

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL STATIONS CONCERNED

1. The attached interpretation of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, October 1952) has been prepared for transmission to friendly liaison services for their comment and criticism and, particularly, to establish a better understanding between our service and liaison on the following important points.
2. It is possible that in the course of the new Soviet-Communist softening-up tactics, government or other pressure will be brought on liaison services to de-emphasize their coverage and investigation of local Communist Parties. The attached report may serve as a warning against this emergency, and as a springboard for discussions as to how to prepare against it.
3. One need not be alarmist in order to recognize that the new, soft Communist "United Front" tactic which is going to be stepped up from now on, is more dangerous than the hard revolutionary line. The Communist order of the day is to split the Western Alliance. Friendly liaison services should be brought into the front line to stave off the attack.
4. The report consists of an analysis of the 19th CPSU Congress and several supporting appendices. Attached to the report is a watch list of indications concerning the new Soviet-Communist tactics.
5. This watch list should also be transmitted to liaison with a request to report pertinent data regularly. Stations are requested to submit monthly follow-up reports on the information requested in the watch list.
6. An internal watch committee has been organized within [REDACTED] 25X1A2d1 in order to review Soviet-Communist tactics on a permanent basis. Thus it will be possible to service liaison with headquarters information and evaluations.
7. All Divisions and Stations are responsible for speedy and effective handling of this transaction. The responsible headquarters staff will continuously review the progress achieved in this matter.

THE 19TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

5 - 14 October 1952

1. On 20 August, the Soviet press announced that the CPSU had convoked an All-Union Party Congress for 5 October. It was the first full Congress since March, 1939--a lapse of over 13 years. The Agenda called for three main reports to be delivered: a report for the Central Committee by G. M. Malenkov, a report on the Five-year Plan by M. Z. Saburov, Chief of the GOSPLAN, and a report by N. S. Khrushchev on proposed changes in the Statutes of the Party.
2. The Congress was attended by over a thousand voting delegates, 167 non-voting delegates, and more than 120 foreign Communist leaders.
3. Just before the Congress began, the Party periodical, Bolshevik, published an article by Stalin entitled "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," which set forth some new refinements in Soviet economic-social theory and which has as an important effect the further postponement of the achievement of Communist society. On the last day of the Congress, Stalin addressed a short message to the foreign Communists. It was not very precise, but it left room for speculation as to its effect on the tactics of the non-satellite Communist Parties and their relation to the Soviet Union. The attention of the Congress, so far as non-Satellite CP's were concerned, was focused on the tactics of the CP's of Western Europe. Relatively little serious consideration was given to non-Satellite Parties in other parts of the world.
4. The Congress, and the Stalin article in Bolshevik, which set the line of the Congress--
 - (1) Endorsed continuation of East-West tension, and of attempts to aggravate friction among the Western Allies, particularly, between the U. S. and Western European countries, through a stepped-up united front tactic and "peace" campaign;
 - (2) Once again demonstrated complete subordination of the international Communist movement to Soviet State interests, and reaffirmed Stalin in power;
 - (3) Pointed to tighter Soviet organizational controls over the Communist Parties abroad and to closer supervision of their activities;
 - (4) Endorsed the continuation of the military and industrial buildup of the Soviet-Satellite block;

- (5) Again postponed the achievement of Communism in the USSR;
- (6) Indicated a substantial increase in powers of the State;
- (7) Revised the Party Statutes in terms that suggest an alteration in the nature and role of the Party;
- (8) Elected the members of the Central Committee, which then elected the members of other leading organs of the Party;
- (9) Elected an 11-man committee to revise the Party program. The first revision of the program since 1919, the recommendations of the Committee should cast additional light on the character and role of the Party. The committee is headed by Stalin, and includes four Politburo members, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich; also P. N. Pospelov, Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute; P. F. Yudin, a Party theoretician and chief editor of the Cominform Journal; Otto V. Kuusinen; A. M. Rumyantsev, M. Z. Saburov, and D. I. Chesnikov.

5. The following paper discusses the most significant results of the Congress. Considerable leeway has been allowed for ideas that are, at the moment, purely speculative. Their validity will be tested by actual events in the next year or so. For the moment, it is hoped that interested readers of this tentative analysis will take the opportunity to criticize it at length and in any respect, or to add to it any interpretation which may have been overlooked.

Attached to the paper are several more detailed analyses of various aspects of the Congress:

- A: Foreign CP's
- B: Comparison of New and Old Statutes
- C: Composition of the Central Committee
- D: Composition of the Presidium
- E: Soviet Domestic Affairs

These were prepared to establish bases for the discussion, but it was felt that they might be usefully attached to the paper for readers who care to examine the problems in detail.

6. Soviet World View and Policy. There has been no change in the Soviet World View. The "two-camp" concept still holds. It has been broadened by the enunciation of its economic counterpart, the division of the world market between the two "camps." Recognition of this division was implicit in the calling of the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952.

Soviet political and propagandistic pressure on the West is to be continued. It will be intensified in an effort to split the Western Block and to isolate the U. S.

This attempt will operate on two levels: (1) internationally, the Soviets will maintain general tension, particularly vis-a-vis the U. S. ; will intensify economic warfare, and may try to defect individual countries from the Western Block by offering to settle secondary issues; (2) within each of the Western Countries, the Communist Party will try to soften up support of the Western security program by means of the "united front" tactic, operating on the "peace" movement, playing up the high costs of military defenses, United States aggressive intentions, interference of the U. S. in national affairs, and the abandonment of democratic freedoms by the national governments.

The Soviets anticipate an East-West war, not in the immediate future, but eventually. Meanwhile, they are doing what they can to weaken the effectiveness of the Western security system and the strength of individual Western countries, and are continuing to build up their own military power and basic industries.

Stalin emphasized the complete identification of interest between the USSR and the foreign CP's. Their role in the softening-up program is vital to the Soviets. However, maximum effectiveness in the "softening-up" effort cannot be achieved unless the CP's in most of the countries of Western Europe set aside, for the time being, their hopes for Socialist revolution.

Stalin's article in Bolshevik implies that the united-front-peace tactic is temporary. "Victory" is "certain," he says. The Communists in Western Europe have it easier than did the Bolsheviks in 1917. Governmental repression is less severe; the Communists have the benefits of the practical lessons of the CP's of Russia and Eastern Europe and of their example and guidance; the ruling bourgeoisie of Western European countries have "exposed" themselves and can no longer claim popular support. The "struggle for peace" and "democracy" can lead to coalition governments which may withdraw from the Western security system or slow down their defensive efforts. Eventually, the united-front-peace tactic may lead to situations where it could be abandoned in favor of an outright revolution on orthodox "socialist" terms. Meanwhile, the united-front-peace tactic would probably arouse opposition on the part of "firebrand" elements within the Western European CP's. Stalin recognized this possibility and indicated that by "helping" these Parties, the CPSU would have to exercise firm control over them to keep the opposition in line.

7. Southeast Asia. The absence of delegates from some of the countries of the Far East (Japan, Malaya, Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China) can only be noted as curious. It cannot be explained by any firm reasoning. As has been remarked, the Congress did not produce anything new or significant regarding Communist tactics in Southeast Asia or Japan. No change of tactics in the Far East was indicated.

8. Economic Policy. The economic programs of the Satellites will probably be revised to speed up their integration into the Soviet economy. Soviet economy itself will remain geared to the military build-up.

The division of the world market between the two "camps" is interpreted by the Soviets as leading to increasing friction among the capitalist countries. It is possible that they will dangle attractive (and insincere) trade proposals before individual western countries in an effort to aggravate these frictions. Dumping of goods from the Soviet-Satellite economy onto the world market was also hinted at.

References by Stalin, Malenkov and others to the possibility of wars between capitalist countries were timed to increase the climate of tension which the Soviets need in order to make their economic warfare moves more palatable. As long as capitalism exists, some kind of war is inevitable. A war among the capitalist countries is just one more possibility.

9. The Foreign CP's. Stalin made it clear in his speech to the Congress that the foreign CP's must be "helped." In his article in Bolshevik, he expressed dissatisfaction with the ideological level of most of the fraternal Parties. In other words, he expressly recognized that many western Communists would not be able to understand the why or the how of the united front tactic, particularly when it means the temporary shelving of their immediate revolutionary aims.

It is clear that he intends that the foreign CP's will be more closely supervised than heretofore; material assistance in the form of money or propaganda was probably also contemplated.

As has been noted, the role of the Western CP's is to carry out the softening-up process by means of the united front.

The united front tactic should not be misinterpreted as indicating a lessening of over-all East-West tension. It is not aimed at lulling the West as a whole into a false sense of security, but at undermining the conviction on the part of the people in individual Western countries

that it is necessary to continue to support the Western alliance with the U.S. and to carry the taxation and other economic burdens of rearmament, and that it is the USSR which represents the real threat to peace. No concessions by the Soviets on major issues were indicated. No lessening of hostility to the governments of Western Europe was implied. And, of course, the virulence of Soviet attacks upon the United States was only increased.

The united front tactic can be effective only in a climate of general tension. The Soviets provide the tension; the foreign CP's exploit the consequences of the tension.

The objectives and demands of the united-front as it is currently being applied are these:

- (1) the U. S. is singled out as the main enemy, not only of peace, but also, of its allies. The latter are not equal partners of the U. S., but are merely its tools. This is aimed, obviously, at arousing general hatred for the U. S. and suspicions of U. S. intentions towards its allies.
- (2) The ruling bourgeoisie in the countries of Western Europe have sold out to the U. S. to maintain their share of the dwindling capitalist market. This is aimed at exposing the ruling bourgeoisie as traitors and at isolating governments that continue to cooperate with the U. S.
- (3) The bourgeois regimes have become fascist; have abandoned the formula of democratic freedoms by which they have disguised their control of society and with which they were previously able to compete against the Communists for the support of the people.
- (4) The Communists must "take up the banner of bourgeois democracy." By posing as the champions of traditional liberties, they will confuse many democrats who are uneasy about any suppression of freedom, even those of the Communists, who provoked the repressions in the first place. (The "democratization" of the CPSU is probably part and parcel of this pose, and the Western CP's may very well adapt their own organizations along similar lines.)
- (5) The Parties must not indulge in "premature" revolutionary attempts. They must concentrate on legal political activities. They must play down doctrinaire Communist demands and promises; emphasizing, on the contrary, demands for "peace" and "democratic liberties." This does not mean an end to Communist-inspired

violence. It does mean, however, that violence will be identified with disguised slogans and not with Communism. To keep the government on the defensive and to provoke it into police counter-action, a certain amount of violence is probably necessary; but it must not be allowed to get out of hand, and it must always be identified with "peace," "democracy," lower taxes, real workers' demands, and the like.

A number of ways by which the Parties may organize and carry out the united front tactic are outlined in the "Watch List" attached to this paper.

10. Character of the CPSU. The changes in the Party Statutes suggest a radical change in the character of the CPSU and in its relations to the Soviet State. That some alteration in the character of the Party has been performed is clear. What is more difficult is to assess what the alteration means.

It can be interpreted to mean that the Party is simply registering by means of its Statutes a recognition of post-World War II realities: the achievement of Socialism-in-one-country; the end of class warfare in the USSR; complete identification of Party interests with those of the State. Accordingly, there is no basic change in the role of the Party vis-a-vis the Government as we have known it: the exercise of total control over the Government by the Party through the parallel authority of the Party apparatus at all levels of the State machinery, and through the system of interlocking membership of Party leaders in directing organs of both sides of these parallel systems.

This interpretation is based upon the following evidence:

- (1) there is no formal recognition of a lessening of the power of leading Party organs in the Statutes, nor was such a lessening implied in any of the proceedings of the Congress;
- (2) Most of the new members of the Central Committee and the new Presidium were promoted up the Party ladder;
- (3) Many of the new members at the top of the Party hierarchy were appointed to important administrative posts in the State bureaucracy;
- (4) A separate and totally disciplined, totally controlled apparatus is necessary to control the various power arms of the State; to keep them from competing with each other for absolute mastery, and to ensure their harmonious functioning in different fields, but according to a single basic plan and policy.

Finally, it should be noted that the lead editorial in the 24 October issue of the Cominform Journal stated that the leading role of the Party had not merely been preserved, but had actually been increased:

" The carrying out of the grand programme for building Communist society raises to a still higher level the leading and directing role of the Communist Party, the significance of its organization and ideological-educational work."

Against this view is one which sees in the Statutes and in the proceedings of the Congress the preparation for an eventual subordination of the power of the Party to that of the State machine. The evidence supporting this thesis is the following:

(1) The nature and role of the Party as they are defined in the new statutes. It is no longer defined as the "organized vanguard of the working class... the highest form of its class organization," an organization of militant, select, and disciplined revolutionaries who lead all institutions of the State. It is now defined simply as "a voluntary militant union of Communists holding the same views." The latter new definition does not appear to be a definition of the main instrumentality of a dictatorial apparatus.

(2) The name of the Party has been changed. On its face, it is sensible enough to drop the word "Bolshevik" from the title, leaving only the word "Communist" since there is no longer any real distinction between them. This is the explanation the Khrushchev gave. It will not hold water, however, for there has been for so long a symbolic meaning to the word "Bolshevik." It has stood, not merely as an historical symbol of Lenin and the Revolution, but also for perfectly definite principles of organization and of the relation of the Party to the State. The explanation fails to say why it was thought necessary to retain this symbol for so long.

(3) Manner of depicting relation of the Party to the State. The third bit of evidence supporting the theory that the Party may eventually be subordinated to the State is that, in the old Statutes, the Party was pictured as being outside and above the State and other non-Party institutions and organizations. This connotation is absent from the new Statutes, and its absence is meaningful. The rules and duties of Communists as defined in the new Statutes are much more closely related to Society (i. e., State) than heretofore.

(4) The tasks of Soviet economy in the transition from Socialism to Communism are defined by Stalin in terms implying an even greater extension of the powers of the State: (a) continued expansion of basic industry; (b) reorganization of the system of commodity exchange,

beginning with the confiscation by the State of the products of the collective farms; (c) an enormous expansion of educational (particularly, of technical training) facilities.

(5) The objectives of Socialist economy are expressed by Stalin in terms that leave their execution in the hands of the State machine, and that leave little for the Party to do: "The essential forms and requirements of the basic law of socialism might be formulated approximately as follows: Assurance of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural requirements of all society by means of uninterrupted growth, and the perfection of socialist production on the basis of the highest techniques."

(6) The administration of Communist economy, in the indefinite time when the main tasks (prerequisites outlined in (4) above) and the objectives (in (5) above) have been achieved, appears to be, in Stalin's Bolshevik article, essentially a continuation of the same methods of administration as are to be in force from now on--state planning, state control of distribution, state management at all points of production. The necessity for a Communist Party is not automatic.

(7) The powers of the State have enormously increased since 1939 (the MGB-MVD; the administrative powers of the bureaucracy; the propaganda apparatus; the Armed Forces).

(8) The Statutes and other pronouncements at the Congress laid much more stress upon State (and industrial) discipline than previously.

(9) Encouragement of "criticism from below" tends to weaken the position of lower Party organizations and to subject the Party to the vicious system of self-protective spying and informing which has infected the State, but which may have been less practiced in the Party itself.

(10) Expulsions from Party membership are now effectable for "offenses punishable by the courts" upon "receipt of the reports on... the misdeeds from the administrative or judicial authorities."

(11) Great stress is laid, not on the Party organization as such, but upon the personal initiative of individual Communists, to see that the State functions smoothly and efficiently.

(12) The Presidium is a much larger and therefore, a more unwieldy body than was the Politburo. Unless a smaller, inner, ruling body

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emerges (the Secretariat, or part of the Presidium), authority within the Party leadership will be greatly diffused. (It is recalled that the Central Committee --in Lenin's time, a genuinely effective leading body--was several times enlarged for the deliberate purpose of diluting its authority.)

11. The interpretation outlined above is a radical approach to explaining what may have been intended by the rewriting of the Party statutes. It is put forward primarily to provoke thought, comment, and watchfulness over forthcoming events which may tend to support it or to disprove it entirely. It is a tentative hypothesis, and nothing more. Should it prove out in fact, the implications are as yet only dimly discernable, but are probably enormous. They are, however, consistent with what we believe Stalin represents.

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