own espionage apparats, from which the Soviets can obtain the intelligence product. It should be remembered, however, that the Soviets are practical operators, and that the extent to which they will use Communists for their networks will be determined in each case by the local political and operational climate.

i. Front Organizations: Their General Uses for Soviet Intelligence. Soviet intelligence exploitation of the International Communist Movement includes utilization of the national and international front organizations. Just as the Party itself is used as a means of performing legal and illegal work, it is the practice of Communist fractions controlling the front organizations to use these bodies for both legal and illegal purposes.

j. Front Organizations: A Means of Penetration and Intelligence Procurement. Some of the fronts appear to have been founded at Soviet instigation as a means of infiltrating military and certain professional groups (engineers, scientists, etc.). [redacted] has been an example of a front organization possibly founded at Soviet direction (through the efforts of an American Communist who probably has been a liaison agent [redacted] and has had as one of its major purposes the acquisition of data from persons in these professions.

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While the primary purpose of the front organizations is to serve as transmission belts for Soviet propaganda, an essential corollary activity is the collection of information. The greater part of this is undoubtedly used to support the political work carried out by these organizations; nevertheless, a certain amount of it is known to come within the category of intelligence information which is of value in furthering Soviet and international Communist military, political, and economic aims.

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For instance, at least one national affiliate of the World Peace Council (WPC) allegedly has made detailed studies of Western military preparations in one country; additionally, the WPC secretariat requested daily submission of confidential political reports from a national affiliate at the time of the Tenth Inter-American Conference; the WPC was the reported sponsor of the Moscow Economic Conference and was the recipient of answers to exhaustive questionnaires issued at that time concerning business and industrial conditions in non-Orbit countries. The WPC has instructed at least one of its affiliates to collect biographic information on persons of professional and intellectual groups. Specific intelligence roles of certain of the other international fronts have not as yet been determined.

The Soviets are endeavoring to keep the international front organizations free from implication in Soviet espionage, in order to maintain the fiction of their political independence. Soviet intelligence staff personnel reportedly are not assigned to the headquarters of these organizations. However, during international conferences and congresses they have attended under cover as Soviet newspaper or TASS correspondents in order to debrief and develop unwitting foreign Communist delegates. Besides exploitation of international fronts at the times of congresses, Soviet State Security has agents placed within offices of the national affiliates of these organizations, and within secretariats of the internationals as well.

An excellent point for the control of information is afforded by offices at the headquarters of the international fronts which prepare detailed surveys or studies concerning activities in non-Orbit countries. Such offices are set up either as central research bureaus, periodical offices, economic sections, departments for relations with national centers (as in the headquarters of the World Federation of Trade Unions), etc. These offices performing analytical and synthetical research and report writing are invariably under the control of a Soviet citizen representing a Soviet national affiliate. It can be assumed that reports compiled by these offices reach the interested headquarters of Soviet State Security, the Foreign Section of the Central Committee, CPSU, or any other customer in the Soviet Party-Government.

k. Front Organizations as Bases for Personnel. The front organizations are also exploited as a means of indoctrinating and developing for espionage purposes persons who are in influential positions or in places where they have access to intelligence information. In this way the Party and the Soviets are constantly replenishing their reservoir of intelligence manpower.

A written directive allegedly was transmitted to Soviet State Security staff personnel abroad in 1952 ordering that they refrain from recruiting persons "whose progressive activities were known to counter-intelligence." This obviously includes known sympathizers, as well

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as Party members, as potential recruits. Therefore in countries where it is difficult for Communists to operate, an effort is probably made for the immediate discovery of persons who are attracted to the front associations, who have an aptitude for espionage, and who are ideologically sympathetic to Communism. Such persons are probably now isolated at a very early stage from open front or Party activity and steered into a secret "study group," or "professional" or "pro" group--or whatever other name may be given to a secret Party cell whose function it is to indoctrinate new members who will eventually be assigned to do covert or illegal work.[6]

Secret "study groups" or secret Party cells thus form a second step in the process of recruiting people from the front associations and are organized by the Communist Parties to provide further ideological instruction; the groups are observed constantly by experienced Party leaders--sometimes by the Party liaison agents themselves--who prepare reports about the psychological and ideological development of the participants.

Some of these persons may remain in secret Party groups or "apparats" and independently, or as members of a small team, provide information to a Party liaison agent. Or, if required by a Soviet intelligence service, individuals recruited via a front organization and secret Party cell or "study group" may be transferred to a Soviet professional network and come under the direct control of a Soviet legal or illegal resident agent.

1. Front Organization Propaganda: An Aid for Soviet IS. Propaganda of the national and international fronts is often designed to counteract and nullify national laws concerning the safeguarding of classified information. For example, at every opportunity the World Federation of Scientific Workers and its affiliates declare themselves in favor of an extensive international exchange of scientists and technicians and of the communication of discoveries and working methods "for reasons of international peace."

In Canada, during the espionage trials of 1946, Prof. Raymond Boyer admitted on the witness stand that his Communist sympathies had influenced him to divulge secret information about explosives to Fred Rose (a Party liaison agent in the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada). Boyer admitted activity in several front organizations, including the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers, which he helped to establish.

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[6] Although occurring prior to 1952, this appeared to be taking place in the Communist career of Herbert Philbrick, according to experiences he has related in I Led Three Lives.

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Boyer stated that he felt it was "of tremendous importance that there should be a full exchange of information between Russia and Canada and the United States and England."[7] Thus, front organization propaganda has constituted an indirect but appreciable aid to Soviet intelligence by persuading scientists and other technical specialists that they contribute most to world peace by violating oaths of secrecy.

m. Counterintelligence Work for Soviets: Possibly Done by Party Apparats. In the Satellite areas, Soviet State Security recruitment of Communists for counterintelligence purposes is apparently standard procedure. One geographic desk in Soviet State Security has maintained dossiers containing derogatory information on the highest Party leadership (Politburo level), as well as on high government figures, in the Satellite area concerned. It is also reliably reported that Soviet State Security recruits agents in the headquarters of international front organizations (generally located behind the Iron Curtain) in order to report on Soviet and foreign personnel employed or active there.

In view of statements of recent defectors regarding restrictions now prevailing concerning the use of Communist Party members in non-Orbit countries, it seems unlikely that Soviet State Security--as a general practice--presently recruits Party members in the free world as professional Soviet agents for counterintelligence work in their own countries. There are many indications that Party security and counterintelligence work is now being stepped up on a global basis (as a logical, concomitant activity with the present united front policy) and that such activity is sometimes under the supervision of a unit forming one branch of the Party's intelligence apparat. Therefore, at the moment it seems probable that much counterintelligence work performed for Soviet State Security by Party operatives in non-Orbit countries is probably being done from within a Party apparat. It is known that one prominent member of a Party intelligence apparat has been directing work of this nature, and it is very probable that the Soviets ultimately benefit from the results.

n. Soviet Funding of Foreign Communist Parties. In the past the amount of Soviet financing of Party personnel involved in espionage depended on the requirements of the individuals involved. For instance, a note in Col. Zabotin's notebook concerning Sam Carr reads: "It is necessary occasionally to help financially." Soviet funds for Party intelligence work were apparently needed only in cases where personnel performing such assignments were mostly or entirely dependent on the Party for an income, or where they had to pay well-placed non-Party agents for the supply of information or other form of support.

[7] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 408.

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Party members active in secret apparats in Washington prior to and during World War II received U. S. Government salaries, and generally no Soviet funds were furnished them. Indeed, when attempts were made by the Soviet services to pay Party members in order to have stronger control over them, American Party operatives working only for ideological reasons were usually offended.

In the few known instances of recent transmittal of Soviet funds to non-Orbit Communist Parties, the amounts have far exceeded those which would be required for the exclusive financing of Party intelligence activity; hence it is obvious that the funds are intended for the Parties' general program--propaganda, front organization work, etc.--as well as the Parties' intelligence activities.

o. Satellite Intelligence Relations with Non-Orbit Communist Parties. Knowledge of this subject is limited, but a few facts have been uncovered. The Hungarian State Security Authority (AVH) has in a non-Orbit Communist Party liaison agents whom it uses for talent spotting and checking of prospective agents. It is believed that in this country there are parallel liaison systems, with both a Soviet service and the Hungarian AVH in touch with identical contacts in the non-Orbit Party. It appears that the Polish Security Service (UB) may have used similarly trusted contacts in another non-Orbit Communist Party.

p. Arrangements for Mutual Assistance. Between at least one Satellite Communist Party and one non-Orbit Communist Party (the Italian), there is reportedly a permanent program for mutual assistance, whereby the non-Orbit Party provides information for which it is reimbursed by the Satellite Party. The entire program is stated to be under the direction of an unspecified Soviet service--possibly Soviet State Security. Although there may be security deterrents to prevent the Soviets from farming out to the Satellite Parties and intelligence services general responsibility for funding non-Orbit Communist Parties, it seems probable that Satellite services in some Western countries may have less conspicuous contact with the local Communist Parties and therefore may be used by the Soviets to transmit funds as well as directives to these Parties.

q. Soviet IS Control over the Satellite Security and Intelligence Services. It is well established that the highest authorities in any East European Satellite security or intelligence service are the Soviet "advisers," who are found at various levels of the headquarters of the Satellite services and in some lower (regional) echelons as well. The term "adviser" is a misnomer, since these Soviet officials actually control the structure and operations of the Satellite services to which they are attached, thus keeping them subordinate to the Soviet Union. All information gathered by a Satellite service, both internally and abroad,

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is made available to the Soviet intelligence services through the Soviet advisers. Therefore, the Soviets have access to any intelligence information obtained by a Satellite from its contacts within a non-Orbit Communist Party.

r. Probable Employment of Non-Orbit Communist Parties against Present Soviet Objectives. At the moment, the priority target of the Soviet intelligence services is the war potential of the free world, particularly that of the United States, with emphasis on air warfare and technical and scientific developments. A directive dated June 1952 which was issued by the headquarters of a Soviet intelligence service ordered that operations be mounted against the Security Service of a non-Orbit country. In view of this directive, plus the fact that certain non-Orbit Communist Parties have had, since approximately 1950, organizational provision for counterintelligence activity, it seems possible that a general emphasis now is also given to this phase of Soviet (and Party) intelligence work.

Soviet intelligence directives of 1952 [redacted] show that 25X1X7
Soviet State Security intelligence officers [redacted]
were directed to refrain from recruiting known Communists or sympathizers as agents. Greater numbers of Soviet illegal resident agents were to be introduced [redacted] and an intensified effort was to be made to 25X1X7
recruit agents among persons of executive status in government, political, and other organizations who could supply valuable information.

In spite of these 1952 directives to Soviet intelligence officers [redacted] in view of the copious and consistent resort the 25X1X7
Soviets have made to foreign Communist Parties for assistance in the past, it can be assumed that wherever security considerations permit, the Soviets will utilize Communist Party and/or front organization facilities and personnel (particularly secret members and sympathizers) to further their intelligence effort. This study is intended to present a detailed description of Soviet intelligence techniques which have been utilized in the exploitation of Communist movements outside the Soviet Union.

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PART ONE

THE COMINTERN: A MODEL FOR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR AFFILIATES

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

SOVIET I.S. EXPLOITATION OF COMINTERN

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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

1. Master Plan for Exploitation. The Comintern, created at Soviet inspiration and under Soviet direction, established a pattern whereby the Soviet intelligence services could profitably exploit the Comintern organization itself and, in a similar manner, all its affiliated national sections (Communist Parties). Through preponderance of Soviet leadership in governing bodies of the Comintern Soviet domination was imposed to an ever increasing extent, until finally a Soviet intelligence service took over immediate direction of controlling sections of Comintern headquarters.[1]

Loyalty to an international ideal implanted by Marxist-Leninist teachings and strengthened by experience in an international revolutionary movement made the most devout Communists willing and effective instruments for Soviet agencies. Naturally, the most active and fanatic of these operatives were in positions of leadership within their respective parties and in the Comintern organization, where their services were always available to the Soviets. An assignment for a Soviet intelligence service always had priority over all else.

With the Soviets themselves--to an ever increasing degree--dominating the headquarters apparatus of the Comintern, and with key positions in each of the national sections under Comintern control (or under direct Soviet intelligence control), the worldwide movement became a vast auxiliary agency for the Soviet Party-Government. Having established undisputed though camouflaged control over the entire international structure, the Soviet intelligence services utilized the Comintern (and its national sections) as (1) an auxiliary information procurement service acquiring its product through both overt and covert methods; (2) a recruitment and training base; (3) for general operational support (e.g., as a source of documentation, of safe houses or other accommodations, for local assistance

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[1] This study is to deal primarily with Comintern and national Communist Party support--services and facilities--provided for Soviet intelligence. At the risk of oversimplification, since the emphasis is on the exploitation of the International Communist Movement, terminology for the Soviet services will be reduced to the fewest number of terms, and that service known variously as the State Political Directorate, Union State Political Directorate, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, etc., will be referred to throughout as "Soviet State Security." For a complete listing of the titles under which it has existed, see Appendix A. A summarized description of the headquarters sections of Soviet Military Intelligence--the other major Soviet intelligence service--is also given in Appendix A.

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in sabotage, for emergency communications or funds, for liquidations, or for any other missions undertaken by a Soviet intelligence service in foreign countries).

2. Progressively Closer Soviet Intelligence Domination of Comintern. Control over all Comintern activity was apparently maintained by the Soviets in the Secretariat, which appears throughout its history to have been headed by a Soviet national. For several years this position was held by Soviet citizen Ossip Piatnitsky, who served as chief of three departments of the Comintern engaged in clandestine work.

A former Comintern agent describing Comintern headquarters procedure in the spring of 1926 writes of Piatnitsky's Secretariat:

> "All activity in the Machavaya building revolves around the secretariat of Piatnitsky. According to the constitution of the Executive Committee, it has only organizational and technical functions to fulfill. It should be only an administrative organ within the Comintern. Actually, however, its activity profoundly influences the political functions of the Executive Committee.
>
> "Two or three times a week the diplomatic couriers of the Narko-mindel deliver the reports of the central committees of the various Comintern parties and sections. Every report or document arriving from abroad, even when it is addressed to one of the national representatives, first is routed through the secretariat. The same applies to every outgoing letter or report. It is difficult to imagine a more complete control than that exercised by the secretariat in regard to its members and collaborators."[2]

Piatnitsky's close relations with Soviet intelligence directors are discussed in paragraph 17 of this Handbook.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern dispatched special agents or representatives abroad, in addition to those sent out by the Org Department and by the OMS (the International Liaison Department); all these Comintern "reps" submitted independent reports about a national section's leaders and their activities, and actually directed the Parties or national sections. Gerhart Eisler, for example, was a Comintern

[2] Ypsilon, Pattern for World Revolution, pp. 108-109.

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representative (probably working directly under the Comintern's Executive Committee) who during his assignment in the United States controlled activities at the headquarters of the Party. Defected American Communists have described his absolute authority in matters of policy, for which directing committees of the Party were normally responsible.

3. Direct Soviet Assumption of Control. In the 1930's, Stalin, aware of strong opposition to his personal power, both among Comintern and national section personnel, took concrete measures to eliminate it. Elements of opposition to Stalin were accused of "Trotskyism" and ousted from Comintern and national section ranks.

Direct administration of Comintern units performing work mostly of a clandestine nature was placed in the hands of Soviet State Security. It is reported that in the summer of 1932 a high-ranking Soviet State Security official, Trilisser, was placed in the Praesidium of the Comintern's Executive Committee and that this Soviet agency took upon itself the "protection" of the Comintern.

The Organization Department of the Comintern was transformed into a Cadre Department, and under Soviet State Security supervision was charged with collecting curricula vitae of all Communists in key places in the national sections and in some of the auxiliary organizations. Central Committees of the German, French, British, Czech, and American Parties were ordered to establish similar cadre departments and to send copies of their files to the central Cadre Department in Moscow.[3]

Immediate direction over the Comintern International Liaison Department (OMS) does not appear to have been taken over outright until 1937, when Soviet State Security (actually GUGB, the successor of the Foreign Section of the OGPU), consolidated its administrative hold over the Comintern and took over the OMS.

4. Role of Foreign Section of the Central Committee, CPSU. The role of the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU, currently the organizational control point for the International Communist Movement, has not been clearly established for the Comintern Period.[4] It is possible that it existed as the specific CPSU control instrument over the Comintern, which was thoroughly dominated in its later period by the CPSU, a fact definitely confirmed by several defectors.

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[3] Ypsilon, Pattern for World Revolution, p. 235.

[4] A Study on the Foreign Section of the Central Committee, CPSU is presently in preparation.

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SECTION II. SOVIET INFORMATION PROCUREMENT VIA COMINTERN FACILITIES

As in the case of the national Communist Parties (as will be shown later) so with the Comintern, the ability of its operatives in countries throughout the world to penetrate Soviet intelligence targets was probably its most valuable form of assistance to the Soviet intelligence program. Additionally, the Comintern provided communication channels so that information from these operatives could be dispatched to Moscow.

Comintern departments and affiliated organizations having as part of their function the collection of intelligence information, which inevitably became available at Comintern headquarters to the Soviets, were the Comintern Organization (Org) Department, the International Liaison Department (OMS), the Information (or Intelligence) Department, the Press Section of the Agitation and Propaganda Department, and the auxiliary organizations such as the Young Communist International, the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers, and other international bodies coming under the jurisdiction of the Comintern.

5. Information Acquired through Comintern Org Department Activity. The functions of this department demanded that Comintern headquarters personnel have an intimate knowledge of the activities of the national sections and a good understanding of the key people in each of the national sections. The Comintern Org Department was responsible for ensuring that the structures of the national sections followed the general principles developed in Comintern statutes. Org Department personnel were required to study and evaluate pertinent reports from the national sections, to supervise the creation of Communist fractions in non-Communist organizations, the establishment of Communist cells in factories, etc. Reports sent in by Org Department instructors in the field, plus reports submitted by functionaries of the organization departments of the national sections provided the essential details. Additionally (see paragraph 17), some Org Department instructors were required to supply information pertaining not only to the national section itself, but more within the purview of intelligence--such as political, economic, and military information concerning the country in which the national section was located.

6. International Liaison Department (OMS): Its Acquisition of Information. According to statements made by Walter Krivitsky, OMS also had representatives in the field who reported information to Comintern headquarters. He has stated: "The OMS is the organization through which the Comintern financed, disciplined, and maintained contact with Communist Parties abroad... . It had its own secret courier system and its own representatives on the Executive Committee of each Communist Party. These representatives reported to Moscow the fullest details of the political

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views, activities, and personal affairs of the senior executive officials of the Communist Party they represented." Thus, although it would seem that OMS and Org Department functions would have overlapped in this respect, it is assumed that Krivitsky would have been thoroughly acquainted with Comintern structure and responsibilities.[1] The facilities and other assets of the OMS network operated by Hilaire Noulens in Shanghai and not exposed at the time of his arrest were apparently absorbed by Soviet State Security.

7. Information (or Intelligence) Department. This headquarters department of the Comintern at first exclusively relied on overt publications for its knowledge of foreign affairs. Then it began to use intelligence reports (political, economic, and military) covertly procured by Org Department instructors in the field.

8. Press Section. By 1925 this Section had organized the Rabkor or workers' correspondence system, according to which Communists employed in factories, offices, mines, etc. sent in letters telling of their personal work experience and thereby illustrated the class struggle in the story of an individual worker. Not only was information of intelligence interest acquired in this way, but there was also acquired operational information which indicated where penetrations could be established and which identified potential agent personnel. The most competent of the worker correspondents were eventually contacted by either a Comintern or Soviet intelligence agent.

9. Intelligence Procured through Comintern Auxiliary Organizations. Available information shows the Young Communist International (YCI) and the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) to have been relied upon by Soviet intelligence services for penetration and information procurement. The most precise information concerning YCI penetration achievements to date was that provided by an American Communist defector, Paul Crouch. This is related in paragraph 21.

ISH. The Seamen's Club (Interclubs) of the ISH functioned as debriefing centers for many witting and unwitting informants. Organizers

[1] Soviet State Security and security units of the various Communist Party apparats continue the counterintelligence and security assignments which were once the responsibility of Comintern Org and OMS Departments. The Ponger-Verber case exposed in 1953 in Austria, revealed that Kurt Ponger furnished reports for Soviet State Security concerning: (1) Skala, the left-wing Communist theater in Vienna; (2) friction and conflict within the Austrian Communist Party, dealing with old and new Party members, persons who stayed with the Party, persons who left the Party, and particularly the interest of former concentration camp inmates in connection with the Party; and (3) friction between the Democratic Women's Movement and the Austrian Communist Party.

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of the Interclubs were obliged to determine cargoes, ships, next ports of call, etc., so that the ISH would have a complete chain of observation of material from its point of origin (armament factory, chemical plant, etc.) through all ports of call to its final destination. All this information, noted by the Interclub organizer, was reported by him to the Interclub secretary. These ISH officers were forbidden to "go out of their way to get such information," according to Richard Krebs, a Communist defector and onetime ISH functionary. ISH cooperated closely with OMS, and it is likely that some of the information about ship itineraries was of value for OMS courier work (which may have been utilized to some extent by the Soviet intelligence services).

Richard Krebs has stated that ISH covert procurement of information was directed mainly against offices of shipping lines, and that ISH personnel performing this work were usually clerical workers, sometimes women, in these offices.

From what Krebs has stated, the ISH, from its inception, appears to have had Soviet intelligence personnel placed at its international headquarters (the ISH Secretariat) and national headquarters level to control and exploit all phases of its work. Michel Avatin, apparently a Soviet State Security agent, appears to have controlled intelligence activities from within the ISH Secretariat.

10. Reporting Done by Special Comintern "Reps" and Observers. In addition to the Comintern organizations and representatives already mentioned as procuring intelligence information for Comintern headquarters, special representatives were dispatched to foreign countries to observe activity at Party headquarters and to report independently to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Solomon Lozovski, for instance, who was a member of the Comintern's Executive Committee, sent an agent, Boris Reinstein, to the United States in 1922, to act as a Comintern delegate to a secret conference of the American Communist Party (at Bridgeman, Michigan); Reinstein was to report directly to Lozovski on the activities of William Z. Foster and on what was happening in the American Party.[2]

11. Party Intelligence Apparats of the Comintern Period. According to the Comintern Statutes and Conditions of Admission, as stated previously, there had to be set up within each national affiliate of the Comintern units which would be responsible for illegal or secret work. Throughout this study the term "underground section" will be used to designate the entire secret or underground organization of a national

[2] Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives, pp. 89-90.

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Communist Party. The term "illegal apparat" or, more frequently here, "intelligence apparat" will be used in discussing the various units, each of which has a specific task and is organized within a Party's underground section.

In the 1920's, and possibly the early 1930's, Soviet intelligence officials acted directly on the scene in supervising the establishment of foreign Communist Party illegal apparats, since at this period foreign Communists apparently were not considered sufficiently trained and experienced to set these up without Soviet guidance. In common with intelligence apparats formed during a later period, they were directed by Party functionaries who served as liaison agents in their respective Parties. Also, in the early established Party apparats, as later, there was a tendency to perform Party intelligence work on two levels, with one reporting information primarily of interest to the Party--for example, bits of information which might be considered useful in forming the Party's labor policy--while a more select group provided information which would be classified as positive intelligence, such as reporting about military installations and scientific developments, and would be of most interest to the Soviet government rather than to the local Communist Party.

A summarized description of two of the earliest Party intelligence apparats--the French and the German--is given in Appendix B.

12. Whittaker Chambers' "Special Apparatus" and Its Base. The Ware Group, an underground Party apparat in Washington, D. C. consisting of several secret Party cells ("study groups"), was composed of approximately 75 persons, almost all of whom were dues-paying secret members of the Communist Party. All were under the close supervision of J. Peters, underground chief of the American Communist Party in the 1930's. The Ware Group conducted political instruction and discussion, recruited new members for the Party underground, and placed secret Party members in government positions (both as a means of influencing government policy--particularly in the fields of labor and welfare--and as a way of procuring information the Party needed). The Ware Group's leading committee consisted of six prominent government officials.

Using the Ware Group as a base, Peters and Chambers organized the "special apparatus." Its productive sources (in addition to two or three operatives who served as photographers or cut-outs) included: Alger Hiss, then assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State; Henry Julian Wadleigh, then an employee of the Trade Agreements Division of the State Department; Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury; Vincent Reno, a mathematician at Aberdeen Proving Ground; and Abel Gross (an alias) at the Bureau of Standards. Documents provided by this group of prolific sources were microfilmed by two apparatus photographers who worked in Washington and Baltimore. Since the activities and methods

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of this apparatus have been well related in Chambers' book, Witness, further description will be omitted here.

13. Silvermaster-Perlo Groups. The details of these two Party intelligence apparats have become known through the defection of Elizabeth Bentley. Like Whittaker Chambers, she was an open Party member who dropped out of open Party work to carry out Soviet intelligence assignments. While employed at the Italian Library of Information (1938-1939) in New York City, she voluntarily contacted a Party officer, Ferruccio Marini and offered to keep the Party informed about activities at the Italian Library. Marini--probably one of Golos' many talent spotters in the Communist Party--introduced Miss Bentley to Jacob Golos. The latter not only performed intelligence work as a professional Soviet State Security agent under cover of World Tourists, a Soviet State Security business firm, but he also served as a member of the Control Commission of the Communist Party of the United States.

After taking another position to procure data for Golos, Miss Bentley became an official of a newly organized Soviet cover firm, U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation. Subsequently Golos employed her as a courier to contact secret Party apparats operating in Washington, D.C. Some of the more productive sources in the Silvermaster-Perlo Groups, for which Miss Bentley served as cut-out were:

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, employed at the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Treasury, and by the Air Force.

Solomon Adler, of the Treasury Department.

Norman Bursler, of the Department of Justice.

Frank Coe, of the Treasury Department; the United States Embassy, London; the Board of Economic Warfare; and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, Foreign Economic Administration.

Bela Gold, employed at Department of Agriculture; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; and Office of Economic Programs in Foreign Economic Administration.

Abraham George Silverman, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, United States Air Forces.

Both of these American Communist Party groups--that contacted by Chambers and that contacted by Miss Bentley--were successful in procuring valuable intelligence information for the Soviets.

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14. Channeling of Comintern Information to Soviet Intelligence Agencies. All information transmitted to Moscow through Comintern facilities had to be channeled as discreetly as possible. The 1920's and early 1930's represented a period when the Soviets were forced by the extremely poor economic conditions in Russia to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the non-Communist world. Therefore, in order not to embarrass the Soviet government, evidence of Moscow control over the foreign Communist Parties was camouflaged.

Particularly, documents relating to illegal activity had to be handled as securely as possible. Information from the Parties was sent to Moscow by (1) Comintern agents and couriers, (2) Party leaders traveling to Moscow or to Berlin, or (3) the Soviet diplomatic pouch. In Berlin the Western European Bureau (WEB) of the Comintern served as a collection point for a number of years, forwarding Comintern (or national section) reporting to Moscow through the pouch facilities of the Soviet Embassy. During the Comintern period, Communist seamen on certain ships of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American Lines probably were used both as Comintern and as Soviet intelligence couriers.

At Comintern headquarters all incoming reports were channeled through the Org Department secretariat, where close control over all documents was maintained. The Chief of the Org Department, as has been stated, was a Soviet citizen and had direct contact with an official of corresponding rank in each of the two major Soviet intelligence services. Krivitsky has written:

> "Every ten days the Chief of this Cadre Section (Org Department) meets the chief of a corresponding section of the OGPU and turns over to him the material gathered by his agents. The OGPU then uses this data as it sees fit... ."[3]

Richard Sorge's statements strongly indicate that the Org Department Chief had equally close relations with the Director of Soviet Military Intelligence (see paragraph 17).

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[3] Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, p. 64.

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SECTION III. THE COMINTERN: A RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING BASE FOR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

A second valuable contribution of the Comintern to the Soviet intelligence services was its steady supply of trained, experienced underground workers who could be transferred to a professional Soviet intelligence network. Many of these operatives were culled from Comintern training schools in the Soviet Union, while others were transferred from a clandestine section of the Comintern, a Comintern front organization or from one of the early illegal Party apparats, and therefore had already benefited from conspiratorial or military experience. Area knowledge, plus acquaintance with persons in foreign countries willing to cooperate with Communists or the Soviets, and knowledge of clandestine techniques, illegal travel routes, hotels or inns not complying with police regulations, etc., were obvious assets for a Soviet intelligence agent. These were already in the possession of a Comintern agent at the time of his transfer to a Soviet service.

15. Comintern Schools: Personnel Bases for Soviet IS. Comintern schools were exploited by both major Soviet intelligence services as a source of agent personnel. Constant watch was kept over them in order to discover the most promising material. In the early period, some sections of the Soviet intelligence services apparently relied exclusively on Comintern schools for the training of their agents--for example, the Special Duties Section of Soviet Military Intelligence which probably was responsible for the organization of revolts, diversions, or strikes. Later, Communists who appeared to have potentialities for espionage, sabotage, or other conspiratorial activity included in the orbit of Soviet intelligence were selected from Comintern schools and enrolled in a Soviet intelligence school.

Krivitsky has mentioned a 6-month course conducted by Soviet Military Intelligence for qualified graduates of the Lenin School.[1] Another Soviet defector has mentioned an advanced military course also for selected graduates of the Lenin School and given under the auspices of the Special Duties Section of Soviet Military Intelligence. Here the emphasis was on sabotage, and a graduate of this course was able to operate on his own in foreign countries as a high-grade sabotage agent.

The courses of instruction given in Comintern schools--especially the "practical" courses in street-fighting techniques, sabotage, espionage, and other conspiratorial activity--and the systematic combination of these courses with ideological training, plus the advantageous location of these

[1] Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, p. 76.

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schools on Soviet terrain for convenient observation by Soviet intelligence officers, made them extremely valuable personnel bases for Soviet espionage networks. 25X1A6a

[redacted]

16. Clandestine Action Departments of the Comintern: Recruitment Bases for Soviet Intelligence. After Comintern Schools, the clandestine action departments, particularly the Organization (Org) Department and the International Liaison Department (OMS), probably were most useful in supplying trained, experienced operatives who were eventually transferred to a Soviet intelligence service.

17. Transfer from Comintern Org Department to a Soviet IS. Probably the best known agent to have served with the Org Department of the Comintern and later to have been transferred to a Soviet service was Richard Sorge, originally a member of the German Communist Party. According to his statement to Japanese authorities, his first Comintern assignment outside of the Soviet Union was in the Scandinavian countries.

Sorge was sent there as a representative of the Comintern Org Department to report on activities of the Communist Parties and their political and economic problems. He was also to report as much as possible on the political and economic situation and on any important military issues which might arise in Scandinavia. At first Sorge, along with other Party officials, assumed a position of active leadership, but later--when assigned to work in England--he was instructed to stay away from Party activities and to report on the labor movement, the status of the Communist Party, and political and economic conditions in Britain in 1929. The instructions to remain aloof from Party disputes enabled him (again, according to his statement) to devote more attention to political and economic intelligence work than had been possible in Scandinavia.

The steps leading to Sorge's recruitment and transfer to Soviet Military Intelligence took place as follows (according to his admission): Upon his return to Moscow after the Comintern assignment in England, Sorge went to see Ossip Piatnitsky, Comintern Org Department Chief, with whom he discussed his past activity and expressed the desire "to enlarge the scope" of his work, which he believed he could not do as long as he remained with the Comintern. It was apparently Sorge's wish to concentrate entirely on positive intelligence and to be relieved of Communist Party organization activity. Piatnitsky discussed the matter with Gen. Berzin, Director of Soviet Military Intelligence, and a short time later Berzin called Sorge for a detailed discussion of intelligence work in Asia. Sorge was then (in the winter of 1929) transferred from the Comintern to Soviet Military Intelligence.

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18. Recruitment from Comintern OMS. A competent agent transferred from the Comintern OMS to a Soviet intelligence service, Robinson, was allegedly chief of the OMS for Western Europe from an unspecified date to about 1940. About 1930 Robinson moved from Berlin to Paris, and probably during that year began to carry out espionage--probably at first procuring intelligence for the Comintern. His agents were recruited among former Communist Party acquaintances.

By 1936, Soviet Military Intelligence was allegedly exploiting Robinson and his net, and undoubtedly he had been used also by Soviet State Security (actually the Foreign Section of the OGPU), which by 1936 had completely taken over control of the Comintern. It has also been reported that Robinson was placed at the head of the intelligence apparatus of the French Communist Party in 1930 upon orders of the Fourth Department of the Red Army, and was thus used to funnel information to the Soviets from an extensive Party apparatus. The details of his transfer from Comintern work to the Soviet IS are not available.

19. Comintern Auxiliary Organizations as Recruitment Bases. Most productive for this purpose (according to available information) were the International Brigade, the Young Communist International (YCI), and the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH). Possibly other affiliates of the Red International of Labor Unions also furnished agents for a Soviet intelligence service. Ideologically and practically, experience in these organizations helped condition Communists for clandestine work, and Soviet intelligence agents, who inevitably held key positions in all Comintern affiliates, were afforded a chance to observe Communist operatives whom they considered promising for espionage.[2]

20. International Brigade: Manpower for Soviet Intelligence. Alexander Foote's experience, well known through his book, Handbook for Spies, relates the process by which he was recruited from the International Brigade. A non-Communist volunteer, he had fought with the Brigade in Spain and returned to England. There he was contacted by the Communist Party and was recruited for secret (espionage) work on the Continent by a functionary (not identified) at Party headquarters. Foote believed that it was D.F. Springhall, National Organization Secretary of the British Communist Party, who had "spotted" him.

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[2] Persons who come within this category are, for example, Ernst Wollweber and Michel Avatin of the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers; possibly, Solomon Lozovski of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern); Percy Glading, a paid official of the League Against Imperialism headquarters in London until 1937; and Agnes Smedley and Irene Wiedemeyer of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers.

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Julian Gorkin has described how service in the International Brigade helped to develop a Mexican Communist, David Siqueiros, so that he was willing to organize a Mexican Communist Party apparat which would effect the assassination of Trotsky for a Soviet service:

> "The Civil War in Spain was an admirable school for political terrorism. The GPU could choose its men, its tools there. I do not doubt that Siqueiros was inspired by a sincere idealism in Spain. But the more or less disinterested combatant is soon converted into the instrument of a political machine, of a totalitarian machine, ruthlessly manipulated from Moscow... . In Spain, Siqueiros really served the USSR. Through ignorance--like all men with a fixed idea, he was not very intelligent--through a love of adventure, and through corruption, he became an active agent of the GPU."[3]

21. Young Communist International (YCI). Information provided by Paul Crouch, an American Communist defector who was formerly a member of the Anti-Militarist Commission of the Young Communist International, indicates that the YCI was a base of some importance in recruiting agents for Soviet penetration of foreign military forces. Crouch states that he was given "very detailed and specific directions" for infiltrating Communists into the United States Army.[4]

He has told of a meeting with Marshal Tukachevsky and other Red Army officials in Moscow and of their instructions for YCI recruitment and penetration work. Crouch has related that he was instrumental (as a YCI officer) in recruiting a Communist soldier to infiltrate a U. S. Army installation in Panama. The latter established civilian contacts in that area, maintained correspondence through underground channels established by the YCI, and served the period of his enlistment (as a Soviet agent) without detection. Steps were taken, Crouch states, to effect other Communist penetrations--as a service for the Soviets--using YCI men in the U. S. Army.

Fred Rose and Sam Carr, who both became agents for the Soviets in the Communist Party of Canada (the Labour-Progressive Party), were attracted to Communism through the Young Communist League in Canada. Rose was appointed National Secretary of that organization in 1929 and

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3 Salazar and Gorkin, Murder in Mexico, p. 209.

4 Testimony of Paul Crouch. Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, May 6, 1949. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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as such went to Moscow, where he was given a 6-month course of instruction and served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International. It is quite possible that he, like Crouch, received training in espionage, particularly instructions for directing infiltration of the Canadian military forces, but to date evidence of this is not available.

22. International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH). Evidence that this Comintern auxiliary organization furnished personnel for Soviet Intelligence has been provided by Richard Krebs (see paragraph 9), who was engaged in ISH Interclub work at Hamburg, Germany and later in Copenhagen. According to his statement, he was not involved in clandestine activity himself, although he could name ISH personnel who had either secret Comintern or Soviet intelligence assignments.

One of the Communist functionaries whom Krebs discussed in some detail, Hugo Marx, held unquestioned authority at the ISH Hamburg Interclub. Although Krebs states that he had no knowledge of Marx's specific role, it is obvious (from his statements) that Marx controlled secret couriers on certain German ships and that he was very probably a Soviet intelligence agent. Krebs has related that on several occasions when he tried to enlist various ISH personnel in overt ISH activity, he was told to keep "hands off" certain persons, who were "Marx's men." Apparently these were ISH members who had been recruited as couriers, informants, etc. for Hugo Marx, whom Krebs always referred to as a GPU agent.

At a slightly later period, when Ernst Wollweber took over control of ISH, he exploited that organization in wholesale fashion as a supply of agents to carry out sabotage work--an activity a Soviet intelligence service appeared to finance and direct (see paragraph 33).

23. Comintern Files: An Aid for Soviet IS Recruitment. Besides serving as a source of personnel and as a training field for Communist operatives who were eventually transferred to, or absorbed by, a Soviet intelligence service, the Comintern served the Soviets as a highly valued source of information about Communists and sympathizers on a global basis. Statements by nearly every Soviet defector have indicated how comprehensive Comintern headquarters files were and how frequently they were referred to in vetting prospective agents, in searching for recruits, etc. Detailed biographic records pertaining to Party members periodically were compiled by each national section of the Comintern and, automatically, copies of biographic reports were forwarded to Moscow for Comintern Org Department (after 1932, Cadre Department) files. Here they were available to both major Soviet Intelligence Services. Currently these files are probably maintained by the Foreign Section of the Central Committee, CPSO, which reportedly is responsible for activities of the foreign Communist Parties.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

24. Recruitment from Early Established Party Apparats. Illegal apparats performing secret work either for the advancement of the Party program or for a Soviet intelligence service, but continuing to function as integral parts of the national Party, served as bases of recruitment and as training fields for Communist agents, who subsequently were transferred to a Soviet intelligence network and became paid, professional agents. The Soviets thus acquired trained, ideologically motivated agents already experienced in espionage techniques. The following are agents who were thus drawn from an illegal Party apparat--the pre-World War II German apparat.

Schulze-Boysen, Harro. About 1936, this German Communist first came into contact with a Soviet intelligence service (probably Soviet Military Intelligence) while acting as leader of a Party group operating underground. An employee of the German Air Ministry, he was at first only an occasional informant, supplying information to the Soviets concerning German activities in Spain. His information was passed to a secret apparat of the German Party and passed by a Party courier to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. Schulze-Boysen allegedly was inactive from 1937 to the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 and then became the chief of the most important Soviet network in Germany. He was arrested and executed in 1942.

Wenzel, Johann. Prior to his arrival in Belgium from Germany in 1936, Wenzel had worked in a secret apparat of the German Party. In Brussels he was recruited by Soviet Military Intelligence. An expert radio operator, Wenzel was arrested while transmitting to Moscow in June 1942 and was forced to "play back" to the Soviets. He escaped captivity in November 1942 and disappeared.

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SECTION IV. COMINTERN OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

25. Sources of Documentation: The International Brigade. In the case of this Comintern auxiliary organization, it is known that it was exploited as a source of genuine passports for Soviet State Security. These were confiscated outright from Brigade volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. These fighters were nearly always compelled to hand over their passports to Soviet State Security agents upon their arrival in Spain. They were told that this was done so that the passports would not be lost in the fighting at the front. Attempting to recover their passports when they wanted to return home, they were usually told that the passports had been destroyed in a bombing incident. In this way hundreds of foreign passports became the property of Soviet State Security.

26. The ISH/OMS Passport Offices. Passport offices located in Copenhagen and in Hamburg were spoken of by Richard Krebs as if they were ISH installations, although it seems possible that actually they were under the administration of OMS. According to Krebs, the office at Hamburg specialized in German passports--doctoring old ones by removing unwanted marks and substituting new pages. A supply of these was kept on hand. The passport office in Copenhagen probably treated Danish passports in a similar manner.

No specific instance in which any of these ISH/OMS passport offices supplied documentation to a Soviet agent is known. According to numerous reports, however, the former ISH officer Erik Aage Richard Jensen, who was in charge of the ISH passport supply office in Copenhagen, has had close connections with a Soviet intelligence service. It seems probable that he was--as a Soviet agent--placed in charge of the Copenhagen passport office to ensure its full utilization by the Soviets.

27. Duplication of Comintern Delegates' Passports. Benjamin Gitlow has related that, on their arrival in Moscow, foreign Communists were immediately taken to Comintern headquarters, where they were required to hand over their passports to an OMS official. Gitlow writes:

> "The passports collected were deposited in a huge safe...and sent to the passport mill of the OGPU, where copies were made of them for use by OGPU and other Soviet government and Comintern agencies. Often the Communists from abroad, without their knowledge, received for their own use the forged passports in place of the genuine ones."[1]

[1] Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives, pp. 167-168.

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28. Cover Provided by Comintern Auxiliary Organizations. Business and other types of cover arrangements were supplied to the Soviet Intelligence Services by certain Comintern-dominated organizations. Probably the most creditable evidence available to date is that of Walter Krivitsky who, at some length, told of Stalin's decision to send concealed aid to the Loyalist cause in Spain. Krivitsky was assigned to procure all arms and munition purchased outside of the Soviet Union. Shipment of these was to be handled by cover firms controlled by Soviet State Security. Krivitsky states that with the aid of men from such organizations as the Friends of the Soviet Union and the many Leagues for Peace and Democracy, Soviet State Security within 10 days had a chain of import and export firms established throughout several European countries. He asserted that both State Security and Soviet Military Intelligence looked upon certain members of these societies as "war reserves of civilian auxiliaries of the Soviet defense system."[2]

In the Far East, Comintern affiliates such as the All China Labor Federation (a Far East Bureau subsidiary), the China League for Civil Rights, and the Anti-War Congress served at least one Soviet agent, Agnes Smedley, as cover activity (in addition to her role as a writer on Far Eastern problems). Her home in Shanghai was used as a meeting place for members of Richard Sorge's Soviet Military Intelligence net while he was based in China. She met with Soviet agents and gave them instructions for assignments.

29. Transfer of Comintern Cover Firms. All OMS field installations--safe houses, businesses, etc.--probably were eventually liquidated or transferred to a Soviet intelligence service. It is known, for instance, that OMS operated in Peking and Shanghai under cover of an import business dealing in German and French wines, perfumes, expensive leather goods, and other luxury articles. In 1938 the assets of this firm were transferred to INU (Foreign Directorate) of Soviet State Security. In other areas Soviet Military Intelligence appears to have been the organization which took over OMS field installations.

30. Comintern Communications Support for Soviet IS. OMS and ISH installations provided travel and communications facilities for Communist and Comintern functionaries. Some Interclubs, because of their location, specialized in serving as communications links for certain areas or countries. The Interclub at Danzig, for instance, served as the link with the underground Polish Communist Party. The Interclub at Kiel performed a similar task for underground Party work in Finland. The Interclub in Oslo--probably because of the many Scandinavian ships sailing to South America and the existence of Communist cells on these--specialized in communications with Latin America.

[2] Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, p. 85.

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It is more than probable that these clandestine Comintern courier routes and facilities, apparently controlled by a Soviet intelligence official at every major OMS or ISH installation, were used--wherever needed--by a Soviet intelligence service. Krebs named one suspected Soviet intelligence agent whom he believed was using the Hamburg Interclub as a point of contact with couriers coming in on transoceanic vessels. Information supplied by Paul Crouch shows that the YCI had communication channels which serviced a Soviet intelligence operation (see paragraph 21).

31. Provision of Meeting Places. A foreign installation of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers served at least one Soviet network by furnishing such facilities. The outlets of this organization in Shanghai, first the Zeitgeist Bookstore and later the Shanghai branch of International Publishers of New York (both operated by Irene Wiedemeyer) were used as meeting places and mail drops by Soviet agents. Agnes Smedley introduced Richard Sorge to his most valuable agent, Hozumi Ozaki, in the Zeitgeist Bookstore.

32. Supply of Safe Houses. The Comintern OMS, responsible for providing such facilities for Comintern personnel, probably was effective in supplying them also--if only in emergency situations--for Soviet intelligence operatives. Unfortunately, there is not any evidence to substantiate this. It is known, as stated previously, that all assets of the Far Eastern Bureau (of OMS) in Shanghai became the property of Soviet State Security and, according to Richard Sorge, these assets (administered by Hilaire Noulens) included safe houses and other accommodations.

33. Sabotage Support: ISH Facilities and Personnel. The Comintern affiliate which performed the most effective sabotage against installations of enemies of the Soviet Union was the ISH. As the time of the outbreak of World War II drew near, ISH activity was focused progressively on espionage and sabotage, particularly the latter. From Krebs' knowledge and from information from other foreign sources, it appears that ISH work during this period was closely controlled by persons probably acting as agents of a Soviet intelligence service.

ISH sabotage came under the administration of three main ISH staffs: materiel, training, and communications. There were several sabotage sections, which were organized in various geographic areas. The materiel department was responsible for the transporting of explosives from one country to another. A seaman aboard the Westplein (of the Millington Steamship Company), assisted by the wireless operator on that ship, reportedly was in charge of the transporting of explosives. The dominant role in all ISH sabotage work was filled by Ernst Wollweber, who not only took charge of the training department but also supervised procurement and transport of explosives and other sabotage material and administered large sums of money allegedly supplied by the Soviets to finance ISH sabotage efforts.

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Documents dated June 1941 which were found in German Security Police files also reflect Ernst Wollweber's directing position in ISH sabotage work, and at that date summarized ISH work as follows:

> "Sabotage attempts on 16 German, 3 Italian, and 2 Japanese ships, which in two cases caused the total loss of very valuable vessels, can be traced to the activity of this Communist terror group, which is spread all over Europe."

Three factors indicate Soviet control over ISH sabotage: (1) Ernst Wollweber, ISH Chief during the years just prior to and up to 1941, probably had been a Soviet agent on either a continuous or intermittent basis since 1920, when Stalin is stated to have personally advised Wollweber to take advantage of political opportunities offered him and pointed out that under parliamentary immunity he would be able to do better "organization" work for the Communist movement (Wollweber eventually did serve as Deputy to the Reichstag); also, several other ISH officials have been reported by well-placed sources as having had Soviet intelligence connections; (2) funds for ISH work reportedly were of Soviet origin and made available to Wollweber through regular OMS and ISH communication channels; (3) targets against which the ISH operated were ships and maritime establishments of powers hostile to the Soviet Union.

34. Concluding Remarks About Soviet Intelligence Use of Comintern. Soviet leaders thus made provision in the Comintern's earliest statutes, and developed through the years, the Comintern's capabilities for Soviet espionage. With the tightening of control of power in the hands of one Soviet leader, there was ever increasing centralization of authority over any Soviet-dominated organization, and the Comintern, an essential tool for Soviet world rule, came progressively under closer domination of a Soviet service subservient to Stalin.

A pattern of exploitation can be seen to have existed in the Comintern period whereby the chief contributions made by the international movement fall into three main categories: (1) penetration of Soviet intelligence targets, (2) a continuous supply of personnel for the Soviet professional espionage services, and (3) operational and technical assistance of the most diverse nature. These general aids have been provided for the Soviet intelligence services up to the early 1950's by the Communist Parties and their affiliates.

The ability of the International Communist Movement to effect penetration at points of Soviet intelligence interest is still its greatest asset for the Soviet espionage program. The extent to which the Soviet services can now rely upon the foreign Communist movements and their affiliated organizations as bases for manpower and as sources for

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other forms of support for Soviet professional services, however, has been considerably curtailed.

Because of exposed cases of Communist Party collaboration in Soviet intelligence activity, there is now among security authorities in Western countries an increasing awareness of the identity of Communist Party and Soviet government subversive and revolutionary interests. The Soviet services, therefore, have now placed restrictions on the use of known Communist Party members and sympathizers as sources for professional networks, and contact with the foreign Communist Parties for any clandestine purpose whatsoever must be most guardedly and discreetly arranged. Hence, although future Soviet intelligence employment of the International Communist Movement may be limited--possibly restricted to use of secret Party elements only--nevertheless, the general plan for exploitation of foreign Communist organizations, personnel, and other facilities was laid out during the Comintern era. It should be noted, in this regard, that need for information may often override security considerations.

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PART TWO

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES IN EXPLOITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR PERIOD

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SOVIET I.S. EXPLOITATION OF NON-ORBIT COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR AFFILIATES

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SECTION V. METHODS OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE ESPIONAGE POTENTIAL

35. CPSU Controls Facilitate Intelligence Exploitation. Controls of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the Comintern and its affiliates, as stated previously, ensured exploitation of the international movement for espionage and other clandestine purposes. To this day, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has retained its organizational control over the world movement. The focal point of CPSU control presently is in the Foreign Section of its Central Committee, and these continued controls facilitate the direct acquisition of information through the channels of the national Communist Parties and their affiliates, the Cominform and the international front organizations, and thereby assist the Soviet intelligence program.

36. Soviet Intelligence Role in the Development of Illegal Apparats. Largely through the comprehensive training program which was provided in the Soviet Union for foreign Communists, the Comintern and Soviet Intelligence jointly developed clandestine action units--underground sections, illegal apparats, etc.--of the national Communist Parties. Several defectors have testified that instructors at Comintern Schools were either Soviet State Security or Red Army Intelligence officials.

It is known that in the Comintern era, Soviet intelligence officials sometimes directly intervened to create and develop in foreign Communist Parties secret apparats which would perform espionage. From exposed cases--such as the Canadian wartime cases and the postwar Danielsen case in Norway--and other evidence, it is known that in the post-Comintern period Soviet intelligence officers have acted similarly.

37. Covert Liaison System for Foreign Communist Party Control. No significant change appears to have taken place in the Soviet intelligence method of maintaining covert liaison with foreign Communist Parties. There is evidence that the Soviet services still work through trusted Communist Party members or Party "liaison agents" in utilizing Party personnel and facilities. Some of these have held high offices in their respective parties.

38. Soviet Domination of the International Fronts: An Aid to Soviet Espionage. The Soviet Party-Government, including the intelligence services, have access to information accumulating in the headquarters of these bodies. Key positions at their headquarters are held by Soviet functionaries representing the Soviet affiliates which manipulate the internationals. Although these Soviet representatives reportedly are not affiliated with a Soviet intelligence service, they automatically furnish the interested Soviet agencies with information.

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In the case of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), for example, its former Assistant Secretary General, a Soviet citizen, Serge Rostovsky, was known to send registered packages every 3 days from Vienna to the International Department of the Central Council of Trade Unions (CCTU) of the Soviet Union in Moscow. There is little doubt that a synthesis of trade union, industrial, and other reporting received by the WFTU reaches an interested Soviet intelligence service by such channels. Thus there is little need for the Soviet intelligence services to plant their staff personnel in the headquarters of these organizations.

39. More Discreet Use of the International Fronts by Soviet Intelligence. As opposed to its exploitation of the Comintern international auxiliary organizations, immediate Soviet Intelligence employment of the present international fronts proceeds in a more subtle and cautious manner. Although there is an attempt for direct, albeit unwitting, contact with foreign members of intelligence interest it is performed only during congresses or conferences by Soviet intelligence officials under cover. It has been reliably reported that during an international meeting of the World Peace Council, Soviet State Security dispatched several staff officers from Moscow under cover as Pravda and TASS correspondents in order to contact and debrief certain foreign delegates on an unwitting basis. Obviously, such relationships may gradually be turned into witting ones, and possibly carried further by Soviet State Security personnel in the home country of the foreign delegate upon his return. Thus, there is a more guarded use of the international front organizations than in the Comintern period, when Soviet intelligence staff personnel were permanently assigned to their headquarters offices.

40. Soviet Intelligence-Communist Party Liaison. Both major Soviet intelligence services--Soviet Military Intelligence, (now Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence) and the organization which has been referred to during much of its existence as Soviet State Security--have had in each foreign country parallel systems of legal and illegal representation. The chief legal representative (or resident agent or director) usually is found to have diplomatic or other official cover. The illegal resident agent is frequently not a citizen of the country in which he works and, formerly, at least, was not a Soviet national. Also, the illegal resident agent frequently does not reside in the country against which his net is working, but lives in an adjacent country.

The illegal or legal resident agent in general must provide for the financing of his network, and for an efficient communications system; he must supervise the procurement of information, etc. He is usually forbidden to search for and develop sources of information himself, but for this important work must rely upon local assistants, either Communist Party liaison agents or professional agents who assist in talent spotting.[1]

[1] See footnote 3, page xi.

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There is sufficient evidence at hand to establish definitely that control of employment of local Communist Party personnel and facilities for Soviet intelligence operations in each country outside the Iron Curtain is maintained by the legal or illegal Soviet resident director, who works through "liaison agents" or "liaison contacts" within each Party.[2] Contact between the legal or illegal resident agent and the Party liaison agent is made either directly or through intermediaries.

41. Covert Liaison Work Allegedly Now Done by Soviet State Security. In the past, both major Soviet intelligence services have had secret contact with the foreign Communist Parties and both have similarly exploited their personnel and facilities. Information about current practice indicates that Soviet State Security since 1951 has been responsible for covert liaison with the Communist Parties and for financing and directing Party illegal work of interest to the Soviet Union. Allegedly, liaison taken out of the hands of Soviet Military Intelligence was assigned to Soviet State Security rather than the Foreign Ministry (MID) because it "required intelligence skills and techniques." Thus, it appears that the foreign Communist Parties still are expected to perform intelligence work for the Soviet Union and require direction for that work.

42. Security Accorded to Clandestine Liaison with the Parties. Because of the very careful handling of the covert contact with the foreign Communist Parties by Soviet intelligence representatives (especially in certain non-Orbit areas), it is this aspect of the Soviet IS-Communist Party relationship which has been most difficult to uncover. Thanks to revelations made by Elizabeth Bentley, Whittaker Chambers, and other defectors, it is now known approximately how it was done in the past. More recently, through the exposure of the Per Danielsen case in Norway and through statements made by Soviet intelligence defectors, data have been obtained to illustrate how the covert liaison work is presently being handled.

As stated previously, responsibility for covert liaison with the non-Orbit Communist Parties was charged to Soviet Military Intelligence from an undetermined date until 1951. Allegedly, the liaison work was transferred to Soviet State Security at this time to "increase the scope and effectiveness" of foreign Communist Party activity. A Soviet defector has stated that any information pertaining to liaison work with a foreign Communist Party now is classified as "top secret" and only the Chief Legal Resident Agent of Soviet State Security has complete knowledge of it, using

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[2] For purposes of simplification, the term "Party liaison agent" will be used throughout this study in referring to persons who simultaneously are active as Party functionaries and as Soviet intelligence operatives--regardless of whether their status in a Soviet service may have been professional, as was that of Jacob Golos in the U. S. Communist Party.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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subordinate State Security personnel only as occasional cut-outs, translators, or drivers to the rendezvous points. In line with Soviet policy since World War II (according to the same defector), foreigners (non-Soviets) are not entrusted with sensitive liaison work.[3]

In one country, the Chief Legal Resident Agent takes sole responsibility for enciphering and deciphering any cable traffic with Moscow about any aspect of the covert dealings with the local Communist Party. He (or one of his assistants) meets with the Party liaison agent two or three times a month--usually between 6:00 and 7:00 on Sunday evenings. Meetings are brief, and generally take place outside the Soviet official installation. The Party liaison agent is permitted to enter the installation only when it is necessary that he be given an extensive briefing.

Directives are transmitted to the Party liaison agent for espionage work to be performed by the Communist Party, but care is taken not to reveal to the Party any knowledge about activities of the Soviet State Security professional network operating in the area. The Party liaison agent is used not only to pass intelligence directives but also to pass specific political directives. He also receives any secret funds the Soviets supply to the Party for general Party activity.

43. Party Liaison Agents. From statements made by Communist and Soviet defectors and from information which has been revealed through exposed Soviet intelligence operations, it has become evident that in every Communist Party, regardless of its program of political action, there is one (or more) Party official who simultaneously carries out his overt Party duties and acts as a functionary of a Soviet intelligence service. The practice of exploiting Party positions as control points from which a Soviet intelligence representative can assure full use of the Party's personnel and other resources has been progressively confirmed by information from recent Soviet and Satellite defectors.

44. Statements of Defectors about Soviet Liaison Agents. Some of the statements which bear witness to this Soviet practice are reviewed here. Walter Krivitsky, former Chief of Soviet State Security for Western Europe, has written: "There is in the Central Committee of every Communist Party in the world one member who holds a secret commission from the OGPU."[4]

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[3] One source who has been very well placed thinks it possible that the Malenkov regime may permit the use of non-Russians for sensitive work for the sake of greater efficiency (and probably to make up for the losses incurred by Soviet Intelligence through defections).

[4] Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, p. 101.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

A statement made by Leon Trotsky testifying to the presence of liaison agents ("representatives") in a national Communist Party has been quoted in paragraph d. of the introduction to this Handbook.

Elizabeth Bentley wrote concerning Jacob Golos: "Also he was high up in Party circles, being one of the three-man Central Control Commission ... which keeps the Party in line."[5]

She quoted Golos as stating: "I am a member of the GPU. We are responsible for doing intelligence work for the Soviet Union all over the world. That man /Ovakimian, a Russian engineer arrested by U. S. authorities on charges of espionage/ ... is my superior officer."[6]

Following his experience as an operative for Soviet Military Intelligence, Alexander Foote observed: "In every Communist Party there is one highly-placed official whose main task is to gather information gleaned from Party members and fellow travelers and pass it on to the resident director through the main cut-out, who is in close but secret touch with him. It is this official who keeps an eye open for likely and useful recruits and passes their names on to the cut-out ... ."[7]

Foote also stated: "I contacted him /Humbert-Droz, at that time a leading Swiss Communist official/ on instructions from Moscow, who wished him to form his own network and supply such information as he could obtain just over the frontier."[8]

Thus there is substantial evidence, even in overt publications provided by persons at one time strategically placed, that both major Soviet intelligence services have designated (and have probably trained) leading Party functionaries who perform a dual role, Party official and Soviet intelligence representative, or liaison agent.

45. Tasks of the Party Liaison Agent. Once appointed as liaison agent within a national Communist Party, this Soviet intelligence assistant then performs whatever task is required by the service with which, however loosely, he is affiliated. Over a period of time--when no service is required--he may seem to have a "sleeper" status and perform no specific, active duty for the Soviet service, but he is always available to discover and recruit agents and to set up emergency intelligence networks for the Soviets if necessary.

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[5] Elizabeth Bentley, Out of Bondage, p. 113.

[6] Ibid, p. 135.

[7] Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, p. 65.

[8] Ibid, p. 118.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

To date it appears that whatever a national Communist Party does for a Soviet intelligence service is centered around these liaison agents within the Party, and penetration work is carried out principally where the Party is found auspiciously placed to work against a Soviet intelligence target or where the Soviets wish duplicate apparats in operation--the professional service and the Party apparat--so that information from one can serve as a check against the intelligence product of the other.

A survey of Party liaison agents indicates that the Soviets tend to use Party functionaries occupying the positions listed here (or, more likely, maneuver their liaison agents into one of these posts): Organization Secretary, Control Commission office, Party parliamentarian, editor or writer on a Party periodical or newspaper, leader of the Party underground section, and, in two instances, Secretary General. Leading positions in national front organizations have also been exploited for Soviet intelligence purposes.

46. Organization Secretary Posts Held by Party Liaison Agents. It has been ascertained from documents taken from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa by Igor Gouzenko, Soviet code clerk who defected in 1945, that Sam Carr, National Organization Secretary of the Labour-Progressive Party (the CP of Canada) was a liaison agent of Soviet Military Intelligence. Carr supplied information on prospective agents (Communist and non-Communist), directed illegal Party apparats which were functioning as auxiliary Soviet intelligence nets, and procured false documentation and performed other tasks facilitating Soviet operations in the Western Hemisphere. Like several other Communist leaders, Carr attended the Lenin School, and upon his return to Canada (in 1931) was appointed Organization Secretary of the Labour-Progressive Party. For a brief time in 1938-1939 he was transferred to work as editor of a Party publication, The Clarion, possibly for Soviet intelligence operational reasons, but returned to organization work in 1939.

Douglas Frank Springhall of the British Communist Party, another Party liaison agent, had a somewhat similar Party career. He attended the Lenin School for an unknown period of time in 1929 and allegedly was attached to the Soviet Navy following the session at the Lenin School. He had a "political position" (not further defined) in the International Brigade in Spain. He made several trips to the Soviet Union, one of them in August-September 1939. In January 1940, he was elected National Organizer of the British Communist Party. Three years later he was arrested and convicted on charges of espionage.

Another Party organization worker who is known to have been connected with Soviet espionage, Steve Nelson, is a district organizer of the Communist Party of the United States.

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47. Control Commission Posts Held by Party Liaison Agents. Control Commission places have been held by several known liaison agents. Jacob Golos of the Communist Party of the United States is stated by Elizabeth Bentley to have taken advantage of his position on the Control Commission to check reports against information in Party files before requesting further checking in Moscow. Fred Rose and Just Lippe, members of the Control Commission in their respective parties (Canadian and Norwegian), also have been active in Soviet intelligence operations in those countries. Possibly affiliated with a Soviet intelligence service are present Control Commission members Maria Bernetic and Giovanni Postogna of the pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste.

48. Communist Party Parliamentarians. According to Section 4 of Thesis 4 of the Second Congress of the Comintern:

> "A Communist representative, by decision of the Central Committee, is bound to combine legal work with illegal work. In countries where the Communist delegate enjoys a certain inviolability, this must be utilized by way of rendering assistance to the illegal organizations and for the propaganda of the Party."

The aspect of "a certain inviolability," which in some countries means immunity from arrest, is of obvious advantage for a Party liaison agent. Additionally, the Party functionary serving as representative to Parliament is exeedingly well placed to procure information most necessary to the Soviet Union.

It is known that Hans Kippenberger of the pre-World War II German Communist Party was not only Communist representative in the Reichstag, where for some time he was a member of the Committee for Military Affairs, but was also a Party liaison agent who headed the German Party's intelligence apparat and kept the Soviets informed of all the latest discussions and appropriations made for the German armed forces.

Documentation brought out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa by Gouzenko proved that Fred Rose played a similar role. Rose was elected to Parliament in August 1943 and re-elected in June 1945. The Report of the Royal Commission states: "There had been a secret session of Parliament on November 25, 1944. It is apparent that Rose had reported to his masters on this session."[9]

Fernand Grenier of the French Communist Party, frequently reported as involved in Party and Soviet intelligence work, has been a

[9] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 121.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Deputy to the French Chamber during most of the time since 1937. During the course of his "legal" duties, he has undoubtedly kept the Party and the Soviets informed of any confidential matters acted on by the Chamber.

49. Party Newspaper Jobs. Party writing or editorial positions in several known cases have been exploited by Soviet intelligence. Louis Budenz, who, before his defection, was managing editor of the Daily Worker, has related that he was asked by a Soviet official to collect information on the "enemies of the Soviet Union" among leftist or labor ranks, and specifically among Trotskyites. Budenz was to note especially those who did a great deal of traveling, particularly foreign travel. In the words of Budenz:

> "A newspaperman can make inquiries and get information much more easily than most people. Seldom did I make an engagement for secretive purposes only. I would combine my private business with topics as a proposed article, or the source material for a series of features, or the address of a proposed correspondent."[10]

Sixten Rogeby, a Swedish Communist since the late 1920's, was instrumental in putting Soviet intelligence officials in Sweden in contact with an old Party friend, Ernst Andersson, a warrant officer in the Swedish Navy. Andersson, from his final recruitment (in November 1949) to the time of his arrest (in September 1951), successfully completed all missions assigned to him by the Soviets.

Rogeby was sent to Moscow in the early part of 1947 as correspondent of the Swedish Communist Party newspaper, Ny Dag. He was there until the turn of 1948-1949 and allegedly had "Party instruction" while there. Since returning to Sweden he appears to have devoted most of his efforts to collecting military information under journalistic cover.

In another part of the world, Ohannes Aghabashian, editor of the Armenian edition of the local Syro-Lebanese Communist Party publication, appears to have acted over a long period of time as a Party liaison agent in Syria and Lebanon.

50. Leader of the Party Underground Section. The leadership of the Party's underground is a position likely to be occupied by a Party liaison agent. J. Peters, head of the underground apparatus of the Communist Party of the United States (like Kippenberger of the old German Communist Party, Henri Robinson of the pre-World War II French Communist Party, and undoubtedly others) appeared to have dual responsibilities: he directed the Party's underground apparatus, but, as called upon, acted for a Soviet service.

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[10] Louis Budenz, This is My Story, p. 258.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Whenever there was a change of principal agent for Whittaker Chambers' ring, Chambers was directed to report to Peters in the interim. Peters always knew the identity of the new principal agent and arranged for Chambers to contact him. Chambers has stated that Peters knew in detail about several Soviet networks operating in the United States. It seems unlikely that anyone not having a definite Soviet intelligence affiliation would have been so highly trusted.

51. Secretary General Posts. While in general the Soviets appear to have avoided using the most prominent Party position to harbor their liaison agents, there is evidence in at least two cases that this position has not been completely overlooked for Soviet intelligence exploitation. It is known that Earl Browder acted as a "spotter" and assisted Soviet agents in whatever way he could while he was Secretary General of the Communist Party of the United States. Previous to his tenure of this Party office, he had served as a Soviet intelligence agent in the Far East (where his mission allegedly resulted in a fiasco). Elizabeth Bentley has described him--while he was Secretary General of the Communist Party of the United States--as collaborating actively with Soviet State Security.

There is mounting evidence that Vittorio Vidali, present Secretary General of the pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste, is one of those ultimately responsible for the Party's intelligence operations and possibly has a Soviet IS tie. He has been known to intervene in the Party's intelligence operations, the product of which is undoubtedly at the disposal of the Soviet Union. His career--suspected Soviet State Security service in Spain and Mexico, long period of training in the Soviet Union, Soviet citizenship, etc.--certainly suggests Soviet intelligence affiliation.

52. Leading Positions in National Front Organizations. Among Communist-dominated organizations which have harbored a Party liaison agent in one of their leading posts, from which point he could control and exploit the organization for Soviet intelligence purposes, are: the societies of friendship with the Soviet Union, national resistance and partisan organizations, "peace" organizations, labor unions, and professional associations.

In a Western European country, the Communist Party official heading the friendship-with-the-Soviet-Union society allegedly serves as a liaison agent for a Soviet intelligence service and reports all information about its members of Russian origin. Since nearly all Russian Communists residing in that country belong to the society, they form a large percentage of the membership. Reportedly the society has 10 "inspectors," who travel throughout the country recruiting new members and carrying out propaganda missions. At least one of these "inspectors" is known to the local authorities as a Soviet intelligence agent. Thus,

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

with liaison agents placed within the leadership and professional agents in other parts of the Society, the Soviets can exploit it successfully as a source of information on persons of Russian origin living in that country. It is well to recall here that Krivitsky and other Soviet defectors have stated repeatedly that Soviet State Security has, through various forms of persuasion, made every possible use of Russian emigres.

At least one front organization (a "professional" association) appears to have been created at Soviet direction so that the liaison agent--who has administered it from its earliest days--could direct penetration work among scientists and other technicians.

53. No Regular Pattern for Soviet IS Use of Party Posts. The Soviets do not seem to have a preference for any one of these Party positions as a place for the liaison agent. As Gouzenko states, concerning Soviet intelligence methods:

> "They would not use just one method; they use a combination of all methods. They are always saying never to put all your aspirations and hopes on one method. Combine methods. They say that life is very complicated, so use everything possible."[11]

Doubtless because of the emphasis on counterespionage and security work in the Party Control Commission and its maintenance of biographic reports on every Party member, there appears to be a tendency for Soviet State Security to exploit Control Commission posts for its Party liaison agents. In the past, Soviet Military Intelligence seemed to prefer Party Parliamentarian posts (for reasons already explained), Organization Secretaryships, and Party newswriting or editorial positions. There were exceptions to these tendencies and there was probably no hard-and-fast, established procedure.

An analysis of the careers of the Party liaison agents shows that most of them have had (1) training in the Soviet Union--in either a Comintern or Soviet intelligence school; (2) revolutionary or intelligence experience in a foreign country; and (3) many years of experience as Communist activists and leaders in their own Parties. The Party affiliation of most of them dates back to the founding of their respective Parties.

54. Cut-Outs between the Soviet Legal or Illegal Resident Agents and the Party Liaison Agent. The best documented case showing the use of these cut-outs was exposed by the defecting code clerk, Igor Gouzenko, who escaped from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa carrying papers relating the story of Soviet intelligence operations in Canada. They show a secret

[11] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 53.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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Party member, Dr. Henry Harris, an optometrist in Toronto, sometimes serving as a cut-out between Soviet intelligence officials and Sam Carr, Organizer of the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada, who was simultaneously a Party liaison agent. Occasionally there was also direct contact between Carr and Soviet officials.

Alexander Foote spoke of a woman whom he knew as "May" who served as a cut-out during World War II between him and Jules Humbert-Droz, then a prominent leader of the Communist movement in Switzerland and an operative for Soviet Military Intelligence. The Per Danielsen case in Norway which was exposed in 1951 revealed that a person posing as a Czech refugee in Oslo probably was being used upon occasion as a cut-out between Just Lippe, one of the highest ranking members of the Norwegian Communist Party and a Party liaison agent, and Soviet legal resident agents in Oslo.

55. Financial Provisions for Party Liaison Agents. Unlike Soviet agents who work as professionals for a Soviet intelligence service and who are invariably obliged to accept payment from the Soviets, liaison agents in a national Communist Party apparently have been under no such compulsion. The Soviets apparently take into consideration the fact that (1) these men (or women) are paid Party workers (or Parliamentarians) and are not dependent on a salary from the Soviet service, and (2) the liaison agents have been judged the most trustworthy, fanatically loyal Party functionaries before they are designated to serve in this way. In Soviet terminology (according to a notebook from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa) they are nash, or, ours. The Soviets do not disregard the financial status of their liaison agents entirely, however; they make sure these individuals have an adequate supply of funds. A note with reference to Sam Carr in Col. Zabotin's notebook reads: "Financially secure, but takes money. It is necessary occasionally to help."[12]

[12] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 104.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

SECTION VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES: AUXILIARY SOVIET INFORMATION PROCUREMENT AGENCIES

The overt, or more accurately the semiovert, and covert methods of information procurement by the Communist Parties will be discussed separately here. The Party's standing regulation that Party members are automatically obliged to report any information of interest to the Party has resulted--especially in certain countries--in exhaustive collections of information deposited in the files of Party headquarters and always available to the Party liaison agents. The workers' correspondence system--utilized by both the Parties and the front organizations, and based on the Rabkor system used by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by the Press Section of the Comintern--has been a productive source of information up to the present time.

Covertly, the national Communist Parties have in general facilitated intelligence procurement for the Soviets through two principal media: (1) the front organizations, which (as previously stated) have been valuable as preliminary recruiting bases for Soviet intelligence and which have also been utilized as a means of penetrating a variety of Soviet targets; (2) illegal Party apparats--made up of persons drawn from the open or secret memberships of the Party and from sympathizers recruited from the front organizations or "study groups"--which have served as penetration teams, sometimes working against several targets or focused on one Soviet objective.

Although countless reports have stated that information was procured by "Cominform agents," to date there is no confirmation that an intelligence procurement unit exists within the Cominform organization. Rather, all evidence to date indicates that information is procured through facilities of the national Communist Parties or the national and international front organizations, and that the Cominform may serve as a collection point for certain types of intelligence information, possibly included in political reports, which are then forwarded to the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

56. Semiovert Methods of Information Procurement. From a cursory glance at these general methods of procuring information--automatic reporting of information to the Party and workers' reporting of personal experiences to Party publications--it would seem that they are completely overt, but actually it is the confidential aspects of such reporting and the covert penetrations revealed by those systems which are most valuable for the Party (and Soviet) information procurement program. Actually, all phases of information collection are tinged with illegality, just as in all Party activity there is an overlapping and interpenetration of the legal and illegal. Thus, it is reported that only a small portion of the "take" from workers' correspondence allegedly gets into Party periodicals;

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much of it pertains to technical construction taking place in factories, in shipyards, etc. and is not exploited for publication but is probably picked up by the Party liaison agent, who is then responsible for transmitting it to the Soviet IS with which he is in touch.

Illegality is also found in the techniques employed by these systems of reporting. For instance, reports from factory cells channeled to higher Party authorities sometimes bear coded indications of the source which may be worded as "a confidential contact in the factory cell of _____ reports that ... ." Sometimes samples of component parts of technical construction are stolen or borrowed from a factory, naval shipyard, etc. and are submitted with reports, so that the samples can be examined at Party headquarters. When submitting information through the open mails or over the phone, Party activists have used numbers to identify themselves. Thus it is not completely accurate to speak of these systems of information procurement as overt, but in this discussion they are distinguished from the Party's covert penetration methods of acquiring intelligence information.

57. Automatic Reporting of Information to Party. Since every Communist Party member is, by Party regulation, automatically an informant for the Party, in countries where the Party's membership is large this actually becomes a system of mass procurement of information. There are large numbers of informants at every level of the administrative, political, economic, social, and military agencies, and they contribute great quantities of information.

Beginning on the lowest level, the worker who belongs to a factory cell reports to his cell secretary about conditions in his factory: grievances of the workers, their attitudes toward labor union leaders, wages as compared with those of other workers, whether conditions are favorable for a strike, etc. Workers of the white-collar variety keep the Party posted on business conducted in government agencies, in offices of industrial plants having military contracts, etc.

Much information is passed along the regular channels of the open Party structure in the form of periodic statistical, organizational, personnel, or labor reports made by the secretaries of the Party committees on the various territorial levels. Such periodic, routine reports are funneled into the Organization or Cadre Department, or another office of Party headquarters, and provide much basic data.

58. Specific Party Directives for Information Procurement: In addition to reporting which Party members are expected to do automatically as a normal part of their Party activity, special directives are sometimes issued defining specific information which Party members must contribute. [redacted] 25X6A 25X6A

25X6A

[redacted]

Specific requests for information are also disseminated through the national and international front organizations. Directives of this nature have no restrictive character, but a moral obligation to extend information procurement to more confidential matters is implicit in the directives. [redacted] Engineering [redacted] al construction [redacted] In carrying out this directive, these unions allegedly also worked to acquire information on naval construction as it was geared for wartime requirements.

25X6A

25X6A

[redacted]

59. Information Procurement and Party Propaganda Closely Correlated. The information contributed by Party members as part of the system of automatic reporting is closely related to the Party's main agitation-propaganda themes, which presently stress the "struggle for peace" and "unity of action of the working class." [redacted]

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

25X6A

[redacted]

The close correlation between intelligence and propaganda programs and the probable reliance on local Communist Parties for support for both these activities is indicated in the statement of a high-ranking Soviet intelligence defector, who remarked recently that the "main Soviet intelligence and therefore propaganda strength" was in certain countries where the penetration of vital communications media was more successful and the local Communist Parties more trusted. In other words, in areas from which there is the best flow of economic, industrial, technical, and political intelligence, Soviet propagandists have the best supply of information--a supply which can be used as source material for day-to-day propaganda items.

60. Party and Front Organization "Research" Sections. In each Communist Party--and frequently in each mass organization--there is a unit responsible for research and analysis of information the Party (or front organization) collects. This office is sometimes located within the secretariat of each organization. In one occupied area, for example, the Partisans of Peace there synthesized, in the form of a "White Book," studies on Western war preparations made by Communists. The book allegedly gives a detailed picture of the Allied occupation and of local military installations. The published details reportedly are accurate, and the book contains sketches and photos of military objectives in restricted zones. It is to be taken for granted that all "studies" prepared by a national Communist Party or front organization, are passed to the Soviets; actually they may have been compiled as the result of a Soviet request passed to the Party through the liaison agent.

61. Worker Correspondents. A cleverly devised system of information procurement, and one formerly used only by the Comintern or by the national Communist Parties, the worker correspondents system has become a practice of the front organizations as well. The correspondents are not paid Party workers, although reportedly they are reimbursed for expenses incurred in their work; their activity is explained by the desire of the Communist movement to free itself from "bourgeois" sources of information.

The networks of correspondents are generally connected with central organs of the Communist (or a front organization) press. Each correspondent, a confirmed Communist, reportedly is chosen upon the suggestion of the local leaders of the Party. He must have (theoretically, at least) special aptitude for observation and must keep himself informed about problems related to the Party's political policy.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

The information collection program of the worker correspondents is very broad in scope; in one country, for instance, correspondents are instructed to report on demands for salary increases, working conditions, job accidents and their causes, general operations of the factories, employee benefits, influence of non-Communists, and the prospects for a united front. They must also report about activities of the municipal assemblies, general demands of the people, rural problems, education, and housing.

The worker correspondence system is known to have operated with considerable success in France, where, between the years 1928 and 1932, a Party leader (who was probably a liaison agent) received military information through worker correspondents of L'Humanite, Midi, and other French Communist publications. At an unspecified time during that period (1928-1932) there were allegedly about 2,000 worker correspondents in the Seine Department alone. Although L'Humanite published only a small portion of the material from these correspondents, all of it was apparently screened for intelligence leads, undoubtedly both by Party intelligence operatives and by a Party liaison agent located either on the editorial staff or in one of the other Party headquarters offices.

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) advocates the organization of worker correspondents on a professional basis. The sixth resolution adopted by the Third World Trade Union Congress of the WFTU reads in part:

> "One of the main tasks of all the trade union organizations and the correspondents is to send regular information to the WFTU and its review, on the position of the workers, on the main events in trade union life, on the forms of the struggles of the workers for their vital interests ... . Within the framework of this task, the Congress recommends the trade union organizations to set up networks of correspondents (workers, peasants, intellectuals, women and young people) for the review, 'World Trade Union Movement,' to persuade all active trade unionists and workers to contribute effectively by supplying news, studies, surveys, articles of an educational nature, etc. for the constant improvement of the review, and to make of it an increasingly useful weapon for the active workers, for all the workers, at whatever level they may be in the trade union movement."[1]

[1] Manifesto, Resolutions and Messages adopted by the Third World Trade Union Congress, Vienna, October 10-21, 1953. (Supplement to World Trade Union Movement Nos. 21 & 22, 1953.)

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Besides serving as material for a propaganda weapon, in view of Party and Soviet IS practices in the past it is obvious that any information procured through worker correspondent systems of the present will be exploited wherever possible for intelligence purposes. To what extent the Soviet IS is now profiting from this system cannot at present be accurately gauged.

62. Communist Party Covert Methods of Information Procurement. As previously stated, from the date of the founding of the Comintern each national Communist Party was obliged to establish units responsible for carrying out illegal work as one of the requirements for admission to membership in the Comintern. Actually, each Party was to have a completely organized secret or underground section, parallel to the open Party structure, which in case of necessity could take over the administration and functions of the Party as a whole.

While the open structure of the Party still functions as a legal entity, the underground Party works quietly in the background, developing its structure for eventual assumption of control and performing the illegal, covert work any revolutionary party must perform at all times.

In this study (as previously stated) we shall use the terminology used in certain overt writings (Whittaker Chambers' Witness, for example) and, in speaking of a Party's underground structure as a whole, we shall use the term "underground section." In referring to the various component subsections of the underground structure, we shall use the term "illegal apparat," or, in the case of those apparats performing espionage, the term "intelligence apparat."

63. Illegal Apparats Formed as Required. Adaptability of Communist organization is probably nowhere in better evidence than in the underground sections of the national Communist Parties. These have had a complete organizational setup on paper only, with the component units (illegal apparats) coming to life only as there was definite need for them to perform specific tasks. Thus, in the United States, for example, illegal apparats (of the underground section of the Communist Party) have been activated (1) in key industrial areas, to carry out Communist labor union activities or procure industrial or technical information; (2) in places where there was opportunity to spread Communist propaganda (Hollywood and other film centers); (3) in Washington, to infiltrate policymaking bureaus of the government for the purpose of exerting Communist influence or procuring political information; (4) near chemical or other research laboratories working on secret developments, to obtain scientific information.

So well designed are the underground sections--and their several illegal apparats--for collaboration with Soviet intelligence that it is obvious their establishment (provided for by Bolshevik leaders through the Comintern Statutes and Conditions of Admission) was made with the Soviet intelligence program in view. The responsibilities of the Soviet intelligence services are broader than those of most non-Orbit governments, since

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they must covertly perform a variety of assignments which will support the Soviet program for ultimate world domination. Secret or illegal sections and apparats of the national Communist Parties have a definite obligation to provide covert assistance to the espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and other missions which the Soviet intelligence services perform.

Personnel for the illegal apparats are frequently drawn from a Communist Party's secret membership; members and sympathizers drawn from the front organizations frequently are found as participants in illegal--including intelligence--apparats.

64. Apparats Frequently of More Than One Level. In some of the national Communist Parties extensive illegal apparats have sometimes consisted of more than one level, with the broader level functioning (often disguised as a study group) so as to: (a) indoctrinate thoroughly persons relatively new to the movement, and (b) infiltrate secret Party members into key places in government departments, research centers, etc. These tasks could be classified strictly as Communist Party work. These groups are sometimes under the direction of experienced Party functionaries, who prepare psychological or progress reports on the development of the newer members. The reports undoubtedly become available to persons acting as Party liaison agents. A small, more selective group is gradually recruited from the broader apparat to perform more sensitive tasks--usually of most interest to a Soviet service.

When an apparat has the definite function to procure intelligence, this split-level nature sometimes is still noticeable. Here, the broader level is found again to perform tasks which are primarily of Communist Party interest. More often this is security or counterespionage work, while the second level, usually a more compact unit, is found to procure positive intelligence information.

65. General Characteristics of Party Intelligence Apparats. Before any individual Party apparat is discussed, a few observations which are applicable to many of them can be made:

a. There seems to be no standard plan for placing a Party intelligence apparat within any specific open Party office, but in several cases where their existence has become known they have been found camouflaged within the Organization Secretariat, the Political Secretariat (or sometimes within a Work Committee which may be the executive unit for either an Organization or Political Secretariat), or within the Control Commission. In other instances, they have apparently been organized under the office of the leader of the entire underground Party structure.

b. When a Party official supervises the work of the apparat, it has been found that the functionary has at least county or district

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organizer rank. In at least five national Communist Parties, one or more of the highest ranking Party officials, simultaneously acting as Party liaison agent, has administered the Party intelligence apparats.

c. Some of the Party apparats organized to carry out Soviet espionage have existed as "sleeper" apparats, having no active duties for a number of years, until the Soviet service responsible for their establishment decided to activate them. This was the status of Whittaker Chambers' apparat for a while.

d. Some apparats organized during or just after World War II show signs of having been hastily organized and insecurely operated--possibly due to Soviet urgent need for specific information. For example, an apparat uncovered in England during World War II was headed by the Party Organization Secretary, Douglas Frank Springhall. Apparently without using cut-outs, he contacted secret Party members in the British Air Ministry, Army, Intelligence Service, and other government agencies, and, naturally, his operations were exposed.

e. Party intelligence apparats operating during World War II were of two general types: (1) those which had been functioning over a long period of time--such as the apparats based on the Ware and Silvermaster groups in Washington, or (2) those which were quickly organized to work against a Soviet priority target--such as the one previously mentioned in England and the group operating under David G. Lunan in Canada and directed by Lt. Col. Rogov. Close supervision was given these groups by Soviet legal resident agents, and directives from Moscow, taken out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa by Gouzenko, reveal irrefutable Soviet interest in them.

f. In at least two national Communist Parties, doormen or guards at the Party headquarters building have participated in the intelligence apparat by serving as cut-outs for Party intelligence apparat leaders.

66. Intelligence Apparats of Various National Communist Parties.

a. Labour-Progressive Party of Canada. At least three apparats made up exclusively of secret Party members or sympathizers were uncovered at the time of the defection of Igor Gouzenko, code clerk of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Since the groups have been described in detail in the published account of the trials,[2] only a general outline of their composition and intelligence tasks will be given here.

[2] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946.

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(1) Ottawa-Toronto Group. This came under the ultimate direction of Col. Zabotin, Soviet Military Intelligence legal resident agent, who apparently was assisted by two other official Soviet representatives in contacting this Party apparat. Within the apparat there were apparently two participants who at times had direct contact with the Soviets: Sam Carr, a liaison agent in the Canadian Labour-Progressive Party, and James Scotland Benning. Carr was the only member of the apparat known openly as a Communist.



Fig. 3. Ottawa-Toronto Wartime Party Intelligence Apparat

Benning, who began working for the Soviets at the end of January 1943, was an employee of the Allied War Supplies Corporation and provided information about war supplies. In April 1945, he became joint Secretary of the Canadian Munitions Assignment Committee.

Squadron Leader F. W. Poland, probably a sympathizer, was an Administrative Intelligence Officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force, Ottawa. He was responsible for Security Education throughout the RCAF through the Command Intelligence Service and for advising the Director of Intelligence on all matters of security policy. Poland was also Secretary of the Security Subcommittee of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee. At the time of Gouzenko's defection he had contributed only maps of air force training schools, obviously a trial assignment, although it is probable he had done work for another network--one operated by Soviet State Security.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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Eric Adams was for a time Technical Adviser to the Wartime Requirements Board and later was head of the Statistics and Research Section of the Foreign Exchange Control Board. He provided detailed information about all industries, plans for the future, and information about conferences.

Surensen had left Canada by the time of the trials; it is not known what information he supplied.

Kathleen Willsher, an employee of the Office of the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom, provided information (through Eric Adams) about the activities of this office and concerning relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, the significance of the visits of prominent British officials, etc. Her contact with Adams was made at the time of secret cell meetings ("study group" meetings), although their conversations about intelligence activities were held privately.

(2) Apparats Organized by Fred Rose. Two other Party intelligence apparats in Canada were organized by Fred Rose, Party Organization Secretary for the Province of Quebec, member of the Party's Control Commission, and Member of Parliament. One of these, called the "Research Group" and located in Montreal, came under the administration of David Gordon Lunan, a writer for the Canadian Information Service, who was in direct touch with Lt. Col. Rogov, a Soviet Military Intelligence legal resident agent. Lunan acted as the contact with a group of secret Party members who were participants in a secret cell of Communist scientists, and directed the group as instructed by Lt. Col. Rogov. Lunan also provided some political intelligence information.



Fig. 4. "The Research Group"

Halperin told about the organization and characteristics of Valcartier Explosive Establishment's Direction; Smith provided

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information about the Radio Laboratory of the National Research Council; Mazerall was to provide models of developed radio sets, photographs, and technical data, and was to describe the work of the Radio Department of the National Research Council and its future tasks.

Halperin, Smith, and Mazerall worked as a team and objected to admitting new members for fear that it might jeopardize them. Lunan and Smith had become acquainted with Fred Rose in the front organization called the Quebec Committee for Allied Victory.

Fred Rose had also organized an apparat called the "Montreal Group," composed of secret Party members (or sympathizers) who worked against a variety of Soviet intelligence targets.



Fig. 5. "The Montreal Group"

"Gray" (Harold S. Gerson) was a geologist who was head of a section of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Ottawa. He supplied information about shells and cannons. "Green" (not further identified) worked in the administrative office of a tank plant in Montreal and gave details about the number of tanks delivered to the Canadian Army. The "Professor" (Raymond Boyer) was a noted chemist of McGill University who supplied information about explosives and chemical plants. The auxiliary group was concerned with photographic work; Gini had a photolaboratory and provided a place for the photographing of documents, plans, etc. Golia was a young artist who worked in a photo studio.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

b. Wartime Apparat in California. A Party intelligence apparat in operation in California during World War II consisted of several subsections or groups, each of which worked as a team against specific Soviet intelligence targets. Directors of the apparats were two Communist Party officials, one of whom was then Alameda County Party Organizer; both were Comintern-trained operatives who have probably been liaison agents for Soviet State Security in the Communist Party of the United States for many years.



Fig. 6. CPUSA Apparat Active During World War II

c. Norwegian Communist Party. In late 1949 the Norwegian CP reportedly had at least three apparats, each of which was to procure military information, working respectively against the Royal Norwegian Navy, Army, and Air Force. All were allegedly under the direction of Just Lippe, a member of the Control Commission of that Party and a Party liaison agent. Available information pertains mostly to that unit operating against the Navy from late 1949 to April 1951, whose key member was Per Danielsen, a Communist Party member and son of a Norwegian admiral.

In connection with operations of this unit, liaison with Soviet legal resident agents was maintained by Lippe and Danielsen.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

The latter received guidance from both Lippe and the Soviet officials. Clandestine meetings between Danielsen and Soviet officers were poorly conceived, as the participants could easily be placed under surveillance and identified. Security violations led to relatively quick exposure.

Another Norwegian Party apparat, functioning under the immediate leadership of Asbjoern Sunde, a Communist resistance leader during World War II, was exposed by Norwegian Security Police in early February 1954. An open Party member, Sunde had been in direct contact with Soviet legal resident agents in Oslo since the end of World War II. Whether or not he, like Danielsen, also came under the supervision of Lippe, is not known.

Sunde's apparat reportedly had penetration agents in the Oslo police, in the Norwegian Army, and presumably in the Navy, since his principal targets also seemed to be naval installations and ships, harbors, and other coastal defenses, as well as MDAP assistance and defense industries. Sunde was arrested in early February 1954, while on his way to a meeting with a Soviet official.

d. Pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste. The intelligence apparat of this Party is divided into two main divisions: (1) an "Internal Section," which performs security and investigation work and which is camouflaged within the Cadre Committee of the open Party; and (2) an "External Section," which carries out positive intelligence assignments and is located within the "Work Committee" (the executive unit of the Political Committee) of the open Party. Administrators of both sections are open Party officers under the ultimate direction of Vittorio Vidali, Secretary General; they are assisted by other open Party members in directing secret agents recruited mostly from front organizations and from Yugoslav refugee groups.

Among targets of the External Section are: the Yugoslav Communist Party; the Yugoslav Army; Yugoslav political and economic institutions; the pro-Tito (Babic) Communist Party in Zone A and all pro-Tito activists in Trieste; activities of the Yugoslav Communist Party in Zone B; military, political, economic, and cultural information concerning Zone B; Yugoslav connections in Trieste and the contacts which exist between Titoists in Zone B and British and Americans in Trieste; and the identification of and background information on all refugees living in Trieste.

The External Section relies upon a front organization, "The Solidarity Committee with Victims of Tito-Fascist Terror," as a recruitment base and for other operational support. The alleged chief of the External Section is the titular head of the Solidarity Committee, although he shows little interest in its overt activities.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

For the following reasons it seems probable that the pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste is a major source of information about Yugoslavia for Soviet IS: (1) known Party intelligence targets concern Yugoslav affairs and are of obvious interest to the Soviets; (2) refugees from the Tito regime living in Trieste furnish a base for recruitment of agent personnel; (3) border controls are relatively more lax between Yugoslavia and Trieste than those between Yugoslavia and the Satellite countries.

There have been reports that information procured through this Party is passed to a Soviet intelligence service through the headquarters of a Communist-front organization in Rome, but to date these reports have not been confirmed. It is likely that Soviet IS liaison with functionaries of the Trieste pro-Cominform CP is usually held behind the Iron Curtain (including Soviet-controlled areas of Austria). The Party official believed to be immediately responsible for the procurement of positive intelligence has made regular trips to countries behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet IS liaison with the Trieste Party possibly is also maintained through certain members of the Italian Communist Party who serve as intermediaries.

e. Greek Communist Party. Apparats (or "mechanisms" as they are called in Greece) of the Greek Communist Party underwent relatively rapid growth during the dictatorship of Metaxas in the years 1936-1940. Hence, during the German occupation the Greek Communist Party already had a fully developed underground organization of experienced personnel. Through manipulation of united front organizations, the Greek Communist Party rose to command over the resistance movement in Greece, which received Allied recognition and support.

The Greek CP during and since World War II has used three principal media for its illegal work: (1) large front organizations (e.g., the Greek Federation of Maritime Unions), which have served both as a base for personnel and as a means of penetrating the Greek maritime service and Communist-controlled, left-wing political parties (e.g., the United Democratic Left); (2) illegal apparats or mechanisms for penetration of all phases of Greek domestic affairs; (3) clandestine radio apparats for prompt transmission of information to Greek Communist leaders in Rumania. Naturally, there is opportunity for information to be passed to the Soviets--at no security risk--by Greek Communists in forced exile behind the Iron Curtain.

While leadership of the entire Party underground is held by veteran Communists, some of the principal agents directing the illegal mechanisms are sometimes teachers, lawyers, or other well-educated Greek citizens who were attracted to the Party during World War II via resistance or other front organizations. Because of the precarious employment situation in Greece after the war, many of these people

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stayed with the Party and were found still active as intelligence agents when some of the apparats were exposed in 1950 and 1951.

Over the long period of illegality during the occupation, the apparats (or mechanisms) had opportunity to acquire experience, and some of the Party underground operatives came to have professional competence in intelligence work. Thus, a former teacher of mathematics who had not joined the Party until 1942 is known to have directed an illegal mechanism, consisting of more than 100 persons, which penetrated all government agencies. He was active until at least July of 1950.

f. Philippine Communist Party. The Philippine Communist Party, a completely underground organization, has had a complex intelligence system under a National Intelligence Department. Captured documents found during government raids of October 1950 indicated that, on paper at least, there was an elaborate organizational arrangement, with parallel systems of civilian and military intelligence apparats which theoretically would complement one another. In actual practice, due to security precautions which had to be observed and the lack of an adequate number of experienced personnel, civilian and military apparats probably have worked as combined units to exploit advantageously the Party's resources for any given task.

In common with several other national Communist Parties, the Philippine CP reorganized its intelligence department in early 1950, an occurrence which suggests a central directive, possibly emanating from the Soviet Union with plans for aggression in Korea in view.

Up to October 1950, Philippine Communist Party intelligence activities were directed toward procurement of military, political, economic, and cultural information, in that order of priority. No evidence of local Soviet direction over Philippine Party intelligence work had been found up to October 1950, and there was no evidence that intelligence was forwarded to a Soviet recipient. At times, the Party was able to procure remarkably accurate information on domestic military, economic, and political affairs, but failed completely in its procurement of foreign intelligence, since it relied on biased, unobjective Communist publications.

g. French Communist Party (Post-World War II). Many conflicting reports about this apparat exist, and it is therefore difficult to construct a true picture on the basis of information now available. A few facts, however, can be set forth as being probably true:

(1) The French Communist Party does have a formally organized intelligence apparat, which, like the Norwegian and pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste apparats, is administered by open Party officials.

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(2) The present intelligence apparat is probably composed of remnants of an older Party intelligence apparat--possibly that operating under Henri Robinson in the 1930's--plus elements of an intelligence network administered by the Franc Tireurs et Partisans Francais during World War II. Activities of this resistance organization may still serve occasionally as cover for Party intelligence work.

(3) As a mass Party, the French Communist Party has informants who automatically report information to the Party about activity on every level of French economic, labor, industrial, political, and scientific endeavors. Party members showing outstanding aptitude for reporting may be recruited as Party newswriters, since in this role they have legitimate access to every social, political, or business circle. For security reasons, intelligence reports are written in the style of newspaper reports and are submitted to Party intelligence officers in that way.

(4) The Party goes to considerable effort to maintain contact with Communists drafted into the French armed services. These persons are encouraged to continue the practice of reporting information to the Party, and arrangements are made for agents of the Party's intelligence apparat to have permanent contact with Communists in military service who show that they have access to valuable intelligence information.

(5) Communist-front groups in France have been useful for the penetration of a variety of targets. The General Confederation of Labor (CGT) unions, for example, reportedly have been of assistance in infiltrating the police and security services; the Association of Scientific Workers has been instrumental in providing the Party intelligence apparat with "studies" on atomic energy, etc.; Russian emigre groups have been penetrated through the France-URSS, a VOKS-supported association sponsoring friendship with the Soviet Union. Allegedly the Party intelligence apparat has agents in the various front organizations who receive reports from informants in their memberships.

(6) Pertinent portions of the intelligence product of the French Party's apparat are probably passed to a Soviet intelligence representative in France through leaders of the apparat itself or through certain officials of France-URSS.

(7) According to a Satellite defector, the intelligence apparat of the French Communist Party appears to maintain liaison with at least one Satellite Party through the Military Commission

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

of the French Communist Party. There are also indications that the Military Commission may, indeed, control the intelligence apparat of the Party.[3]

(8) Probably within the headquarters of the French Communist Party intelligence apparat is a unit responsible for administering secret Party cells which assist Soviet deep-cover agents operating in France. According to a recent defector, these cells are "dedicated exclusively to provide cover for Soviet agents in France or, specifically, to defend them from the French counterintelligence service." Not only in cases of emergency but at all times the secret Party cells can be contacted if a Soviet agent needs local assistance.

(9) Several of the doormen and guards at Party headquarters in Paris serve as cut-outs for Party intelligence chiefs.

h. Tudeh Party. Only a rough outline of the organization of this apparat is presently available. As an underground Party, its existence depends on daily watchfulness; therefore, it is to be expected that much of its intelligence effort is of a counterintelligence nature. One Tudeh Party intelligence operative who was slated to be transferred to positive intelligence work was found several months later to be still active as a counterintelligence agent, indicating that this phase is very likely given the most attention.

Like the pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste, the Tudeh's intelligence apparat reportedly is composed of two main subdivisions: an internal section, which is apparently concerned with counterintelligence information, and a "foreign intelligence section." Little is known about the latter section.

Counterintelligence operations of the Tudeh Party apparat are presently being run against Iranian Army G-2 and secret police personnel and against a Court-supported intelligence network. Also, a positive-type operation directed against United Nations personnel stationed in Iran appears to have been activated.

67. Front Organizations: Instruments for Information Procurement. From the earliest days of the Communist movement, as stated previously in the discussion of Comintern auxiliary organizations, these have been

[3] Possibly the intelligence apparat of the Italian Communist Party is similarly organized, since a Polish defector has related instances in which the Polish Communist Party, desiring to obtain information from Italy, made contact through its Foreign Affairs Branch with the Military Commission of the Italian Party.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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indispensable for clandestine work. In penetrating targets of interest to Soviet intelligence and in recruiting new members for both secret Party apparats and for Soviet professional networks the front organizations have been indispensable. International front organizations and their national affiliates--such as worker's relief, unemployment, refugee, antifascist, antiimperialist, labor, youth, professional, partisan, and, more recently, the "peace" associations have all contributed to Party and Soviet penetration work, as well as to the recruitment of additional personnel who carry out such activity. The use of front organizations for illegal Party and Soviet intelligence purposes despite the Soviet desire to keep them untainted is of such proportions that it is possible to treat the subject only in a summary fashion here.

In the pre-World War II period, certain persons in the international front organizations were considered reserves for Soviet Military Intelligence, particularly those who could assist in setting up business cover for specific Soviet intelligence projects. Whether members of international fronts are still similarly utilized is not known.

68. The International Front Organizations: Their Intelligence Import. While the international front organizations appear to have as their primary function the "education of the masses" through dissemination of Soviet-sponsored propaganda, a secondary purpose as significant as the primary one is the procurement of information, largely through the pooling and collating of that contributed by the national affiliates. Each of the international bodies is directed against a variety of Soviet intelligence targets: the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), for instance, is responsible for the compilation of scientific information; the World Peace Movement for technical and military data; the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) for industrial, economic, and labor reporting, etc.

a. World Federation of Trade Unions. Because of its horizontal and vertical structure, the WFTU is of considerable importance for intelligence procurement. Through the national trade union affiliates, WFTU leaders have an exact picture of economic and labor conditions in the countries in which the affiliates are located. Through the trade union internationals, a continental or international approach to an intelligence target can be made. Thus, the seamen's and dockers' unions affiliated with the Trade Union International (TUI) of Transport, Port, and Fishery Workers, have informed this TUI headquarters office about delivery of American arms, a subject which reportedly they were directed to give priority attention. The TUI of Metal and Engineering Industry Workers, in collaboration with the TUI of Miners, allegedly has followed closely all questions relating to the Schuman Plan.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

b. The International Federation of Resistants, Victims, and Prisoners of Fascism (FIR). The presence of several Communists known to be, or to have been, connected with their Party intelligence apparats or with a Soviet intelligence service on directing committees of the FIR would indicate that this international body rather definitely has covert intelligence functions. However, to date the specific intelligence role of this international front is not known.[4]

c. World Peace Movement. This international front has been responsible in several known instances for the collection of diversified intelligence information. Its information procurement program has had two purposes: (a) support and assistance for the agitation-propaganda activity of international Communism, and (b) support for the advancement of the military, political, economic, and social programs of this international movement and its parent organization, the Soviet Party-Government.

An example of information procurement for the first purpose was the effort of Prof. Andre A. Bonnard, President of the Swiss Peace Movement, to procure information about the International Red Cross. This he carried out in connection with World Peace Council efforts to spread the story that U. N. forces employed bacteriological weapons in the Korean War. Swiss courts found Bonnard guilty of political espionage on behalf of a foreign power. Instances are known where national affiliates of this organization worked to procure and correlate military information.

Instances are also known where the headquarters of the international movement--the World Peace Council itself--has sought intelligence information. In February 1954, Jean Lafitte, Secretary of the World Peace Council, requested the Secretary General of the Peace Movement in a Latin American country to submit to the Council a daily dispatch of information on subjects discussed at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, "especially items which the international news agencies were prevented from reporting."

Since all the international front organizations are ultimately directed by the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it is obvious that all information collated at their headquarters offices is undoubtedly routed by Soviet representatives (who are always in key positions) to the Soviet national affiliates, and any significant political, military, scientific, etc. intelligence data would logically be channeled to the Foreign Section or to an interested Soviet intelligence service.

[4] This international front was founded by Communists and sympathizers; it is based largely on wartime partisan, prisoner-of-war, and deportee associations.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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Soviet State Security use of international front organization meetings for contact with foreign delegates who provide information on an unwitting basis during informal conversations has been pointed out previously.

69. National Front Organizations: Their Uses for Soviet Intelligence. Control over the intelligence effort of a national front organization may be in the hands of a Communist Party liaison agent, who is possibly serving as a leader of the front organization itself, or the control may be wielded by a Party liaison agent at Party headquarters who has assistants in the front organization acting as talent spotters or as cut-outs in procuring information from sources in the front organizations.[5]

a. Story of an American Communist Active in Front Organizations. One method of illustrating the value of these organizations to Soviet intelligence is to follow the career of an American Communist, Marcel Scherer, who very probably has been a Party liaison agent since at least the early 1930's and has worked mainly through national front organizations. In 1928 Scherer was given the assignment of establishing within the American Party a National Department which would work among scientists and technicians. Working with him in setting up this Department were William Z. Foster and John Pepper (Josef Pogany), a Comintern representative in the United States.

(1) National Department for Work Among Scientists and Technicians. The purposes of this National Department were twofold: (1) to obtain all possible scientific information in the United States and to transmit it to the Soviet Union; (2) to get as many key scientists as possible into the Party so the Party would be able to cripple American industry in the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the United States and any other country--in order to permit the Communists to exploit a chaotic situation.

(2) The FAECT. Scherer received instruction at the Comintern's Lenin School about 1932; upon his return to the United States he founded an organization (probably as the result of a Soviet intelligence or Comintern directive) which came to be known as the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT) which would facilitate his work among people of these professions. It is known that Scherer was the director of this organization from its inception, although his

[5] As in the case of the liaison agents in the national Communist Parties, all front organization personnel who collaborate with a Soviet intelligence service, whether on a professional or less formal basis, will be referred to here as "liaison agents" for purposes of simplification.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

listed position was only Executive Vice President. Although little is known about specific information procured through the FAECT, Scherer is known to have told another Party member in the summer of 1939 that it had made great progress and had reached a position from which it could fulfill its early objectives (identical with those of the Party's National Department for scientists and technicians). The organization was carefully camouflaged as a trade union, and in about 1937 was successful in obtaining a charter in an International Union in the CIO.

From the early part of World War II until the summer of 1943, Scherer was personally active in organizing chapters of the FAECT near such installations as the Donner Radiation Laboratory of the University of California, the Shell Development Company Laboratory in Emeryville, California, and various other points where work on atomic energy and on other components used in the production of explosives was being done. Working with Scherer in organizing Communist scientists into penetration groups on the West Coast were Steve Nelson and Bernadette Doyle, both one-time organization secretaries of the Communist Party in Alameda County, and Kenneth May, who headed a "special section" which appears to have had three branches: one working against the University of California, another directed specifically against the Radiation Laboratory, and a third which was apparently operating against government employees in the area.

(3) Scherer's Connections with Other Front Groups. Not only was Scherer carrying out clandestine Party activity by means of the FAECT, but he was also connected with several other Communist-dominated front groups.

At an unspecified date Scherer was Secretary of Comintern-controlled Workers' International Relief (WIR) in the United States. He reportedly obtained great amounts of information through his photographic work in the Workers' Film and Photo League of the WIR, where amateur photographers sent him photographs which were of intelligence value to the Soviet Union.

A Party defector who knew Scherer in the Soviet Union in 1931 reports that Scherer was involved at that time in discussions about broadening and strengthening the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in the United States and Canada; Scherer reportedly was appointed to perfect the development of IPR activity in the United States. Elizabeth Bentley has stated that the IPR was used by the American Communist Party to place secret Party members in policymaking jobs relating to the Far East, where they would be of use to Soviet intelligence services. According to her, Jacob Golos criticized the security of operations

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handled through the Institute of Pacific Relations and described it as a "hangover from the old days," when the Soviets did not operate properly. All material acquired from members of the IPR, according to Miss Bentley, was passed to the Soviets through Earl Browder, Secretary General of the American Communist Party.

Over a long period of time Marcel Scherer was an officer of the Friends of the Soviet Union. He was at one time Organizer of that association and was known as its manager in the 1930's. In 1931 and 1932 he was appointed National Secretary of this organization; in 1941 he is known to have signed himself as Secretary of it. Specific information about his exploitation of the Friends of the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes is not known.

Although much of his work in this organization, and presumably in the other front groups as well, actually concerned propaganda, labor agitation, or other overt activity, probably throughout his career in the front associations, he has been simultaneously an agent for a Soviet intelligence service. More recently, Scherer has probably used "peace" work as a camouflage for his illegal activities; in March 1951 he was serving as New York Coordinator of the National Labor Conference for Peace.

b. "Scientific" Front Organizations. Three types of front organizations of this nature have been exploited by Communists for propaganda and, in some known cases, for espionage purposes: (a) longstanding, nonpolitical scientific organizations into which secret Party members or sympathizers have been infiltrated; (b) scientific or technical front organizations which a Communist Party itself has established at a much earlier period for purposes of extending Communist influence or facilitating Communist penetration of scientific laboratories and research centers; (c) scientific associations set up in several countries, apparently at Soviet instigation, either during or shortly after World War II.

The British Association of Scientific Workers is an example of a nonpolitical organization over which Party members or sympathizers gradually asserted control. It had been founded in 1918, had operated as a trade union affiliated with the British Trades Union Congress, and had sought to influence governmental scientific policy. By 1946 its most active members were Communists or sympathizers who apparently had been instructed to create a worldwide organization of scientists, a task they accomplished in 1946 with the founding of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW).

This international scientific organization was to be an agency permitting mutual cooperation between national scientific

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organizations and was to promote human welfare through the application and development of science. Its very limited scope of overt activity has been largely Communist propaganda; its chief purposes are probably to facilitate Soviet acquisition of scientific data and to develop among scientists the conviction that they contribute most to human progress by disregarding governmental security regulations and freely exchanging scientific data with scientists of all nations.

A whole new crop of scientific workers' organizations appeared during the decade 1943 to 1953. Among these have been: the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers, formed in the fall of 1943; the French organizations, the Association des Travailleurs Scientifiques (ATS) formally established in 1944, and the Syndicat de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Enseignement Superieur; the Association of Scientific Workers of India, established January 1947; and the Netherlands Association of Scientific Research Workers (VWO). Most of these organizations were at one time under Communist domination.

c. The Canadian Association of Scientific Workers. Informal meetings for the purpose of organizing the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers were held in the home of Prof. Raymond Boyer, who was subsequently convicted on charges of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Norman Veall, also implicated in the Canadian espionage case of 1946, admitted taking an active part in the formation of the organization and was a member of its National Executive Committee, responsible for maintaining liaison with fraternal organizations in other countries. According to the Royal Commission Report, there is evidence that he used this position as a cover for making contacts with members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Another secret Party member involved in Soviet espionage, David Shugar, testified that he had been very active in organizing and extending the Association and that he had been elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Ottawa Branch.

Still another Party member active in Soviet intelligence stated that the Association was something "which people in the study groups were interested in forming"--in other words secret Party members were obviously under instruction to establish a scientific front association to facilitate Soviet penetration work. That the Canadian Association was primarily founded to uncover persons amenable to carrying out Soviet espionage is strongly suggested by the fact that after these activities were exposed by the Canadian espionage trials (based on evidence supplied by Igor Gouzenko) the organization ceased to be active.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

SECTION VII. THE NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS AS SOVIET RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING BASES

Another major form of support rendered by the foreign Communist Parties and their front organizations in the past has been the supplying of manpower for Soviet State Security and Soviet Military Intelligence. Both services have appeared to prefer recruits from the Parties' secret membership, but both--in the past--have drawn heavily upon the open Parties for new agents.

Having been recruited for a Soviet professional intelligence service, it was common practice for an agent recruited from open Party membership to drop out of open Party activity. The exception to this procedure has been the Party liaison agent (who is sometimes of professional Soviet intelligence status), who remains as an active member or leader in the Party and who uses his Party position wherever possible for the benefit of the Soviet service with which he is affiliated.

70. Soviet Recruitment in the Communist Parties: Statements of Defectors. Information from Soviet intelligence and Communist Party defectors has revealed somewhat the extent of Soviet reliance on the national Communist movements as bases for agent personnel. Especially heavy, according to defectors, has been Soviet dependence upon the American Communist Party for this purpose. A statement of Walter Krivitsky, formerly responsible for all Soviet State Security operations in Western Europe, is illuminating:

> "In the United States, the Communist Party as such never played any serious role, and was always regarded by Moscow with supreme contempt. For all its long years of activity up to 1935, the American Communist Party had almost nothing to show. Organized labor did not respond to its slogans, and the mass of American people were barely aware of its existence. Even in those years, however, the Party was important to us, because it was more closely connected than any other Communist Party with our OGPU and Intelligence Service. During the mechanization and motorization of the Red Army, we had members of the American Communist Party as our agents in aircraft and automobile factories and in munitions plants."[1]

[1] Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, p. 90.

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Dependence on the Communist Party of the United States for intelligence agents for Soviet State Security is also mentioned by Elizabeth Bentley. She quotes Jacob Golos as having stated:

> "'The Soviet Union is in a bad position in regard to finding undercover agents; unlike the British Empire, which can call on any of its nationals abroad, we don't have many Russians who are sympathetic to the new regime. Of course, we can always buy people--and we do when necessary--but it is better to have people with the right ideology. That's the function of the American Communist Party; it's the reservoir from which we draw most of our agents.'"[2]

One valuable Soviet State Security agent--among the many others--recruited directly from the open Party in the United States was Nicholas Dozenberg, a charter Party member, who successfully set up business cover for the Soviets in China and Rumania.

In the 1920's and 1930's a Soviet agent recruited from a national Communist Party most commonly was found to have served first as an open Party member, then gradually to have progressed to secret Party work or to Comintern activity, and finally to have been transferred from an illegal Party apparat or from a Comintern network to a Soviet intelligence service. There was extensive recruitment in some countries--Germany, for example--from underground Party apparats.

71. Front Organizations as Recruitment Bases. In recent years there has been a greater tendency to use the front organizations as preliminary Soviet recruitment bases. From the front organization--where he is spotted by a Party member who is either a liaison agent or a talent spotter acting on behalf of the liaison agent--a prospective agent is invited to join a secret Party cell, frequently referred to as a "study group." Here he is indoctrinated to the point where his allegiance to the Party over all other loyalties is completely assured.

From the study group the prospective agent may progress to a Party intelligence apparat (contributing information concerning a specific Soviet target) or he may become a Soviet professional intelligence agent, in touch first with a Party liaison agent (or another trusted Party cut-out) and subsequently in direct contact with a Soviet agent.

The current value of front organizations as sources of personnel for illegal Party and/or Soviet intelligence activity cannot be overlooked.

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[2] Elizabeth Bentley, Out of Bondage, p. 257.

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At present in the Trieste area, for example, Party-controlled refugee and partisan associations are used by the pro-Cominform Communist Party as a source for agents the Party can send back into Yugoslavia for penetration work.

72. Study and Professional Groups. There appear to be two types of secret study groups within a national Communist Party: (1) those formed as a means of preparing Communists ideologically for illegal Party work or for eventual employment in Soviet espionage; (2) those formed as a disguise for a unit of an illegal Party apparat, in which Party members--usually of the same profession or employed at the same factory, research center, military base, etc.--act as a team in performing espionage. Here we will discuss only the first, the type which is designed to draw qualified persons into clandestine Party (and Soviet) activity.

Study groups found to be functioning as recruitment bases in Canada are described in The Report of the Royal Commission as follows:

> "These study groups were in fact 'cells' and were the recruiting centres for agents, and the medium of development of the necessary frame of mind which was a preliminary condition to eventual service of the Soviet Union in a more practical way."[3]

The Royal Commission found that for each of the study groups in Canada there were veteran Party activists who prepared psychological reports on persons in the groups as routine procedure. The reports were passed up through Party channels to higher authorities, and thus facilitated selection of secret Party members for illegal work and indicated the best method of approaching them.

The close interest of national Party officials in the study or professional ("pro") groups as they were operating shortly after World War II in the United States has been related by Herbert Philbrick. He has described the Pro-Council, "the governing body of the entire pro-group" (presumably in the Boston, Massachusetts area) as having a direct link with national Party headquarters in New York.[4] It is presumed that the link was with the chief of the underground section, CPUSA.

Extensive study groups were often composed of persons who had been attracted to the movement via one of the front organizations--the Anti-Fascist League, a refugee organization, the Red Aid, etc. From their

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[3] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 44.

[4] Herbert Philbrick, I Led Three Lives, pp. 257-258.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

very first contact with the Party, certain individuals--frequently scientists, government office workers, etc.--were steered into one of the study or professional groups. Then, either as a more select group or as individuals, certain members of the broader study groups gradually became involved in work of a more secret nature, having been systematically and psychologically prepared for such activity by the training received in the larger study group. Thus, after a period of time they were willing to cooperate in the procurement of information. Rarely were they told at first that information they contributed was for a Soviet destination; in the early phase they were led to believe that it was for the Party's exclusive use, until gradually they came to suspect, through the nature of the information requested, that it probably was for the Soviet Union.

An alternative method of recruitment was thus gradually developed--as opposed to the former system of drawing people from the open Party and having them drop out of sight and then become active for a Soviet net. The steps in the recruitment process from the study groups, as they were taken by the prospective agent, were often as follows: activity in a front organization, participation in a large study group, membership in a group performing secret penetration work. After the systematic and thorough indoctrination this system afforded, the approach to a prospective recruit for a Soviet intelligence service was a relatively easy matter.

With only one exception, persons involved in the Canadian espionage case were found to have been active in either a front organization (where they had been spotted by a Party liaison agent) or in one of the secret study groups. Kathleen M. Willsher, an employee of the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Ottawa, testified during the 1946 trials in Canada that she had been requested as far back as 1935 by Fred Rose (whom she met at a study group meeting) to supply information for the Party's use about activity within the High Commissioner's Office. (Fred Rose, as stated previously, was a Communist Parliamentarian and liaison agent within the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada.)

78. Talent Spotting. Finding new recruits for a Soviet intelligence service within either the open section of a national Communist Party or within its secret cells or study groups is one of the duties of the Party liaison agent himself, but he may also have trusted Party members scattered throughout the Party organization who help him with this work.

Among known Party liaison agents who have recruited for Soviet intelligence are: Sam Carr and Fred Rose of the Canadian Communist movement; Earl Browder of the American Communist Party; Humbert-Droz, formerly of the Swiss Communist Party; and Sixten Rogeby of the Swedish Communist Party. Some liaison agents specialized in finding agents within specific

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

professions; for instance, Isaac Folkoff of the American Party looked for technical and scientific agents.[5]

One known Soviet agent operating from within a national Party, Jacob Golos, had helpers to do talent spotting for him, according to Elizabeth Bentley:

> "Over a period of many years Yasha [Golos] had built up a series of 'look-outs'--people strategically situated in Communist-front organizations or in the Party itself--through whom he could contact Communists who would be useful for espionage work."[6]

Grace Granich, one of these "look-outs" or talent spotters, discovered Helen Tenney for Golos. He subsequently used Helen Tenney as a penetration agent in the wartime Office of Strategic Services.

74. Vetting. In checking and investigating personal data concerning individuals proposed for intelligence work by liaison agents or talent spotters, information in Party and front organizations is checked and then old Comintern files and Soviet intelligence services files are utilized as a double check. The Party's Central Control Commission or Cadre (Personnel) Department files appear to be most valuable for vetting, as they are a repository for detailed dossiers on every Party member. Soviet defectors testify that records on all Communist Party members are more complete in Moscow than elsewhere.

A note of instruction written by Lt. Col. Rogov of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, and which was brought out by Igor Gouzenko at the time of his defection, showed that Rogov had requested Sam Carr (National Organizer of the Labour-Progressive Party) to check on various details in the career of Norman Veall, an English Communist then residing in Canada. Rogov had written a comment that the details were to be checked through Frank Chubb, a Canadian Communist who was Recording and Membership Secretary of the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers, of which Norman Veall was also an active member.

The vetting process of Soviet State Security, according to Elizabeth Bentley, is geared especially to eliminate Communist recruits

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[5] Folkoff's duties were not limited to talent spotting, however, since he is known to have acted as paymaster (using funds of Soviet origin) to reimburse secret Party penetration agents.

[6] Bentley, Out of Bondage, p. 156.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

who would not stand up under pressure. Included in this category, she states, are the ideologically unsound, those having serious weaknesses (drink, women), and those who by kinship, friendship, or marriage have too close ties with anti-Communist elements. The greatest fear, she states, is of agents who are apt to "crack up" and terminate their espionage careers in a psychiatrist's office.[7] In one country, Soviet State Security is at present using contacts its Party liaison agent has in the local police for vetting and checking purposes.

75. The Approach. As stated previously, persons recruited from Party units are those who have undergone systematic ideological training and have been found, after a long period of observation by experienced Party liaison agents or other observers in the Party, to have special aptitude for intelligence work. At a suitable moment, a person considered qualified is approached by the liaison agent or a trusted Party cut-out, and is asked to contribute information, either for the Party's use or for some humanitarian cause.

In cases where the information requested is of such a nature (technical specifications, complex scientific data, etc.) that it obviously is destined for a foreign power rather than a Communist Party or a humanitarian purpose, the persons approached have undoubtedly been evaluated as reliable and sympathetic to the Soviet cause. Rarely has a "cold" approach been used in recruiting even Party members and sympathizers. When a Soviet legal resident agent seems to have made a direct approach, the victim is always--as far as can be determined--a person whom the Party liaison agent (or other Party spotter) previously had pointed out. The recruiting agent takes care not to reveal in the early stages the importance of the work which the prospective agent may be required to do.

76. Test Period for Recruits for a Soviet Professional Network. The agent recruited through the Party goes through a long period of test assignments, during which time he usually does not come into contact with the Soviet legal (or illegal) resident agent, but passes reports through a Party liaison agent or through another Party intermediary. After Whittaker Chambers was ordered to drop out of visible Party activity, for a long time he reported to J. Peters, head of the underground section of the American Communist Party. Chambers believed he was working for a Party apparat during this time, but it seems possible that he actually began to work for Soviet Military Intelligence the moment he went underground, passing his reports through Peters during the required trial period.

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[7] Bentley, Out of Bondage, p. 157.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

77. Soviet Security Precautions in the Employment of Communists for Espionage. Party officials serving as liaison agents in the national Communist Parties are sometimes of Russian or Slavic origin or parentage. Because of this fact the Soviets appear to feel that such persons will be more apt to remain loyal to the Soviet Union than to their country of adoption or residence. It is probably true that the Soviets may, in their employment of liaison agents, choose Communists from a third country, i.e., use the liaison agent in a Party other than his own and in an area where he is a foreign citizen. Then, in case of exposure, the worst that can probably happen to the agent is deportation. In some cases in which the liaison agent has been a native citizen of the country where he is active as a Party leader, the Soviets have granted him Soviet citizenship, possibly as a means of strengthening his loyalty, as a possible means of protection, or as a reward for work well done.

As previously stated, it has been common procedure for Communists recruited for Soviet intelligence to become inactive in the open Party. The exceptions to this policy are the liaison agents, who always remain in strategic Party or front organization positions. During World War II when Henri Robinson, at that time a Soviet Military Intelligence agent, was forced to use French Communist Party members to complete his net, he asked the Director of Soviet Military Intelligence in Moscow to inform Maurice Thorez and Andre Marty--French Party leaders then in the Soviet Union--that the individuals in question had just quit the Party at his orders in order to carry out intelligence missions. The Director was asked to make the necessary arrangements for their reintegration upon completion of their work for the Soviet service. In one exposed postwar Soviet operation, the Ernst Andersson case in Sweden, this procedure was apparently still being followed.

In the employment of agents who have been recruited from the Communist Parties and who have subsequently dropped out of Party work, the Soviets have sometimes:

(a) Transferred them to another country (or, in a large country, to another section of it) where it was unlikely that their record of Communist activity would come to light.

(b) Used nationals of the target country whose Communist activity had taken place outside their native country.

When Communists have been recruited in Moscow for Soviet Military Intelligence, they have been requested to sign pledges binding them to secrecy and to fulfill their mission to the best of their ability. This is not known to be done in the recruitment of a Communist outside the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled territory. Elsewhere, the agent's acknowledgment of obligation to the Soviet organization is shown by his signature on receipts for expense allowances and other payments. Even

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Klaus Fuchs, who volunteered his services, was required to accept payment and sign a receipt for it, to prove his subordination to the cause.

78. Present Restrictions and Security Precautions in the Recruitment of Non-Orbit Party Members. As was stated in the introduction to this Handbook, there have been standing regulations since at least the middle 1930's that the professional Soviet intelligence services were to refrain from recruiting agents from the membership of the foreign Communist Parties. However, such regulations apparently have been nullified whenever a Soviet intelligence staff officer was able to submit to his headquarters office substantial reasons for the Party member's recruitment--the Party member was exceptionally well placed, he had contacts in places where they could procure sensitive information, etc. According to available information, the request was usually granted--except in cases where the Party member in question was already working for another Soviet intelligence service.

Apparently after the Gouzenko case in Canada, a new directive was issued pertaining to the employment of Communist Party members. Its specific provisions are not known, but one Soviet defector has stated that from the time of the Gouzenko affair to November 1953, the practice of employing Party members as agents was seriously discouraged and there had to be strong operational justification for their recruitment.

In the autumn of 1952, in a non-Orbit European country, oral instructions were allegedly given out to Soviet State Security staff personnel forbidding the recruitment of agents from the Communist Party. Whether or not written instructions were received there from Moscow in June 1952 is not known. In spite of the oral instructions, however, the practice continued: a legal resident agent would write to Moscow describing a Communist Party member's qualifications, his valuable contacts, etc., and authorization would be granted for his use. In November 1953 Soviet State Security staff personnel in one country received a "categorical directive" which stated that approval for the recruitment of any Communist Party member, or for the retention of Communist Party members already active as sources, had to be cleared with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[8] As a result, many agents recruited from the Communist Party were released, but valuable ones were retained.

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[8] Although definite clarification is lacking, it appears to be the Foreign Section of the Central Committee which must sanction the employment of foreign Communist Party members as agents for a professional Soviet intelligence network. It is possible that in especially important cases a Central Committee department of greater authority than the Foreign Section may have to be consulted.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Another Soviet State Security defector, who has been working in an entirely different area, believes that if the Communist Party member in question is not particularly well known or important, the Chief of Soviet State Security--whose title is currently Chairman of the Committee of State Security (KGB)--can give the necessary authorization and the Central Committee is simply informed. If, on the other hand, the Communist is a prominent leader, his recruitment has to be cleared through the Central Committee, CPSU.

Present Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence regulations pertaining to the use of Communist Party members for professional networks are not known. Presumably, the restrictions are as severe as those applying to Soviet State Security. It is known that in early 1953, in one non-Orbit country, Soviet Military Intelligence staff personnel were forbidden to recruit from the local Communist Party, but could use certain Party members as talent spotters and for operational support. It is not known if exceptions have been made.

79. Current Restrictions in Soviet IS Use of Front Organization Members. One defector has stated that the very strict regulations which pertain to the employment of Communist Party members do not apply to front organization members, and that no special clearance from the Central Committee of the CPSU is required for permission to recruit them. On the other hand, a directive allegedly received by Soviet State Security personnel in Australia ordered them to refrain from employing persons "whose progressive activities were known to counterintelligence."[9] It would thus appear that any known Party member or sympathizer would not be recruited for a Soviet professional network in that area. The Soviet IS will, in any case, carefully weigh the security risks involved against the chance of obtaining information, particularly in countries where front organizations have been exposed as Communist instrumentalities.

In recent years Soviet State Security has been in contact in one country with a ranking member of the local peace movement, who had originally been recruited in the Soviet Union while a prisoner of war. The agent's original mission was to infiltrate the national peace movement and obtain a high position therein. The local Soviet legal resident agent subsequently maintained occasional contact with the agent to procure information. A recent Soviet defector, knowledgeable about this case, considered it highly irregular. From the information available about the case, however, it would seem to be another instance where a Soviet IS has assigned an agent to work into a key position in a front organization, and

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[9] Royal Commission on Espionage. (Transcript of proceedings taken at Canberra, Monday, 17th May 1954 at 10 a. m.), p. 15.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

from that point as a "liaison agent" (as we have termed agents working in leading positions of a Party or front organization) to exploit the organization as required by the Soviet IS.

The employment of other front organization personnel as agents (as opposed to liaison agents) will undoubtedly be determined by Soviet officers by weighing the security risks involved against the need for information.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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SECTION VIII. GENERAL OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FURNISHED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

A complete record of all known instances in which the national Communist Parties have furnished technical and operational assistance for a Soviet intelligence service is outside the scope of this study; it will be sufficient here to illustrate with a few examples the various types of this aid.

In general, documentation, cover arrangements, and sometimes other facilities have been supplied by the foreign Communist Parties as regular practice; safe houses, communications, and funds have been provided on an emergency basis.

Operational support includes information supplied by a Communist Party to support a professional Soviet agent or network of agents, or to serve as a check on information submitted by a professional agent. Operational support supplied by the parties also includes aid for Soviet sabotage and liquidation missions.

80. Provision of Documentation.

a. Communist Party of the United States. Chambers stated that the simplest part of any new Soviet intelligence undertaking in the United States was the procurement of false documentation. He described in some detail the machinery set up by J. Peters, chief of the underground section of the Party, to obtain identification papers. Peters had two teams of researchers at work in the Genealogical Division of the New York Public Library. One studied dates of births of infants, the other did research on dates of their deaths. When it was discovered that an infant had died shortly after birth, Peters' apparatus would write (in the name of the dead child) to the office of the registration of births and request a photostat copy of the birth certificate. The return address used was always one of Peters' secret letter drops. Anyone equipped with one of these birth certificates could then apply for an American passport.[1]

Hede Massing told of having resorted to Peters' service to procure documentation for Soviet State Security. Over a period of about a year she met Peters 10 or 12 times, and on each occasion gave him the specifications: documents for persons of a particular age, native born or naturalized, but of a particular national origin. On

[1] Whittaker Chambers, Witness, pp. 355-356.

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the completion of each deal, Peters and Mrs. Massing exchanged envelopes--hers containing money and his the papers for Soviet agents.[2]

According to Whittaker Chambers, Peters' involvement in document procurement for the Soviets dated from the time when the first Five Year Plan was initiated in the Soviet Union, and foreign Communist Parties were ordered to finance themselves. Peters then started the business of procuring documentation for false passports as one means of earning money for the Party.[3]

b. Canada. Nicholas Dozenberg, active in the Communist Party of the United States until his recruitment for Soviet Intelligence in 1927, has stated that Alfred Tilton, head of Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States for a time, lived in New York City under fraudulent Canadian papers obtained through the assistance of Tim Buck, then Secretary of the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada and probably a Party liaison agent.

Arthur Adams, notorious Soviet agent who was found during World War II to be directing the procurement of information about the utilization of nuclear fission by American scientists, had entered and left the United States on many occasions. In 1938 he returned from the Soviet Union via Canada, using a fraudulent Canadian birth certificate which he had obtained through a member of a Communist illegal apparat in Toronto.

Acting on instructions delivered through Col. Zabotin, Sam Carr of the Labour-Progressive Party attempted in 1944 to obtain illegally a renewed Canadian passport for a Soviet deep-cover agent living in California since 1938 under the name of a Canadian citizen, Ignacy Witczak. By forgery and bribery, Carr succeeded, at the end of August 1945, in obtaining a renewed passport. The earlier Witczak passport had been confiscated by the Soviets in Spain during the Civil War, where the real Ignacy Witczak had been a volunteer in the International Brigade.[4]

c. Switzerland. After Robinson's employment as head of a Soviet network, he was at one point in need of false documentation to cross the Swiss-French border. The Central Committee of the Swiss Communist Party ordered a Party member to obtain a passport and to hand it over to the Party. Subsequently it was altered and used by Robinson.

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[2] Hede Massing, This Deception, pp. 182-188.

[3] Witness, p. 370.

[4] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, pp. 541-563.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

81. Party Assistance in Cover Arrangements: Business Cover. When faced with the problem of setting up business cover in England, where he was to operate a Soviet network, Whittaker Chambers went to J. Peters of the underground section of the American CP for assistance. Shortly afterward Peters reported that he had found the perfect cover job for Chambers: Maxim Lieber, an American Communist and operator of a small literary agency in New York, had long wanted to open a London branch for his business but could not afford to do so. Now it was arranged that the Soviets would pay for the establishment of the office, that Chambers would manage the London office and the Soviets would pay Chambers' salary. At this point Peters released Lieber from the American Party so he could work exclusively with the Soviet network.[5]

A Soviet agent, Kirchenstein, who upon his arrival in the United States assumed the name and identity of Frank Kleges, a deceased American, was assisted in various ways by Nicholas Dozenberg and by J. Lovestone. Dozenberg helped him to set up an office in New York and placed him in contact with various American firms. Allegedly, arrangements were made through Lovestone, then a prominent Party official, for Kirchenstein (alias Kleges) to be introduced at the Irving Trust Company, New York City, thus enabling him to establish credit. Kleges then went to Paris and established a cover firm (dealing in the import of dried vegetables) which was subsequently utilized by Soviet Military Intelligence.

82. Front Organization Buildings as Meeting Places. The buildings or meeting places of front organizations have been used sometimes as points of contact between a Soviet principal agent and a Party liaison agent or in a front organization. A well-known Communist who reportedly has collaborated with Soviet intelligence officials and who very likely has the status of a liaison agent is presently head of the national Society of Friendship with the Soviet Union in a Western country. Since the headquarters of the friendship society and those of the Soviet Information Bureau are housed in the same building, meetings between the Soviet legal resident agent of Soviet State Security, who is a functionary of the Soviet Information Bureau, and the Party liaison agent working in the Friendship Society can be easily arranged.

United States. American Communists affiliated with a front organization, the American-Russian Institute, reportedly have used it as a means of contacting persons who might be encouraged to engage in espionage. A regional Peace Council office in the western part of the United States has been used by a suspected Soviet agent to contact a secret Party member. Thus, although the front organizations are recognized by many non-Communist governments as instruments of the subversive Communist

[5] Chambers, Witness, p. 355.

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Parties, presumably for the want of better arrangements they do serve as slightly camouflaged contact points for Soviet intelligence.

83. Provision of Safe Houses and Other Accommodations. The two illustrations which immediately follow (Canada and Switzerland) are examples of wartime resort to Party safe houses. The professional Soviet espionage services, under normal conditions, would not habitually use safe houses simultaneously serving covert Party elements.

Canada. Dr. Henry Harris, an optometrist in Toronto who was a secret Party member, permitted his home to be used for meetings between Soviet intelligence officials and Sam Carr of the Labour-Progressive Party. Also in Canada, a member of an auxiliary group associated with Fred Rose's penetration unit known as the "Montreal Group" maintained in his drugstore a photo laboratory which he put at the disposal of the "Montreal Group" for its work against Soviet intelligence targets.

Switzerland. When Alexander Rado, chief of a Soviet Military Intelligence network in Switzerland, felt that his organization was in danger (after he accidentally met a former Soviet agent who had gone over to the Germans) he contacted the Swiss Party and asked it to have hiding places ready for him and his agents if it became necessary for the net to go underground. After several members of his net had been arrested, Rado himself went in hiding with the local Communist Party and remained in that status until he left Switzerland a year later.

France. A recent defector has related that there are secret cells of the French Communist Party which operate exclusively to aid and protect Soviet agents active in France. These Party cells allegedly must provide cover and refuge for Soviet agents in case of necessity.

84. Party-Supplied Emergency Communications: Courier Service. Because of the sensitivity of this kind of work, the Soviets have probably never relied on the Parties for assistance in communications except in an emergency situation. There is at least one known instance where possibly as many as three Communist Parties provided courier service for a Soviet net which was out of action because of lack of contact with Moscow. The network in question--one belonging to Soviet Military Intelligence--was headed by a German Communist, Dr. Arwid Harnack, and included as agents an Abwehr officer at OKW headquarters, a lieutenant in German Naval Intelligence, a proprietor of a firm manufacturing radio parts for the Luftwaffe, etc. The group was centered in Berlin, operating from 1940 to the fall of 1942, and produced high-grade information.

Before leaving Berlin in June 1941, Alexander Erdberg of the Soviet Trade Delegation had recruited Dr. Harnack and had left with him instructions, funds, and a radio transmitter. Harnack's radio operator never succeeded in establishing contact with Moscow, but communications

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finally were set up through use of a courier link to a member of the German Communist Party in Hamburg, then through Flensberg and Denmark to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. Probably the Danish, and possibly the Swedish, Communist Party served as a link in this communications chain.

Switzerland. Courier service was provided by the local Communist Party for a Soviet Military Intelligence net operating in Switzerland during World War II. Three radio operators working for Alexander Rado's net had been arrested and imprisoned, and Rado desired to make contact with them to find out how much Swiss authorities knew about his operations. Contact was made through the assistance of the Geneva branch of the local Party, which had assigned a secret Party member employed as a prison warden to pass and receive messages for the captured agents. Similarly, Alexander Foote after his release from prison received a message from his principal agent through secret Party couriers.

85. Emergency Communications: Communist Party Radio Transmissions. A Dutch underground Communist Party transmitter which for a brief period--October 1939 to January 1940--served Soviet intelligence agents had been set up previously in accordance with Soviet instructions. Daniel Goulooze, Central Committee member and from 1935 on probably a Soviet Military Intelligence liaison agent in the Dutch Party, had apparently been called to Moscow and ordered to set up an intelligence apparat which would have a "sleeper" status until the outbreak of the war. In Moscow, Goulooze was given a reserve cipher to hold for future use. The radio transmitter was activated about September 1939 and shortly afterward began to provide temporary communications with Moscow for a Soviet professional agent in Belgium. It is probable that two other Soviet agents used this Party-operated transmitter.

In the summer of 1940, Henri Robinson (of Comintern and French underground fame) was ordered by Soviet Military Intelligence to organize a net based in France to operate against Germany. He was furnished with a transmitting set and cipher about January 1941. Up to June 1941 the set was still not in operation. Confiscated messages dated about December 1941 indicate that Robinson probably was sending his traffic through a transmitter operated by the underground French Communist Party. Another Soviet Military Intelligence agent, Leopold Trepper, was put in contact with Robinson about September 1941, probably due to his need for secure communications with Moscow. The underground French Party transmitter may have sent the messages to the Soviet Embassy in London for relay to Moscow.

86. Emergency Funds Supplied by a Communist Party. Arthur Adams, a Soviet agent in the United States directing operations to obtain information about the development of the atomic bomb, became aware that security officials had him under surveillance and would probably soon arrest him. A member of a secret Party apparat in New York furnished Adams with funds with which the latter flew to Portland, Oregon, where he tried to board a

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Soviet ship. As it turned out he was unable to do this, but information available indicates that he finally was successful in making his way back to the Soviet Union.

87. Communist Party Operational Support for Soviet Intelligence. Generally, this pertains to the supply of information to Soviet professional agents about local currency, border, and travel controls and other local laws and regulations. As has been stated, operational support may also take the form of Party-procured information which the Soviets use as a check for reports supplied by their own networks.

Canada. One of the pages in the Russian dossier brought out of the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa by Gouzenko concerns the assignments given to Sam Carr. The page is headed "Task No. 3 of 1.8.45" and reads:

"1. Requirements which a person living as an 'illegal' must meet (nationality, citizenship, occupation, education, knowledge of languages, family and financial conditions, etc.)

"2. Ways of legalization (organization of a commercial undertaking, joining a business firm as a partner, kind of firm, joining as a member any office, joining the army as a volunteer, accepting employment)

"3. Documents which an 'illegal' must possess (passport, different kinds of certificates, references, recommendations, letters, etc.)

"4. More expedient methods to slip into the country.

"5. To provide for secure living quarters and financial means during the period when the 'illegal' gets acquainted with the local set-up and conditions ... .

"7. Conditions of entry into the country and of moving about in the country.

"8. Conditions of adaptation and living in the country.

"9. Methods of work of the counterespionage. The organization of the Federal and provincial counterespionage services."[6]

Japan. Soviet State Security is currently exploiting the intelligence apparat of the Japan Communist Party as a source of information

[6] The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, pp. 109-110.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

which it uses as a check on reports procured by its professional networks in Japan. The Party liaison agent, who knows nothing about the existence of the professional networks, is allegedly unaware that some of the information he passes to the Soviets is used in this way.

88. Party or Front Organization Support for Soviet Sabotage Operations. The most notorious sabotage assignments known to date to have been carried out on behalf of the Soviet Union by foreign Communist agents were those accomplished by Ernst Wollweber and his Communist collaborators, most of whom were recruited from the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (see Part One, paragraph 22). Since that period no instances of assistance in sabotage have been revealed.

At the present time, sabotage instruction reportedly is being given in the Finnish Communist Party and the Tudeh Party of Iran. Since the Soviet intelligence services can exploit the local Communist movements for any assistance needed and can demand priority service from any Communist Party, sabotage instruction now being given in the Parties will possibly be of ultimate value for Soviet sabotage operations requiring local support. Further data are required before definite conclusions can be drawn about the current relationship of Party-Soviet IS sabotage programs.

89. Communist Party Support for Liquidation Mission. The best-known case to date is the murder of Leon Trotsky, in which members of the U. S. and Mexican Communist Parties were involved. Two Mexican Communists--David Alfaro Siqueiros and Leopolo Arenal--were in charge of local direction of the first attempt against Trotsky's life, in May 1940. An entree to the Trotsky household was assured through an American Communist, Robert Sheldon Harte, who had succeeded in obtaining a position as a household guard. With Harte's assistance, an armed, Party-directed mob attacked the house and by machinegun crossfire tried to assassinate Trotsky. However, this attempt failed.

Next, another Party penetration into the Trotsky home was used. This was accomplished through an American, Ruby Weil, a secret Party member who had successfully infiltrated a Trotsky group in Chicago. There she had become friendly with a longtime follower of Trotsky, Sylvia Agelof, and was instrumental in introducing the latter to Frank Jacson-Mornard, a Soviet agent. Through Sylvia Agelof, Jacson-Mornard had access to Trotsky and murdered him in August 1940.

That unlimited operational assistance of every possible nature must be given to Soviet agents by the national Communist Parties is indicated by a note found on a suspected Soviet agent once operating in the United States: "The bearer of this credential is thoroughly trustworthy and should be given all possible support so that he may effectively accomplish the mission in which he is engaged. Fraternally yours, Max Bedacht, for the Secretariat."

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

SECTION IX. ROLE OF SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES VIS-A-VIS NON-ORBIT COMMUNIST PARTIES

Available information on this subject is limited. However, one well-documented case shows that, in a manner similar to that of the Soviet intelligence services, a Satellite service, the Hungarian State Security Authority (AVH), uses persons in a non-Orbit European Communist Party for talent spotting and checking of prospective agents.

90. Satellite Contacts in Non-Orbit Parties. In this instance it appears probable that there is a duplicate liaison system and that a Soviet service (probably Soviet State Security) employs the same contacts in the Party concerned. In one case, when the Party liaison agent refused to clear a prospective agent for AVH use, officers of this service strongly believed it was due to the fact that the individual in question was already in Soviet intelligence employ. Satellite contacts in this Party are three members of the Cadre Commission who are visited by two AVH professional agents at Cadre Commission offices. The latter are known to the Party contacts as members of the Hungarian service.

It is known that U. S. Communist Party contacts have been used by a Polish Consulate in this country for visa-check work. It is probable that the Consulate officer in touch with these Communists also used them for spotting and checking prospective agents for a Polish intelligence service.

91. Mutual Assistance between Non-Orbit Parties and Satellite Intelligence Services. A recently defected Polish intelligence official has stated that the Polish United Workers' Party (the Polish CP) is morally obliged to supply financial and other assistance to certain non-Orbit Communist Parties. He has indicated that this is a reciprocal arrangement, as non-Orbit Parties have provided intelligence information in return.

A request to a non-Orbit Communist Party for an assignment of intelligence nature may originate in the Special Section of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), or in Department VII of the Polish Ministry of Public Security (MBP).[1] Requests originating in either of these bodies are forwarded through the normal liaison

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[1] The Special Section of the Central Committee of the PZPR has overall responsibility for intelligence matters and is therefore ultimately responsible for the work carried out by Department VII of the Polish Ministry of Public Security--that Department charged with the procurement of all foreign intelligence information.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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channels maintained between the Foreign Affairs Branch of the Central Committee of the PZPR and a counterpart in the non-Orbit Party. Allegedly it has been the Military Commission of the French CP which carried out liaison with the Foreign Affairs Branch of the PZPR. The Military Commission of the French CP, without any specific request, automatically forwards to the Foreign Affairs Branch of the PZPR information which it knows to be of interest to the latter.

The Polish defector has cited specific instances in which the French Communist Party supplied information in response to MBP (Polish Ministry of Public Security) requests. This former Polish officer mentioned a trial of a Polish functionary (Komar) formerly stationed in Italy, during which Rosen-Zawadzki, former Polish Attaché in Italy, admitted transmitting funds to Communists in Italy for intelligence purposes and maintaining contact with Italian Communist Party chief Palmiro Togliatti.

92. Satellite Services: Possible Indirect Soviet Intelligence Channels to Non-Orbit Communist Parties. Polish financial contributions to one foreign party (the Korean) were given in dollars. Reportedly the Italian Communist Party is currently Poland's "special financial charge," and monetary aid to that Party is "systematic and on a sustained basis." This program providing for Satellite aid to non-Orbit Communist Parties allegedly is under "special Russian arrangement and direction."

In view of these statements (contributed by a former Polish IS functionary) it seems possible that certain non-Orbit Communist Parties may now be receiving from the Central Committee of the PZPR and through Satellite intelligence channels, financial assistance which formerly was provided directly by a Soviet intelligence service. This possibly indirect manner of Soviet assistance and control over the non-Orbit Communist Parties might be attributed in some instances to expediency and to better security arrangements.

As has previously been stated, Soviet State Security is the intelligence service which now plays an important (allegedly exclusive) role in handling the covert liaison and financing of foreign (non-Orbit) Communist Parties. There is also evidence that Satellite services are under Soviet State Security control, which is maintained by "Soviet advisers." Therefore, the final responsibility for liaison, direction, and financing of illegal Party work--particularly espionage--in Western countries is probably under Soviet State Security direction.

A prominent member of the Communist Party of the United States who probably has served as a Party liaison agent for several years has recently been in contact with Rumanian diplomatic officials in the United States--a possible indication that a Rumanian intelligence service is now used for contact with liaison agents in the U. S. Communist Party.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

93. Schools in the Satellites: Recruitment Bases for Satellite Intelligence Services. Training schools in Satellite countries--probably run under joint Soviet-Satellite administration and now presenting political and espionage training to non-Orbit Communists--appear to serve as recruitment and training bases for the Satellite intelligence services. The Bulgarian Intelligence Service has particularly benefited from these schools in the recruitment of Greek Communist agents, whom it has subsequently sent into Greece.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECTION X. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Soviet intelligence financing of covert activities of the Communist Parties of Western nations is a subject prohibiting generalized comment, since each Party's illegal apparat's requirements differ. A Party's need for outside assistance and the amount required depend on (1) how much a Party can raise through its own efforts (e.g., membership dues, Party-sponsored social activities, revenue stamps, Party-operated businesses, etc.); and (2) the needs of the individual operatives performing clandestine work (e.g., whether or not they have fulltime paid employment or other sources of income).

94. Factors Determining Soviet Intelligence Subsidization of Parties. The financial need is weighed according to two Soviet intelligence gauges: (1) the financial requirements of the individual Party operative performing espionage on behalf of the Soviets, and (2) the need, as it is determined by Soviet officials, to assure a person's loyalty and obligation to a Soviet service. As stated previously, a document from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa pertaining to Sam Carr reads: "It is necessary occasionally to help financially."

95. Soviet Financing of Foreign Communist Parties. A recent Soviet defector has stated that Soviet State Security is now responsible for secret Soviet financing of non-Orbit Communist Parties for general purposes. At least one Party, which currently is being generously financed by the Soviet Union, is undertaking assignments of interest to Soviet intelligence, and large sums of dollars, in small denominations, are passed through Soviet State Security channels to the Party liaison agent. These funds arrive from the Soviet Union by official courier or are entrusted to Soviet State Security internal agents on Soviet ships, who at the country of destination turn the money over to Soviet State Security foreign staff personnel.

Sums of money passed to the Party under discussion through Soviet State Security channels have ranged from amounts of 150,000 to 300,000 dollars. Sometimes, in addition to the dollars, there have been turned over to the Party, in local currency, varying sums of money derived from profits made on Soviet films.

96. Vague Sources of Income Listed in Party Finance Reports. Study of the few Party financial reports available shows that the largest amounts listed under "Income" are derived from sources described as "Special Fund," "Fund for Special Expenditures," "Extra Income," or some other such vague listing. There have been references in some unevaluated reports to "large Cominform subsidies" which allegedly have been of considerable aid to certain non-Orbit Parties. The actual source of all

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

such income has not yet been determined, but in view of the fact that Soviet State Security has definitely financed certain non-Orbit Parties, it is probably justifiable to assume that funds not obtained locally by the Communist Parties are of Soviet origin and are currently being transmitted to the Parties through Soviet State Security personnel.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

SECTION XI. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the facts which have become known about Soviet intelligence-Communist Party relationships from information available from known cases and from Soviet or Communist defectors may be summarized as follows:

a. Modeled after the systems of control laid down during the existence of the Comintern, Soviet intelligence still exploits the International Communist Movement at the level of the Soviet-dominated international front organizations, and at national Communist Party and front organization level. Exploitation has been assured in each foreign country by legal or illegal Soviet resident agents, who, for purposes of exploitation of the Parties' resources, have had contact with trusted liaison agents in the foreign Parties. In the past, both major Soviet intelligence services have followed the practice of designating in each national Communist Party one or more liaison agents upon whom they can call for any type of assistance needed. Presently, Soviet State Security is stated to have exclusive covert contact with the foreign Communist Parties for assistance with intelligence operations, for the forwarding of secret funds to the foreign Parties, and for the transmission of specific political directives.

Most frequently, the liaison agents assist in recruitment for professional Soviet networks by pointing out prospective recruits and providing information about those persons. However, the liaison agents--usually Moscow-trained, veteran Party members--may also be requested to form illegal Party intelligence apparats to transmit intelligence procured by the Party apparats, or to perform any other espionage or support work required by the Soviet service. It is unlikely that any intelligence information at Party headquarters, whether acquired by overt or covert means, escapes the attention of the liaison agents, and such information is passed by them to the Soviet service with which they are in touch.

b. In areas where they have been able to organize effective professional networks, the Soviets in the past have, for reasons of security, preferred to rely upon these for penetration work. Wherever such professional networks do exist, they are usually under strict orders not to have contact with Party elements. In areas where both a Party apparat and a Soviet professional network are operating, the information from the Party is also used as a check on that procured by the latter network, and vice versa.[1] In view of

[1] According to reliable information, Soviet intelligence is alert to the possibility that intelligence reports prepared by the Party apparats may be "slanted."

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

present restrictions against the use of Party members for professional networks, it is probable that in the future wherever a Party member (especially a secret Party member) is engaged in espionage, it will probably be as a participant in a Party apparat. Exceptions, however, will continue to occur, particularly when the Communist in question has access to information which is of special interest to Soviet intelligence.

c. In the main, the Parties' contributions to Soviet intelligence have been: sources of manpower for Soviet professional nets; the procurement, through overt or covert means, of intelligence information; and general support--which may consist of the supplying of operational information, communications, emergency funds, or safe houses, or assistance in sabotage, liquidation operations, etc.

d. It has been irrelevant whether or not a Party has had a specific program of political action; the degree of Soviet exploitation of a national Communist Party has depended on the Soviet requirement rather than on any factor affecting the Party's tactics or status within its own country.

e. The Satellite intelligence services are under Soviet intelligence control, which is maintained by Soviet intelligence "advisers" invariably attached to the Satellite intelligence services. The latter are possibly exploited by Soviet State Security as additional channels for the transmittal of secret funds to non-Orbit Communist Parties.

f. The security-consciousness of the Soviet intelligence services has increased as a result of the exposures of several espionage nets. More than ever the Soviets wish to maintain the fiction that the U.S.S.R. does not support, direct, or exploit the Communist movement in the free world for intelligence purposes.

The Soviet Union's capability to conceal her clandestine relations with Communist Parties are, however, limited. No matter which Soviet intelligence service may be charged in the future with maintaining covert liaison with the Communist Parties, systematic surveillance of contacts of Soviet officials outside the cover installation (diplomatic, trade, etc.) should occasionally lead to the detection of their relations with Communist Parties.

Penetration of Communist Parties by hostile security or intelligence services--a possibility always feared by the Soviets--may further expose clandestine Soviet relations with Communist Parties. In order to increase the security of their operations abroad, the Soviets may: (1) step up the efficiency of underground sections of Communist Parties; (2) seek to develop and control

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

non-Russian Communists (particularly those of Satellite countries) and use them for liaison purposes; (3) shift contacts to adjacent countries, a technique now probably being used in certain Latin American countries; (4) increase direct contacts behind the Iron Curtain; (5) utilize Satellite intelligence officers or agents in instances where direct Soviet IS-local Party contact may be especially dangerous.

It is quite unlikely that the Soviets will cease to exploit the Communist Parties and front organizations for espionage purposes or will cease to furnish the non-Orbit Communist organizations the clandestine support and direction deemed necessary by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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APPENDIX A. THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

1. Soviet State Security

This service has frequently been referred to by one of its varying initials--GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MVD. Prior to 13 March 1954, it was a structural part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) with which it had been integrated on 6 March 1953. A complete listing of the names under which this service has been known is as follows:

1918-1922	Cheka
1922-1923	GPU (State Political Directorate)
1923-1934	OGPU (Union State Political Directorate)
1934-1943	NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
May 1943-March 1946	NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security)
March 1946-March 1953	MGB (Ministry of State Security)
March 1953-March 1954	MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs)
March 1954 to present	KGB (Committee of State Security)

In March 1941 the Chief Directorate of State Security (GUGB) was made a separate commissariat (NKGB, or People's Commissariat of State Security), but because of the war situation the separation was not workable and the organization was reintegrated in the NKVD until May 1943, when it again was given independent status. In March 1946 all People's Commissariats were renamed Ministries; thus the NKGB became the MGB (or Ministry of State Security) and the NKVD became the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Foreign Directorate. In the past, the part of Soviet State Security which was responsible for the procurement of foreign intelligence was called the Foreign Directorate (INU); it is probably this Directorate and its successor organizations which are involved in Soviet State Security operations mentioned in this study. During the period 1923-1934 it was the Foreign Directorate which was assigned to cooperate in the Comintern's underground work, and there was close coordination between this Directorate and the Comintern throughout the world.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

In the fall of 1947 a Committee of Information (KI) was formed under the Council of Ministers, at which time most of the MGB/INU sections were transferred to KI. The latter was abolished however at an unspecified time in 1951 because of its unworkability, and its MGB components (including INU) were returned to MGB.

MGB and MVD were merged in March 1953, with functions of INU coming under MVD. In March 1954 an unidentified number of Directorates formerly under MGB and including INU were taken out of MVD and were reconstituted as the Committee of State Security (KGB) under the Council of Ministers.

Foreign Directorate (INU) Field Installations. INU operations abroad are usually run through independent, unrelated espionage nets. Though rigid in its control, INU has been elastic in adapting its field organization to varying conditions. Field organizations are of two types, depending on whether the intelligence officer in charge is attached to a legal residency (that is, under official cover) or is operating under deep cover.

Typical of INU operations is the use of the legal residency to support and facilitate the operations of a net or nets controlled by an illegal resident. High-ranking officers of Soviet State Security have in some instances been sent abroad to control all operations in one country, or for an entire continent. Like Soviet Armed Forces (Military) Intelligence, Soviet State Security follows the practice of using one country as a base for operations against another. INU operations are kept completely separate from Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence activity in the same area.

2. Soviet Military Intelligence

Since its creation, Soviet Military Intelligence[1] has been directed from the general staff level, though with varying designations of the headquarters organization. In 1925 or 1926 the Soviet Military Intelligence Directorate (Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye--RU) was reconstituted as the Fourth Directorate (Chetvertoye Upravleniye--ChU) of the General Staff. In subsequent reorganizations, the Fourth Directorate was redesignated variously as the Seventh and later as the Fifth Directorate of the General Staff. Eventually it ceased to be a numbered directorate.

[1] Since the consolidation of Soviet Army Intelligence with Soviet Navy Intelligence, it seems more appropriate to term this service, "Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence." For purposes of unity and simplification, however, and since most of the information in this handbook refers to events prior to the amalgamation, Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence has been referred to throughout this study as Soviet Military Intelligence.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

In June 1942, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, RU, was upgraded to the status of a chief directorate, GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye). Sometime during the war (and possibly at the time it was upgraded) the GRU was constituted as the Second Chief Directorate (Vtoroye Glavnoye Upravleniye--VGU) of the General Staff. As far as is known, the GRU remained the VGU of the General Staff of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of War, and, from March to May 1953, the Ministry of Defense.

At the end of May 1953, a reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces, which began with the consolidation of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy into the Ministry of Defense (March 1953), was extended to include Soviet Military Intelligence. The GRU was then downgraded to the status of a directorate, RU.

During the long history of Soviet Military Intelligence, its functional units have existed with a considerable degree of persistency. The organizational titles, however, have frequently changed. Following are summarized descriptions of the most significant functional units, using descriptive though not necessarily the true names of these units.

The Office of Operations. The division at RU headquarters responsible for the acquisition of foreign intelligence (actually currently entitled, "The Strategic Intelligence Directorate") is divided into geographic agentura sections, technical sections, and special task sections. The Foreign Relations Section and the Secretariat, while not strictly a part of the Office of Operations, are very closely allied with it functionally.

The Office of Information. This office is primarily concerned with the processing and dissemination of information and the maintenance of an intelligence registry and reference library.

The Office of Transborder Intelligence. The agency at intelligence headquarters which is responsible for the direction of the intelligence section attached to the staffs of the military districts, independent armies, and armies of occupation is currently set up as a section of the Office of Operations (The Strategic Intelligence Directorate). It is not concerned with the acquisition of strategic intelligence. Until recently it held the status of a directorate.

Other functional sections of the headquarters organization of Soviet Military Intelligence are (descriptive titles, not necessarily true):

(a) The Finance Section (now reportedly subordinate to the Deputy to the Director for Material and Technical Support). This Section must furnish the proper foreign currency for

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

residencies of the Office of Operations abroad and for the financial support of intelligence officers at headquarters and in the field.

(b) The Training Section

(c) The Political Section (under the Chief of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense)

(d) The Personnel Section

(e) The Administrative and Supply Section

(f) The Medical Section

(g) The Material and Technical Support Section.

This general organization of Soviet Military Intelligence applies to its present peacetime organization. In the event of war, the structure would almost certainly be modified temporarily in order to place greater emphasis upon wartime objectives and transborder operations.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

APPENDIX B. EARLY ESTABLISHED PARTY APPARATS

1. French Communist Party Apparats: Auxiliary Penetration units for the Soviet IS

The underground section of the French Communist Party, with its component illegal apparats, reportedly was established in the 1920's by Party leaders Jacques Duclos and Maurice Thorez under the direction of Soviet officials--probably of Soviet Military Intelligence. A French Comintern official, Cremet, was allegedly involved in the founding and early direction of the French Communist Party's intelligence apparats. Both Soviet State Security and Soviet Military Intelligence subsequently seem to have exploited the French Party wholesale by requisitioning entire groups of trusted Party members who were located in strategic locations and using them as penetration teams under the direction of Soviet liaison agents in the Party.

The underground section came under the Central Organization Section of the Party and in each region of France it had an illegal "direction" known as the Cellule No. 1 Comite Revolutionnaire, or sometimes the Comite illegal d'action, composed of about 20 operatives (who were mainly concerned with the direction of strikes or mass demonstrations). Besides these regional direction committees, the underground section consisted of several illegal apparats each having a special function which was indicated by a letter before the word "apparat."

One of these illegal apparats, very likely the M-Apparat, was responsible for the procurement of military information. In 1924 the chief of this Apparat was using two women assistants to find agents in certain French dockyards who could furnish plans. One of these women recruiting agents also approached a former Army officer and asked him for information about tanks and antitank defenses.

In 1932 a Party apparat was uncovered--probably a component of the M-Apparat--which was procuring information from Party members employed in dockyards and arsenals. Documents found on members of this apparat gave specifications of a new type of machine gun and of defenses of the port of Brest. A Deputy to the French Chamber (Beaugrand) allegedly was head of the M-Apparat in 1937.

One report states that the M-Apparat of the French Communist Party reportedly became of increasing importance in providing both Soviet State Security and Soviet Military Intelligence with networks of qualified agents. Certain members, both men and women, were found to have a combination of qualities of fanaticism, courage, and expert knowledge which made them very useful agents. The most efficient agents recruited in the

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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Party were accepted on terms of virtual equality by professional agents of the Soviet services, though the latter were usually in control. By the 1930's the connections between the Soviet services in France and the Party apparats were very close. The Soviets thus developed qualified agents who worked from motives of ideological conviction and under perfect cover in their own country and who could, as members of a Party penetration unit, operate against Soviet intelligence targets. This same system has been worked in every country where a Communist Party exists and where Soviet professional networks were inadequate to handle specific intelligence operations.

Recruits for the French illegal Party apparats were drawn from the open Party. They were ordered to sever connections with the Party and drop out of sight for a while. Frequently at this time they were given training in a Comintern school in the Soviet Union, which included instruction in espionage and sabotage. For a while following this training period some of them served the Comintern organization itself--Henri Robinson of the French Communist Party, for instance, served as Chief of the Western European Bureau in Berlin before being assigned by the Soviets (reportedly Soviet Military Intelligence) to organize a new Party intelligence apparat about 1930.

2. Pre-World War II German Communist Party Intelligence Apparat.

As early as 1919 rudimentary illegal apparats existed within the underground section of the German Communist Party. After the French occupation of the Ruhr, Soviet Military Intelligence officers, believing that a revolutionary situation existed, went into Germany to assist German Communists in exploiting political events to best advantage. Under the guidance of these officials, three clandestine apparats were set up in the underground section of the Party: (1) a military formation as a nucleus for a future German Red Army; (2) Zersetzung-dienst, comprising units which worked to shatter the morale of Army and police personnel; and (3) a Party intelligence service working under the direct supervision of Soviet Military Intelligence. Officers of this service appointed Hans Kippenberger as head of the apparat, which became known as the AM-Apparat (Anti-Military). In 1932 the AM-Apparat absorbed another apparat, the Nachrichtendienst (NR), which included a passport-forging service and provided accommodations for agents.

The AM-Apparat then included (besides the NR), sections for Party security, for subversion of the armed forces and police, for penetration of left-wing and right-wing political parties, for penetration of trade unions, and a section called at first the U (Unternehmer) and later the U-BB (Betriebsberichterstattung), which was responsible for procuring information in all industrial plants.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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The U-BB section allegedly operated on two levels. One part reported information of interest primarily to the Party--for example, the morale of workers, their attitudes toward their employers, whether workers in a specific factory were prepared to strike for higher wages, etc. Another level worked to procure intelligence information concerning technical developments which were primarily of interest to the Soviet Union. Agents known to have operated in this section conducted espionage in two branches of the I. G. Farbenwerke in 1931 and 1932. A network of this section set up in Krupps in 1932 reportedly was responsible for the theft of more than 300 plans of tanks, artillery pieces, etc.

The AM-Apparat--either through one of the sections listed above or through a special Nachrichtendienst--was also responsible for the collection of general intelligence information. The AM-Apparat always worked in close relation with Soviet Military Intelligence and Soviet State Security, providing those services with agents and with information. Krivitsky states, however, that the most promising operatives in the Party apparat were early absorbed into Soviet Military Intelligence and were responsible for its networks becoming the most efficient foreign intelligence service operating in Germany in the 1930's.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

APPENDIX C. THE COMINTERN SCHOOLS

1. Lenin School

Also known as Lenin University (and not to be confused with Lenin Institute, discussed in paragraph 3, below), this Comintern school offered the most advanced courses of instruction in Marxist-Leninist theory for foreign Communist students. According to Erich Wollenberg, an instructor at the Lenin School and at an M-School from 1927 to 1931, the Lenin School gave 3-year courses for young Communists who were regarded as future leaders of their Parties; Party journalists were included in the 3-year course. Nine-month courses were given for district leaders and secretaries and 6-month courses for Communist youth functionaries. In addition, several specialized shorter courses were given.

According to Wollenberg, candidates for the Lenin School were selected by the Central Committees of their own Parties and were given an aptitude test before they were sent to Moscow.

Some Communist defectors have stated that all students at Lenin School used an alias and that great care was taken to conceal identity; others report that at the Lenin School, where advanced seminar work was given for Communists slated for important positions in their own Parties, the students went by their own names. Some have reported that only students from Parties which were underground used pseudonyms. Erich Wollenberg states that the students were required to live in the school building, but otherwise were free to move around Moscow and to contact their friends.

After 3 months at the school, the student reportedly became a regular member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and transferred his membership from his own national Party.

Allegedly, the duration of the stay of a pupil in the Soviet Union is no guide as to what courses he has attended. For example, during the preliminary course a factory worker might show outstanding ability in understanding industrial or social educational problems. Such a man might be sent for 6 months or even a year to work and study in a variety of factories throughout the Soviet Union. He might be away from his own country for 2 years without having attended the military or intelligence courses. On the other hand, the OGPU, which operated among all groups of students, might discover a man as having particularly useful connections in the country of his origin and after a very brief period of training send him back to his own country as an intelligence agent.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

The following academic courses were offered at the Lenin School: dialectical materialism; political economy; Marxism-Leninism; capitalism; syndicalism and strikes; history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; history of the student's own national Communist Party; foreign languages--generally two, Russian and one other; military science--especially the science of civil warfare (presented by Red Army instructors); history of the international labor movement and of the labor movement in in the student's own country; propaganda; Party organization work; youth and agrarian problems. Among the "practical" courses at the school were: strike techniques, street fighting, sabotage, espionage, methods of conspiracy (such as how to act in case of arrest), practice in the use of firearms and in dismantling and assembling them, map reading (warfare type), use of mail drops, storage of printing equipment and firearms, techniques of capture and value of holding hostages, guerrilla warfare, gas mask training, code work, how to use Party members and sympathizers in regular warfare. Each course of instruction lasted from 3 to 6 months.

William Odell Nowell, a former member of the American Communist Party and one-time Director of the Negro Committee in Detroit, Michigan, has testified that he attended the Lenin School from September 1931 to December 1932. He lists the courses of instruction at the Lenin School as:

1. Marxian Economics
   (a) Criticism of "capitalist economics"
   (b) Soviet Economy
2. N.E.P. (New Economic Policy)
3. Socialism
4. Communism
   (a) Marxian Philosophy
      (1) Criticism of "bourgeois philosophy"
   (b) Labor History
   (c) Trade Unionism
      (1) History
      (2) Organization
      (3) Strategy and Tactics
      (4) Red Unions
   (d) Communist Party Organization
      (1) Communist International
      (2) Structure
      (3) Communist Party Structure
      (4) Communist Party, Soviet Russia
      (5) History
      (6) Communist Strategy and Tactics in Mass Organizations
   (e) Science of Civil Warfare
      (1) Military training
      (2) Ambush fighting

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

(3) Barricades
(4) Codes
(5) Study of various arms
(6) General conspiracy
(7) Work in Army and Navy

(f) Propaganda
(1) National
(2) International, etc.

Another 1-year student at the Lenin School, John L. Hladun, a former Canadian Communist who attended the school from November 1930 to September 1931, received instruction having greater emphasis on paramilitary, espionage, and sabotage work. He listed his courses of instruction as:

1. Marxist philosophy
2. Espionage tactics
3. Drafting military maps which could be used in riots or insurrection
4. Sabotage, including the manufacture of crude bombs and how to use them to blow up trains and demolish bridges
5. Instructions in the composition and organizational structure of the American, British, and Canadian armies
6. Tactics and strategy of warfare and armed insurrection, strike demonstrations, and street fighting
7. Communications and supply and military intelligence.

According to Hladun, the faculty of the Lenin School was composed of Russian professors and philosophers, Red Army instructors, and secret police (OGPU) officials. Special lectures were given by outstanding foreign Communist Party leaders, such as Wilhelm Pieck of the German Communist Party, Otto Kuusinen of the Finnish Party, Palmiro Togliatti of the Italian Party, and Eugene Varga and Bela Kun of Hungary.

Some Lenin School students, such as Joseph Zack Kornfeder, who attended it from 1927 to 1930, simultaneously were assigned to work at Comintern headquarters. Kornfeder was for 2 years a member of the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Comintern and of the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Profintern. Kornfeder has described the purpose of the Lenin and other Comintern schools as the training of leaders of the Communist Parties in the more advanced countries--Germany, France, England, Italy, and the United States.

The last 3-year course at the Lenin School was organized in 1934, but disbanded when the school reportedly dissolved in 1937 or 1938.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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2. M-Schools

Erich Wollenberg has stated that after the abortive uprising in Germany in 1923, Soviet officials decided that revolutionary leaders had to be trained to head illegal Party apparats which would lead uprisings in foreign countries. The Soviet government had suffered some embarrassment because of the fact that Soviet military men had been discovered directing operations in Germany in 1923.

In order to prepare military leaders to direct Communist uprisings abroad and to supervise conspirative activities, Leon Trotsky and Ossip Piatnitsky undertook the organization of a military program. The schools were under the administration of the Soviet Ministry of War and were conducted by Soviet officers with the assistance of Comintern personnel.

Unschlicht, a Polish Comintern functionary, allegedly was chief of the M-School project. Wollenberg described himself as "deputy commissar"--apparently of the same undertaking. A former Hungarian Army officer under the alias of Otto Neuberg organized the first school in April or May of 1924. The first husband of Herta Kuusinen, Langer (also known as Lander, Lehen and Tuuri Lehti), was in charge of the plan for instruction. At the time of the founding of the M-Schools, the Comintern formed a Military Commission which was subsequently headed by Langer (or Lehti).

The curriculum at the M-Schools, according to Wollenberg, included the following subjects: history of the working class, dialectical materialism, revolutionary uprisings (using those at Hamburg, Reval, and Munich of 1923 as examples), industrial espionage, bombing and sabotage (making of bombs, chemicals, poisons), conspirative cover, map reading, maneuvers, and practical problems in uprisings, foreign armies, technical details of weapons and arms (including target practice), driving of cars, and handling of locomotives.[1]

Wollenberg was expelled from the Comintern in April 1933 and for 1 year lived as an outcast in Moscow until he successfully escaped in 1934.

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[1] Benjamin Gitlow has written (in Chapter VIII of The Whole of Their Lives): "The Lenin students are taken out by OGPU instructors to an abandoned track of railroad on the outskirts of Moscow to learn how to operate railroads during a revolutionary uprising and how to sabotage and destroy them should that become necessary. The students man the locomotives and learn how to drive them. In addition, they are shown how to derail locomotives and cars as part of a course in sabotage methods ... . The OGPU instructors also take the Lenin students to the locomotive works to teach them how a locomotive is constructed, to acquaint them with the parts that go into its making and to give them training in essential repairs."

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

He has stated that at the time of his escape "the training program was still in progress." Wollenberg has also stated that M-School students lived in the school buildings, were not allowed to contact people in Moscow without special permission, and were registered under false names. He states that at least two or three small M-Schools were run simultaneously.

Wollenberg reports that (at a date he does not specify) the program and functions of the M-Apparats of the national sections of the Comintern were changed. Instead of leading sudden military uprisings, the M-Apparats were directed slowly to organize military strength and develop an information service, and gradually to disrupt the state organization and opposing political groups. Possibly due to this change of plan for the foreign Communist Party apparats, instruction given at M-Schools may have been integrated with that presented by the Lenin School, since many Communist defectors have made no reference to the existence of the M-Schools and have received training at the Lenin School which closely parallels the M-School curriculum.

3. Lenin Institute

George Timothy Holmes Hewitt, a former member of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, has testified that although there is a tendency to speak of the Lenin School as the same organization as the Lenin Institute, these were two entirely different schools. The Lenin Institute he described as a Russian school used mainly for Russian men and women and dealing with various political theories and the science and history of the "class struggle" in Russia and the various other countries of the world. Occasionally, according to Hewitt, it catered to foreigners on special recommendation from the Soviet Government itself. The Lenin Institute reputedly had a vast library, and a number of its instructors were also teachers and guides at the Lenin School.

The Lenin Institute apparently was not under Comintern administration, and apparently still functions. Dionisio Ena, Secretary General of the Partido Communista Mexicano (PCM) has stated that during a recent visit to Moscow he attended courses in Communist orientation and modern Communist political theories at the University of Moscow. His instructors, he has stated, were specialists in Latin American affairs at the Lenin Institute.

4. Comintern Radio School

This was also called the "Wilson School," and was set up sometime between 1925 and 1927. Students were taught construction of receiving and transmitting sets and use of cipher and code systems. Graduates were given assignments by Comintern headquarters and were sent abroad--usually not to their native countries. They operated singly and frequently changed location.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

The school's standard of instruction was allegedly high; one source states that when Soviet Military Intelligence acquired an inefficient radio operator from that service's own radio school he was sent back and a competent one was procured from the Comintern Radio School.

5. Stalin University of the Toilers of the East

This school is probably identical with the Comintern school previously reported as the University of the Peoples of the East. It was set up for the instruction of all Oriental Communist students with the exception of Chinese. With the exception of language teachers, its instructors were Communist Party or Comintern adherents. A group called the "Learned Association of the Colonial and National Problems," which was a research body under the jurisdiction of this University, did research for the Comintern and the university. Studies in political theory and propaganda were emphasized.

6. Sun Yat-Sen University

According to some sources, this school was exclusively for Chinese students, although one former Comintern functionary has described it as providing instruction for both Chinese and Japanese Communists. Its curriculum was concentrated on Marxist-Leninist theory, agitation, propaganda, organizational methods, youth, etc. and not on the more conspiratorial aspects of revolutionary training, such as espionage, sabotage, etc. Sun Yat-sen University was in Moscow. Erich Wollenberg described Sun Yat-sen University as "corresponding to the Lenin School" and as training functionaries for China and the Far East. He stated that its most important department was the Chinese Department, where Karl Radek lectured frequently.

7. University of the Peoples of the West

Located in Moscow, this school reportedly had a special department for American Communists. Erich Wollenberg speaks of the Western University as a "low-level grammar school" giving mostly general education. He states that its main purpose was to train foreign Communists for work in the Soviet Union--for example, preparing Germans for the Volga German Republic.

8. Other Comintern Schools

Other schools allegedly under Comintern administration were the Pan-Pacific University, located in Vladivostok and used to train Far Eastern Communists; the Communist University for National Minorities, located in Leningrad (possibly this was identical with the Lenin Institute, which may have been originally located in Leningrad and which occasionally gave courses for special groups of foreign Communists); Tolmachoff Political Military Academy, which was renamed Lenin Political Military Academy and located in Leningrad until 1936 or 1937, when it was moved to Moscow.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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The Anti-Fascist or "Antifa" Schools, which reportedly were administered jointly by the Comintern and Soviet State Security during World War II, might be mentioned here since they have undoubtedly functioned as a recruiting base for professional intelligence agents. The training program in the Antifa Schools is stated to have included propaganda and ideological training in the prisoner-of-war camps and preparation for espionage work in Germany. Students selected for espionage allegedly received 6 months' additional instruction, given by Soviet military authorities.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

CP - Communist Party

CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CPUSA - Communist Party of the United States

FIR - International Federation of Resistants, Victims, and Prisoners of Fascism

IB - International Brigade

IS - Intelligence Service

ISH - International of Seamen and Harbor Workers

MBP - Polish Ministry of Public Security

MID - Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union

OMS - International Liaison Department (of Comintern)

Org - Organization Department

TUI - Trade Union International

WFSW - World Federation of Scientific Workers

WFTU - World Federation of Trade Unions

WPC - World Peace Council

YCI - Young Communist International

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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300090002-7

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