

Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 420, nays 0, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 271] YEAS—420

- Abdnor, Cornell, Hastings, Abzug, Cotter, Hawkins, Adams, Coughlin, Hayes, Ind., Addabbo, Crane, Hays, Ohio, Alexander, D'Amours, Hébert, Ambro, Daniel, Dan, Hechler, W. Va., Anderson, Daniel, E. W., Heckler, Mass., Calif., Daniels, N.J., Hefner, Anderson, III, Danielson, Helnz, Andrews, Davis, Helstoski, N. Dak., de la Garza, Henderson, Annunzio, Delaney, Hicks, Archer, Dellums, Hightower, Armstrong, Derrick, Hillis, Ashbrook, Hollander, Holland, Ashley, Devine, Holt, Aspin, Dickinson, Holtzman, AuCoin, Dingell, Horton, Badillo, Dodd, Howe, Bafalis, Downey, N.Y., Hubbard, Baldus, Downing, Va., Hughes, Barrett, Drinan, Hungate, Baucus, Duncan, Oreg., Hutchinson, Bauman, Duncan, Tenn., Beard, R.I., du Pont, Hyde, Beard, Tenn., Early, Jarman, Bedell, Eckhardt, Jeffords, Bell, Edgar, Jenrette, Bennett, Edwards, Ala., Johnson, Calif., Bergland, Edwards, Calif., Johnson, Colo., Bevill, Ellberg, Johnson, Pa., Biaggi, Emery, Jones, Ala., Biester, English, Jones, N.C., Bingham, Erlenborn, Jones, Okla., Blanchard, Esch, Jones, Tenn., Blouin, Eshleman, Jordan, Boggs, Evans, Colo., Karth, Boland, Evans, Ind., Kasten, Bolling, Evins, Tenn., Kastenmeyer, Bonker, Fary, Kazen, Bowen, Fascell, Kelly, Brademas, Fenwick, Kemp, Breaux, Findley, Ketchum, Breckinridge, Fish, Keys, Brinkley, Fisher, Kindness, Brodhead, Pflizer, Koch, Brooks, Flood, Krebs, Broomfield, Florio, Krueger, Brown, Calif., Flowers, LaFalce, Brown, Mich., Flynt, Lagomarsino, Brown, Ohio, Foley, Landrum, Broyhill, Ford, Mich., Latta, Buchanan, Ford, Tenn., Leggett, Burgener, Forsythe, Lehman, Burke, Calif., Fountain, Lent, Burke, Fla., Fraser, Levitas, Burke, Mass., Frenzel, Litton, Burleson, Tex., Frey, Lloyd, Calif., Burlison, Mo., Fuqua, Lloyd, Tenn., Burton, John, Gaydos, Long, La., Burton, Phillip, Giammo, Long, Md., Butler, Gibbons, Lott, Byron, Gilman, Lujan, Carney, Ginn, McCloskey, Carr, Goldwater, McCollister, Casey, Gonzalez, McCormack, Cederberg, Goodling, McDade, Chappell, Gradison, McDonald, Chisholm, Grassley, Clancy, Green, Clausen, Gude, McFall, Don H., Guyer, McHugh, Clawson, Del, Hagedorn, McKay, Clay, Haley, McKinney, Cleveland, Hall, Madden, Cochran, Hamilton, Madigan, Cohen, Hammer, Maguire, Collins, Ill., Schmidt, Mahon, Collins, Tex., Hanley, Mann, Conable, Hannaford, Martin, Conlan, Hansen, Mathis, Conte, Harkin, Mazzoli, Conyers, Harrington, Meeds, Corman, Harris, Melcher

- Metcalfe, Quile, Stanton, Meyner, Quillen, James V., Mezvinsky, Fallsback, Stark, Michel, Randall, Steed, Mikva, Rangel, Steelman, Miller, Calif., Rees, Steiger, Ariz., Miller, Ohio, Regula, Steiger, Wis., Mills, Reuss, Stephens, Mineta, Rhodes, Stokes, Minish, Richmond, Stratton, Mink, Riegle, Stuckey, Mitchell, Md., Rinaldo, Studts, Mitchell, N.Y., Risenhoover, Sullivan, Moakley, Roberts, Symington, Moffett, Robinson, Symms, Mollohan, Rodino, Talcott, Montgomery, Roe, Taylor, Mo., Moore, Rogers, Taylor, N.C., Moorhead, Roncallo, Thompson, Calif., Rooney, Thone, Moorhead, Pa., Rose, Thornton, Morgan, Rosenthal, Traxler, Mosher, Rostenkowski, Treen, Moss, Roush, Tsongas, Mottl, Rousselot, Udall, Murphy, Ill., Roybal, Ullman, Murtha, Runnels, Van Deerlin, Myers, Ind., Ruppe, Vander Jagt, Myers, Pa., Russo, Vander Veen, Natcher, Ryan, Vanik, Neal, St Germain, Vigorito, Nedzi, Santini, Waggonner, Nichols, Sarasin, Walsh, Nixon, Sarbanes, Wampler, Nolan, Satterfield, Waxman, Nowak, Scheuer, Weaver, Oberstar, Schneebell, Whalen, Obey, Schroeder, White, O'Brien, Schulze, Whitehurst, O'Hara, Seiberling, Whitten, O'Neill, Sharp, Wiggins, Ottinger, Shipley, Wilson, Bob, Passman, Shriver, Wilson, C. H., Patman, Tex., Shuster, Winn, Patten, N.J., Sikes, Wirth, Patterson, Simon, Wolf, Cattell, Sisk, Wright, Pattison, N.Y., Skubitz, Wyder, Pepper, Slack, Wylie, Perkins, Smith, Iowa, Yates, Pettis, Smith, Nebr., Yatron, Peyer, Snyder, Young, Alaska, Pickle, Solaz, Young, Fla., Pike, Spellman, Young, Ga., Poage, Spence, Young, Tex., Pressler, Spencers, Zahlocki, Preyer, Staggers, Zeferetti, Price, Stanton, J. William

NAYS—0 NOT VOTING—14

- Andrews, N.C., Harsha, Matsunaga, Carter, Hinshaw, Milford, Dent, Howard, Murphy, N.Y., Diggs, Jacobs, Teague, Fulton, Macdonald

So the bill was passed. The Clerk announced the following pairs: Mr. Dent with Mr. Diggs. Mr. Matsunaga with Mr. Fulton. Mr. Teague with Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Murphy with New York with Mr. Andrews of North Carolina. Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts with Mr. Howard.

Mr. Harsha with Mr. Carter. Mr. Milford with Mr. Hinshaw. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill (H.R. 8714) just passed. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia? There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO SIT DURING HOUSE SESSION TODAY

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on International Relations may be permitted to sit today while the House is in session.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York? There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON RULES TO FILE A PRIVILEGED REPORT

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules may have until midnight tonight to file a privileged report.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Heiting, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on July 19, 1975, the President approved and signed a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 7405. An act to amend section 3620 of the Revised Statutes with respect to certain disbursements to be made by banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions.

AUTHORIZING FURTHER SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 626 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 626

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (S. 846) to authorize the further suspension of prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed three hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations and Representative Dante Fascell and Representative Edward Derwinski, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on International Relations now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, and all points of order against said substitute for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 7, Rule XVI are hereby waived. At the conclusion of such consideration, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand

in order to work out a benefits package satisfactory to both sides. As you know, Mr. Speaker, the benefits provided under this bill do not come out of Federal tax money. All of the expenses are paid for by the industry itself. Our role in this matter is to act as an intermediary or arbitrator. It is only an accident of history that has us involved in this matter at all. All of the provisions as contained in the bill are agreed to by both labor and management.

The most significant feature of the agreed-upon bill would increase the maximum daily unemployment compensation benefit from \$12.70 to \$14 per day for the first year, and \$25 per day for years thereafter.

The 7-day waiting period for sickness benefits under existing law would be reduced to four days.

The bill would provide for extended unemployment benefits of 13 weeks for employees with less than 10 years of service. Extended benefit periods are currently available under existing law for employees with 10 years or more of service. The new group of employees covered by extended benefits would be eligible for those extended benefits depending upon a trigger device similar to the method used for extended benefits under normal unemployment compensation programs; that is, a national trigger is "on" whenever the number of insured employment claimants in the nation exceeds 4 percent.

The qualification requirement for new employees in the railroad industry is reduced from seven months to 5 months.

The agreed-upon bill provides for adjustments in the carriers' contribution to unemployment insurance fund in an amount to assure adequately funding of the new program.

Some technical amendments are contained in title II of the bill relating to railroad retirement account and the railroad retirement supplemental account.

In addition to the above provisions, the existing law was changed so that an employee cannot receive unemployment insurance benefits during the first 7 days of a strike. Under existing law, unemployment benefits were payable from the beginning of a strike.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote for the passage of the measure before us. As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, both labor and management are to be commended for their diligent negotiations which have led to an agreement on the provisions contained in this bill. Unemployment in the rail industry is higher than normal, and it is imperative that we pass this law so that benefits can begin from July 1.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. STAGGERS

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. STAGGERS: Add at the end of the bill the following:

TITLE III—AMENDMENTS TO THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT TAX ACT, AS AMENDED

SEC. 301. Section 3201 of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is amended by striking out "compensation paid to such employee"

and inserting in lieu thereof "compensation paid in any calendar month to such employee."

SEC. 302. Section 3211(a) of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is amended by striking out "compensation paid to such employee representative" and inserting in lieu thereof "compensation paid in any calendar month to such employee representative."

SEC. 303. Section 3221(a) of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is amended by striking out "compensation paid by such employer" and inserting in lieu thereof "compensation paid in any calendar month by such employer."

SEC. 304. Section 3231(e)(1) of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is amended by striking out the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof:

"The term 'compensation' means any form of money remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered as an employee to one or more employers."

SEC. 305. Section 3231(e)(2) of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is amended by striking out the first sentence thereof.

SEC. 306. Section 3231(e)(2) of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is amended by adding as the first sentence thereof:

"An employee shall be deemed to be paid compensation in the period during which such compensation is earned only upon a written request by such employee, made within six months following the payment, and a showing that such compensation was earned during a period other than the period in which it was paid."

SEC. 307. The amendments made by Sections 1 through 6 of this title shall apply for taxable years ending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act and for taxable years ending before the date of the enactment of this Act to which the period for assessment and collection of tax or the filing of a claim for credit or refund has not expired on the date of enactment of this Act. The amendment made by section 6 of this title shall apply for taxable years beginning on or after the date of enactment of this Act: *Provided, however,* That with respect to payment made prior to the date of enactment of this Act, the employee may file a written request under section 6 within six months after the enactment of this Act.

Mr. STAGGERS (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia?

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

The Clerk continued to read the amendment.

Mr. STAGGERS (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I renew my unanimous consent request that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD, after which I will make an explanation of the amendment.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, the Railroad Retirement Tax Act was amended in 1946 in part for the purpose of imposing the tax on a "paid" rather than an "earned" basis. Public Law 79-572 (79th Cong. 2d sess. (1946)). The Senate Commerce committee report that accompanied the bill stated that the amendments "are necessary to change the computation of benefits and taxed

from a 'compensation earned' basis to a 'compensation paid' basis," and that existing law "brings about heavy administrative burdens both on the Railroad Retirement Board and on the employers to make thousands of corrections in report previously filed" which are "useless operations." Senate Report No. 1710 (part 2) (79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7). Since 1946 the Railroad Retirement Board has permitted carriers to report compensation on an as paid basis, and the Board has recently confirmed the legal propriety of this procedure.

Nonetheless, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled in Revenue Ruling 75-226 (IRB 1975-27, p. 33) that compensation is to be taxed under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act as of the period when earned irrespective of when it is paid. The bill would amend the Railroad Retirement Act to clarify the intention, originally expressed in 1946, that compensation is to be taxed only on an "as paid" basis. Because these amendments are clarifications of existing law they are to apply to all taxable years not yet closed as well as those in the future.

The Railroad Retirement Board also has taken the position that under existing law individual employees may have compensation credited, upon an appropriate showing, to periods when earned for purposes of determining benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act.

The bill ensures that for taxable years in the future individual employees, and only individual employees, may establish, for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, that amounts paid in one period were earned, and therefore may be deemed to have been paid, in an earlier period. Under the bill an employee is to be permitted six months from the date of the payment to make the required claim, but he will have that right only as taxable years beginning after the date of enactment of the bill.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STAGGERS. I will be very happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Skubitz).

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, as I understand, this amendment was offered by management?

Mr. STAGGERS. That is correct.

Mr. SKUBITZ. And was approved by labor?

Mr. STAGGERS. That is correct.

Mr. SKUBITZ. On this side we have no objection to the amendment.

Mr. STAGGERS. I thank the gentleman.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. STAGGERS).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the

a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. SISK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, the reading of the resolution makes it very clear that we are presenting what is an open rule, a rule with 3 hours of general debate on a bill that would authorize the suspension of prohibitions against U.S. military assistance to Turkey. The resolution provides that the 3 hours of general debate shall be equally controlled—and I think it would be well if Members, at least to the extent that they are interested, might listen to this.

Mr. Speaker, we hope to take only a comparatively short time on the rule. However, it is well that we understand that the committee has brought up a rather unusual procedure, although it is not without many precedents.

In connection with the division of time, the 3 hours of general debate will be equally divided and controlled by the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DERWINSKI), with each controlling 45 minutes of the general debate time.

As the Committee on Rules understands, this means that actually we have an hour and a half time under the control of the proponents of this legislation and an hour and a half controlled by the opponents of the legislation, being divided between the majority and the minority. Therefore, in seeking time, I think it would be well that Members keep that in mind.

The resolution provides that it shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on International Relations now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule. It also provides that all points of order against the committee substitute for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 7, rule XVI of the rules of the House—germaneness provisions—are waived.

Mr. Speaker, Senate 846 authorizes the delivery of defense articles and defense services to Turkey with respect to which contracts of sale were signed prior to February 5, 1975. Mr. Speaker, if I could, I would simply like to state that there have been a number of comments by my colleagues with reference to lobbying.

There has been a great deal of effort, I think, on both sides of this issue, and,

so far as this Member is concerned, that effort has been in all good conscience on the part of those who have sought to carry their own particular position.

I am sure that each Member of the House, in making a final determination in casting a vote on this issue, will vote as he believes in his own conscience to be in the best interest of his country.

I know I have received a number of telephone calls, and I am sure many of the Members have. In my discussions with some of the people who have become somewhat emotionally involved, I have attempted to discuss with them in a rational way those things which all of us—those of us here in Congress, as well as our constituents at home, who, I am certain, are concerned—consider are in the best interests of our country, regardless of emotional feelings or ethnic ties or any other consideration.

Mr. Speaker, let me make clear my own personal position. I am here today supporting this rule. I am going to vote for this bill, in the firm belief that it is in the best interests of America. This bill, as I understand it, is not tilted, necessarily, in favor of Turkey, nor is it tilted in favor of Greece; but it is an attempt by people, at least in the minds of those who have come to me about it, to provide for negotiations and, ultimately, a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus issue by and between the parties concerned. I sincerely doubt that any Member will, here today, be charged with voting either for or against Greece or for or against Turkey, and so I would hope that, in our considerations and in the final determination that we would make, we would do that which is in the best interest of our country.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 626 makes in order House consideration of S. 846 under an open rule with 3 hours of general debate. The Rules Committee conducted an all-day hearing on this matter on Tuesday of this week, hearing from Members on both sides of this issue. And I think the committee bent over backward in fashioning a somewhat unusual rule to insure that all sides would have a full and fair hearing on the House floor. This rule divides the 3 hours of general debate time four-ways, with 45 minutes each to the chairman and ranking minority member of the International Relations Committee, and Representatives FASCELL and DERWINSKI.

I therefore want to urge adoption of this rule so that the House may proceed to debate this controversial matter. In conclusion, I also want to commend the bipartisan group on the International Relations Committee which put together this compromise bill on Turkey aid. I know it is not everything which the administration would have wanted and so it is not fair to characterize this as an administration bill. This is indeed a con-

gressional initiative aimed at breaking the impasse which exists over the Cyprus issue and protecting the legitimate national security interests of the United States in that important part of the world. I hope this compromise bill will be adopted by the House.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 419, nays 0, not voting 15, as follows:

[Roll No. 428]
YEAS—419

- | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Abdnor | Butler | Evans, Colo. |
| Abzug | Byron | Evans, Ind. |
| Adams | Carney | Evins, Tenn. |
| Addabbo | Carr | Fary |
| Alexander | Casey | Fascell |
| Ambro | Cederberg | Gaywick |
| Anderson | Chappell | Findley |
| Calif. | Chisholm | Fish |
| Anderson, Ill. | Clancy | Fisher |
| Andrews, | Clausen, | Fithian |
| N. Dak. | Don H. | Flood |
| Annunzio | Clawson, Del | Florio |
| Archer | Clay | Flowers |
| Armstrong | Cleveland | Flynt |
| Ashbrook | Cochran | Foley |
| Ashley | Cohen | Ford, Mich. |
| Aspin | Collins, Ill. | Ford, Tenn. |
| AuCoin | Collins, Tex. | Forsythe |
| Badillo | Conable | Fountain |
| Bafalis | Conlan | Fraser |
| Baldus | Conte | Frenzel |
| Barrett | Conyers | Frey |
| Baucus | Corman | Fuqua |
| Bauman | Cornell | Gaydos |
| Beard, R.I. | Cotter | Gialmo |
| Beard, Tenn. | Coughlin | Gibbons |
| Bedell | Crane | Gilman |
| Bell | D'Amours | Ginn |
| Bennett | Daniel, Dan | Goldwater |
| Bergland | Daniel, R. W. | Gonzalez |
| Bevill | Daniels, N.J. | Goodling |
| Biaggi | Danielson | Gradison |
| Blester | Davis | Grassley |
| Bingham | de la Garza | Green |
| Blanchard | Delaney | Gude |
| Blouin | Dellums | Guyer |
| Boggs | Dent | Hagedorn |
| Boland | Derrick | Haley |
| Bolling | Derwinski | Hall |
| Bonker | Devine | Hamilton |
| Bowen | Dickinson | Hammer- |
| Brademas | Diggs | schmidt |
| Breaux | Dingell | Hanley |
| Breckinridge | Dodd | Hannaford |
| Brinkley | Downey, N.Y. | Hansen |
| Brodhead | Downing, Va. | Harkin |
| Brooks | Drinan | Harrington |
| Broomfield | Duncan, Ore. | Harris |
| Brown, Calif. | Duncan, Tenn. | Harsba |
| Brown, Mich. | du Pont | Hastings |
| Brown, Ohio | Early | Hayes, Ind. |
| Broyhill | Eckhardt | Hays, Ohio |
| Buchanan | Edgar | Hebert |
| Burgener | Edwards, Ala. | Hechler, W. Va. |
| Burke, Calif. | Edwards, Calif. | Hecker, Mass. |
| Burke, Fla. | Elberg | Hefner |
| Burke, Mass. | Emery | Heinz |
| Burleson, Tex. | English | Helstoski |
| Burlison, Mo. | Erlenborn | Henderson |
| Burton, John | Esch | Hicks |
| Burton, Phillip | Eshleman | Hightower |

Hillis	Minish	Sarbanes
Holland	Mink	Satterfield
Holt	Mitchell, Md.	Scheuer
Holtzman	Mitchell, N.Y.	Schneebell
Horton	Moakley	Schroeder
Howe	Moffett	Schulze
Hubbard	Mollohan	Sebelius
Hughes	Montgomery	Seiberling
Hungate	Moore	Sharp
Hutchinson	Moorhead.	Shipley
Hyde	Calif.	Shriver
Ichord	Moorhead, Pa.	Shuster
Jarman	Morgan	Sikes
Jeffords	Mosher	Simon
Jenrette	Moss	Sisk
Johnson, Calif.	Mottl	Skubitz
Johnson, Colo.	Murphy, Ill.	Slack
Johnson, Pa.	Murphy, N.Y.	Smith, Iowa
Jones, Ala.	Murtha	Smith, Nebr.
Jones, N.C.	Myers, Ind.	Snyder
Jones, Okla.	Myers, Pa.	Solarz
Jones, Tenn.	Natcher	Spellman
Jordan	Neal	Spence
Karth	Nedzi	Staggers
Kasten	Nichols	Stanton,
Kastenmeyer	Nix	J. William
Kazen	Nolan	Stark
Kelly	Nowak	Steed
Kemp	Oberstar	Steelman
Ketchum	Obey	Steiger, Ariz.
Keys	O'Brien	Steiger, Wis.
Kindness	O'Hara	Stephens
Koch	O'Neill	Stokes
Krebs	Ottinger	Stratton
Krueger	Passman	Stuckey
LaFalce	Patman, Tex.	Studds
Lagomarsino	Patten, N.J.	Sullivan
Landrum	Patterson,	Symington
Latta	Calif.	Symms
Leggett	Pattison, N.Y.	Talcott
Lehman	Pepper	Taylor, Mo.
Lent	Perkins	Taylor, N.C.
Levitas	Pettis	Thompson
Litton	Peyster	Thone
Lloyd, Calif.	Pickle	Thornton
Lloyd, Tenn.	Pike	Traxler
Long, La.	Poage	Treen
Long, Md.	Pressler	Tsongas
Lott	Preyer	Udell
Lujan	Price	Ullman
McClory	Pritchard	Van Deerlin
McCloskey	Quie	Vander Jagt
McCollister	Quillen	Vander Veen
McCormack	Railsback	Vanik
McDade	Randall	Vigorito
McDonald	Rangel	Waggonner
McEwen	Rees	Walsh
McFall	Regula	Wampler
McHugh	Reuss	Waxman
McKay	Rhodes	Weaver
McKinney	Richmond	Whalen
Madden	Riegle	White
Madigan	Rinaldo	Whitehurst
Maguire	Risenhoover	Whitten
Mahon	Roberts	Wiggins
Mann	Robinson	Wilson, Bob
Martin	Rodino	Wilson, C. H.
Mathis	Roncalio	Wilson, Tex.
Matsunaga	Rooney	Winn
Mazzoli	Rose	Wirth
Meeds	Rosenthal	Wolf
Melcher	Rostenkowski	Wyder
Metcalfe	Roush	Wylie
Meyner	Rousselot	Yates
Mezvinsky	Roybal	Yatron
Michel	Runnels	Young, Alaska
Mikva	Russo	Young, Fla.
Miller, Calif.	Ryan	Young, Ga.
Miller, Ohio	St Germain	Young, Tex.
Mills	Santini	Zablocki
Mineta	Sarasin	Zeferetti

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—15

Andrews, N.C.	Jacobs	Stanton,
Carter	Macdonald	James V.
Fulton	Milford	Teague
Hawkins	Roe	Wright
Hinshaw	Rogers	
Howard	Ruppe	

So the resolution was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Teague with Mr. Fulton.
 Mr. Hawkins with Mr. Andrews of North Carolina.
 Mr. Howard with Mr. Carter.
 Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts with Mr. Roe.
 Mr. Milford with Mr. Ruppe.
 Mr. Rogers with Mr. Wright.
 Mr. James V. Stanton with Mr. Jacobs.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the Senate bill (S. 846) to authorize the further suspension of prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the Senate bill S. 846, with Mr. SISK in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the Senate bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) will be recognized for 45 minutes, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD) will be recognized for 45 minutes, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL) will be recognized for 45 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DERWINSKI) will be recognized for 45 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN).

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of S. 846 as reported by the Committee on International Relations. In my opinion passage of this bill is vital to the security of the United States and the North Atlantic.

As Members know there has been a total embargo on arms shipments to Turkey since February 5, 1975. The embargo was placed on the shipment of defense articles and services to Turkey because that country used U.S.-furnished arms in the invasion of Cyprus last summer in violation of her agreement with the United States relating to the use of such equipment. In approving the embargo the Congress hoped that it would induce Turkey to end the military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and to negotiate a peaceful settlement on Cyprus between Greece and Turkey.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the embargo has not brought about a solution of the problem. During the 5 months the embargo has been in effect progress toward any solution of the problem has been blocked and we have suffered and the people of Cyprus are enduring prolonged suffering. All negotiations have stalled. Turkey's attitude has hardened. Tensions between Greece and Turkey have increased.

Moreover, the ban in military shipments and sales of military arms to Turkey has limited our ability to promote a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict, weakened NATO's southern

flank, and put in doubt continued U.S. access to important military installations and bases in Turkey.

Mr. Chairman, S. 846, as amended by the Committee on International Relations, is a compromise, a compromise offered in the hope that it will help improve relations between two members of NATO, both our friends, provide a new start for the deadlocked negotiations on Cyprus and assure continued U.S. access to bases which are very vital and important to our own security. In order to achieve these objectives the bill provides the following measures:

First, the bill would lift partly, Mr. Chairman, and only partly, the embargo on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey by permitting the delivery of those defense articles which Turkey purchased from us prior to February 5 of this year. This would allow approximately \$185 million in military sales to be released to Turkey.

Second, the bill* authorizes the President to issue licenses for exports to Turkey of military equipment through private and commercial channels.

Third, the bill has a clause known as the Fraser amendment, which provides that after the Congress has a chance to review this situation 2 or 3 months from now, and act on the regular Foreign Military Sales Act authorization, government-to-government sales and credits would be executed from the embargo. The suspension of the embargo on government-to-government sales of military equipment would, however, be effective only with respect to the items which are needed for NATO use and only if Turkey meets some other conditions spelled out in the bill.

Fourth, the bill requests the President to begin negotiations with the Greek Government about that country's most urgent needs, including needs for both economic and military assistance.

The President is directed to report on his recommendations on aid to Greece within 60 days from the enactment of this bill.

Fifth, the bill calls on the President to encourage and cooperate in the development of additional humanitarian relief programs for the refugees on Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, those who oppose S. 846 as reported by the committee argue that there is no compromise involved in this legislation. These critics claim that in exchange for a resumption of arms shipments, Turkey is required to do nothing to correct the action it took on Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, I want to stress again what we have proposed is a compromise which falls considerably short of what the President asked for: A complete removal of the present arms embargo on Turkey.

First, S. 846 would lift the embargo only partly and only if Turkey does not violate the cease fire, does not increase its forces on Cyprus, does not send any U.S. arms to Cyprus.

Moreover, the bill would not allow at the start any Government arms sales to Turkey. Section 3 of this bill states that such sales could not be resumed, and I emphasize, could not be resumed until

the legislation authorizing sales and credits for the fiscal year 1976 has been enacted by this House sometime late this fall.

The committee placed this limitation on resumption of arms sales to Turkey to permit the Congress time to determine what progress, if any, is made with respect to a solution on Cyprus. The committee also wanted to prohibit the use of any funds made available for 1976 under any continuing resolution authority for the sale of military equipment to Turkey.

I can assure the Members of the House that the Committee on International Relations, in response to this partial lifting of the embargo, will give Turkey the closest scrutiny. If there is no progress in negotiations, if there is no good faith effort on the part of Turkey, it is highly probable that the Committee on International Relations and this Congress would certainly not permit any future sales to Turkey.

Second, this bill retains the prohibition against grant military assistance. For those Members who oppose any form of foreign aid, or any form of grant military assistance to Turkey, I want them to know that there is not one single dime of grant military assistance in this bill.

Again, I am saying all we are doing here is partially lifting the embargo. We are letting Turkey pick up the military equipment they bought and largely paid for. Some \$85 million has already been paid for items in this \$185 million pipeline. The Turks are actually paying storage charges in this country for military equipment which they purchased here. All this bill does is lift the embargo partially by letting that pipeline and commercial sales to be delivered.

I know this is a very emotional issue to some of the ethnic groups in our country; but I want to say to this House, I am a first generation American. I think where I come from, we are good, loyal Americans. I think most of my Greek American friends are among the most patriotic Americans I have ever met. As Americans—all of us—are dealing here with a matter which not only has an emotional content but also affects the security of our country. When we deal with such an issue, we must all try to put aside our emotions and act on it on the basis of what is best for our country and for peace.

The bill which is before us tries to do this. In putting it forward, our committee tried to use an even-handed approach.

We believe, it is important for our country to be friends with both Greece and Turkey.

That is why our bill calls for military and economic aid to Greece, in addition to the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Turkey, and refugee aid.

Last year, Greece purchased \$169 million dollar's worth of arms in the United States.

The pipeline of arms going to Greece is over \$619 million dollars.

We want Greece to get those arms, even though some Greeks started the fireworks on Cyprus, and even though we received testimony that U.S. arms

furnished to Greece were used illegally on Cyprus.

But in addition to helping Greece, we want to help break the deadlock which is hurting everybody; Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and NATO, and to retain the right of access to critical military bases in Turkey which are essential to the security of our own country.

Mr. Chairman, there are two categories of such military bases and installations in Turkey which are of particular interest to the United States. In the first category are those bases which are oriented toward the common defense of NATO. The second involves those which are of primary importance to U.S. defense needs, including several essential intelligence installations.

Loss of these bases would impair U.S. ability to carry out its NATO responsibilities and would deny the United States use of valuable, if not irreplaceable, intelligence installations which serve U.S. strategic defense needs, separate and distinct from those of NATO. Furthermore, loss of the bases would inhibit or preclude the use of Turkey to support contingency operations elsewhere in the region, including the Middle East, and would restrict overflight of Turkish air space by U.S. military aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and I assume the National Security Council have made the decision that access to those bases—and peace between Greece and Turkey—are in the national interest of our country. They also concluded that we cannot achieve those things unless we help the negotiations get started by removing the arms ban on Turkey. That is why I am standing in this well. I am not against the Greek people or the Turkish people or the people of Cyprus. I hate to see them fight each other. And when the President of the United States—even though he is of a different political party than mine—comes to me and says that we must remove this embargo in the interest of this country and in the interest of resolving the problem on Cyprus, I am willing to give him a hearing. And I am wishing to move at least part way in his direction.

This may be the only way, the only way we are going to nudge the Greeks, the Turks, and the Cypriots to start negotiations. All of them seem frozen in concrete on this issue. I do not want to go into the history of Greek-Turkish relations to try to explain why each side finds it so difficult to make the first move and compromise. The people of those countries have had some rough times with each other for a thousand years—or more. All this stands in the way of a solution to this problem.

Mr. Chairman, 15 years ago, when Cyprus became independent, three countries—Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain—undertook to guarantee its independence. When Turkey invaded Cyprus a year ago, it did it because, in its opinion, it had to invade in order to fulfill its responsibility under that treaty.

Even my friends who are opposing this bill will admit that Turkey had a right

under the treaty of 1960 to go in and try to preserve the independence of Cyprus. The Turks did not start this conflict, The Members know and I know that it was not the Turks who tried to assassinate the elected leader of Cyprus. Turkey had nothing to do with it. So the people who started this have to bear a little bit of the blame for this whole operation. Emotions are high, but we cannot afford to walk out and leave our southeast flank of NATO alone. So, we must make some move to break the deadlock.

We offer this compromise—and it is a compromise, it has got all kinds of safeguards in it—to break that deadlock. All we are saying is that we are going to take the first step. We, the United States, are going to take the first step. It is going to be up to Turkey to take the second step. Then further progress could follow. What we want is to get negotiations started and bring peace to that part of the world.

I want to say something to those of my good friends who strongly support Israel in the Middle East. During the Yom Kippur war, we used the Azores as a staging area to support Israel. The Members know and I know what is going on in Portugal today. The prospects are not very good that we can depend on the Azores if we ever have a conflict in the Middle East again. So our access to bases in Turkey—access which we can only have if there is a friendly relation between our two countries—is very important.

I was the author of the \$2.2 billion emergency security assistance bill for Israel. I brought it to this floor in 1973 to bail out a country that has the only democracy in the Middle East. I just wonder what is going to happen then in the future? We have some very important bases in Turkey, both NATO and U.S. intelligence gathering bases, and they are very, very important and they will be important not only to this country but important to our friends in the Middle East if we ever have another conflict there.

So there is quite a bit wrapped up in this bill today. I know that many of us have all kinds of pressures, all kinds of pressures. I even got a call from one of my constituents, and he said to me, "You know, I am going to defeat you next time and put you back to practicing medicine."

I said, "Well, maybe I would be better off practicing medicine than with the job I have now." So I know emotions are running high in this. But I want everybody to assess their position before they vote. When this debate is concluded, I hope the Members will decide the way I did, that the vote for this compromise bill is in the interest of the national security of our country—of peace between Greece and Turkey—of help for the refugees on Cyprus—and of the overall security situation in eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, as we move to debate the proposal to ease

the embargo on military assistance to Turkey, let us be clear from the outset about the significance of the choice before us. Congress today is considering an emotionally charged issue of very real consequence to the conduct of our foreign policy, an issue that transcends partisan political considerations and goes to the very heart of our national security interests, the continued vitality of our alliances, and the security situation in the eastern Mediterranean. We seek to help resolve a tragic human situation on the island of Cyprus, but we also seek to strengthen bilateral relationships with important allies, to buttress the southern flank of NATO, and to preserve the status of vital security installations. Our vote today may well be the most important foreign policy decision Congress will make this year. We have a responsibility, to ourselves and to the Nation, to judge this matter on its merits and to act in the overriding national interest.

More than a generation ago, in the aftermath of a World War II, a Republican Congress joined with a Democratic President to meet a Communist threat to Greece and Turkey. In a historic demonstration of bipartisanship and concern for the overriding security objectives of this Nation, Congress and the Executive joined in support of the Truman doctrine. Many isolationists cast their first vote for a policy of responsible internationalism. This departure from past practice was a gamble, intensely debated, and unpopular with many constituents. There was no guarantee that the Truman doctrine would save Greece and Turkey from communism, but it did. In retrospect, one would have to say that Congress acted with courage, wisdom, and foresight.

Today Congress is again confronted with a crisis of major proportions in the eastern Mediterranean, a conflict involving Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus that is growing more acute with every passing day. The United States, deeply involved in the effort to bring peace to the Middle East and well aware of the implications of any future war in that area, can ill afford deterioration of conditions on Cyprus or a new crisis between Greece and Turkey. Our own security interests are very much at stake.

The situation on Cyprus is festering. The embargo on arms to Turkey has not forced negotiating concessions. Rather it has poisoned relations between Ankara and Washington, contributed to tensions in the Aegean, damaged NATO solidarity, called into question the status of important U.S. installations in Turkey, and increased the possibility of future conflict in the region.

All of us are aware, Mr. Chairman, that the arms embargo is a hot political issue. There are very few of us in this Chamber who stand to gain popularity back home by voting in favor of this bill. In addition to the political aspects of this question, there are many Members of Congress who see the involvement of profound—and in my opinion frequently legitimate—moral issues. Some would construe easing the embargo as a reward for Turkish aggression on Cyprus, or as a license for other nations around the

world to misuse weapons supplied to them by the United States.

On one moral issue, however, there should be no disagreement. All of us are deeply concerned with the plight of the 180,000 refugees on Cyprus who have been displaced for almost a year, living in wretched conditions, yearning to return to their homes. There are honest differences of opinion on how best to move forward the Cyprus negotiations and resolve the refugee problem, but I can say with confidence that all of us are working in good faith to achieve this objective. The legislation before us makes clear our concern with the refugees on Cyprus and encourages the administration to render effective assistance to victims of the conflict.

If we are going to debate the Turkish arms embargo with the seriousness of purpose it so clearly deserves, let us begin by resolving any ambiguity about the legislation before us. This bill does not emanate from the White House; it is barely acceptable to the President, the Department of State, and the Government of Turkey, all of whom have a clear preference for the Mansfield-Scott version. The proposal on the floor is a bipartisan congressional initiative, negotiated and drafted by Members of this body, and I commend my Democratic colleagues on the Committee on International Relations who have made such an important, responsible contribution to this proposal. It is a sincere attempt at evenhandedness: an honest effort to help break the stalemate on Cyprus, to relieve the human tragedy on that island, to improve our relations with important NATO allies—Greece included—and to serve the vital security interests of this Nation.

This legislation does not countenance the illegal deployment of military equipment supplied by the United States. It does not imply tacit recognition of the status quo on Cyprus. It is not pro-Turkish or pro-Greece, nor is it a knuckling under to Turkish pressure on our bases. This bill does not open wide the gates to renewed arms shipments to Turkey. It provides for continuing restrictions on access to arms that leaves Turkey at a distinct disadvantage, in comparison to Greece, in acquiring military equipment. In addition, section 3 of the bill clearly stipulates that Turkey shall acquire only military equipment as the President determines, and certifies to Congress, as necessary for Turkey to fulfill her NATO responsibilities. Section 3 also states that relaxation of the embargo shall only be effective while Turkey observes the cease fire on Cyprus, does not increase its forces on Cyprus, and does not transfer U.S.-supplied arms to that island.

Those who are concerned with punishing Turkey for misuse of American military equipment should understand that that this bill, in effect, places Turkey on parole by denying important military credit and FMS cash purchases to Ankara until such time as Congress acts on foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1976.

In its most fundamental sense, the legislation we are debating today is recog-

nitition that continued stalemate on Cyprus can only produce consequences unacceptable to all.

Supporters of the bill seek a step back from confrontation with Turkey and a chance to get the Cyprus negotiation off dead center. There is admittedly no guarantee that favorable House action today will lead to peace on Cyprus, mend the fissures in the southern flank of NATO, or even help determine the fate of the 13 American citizens presently unaccounted for on Cyprus. But surely, Mr. Chairman, anyone who looks at the situation objectively will have to admit that the prospects for progress on these fronts are virtually nonexistent under the present circumstances.

As a cosponsor of this bill and an active participant in the negotiations preceding it, I am frank to admit it is my considered opinion that Turkey acted in violation of provisions of U.S. law and agreements in force when it undertook its second phase offensive on Cyprus last year. One could also argue that the Government of Greece is also in at least technical violation of similar agreements, but this is not the question. Turkey has been punished, and punished by Congress, for her transgressions. For how long is it in the national interest of the U.S. Government to punish Turkey? I submit we have reached the stage where continued punishment is counterproductive, jeopardizes the policy objectives we have set out, damages our security interests, and threatens the vitality of important relationships.

Some would maintain that Turkey should be punished until she repents, and penance in this case implies a prior concession on the Cyprus issue. I think we can all agree that the bill before us would lack the drama and emotional content so evident today if the Government of Turkey would agree to make prior concessions, but the fact is that the Turks have made it apparent they are not prepared to make concessions under pressure. This attitude is not unique to the Government of Turkey. Nor, I submit, is it the proper role of the United States to use its leverage on Turkey or other Middle Eastern states to force concessions or prejudice negotiating positions. Our task is rather to help create an environment conducive to negotiations and encourage the parties to the dispute to meet and compromise their differences.

A favorable vote on this bill does not strip Congress of its prerogatives in respect to future military shipments to Turkey. It does provide an incentive for the Turks to negotiate in good faith and, through the provisions of the Fraser amendment unanimously endorsed by the Committee on International Relations, establishes a suspense period—from now until such time as we can act on fiscal year 1976 foreign assistance legislation—in which Congress can gauge the Turkish attitude on Cyprus negotiations. The congressional oversight role is fully protected by the requirement that the administration report, at 60-day intervals, on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

I hope my colleagues on the floor will also bear in mind that, during its deliberations on the arms embargo, the Committee on International Relations addressed on several occasions the question of Turkish control over the opium poppy crop. While the opium issue is essentially unrelated to either the imposition or the relaxation of the arms embargo, it is nevertheless a question of considerable, understandable concern to the American Government. The Turks are currently harvesting their opium crop under a system of controls sponsored by the United Nations. It is still too early to determine if this system will prove effective, but I believe the Government of Turkey deserves an opportunity to demonstrate its good faith on this issue while we monitor the situation closely. I have every confidence that, with Ambassador MacComber serving in Ankara, the Congress will be kept fully and currently informed of any illegal diversion of Turkish opium production.

Congress today has an opportunity to give peace a chance in the Eastern Mediterranean, to make a creative, balanced contribution to American diplomacy. We are not being asked to endorse the administration's preference—a simple lifting of the arms embargo such as passed in the Senate. We are instead assessing an initiative of our own making, one intended to demonstrate our good faith to both the Greeks and the Turks, and one which will hopefully break the impasse that has eroded the strength of NATO, prolonged the tragedy of Cyprus and damaged our bilateral relations with important allies.

Mr. Chairman, after man-years of Executive preeminence, Congress is gradually and effectively asserting its shared responsibility in the conduct of our foreign relations. We have an obligation to see that a shared responsibility is responsibly shared. When Congress imposed the embargo on arms to Turkey, it worked its will on the administration; it initiated foreign policy.

Foreign affairs is not a static discipline. Regardless of the wisdom or lack of foresight inherent in the original decision to ban the shipment of arms to Turkey, it is now apparent that a continuation of this embargo is not in the best interests of the United States, Turkey, Greece, or the people of Cyprus. Action on this issue is imperative. Failure to pass the legislation before us can only result in damage to our vital security interests, increased tensions between Turkey and the United States, dangerous stalemate on Cyprus, and a greater likelihood of further hostilities in the area.

Mr. Chairman, there may be no more vital foreign policy decision before this body this year. I urge every Member to weigh the consequences of his vote carefully and make a judgment based on the real merits of the issue as it affects the national interest of this Nation and our allies.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSENTHAL).

(Mr. ROSENTHAL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to S. 846.

I agree with the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN); the distinguished chairman of our committee, that this is a vitally important vote. It is probably the most important foreign policy vote in this Congress and probably one of the most important foreign policy votes in many, many years.

It involves a number of areas of great interest: United States-Turkish relations, United States-Greek relations, and U.S. relations with other arms purchasing recipients. It also involves deep NATO security interests, and, I think most importantly of all for the long-term future of U.S. national interests, it involves the role of the Congress.

What is the role of Congress in foreign policy? The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) elucidated that the role of Congress must be subservient to the Chief Executive, that he is our Commander in Chief, and that when he, together with the National Security Council, lays out the course of conduct of the Nation, Congress must follow.

That is the question that is before us today.

Equal questions that we have to consider are whether the rule of law or the rule of pragmatism will prevail, whether principle will prevail over expediency; and this decision, each and every one agrees, must be based on U.S. national interests and on nothing else.

Like most of the important issues before the House, this is a complicated subject. It involves conflicts of values, of interest, and of obligations. Close allies are involved, and so, indeed, is an important principle of law.

Equally important for the future is our national policy on arms sales.

As I said earlier, the role of Congress in setting foreign policy limitations and restraint is in serious question.

Some of us have been involved for many years in this and in associated issues. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, I have worked on U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean and toward Greece since 1967. During most of those years I had to oppose the Government in Greece and our policy of supporting the military dictatorship. There has been innuendo and talk today of the Greek lobby. Frankly, even though I am opposed to this bill, I would think I am one of the least likely members of that lobby because for 7 years in my community I had to explain to my constituents why I opposed the government in Athens.

Realistically speaking, the issue today is not whether we favor Greece or favor Turkey. The question really is as to what kind of government we are. The question is whether the rule of law still operates in our foreign policy.

I have been to both Greece and Turkey many times, and I know and respect the leaders of both countries. My carefully considered opinion is that both countries

will respect the United States, in the long run, only if we reject this bill.

S. 846 is bad policy, it is bad legislation, and it is bad precedent. It is bad policy because it continues a dangerous and basically unfair tilt toward Turkey. It is bad legislation because it carves a fearful loophole in the law which forbids the use of military aid, a law that has been in existence for over 20 years. It is bad precedent because the image of the United States submitting to extortion for the sake of military bases, no matter how worthwhile, will not be lost on the rest of the world.

I could tell the Members that the time I spent on issues concerning the Eastern Mediterranean is not necessarily pleasant, and it was not politically expedient, but this is an important area of the world. It is an important area with respect to both present and future American foreign policy. What we decide today will determine United States foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East, as well as in the Persian Gulf, for the foreseeable future.

The vote we cast today will be registered in Portugal and Spain and in many other places.

The fact of the matter is that this bill cannot be sweetened. I think it is bad legislation which must be rejected as it is presented to us.

If the basic principles of law which have guided our foreign aid policy for 25 years are herewith today abandoned, we may as well abandon any future help of a balancing and meaningful role for Congress in foreign policy.

The separate views in the report list nine reasons why this is bad legislation.

Mr. Chairman, the nine points to which I refer are as follows:

(1) *The so-called compromise is no compromise.* In exchange for a resumption of arms sales, Turkey is required to do nothing to correct actions it took on Cyprus. These aggressive actions, made possible by American weapons, caused the arms cutoff.

(2) *A major principle of American foreign policy is abandoned.* Reviving arms to Turkey without any action by Turkey to remedy the consequences of its aggression abandons a fundamental principle of American foreign policy—that weapons are supplied by the United States to other countries for defensive and not for aggressive purposes.

(3) *Restoring arms sales to Turkey condones the continuing violations of law and bilateral agreements.* Over 30,000 Turkish troops, equipped with American arms, still occupy 49% of Cyprus, an independent country. 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees remain homeless. Turkey refuses to deal with these conditions.

(4) *This bill encourages further Turkish aggression.* Arms ordered by Turkey before the embargo would be released "notwithstanding any other provision of law" including prohibitions against offensive use of American supplied arms. Turkey could use these arms, and all commercial arms which it is also allowed to buy under this bill, in aggression against Greece.

(5) *Resuming arms sales would be yielding to Turkish extortion.* This bill is a surrender to the Turkish threat to close U.S. bases. Yielding to such a threat invites other countries to hold hostage 300 major U.S. overseas bases.

(6) *Passage of S. 846 would encourage other countries to misuse U.S. arms.* Over \$8 billion in U.S. arms were sold abroad last

year. The legal restraints prohibiting the transfer of these arms and limiting their use to self-defense will be severely eroded elsewhere if Turkey can resume buying U.S. arms under present circumstances.

(7) *The arms embargo has not produced progress on Cyprus because it has been undermined publicly and privately by the Department of State.* On February 16, 1975, 11 days after the arms ban went into effect, an Administration proposal was introduced in the Senate to repeal the arms ban. Administration spokesmen have consistently and repeatedly blamed Congress, which is enforcing the law, instead of Turkey, which is violating it, as the obstacle to peace. This has encouraged Turkey to remain intransigent with the expectation that the Administration would soon cause the ban to be lifted.

(8) *Resumption of arms sales to Turkey could severely damage Greece.* Rearming Turkey could have a "catastrophic" effect on the new democracy in Greece according to former Under Secretary of State George Ball when he testified in opposition to this bill. To rearm Turkey without the fundamental restraints of our laws, as this bill proposes, could also endanger U.S. bases in Greece and a revived Greek role in NATO.

(9) *Opponents of this bill support NATO and want both Greece and Turkey to resume their full participation in the alliance.* American policy must move toward rebuilding the southeastern flank of NATO by supporting a prompt and fair settlement on Cyprus. As long as U.S. policy tilts toward Turkey, the rebuilding of NATO is impossible.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important that, to the degree possible, we keep the debate on this issue directed to the actual facts.

When we stop to think that in the background of any discussion of an issue involving Greece and Turkey, there are over 500 years of historic animosity, one can understand the ease with which a debate and discussion could get completely out of hand.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge the Members to vote against S. 846, as amended. The basic issue in my judgment is whether or not there has been sufficient progress on Cyprus to logically permit resumption of arms shipments from the United States to Turkey.

As we all know, S. 846 allows: a. immediate shipment of \$185 million in arms ordered by Turkey before the February cutoff; b. immediate resumption of all commercial arms sales, and c. arms sales by the U.S. Government later this year, including credit sales at subsidized interest rates.

Like many others who oppose the bill, I favor resumption of arms shipments to Turkey, but I believe this should take place only after specific progress has been achieved in restoring property rights to refugees on the island and substantially reducing military forces on Cyprus.

Like many Members, I am also concerned over the fundamental principle that countries receiving or purchasing arms from the United States should not use them for purposes other than the definite alliances by which they are approved.

Those Members who served in the last session will recall that starting in September of 1974 there were a series of resolutions containing restrictions on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey. This came about as the result of the invasion of Cyprus by the military forces of Turkey. Basically, the Congress at that time was saying that there should be a prohibition against further shipment of military arms to Turkey until there was "substantial progress" on the Island of Cyprus.

The original resolution called for "substantial progress." Later on there was a term, "good faith efforts" that was involved in the House and Senate negotiations.

Finally, the third resolution, which was passed, if I recall correctly, in the lame duck portion of the session, required that Turkey not break the cease-fire agreement, nor increase its troops on Cyprus.

This eased the shipment of arms temporarily, allowing for the shipment of spare parts.

Then when this Congress again faced this subject early in this session the present restrictions were placed in a continuing resolution.

In February of 1975, Secretary Kissinger under these provisions, had to announce that only "slight" progress had been made through negotiations on Cyprus.

This is where we find ourselves today.

It is my understanding that later this week the next scheduled round of discussions between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are planned, and will undoubtedly take place, but I am afraid they will not produce progress, which is the real issue before us.

We all recognized, regardless of one's view on the bill that is before us, that both the Government of Greece and the Government of Turkey face major political complications of their own because of this issue. The fairly new Government of Greece under Mr. Karamanlis cannot make any major concessions on any of its negotiations with Turkey unless there is substantial progress on Cyprus. We have also been told repeatedly that the Government of Turkey, which is a coalition government, could lose control of the Parliament there if it made major concessions in this respect.

We as Members of the Congress know the domestic pressures that we often face, and therefore, we can understand the pressures on the Parliaments of Greece and Turkey.

I would like to concur with the point made earlier by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSENTHAL) that this is not a Greek-versus-Turkey issue. Those who are opposed to this message are not doing so as what the press has labeled "the Greek lobby." I think that is a very erroneous and oversimplified concept. As I understand the situation, the issue is whether or not there has been substantial enough progress on Cyprus to warrant the resumption of military sales to Turkey.

If in the judgment of a New York Member the situation on Cyprus is that

of substantial progress, then that Member should vote for this measure.

But if a Member believes, as I happen to believe, that there has not been substantial progress on Cyprus, then a "no" vote is called for.

I should also point out that, in this context, that the Greek-Americans across the country who have communicated with all of us in telegrams and mailgrams, letters and telephone calls, are not doing anything more than any other group of interested Americans would do on any subject. The fact that the Greek-Americans feel very involved in this issue and are very concerned with it is perfectly understandable. There is not anything inconsistent with any group of people in America feeling a special pride or interest in the land of their forefathers. If in this case the Greek-Americans are especially concerned, we should expect this as a matter of practical fact. I do not think this should be labeled a Greek lobby or Greek pressure. It is the legitimate views of a very interested group of American citizens.

One last point I wish to make at this time, Mr. Chairman, is my concern over the future of NATO and, of course, the future of United States-Turkish and United States-Greek relations. I have here in my hand a recent article from the Chicago Daily News, and the headline in the article reads: "Kissinger and U.S. Villains to Greece."

We have nothing to gain, as I see it, by alienating either the governments or the peoples of Greece or Turkey. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State, as this headline indicates, has been cast in the role of a villain. I submit that that is obviously an exaggeration but, nevertheless, it is a fact—a fact insofar as opinion is concerned. It is a fact insofar as public opinion in Greece is concerned.

I think what we all want, even though we are not agreeing on the formula to obtain it, is a solid NATO. We want continued strong ties with Greece and continued strong ties with Turkey. We want the Greeks and Turks to remain allies. They have far, far more to gain by working together than they have by drifting apart.

Our differences of opinion today rest on this very simple basis. Has there been enough progress in the resettlement of refugees, the restoration of property rights, of progress in negotiations between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot leaders? Has there been enough of a withdrawal of troops so that the Government of Cyprus is in fact in control of its island, its domain? One point I am making at this time and that is in my judgment it is not the case. There has not been sufficient progress on Cyprus to warrant the resumption of the shipment of military equipment to Turkey.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL).

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRADEMAS).

(Mr. BRADEMAS asked and was given

permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to urge my colleagues to vote today against the bill, S. 846.

I believe, for a number of reasons, that it would be a profound mistake, in terms of the national interest of the United States, for the House to approve this legislation.

Let me, Mr. Chairman, here set forth the reasons that I believe the House should reject S. 846.

First, this bill, which has been described as a "compromise" is no compromise.

Under the bill, Turkey gets arms from the United States but Turkey is required to do nothing with respect to the Turkish action which caused the cutoff, the use of American arms on Cyprus. Let me here note, Mr. Chairman, that opponents of arms to Turkey have consistently favored resumption of arms provided Turkey takes steps to remedy the consequences of its action on Cyprus, especially with respect to the humanitarian problem of the nearly 200,000 refugees who have been displaced from their homes.

The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES) and I visited some of these people on Cyprus last January. Many of them are living in tents.

There is a second reason the House should reject S. 846. It is that the resumption of arms to Turkey without action by Turkey to remedy its aggression on Cyprus will explicitly condone clear violations of conditions of U.S. law and bilateral agreements between the United States and Turkey under which Turkey received the arms.

Mr. Chairman, the issue represented by S. 846, is an issue of the rule of law.

Both the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act contain provisions prohibiting the use of arms supplied by the United States for aggressive purposes and both laws mandate an immediate cutoff in further arms to any country violating this condition.

Surely, Mr. Chairman, Congress cannot be accurately characterized as meddling in the conduct of foreign policy when Congress insists that the laws of the United States be enforced.

A third reason S. 846 is a bad bill, Mr. Chairman, is that the approval of arms to Turkey which S. 846 authorizes only encourages other nations buying or receiving U.S. arms to use them without restraint.

The distinguished former Under Secretary of State, George Ball, in testifying against this bill, warned of the "explosive" effects of a failure by the United States to insist on restrictions on the use of arms that we supply to other countries. With U.S. arms exports increasing dramatically, especially to such volatile areas as the Middle East, such dangers appear all too real.

A fourth reason for the House to reject S. 846 is that by approving arms to Turkey and thereby condoning the use of American arms for aggressive purposes, we will be signaling the abandonment of a fundamental principle of American foreign policy. Turkey conducted its massive invasion of Cyprus on August 14, 1974,

with American arms and continues its occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus with American arms.

Mr. Chairman, there is a fifth reason that S. 846 is bad legislation.

The resumption of arms to Turkey which this bill authorizes would have a very damaging impact in Greece.

Such resumption could threaten the new democracy there. Former Under Secretary George Ball told the Committee on International Relations that passage of this legislation would have a "catastrophic" impact in Athens with little hope of bringing about constructive response in Ankara.

Moreover, approval of the legislation could endanger both U.S. bases in Greece and a revived role for Greece within NATO.

There is still another reason the House should reject S. 846, Mr. Chairman. Resumption of arms to Turkey without remedial action by that country on Cyprus would be to yield to Turkish blackmail threats to shut down U.S. bases there.

Secretary of State Kissinger said in Atlanta, Ga., last month that the United States would not surrender to threats of this kind from other countries but, of course, that is precisely what S. 846 represents.

And, Mr. Chairman, for the United States to yield to such Turkish threats would be to invite similar threats to U.S. bases by other countries in which they are located.

Mr. Chairman, we have repeatedly been told by the administration that the arms embargo has not produced progress on Cyprus and should therefore be lifted. But the fact is that Secretary of State Kissinger has, by both public and private automatic, undercut the effectiveness of the embargo from the start.

On February 16, 1975, 11 days after the arms ban went into effect, Mr. Kissinger's bill to repeal the ban was introduced in the Senate. Mr. Kissinger has consistently blamed Congress, which is enforcing the law, instead of Turkey, which is violating it, as the obstacle to peace.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kissinger's statements and actions have encouraged Turkey to believe that the administration would be successful in reversing Congress on the Turkish aid issue. It is obvious that this approach served only to kill any incentive Turkey would have had to make concessions on Cyprus. And, Mr. Chairman, I should point out that arms flowed to Turkey from July to February but that during that time Turkey showed no willingness to make concessions on Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, if we pass S. 846 today, we will not only be authorizing the immediate shipment of \$185 million of arms to Turkey and we will not merely be allowing the immediate resumption of commercial sales by U.S. arms manufacturers to Turkey. By passing S. 846 we will also be authorizing the automatic resumption this year of all sales by our Government of military goods to Turkey by cash or by credit subsidized by American taxpayers immediately upon enactment of the regular foreign assistance bill.

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that S. 846 is a bad bill. It means a surrender by Cyprus of principle, a surrender by Cyprus of its proper role in insisting that our laws be faithfully enforced. It would mean opening the door to further and dangerous abuses of arms supplied by the United States to other countries.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of America, this bill should be rejected.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute because I think the RECORD should be corrected with respect to one statement made by my good friend from Indiana.

I have in my hand here a "Dear Colleague" letter signed by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN), and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. BUCHANAN).

This letter says:

George Ball, who testified in opposition to the bill as originally before the Committee, did testify at that time that the U.S. should do something.

His present position is that while he would have preferred that the bill contain a direct linkage to negotiations on Cyprus, that with the Committee amendment which defers any new sales until Congress acts on the military authorization in the fall, on balance it is better to pass the bill as amended than to kill it.

I just want to say that George Ball's position has changed with the adoption of the Fraser amendment.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN).

(Mr. WHALEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, whether or not to continue military aid to Turkey has been the most troublesome issue with which I have had to deal since joining the International Relations Committee in 1971.

With one exception, I have voted for every resolution terminating military assistance to Turkey. I did so for two reasons.

The first was a matter of principle. I felt it wrong to continue to supply weapons to a nation which had used our equipment in invading another country.

Second, I hoped that the discontinuance of aid would result in meaningful concessions by Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, it is not easy for a politician to admit a mistake. But I am compelled to do so today, because it is clear to me that I was wrong in both of the assumptions upon which I predicated my past Turkish aid roles.

First, I was not fully informed of all of the facts relating to the use of American arms in Cyprus. I was aware that actions by the Greek Government precipitated the Cyprus conflict. However, I only learned recently that Greek troops equipped with infantry-type American weapons were sent to Cyprus to reinforce Greek troops, 700 of which were illegally positioned there since 1967. Mr. Chairman, principles of law must be applied uniformly. It is now obvious to me that

the Congress has not done so in the case of last year's Cyprus conflict.

Second, I misjudged human nature. As has so often happened in the past, a congressional threat generates a response quite the opposite from that which we intended. Turkish politicians are confronted with the same pressure as we are. Thus, I should not have been surprised that national pride would preclude Turkey's caving in to congressional dictation.

For these reasons I have changed my position of the question of limited military aid to Turkey. Thus, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of S. 846, as amended by the Committee on International Relations.

Today the House should consider this measure in the light of two questions: first, has the objective of the aid been achieved? Second, what might we expect if the Congress fails to enact S. 846, as amended?

Let me discuss each briefly?

First, has the cutoff goal been attained? Obviously not, for the reasons which I already have indicated. Cyprus negotiations still are stalemated.

Second, what might occur if the Congress continues to apply a principle unevenly?

The negotiations stalemate undoubtedly will continue. We must remember that concessions are all one way. It is only Turkey which, literally, can give ground.

Congress will put the Government of Turkey in the unwilling, but politically necessary position of taking retaliatory actions against us with respect to our important military bases there.

The Turkish armed forces, in the short run will feel the pinch of the embargo. In the long run, however, Turkey can purchase comparable arms from any number of other nations.

The situation in the Middle East would be further destabilized if Turkey obtains cash or credits from the oil-rich Arab states with which to pay for these acquisitions.

Mr. Chairman, the United States, regrettably, is in the middle of an age-old dispute between two valued friends. Since we already have chosen to ignore the principle of equal application of the law, two other factors command our consideration as we vote on this measure today.

First, will passage of S. 846, as amended, bring progress toward a Cyprus settlement? This I cannot guarantee. The President believes it will. But we do know that the present approach has not worked.

Second, is enactment of amended S. 846 in our national interest? The answer is an unequivocal "Yes." Failure to do so will jeopardize our intelligence-gathering capacity, will weaken NATO, and will perpetuate a cancer which threatens peace in the Middle East and, indeed, the world.

Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of S. 846, as amended.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I am impressed by the thoughtful presentation the gentleman has made, and would like to associate myself with his remarks as the reason why I too join in urging support for this bill.

Mr. WHALEN. I thank the gentleman for his support.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DERWINSKI).

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PEYSER).

(Mr. PEYSER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEYSER. I yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) has neglected to mention that under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President had up to \$50 million in grant military assistance which he could give to any one country in any year. In other words, last fiscal year, which ended on June 30, the President could give Turkey \$50 million. Beginning on July 1st, the President could give another \$50 million. The gentleman from Ohio at no point entered that consideration into his theory of what might happen if this bill is defeated.

Mr. PEYSER. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Chairman, this is not an easy vote for me today. I am a Republican, and we have, I believe, an outstanding Republican President sitting in the White House today. But, I also feel that if President Ford were sitting in the House with us today as a Member of Congress, I am confident he would say to us, "Listen to both sides of the argument and act using your own judgment as to what you think is best for this country."

I am equally sure he would never suggest that Congress act as a rubber-stamp for the executive branch. I have very much appreciated the opportunity given to me by President Ford to let me hear the administration's side of the picture, and I am equally indebted to the many Members of this body, who have been actively involved over the past 8 months, in learning their points of view. I have, after careful thought, reached a decision on this issue. My decision is based on many factors; but due to the very limited time, I am going to touch on just two of them.

In the fall of 1972 the Turkish Government put into force an agreement reached with the U.S. Government not to have its people grow the poppy that is ultimately used for the production of heroin. In exchange for this, the United States agreed to pay the Turkish Government in excess of \$35 million. There is no need for me to outline to the Members the havoc that was being wrought in this country by the influx of heroin.

In the summer of 1974 the same Turkish Government ultimately broke its agreement unilaterally and once again reinstated the right of the farmers in

Turkey to grow the poppy. It is estimated by our people this year that over 140 tons of opium will be produced in Turkey.

The impact on our country, if we are not successful in stopping the flow of heroin into this country that is now being produced, is going to be perfectly terrible. For this reason, I feel that the word of the Turkish Government is very much in doubt. This is a government that today says to us: "Approve our arms deal or we will throw you out of the military bases."

I would also like to note that today in the press the Government of Jordan—and this is King Hussein speaking—said:

Do not attempt to scale down our arms deal or we will go elsewhere. Such attempts will entail adverse effects on the United States and Jordan relationships.

I wonder, are we really about to go down a road in foreign affairs that has a signpost on it that says, "Shout loud enough, threaten us enough, and we will give you what you want, whether we agree with it or not."

I am beginning to believe we are in a period of foreign policy by blackmail, and I hope we can get out of that period and get out of it right now and that foreign governments recognize that our actions will not be controlled by threats.

I believe that the people of this country want us to be part of the world community, but they want and demand that we in Government act independently and not under the threat of reprisal.

I believe that this vote today against further aid to Turkey, at this time, will make our feelings very clear.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PEYSER).

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEYSER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to refer to the question posed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSENTHAL). Of course, it is true that during my remarks I did not mention the fact that the President does have a so-called waiver authority, authority to issue some \$50 million worth of equipment to Turkey. But this is not the issue. The issue concerning the Turkish Government is the action of the U.S. Congress. If the President does issue a waiver authority, this in no way removes or resolves the issue in the minds of Turkish officials.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEYSER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, the issue is the position of the U.S. Government. If these bases are important—and I think they are important—then the President could have done something to help resolve the issue by giving a grant of \$50 million to Turkey this year and \$50 million this week—that is \$100 million—and if Turkey responded firmly to

that, then I would have been in the forefront of leading the Congress to rescind the arms embargo.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield so that I may respond to the gentleman from New York?

Mr. PEYSER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I say this is in no way the issue. The Turkish Government is not concerned with the attitude of the administration. It is the administration which is, after all, trying to achieve a partial lifting of the ban. The Turkish Government is concerned with the position of the U.S. Congress, and by failing to act, the problem would still pertain.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Chairman, there is one statement I would like to make before my time is up.

There are many of us who are taking this position today against giving aid to Turkey who have consistently voted in support of defense funds for the continued strength of the United States and for keeping the United States stronger than any nation in the world.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL).

(Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize what has just been said by my dear friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PEYSER).

It seems as though we have been just concerned with the sensitivities of the Turkish people and their internal political problems, and not the integrity of this Government. The integrity of the U.S. Congress has never become an issue as far as the Turkish Government unilaterally violating an executive agreement is concerned.

The question is: What good is any agreement that we legislate or that the executive branch goes into? What difference does it really make whether we put restrictions on arms that we ourselves give to other nations?

The fact of the matter is the integrity of this country, regardless of who was the President at the time and regardless of who was heading the Turkish Government at the time, involves certain principles of international law and decency. If it means, because the Turkish Government changes its leadership because of political problems, that then Turkey can decide to go into the growing of opium, then we should not have gone into the agreement.

What bothers me is not that one country may insult the United States but that my country will join in that insult instead of asking for enforcement of the agreement. If we were asking diplomatically for explanations as to why the agreement was not enforced, then perhaps I could stand here and say that at least our country is concerned about these tons of poison, this heroin that flows into the streets of our cities; I could be assured that our Government is concerned about the problem.

But what do we find instead? We find our Ambassador, Ambassador Maccom-

ber, who fought vigorously, without any support from our administration, begging the Turkish Government to abide by its agreement. And they ignored him, Secretary Kissinger made no remarks, publicly or privately, about the Turkish decision. Then we find our representatives in the United Nations lauding the Turkish Government because they decided to grow opium and produce it by using a straw process that nobody in the United States of America is familiar enough with to know what is going on, since they have no straw-processing machinery in Turkey.

The Turkish Government tells us that they do not want Americans involved in oversight, and that only the United Nations will be able to give them assistance to avoid diversion of opium from their fields, and yet it is this very same Turkish Government that said that the only way to control diversion of opium was to have a ban on opium in Turkey.

If 4 years ago they could not control the growth or the diversion of opium in four provinces, how in God's name are we going to believe that they can control it in eight provinces.

It bothers me that nobody in the State Department has even raised this as an order of priority. I have been told by the State Department and the executive branch that we have to wait to see what happens.

Members of the House, I think that when we go into a contract, at least our side, the party representing the interests of the United States, should not say that we will wait to see what happens.

The Drug Enforcement Administration is just as much a part of the executive branch as the Secretary of State. Therefore, when we go to the Drug Enforcement Administration, the former Director has been saying that we expect that in August and early September, as a result of a bumper opium crop, that the heroin will be on the streets of the United States of America, and the executive branch immediately responded by saying, "Mr. Bartels, you are an honorable man, but you are fired from your job."

That has been the only voice which has been undisputed as the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and nobody who has taken over since Mr. Bartels has been fired and has given me any security to believe that that Turkish opium will not be reaching the streets of New York and other major cities.

Therefore, my colleagues, some Members may think that it is unrelated. They may say, "What does this have to do with our international relationship?" I am telling the Members that we are asking the Congress today to enter into some kind of compromise, and based on this, we do not know whether the Turkish Government is going to do anything because they have not agreed to do anything.

I would suggest and respectfully ask the Members to do this: Look at what they did the last time when they actually entered into an agreement. What they decided to do unilaterally, without even telling our President or our Congress, violate the agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL) has expired.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL).

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANGEL. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL) this question: In the event the lifting of the embargo is not successful, does the gentleman think, in his judgment, that we will have better control, better relations with Turkey over the poppy issue? I think we will have less, and I think it is important.

I think the gentleman will agree that we have one of the top diplomats in the State Department in Bill Macomber, who is working extremely closely with the Turkish Government. They know of our concern.

The gentleman in the well made a very fine presentation before our committee. This is of top priority to the Government of the United States, but I think we would be in a much better position with respect to the lifting of the embargo if our relationships would continue. This is not going to be a low priority matter.

Will the gentleman comment on that?

Mr. RANGEL. I certainly will because until the Turks were in trouble in Cyprus, this never was a priority item with this administration, and my dear friend, Bill Macomber, one of the most dedicated public servants I have ever met, was in the battlefields alone fighting the Turks until the Cyprus situation came along.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BIESTER).

(Mr. BIESTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, I fully appreciate the sensitivity of this issue to each of us as Members.

I would not come to the well of this House and urge a single colleague to risk the anger of good friends and supporters unless I were certain that the interests of the entire American people demanded it.

We have heard arguments and discussion here today about what the role of Congress ought to be in these issues. Obviously, the role of Congress should be that of an equal partner in the development of foreign policy. That is a constitutional responsibility. However, Mr. Chairman, that constitutional responsibility imposes upon each of us, as a Member of Congress, to dispose that responsibility wisely and well in the long-range and short-range interests of all of the American people.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, I was somewhat astonished to hear the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSENTHAL) after a very eloquent initial speech about the role of Congress, say that he would prefer that the President, not the Congress, proceed to ship arms to the Turks.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIESTER. I yield briefly on that point.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, my point is that I do not want to see the fundamental law changed, and if the pragmatic situation is in the interest of the United States to get some dialog going with the Turks, then the President has the unique opportunity under existing law to do this, and he chose not to do it.

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, I continue to be astonished by the gentleman's remarks.

Mr. Chairman, the strong argument for this bill lies not in any words that we can offer here but lies instead in a view of the map of the Mediterranean Sea. We cannot underestimate the significance of the entire Mediterranean area in terms of a potential outflanking of western Europe and thereby the Finlandization of western Europe.

We dare not be naive about the Soviet ambitions not only in the eastern quarter of the Mediterranean which they have well displayed, but their ambitions throughout the entire Mediterranean which they display in their interest in the Government of Libya, which they display in their interest in the events in Portugal and which they display in the development of the Communist Party strength in Italy. Certainly each Member of this House must understand thereby the significance and importance of both Greece and Turkey as allies and friends of the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, this is an ancient issue, it is not a new one. Why should we be surprised because in the middle of this ancient issue a proud people like the Turks would decline to be interested in movement toward compromise under the pressures of the American Congress?

Realistically, Mr. Chairman, any Turkish Government which conceded and caved in under that pressure would be swiftly replaced by one which would then repudiate the compromise earlier reached.

I have sat in this Chamber and I have listened over and over again to the development of the idea that we in America must become accustomed to a new role in the world in which, as it has been expressed in recent years, arrogance of power ought not to let us believe that we can control all the issues of the world all the time. In this instance we cannot as an outside party force either one of these two currently quarreling friends of ours to take a particular position in the solution of their long-term dispute. We dare not, in the pursuit of trying to live up to the letter of our own law, under circumstances in which its application is far from clear, jeopardize the long-range interests of the American people.

One can say that he does not care about those bases in Turkey, but, Mr. Chairman, any analysis of what those

bases are and what the losses of those bases would mean to the security of the American people is something each Member will have to consider as he or she casts his or her vote. Are we to ignore the data on the Soviets' space and missile programs? Are we to ignore the data about the early warning radar on Soviet missile attacks? Are we to ignore the data concerning verification of Soviet compliance with agreements limiting ABM development?

I urge support of this legislation.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. JOHN L. BURTON).

(Mr. JOHN L. BURTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this resolution. I would like to address myself briefly to the great importance that everybody says these bases in Turkey have. I would hope to God that the strength of America and the protection of our people is not based upon an unstable nation, and that we have to rely on Turkey, whose government is unstable, to protect us and give us information regarding the Soviet Union. If we have to do that, we are in big trouble.

I submit, one, the question is Congress and Congress attitude. I think we expressed our attitude last year. We have a right to express it this year. We are being asked to submit to blackmail from Turkey that they might take away these bases from us. I have been told that if all of these bases are taken away, we would have to spend \$250 million to come up with the expertise to give us the type of oversight that these Turkish bases give us. But I would rather spend that money and have that oversight within the jurisdiction of this Nation and not in the jurisdiction of a government that is unstable.

The present law merely states that the President certify good faith efforts are being made and that Turkey is obeying the laws of our land. This resolution would not be necessary if that were so, but Turkey has not shown good faith. They have not obeyed our laws, and, therefore, the administration is coming back with Secretary of State Kissinger again saying that he knows it all. He has given his commitment somewhere, and he can break the back of the legislative branch of the people of the United States.

I said last year during the Turkish debate that Kissinger ought to go. I say today Kissinger ought to go, and I think that the Congress, the duly elected Representatives of the American people, should make these determinations. I urge a "no" vote.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIR

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. SISK). Let the Chair admonish the guests in the gallery that they are not to audibly demonstrate or manifest any feeling in connection with debate on the floor. The Chair would expect adherence to that rule.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN).

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. SOLARZ).

(Mr. SOLARZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, this is the most difficult question which I have ever confronted in the 7 years I have been in public life. I think the pros and cons with respect to this legislation are so exquisitely in balance that I find it difficult, indeed, to make a determination as to what to do. There are without question strong and substantial arguments on both sides of this issue, and it was with great reluctance, and only after the most serious thought, that I decided to change my mind and support the legislation before us.

I thought that I might briefly this afternoon share with the Members what were for me the governing considerations in this regard. First, I think that we have in Turkey some critically significant intelligence installations which it is clearly in the national interests of our Nation to maintain. I am referring now not to the NATO bases in Turkey, not to the Air Force and naval bases of our own country in Turkey, but rather to those intelligence installations which provide us with a range of information involving the SALT agreements, Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile capacities, and Soviet troop movements, which it is absolutely essential for us to have. To be sure, we could build bases elsewhere in the general area in the unfortunate event that our intelligence installations in Turkey were closed down. But on the basis of information available to our committee and to the Congress as a whole, I think it fair to say that the reliability of our intelligence estimates in the event our installations in Turkey were closed down would be substantially and significantly reduced.

Insofar as these installations give us the capacity to monitor Soviet adherence both to present and possibly to future nuclear arms limitations as well, I think it is critically important for us to maintain our position in Turkey. As someone who is very much committed to the principle that the peace of mankind is contingent on progress in further nuclear disarmament talks with the Soviet Union, I think it very clear that our capacity to enter into such agreements depends on our ability to monitor Soviet adherence to them.

Second, I decided to support this legislation because it seems to me it would tend to facilitate progress in the negotiations between Greece and Turkey with respect to a resolution of the conflict over Cyprus. Quite clearly, any progress in the negotiations is contingent upon concessions by the Turks who, through their control of over 40 percent of the land mass and the presence of 35,000 of their troops in Cyprus, regrettably and unfortunately hold most of the cards in their own hands.

So far we have had the embargo in existence for 6 months and it seems fair to say that however well intentioned the embargo might have been, it has served to harden rather than soften the Turkish

position concerning conflict on Cyprus. There is, of course, no guarantee that if the embargo is lifted the Turks will be willing to make the kind of concessions which everyone agrees are a precondition for a solution of the problem. But I think it fair to say that if the embargo is not lifted it is quite clear that concessions will not be made, while if the embargo is lifted there is reason to hope that concessions will be made.

The political situation in Turkey today is such that the Turkish Government is composed of a very shaky coalition which received a vote of confidence when it was first installed by a margin of only 4 votes in the Turkish Parliament. It consists of political parties which are adamantly opposed to any concessions with respect to Cyprus and it is opposed by an opposition party led by the former Prime Minister of Turkey who was in office when the invasion first took place and who as a consequence of that is enormously popular with the Turkish people.

There is strong reason to believe that in the absence of lifting the embargo the Prime Minister of Turkey, however much he might hope to get these negotiations under way, would lack the political ability to do so. It is our hope that if the embargo is lifted it might strengthen the hand of the Turkish Prime Minister sufficiently to enable him to go to the Turkish Parliament and rouser enough support to permit him to make the kind of conclusions which are necessary for our agreement.

If lifting the embargo does not work, then there is no reason why the Congress cannot reimpose it. I think it is quite clear that the committee voted to lift the embargo partially in the hope and expectation that it would facilitate concessions by the Turkish Government. I would point out that the Fraser amendment, adopted in committee, provides that no arms can be given to the Turks through government sales, credits, or guarantees until enactment of the Foreign Military Sales Act later in the year. So we will have an opportunity, if this bill passes today, to observe whether or not the Turkish position softens and, if it does not, then I for one would be willing to reimpose the embargo and to vote against any military assistance for Turkey when the Foreign Military Sales Act comes up in the fall.

The major argument against this bill, to my way of thinking, is that there is a fundamental principle involved here and that, if we lift the embargo on Turkey, we will somehow vitiate the restrictions on the use to which American arms can be put by other countries that have bought our weapons elsewhere in the world. This is a significant argument which deserves serious consideration. But I would say, by virtue of the fact that we did impose an embargo for 6 months, that we have already made it clear that we are prepared to penalize those countries which violate the restrictions on the use to which our weapons can be put.

Second, I think this argument is not fully responsive to the complexities of international politics. The fact is that in the last 30 years there have been a series of conflicts including the first Vietnam

war from 1945 to 1954; the Nicaragua-Costa Rica dispute in January 1955; the Suez war in 1956; the Honduras-Nicaragua dispute in 1957; the Indonesia-Malaysia war from April 1963 to June 1966; the Rann of Kutch incident in April 1965; the India-Pakistan war in September 1965; the 6-day war in the Middle East in June 1967; and the El Salvador-Honduras war in 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLARZ. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentleman in the well for presenting a well-reasoned statesmanlike position on this bill. I know it has not been easy politically for the gentleman to come to this position. I regret that only a relatively few Members of the committee are present to hear it, because I think it sums up the whole case for the resolution in a splendid manner.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by referring, in addition to the conflicts I have already mentioned, to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1972, and the Omani-Dhofar war from 1972 to 1974, and the Kurdish Civil War from 1967 to 1975, where American weapons were used in a highly dubious fashion and is a way which was presumptively in violation of the restrictions which we had imposed on them.

So what I simply suggest is that the realities of international life are such that, in the final analysis, the countries to which we sell or give our weapons will determine whether or not to use them on the basis of the immediate situation which confronts them rather than on the basis of abstract principles embodied in the laws of our own land.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. RIEGLE).

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I will have more to say later when I have more time, but I think the proposal before us now to end this embargo is really a terrible mistake.

It is true that we have not accomplished anything during the time that this embargo has been in place. That is because this administration and this Secretary of State have made it absolutely certain that there would not be any progress by opposing the embargo, by fighting in every way to get around it, by suggesting to the Turks if they stood firm in their situation, we would finally come to the exact moment we are at today, namely, the embargo would come off, because this administration would fight to remove it, in spite of the fact there has not been any progress on Cyprus.

The other historical situations cited have no bearing on the Cyprus case today. We are talking about an area where 40 percent of the land is occupied. We have some 200,000 refugees. Turkey moved on Cyprus not once, but twice, using our arms in violation of written,

signed agreements with our country. Now we are being asked to set our laws aside today, because this administration does not have the strength or the will to lay it on the line to Turkey, and say there has to be progress on Cyprus coincident with the resumption of U.S. arms shipments.

We are being asked today to break our own laws and I think that is wrong. If by lifting this embargo today, we say to the rest of the world, which is watching closely, "Look, you do not have to stick with the agreements you made with us. If you want to take our arms and use them against another ally the next day, you are free to do so."

If we say that, and that is what we would be saying, the rest of the world is not going to miss that message. If we want more Cyprus-type problems, that is the way to make more of them happen by ending this embargo at this time. I am willing to consider an end to the embargo, if, at the same time, we get some progress on the Cyprus question, but not a minute before.

There is absolutely no excuse, none whatsoever, to use the argument of political instability in Turkey to say there cannot be discussions right now on Cyprus. There have to be.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. MCKINNEY).

(Mr. MCKINNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, it is extremely difficult, I think, for a Congressman who is pledged to the national security and the strength of his Nation to stand up and have to take a course which means that perhaps this Nation could be made a little weaker within a specific area of the world. I do not think, as one of our earlier speakers said, that I have ever wrestled with a problem as long as I have wrestled with the emotional arguments on both sides of this issue. But, it seems to me that one of our problems is that we have come down to emotion, and forgotten that we are a nation of laws.

Finally, I had to ask myself, why did I run for Congress and why did I come here? When I get back to the base fact, it was because I was committed to stopping what I thought to be an immoral, illegal, and incorrect war in Southeast Asia. Now, I am confronted with another basic issue of American foreign policy. On the one hand, quite rightfully, the President says that we may lose our Turkish bases if we do not remove the embargo; but on the other hand, I have to remember that on January 14 of this year, I stood in this room and once more reaffirmed my oath to the Constitution of this country and to my best judgment as to how I saw it.

The Military Sales Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, both prohibit the sale, delivery, or contract of arms sale to any nation that uses them to attack another sovereign nation.

In response to this point, I have had the argument of Israel thrown at me.

However, I would suggest that the Members of the House read the state-

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ments of the Israel Government which clearly stated that should Lebanon make its borders safe and stop harboring the PLO, that Israel would have no need to attack them, and that in attacking them, they were not attacking the nation of Lebanon; and, in fact, had no argument or aggressive intent toward its Government.

Certainly, I would admit that there is a gray area there, but there is no gray area in this issue. The Turks are blackmailing the U.S. Government into violating the very laws that this House and the Senate of the United States passed, and should we move to allow this one instance to pass to expediency it will become instead the accepted method of violating our laws and forcing our hand, a precedent we can ill afford.

We have sold, according to my figures, almost \$11 billion worth of arms to foreign nations. The potential for blackmail, the potential for misuse, the potential for other Cypruses, appalls me. Do we feel as a Nation that these people buy arms to polish these arms and parade them around on their national holidays? No, we are giving them a potential for blackmail; giving them a potential for war. We are, in fact, giving them the weapons with which to kill.

The people of my district, as I believe I represent them, are tired of it. They are tired of our involvement. They are tired of our arms sales and they are doubly tired of the United States being blackmailed, particularly by a nation which as we will be discussing in 3 or 4 months, the fact that their opium crop is coming into my district and into my neighboring city of New York and destroying American kids by the thousands. It seems to me that to use an argument that the stability of the Turkish Government depends on our action is to admit that we are putting our eggs in a basket that is unstable: that we are saying by our very excuse that we are going to give arms to a nation that does not have a stable government.

I do not think that I will ever have cast a more difficult vote in this particular term than this one, but I will not condone, No. 1, the blackmailing of the United States of America. I will not condone knowingly the use of our weapons in the attack on another sovereign nation. In the debate I have listened to today, everyone seems to forget that Cyprus is a sovereign nation.

Are we to admit that an Irishman in the United States or a Greek or an Italian, or Hungarian, is still Hungarian and not an American. A Turk in Cyprus is a Cypriot, or else he would be back in Turkey.

I know that the Greeks transgressed in the very beginning, but in the form of a coup that we have seen time and time and time again in this world. So let us remember that the second attack of the Turks was an attack of outright force against a sovereign nation and must be condemned by this House.

Last but not least, I shudder to think of the future of my five children in a world where American arms, American bullets, can be used in any manner chosen by any nation, without our concern and in fact our immediate action.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 additional minute.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say I think the gentleman today has made a very conscientious speech, but if he is going to apply the law to all countries, it should be applied evenly. The gentleman admitted that Greece transgressed and we did not cut off our aid. In July 1974, Greece had 1,650 troops in Cyprus, 700 of them illegally. After the coup, that number was increased. When they finally left, there was not any question of the presence of American arms all over Cyprus. Yet Greece has furnished \$16 million worth of arms in the United States in fiscal 1975 and \$619 million in the pipeline. The embargo does not apply to Greece—only to Turkey.

If we are going to apply our agreements, let us apply them evenly.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I have listened attentively to the debate thus far. I am reminded of a conversation between an elderly British clergyman and a young firebrand of his acquaintance. The younger man had just made a strong point, very heatedly stated, and the clergyman responded, "I am not certain I understand your point of view, but if I understand it I am not certain I agree with it."

The young man replied, "But I have clearly stated the pure and simple truth," to which the clergyman responded, "Young man, the truth is never pure, and seldom simple."

As the chairman of this committee has just illustrated, we are not here dealing with a clear situation where there is a guilty party which must be further punished, having violated our law, and uniquely so, and no more guilt involved in this or other similar situations on the part of other parties.

As the gentleman from New York (Mr. SOLARZ) earlier indicated, there could be a veritable laundry list established of similar uses of American arms in military conflicts in possible and probable violation of our law.

But let us examine this situation, let us review the history here in the Cyprus tragedy. Many of us for years were concerned about the need for restoration of democracy and the rights of the people in Greece. From the time the colonels and pro-Western generals, and took over the government of that country, doing away with parliamentary government, suspending the civil liberties of the people, many of us were concerned about the restoration of human rights and democracy in the world's cradle of democracy.

May I submit that some of the guilt in this present tragic situation in Cyprus must rest at the door of the instigators of the whole crisis, the Greek military junta which fought to overthrow the lawful government of Cyprus and did

succeed with the military action of the mainland Greek National Guard, together with pro-enosis Greek Cypriot factions, in overthrowing the legitimate government and placing their man, Nikos Sampson, as President, in place of Archbishop Makarios.

This was an event which upset the treaty arrangement and which created the crisis in which the Turks under the 1960 enforcement treaty felt they had a right and an obligation to move their forces in. This was the inception of the crisis. The man who was installed to head the new regime was a man feared by the Turkish minority. This had to be a part of the reason for the Turkish reaction.

We may feel, and we do feel, that reaction was extreme and unwarranted, and yet, from the Turkish view, the Turks maintain that rather than acting illegally, they have sought to protect the Turkish minority group on that island, to take action toward the restoration of lawful government on the island of Cyprus and to protect and fulfill their treaty rights and obligations.

I simply say these things to point up the fact that this is not a clear and simple case of guilt. What is clear is that the national security interests of the United States will be well served by the passage of this legislation.

This is not a radical reversal of policy. This is a mild and moderate modification of our position after 6 months of punishment and after the application of our law. This is simply saying that we are not going to give anyone anything, but we are going to release to Turkey material, much of which they have already paid for and all of which is under firm contract and will be carried out as cash sales.

This is a modest reappraisal of our position. What it can do is this: It can protect our national security interests, our legitimate interests in our own national security; it can protect the NATO Alliance from further dissolution; and it can bring about, I believe, a movement on Cyprus and between Turkey and Greece, which would clearly benefit the democratic government in Greece, and ultimately serve to protect the rights of the people of Cyprus as well as the national interests of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this is reason enough to make this modest reappraisal, and I urge the passage of S. 846, as amended.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN).

(Mr. MADDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, yesterday, the Rules Committee held hearings most of the day with various witnesses testifying pro and con on this pending Turkish aid legislation. This bill would permit the President to postpone the embargo to the Government of Turkey on articles contracted for under the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975. It would release for shipment \$184.9 million in defense articles to Turkey under this authority, also issue

licenses for the transportation to the Government of Turkey arms, ammunition, and implements of war, thus removing the ban on the shipment of defense articles purchased by Turkey through commercial channels in the United States. This authorization would be effective only while Turkey observes the cease-fire in Cyprus and neither increases its forces on Cyprus nor transfers to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied implements of war.

Last year, in 1974, the Foreign Assistance Act contained a provision, which passed the House 297 to 98 and by voice vote in the Senate requiring the President to suspend all military assistance; sales of defense articles, arms, ammunition, and other implements of war to Turkey.

Our Government maintained this embargo on furnishing such military aid to the Turks and the present legislation now being considered is to waive the embargo provision with certain provisions and continue giving limited amounts of military aid and assistance to the Government of Turkey.

During the recent 4th of July recess, when visiting my congressional district, I attended a picnic gathering of constituents made up mostly of Americans of Greek descent and a great number of other ethnic groups, approximately 5,000 to 6,000 citizens of the Calumet Region in Indiana. The consensus of that gathering was almost unanimous in opposition to any further aid or consideration to the Turkish nation, primarily due to its complete disregard to keep its agreement on international problems made not only with our Nation but with neighboring nations in the Middle East.

Our Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger's proposal to lift the American ban on further arms to Turkey did not meet with any endorsement of the folks which I contacted when I was home in the First District of Indiana.

I believe that our country and our NATO partners must stand against aggression, whether by friend or foe. To do otherwise would be a renunciation of a fundamental principle of our foreign policy—to oppose aggression, not aid or acquiesce in it. I must condemn the continued acts of Turkish aggression against Cyprus and its people. It is unconscionable that the Government of the United States should surrender to the threat of Turkey to close our bases there. This is capitulation to blackmail and unworthy of our country.

The Congress has been thoroughly lobbied by the State Department during recent weeks advocating the lifting of the American ban on further aid to the Turkish Government.

But to pit one country against another in this way is as dangerously inflammable and divisive in foreign policy as it is in the Halls of Congress. However, if a choice is to be forced between our military installations in Turkey and the continuation of the support of U.S. installations by a democratic government in Greece, then in my judgment, the Congress should cast a vote for Greece, and against the Kissinger amendment to lift the ban on U.S. arms to Turkey.

In my opinion, existing and potential military bases in Greece aid for the Greek people in Cyprus are more important to us than our installations in Turkey.

As the harvest of opium poppies begins this week in Turkey, all Americans should remember that Turkey unilaterally rescinded the ban on the growing of opium poppies for which U.S. Government agreed in return to pay Turkey \$35 million over a 3-year period. U.S. taxpayers have already supplied \$15 million of this sum to Turkey.

The Turkish Government as usual to this day has totally ignored its agreement to terminate the growing of opium poppies and exports millions of that poisonous weed which is destroying the health and mentality of our American youth, as well as other citizens throughout the globe.

It was 1 year ago that the Turkey armies aggressively took over the island of Cyprus and today occupy about 40 percent of the most productive land on the neighboring island which had been under the control of Greece. Approximately 80 percent of Cyprus is populated by Greek people.

I do hope that the Congress defeats this unfortunate legislation calling for the lifting of the ban on American aid to Turkey.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WHITEHURST).

(Mr. WHITEHURST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this legislation.

I have followed very carefully the record of events that have occurred on the Island of Cyprus for the past year. I have held my breath and hoped with all of my heart that the Turkish Government, certainly in the last 6 or 7 months, would show some spirit of moderation in its conduct, and I have hoped that that government, which has clearly behaved in an excessive way in an effort to protect the Turkish Cypriots, would show some spirit of accommodation, some spirit of compromise.

Mr. Chairman, I regret to say that the record has been the antithesis of that, and at this moment I see no indication on the part of the government in Ankara that it is willing to settle the problem of Cyprus on an equitable basis, one that would go some distance toward restoring the property and the rights of the Greek Cypriots.

I have a substantial number of Greek Americans and Cypriot Americans who live in my congressional district. As a matter of fact, my office has been involved with dozens of those people in an effort to bring their relatives out of Cyprus.

I have a very heart-rending situation right now, a 75-year-old woman, the mother of one of my constituents, who is in the Turkish zone. She has a visa. She can return to the United States. The Turkish authorities will not let her leave. Why? What do they want a 75-year-old woman for?

Mr. Chairman, how could I come here

today in this Chamber and cast a vote for this bill in the face of this conduct? No, I cannot do that.

I hope the moral position taken by this House months ago will be sustained this afternoon. If our position was a moral one 6 months ago, certainly it is not less than that at this time. I hope that our action and our firmness will act as a persuasive factor upon the Turkish Government to get on with the business of reaching a peaceful settlement on that island, working out an agreement that will restore peace, a peace that will have a basis that is lasting and meaningful.

Mr. Chairman, I am thankful for this opportunity to speak on this bill.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHITEHURST. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that what really prompted this compromise by members of our committee was the feeling we have for, and the confidence that we have in, the President of the United States.

As the gentleman from Virginia knows, a few weeks ago President Ford did go to Brussels and met with the leaders of Turkey as well as Cyprus and Greece, and his conclusion was that the climate was favorable for negotiations.

Again, the committee that worked out this bill was deeply concerned about the very problems the gentleman from Virginia has just mentioned so eloquently, the 180,000-some refugees in Cyprus, and we are not satisfied with just keeping the status quo, we want some movement there. That is the reason we have tried to develop legislation that did not tilt in favor of either Turkey or Greece, but provided an even-handed approach.

If one wants to look at the amount of weapons and military equipment in the pipeline for Greece they will find that they have over \$600 million worth coming to them.

So I hope that when the Members consider this bill today that they will keep in mind that really the people who are pushing the compromise are people who are equally concerned about the problems and who want a settlement of those problems on Cyprus. That is what brought about this compromise.

Mr. WHITEHURST. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. KREBS).

(Mr. KREBS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KREBS. Mr. Chairman, let me say that one of the more pleasant surprises that I have had in coming to the Congress has been quality of the Members of this body and listening to the debate today has certainly helped to again enforce my feelings in this regard.

I think this is a very close question regardless of which side of the issue one may be on. It is really in a sense a no win issue which each and every Member of this body must settle for himself, and there is no sense in kidding ourselves about that.

The gentleman from Alabama (Mr.

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BUCHANAN) very articulately described the history of the Greek junta and I at least will be so brazen as to state that in the final analysis the whole difficulty in which we find ourselves was indeed created by that Greek junta.

It was exactly that same Greek junta that past Congresses, when some of us new Members were not around, were asked to support in the name of our national security.

It is in the same name of our national security that we are being asked now, as, unfortunately, past Congresses have been asked on many other issues previously, as the Members will know, to compromise on the very basic principles that made this country the great country that it is.

I cannot help but feel, Mr. Chairman, that unless we have a change in direction that we are going to find ourselves in the same position in relation to Jordan, if the President's wishes are granted in providing Jordan with \$350 million worth of the most sophisticated missiles. We will indeed find ourselves in the same position in Jordan when they will be moving those missiles to sites other than those designated pursuant to an agreement with that country.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California.

Mr. KREBS. Mr. Chairman, as I say, we will find ourselves in exactly the same position of having to compromise basic principles if the Shah of Iran decides that it is in his best interest to move those billions of dollars' worth of weapons that we have given him to other parts of the Middle East. He will do so only on the basis of the decision that we may be making again in the name of compromise, and national security. Since we are all creatures of our own environment—all this cannot help but remind me, at least, as one Member of the House of some of the compromises we have already made and some of the succumbing to blackmail that we witnessed in the late 1930's. I submit to the Members that this type of compromise is not going to get us any farther than those who have engaged in similar types of compromises in the 1930's.

I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. RYAN).

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, at this point in the debate we have established several things: First of all, that this is not a partisan issue. The second is that S. 846 is not an administration-initiated bill. This particular bill, this particular compromise began as an effort here in this House in the Committee on International Relations. We have established the fact that this is not an inconsequential vote. Finally, we have established the fact that all of the angels are not on one side.

I would like to zero in, if I can, on a particular matter raised, I think, by both

the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN), and the gentleman from New York (Mr. SOLARZ) which has to do with the politics of the situation as it exists in Turkey today. Turkey is a parliamentary democracy. The pressures upon Turkist parliamentarians are the same as they are upon us as Representatives in this country. If there is an ethnic base to the debate on this bill in this country—and I believe there is—there is certainly an ethnic base to the nationalistic view of Turkish politicians who must please their own constituents.

I do not think any issue since I have been in the Congress has been more hotly argued at home or more heavily pressured here in Washington than this issue. I have received calls from my district from people for whom I have great respect and affection who are of Greek-American heritage. The man who took my place, as a matter of fact, in the State legislature is Greek, and I have heard from him regularly on this issue. One of the most distinguished members of that legislature for years is a State senator who called me to talk about it. I have had a call from a former mayor of San Francisco about this issue, who is of Greek heritage. This issue of great concern to Greek Americans, but I submit to the Members that the Greek Americans in this country cannot be as objective as they might be, I think, because of their heritage.

If I can draw a parallel, I think it would be not wise for this House to accept my own opinion regarding matters of Northern Ireland. I happen to have some strong opinions about what should be done there, but I do not believe in the best interests of the United States the Members should accept my advice on the matter because I tend to be prejudiced about that particular problem.

If we look at this matter objectively, there is only one question being raised here about this particular issue, as I see it. In February, this Congress passed the Rosenthal resolution against the Turkish nation as a kind of punishment for the invasion of Cyprus. We have heard the word "punishment" used on the floor here today. Reverse the situation. Imagine, if one will, this country's dependence upon some other country for its arms, and then having that other country punish us, and then having us as politicians go home and accept that humiliation easily and willingly before our own people and try to tell our own people that we have been punished by another nation and that we must accept another country's judgment. This arms embargo—this punishment is a matter, I believe, of honor for the Turkish nation and the Turkish people. I do not question the moralities here, because in fact both sides, I think, are guilty of the kinds of actions which could not stand the test of history or the test of severe examination of the law. The question here has to do, then, with whether or not it is in the interest of the United States to pursue a policy which will allow the Turkish politicians and the Turkish people to take some action on their own to relieve the present situation that is a stalemate in Cyprus.

The national interest in this country, it seems to me, is to resolve the Cyprus situation. The Turks have no particular reason for moving from their present position. They already dominate the situation and they can continue to dominate it because Greece cannot change that by force or parliamentary action or diplomatic action.

The United States took an action in response to the Turkish actions on Cyprus, and the result for the last 6 months has been a stalemate. A stalemate in a situation like this is dangerous for this country. In order to move this matter off center, this bill then is offered as a partial solution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think our colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WHITEHURST), has done us a favor in focusing our attention on the plight of one little old woman on the island of Cyprus, a 75-year-old woman who has a visa to come to the United States but is being denied that opportunity by the Turkish authorities on Cyprus. The question we ought to consider here today is the effect of our action today on the multitudes of individual human problems like that confronting that little 75-year-old woman.

If we reject this resolution, can anyone in his wildest imagination believe the prospect for that little old woman getting off Cyprus and coming to the United States will be enhanced? Exactly the opposition will occur. Her prospects for getting to the United States will be diminished.

It seems to me we ought to think about this issue that is before us today in those very human terms. What will help these poor helpless individuals the most? Approving the resolution or rejecting it?

A step like that proposed in this resolution which will renew some leverage on the part of our Government would enable us to have some influence, which is today totally lacking, upon the policies of the Turkish Government.

So I hope as we reflect upon the question that will soon come before us we will think of those very human terms suggested by the gentleman from Virginia. When we do that I feel sure we will come up with an affirmative vote and approve this resolution.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mrs. SPELLMAN).

(Mrs. SPELLMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. SPELLMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned—I am frightened. I am frightened that this country might be on the brink of setting a dangerous precedent. A vote for this bill would be capitulating to another nation's demands—demands which amount to blackmail. To resume shipment of arms to Turkey would be a betrayal of our own moral values. To continue to give military aid to Turkey would be a blatant repudiation of our own laws.

The fact remains that Turkish use of American arms in the invasion of Cy-

prus violated the very agreement by which the Turks obtained those arms. If the House goes along with the Senate in backing down now, we can never again expect that provisions of law will be binding on any recipient of American arms. We would also be saying to the President that we dare not limit his authority in international affairs.

We must also consider the refugees, many little old women—men, women, and children.

There are 200,000 people who will remain homeless as long as this country continues to condone the actions of the country which has displaced them. There will never be a settlement of the Cypriot situation as long as we provide the means for the Turks to continue their pursuit of conquest.

It is time for this country to stop being blackmailed. It is time for us to give an ultimatum to the Turks and to all the nations which might seek to manipulate us in the same way. It is time to say that we cannot support military aggression by either friend or foe.

I have been involved in politics long enough to know that there is often a need for compromise. But this is not compromise. Compromise means conciliation—not capitulation.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRENZEL).

(Mr. FRENZEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, in February, I, along with a solid majority of this House, supported the imposition of the arms embargo to Turkey. The embargo vote was an important statement of American disapproval of what we considered then, and still do, an unwarranted, aggressive action on the part of Turkey. The embargo was a necessary and proper action to express the will of this Congress. I do not regret my vote, nor that of the Congress.

However, our primary interest—and we should never lose sight of this priority—is to end the terrible suffering of the Cypriot people who have been removed from their homes, families, businesses, and farms; to secure the removal of Turkish military forces, and to provide for self-determination by the people of Cyprus.

The embargo, still an important symbolic statement, has been with us for 5 months. Whatever else it has accomplished, it has done nothing to achieve our priority goals. The United States cannot tolerate a stalemate in the quest for those goals, and for a settlement on Cyprus. However important the embargo has been in other respects, it has not changed the stalemate situation, and indeed has undoubtedly extended the stalemate.

The Turkish Government has refused to enter into serious negotiations until there is some sign from our Government that it is willing to lift the embargo, however slightly. I believe that the situation demands American involvement as an honest broker for settlement—a role we have fulfilled elsewhere in the Middle

East. I believe that until we are involved in the settlement, there will be no settlement. Until there is a settlement or progress toward a settlement, the suffering of the Cypriot people can only be exacerbated.

There is some reason to believe that the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate if there are signs from the United States that we are willing to resume some limited shipments. Many of us have heard personally from the Secretary of State, the President and other officials of the administration on this subject. We have no guarantee of progress, but we have no other alternative course that even gives us a chance for progress.

Additionally, the Turkish Government has already consented to allow the International Court of Justice to adjudicate oil rights with Greece over recently discovered fields in the Aegean Sea.

The International Relations Committee, which has structured the compromise which is now before us, has given us the additional assurance that it will report legislation to reimpose the embargo if significant progress is not made. We have assurances from the administration that it will not oppose such an effort in the absence of progress.

I am sure that we will have some honest disagreements over a definition of substantial or significant progress, but I think the intent of Congress is clear if we pass this bill today.

The reason that I support this bill, H.R. 8454, is that it seems to me that it offers the only chance for movement toward the goal of the alleviation of the suffering of the people of Cyprus.

In February I wrote some of the House Members who had exercised important leadership in the vote to impose the embargo. I asked what strategy was now being employed to settle the situation on Cyprus. The letter was not answered formally, but informal discussions revealed that there was no viable alternative policy. Those who wish to have the embargo extended have given us no alternative policy which might lead to hope for settlement, or for reduction in the suffering on Cyprus.

Therefore, if there is a moral issue involved in this debate, I think it relates to our responsibility to help find a solution to the Cypriot problem. Continuation of the embargo offers no chance for a solution. Continuation of the embargo means continuation of stalemate, continuation of Cypriot suffering. This slight easing of the arms embargo offers some chance for progress. I cannot personally pass up the opportunity to grasp that chance, however minimal it may be, especially when it is buttressed by a guarantee that the embargo will be resumed if there is no progress.

I support S. 846, because I strongly believe that the limited resumption of arms sales to Turkey is our only opportunity to begin progress in restoring their homes, vocations, and dignity to displaced and distressed Cypriots. I urge my colleagues to give first consideration to the plight of the people of Cyprus. I believe the humanitarian aspects of this situation tip the balance in favor of the com-

mittee's compromise. I hope that the bill will be passed.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. BEARD).

(Mr. BEARD of Rhode Island asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEARD of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, 3 weeks ago I experienced really what was the experience of my lifetime. I spent 2 days on Cyprus. During those 2 days on Cyprus I had a chance to talk to many refugees. They told me some horrible stories about poppies being grown in the areas presently occupied by the Turks.

They also mentioned the abuse of churches, because that country does not recognize its obligations on Cyprus to Christians and those under the Christian faith. They do not recognize human dignity.

I spoke to a man 107 years old who had his face kicked in.

Mr. Chairman, I am not a Greek and I am not a Turk. I am a plain American citizen from Rhode Island.

Mr. Chairman, I call this machinegun diplomacy. I requested 1 hour to be able to go to the Turkish side of the border to see what they claim was their side of the story and after presenting my credentials of the House of Representatives and my passport, I was turned away at gunpoint by the Turkish soldiers.

Let us face really what has happened here. This is not more than blackmail—blackmail, that is all it is. Why?

They are telling us, "If you do not give us the arms, then get out of Turkey." Well, we should not give in to blackmail. If we do and they blackmail us out of the Turkish incident, every country where we have a base will raise the stakes pretty high, and if we keep giving in, we will be worse off.

Let us think about those reservations and think about indicating to other countries that we do not get into blackmail. When the Russians came over here under Khrushchev, President John F. Kennedy told them to go back. I am telling the Members right now that, yes, we need the bases and they are imported, but the world is not going to come to an end for the United States if we are told to get out of Turkey. We may end up losing Greece, and she is also an ally of ours.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. MARTIN).

(Mr. MARTIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, as I walked down the center aisle into the well of the House just then, I felt that it was somewhat symbolic for me on this issue. I also felt that it was somewhat symbolic once I got down into the well and found that it was necessary to turn one way or the other in order to be able to address the House, because that symbolizes the difficulty I—as apparently many others in the Chamber—have had in trying to reach a position to take on this particular bill.

As I listened to others speak, I was glad to realize that I am not the only

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one that has a great deal of difficulty in trying to balance this very complicated issue, this very serious issue. I have tried to solve the riddle and have tried to find the correct way out of the maze. As with many Members, I have talked with representatives of the State Department, the administration, members of the Committee on International Relations which has presented this bill, with representatives of the Justice Party of Turkey, as well as with advocates on the other side of the issue here in Congress and, yes, with partisan constituents of Greek ancestry in my own district. Of course, they certainly have just as much right, just as legitimate a stance to take in this matter as anyone else I have talked with.

Mr. Chairman, I have sought to find a different, a more timely, more acceptable compromise, something with a quid pro quo; something that would give us something definite in return, with some assurances built in that the Turkish Government would have to respond positively in order for us to restore these weapons that are at issue. Regrettably to me, without exception everyone that I talked to felt—and this included advocates on all sides of the issue—that they had to reject such preconditions because that would amount to dictating terms to the Government of Turkey and they might object to that pressure.

So, there is no way to work in that direction. I am aware—and this has been pointed out here—that there was a provocation by the military junta which formerly ruled Greece, but I am also aware that that thorn has been removed. Likewise, I am aware that the Government of Turkey has changed, and it seems to me very tragic that these two more moderate governments have not been able to approach each other and come to terms and resolve the issues on Cyprus.

I am told that the present Government of Turkey is under intense pressure at home from the opposition party, and yet if the present Government of Turkey is unable to parry that rivalry of the opposite political party by moving into negotiations now as a means of restoring armaments and normalcy, if they cannot begin to solve the Cyprus dispute as a part of a combination in which they would gain an advantage in return by receiving these arms shipments, then how can they possibly, Mr. Chairman, make concessions thereafter when they will then already have their weapons in hand? How would their political rivals accept a subsequent moderation of the Turkish gains with no consequent benefit, if they cannot now support such moderation tied to direct benefits?

If the Turkish Government objects to our stating terms to them, terms which they would regard as an offensive ultimatum, then would it not be more appropriate for them to initiate the stating of such terms and say to us what they would be prepared to do, and give us a reason and a confidence for modifying our stance of a few months ago?

So the situation is this:

First, of our having insisted that weap-

ons shipments to Turkey be suspended because of violation of limitations that we have placed on the use of such arms;

Second, of having assured Turkey that under our law, weapons must be withheld until Turkey makes some good faith efforts to negotiate a solution to Cyprus; and

Third, of having witnessed no such progress on Cyprus.

It is in this context that we are now asked to ship the \$185 million worth of weapons anyway and are asked to forget these three circumstances I have just listed and hope for the best.

I cannot accept that and, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I must oppose such a resolution until some public assurances are obtained and given by the Turkish Government as to what their response will be.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARTIN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. My understanding, based upon information from the Department of State, is that originally there were some 40,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus. There was an initial reduction of 5,000. I have been informed by the Department that there has since been a gradual reduction, and today they are estimating that only 30,000 Turkish troops remain on Cyprus—a reduction of 10,000 troops.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman that I appreciate very much his bringing this to our attention.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI).

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I think we have to look at this compromise—and it is a compromise—as a solution that we cannot afford to turn down.

Mr. Chairman, if we review the history—and I shall not take the time, because I could not do it in 5 minutes—however, the chronology that is contained in the committee report will clearly indicate what a difficult situation has existed for centuries over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey and which is the burning issue of today.

We have an embargo that is almost in its 6th month, and it has not worked. It is quite clear that if we are going to do something in the interest of Greece, and primarily in the interest of our own country, we must find some way and means for negotiations to meaningfully take place over the issue in that area.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I will yield briefly for a question.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Is it not true, that one of the reasons that we have had some problem with this embargo being ineffective is that some members of our Department of State and our Secretary of

State have said to the Turkish Government, "We will help turn Congress around, so do not worry about it"?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. My answer to the gentleman is, as I understand it, there were no such indications on the part of our administration after February 5. There may have been the latter part of last year, when we were discussing the possibility of an embargo.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. If the gentleman will yield further. We all understand that there was a great deal of such conversation by our State Department prior to February 5, but what about after the embargo was imposed by Congress?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. But let me point out that it is not my administration; it is the gentleman's administration. But they did not violate the law. They abided by the law that the Congress passed, despite the difficulties involved.

Mr. Chairman, realizing the negotiations were dead center, our good chairman had asked a few of us on the Committee on International Relations, over the Fourth of July recess, to work on some language which would be a compromise between those who wanted to remove the embargo unconditionally and those who did not want to lift any part of the ban.

The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON) and, yes, my good friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL) have contributed much of the language that is in here. That is why I cannot understand why the gentleman from Florida is now on the other side.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Since I mentioned the gentleman's name, I must yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I will be very happy to explain to the gentleman why I am on the other side. It is because I disagree completely with the thrust of the bill.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I might say to the gentleman that he expressed disagreement before we had hardly dotted an "i" or crossed a "t" in the language he suggested as a compromise.

Over the Fourth of July recess we worked on a compromise. There had been movement toward solution of the Cyprus problem. Should we let the status quo continue and the situation on Cyprus between Turkey and Greece deteriorate?

The other alternative would be to go the route that was cast in the other body, albeit by one vote, and that would give the President, the administration of the gentleman from California (Mr. ROUSSELOT), the entire suspension of the embargo, of the grants, the sales, and the commercial sales—you name it—to Turkey. We decided we were going to take an evenhanded approach and, therefore, we worked on this compromise which has been explained by the chairman of the committee. The provisions were also explained adequately by the members of the Committee on International Relations on the Republican side, so I shall not repeat them.

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But I do wish to make several brief points about the legislation which is before us today:

It is a compromise proposal.

It is not a compromise to help Turkey. It is not a compromise to hurt Greece.

It is legislation designed to bring an even-handed policy to that area, to help get negotiations off dead center, and ultimately to bring peace and to promote our national security interests.

We have three alternatives.

First, we can do nothing. That would perpetuate the present unsatisfactory status quo.

Second, we could lift the embargo completely. That course would be unacceptable to many here for valid reasons.

Our third choice is this compromise. It is a good choice and I urge that it be the choice of the House this afternoon.

I recall that one of the Members who spoke here has expressed concern for the refugees. I think this is a very burning issue. Are we going to sit in this air-conditioned Chamber and not be concerned about the 180,000 to 200,000 refugees many who are living in tents? If we vote against this compromise, we may condemn them to a life of deprivation for many months ahead. How in conscience can we do that? We must be concerned about the refugees.

Mr. Chairman, we must act confidently and resolutely on this matter. I shall in my extension of remarks include other reasons for that, but I just want to leave the Members with one last thought.

Let me assure the Members that I fully realize and recognize the domestic political concerns of my colleagues. I have gone all through this. I have received telegrams; I have received letters.

I met with my Greek-American constituents, and I had, I might say, a heated discussion which lasted an hour and a half. I did not convince them, but I want to share with the Members something that made me feel good. This is something that reaffirms our faith in our Greek-American people, because I know they are patriotic citizens.

I want to share with the Members a memo that I received from one of those, a constituent named Paul Anton. There were others, I understand, who supported him in this.

Mr. Chairman, this memo reads as follows:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Even though we, the Greeks in Milwaukee, feel bitter for your last decision to aid the Turks we must say you are 10 feet tall—and being 5 feet 3½ inches, I feel that is a good compliment—10 feet tall by being frank about the matter and by coming to our picnic.

Personally, I am sorry I did not recognize your responsibility is to our America first and did not give you the proper welcome.

We the Greeks love you and you have our support.

Mr. Chairman, if the Members are concerned about their Greek-American constituents, I suggest they send them the report of our committee, and if they will look on page 9 and if they will read the hearings that we have conducted, they will learn that there cannot be concessions before negotiations; they will learn

that it is indeed in the national security interest to have this compromise, and they will applaud the Members for voting for the compromise.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LAGOMARSINO).

(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of S. 846.

This is a difficult issue for me. I have many Greek constituents, many Greek supporters and friends.

When I voted to impose the arms embargo on Turkey last year, I did so out of a desire to break the deadlock on Cyprus. Since that time I have visited the NATO countries, and talked with a number of people about the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. My discussions convinced me that the boycott should be partially lifted. The fact is the embargo has not worked, and has only served to harden the situation. The 180,000 refugees live in as much misery and squalor as they did before we imposed the embargo. Meanwhile, American interests are in jeopardy.

I am convinced that nothing will be achieved as long as the embargo continues. The Turks have said that the embargo must be lifted for them to be able to negotiate seriously. The domestic political situation in Turkey is very sensitive. The Turkish Government feels it will be in jeopardy if it appears to be yielding to external pressure. Thus, the lifting of the embargo is necessary for serious negotiations on Cyprus.

Lifting the embargo under the very limited conditions of S. 846 will give American diplomats a stronger hand in this sensitive part of the world. The Turkish Government has threatened to close the American bases in Turkey if the boycott continues. If the bases are closed, American influence will be reduced still further. It is in the interests of the Cypriot refugees that we retain a strong voice. Also, with the resumption of opium poppy growing in Turkey, the stakes have become too high for us to risk losing our influence in Asia Minor. If we do, the results could well be disastrous.

NATO has been weakened by the embargo. Turkey has one of the largest standing armies in the alliance but is becoming unable to equip them properly. According to the provisions of the bill before us, the arms we can sell Turkey are those needed to fulfill her NATO commitments. If Turkey does not receive this equipment, her ability to fulfill her NATO obligations will be severely limited.

The bases in Turkey are vital to American and NATO security, and the intelligence bases are invaluable and irreplaceable. We cannot afford to lose them over an embargo that has not even achieved its purpose.

Recent events in Portugal have contributed to the weakening of NATO and of America's European posture. Further losses in NATO's southern tier would have dire consequences in the near future.

My primary concern is that the nego-

tiations produce a meaningful settlement to end the misery of the refugees. I also wish to enable both Greece and Turkey to fulfill their roles as NATO allies. The embargo has not moved anyone toward the negotiating table, and is only hardening attitudes. According to this bill, further arms sales to Turkey depend upon passage of new foreign aid legislation for fiscal year 1975. This will give us time to see if Turkey takes appropriate action toward achieving a solution of the Cyprus problem. I believe that the passage of this bill is necessary if we are to break the stalemate on Cyprus and preserve the strength of our NATO alliance.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a favorable vote on the bill.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Russo).

(Mr. RUSSO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RUSSO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in total disagreement with resuming any type of aid, military or otherwise, to Turkey until it removes its troops from the Republic of Cyprus. I stand here today to remind the Congress of its duty to oversee that the executive branch faithfully execute the Constitution and laws of the United States.

We have been told by the bill's supporters that this is a compromise measure. That may be true, but I think that this amounts to a misuse of the word "compromise." If we take the action requested under this bill, it will be a compromise of the principles upon which this Government was founded. To revise somewhat Finckney's famous observation: "This, would be millions for tribute with no assurance of defense."

If we give in today, gentlemen, I fear it would set a precedent which all of us would dread in the years to come. Every effort to reassert our position as a co-equal branch of Government within these past 2 years would have been made in vain. This bill represents more than merely a foreign aid authorization proposal, it represents a challenge from the President and his Secretary of State.

If you read the law which the Congress passed and the President signed last December, you will note a two-prong test for resumption of aid. First, Turkey must comply with the Foreign Assistance Act and pull out its forces from Cyprus; and second, the Cypriots must have made substantial progress toward resolving their differences. Have either of these conditions been fulfilled? No.

What has changed? Have the Turks shown any good faith? No, as a matter of fact they have shown nothing but contempt for the United States. Immediately after discontinuing payment to the Turks so that they would not cultivate the poppy plant, they began growing it again despite our request that they not do so. Reports from Cyprus indicate that the Turks have begun growing poppies on that island. What type of good faith is this?

Turkey does not intend to vacate Cyprus for quite some time. In addition to cultivating dope fields, the Turks are

transporting Turkish citizens from the mainland to the island. Later the new population figures of 40 percent Turks—60 percent Greeks will be used as justification for the Turkish Cypriots asserting control to 40 percent of Cyprus; the most valuable 40 percent I might add. It is on this 40 percent that the island's major cities and a substantial portion of its revenue producing industries are located.

Along with its people, the Turks have transported their customs to Cyprus. The Turkish portion of the island now functions according to Turkish mainland time instead of the old Cyprus standard. Churches, formerly Greek Orthodox, were converted into Moslem mosques. For the life of me, I cannot see why we should give into the Turk's demands.

However, something has changed. Since February when the arms embargo became effective, Turkey has threatened to close all of our military installations within it unless we resume military assistance. In short, a blackmail threat. Ransom to which President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger are willing to pay. After the first installment will we continue to pay? Once we make the first payment it will become easier and easier to make the second, the third and every one after that. Stop now before it is too late.

What if Turkey does go through with its threat and closes all of our bases? Our military experts agree, and even Secretary Kissinger has stated that Turkey needs our help more than we need our Turkish bases. Gen. James Van Fleet has repeatedly indicated that our Greek naval bases are vastly more important for control of the Mediterranean Sea than our Turkish bases. Without Greece we could not protect Turkey; but without Turkey we could still protect the rest of the Mediterranean countries.

Recently the President accused Congress of interfering in international affairs, a domain he believes is reserved exclusively for the Chief Executive. President Ford is correct that the Chief Executive is our exclusive negotiator in foreign affairs, but we are discussing an authorization bill today.

Today the Congress is acting in a field reserved exclusively by the Constitution for us, appropriations. If this appropriations process involves international relations, Congress, and Congress alone, has jurisdiction. Study the history of the Constitution and you will discover why the Congress was vested exclusively with the power of the purse. The Founding Fathers wanted to keep the President from exercising complete control over foreign affairs in the manner of the kings and emperors of their day. This device represents the heart of our check on the President's power today, the Congress will revert to its yes-man status of the Vietnam war days.

Congress has for the last year shown good faith in the execution of our laws. It is the President, sworn to uphold and faithfully execute the law, who has floundered around and evaded faithful execution. Are we now to join him in disregarding our own laws? I think not.

Imagine the reaction of our other al-

lies were we to follow the course set by our leader. They would rightly assume that the United States does not consider itself bound by its international agreements, and that we are supporters of aggression by large nations against smaller countries. As it is, many of our allies openly questioned our willingness to stand by our agreements after the Southeast Asian debacle. I can see their reaction if we support aggression and disregard our own bilateral agreement now.

I hope that you fully realize all of the ramifications of the actions which we are taking here today and vote against resumption of military arms shipments to Turkey.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Ms. HOLTZMAN).

(Ms. HOLTZMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong opposition to this resolution that would lift the embargo on arms sales to Turkey.

I think it is important to remember that before the congressionally enacted arms embargo went into effect last February, 5 months passed in which the Secretary of State was unable to get concessions from Turkey on the Cyprus matter. Neither have we had any progress since the embargo has been in existence. My question is, Has the Secretary of State negotiated in good faith on this issue? I do not believe so.

This measure ought to be defeated because the Congress needs to stiffen the resolve of the Secretary of State.

It was only a few months ago in justifying the *Mayaguez* incident that the Secretary of State said, "No one is going to push us around."

Yet, when Mr. Solzhenitsyn came to this country, the Secretary of State got so nervous that he advised the President not to meet with him.

Now Turkey is rattling a few sabers, and the Secretary of State is getting so nervous that he is asking us to abandon our laws.

I think it is important to send a very strong message to the White House and to our Secretary of State saying that we will not be blackmailed and that we in Congress are going to insist on certain principles in our foreign policy. That is what is at issue here.

I think if we fail to hold firm, if we tell the Secretary of State, "Yes, you can cause us to abandon the rule of law; you can cause us to abandon our statutes on grounds of expediency," then I think we are going to find the next victim will be the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and then we will find next Israel, our closest friend in the Middle East, is in real trouble.

So, Mr. Chairman, I believe we have to send a very strong message downtown to the administration.

I would therefore urge defeat of this measure.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given

permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I oppose this legislation because it repudiates the sound position which Congress has taken that we should not aid, by our arms arrangement with other countries, any act of aggression against a third country.

It is my understanding that if this bill passes arms ordered by Turkey before the embargo would be released "nonwithstanding any other provision of law," including prohibitions against offensive use of American supplied arms which were purchased with this restriction on their use.

If the bill passes, Turkey could use these arms, and all commercial arms which it is allowed to buy under this bill, in aggression on another country. I am fundamentally opposed to such a U.S. policy. It is wrong and it cannot be condoned.

America is a great country. It is great, because it stands for great principles. When it ceases to stand for great principles it will cease to be great. The vote of this Congressman, as long as I can cast it, will be to put my constituents and my country on the side of greatness. I am optimistic enough to believe that right principles will win in the end; but if it were not so, I would still want my vote, which is really one cast in trust for my constituents, always to be cast on the side of what is clearly the course of rightness and proper principle.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MEEDS).

(Mr. MEEDS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Chairman, although I voted in the past to impose the arms embargo on Turkey, I am going to support H.R. 8454, because action is needed to break the negotiations deadlock over Cyprus.

The embargo has been in effect since February and it has not brought meaningful negotiations. Instead it has hardened Turkish domestic opinion, worsened relations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and provoked threats to close of U.S. military facilities.

Both Greece and Turkey are allies and important members of NATO. Their importance should not be understated in the volatile Middle East situation.

H.R. 8454 does not completely drop the military aid embargo. It would permit shipments of \$185 million in military equipment purchased by Turkey prior to February 5. Of this only \$52 million is available for immediate shipment. The bill's symbolic contribution is to give the Turkish Government an opportunity to respond positively in the Cyprus negotiations. There is no momentum in peace talks at this time and this is an attempt to provide some.

It was only after a great deal of thought that I agreed to this temporary lessening of the embargo. H.R. 8454 specifically provides that any new arms sales by the United States to Turkey are forbidden until the 1976 foreign aid bill

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comes before the Congress this fall. At that time, if Turkey has not responded favorably to this concession and negotiated in good faith, the embargo can be reimposed and in my opinion, should be.

No one's interests are being served by a continuation of the negotiations deadlock and subsequent human suffering. This congressional compromise, if it produces progress toward peace among our allies, will be well worth the limited risk of allowing Turkey the arms it has already purchased and paid for.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. MINETA).

(Mr. MINETA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, we have before us a bill which the administration tells us must be passed in the name of national security. Many of us in this House believe, however, that to pass this bill would be to condone past violations against U.S. law, and that we would thereby be encouraging similar violations in the future. I personally can see no way in which a bill that condones the use of our military assistance by our allies to weaken and cripple each other, rather than to add to our common strength, furthers our national interest.

This House and the administration are not arguing with each other so much as we are passing each other in the night: Congress discussing the rule of law, the President national security.

The events that brought us to this point are clear. In the wake of the 1959 London and Zurich agreements, any hope for stability in the area required the maintenance of Cypriot sovereignty and the prevention of unilateral aggression by either Greece or Turkey. In the flare-up of 1963-64 and again in 1967, the U.S. State Department, through strong diplomatic initiatives, prevented intervention into Cypriot affairs by either Greece or Turkey. Consequently, after 1967, the chances for an internal Cypriot accommodation began to improve. In 1974, the State Department failed to take the strong diplomatic action necessary to prevent outside interference in Cyprus. The tragic results and the severe strain on our NATO alliance caused by this diplomatic failure are known to us all.

If we now find ourselves in a situation where, in order to fulfill our constitutional obligation to uphold the law, some strain may unfortunately and unintentionally be added to our relations with Turkey, then I believe that the problem dates from 1974 and not from 1975, and that the blame lies with the administration and not with the legislative branch. The congressional position has been clearly spelled out from the beginning—the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Our intent has been clear, unequivocal, and public. Any problems now incurred are not the fault of Congress, but are the fault of inadequate diplomacy on the part of the executive branch.

I urge the Members of this House to be unintimidated by any criticisms from

the administration and to oppose this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the gentleman from California 1 additional minute so that I may ask the gentleman a question.

Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINETA. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, there has been a considerable amount of debate this afternoon about the rule of law, and about the violations of the Turks as far as the use of U.S.-furnished arms are concerned. I for one certainly realize that there have been violations, and I think that could be said of a lot of other nations, many of them have done the same things. But there is no immutable principle that requires the imposition of a total embargo for an indefinite duration as the only permissible response to each such violation. I think that the nature of the response is what the Congress has to decide. In other words, what is the penalty?

How long do we keep it in effect? We believe that the Turks have paid a substantial penalty, and now is the time to move forward and try to get negotiations moving.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SKUBITZ).

(Mr. SKUBITZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, I do not hold myself out as an expert in the field of foreign relations or foreign policy—although it appears that the only prerequisite required is membership in the Congress.

I must confess that while my heart urges me to vote no and stop meddling in the affairs of other nations—reason tells me to “stop, ponder, and listen.” This I have done.

Several days ago, at the invitation of the President, I attended a briefing at the White House. I listened attentively to the remarks of President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. When such men as Congressman MORGAN and Congressman BROOMFIELD, the chairman and ranking members of the committee, support the President when Congressman WAYNE HAYS of Ohio, certainly no admirer of President Ford's foreign and domestic policies—a man who perhaps knows more about internal affairs of the countries involved, the significance of the legislation and the effect that the failure to pass this legislation would have on the national security and welfare of this Nation—says the President is right on this one—I am persuaded to stop, listen, and ponder.

Mr. Chairman, I shall support S. 846 and take this time to state my reasons for so doing.

In my humble opinion, our national interests in the eastern Mediterranean, our national interests dictate that we

maintain and enhance our ties and security arrangements with both Greece and Turkey, our friends and allies of long standing. The importance of both these nations to the continued vitality of NATO—and, thereto, to the continued security of this country—is self-evident.

In Cyprus, we have an important interest in fostering a fair and freely negotiated settlement tolerable to both sides, one which eliminates suffering and removes that island as a flash point in relations between our Greek and Turkish allies.

It is my belief that our policy goals in the Eastern Mediterranean, in Greece, Turkey, and in Cyprus, are related one to the other; they do not stand in isolation. Action such as the arms embargo against Turkey neglect this interrelationship; they are designed to promote one policy goal without adequate consideration of the adverse effects on other objectives, equally valid.

As a result, a false dichotomy is created. We are asked to choose—unnecessarily in my view—between continued good relations with an old and valued ally and progress on a Cyprus settlement. We tend to lose sight of the necessity and importance of both goals to our national interest. We devote time and energy confronting each other, rather than seeking ways to work together to reconcile and promote our common national objectives.

We engage in unproductive debate in which we, our allies, and the suffering people of Cyprus all come out losers. With misplaced confidence in our ability to influence the course of events through threats and overt pressure, we jeopardize a mutual security relationship for uncertain gains.

In the process, we create doubts in the rest of the world about our judgment, our reliability, and our ability to carry through on important commitments to allies.

I would argue that the tactic of suspending aid to Turkey in order to force movement in the Cyprus negotiations has not and will not succeed. Our unique ability to assist in negotiating a just and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem is based on the relationship of friendship and trust we have established with the parties concerned. It has become clear that actions such as the arms embargo which cast doubt on any of these friendships can only reduce our ability to be helpful. The way to right any wrongs or excesses that have been committed is not to debase our friendships, but to use them to bridge the gaps of fear, bitterness and suspicion.

Certainly it is evident to all of us that the arms embargo has not forced negotiating concessions on Cyprus. Rather it has made it more difficult for the government in Ankara to agree to major steps to move the negotiations forward. No government, in Turkey or elsewhere, can afford the appearance of knuckling under to unacceptable and overt foreign pressure. This is all the more the case when it involves an issue on which the Turks feel they have been deeply wronged and threatened over the years. By cutting aid,

we do not hasten progress; we merely produce a hardening of positions. We create resentment. We inject new issues into a negotiation which is complicated enough as it is. We divert attention from the real issues begging to be addressed. And we prolong a crisis which, if it remains unresolved, can only undermine political stability in all the countries in the region with all the obvious, unacceptable results this entails for the United States.

In our desire to promote a just peace on Cyprus, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that we can legislate progress or resolve by fiat issues rooted deep in history. Nor can we afford to ignore the fact that more rapid progress on Cyprus has been hindered by political factors beyond our influence or control—the fall of a government in Turkey in November, the preoccupation of Greece until December with elections, uncertainties over the return of President Makarios to the island.

Above all, we should not lose sight of the fact that we, the Congress and the Executive, are in close agreement on the main outlines of a settlement and the requirement for progress. We all seek a solution to the Cyprus problem that preserves that island as an independent state. We are disappointed over the slow pace of progress and agree it is up to Turkey as the stronger power to show greater flexibility in the negotiations. And we are determined to see a fair and freely negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem that will resolve the refugee problem.

This, in short, is where we stand today and this is why I am urging that we work together with the administration to find ways to ease the embargo on aid to Turkey and safeguard our vital national interests. Only by relaxing the aid embargo can we preserve the bonds of friendship and alliance which have served us well these many years and give us a unique role to play in a Cyprus settlement. Only by eliminating obstacles to our bilateral relationships can we restore confidence in our leadership of the NATO alliance, safeguard friendships whose importance extends far beyond the Mediterranean, and eliminate a major inhibiting factor to progress on a Cyprus settlement.

This is not the time for recrimination or for the assessment of blame. It is a time to look forward, to assist in formulating realistic foreign policy goals which do not force us to choose between equally valid policy objectives, to preserve and strengthen our relations with our key allies, to assist those allies to reconcile their differences peacefully and to see their mutual interest in a peace of justice and conciliation on Cyprus.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TSONGAS).

(Mr. TSONGAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, there is one issue that I would like to address, out of the many that have been brought to the attention of this body, and that is the very real question of what impact

this bill is going to have on the Government of Greece.

Those of us who have been to the White House, and listened to the Secretary of State in his speech in the Department of State, have heard much about the jousting within the Turkish Government, and that, if we do not do this or that, it will have an impact. Such as that Ecevit can criticize Demirel and vice versa. Then we go along with the process of the internal politics of Turkey. We are concerned about that, and perhaps we should be. But does that not raise a question? What is going to happen in Greece? For 7 years Greece was ruled by a rightwing military dictatorship that many of us strongly opposed, and after 7 years we now have a return to democratic constitutional government under Karamanlis, which embodies everything that we as a country profess to believe in.

Why are we not concerned about Karamanlis now? Why are we not in any way structuring this bill to aid his government? We talk about being evenhanded, and I think that we should be. We should evidence interest in what is happening in Turkey, because Turkey is our ally. But that same rationale would argue that we should be concerned with what is happening in Greece.

Not once during the Secretary of State's talk at the Department of State was there any concern expressed about what is going to happen to Karamanlis. I think that is our responsibility even if, indeed, he does not think it is that important. If we were going to come up with a bill that was a real compromise, it should have in some way addressed the internal domestic problems in Greece as well as those in Turkey.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. FISH).

(Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I praise the level of debate we have had here today on this very difficult issue of balancing the United States' security interests against some very important principles. I believe personally that where a major principle is at stake, such as the laws of the United States in this issue, that there is even a higher burden than usual on the proponents, those who would have us in this case relax the embargo.

I would like to take the few minutes I have to address some questions to the leadership on this matter. Much has been said about the safeguards in S. 846 if we do lift the embargo. I wonder if I could address my first question to the gentleman from Florida on an issue that I do not think has been given adequate attention, and that is the danger of future aggression against others than Cyprus.

What is to prevent the use of the \$185 million worth of arms for aggression by the Turks against Greece itself or in the Aegean Sea?

Mr. FASCELL. The way I read it, nothing, because the bill says "notwithstanding any other provision of law."

Mr. FISH. There is nothing to prevent it. Would the chairman of the full committee answer that?

Mr. MORGAN. I disagree with that because there is a provision in section 2 which says:

Any such suspension shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

Mr. FISH. Would the chairman agree that section 2 refers only to Cyprus rather than any other part of the world?

Mr. MORGAN. That is true. But the provisions of our law have been included in all agreements of sale covering the pipeline to Turkey.

Mr. FISH. Just one more question of the chairman. Would he tell us what type arms make up the \$185 million, and more specifically whether there are amphibious landing craft included?

Mr. MORGAN. These arms include aircraft, ships, vehicles, ammunition, missiles, communications equipment, supply operations, training, and technical assistance.

Mr. FISH. Were amphibious landing craft included?

Mr. MORGAN. There are miscellaneous boats and craft and spares but it is not spelled out whether any of them are landing craft or not.

Mr. FISH. Any offensive missiles?

Mr. MORGAN. Missiles and support equipment are listed for \$18 million.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Ms. ABZUG).

(Ms. ABZUG asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of debate heard today on this bill which is called a compromise. It is no compromise; it is a sellout of a basic principle. Turkey used our arms illegally in its flagrant aggression against Cyprus. We exercised our congressional power to limit the President's right in foreign affairs, for one of the few times, when we voted a ban on arms to Turkey for its misuse.

I think there has been no evidence that we should change our vote. Turkey has shown no inclination to withdraw the 30,000 troops—supplied with U.S. arms—who still occupy 40 percent of Cyprus nor to take any steps to move toward negotiations.

A great deal of suffering has come about as a result of this illegal use of our arms. We are talking about people, we are talking about refugees, we are talking about men, women, and children, we are talking about the right of people to be sovereign and to be independent without the interference of others by the use of force of arms especially ones we supply; 180,000 Greek Cypriots remain homeless and in need. Are we to ignore them and allow Turkey to impose settlement by force? Perhaps to invade Greece itself?

There has been a great deal of effort by the White House to twist arms. I am

the Turkish position and weaken our ability to insure that there are adequate safeguards against Turkish opium getting into illicit markets.

Fourth. The current diplomatic, political, and military situation in the eastern Mediterranean is intolerable, and, if the arms ban continues, a bad situation will only get worse; and

Fifth. The aid embargo has been counterproductive. It threatens important U.S. interest in the eastern Mediterranean and our access to defense and intelligence installations in Turkey.

A vote then against this bill is a vote for the status quo. It is a dead end—negative—approach. Such a vote represents support for the present, unsuccessful approach to win Turkish concessions on Cyprus.

A vote for this bill is our best hope in the present situation to try to set in motion a series of moves, some by Turkey, that will produce meaningful negotiations on Cyprus; restore vitality to NATO; protect important U.S. intelligence gathering facilities; and improve U.S. bilateral relations in the area.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, the time has come for some rethinking of our action taken last year imposing an embargo on all arms sales to Turkey. The passage of time and recent developments have persuaded me that we should introduce some flexibility in our stance on Turkey's violation of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for this reason I support H.R. 8454.

Last September, Congress embargoed further military sales or grant aid to Turkey in the firm belief that we could not allow statutory restrictions on arms sales to be violated. Indeed, Turkey had used arms sold to her by the United States in her occupation of 40 percent of the island of Cyprus, thereby violating section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act and section 503 and section 505(a)(1)(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act. These conditions, which Congress has mandated for military aid and sales programs, cannot be disregarded. They stipulate that arms we sell must only be used for self-defense against outside aggressors or against internal subversion, and a flagrant violation of that stipulation cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed. It was on that basis that I voted for the embargo last year.

The hope that an arms embargo would induce Turkey to negotiate constructively with respect to Cyprus also influenced many Members of Congress. However, I did not share that hope at the time, and I am now more convinced than ever that continuation of the total embargo will only anger Turkey without encouraging dialog and compromise.

Political developments in Turkey in recent days demonstrate the counterproductive effects of the arms embargo. This is revealed by the trend in Turkish foreign policy statements. The embargo has pushed Turkey into a more and more inflexible position and closer to a rejection of her alliance with the United States. In mid-June, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and his foreign min-

ister, Mr. Ihsan Caglayangil, were making statements no more definite than that the U.S. presence in Turkey needs to be adjusted to the new situation. By the end of June, internal pressure had built tremendously, and Government positions had changed. Prime Minister Demirel has begun to speak out against the United States, and yet his statements are far too moderate to please the majority of his countrymen.

Whereas, in his June 16 notice to the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, Foreign Minister Caglayangil left open the question of the status of U.S. installations during the reappraisal period which was to start July 15, 2 days later he had been attacked by the opposition. He responded to a reporter's question of "who will determine the provisional status—of the installations starting July 15?" saying "We shall determine it." Whereas Caglayangil, in his June 16 statement said that, in light of U.S. action, Turkey is entitled to abrogate her treaties with the United States, shortly afterwards he was pressured into saying, during a news conference, "We also told the United States Government that the Turkish Government could no longer continue to consider as valid the joint defense agreements between the two countries."

These are serious developments with grave implications for the future of United States-Turkey relations. Turkey will hold senatorial elections in the fall, and one of the sharpest criticisms used by the opposition is the contention that the Demirel government is not strong or swift enough in retaliating against the United States for having imposed the arms embargo. The issue is one of national pride for Turkey, and, although the embargo itself is not hurting her severely yet, it is having the serious effect of driving her into an increasingly hostile and extreme anti-American direction. If present trends continue unchecked, as they surely will as long as the U.S. arms embargo remains intact, moderate political leaders will be eclipsed by radical new forces and one of our closest alliances in the Middle East may well be disrupted.

The consequences of such disruption would be extremely serious, as Turkey's pro-Western posture and our military installations there are at risk. Our embargo is now placing the future of both in jeopardy. Turkey, in addition to being a major military power in the eastern Mediterranean, includes uniquely strategic points for observation of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that Turkey is of great importance to the national security of the United States.

I realize that even a partial lifting of the embargo is strongly opposed by most Greek-Americans, and I sincerely regret that I cannot vote on this matter as they would like.

However, I am convinced that, in the long run, it is as much in the interest of Greece as it is in the interest of the United States and the rest of NATO that Turkey not turn away from a pro-Western posture. Greece's dispute with Turkey over the Aegean is extremely serious, probably more dangerous even than the

Cyprus problem. Think how much more serious the Aegean problem would become for Greece if Turkey turned away from the West toward the sweet-talking Russians and secured the backing of the Soviets for Turkey's designs on the Aegean.

The importance of Turkey's basic posture is also deeply felt by the Israeli Government. It is greatly concerned by the present impasse and by the possibility that Turkey would abandon its close ties to the United States and the West and turn toward the U.S.S.R. or toward the oil-rich and newly powerful Arab bloc. While the Israeli Government has not felt it could take an official position in the matter, I have every reason to believe the Israelis hope H.R. 8454 will be enacted.

Opponents of this measure assert that Turkey is bluffing. My answer to this argument is twofold. First, I do not believe Turkey is bluffing, for the simple reason that I do not believe any government in Turkey could afford to knuckle under to the pressure of a total embargo. Second, even if that is wrong, no one can be sure, and the stakes are too high for us to risk finding out that the Turks are indeed not bluffing.

As has been pointed out by many speakers, H.R. 8454 is not a lifting of the embargo such as was passed by the Senate. This bill is a compromise, for it allows only commercial cash sales and what was previously contracted for to be supplied to Turkey now. Thus it represents an invitation to Turkey to negotiate and compromise in turn. This bill postpones the issue of FMS credit and cash sales until the fall, when we will be considering the entire military and sales program. This will give Turkey a time in which she can prove her good faith, and will give us an automatic opportunity for a reevaluation of our stand.

This aspect of the bill encompasses a major point of the proposal made by George Ball and Cyrus Vance, in that it mandates a further reconsideration of our position a few months after this initial gesture. However, it does not constitute the kind of a threat which Turkey found intolerable before that is, specifying that the embargo will be reimposed if Turkey makes no conciliatory moves. Incidentally, I understand Mr. Ball has now endorsed H.R. 8454 in its present form.

Let me now comment on the argument that we should retaliate against Turkey's lifting of her internal ban on opium-poppo growing by continuing the embargo. First, let me say that I yield to no one in my hatred of the devastating curse of heroin addiction and in my anger at those despicable persons who enrich themselves by illicitly trafficking in opium and its derivatives.

But Turkey has announced a new determination to stop the illicit trade in opium, as other nations such as India have successfully done. Turkey has introduced new methods of control and a government buying program, as well as adopted laws which severely punish those who violate the new methods. These measures have been approved by the in-

I think it is high time, Mr. Chairman, that we vote in favor of the United States of America, and to me a vote in favor of this bill is such a vote, and I urge the Members to vote for the legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL).

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.

(Mr. FASCELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the pending bill and urge all my colleagues to vote against it. The only real issue today is what is best for the United States. If this resolution is adopted I respectfully suggest that it is not in the best interests of the United States.

This House went on record by a vote of over 3 to 1 in February of this year deciding the issue with respect to the violation of American law in the use of arms by Turkey for aggressive purposes. Speaker after speaker have gotten up here today and said that the issue is a matter of principle.

A principal argument for the bill is that the embargo has not brought about any concession by anybody, so they are no closer to a settlement now than they were before and therefore we in the United States should forget principle.

Mr. Chairman, it is suggested by the proponents of the pending bill that all of us who voted for the embargo on arms the last time as a matter of principle should now turn right around in a complete circle, about-face, and lift the arms embargo. I ask the Members to ask themselves what has changed as a matter of principle? What has changed that would make them make that decision?

I will tell the Members what has changed since we put that embargo on. There are two things: one, the Turkish Government came out very explicitly and said after a period of time, "We, the Turkish Government, are going to review our agreement with the United States on U.S. bases in Turkey." In other words pressure was put on the United States.

Immediately out of our Government came the unilateral conclusion that Turkey's statement affects our national security; therefore, we ought to change our minds and lift the embargo.

The other thing is that it is quite clear, and admitted by everybody—proponents, opponents, the administration—that there is absolutely no guarantee of any kind, or even a possibility—it is just a big if—that if we adopt this resolution that progress will be made on the issues between Greece and Turkey. The Turkish Government is in command of the situation. They have the majority of the island. They have most of the military force. If the Turkish and Greek Governments have not agreed by now, why would they have to agree to anything later?

I do not know why the sole burden is on the U.S. Government to bring about an agreement between Greece and Turkey.

We have bases also in Greece that are important to our national security. But we do not seem to be worried about them.

The answer is, nothing has changed. This resolution will not help it any. The Turkish Government will get the arms but it does not necessarily mean that they will thereafter do what they could have done before.

The United States sells over \$9 billion a year in arms to other countries under the same restrictions. If we lift the embargo it will undercut all congressional restraints and executive agreement on arms sales.

In the final analysis it will be clear to all, that the United States caved in under pressure and that an important principle of law has been rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) to close the debate.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON).

(Mr. HAMILTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORGAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to remind the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL) when he asked what did Greece do, that, of course, the Greeks have taken our bases in Greece and our home-porting privileges, and put them under Greek command.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of S. 846.

The vote on this bill may be the most important single vote for Congress on a foreign policy issue this year, and I hope the Members of the House will support the bill.

Whatever your view of the arms ban on Turkey 6 months ago, it has become clear today that the ban is not working. It has been counterproductive to America's best interest in the eastern Mediterranean. The ban is now contributing to an unacceptable and deteriorating situation.

The arms ban on Turkey has threatened the viability of the southern flank of NATO and Turkey's ability to carry out its NATO force goals; contributed to a deadlock in negotiations on Cyprus and thereby helped to prolong suffering of the Cypriot people; jeopardized continued U.S. access to military and intelligence installations in Turkey; and undermined Turkish-American relations and, because of the festering Cyprus crises, threatened continued Greek-American relations.

The crucial question here concerns the means that the U.S. Government has to influence the Governments of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus to deal with this intolerable situation in the eastern Mediterranean.

More precisely, the question is whether the several U.S. foreign policy interests in the area will be better served

by a continuation or modification of the arms embargo against Turkey.

If this bill is defeated and the ban continues, the consequences could be serious:

Turkish bases and intelligence-gathering facilities may be lost;

Our 30-year relationship with Turkey may be irreparably harmed;

Turkey may be forced to realign itself with closer ties to the Soviet Union to the north and to some of its less moderate Arab neighbors to the south; and

The stalemate in Cyprus will drag on, with all that means in human suffering by the refugees, and eventual problems for Greece.

Wise policy simply does not risk these kinds of consequences. We have two possible courses of action:

1. The ban be continued. The theory of this approach is that by denying all arms to Turkey pressure will mount on Turkey to make concessions that will get Cyprus negotiations off the ground; and

2. The ban can be modified. The theory here is that a partial lifting of the ban will show the good faith and willingness to compromise of the United States and that a new climate will be created to put in motion a series of moves, some by Turkey, that will lead to successful talk on Cyprus and improvement on other issues.

Keeping the ban in tact tends to perpetuate all the problems that now exists. That course of action simply has not worked. The people in our Government who are closest to this problem believe that the Turks will not buckle under the pressure of the arms embargo and make concessions while the embargo is in effect. It simply runs counter to their national character to do so. Furthermore, they can obtain the equipment they seek from other sources. The fragile internal political situation in Turkey, which permits no sign of weakness on the Cypriot question, also argues against early Turkish compromise under pressure.

The present unacceptable situation requires, then, some action to modify the ban.

This bill represents an effort to break out of the present stalemate. The bill resumes some arms shipment but links their continuation later to progress in Cyprus. If Turkey has a feeling for its continued relationship with the United States, it will accept the opportunity created. If not, the ban can be reimposed.

This bill then should be supported because:

First. The United States, as the superpower, needs to take the first step to help break the present impasse and to prevent further deterioration in the situation on Cyprus;

Second. We need to keep the southern flank of NATO strong and viable. In order to do that we have to have good ties with our two allies, Greece and Turkey.

Third. Our best hope to be able to influence Turkey on issues that matter to us, including the opium issue, is by modification of the arms embargo. A continuation of the ban will simply harden

the resumption of American arms sales to Turkey would enhance relations between Greece and Turkey. This bill could be more accurately named "The Turkish Rearmament Act of 1975." I urge my colleagues to uphold the law, to reassert our Nation's historic opposition to armed aggression, and to reject this attempt at foreign blackmail by soundly defeating this bill.

Mr. PHILLIP BURTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SARBANES. Yes; I yield to the gentleman from California.

(Mr. PHILLIP BURTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PHILLIP BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend our distinguished colleague in the well, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES), for his comments, and I would like to associate myself with his remarks and urge all of my colleagues to reject the proposal before the House.

[Mr. PHILLIP BURTON further addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS).

(Mr. HAYS of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, there is no Member of this body for whom I have higher respect and deeper regard than for the gentleman who just preceded me in the well, Mr. SARBANES.

I can well understand his position, and I can understand that he has deep emotion about it. I supported his position in the last go-round on this issue, as I supported the Vanik-Jackson amendment, because I felt emotional about the treatment of the Soviet Jewish minority by the Soviet Government. It gave me a good deal of personal satisfaction to cast that vote.

However, what has been the result? The results in both cases have been not only counterproductive, but in the case of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the Russians simply cut the migration of Jews from 36,000 to 6,000; and in the case of the restrictions on Turkey, they simply have refused to negotiate under the gun.

I have talked to the Turks about this, and I have talked to the Prime Minister of Greece. There are great differences of opinion, but I think they are soluble if we can get negotiations started, meaningful, real negotiations.

I think I have a special right to talk about this because in the days of the junta, in the days of the dictatorship, who did more damage to the Greek people even than the Turks did on Cyprus, in physical damage and mental torture? I am the one who introduced an amendment not to give any more arms to that government until a democratic government was installed in Greece.

I am sure that if the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES) had been in this body then, he would have supported it, or maybe he did; I am not sure.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Yes; I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) offered such an amendment after I became a Member of this body, and I did, indeed, support it.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. The gentleman from Maryland did support it, and I recall that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRADEMAS) also supported it.

Yet, many of the same voices outside of this Chamber—and I heard some of them in my district—of the so-called Greek lobby, were denouncing me all over this country as an enemy of Greece. They were supporting the junta which had its fingers around the throats of the Greek people.

Mr. Chairman, I want to see this problem in Cyprus settled. I want to see those Greek Cypriots get to go back home. I want a settlement. I want a government. I do not know what we can come up with. My judgment is that we are going to come up with a compartmentalized Cyprus which has a Turkish minority section and a Greek Cypriot majority section, but I think we have to look at the whole picture.

As the gentleman said, the junta did start this, and the Turks did invade, and I agree that they went too far when they broke off negotiations in Geneva.

The Members and I have no disagreement about that, but as I said to Prime Minister Karamanlis in his office in Athens, "You have to think of one thing, Mr. Prime Minister: If it had not been for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus which so humiliated the junta, they would still be in power, and you would still be sitting in exile in your apartment in Paris where I met with you and talked about the future of Greece."

Therefore, this is not all a one-sided thing. What we are really doing if we pass this resolution or bill is saying to Turkey, "Yes, you can have the arms if they are bought and paid for, and we are not trying in the legislation to cut you off in 3 months." However, after July 31, if I am not mistaken, nobody can buy any more arms until there is a new arms sales bill passed, and that is coming up in October, at which time we can take another look.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES).

(Mr. RHODES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I must say that each time I have taken the floor on this subject—and I have done so several times—that it is one of the more difficult jobs that I do as a Member of this body. It is difficult because there is merit on each side of this question, so I can certainly understand how the Members feel. Also, I have no quarrel with anything the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES) said, and I agree with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), for whom I have great respect, and for the gentleman from Indiana

(Mr. BRADEMAS) who also feels very strongly about the matter.

However, I believe the thing we need to be looking at now is what this does to the United States of America.

This is not a Greek matter or a Turkish matter. As a matter of fact, it is a NATO matter, and it is an American matter. NATO needs both Greece and Turkey. Without both of them the southern flank of NATO is exposed and can be turned by an armed and determined enemy.

Even more, Greece and Turkey need each other because if they end up with permanent enmity then some of the other nations in that part of the world who have been predatory in the past can certainly become predatory again.

So, Mr. Chairman, I believe what we are trying to do here today is to unravel a very knotty problem. It seems to me that this is the first step in solving it.

We need to get people to negotiate, not only on the Cyprus situation but on some of the other matters that involve the relationships between Greece and Turkey in that part of the world. I think the Aegean Islands are important. I believe that progress can be made concerning them and, indeed, that we could get that matter settled.

The embargo that was imposed at the insistence of this body just flatly has not worked. There have been no negotiations. There has been no progress toward any kind of settlement. The refugees on Cyprus continue to suffer and, in the meantime, the Greek-Turkish schism becomes deeper and wider, and the United States has to move in order to get this situation off of dead center.

Let me just mention some of the things that might occur if this bill is not passed. It has been said that the Turks will demand renegotiation of our bases there, and perhaps it will be necessary for us to close them down. If we do have to close those bases, this will not hurt Turkey, it will hurt us. Also, as the Members know, many of the things which we do at those bases are much more important to the United States and Western Europe and, in fact, to the whole free world, than they are just to Turkey. We need those bases. It is not a matter of their blackmailing us because, after all, according to the Turks—and I can understand that many of the Members disagree with them, but I can also understand their viewpoint—they say we committed the first act of repression by imposing an embargo on them. They felt they had a right to invade Cyprus to comply with their treaty obligations after the Greek junta sponsored a takeover of that island by people who tried to assassinate Archbishop Makarios. Whether right or wrong, that is the way they feel, and I can imagine their feelings because they feel that we in America drew the first sword after having been good friends of ours.

It has not been said before, but I do not think there were any more valiant soldiers in Korea than were the Turks. They fought shoulder to shoulder with our people, and they did a great job. So, as I say, they wonder why we did what we did.

President came to my district, to Fort McHenry in Baltimore, and quoting Abraham Lincoln, he said that the United States was "the last best hope of mankind."

If we are to be the last best hope of mankind, then we must keep principle as well as power as essential elements of our leadership. That is what we are asking for here today.

We have gone to the Secretary of State again and again and said, "Take this tool of the cutoff which the Congress has given you to work constructively to achieve a resolution on Cyprus. Do not simply address yourself to the task of reversing the Congress, of turning the Congress around. Take some action to meet the pressing humanitarian problem which exists on that tragic island so that we can then move forward with this matter."

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SARBANES. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to associate myself with the eloquent remarks of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES).

(Mr. DRINAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to reiterate the compelling arguments against this legislation which have been made by previous speakers on both sides of the aisle. Nevertheless, in order to clarify my reasons for opposing this bill, a brief historical review is called for. When S. 846 was passed by the Senate on May 20 and referred to the House Committee on International Relations, I began searching diligently to discover any change in the circumstances which had prompted Congress to enact legislation suspending the sale of arms to Turkey in December of last year. On five separate occasions during September and October of 1974, the House had voted overwhelmingly to cut off the shipment of arms to Turkey.

At that time, the case seemed quite clear. On July 20, 1974, following an attempted coup by Greek militarists, the Turkish army invaded the independent nation of Cyprus. By August 16, when a cease-fire was agreed to, 40,000 Turkish troops occupied 40 percent of Cyprus, including most of the country's farmland and economic resources. Nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots, one-third of the entire population of Cyprus, were driven from their homes by the invading army. Some 6,500 Greek Cypriots were killed or wounded. Civilians were brutally raped and tortured.

We are all familiar with the tragic events of last summer. The facts are undisputed. No Greek soldiers set foot on Cyprus during the fighting. It was a case of naked aggression, with Turkey acting to carry out its vows to seize control of Cyprus from the Greek Cypriots who make up more than 80 percent of the country's population.

In the wake of the Turkish invasion, the administration had no choice under the Foreign Military Sales Act and the

Foreign Assistance Act but to cut off all weapons shipments to Turkey. The law is quite clear on this point; American arms can only be used for defensive purposes. Turkey had openly violated the agreement under which it had received our arms. Nevertheless, the administration refused to act to uphold the law.

It took an act of Congress which specifically suspended the sale of arms to Turkey to accomplish that. The bill enacted in December permitted the President to put off the effective date of the arms suspension until February 5, 1975, if he determined that such action would further the progress of negotiations for peace on Cyprus. President Ford made that determination on December 31, 1974, and American arms continued to flow into Turkey until February 5, 1975, when shipments were finally halted.

So, I ask again, how has the situation changed? Has Turkey ceased to occupy a large portion of Cyprus with its invading army? The answer is no. Indeed, Turkey is in the process of transferring some 100,000 Turks to Cyprus to replace the Greek Cypriots who have been forcibly driven from their homes into squalid refugee camps.

Has Turkey agreed to negotiate with Greece to remove its forces and restore Cyprus to its sovereign state? The answer is no. Forty thousand Turkish troops remain in place, and no progress has been made in negotiating their withdrawal.

Has the Congress repealed the requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act and Foreign Military Sales Act which forbid the transfer of American arms to a foreign country engaged in aggression? The answer once again is no.

So there has been no change in circumstances. Yet the administration says that this legislation is needed. Indeed, the President and his Secretary of State have waged an all-out campaign to convince the House to reverse itself on this issue.

I have listened carefully to the arguments for resumption of arms shipments to Turkey presented by the administration and by the proponents of S. 846. I find them all to be completely lacking in substance. First, the proponents assert that the arms embargo has been ineffective in settling the Cyprus dispute and therefore should be abandoned. There are several fallacies in this line of argument. The purpose of suspending arms sales was not to drive Turkey to the bargaining table; it was to enforce our own laws regarding military sales and to stop our involvement as a direct accessory to aggression on Cyprus. Our foreign policy must be grounded in principle to some extent, not molded on the expedient basis of what will work and what will not. Moreover, once the administration stops trying to end the embargo, and Turkey learns that we mean what we say with regard to their forced occupation of Cyprus, perhaps the Turkish Government will be more prone to negotiate seriously.

Second, the proponents say that we are punishing an ally by singling out Turkey for an embargo on arms. These Members ignore the fact that we have

given Turkey more than \$3 billion in economic and military aid since World War II. They ignore the fact that Turkey had a period of 5 months between the first House vote to cut off arms in September and the imposition of the embargo in February to change its policies. Yet Turkey did nothing. Finally, they ignore the fact that our laws prohibiting the use of American arms for aggressive purposes do not have a time limit of 2 months or 4 months or 6 months. They are operative indefinitely until the offending condition has been eliminated. Turkey has not been singled out for punishment. The United States is simply enforcing its long-established laws regarding foreign military sales.

Third, proponents of this legislation point to Turkey's recent threats to expel American forces from Turkish military bases. "American national security and the preservation of NATO require that we prevent this from occurring," they argue. If this argument is accepted by the House, dozens of nations, large and small, throughout the world, will be handed a license to extract assistance and other promises from the United States by engaging in such blackmail.

On June 23, Secretary Kissinger stated firmly that "no ally can pressure us by a threat of termination." Yet Mr. Kissinger and others now ask us to capitulate to such a threat emanating from Turkey. No evidence has been presented which demonstrates that our survival as a nation would be imperiled should Turkey carry out its threat to close its bases to the United States. As for the survival of NATO, I should point out that NATO was established to prevent armed aggression, not to countenance it. If American support of Turkish aggression on Cyprus is the price we must pay for Turkey's membership in NATO, perhaps we should be willing to suffer Turkey's departure from NATO. I strongly suspect that such a move would imperil the security of Turkey far more than it would our own.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the situation has not changed since last December and no valid reasons for lifting the embargo on arms to Turkey have been presented. This legislation has been labeled a "compromise" and deceptively entitled "An act to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece, and Turkey." In reality, this is no compromise at all. It simply permits the President to supersede existing law and resume the shipment of arms to Turkey. Turkey need take no action in return. There are some constraints imposed on the transfer of such arms under the Foreign Military Sales Act. But commercial arms sales conducted under the Mutual Security Act would be unlimited in quantity and free from prior congressional scrutiny or disapproval. This bill constitutes a blank check for the continued support of Turkish aggression on Cyprus.

As for improved relations, there can be no doubt that the enactment of S. 846 would make Turkey quite happy. On the other hand, I do not see what it would do to improve American relations with the democratic government of Greece. Moreover, it is hard to understand how

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ternational experts in narcotics control. We cannot now assume that they will fail. It is simply premature for us to decide to punish Turkey on this ground.

Second, even if Turkey's control methods do not prove successful, we have no reason to believe that continuation of the arms embargo will result in Turkey's reimposition of the earlier poppy growing ban. Indeed, the contrary is the case. If Turkey's anger at what the Turks consider an unfriendly act by a long-time ally produces an unfavorable change in Turkey's foreign policy, one predictable consequence will be a "to-hell-with-you" attitude on opium control as well.

Third, I do not believe that we will ever stop the ghastly flow of heroin to our city streets by attempting to stop the illicit opium trade all over the world. If one source is plugged, another quickly appears to take its place. Southeast Asia is one such source, Mexico is another. I am advised that heroin today is in plentiful supply in New York City, none of it coming from Turkey.

Finally, it has been argued ad nauseam that H.R. 8454 represents an abandonment of principle.

I might be impressed by this argument if the opponents of H.R. 8454 were insisting that all American-supplied arms be removed from Cyprus before any lifting of the ban could take place. But they are not saying that. They are saying "let the Turks do a little something, and then we will ease the embargo." So the argument is not over a matter of principle, nor is it over whether to compromise; it is over the question of when to compromise.

No one can contend that the United States ignored or condoned Turkey's violations. A total embargo for 5 months is a substantial penalty.

Now the question we must answer is whether the United States must, either as a matter of principle or of expediency, extend the penalty indefinitely, at great risk to ourselves, to NATO and, ultimately, to Greece as well.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, today we are on the threshold of deciding one of the most important foreign policy questions to be entertained by this Government in the immediate post-Vietnam war period. The consequences of our action today will affect not only Turkey and Cyprus, Greece, and our Western alliance, but will have far-reaching implications that will signal the philosophy to which the United States is prepared to adhere in its pursuit and determination of future foreign policy and international relations.

It is thus very important that we fully understand what we will be saying by our vote today. After former ruling Greek military junta engineered a coup against the duly elected President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, Turkey launched a massive invasion of Cyprus. This invasion was accompanied by large-scale air raids, killing thousands of innocent people, and resulted in the flight of over 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes in the north. Cyprus, a NATO ally, largely defenseless, was subsequently occupied by Turkish forces. This occupation by Turkey, now 1 full year later, includes

virtual control of the economy and production, as well as the displacement of thousands of Cypriots, now refugees. All of this ravenous occupation occurs under military force.

Our arms, supplied to Turkey for the ostensible purpose of strengthening our Western alliance, have now been used against one of our NATO allies. We are in the precarious position of having supplied arms to one NATO ally who has used them to the ruination, destruction and occupation of another NATO ally. Despite the cries of outrage from other of our allies, as well as the U.N., Turkey has not yielded in its aggression. The intentions of Turkey must now be considered seriously suspect.

Mr. Chairman, I am not unaware of, nor insensitive to, the cogent arguments advanced by those who believe that the United States can proceed in a better negotiating position if we pass this bill. The Congress, and I believe wisely, required the President to suspend all military assistance to Turkey until such time as the President determined that Turkey was in compliance with our laws relating to defense articles supplied by the United States, and until substantial progress had been made towards a settlement with Cyprus. In the absence of such a determination, on February 5 of this year the embargo became effective. We were asserting that the United States would not condone the invasion of one ally by another, that we would not accept the human rights and national sovereignty violations inherent in such an invasion, and that the United States would not be a party, through the supply of arms, to such outrageous aggression. Further, our tradition of freedom and democracy, as well as the lofty ideals of NATO, would not permit us to be associated with such gross violations of democratic principles and blatant aggression. This, I submit, is what we will be explicitly condoning by resuming arms shipments to Turkey, and this I cannot do. Once we establish, openly and forthrightly, and as a matter of public policy, that we will assist in this horror, we will have opened the door that nothing is unacceptable in achieving desired ends. To abandon these principles has, I fear, the gravest consequences for our foreign policy relations and our perception of ourselves as a freedom loving and democratic Nation.

I earnestly urge a defeat of this bill.

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I am strongly opposed to lifting the ban on military aid to Turkey because I feel that to do so will violate existing provisions of American law which prohibit countries receiving American arms from using those arms against our other allies.

Section 505(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, states that—

No Defense articles shall be furnished . . . to any country . . . unless the President determines . . . that such defense articles will be utilized by such country for the maintenance of its own defensive strength, or the defensive strength of the free world; . . .

Thus, when on August 14-17 Turkish military forces launched a major military

assault on Cyprus using American military equipment including tanks, planes, guns, personnel carriers, and landing craft, it clearly violated section 505(b).

Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act states:

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold . . . solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations . . .

Inasmuch as the American tanks, planes, guns, personnel carriers, and landing craft were delivered to Turkey for NATO purposes only, it is irrefutable that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was an explicit violation of section 4. And that is not all. Section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act states that—

Any foreign country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act, in substantial violation of any provision of this Act . . . shall be immediately ineligible for further cash sales, credits, or guarantees.

And section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended states that—

Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country . . . in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

I am sure that my colleagues will agree that Turkey's capture and occupation of 40 percent of the island of Cyprus and 70 percent of the economic wealth; its killing of 5,000 Cypriots; its immobilization of the island economy; and its expulsion of 200,000 Greek Cypriots—all with the use of over 90 percent of the American military equipment—is further evidence that Turkey has indeed violated both of these sections of our law also.

Last week, I listened intently as President Gerald R. Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger presented persuasive arguments that the U.S. military installations in Turkey are crucial to the well-being of our country.

It is my view that strategic bases in both Turkey and Greece are needed for our internal security and associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished colleague from Michigan, Congressman DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., who said "bases in one country ought not to be jeopardized for bases in another country."

We must not, therefore, permit ourselves to be browbeaten into breaking our own laws as ransom for U.S. bases abroad and must not jeopardize the well-being of our citizens by setting a precedent that will invite other nations to blackmail the United States over base rights in their countries.

The provisions of this bill are extremely broad. They will: First, allow the immediate sale of all commercial military equipment by the U.S. arms manufacturers to Turkey; second, permit later this year the resumption of all sales by our Government of military goods to Turkey with U.S. taxpayer-paid subsidies—which will provide Turkey with reduced interest rates with which to buy goods either directly or on credit;

third, release immediately all goods—totaling \$175 million in arms and including 24 F-4-E aircraft—which Turkey now has under contract with the United States; and fourth, open enormous loopholes in existing laws as well as repeal the cutoff amendment which went into effect on February 5 of this year.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to defeat this bill.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today, S. 846, asks us to repeal the ban on military aid to Turkey which Congress imposed on February 5, 1975. That ban was instituted in reaction to the illegal use of American-supplied arms and materiel by Turkey in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus last year. In that invasion over 30,000 Turkish troops equipped with U.S. arms occupied 40 percent of the island and drove 200,000 Greek Cypriots out of their homes. Yet today we are asked to support S. 846 which would condone this illegal invasion and occupation.

There are a number of reasons why we should reject S. 846. First, this country has always believed in the rule of law. Yet, Turkey has clearly violated both U.S. law and bilateral agreements in its actions in Cyprus. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act both state that U.S. military assistance and equipment are to be used only for defensive purposes. The Turkish aggression in Cyprus stands in clear violation of these legal provisions.

If we pass S. 846 we will be sending clear signals to the international community that we are abandoning our long-time insistence on limiting weapons assistance to defensive purposes—an insistence which has been a traditional cornerstone of our foreign policy. Permitting Turkey to receive U.S. arms after employing them in contravention of U.S. law would encourage other nations to misuse U.S. military assistance in a similar manner.

There is nothing in this bill to discourage further Turkish aggression. If we waive existing restrictions on the offensive use of U.S.-supplied arms Turkey could use arms supplied under this bill, as well as arms purchased commercially in the United States, to make further encroachments in Cyprus. Indeed, given the volatile situation in the eastern Mediterranean it is not inconceivable that such arms might be utilized in an invasion of Greece itself.

Secretary of State Kissinger has argued that this bill is necessary if we are not to lose the bases we have in Turkey. Do we want to be placed in a position of yielding to Turkish blackmail? I, for one, do not. There are over 300 major U.S. installations in other countries. Yielding to such blackmail would place us in an untenable position with those other countries.

Furthermore, Secretary Kissinger's assertion that the Turkish bases are essential for policing the SALT agreements and monitoring Russian missile testing are open to question. Several experts have testified that these bases are only marginally useful in verifying the SALT

agreements, that alternative observation sites and satellites would be more useful, and that the SALT agreements cannot be reasonably used to justify giving arms to Turkey in order to save our bases there.

Some of my fellow members who support this bill argue we should accept it as a "compromise." What kind of compromise is one in which we do not ask that Turkey take positive actions to rectify its illegal depredations in Cyprus in exchange for U.S. arms aid? Obviously this would be no compromise at all. Rather it would represent a caving in by this country which would increase the likelihood that future recipients of American arms would not feel bound by the provisions of the agreements by which they obtained those arms.

Supporters of the bill also argue that the present arms embargo has been ineffective because it has not brought Turkey to the negotiating table over the Cyprus question. The reason that the embargo has been less successful than anticipated is because the Secretary of State and others in the Ford Administration have undermined its credibility by publicly blaming Congress for enforcing this country's laws. Instead of blaming Congress the Ford administration should be exerting the various diplomatic, economic, and military pressures at its command on Turkey which violated the law. It is not surprising that the embargo has not led to quick negotiations since the actions and words of the executive branch have fueled Turkish hopes that Congress would backdown and lift the arms ban without evidence of substantial Turkish progress toward negotiations.

Passage of this bill would also have serious consequences for the fragile new democratic government in Greece. Such an action would indicate a significant American tilt toward Turkey which could undermine the internal stability of the Greek Government, endanger our NATO and 6th Fleet bases there, and threaten the recently revived Greek participation in NATO.

Finally, this question is part of the larger one of restoring Congress' proper role relative to the Executive in the making of foreign policy for this country. In recent years Congress has taken a number of important steps to redress its power imbalance vis-a-vis the Executive and regain its proper constitutional role in foreign policy. As Tom Wicker noted in Tuesday's New York Times:

There is . . . no question that where appropriations must be provided, Congress has a right to set certain terms and conditions—make policy—even in the field of foreign affairs.

The argument of the administration that they must ignore American law in order to protect American interests is one that must be rejected. To accept such an argument would be to reject the rule of law on which this country is based. To accept such an argument would be to acquiesce in the further abdication of congressional prerogatives in the field of foreign affairs. To accept such an argument would be to tell our long-time ally and friend, Greece, that

we will capitulate to Turkish blackmail and turn our backs on "the cradle of democracy."

I hope the United States will never be put in such a position. I urge my colleagues to vote against aggression, against illegality, and against international blackmail by rejecting S. 846.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to object to the restoration of American arms assistance to Turkey.

I have come to that decision after considering the important issues of our nation's relationship with both Greece and Turkey, their involvement in NATO, the necessity of preserving military installations in both countries, and the need to resolve the impasse on Cyprus.

Also, I have tried to keep in mind that our actions on this issue will affect our policy with respect to the sale or grants to other foreign countries, and equally as important, our actions will affect Congress role in future foreign affairs decisions.

Recognizing that the United States has a responsibility for international peace and stability commensurate with its capacity to affect external events, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was passed into law. This law was designed to continue supplying military aid to help meet security threats confronting our allies. Our Nation's international security system involving NATO, of which both Greece and Turkey are members, other mutual defense arrangements and military assistance have gone a long way to protect the weak against the ambitions of the strong.

However, the mandate of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is that American arms are not to be used by our allies in aggressive actions. This vital stipulation expressed the moral concern at the Congress about the conduct and consequences of our Nation's foreign policy. It was hoped that the U.S. security assistance program with this fundamental principle behind it would lead to more responsible behavior by our allies.

Today we are asked by the President to resume military sales to Turkey. The administration argues that lifting the embargo is the only way to create a negotiating climate suitable for a Cyprus settlement. The President insists that Turkey will only enter serious negotiations if the Congress lifts the ban on military weapons.

Mr. Chairman, it was with our military assistance that the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus. It is with our arms that the Turks presently occupy 40 percent of Cyprus. It is with our arms that the Turks have murdered and wounded thousands of Greek Cypriots. And it is with our arms that the Turkish army has created a refugee problem mounting to 200,000.

The immediate outlook on Cyprus includes the threat of further Turkish military expansion. In its quest for security, Turkey has become a coercive power on Cyprus.

During the 6-month period between the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in August and the imposition of the arms embargo in February, Turkey did receive American arms aid and yet adamantly

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refused to negotiate compromises with Greece. Even after negotiations had begun Turkey increased its control of territory in Cyprus.

Today, to our knowledge, neither the President nor Congress have received any assurances that Turkish withdrawal from Cyprus would proceed once military aid was renewed.

Mr. Chairman, armed forces are instruments of war; diplomacy is an instrument of peace. It is through diplomacy and not violence that you safeguard one's own vital interest without hurting those of the other side.

By lifting the arms embargo on Turkey the United States will be losing all influence with Turkey to initiate serious peace negotiations. Our arms will permit the Turkish forces to further entrench their position on Cyprus and to further subordinate the Greek majority.

Lifting the embargo at this point would constitute a violation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which calls for an arms embargo against any nation who uses American arms for aggressive purposes. One of the principles that law communicates is the solemnity of a commitment. Congress has the responsibility of upholding this legal principle even though it has failed to deter Turkey from its aggression.

Such a violation would permanently injure our relationship with Greece. By our failing to thwart the Turkish invasion and by our subsequent failing to honor our legal commitment, Greece may withdraw from NATO. This would mean a serious weakening in our eastern Mediterranean defense system.

Renewing arms aid to Turkey will give the appearance of a weaker ally making decisions for the United States. Turkey has threatened to renegotiate our bases in mid-July unless we lift the arms embargo. Turkey is of strategic value to NATO, but this is hardly the most vital issue. Under these circumstances the United States must not relinquish its freedom of action to a weaker ally which uses its control over our policies for its selfish purposes.

Furthermore, by resuming military assistance the United States will be giving the impression to all countries that they are free to use American arms regardless of the consequences. Such a free hand destroys the usefulness of international diplomacy and thus, makes the outbreak of war more likely. I am fearful that Congress will suffer as a result of lifting the embargo. Congress will be put in the untenable position of condoning countries employing American arms for aggressive purposes. Congress will undo legislation that calls for responsible behavior by our Government in foreign affairs. And lastly, Congress will show that it is unwilling to enforce existing law in spite of White House opposition.

The political scholar Walter Lippmann once wrote:

In the clash of arms the laws are silent. We may add that in the truce of arms the laws are heard.

I strongly believe in that principle and it is for that overriding conviction that I presently oppose the lifting of the arms embargo on Turkey.

Mrs. BURKE of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to S. 846, which would lift the congressionally imposed embargo on military assistance to Turkey. Passage of this legislation would violate a fundamental moral and legal principle of U.S. foreign policy—that we supply weapons to other nations for defensive, not aggressive, purposes.

Seven months ago, Congress defined American policy on this issue when it imposed the embargo, which suspended military assistance and sales to Turkey until substantial progress had been made toward a settlement of the Cyprus issue. The challenge before us today is to prove that we have the strength of our convictions—that we will not submit to the international blackmail evidenced by Turkey's threat to deprive us of our military and intelligence bases.

Rather than stand up to this threat, our own President asks us to compromise—as he calls it—with the Turks. Mr. Chairman, I fail to see any compromise in this bill. Capitulation, yes. Compromise, no. Under this legislation, Turkey would be able to buy arms from the United States, but is required to do nothing about the Cyprus problem in return for those arms.

Without requiring action by Turkey to remedy the Cyprus situation, the United States weakens its moral stance and condones clear violations of U.S. law and bilateral agreements between the United States and Turkey under which Turkey received the arms in question. Both the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act contain provisions prohibiting the use, for aggressive purposes, of arms supplied by the United States. Furthermore, both laws mandate an immediate cutoff in further arms shipments to any country violating these provisions.

Dr. Kissinger has attempted to persuade us that our military bases in Turkey are more important than American relations with Greece. Yet, ironically, when the military junta was imposing a dictatorship on Greece, the argument was that Greek bases were of vital importance to NATO and the United States. Mr. Chairman, this kind of political expediency fools no one and only serves to undermine our international credibility. Authorizing the sale of arms to Turkey under these conditions simply encourages other nations buying or receiving U.S. arms to use them without the restraints we profess to impose by law.

With regard to our bases, it is argued that loss of the bases would impair our ability to carry out our NATO responsibilities and would deny the United States the use of valuable intelligence installations which serve our defense needs. The irony of this argument is that Turkey does not need an embargo to justify depriving us of our bases. Any political excuse will do. What, for example, is to prevent Turkey's uttering the same threat, should we refuse to continue paying them not to grow opium poppies on the ground that Turkey has violated its part of the bargain? Furthermore, if we back down on the issue of the bases, we are inviting other countries to hold hostage 300 major U.S. bases overseas.

The administration further attempts to persuade us that the purpose of the embargo, which has been in force for 5 months, has not been achieved. Its intent is to influence Turkey to seek a meaningful settlement of the Cyprus situation and to encourage Turkey to withdraw troops and U.S.-furnished defense articles from the island. What this argument does not take into consideration is the fact that, since its inception, the embargo has been undermined publicly and privately by the Ford administration. Six days after the embargo took effect on February 5, the administration had a resolution of repeal introduced into the Congress. This action operated as a clear signal to Turkey that foreign policy was divided in this country and that the embargo might be lifted. Therefore, there was no need for Turkey to seek a settlement with Greece.

We are also accused of undermining Turkey's ability to fulfill its NATO responsibilities, thus weakening NATO's strength in the Mediterranean. This is indeed a strange argument in light of Turkey's contention that NATO and Cyprus are separate issues. So long as Turkey makes any progress on the Cyprus issue contingent on our lifting the embargo, Turkey itself is directly connecting the two issues. Furthermore, should Turkey gain the military assistance it desires, what assurances does Greece have of Turkey's alleged willingness to negotiate? The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that there are no assurances whatsoever. On the contrary, Turkey's ability to wage war would be increased considerably. Under these conditions, how, in good conscience, can this Nation profess to advocate peace on the one hand while supplying the machinery of war with the other? The logic of this position frankly escapes me. Certainly, it deserves decisive rejection by this body.

Only by making it as difficult as possible for the two sides to wage war can we hope to see some negotiated settlement rise out of the ashes of conflict. Today, only Congress has the lawful power to clarify U.S. policy in this controversy. It is a challenge we cannot and must not reject.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to conclude my remarks by offering this thought: The essence of politics may be compromise, but principle must be at the heart of any meaningful international order. The nation which continually compromises those principles it professes to hold dear will one day find itself minus any principles at all. A nation without principles cannot hope to sustain its own existence, much less lead other nations toward a peaceful world order.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of S. 846 as amended by the Committee on International Relations.

I speak as one who voted for the Rosenthal amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 which embargoed all shipments of U.S. military equipment to Turkey.

I voted in favor of imposing the embargo at that time for two reasons.

First, I firmly believe that recipient countries should use U.S.-furnished military supplies only for defensive purposes and not for aggression. Clearly, in the

case of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, American arms were used by Turkish forces in an aggressive act. This action by Turkey violated an agreement between the United States and Turkey and, had we continued to furnish arms to Turkey during the invasion, we would have broken our own laws.

Second, I sincerely hoped and expected that the embargo would induce the Turkish Government to enter into productive negotiations with Greece and the Government of Cyprus for a peaceful and equitable settlement of the conflict.

What has happened since the embargo became effective on February 5 this year? In short, no progress has been achieved. To the contrary, the denial of military supplies to Turkey has severely limited our ability to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict. In place of negotiations, the plight of the refugees on Cyprus has been prolonged, the southeastern flank of NATO has been weakened, and continued U.S. access to bases in Turkey which are vital to our security is endangered.

What, then, can the Congress do to resolve this impasse?

In seeking possible legislative solutions to the deadlock between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue, three criteria should be met.

First, such legislation should not violate our principles and laws by furnishing military equipment which will be used, without sanction, by the recipient country for aggressive purposes.

Second, it should not encourage other countries to blackmail us by holding U.S. access to military bases hostage to inflated and unreasonable demands for military and economic assistance.

Third, it should be evenhanded with respect to all parties to the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, it is my judgment that S.846, as amended, meets these criteria and offers a reasonable chance to move negotiations forward.

With respect to the first criterion, I would like to reemphasize those sanctions in the bill against misuse of American supplied equipment which the distinguished chairman of the committee has already cited. The partial relaxation of the embargo will apply only if Turkey—

Does not break the cease-fire;

Does not send more forces to Cyprus; and

Does not send any more U.S. military equipment to Cyprus.

If Turkey violates any one of these provisions, the full embargo would be reimposed immediately.

With respect to the blackmail issue, it should be recognized that the provisions of S. 846 are not based on a quid pro quo of U.S. military assistance to Turkey solely in return for continued U.S. access to bases there. Rather, the bill is based on a step-by-step approach which will give Congress an opportunity to judge future Turkish actions with regard to the Cyprus issue.

Finally, the bill is evenhanded in its provisions. It recognizes that the United States has important security interests in Greece as well as in Turkey and it provides for further assistance to the refugees on Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of bringing about peace on Cyprus, in the interest of the refugees, in the interest of NATO, and in the interest of our own national security, I urge that we take the first step toward breaking the current deadlock by adopting S. 846.

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Chairman, in good conscience, and after a very difficult period of study and reflection, I cannot support S. 846, a bill to provide for resumption of shipments of arms from the United States to Turkey.

I have listened carefully and long to the President, the Secretary of State and other State Department officials, and I cannot agree at all that the resumption of arms shipments to Turkey is in the best interests of the United States.

Turkey has invaded Cyprus, and Turkey is in the process of consolidating its hold on 40 percent of that nation. The refusal of the United States to ship arms to Turkey under these circumstances is right and proper. Nothing has changed in my judgment, to warrant resumption. The State Department offers no assurances that arms shipments are going to bring about a better climate for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus situation.

It is wrong for the United States to acquiesce in or reward armed aggression by our friends or enemies. I regret my inability to support the President on this measure, but there is no change in the situation.

Moreover, the climate for bending over backwards to offer a gesture to Turkey is clouded by that country's decision to resume its opium poppy crop. It will not be long now before heroin from that crop enters American cities and the bodies of thousands of our citizens. This country worked hard for an agreement and appropriate payments to Turkey to cease growing opium poppies. That agreement stands broken, as does the agreement that American military weapons would not be used to support armed aggression.

Under the circumstances, I see no choice but to vote against this measure before us today. To approve the resumption of arms shipments to Turkey is to signal other arms recipients that they can ignore with impunity the agreement not to engage in wars of aggression with American supplied weapons.

To support this measure is to openly approve of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and this I cannot do.

Mr. HAGEDORN. Mr. Chairman, the question of U.S. aid to Turkey which is before us today requires close attention to the facts by every Member of Congress.

Turkey is a vital ally of the United States, and a strong member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Her modern army numbers 460,000, making it second only to ours among the NATO nations.

As part of NATO, Turkey has consistently supported American foreign policy, and helped restrain the Communists in Europe. Her troops and government still participate in NATO, and support its goals. Turkey is the only nation with a navy opposing the Soviets in the Black Sea.

A strong American ally, Turkey has allowed highly classified U.S. military facilities on her soil with the inherent threat of a strike from the Soviet Union, her bordering neighbor. Turkey has steadfastly ignored Soviet protests and pressures over these secret installations.

Greece is also a part of NATO, but has withdrawn her forces from the organization, and contemplates a total end to her NATO involvement.

Late last year, Congress sought to resolve the impasse over the island of Cyprus, which had been largely occupied by Turkish troops seeking to protect the minority Turkish Cypriots from control by the Greek colonels then in power. In its zeal to bring about a speedy return to Cypriot normalcy, Congress ordered the unfortunate cutoff of arms to Turkey.

This cutoff extends to all arms bound for Turkey, including those duly purchased by the Turkish Government. The Turks must now pay storage fees to U.S. firms because they cannot ship the arms and supplies out of the United States. It must be clearly understood that these goods, which are now impounded, were not grants in aid, but valid purchases negotiated by the Turkish Government in good faith with U.S. firms.

Instead of increasing the opportunity for peace, this action has led to widespread discontent among the Turkish people who have long withstood external criticism and remained our firm allies. Now they see their ally leaving their army without resupply requirements under the aegis of "pressure for peace."

The Turkish people recall Turkey stood by us in Korea, and lost many hundreds of their men in that war.

They recall Turkey never tried to force us to leave Vietnam by withholding their support for NATO or U.S. facilities.

They recall Turkey has not attempted to extort outrageous sums in return for friendship and military bases.

What are they to think about their friend, the United States?

There is no precedent for this situation, and the time to rectify this well intended, but most unwise condition, is upon us.

Mr. Chairman, I shall support the plan of the Committee on International Relations, and call upon my colleagues to consider the contributions this solid ally has made toward international security and in favor of the mutual defense of the NATO Alliance before making their decision.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I vote for this compromise reluctantly, but with the hope that it will generate a just solution between Greece and Turkey.

Up to this point, there have been no serious negotiations. The 100,000 refugees are still in tents and living under dire circumstances. Their future is of grave concern to me.

I have had the privilege of recently meeting with 12 of the most influential Greek Americans in the congressional district. They may not all agree with my position, but they suggested that I should do what I think is in the best interests of the United States. After listening to President Ford and the ex-

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tensive debate on the floor of the House, it is my opinion that the U.S. bases in Turkey are extremely important to the strategic defense of the United States. It is also clear these bases are in jeopardy if some action is not taken.

Former President John F. Kennedy once said:

The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world.

I, therefore, with great hope, vote for a compromise which I hope will cause realistic and meaningful negotiations which will liberate the refugees and settle the Cyprus situation as quickly as possible. I believe it is the best way to shape the very real events we face in the real world, without losing sight of America's long-range goals of humanitarian and legal concern for the rights of Greek citizens, peace in the area, and friendly relations for the United States with both nations.

Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, about this time last year, we witnessed the brutal invasion of Cyprus by Turkey—an act of aggression that has resulted in the occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus by Turkish troops, the creation of 200,000 refugees—about a third of the island's population—and the killing and wounding of thousands of innocent people.

The death and destruction wrought by the Turks on that small peaceful island was carried out with American arms and ammunition which were supplied to Turkey for defensive purposes.

Turkey's use of those weapons was a direct violation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act which require immediate suspension of aid to countries that use U.S.-supplied arms for aggressive purposes.

After the Cyprus invasion last summer Congress gave the administration time to execute the law, and after it failed to do so, we voted to cut off all military aid despite the intense opposition of the President, Secretary Kissinger and others in the administration.

Since the arms embargo became effective, Members of Congress have urged the administration to seek a negotiated settlement on Cyprus, but these requests have gone unheard. Instead of trying to negotiate a settlement with Turkey, it seems the administration has directed its efforts to reverse the arms embargo enacted by Congress. Had the administration concentrated on pressing the Turks for a settlement rather than attacking the Congress, we may have had a settlement on the issue by now. But the administration's action has only made the Turks more stubborn.

For us to reverse our decision, as the administration proposes, would be a violation of one of the basic principles of our foreign policy—that U.S. weapons are supplied to other countries for defensive, not aggressive, purposes. If this body reinstates military aid to Turkey, which I pray it does not, we will have compromised our own deep rooted principles and set a dangerous precedent in the eyes of the world.

I urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to vote against resumption of military aid to Turkey until a reasonable settlement is reached between Turkey and Cyprus.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Chairman, one of the most difficult positions a nation can face in foreign policy arises when two of its allies suddenly engage in conflict. This is the situation the United States faces on the island of Cyprus.

We are asked today to resume military aid to Turkey, while that nation still refuses to withdraw from Cypriot territory. I believe the history of this episode leaves us with little choice over which path to take.

At this time, I believe it would be a grave mistake to supply the Turkish Army with additional U.S. weapons.

Slightly over a year ago, Turkish forces invaded the island of Cyprus following the overthrow of the Cypriot government, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots from the revolutionary junta which had seized power. As a result of those events, the junta failed to maintain control of the government.

The Greek Government renounced the efforts of some extremists to take over Cyprus, and requested that the Turkish Army leave the island. Instead, those forces expanded their control and refused to leave.

Now, a year later, the Turkish Government still maintains its military presence in Cyprus. Huge portions of the island's population, both Greek and Turkish, have been forced to live as refugees, unable to return to their homes.

Turkey, in attacking a fellow ally of the United States with arms supplied by the United States, violated the agreements under which such military aid is made available. Thus, we had little alternative but to cease our military assistance to Turkey until that nation agreed to leave Cyprus in peace.

Turkey got away with threatening Greece, and with dominating the defenseless island of Cyprus. Apparently these successes emboldened that nation, because they are now trying to use the same tactics against the United States.

Instead of promises of a settlement on Cyprus, Turkey has responded by threatening to close down U.S. military bases in her territories.

Instead of peaceful withdrawal, Turkey has violated an earlier agreement with our Government and resumed the cultivation of opium poppies—the fruit of which will inevitably wind up in the streets of our cities, adding further to our own problems in drug control.

Instead of trying to heal the wounds caused by the unfortunate events of last year, Turkey has apparently decided to maintain its militant posture, and threatens to end its alliance with the United States unless we resume military aid.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot bow to threats, even from our own allies.

The bill before us today has been touted as a "compromise measure" by the State Department. Is it a compromise between Greek and Turkish interests? I think not.

This measure is a compromise only in the sense that it appears to be the only way the administration can gain its desire to rearm a nation that has violated its agreements with the United States—and has shown no intention of ending those violations.

This is no longer a "Greek against Turk" issue.

It is not something just opposed by the "Greek Lobby," whatever that is.

The only thing that is compromised by this bill is the integrity and strength of will of the Government of the United States.

And for those reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose S. 846. Supplying weapons to Turkey will not bring that nation to the conference table—and that is where this dispute must be settled.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I stated my views and opposition to this resolution when it was before the Rules Committee and I voted against reporting it out of the Rules Committee day before yesterday, the 22d. I think it is hurtful to the prestige and contrary to the interest of the United States to adopt this resolution lifting the arms embargo against Turkey.

That embargo imposed a few months ago was required by the admitted fact that the Turks sent to Cyprus and used in aggressive action their arms, weapons, and instruments of war which had been furnished to Turkey by the United States for use in the discharge of its functions as a member of NATO, in violation of the military sales law which forbade the use of such instruments of war except for the purpose for which they were delivered, namely, in furtherance of Turkish obligations under NATO. Those facts remain the facts today. Nothing has changed those facts.

If the indirect effect intended by the embargo when it was imposed was to induce Turkey to come to some reconciliation in respect to the dispute between the Greeks and Turks of the Island of Cyprus and the Greek Government and the Turkish Government, then no progress has been made toward the settlement of that dispute. Turkey has done absolutely nothing toward reaching a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Turks occupied Cyprus using American instruments of war furnished to her as a NATO power only, pressed on into the Isle of Cyprus until it occupied 40 percent of that island—the best part of the island economically. In doing so it dispossessed 200,000 refugees of their homes. They are still dispossessed—still not allowed to return to their homes.

So what is the justification for asking us to lift the embargo. Do the Turks ask us to allow them to be an exception to the Military Sales Law and to be permitted to use the weapons which we furnish for NATO purposes for any purposes for which they may wish to use them—aggressive or otherwise. If they be such an exception, will all the other countries who are subject to the prohibition of the same law ask us that they respectively be made a similar exception. Remember that we sell about \$9 billion worth of arms a year and we sell to a

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great many purchasers. To make this exception would destroy the wise prohibition in the military sales law.

The only other reason given for this resolution is that the Turks have indicated that if we do not lift the embargo they may take away from us the bases—two of which are important—which we have in Turkey which serve the purposes of NATO, enabling us to gain valuable information about military activities of the Russians. But Turkey is a member of NATO and the function of those two bases is important to the security of Turkey—even more important—than it is to the security of the United States. Moreover, Dr. Kissinger made recently what was considered a very timely statement in Atlanta when he said any nation that did not want to have an agreement with us was at liberty not to have such an agreement—that if our agreement with them did not serve their interest as well as ours and they wanted to terminate it they could do so. Now, Dr. Kissinger seems to be retreating from his brave and proper position and making this great country yield a matter of law and, I think, a matter of honor, to the pressure Turkey is now imposing—a threat to take away some of their bases which we use with them for NATO purposes.

I want to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, those of us who oppose this resolution are not antagonistic toward Turkey. We do not approve of all the Turks have done or are doing but they are strong, brave people. They are a good ally for us to have, especially strategically located as they are. But they have no right to ask of us what others similarly situated would have no right to ask. Those of us who oppose this resolution are standing firmly by two principles:

First. Respect for the provisions of the military sales law.

Second. That the United States should not under threat from a nation with whom it has an agreement respecting the mutual security of that country and ourselves, ignore clear violations of our law, a just and wise law, by that country.

So, Mr. Chairman, believing that it is the right course to pursue as a matter of conscience and in the interest of the United States, I shall vote against this resolution and hope it will not be approved by this House.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, I will support S. 846, the compromise measure to release a limited amount of military equipment to Turkey in accordance with earlier agreements between that country and the United States. I do so not out of any desire to show favoritism to one ally of our country over another. In fact, I feel that it is imperative for the United States to be evenhanded in its conduct of foreign policy with respect to nations with whom we are friendly or allied.

This bill represents an attempt to demonstrate that kind of balanced approach to the unfortunate and emotionally charged situation which has produced such discord among Mediterranean nations. It is a reasonable piece of legislation dealing with a complex situation at a difficult time, designed to

demonstrate to both Turkey and Greece that the United States does not wish to take sides in disputes between these countries or to take actions which will work to the advantage of one country or to the detriment of another. S. 846 provides for the delivery to Turkey of arms which were contracted for prior to the embargo which began in February of 1975, most of which have already been paid for. It proposes new military and economic assistance to Greece and additional humanitarian aid to Cyprus.

What this bill does not do is authorize new military assistance to Turkey without further congressional action. This provision is a particularly sensible one since it will give the United States time to evaluate the Turkish reaction to the lifting of our February embargo and to further examine the attitudes of all parties to the Cyprus difficulties. It also shows Turkey that by lifting our embargo, the Congress is not giving that country a green light to use these arms in any manner it wishes nor to act contrary to the interests of peace and reconciliation in the Mediterranean.

It is in the best interests of all countries involved in this difficult situation to take positive steps toward a peaceful, lasting solution to the Cyprus dispute. An evenhanded U.S. policy toward the principal antagonists, Turkey and Greece, is particularly necessary, not only for a resolution of this particular disagreement, but also for the strengthening of the NATO alliance and the security of the free world by maintaining U.S. access to very important military bases.

Finally, and not least of all, this bill preserves the integrity of congressional action to oversee an ally's use of U.S.-supplied arms, a principle for which I have spoken in the past. On October 15, 1974, when the House considered President Ford's veto of House Joint Resolution 1131 which mandated an immediate cutoff of military aid to Turkey, I offered the following remarks as part of my justification for voting to uphold the veto:

While I firmly believe that the Congress should reassert its constitutional responsibility in the making of overall foreign policy, much of which has been abdicated to the Executive in recent years, I do not wish to see us overreact in the opposite direction—that of Congress dictating absolute terms for negotiating foreign policy to the Executive.

It is clear from the experience of the past 6 months that the arms cutoff which was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations had no such results. Thus, it is my concern that if we fail to pass this legislation, we will not only continue to harm Cyprus, but will pose grave risks to the security and stability of the entire eastern Mediterranean.

I urge my colleagues to support S. 846.

Mr. GUDE. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to lengthen the debate at this point by going into great detail on the nature of the Cyprus problem, its genesis, who is responsible for it and other such questions. These are primarily for historians and students of international relations. What is important now is the

answer to the problem, and it is toward a viable solution that our efforts must be directed. I do not have that solution, and I doubt that any of my colleagues here have it either. Nor should we have it. Any credible and lasting resolution of the situation on Cyprus can only be one developed and agreed to by those involved—Greece and Turkey and Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It is possible to say with certainty, however, that any solution will inevitably be a compromise. Partisans of both sides in this country should also keep this in mind. Compromise invariably lies somewhere between extremes, and while American policy must be that of justice, it must also be that of peace and compromise, a policy which is neither vengeful nor judgmental.

The question for us today is what policy will help achieve compromise and peace. It is my judgment at this point, that removing the embargo will not help to accomplish that objective. On the contrary, it will serve to justify and sustain all that has happened in the past year, and it will harden the Turkish resolve to impose their own solution on the island rather than to seek to negotiate one.

The administration has suggested that a lifting of the embargo will produce a conciliatory response in Turkey which will unfreeze the situation and lead to a satisfactory resolution. The administration's suggestions, however, must be based on firmer evidence to be convincing. Moreover, the fact remains—and this has never been refuted—the law was broken. Further, it is still being broken, as Turkey continues its use of American-supplied weapons on Cyprus. Not only was the law broken, but an American response was withheld for some 6 months, more than enough time for conciliation had anyone wished to try that approach. At this point I believe it appropriate that the initial gesture come from Turkey. Once made, I am confident that the Congress will reciprocate with a lifting of the embargo. It view of the legal aspects of this question, I believe this would be a more appropriate course of events and one which would more effectively insure that negotiations would take place and that a compromise would occur.

Mr. MAGUIRE. Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to restoring arms aid to Turkey.

A little over 1 year ago, tragedy struck the island of Cyprus. Today that tragedy continues. There are nearly 200,000 refugees on the island and the Cypriot economy lies in ruin. Forty percent of the island remains occupied by the military forces of Turkey. We have seen no progress in negotiations. Against this background President Ford is now asking us to resume arms support to Turkey. What Mr. Ford should instead be asking for is more aid to alleviate the human suffering being endured by so many on Cyprus, together with assurances from Turkey as to what positive steps Turkey is prepared to take to resolve equitably and satisfactorily the Cyprus issue.

Mr. Chairman, there is yet another is-

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sue at stake here today. In enacting the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act, Congress prohibited arms provided to a foreign nation, either by grant or direct sale, from being used for purposes of aggression. Turkey violated the terms of our agreements with them and the Congress responded properly by placing an embargo on arms shipments to Turkey. We must not today abandon the principles embodied in these laws and agreements by reversing our policy on the embargo on shipments of weapons to Turkey in the absence of any conciliatory move on Turkey's part.

Should Congress choose not to continue the embargo, the consequences could be serious, both for Cyprus and for national and international security. Billions of dollars worth of arms are distributed each year by our country. Any present or future restrictions on the use of this materiel would be rendered all but meaningless. It is imperative that other nations recognize that violations of the terms by which the arms were provided are intolerable and carry the gravest of consequences.

The eastern Mediterranean has become a potential flash point of international tension, threatening both the peoples of the region and the world at large. This is further exacerbated by the volatile situation in the Middle East. For these reasons, coupled with Turkey's violation of law regarding use of our arms and the apparent lack of any positive efforts on Turkey's part to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem, I regard renewed arms aid to Turkey as contrary to the national interest.

Mr. ASHLEY. Mr. Chairman, it is only after real soul searching that I have decided to vote for S. 846 and I will do so because on balance I believe the approach it takes is in the best interests of the United States.

Let me say that I cast this vote with reluctance because of my deep personal bond of friendship for many in my community who strongly and urgently take the opposite view, with reservations because I cannot say with certainty—any more than any one else can—that future events will bear out my perception of the national interest.

In all truth, there is no assurance that a partial lifting of the arms ban against Turkey will promote positive negotiations for a prompt and equitable settlement of the Cyprus issue. Nor is there any assurance that a continuation of the ban will help achieve this end. Events of the last 5 months would seem to offer evidence to the contrary. Faced with the uncertainties of both of these policy alternatives, my judgment is that a partial lifting of the ban—under very restrictive conditions—offers the best hope of prompting a just settlement of the cruel and dangerous situation on Cyprus.

But this is not the only issue involved. Just as France and Greece itself have acted to sharply curtail their participation in NATO, so Turkey is threatening to reduce their NATO commitment and to insist on the removal of key U.S. intelligence facilities from their key locations in Turkey across from the Soviet border.

The security of the United States is very much involved here—as, indeed, are the security of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The southern flank of NATO is of enormous strategic importance which cannot be discounted, regardless of our disposition toward one or the other of the allies who occupy this area. Our primary responsibility must be to assure the security of the United States and the other nations which comprise this vital defense organization.

Mr. Chairman, I voted for the imposition of the arms embargo against Turkey because I was offended and outraged by the precipitate military invasion of Cyprus by Turkey following the overthrow of the Cypriot Government at the instigation of the then Greek dictatorship. I do not now favor a complete lifting of this embargo—only a very limited resumption of arms purchased and largely paid for by Turkey prior to February 5, 1975. And I favor this limited resumption only with the certain knowledge that in less than 90 days the Congress will have a full opportunity, when the Military Sales Act is before us, to review developments, particularly the status of negotiations with respect to Cyprus.

Again, Mr. Chairman, this is perhaps the most difficult vote that I have cast since coming to Congress more than 20 years ago. But I must vote my conscience on the basis of my perception of the national interest, on the basis of bringing relief to the 180,000 refugees on Cyprus and restoring stability there, and on the basis of preventing complete disintegration in the relationship between Greece and Turkey.

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Chairman, as the House prepares to decide whether or not to lift the embargo on military sales to Turkey, a fundamental point of U.S. foreign policy necessarily comes into question. In both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and, more recently, the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Congress has clearly provided that the sale of U.S. arms to foreign nations is contingent upon their use for defensive purposes only. The language of these laws is quite explicit; the Military Sales Act states that—

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold . . . solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . .

The question thus raised is, will the United States now simply accept Turkey's blatant violation of our restrictions on the use of our arms, or will we refuse to resume this cooperation with that country until such time as the provisions of the agreement are respected?

The actions of the 30,000 Turkish troops now occupying Cyprus, carried out through the use of plentiful American equipment, are hardly worthy of our support. The economy of the island is being destroyed, as the Turkish-controlled northern sector, which comprises 40 percent of the total land mass of Cyprus and includes 65 percent of the cultivable, produced 80 percent of the

island's industrial and farm products and accounted for 70 percent of the gross national product. Vandalism, murder, rape, and torture have become commonplace, while 180,000 Greek Cypriots have been made refugees. The Turks continue to exile Greeks from the land gained in last year's invasion, replacing them with their own people. Terrorism and the destruction of a way of life have resulted because U.S. arms were used for offensive purposes instead of "legitimate self-defense." If we now accept this violation of our laws and allow Turkey to complete her purchases of American arms, we will set a dangerous precedent for our foreign military sales throughout the world.

Supporters of the bill to end the embargo, H.R. 8454, have voiced their concern that by continuing our present policy we may alienate Turkey, weakening NATO and threatening agreements governing U.S. bases in that nation. What is being overlooked in the face of Turkish threats about these installations, is the importance of Greece in NATO and our bases, especially at Souda Bay in Crete, upon which the operations of the 6th Fleet depend. Greece has proved herself a valuable ally in the past, and deserves the same consideration as accorded Turkey; giving Turkey a free hand in the use of American war materials is clearly not in the best interests of Greece. We must be careful not to weaken our alliance with Greece in an overzealous effort to please Turkey. Both nations are essential to an effective NATO alliance.

The occupation of Cyprus by Turkish force and the atrocities being committed against the Greek Cypriots must end before we can consider resuming military sales to Turkey. Only through such a firm stand can we be sure that recipients of American arms will not be so fast to ignore U.S. restrictions in the future. At this point in the RECORD I include the following:

[FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 15, 1975]

FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE TURKISH INVASION

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Speaker, July 20, 1975, will mark the first anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. A full year has passed and the crisis in the eastern Mediterranean still lingers on. Suppressed under a Turkish occupation force that controls nearly half of the island, Cyprus is still capable of touching off a war between Greece and Turkey.

Since the invasion, brutal atrocities aimed at the Greek Cypriots have occurred throughout the island. The Turks have repeatedly inflicted immeasurable suffering on these citizens to the point of being able to make a reasonable comparison with the savage and violent inhumane crimes of the Second World War. Their takeover has affected all aspects of the Cypriots' lives from the economic stability of the island to the education of both high school and elementary students. Vandalism, rape, torture, and murder are among the tales of horror that occur each day as the heavily armed Turks move through Greek Cypriot mountain villages.

I have strongly opposed the aggressive action and unjustifiable behavior of the Turkish Government and occupying forces. I

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therefore call upon my colleagues in Congress to oppose all measures that will lift the ban on U.S. military assistance to Turkey until such time as Turkish forces are withdrawn from Cyprus and there is a negotiated settlement by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have decided to vote against this resolution lifting the embargo on our military sales and aid to Turkey after much soul searching.

What most persuaded me was concern about undermining the Caramilis government in Greece. It seems to me the administration has acted very badly and against the U.S. interests in Greece over the recent past. We instantaneously recognized the Greek military junta and continued actions which boosted their authenticity despite continued repressive actions on their part against the Greek people. We stood by in incredible silence as the Greek junta attempted to overthrow the Cyprus Government and assassinate Archbishop Makarios. Then, upon the failure of that plot and restoration of democratic government in Greece, we turn our backs on the Greeks, do nothing to assist a resolution of the desperate situation of the Greek refugees on Cyprus, and now proposed to resume military aid to Turkey despite the fact that the Turks have neither made nor promised any progress on Cyprus negotiations. I greatly feared that passage of this resolution might endanger the Greek democratic regime.

Also, I have a great distaste for yielding to Turkish blackmail efforts, threatening to kick us out of our military bases in Turkey if we did not resume aid without conditions. Yielding to these threats would have provoked similar threats throughout the world.

Lastly, resuming military aid to Turkey without any Turkish concessions on Cyprus would serve to undermine the credibility of the important conditions we attach to our sales of military equipment around the world. If we let Turkey off with just a slap on the wrist, no other country would take these limitations seriously.

I was singularly unimpressed by the national security arguments put forward by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and felt he once again badly misled us. Certainly his claim that we need a military installation on the Bosphorus Canal to be able to tell what Russian ships are passing through and what they are carrying is ludicrous. I have been there. The Bosphorus is so narrow that anyone can make these identifications from the shore without the necessity for any formal facility. Similarly, the other installations he described as essential defy credibility. Though they may be more convenient, the satellite pictures I have seen, so sharp you can read license plates on automobiles, certainly can provide the intelligence we need, and I understand there are other land-based facilities that can be used as well. This argument also neglects the importance of our Greek military installations that might have been jeopardized had we resumed arms to Turkey.

Indeed, one persuasive factor in making my decision was the lack of candor

with which I felt we were treated by both Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Kissinger on this subject.

In the last analysis, the Turks clearly violated the conditions of our provisions of arms to them. They invaded and occupied 40 percent of Cyprus using our weapons illegally and have grossly abused the Greek Cypriots since their occupation. They have been totally intransigent about settling the Cyprus dispute on any reasonable and acceptable basis. Under these conditions, and subject to the unconscionable threats to which they have subjected us, I just do not see adequate reason to reward this conduct in any way.

Furthermore, the relief offered in order to persuade the Turks to negotiate was totally open-ended in this legislation. Cash and credit sales were to be resumed without limit, the latter only subject to veto if in that act we were to decide to impose another embargo. This, it seems to me, represents serious overreaching by the administration, which appears in all cases to prefer peddling arms to any other diplomatic consideration. Indeed, our whole foreign policy seems based on provision of arms and nuclear sabre rattling, a matter which deeply disturbs me.

All in all, this seems to me to be a bill too fraught with inadequacies and dangers to be worthy of support on the outside chance it might induce Turkey to move toward meaningful Cyprus negotiations.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I voted on each of the occasions when the matter was before us previously to place a ban upon the sale of further military implements to the Government of Turkey. I did this because I felt very strongly that the Government of Turkey, under its previous administration, had clearly violated the terms of our military agreement by invading Cyprus.

While it unquestionably can be argued that the previous Government of Greece, under the military junta, also had violated these agreements by its invasion of Cyprus, this did not in my opinion justify our simply abandoning our long-standing policy of insisting that U.S.-supplied military equipment be used only for defensive purposes. This is the very cornerstone of our policy.

Subsequent events and the very urgent pleading of both the President and the Secretary of State have caused me to examine the present bill very carefully, and I believe it now may be timely to permit the limited and tentative resumption of our agreement with Turkey based upon the assurances and guarantees contained in this bill.

Since both Greece and Turkey have undergone changes in their governing administrations since the outbreak of hostilities on Cyprus, and since a settlement of the Cyprus dispute obviously has not been assisted by the hostile attitude which has developed between the United States and Turkey, I think it possible that a tentative relaxation of our total embargo conceivably might be productive of a peaceful settlement. Clearly our President and the Secretary of State believe that it could be.

At the same time, I want to make it absolutely clear that I am voting for this legislation only upon the guarantees contained in sections 2 and 3 of the bill before us.

Specifically, I am relying upon the absolute compliance with the language beginning on line 15 of page 2, as follows:

Provided, That such authorization shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied implements of war:

Further, in connection with any Presidential suspension of future embargoes, I am relying absolutely upon the clear provision contained in section 3, which appears in the bill beginning on Line 17 on Page 4, to wit:

Any such suspension shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

I want to make it clear that if the present Government of Turkey should fail in any degree to abide by these clear and unambiguous conditions, I shall vote to reinstitute the absolute ban upon the shipment of any goods to that country when the Military Assistance Act comes before us for renewal within the next few months.

My decision to support this tentative and partial lifting of the absolute embargo at this time is influenced by the pleading of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and their insistent belief that to do so is in the military interest of the United States and in the maintenance of vital U.S. defense installations in Turkey which presently provide our only means of monitoring Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements.

Since the hostilities of last year, both Greece and Turkey have new governments. Perhaps it is timely to let them both begin with fresh slates and a fresh opportunity to make peace on Cyprus, unimpeded by our understandable displeasure over actions of their predecessor governments.

But this willingness to give the new administration in Turkey an opportunity to demonstrate its good faith in negotiating an acceptable settlement on the Island of Cyprus and in a cessation of its aggressive activities on that island emphatically does not and should not justify us to surrender the basic and fundamental principal that military weapons and equipment purchased from this country must not be used for aggressive military adventurism or for offensive attacks on one's neighbors.

If these agreements are to any degree violated in the future, I shall have no hesitation whatever in voting to reimpose the ban.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the Clerk will now read the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress reaffirms the policy of the United States to seek to improve and harmonize relations

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among the allies of the United States and between the United States and its allies, in the interest of mutual defense and national security. In particular, the Congress recognizes the special contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance of Greece and Turkey by virtue of their geographic position on the southeastern flank of Europe and is prepared to assist in the modernization and strengthening of their respective armed forces.

The Congress further reaffirms the policy of the United States to alleviate the suffering of refugees and other victims of armed conflict and to foster and promote international efforts to ameliorate the conditions which prevent such persons from resuming normal and productive lives. The Congress, therefore, calls upon the President to encourage and to cooperate in the implementation of multilateral programs, under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or other appropriate international agencies, for the relief of and assistance to refugees and other persons disadvantaged by the hostilities on Cyprus.

Sec. 2. (a) In order that the purposes of this Act may be carried out without awaiting the enactment of foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1976 programs—

(1) the President is authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles and defense services with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under section 21 or section 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975, and to issue licenses for the transportation to the Government of Turkey of arms, ammunition, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto): *Provided*, That such authorization shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied implements of war; and

(2) the President is requested to initiate discussions with the Government of Greece to determine the most urgent needs of Greece for economic and military assistance.

(b) The President is directed to submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees of the Senate within sixty days after the enactment of this Act a report on discussions conducted under subsection (a) (2), together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for the fiscal year 1976.

Sec. 3. (a) Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out all after the word "Provided," and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and of section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act only with respect to sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, for the procurement of such defense articles and defense services as the President determines and certifies to the Congress are necessary in order to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Any such suspension shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied arms, ammunition, and implements of war."

(b) Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is further amended by designating the present subsection as paragraph (1) and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) The President shall submit to the Congress within sixty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding sixty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward

the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict."

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing (1) military assistance to Turkey under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or (2) sales, credits, or guaranties to or on behalf of Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales Act for the procurement of defense articles or defense services not determined by the President to be needed for the fulfillment of Turkey's North Atlantic Treaty Organization responsibilities.

(d) This section shall become effective only upon enactment of foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976.

Mr. MORGAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BUCHANAN

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BUCHANAN: Page 3, line 3, immediately before the period insert "pending a final settlement of the Cyprus refugee situation in the spirit of Security Council Resolution 361".

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I think this amendment simply clarifies the intent of the committee. I hope it can receive the approval of those on both sides of this issue in that it simply underlines our support of the Cyprus refugees and makes reference to the Security Council Resolution 361, which was passed on the 30th of August 1974 in their support.

The heart of this resolution is this:

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary General for the part he has played in bringing about talks of leaders of the two communities in Cyprus.

2. Warmly welcomes this development and calls upon those concerned therein to pursue the talks actively with the help of the Secretary General and in the interest of the Cypriot people as a whole.

3. Calls upon all parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering, to ensure the restoration of fundamental human rights for every person and to refrain from all actions likely to aggravate the situation.

4. Expresses its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus and urges the parties concerned, in conjunction with the Secretary General, to search for peaceful solutions of the problems of refugees and take appropriate measures to provide for their relief and welfare and to permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes in safety.

5. Requests the Secretary General to submit at the earliest possible opportunity a full report on the situation of the refugees and other persons referred to in Paragraph 4 of this resolution and decides to keep that situation under constant review.

6. Further requests the Secretary General to continue to provide emergency U.N. humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of the island in need of such assistance.

7. Calls upon all parties, as a demonstra-

tion of good faith, to take both individually and in cooperation with each other, all steps which may promote comprehensive and successful negotiations.

8. Reiterates its call to all parties to cooperate fully with UNICYP in carrying out this task.

9. Expresses conviction that the speedy implementation of the provisions of this resolution will assist in the achievement of a substantial settlement in Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, we agreed in the committee to this section concerning the refugees on Cyprus to indicate our Government's concern for them; but I would add these words to underline that we do not consider this a final solution. We do consider this something that must be addressed in the negotiations. It is simply an underlining of our support of the rights of the Cyprus refugees and I believe fulfills the intent of the committee which it can be important if this legislation does pass.

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

(Mr. BIESTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman's amendment. I think it is a clarification of the committee's intent. In emphasizing the plight of the refugees the gentleman points to the most serious human problem in this entire matter.

[Mr. BIESTER further addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I had read the gentleman's amendment earlier today. I have no serious objection to it, because I agree with the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BIESTER) that it reflects the committee's intent. I am for these refugees returning to their homes and a settlement on Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, the majority side has no objection to the amendment.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we also have reviewed the amendment. We think it improves the legislation and is consistent with our original objectives in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. BUCHANAN).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, we are coming close to the moment of truth, to a difficult decision for most; easy for some. But, I would be remiss if, at this point, I did not bring to the attention of the committee that the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) was responsible for the passage of the \$25 million appropriation for refugee relief which I introduced as an amendment earlier in the year. For without his support this amendment would not have passed. I understand the difficulty of his position, and I respect it. However, at that point we part.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the entire debate this afternoon and I, like others, have pondered over the merits of the relative positions. I resented in some measure the implication that a lobby was distasteful, that a lobby was something to be avoided. We live in the midst of lobbies every minute of the day. This time, it is different because it happens to be of Greek ancestry. Yet, we were conspicuously silent in the acknowledgment that we did have those of Turkish ancestry lobbying equally as vigorously.

Let me tell the Members about the difference. Each of them believed that they were right. In my judgment and in the judgment concurred in by this Congress early in the year by the enactment of the embargo, the Greek lobby has one thing going for it, and only one, but it is the most compelling reason and the most compelling element for my consideration, at least, and I am sure for other Members. That is simple justice.

Somehow, in this procedural undertaking this afternoon, in the very clinical approach to foreign affairs, we forget the impact of justice. Now, what the devil has happened on that island? Right or wrong, who precipitated it at this point becomes obscure even if we find justification for the Turks invading Cyprus. Can we then find justification for them ravaging Cyprus? Can we find justification for the ravaging of the women, the ransacking of homes, the confiscation of properties?

The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD) said early on, "How long do we punish them?" They took that initial action. That would be right if they went onto the island and left it, but Turkey went onto the island and has and still occupies 40 percent of this land with 70 percent of its industrial wealth. I agree with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) when he said that he does not contemplate that the Turks will ever withdraw from Cyprus. The original statement was made that they are there to stay, they intend to stay. We know the intricacies of foreign affairs and the conduct of the Secretary of State and the Department of State, whose record leaves a great deal to be desired. I am certain they will remain in Cyprus no matter what concessions are eventually made.

Nothing has changed. The gentleman from Florida said it. Nothing has changed. The law somehow becomes important with certain issues, with certain people, and with certain nations, but the double standard used here indicates that the law is not important with Cyprus.

Let me tell the Members what frightens me. I see it more and more across the world: the United States is being regarded more and more as a paper mache nation. Its integrity, its fortitude, its determination to remain dominant with integrity is diminished and very seriously eroded.

What if we do pass this resolution today? We will, in effect, be giving a signal to every other nation which benefits as a result of our Foreign Assistance Act to utilize as they will, if it suits their national interests best, those weapons to invade other lands. It is significant. We

never thought it would occur, but some people say it is happening. Well, it has happened here in Cyprus, we took action. If it is happening anywhere else, let us take action. This attitude of a double standard is what is perplexing to the American people and confusing to the Congress, and certainly should cease.

Mr. Chairman, I once again find myself rising to oppose the latest administration effort to thwart the will of Congress and resume arms shipments to the Government of Turkey. Their latest vehicle comes in the form of S. 846 which allows Turkey to be sent weapons and materials already purchased, as well as resume commercial sales. This legislation deserves to be soundly and swiftly defeated.

One year ago the island of Cyprus was brutally and illegally invaded by the Turkish Government. In the 12 months since the invasion, Cyprus has been devastated by Turkey and their occupation force. Even 1 full year later we find 40 percent of the island and 70 percent of all industrial and agricultural production controlled by Turkey. Yet even more significant is the fact that there are an estimated 200,000 refugees on the island typifying a deplorable example of human misery and suffering. We have attempted to assist and under an amendment I attached to the Foreign Assistance Act, Cyprus was given \$25 million in emergency aid.

Yet peace is far from being a reality in Cyprus. The administration claims that the embargo which the Congress imposed on February 5, has hardened Turkey's resolve to avoid taking steps for peace. The fact is, an overwhelming number of Members feel unequivocally that a cutoff of aid is the only way of convincing Turkey to work for peace on Cyprus. The embargo has not even had long enough time to be effective and already the administration is seeking to lift it.

On what grounds do they seek to do this. One of their main arguments is that Turkey has shown signs of wanting to resolve the Cyprus crisis. I have seen nothing to document this contention and in fact it was only after American initiative that meetings between high Greek and Turkish officials took place.

The only real issue we must concern ourselves is the restoration of peace. This cannot be done by allowing Turkey to obtain more arms, for all this will do is allow them to strengthen their hold on Cyprus. The embargo remains the one key to peace. If the administration and Turkey were so convinced that lifting the embargo would bring peace why then did they offer no assurances to Congress that they would consider the lifting of the embargo a catalyst for working for peace. I am sure that if these assurances were available, there would be a great deal more support for S. 846.

In addition, we cannot forget that we are dealing with an important legal principle. Turkey was and continues to be in strict violation of the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act. Every troop of Turkey on Cyprus is illegal, every offensive action they take is illegal. Do we now

vote for legislation which, in effect, condones the yearlong violations of Turkey in Cyprus. I cannot imagine anyone wanting to vote in this fashion, but I am sure there are some. Rejection of S. 846 will be a demonstration of both our support for peace on Cyprus and adherence to the conditions of articles of international law.

I have said on numerous occasions that the handling of the Cyprus crisis represented a sorry era in American foreign policy history. We in Congress sought to work at ending the conflicts and bringing peace to Cyprus. The administration is willing to prolong the misery and suffering which is exactly what will happen if we lift the embargo today. A lifting of the embargo without assurances that conditions will improve for the 200,000 refugees and others suffering on Cyprus would be a tragedy of profound significance. I want no part of such a vote, nor do my colleagues. A no vote is needed to preserve integrity and firmness in our foreign policy as well as offer a ray of hope for peace for the beleaguered people of Cyprus.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Now that we have come to the portion of the debate that has to do with the reading of the bill, I think it is important that we read some of the language very carefully, because the language of this bill is dangerous, and is the kind of language that has been dangerous to the Congress in years past.

On page 3, line 7, the bill says:

The President is authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles and defense services...

The words, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," really mean that we are being asked to repeal the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Foreign Assistance Act.

We should have learned from the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and from other resolutions never to vote for a bill that uses the words "notwithstanding any other provision of law," because that is the way in which we indirectly repeal legislation that we would not otherwise repeal if the legislation were specifically named.

But we have more dangerous provisions further down in that section on page 3.

It has been said by the gentlewoman from Maryland that what we are doing here is capitulating in Turkey, but if we read on line 15, where it says, "Provided, That such authorization shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. supplied implements of war," those words are not merely capitulation, they are ratification of an existing condition.

If we vote for this, we will be accepting the fact, we will have voted for the fact, that Turkey is permitted to occupy

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment which I propose has a single objective: It is to assure that the partial lifting of the embargo on arms to Turkey would not go into effect unless such action is determined by the President to be important to the national security of the United States.

Much has been said in this debate about the southeast flank of NATO and about the various military and intelligence bases which the United States has access to in Turkey.

Those bases, we were told, are important if the United States is to have the necessary flexibility to respond to any crisis in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, or in the eastern Mediterranean.

Those bases are also important if the United States is to have adequate means to monitor any arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. SALT II cannot come into effect, it has been said, if we cannot monitor Soviet arms and missile actions. The bases in Turkey are important to such monitoring.

Much of the information about the military intelligence situation in that part of the world is classified. The Congress is in no position to make some of the day-to-day determinations in that field. But the President can, and the President should.

The Congress, at its peril, I believe, acts as its own foreign minister. We do not belong in that business ordinarily. We do not belong in that business in this particular case, and the President can much better determine what action to take.

My amendment would allow the arms which Turkey purchased before the cutoff—before the embargo—to be delivered only if the President certifies to the Congress that such deliveries are important to our national security.

The same thing would apply to commercial sales.

Only the President has the information and intelligence necessary to make such a decision, and it should be his decision to make.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment is a perfecting amendment which allows even tighter or more sophisticated control of the present situation in Turkey.

Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would just like to state for the record that when I called for Secretary Kissinger's resignation, it was not because I was not invited to one of his breakfasts, but it was out of a profound belief that the people would be better served if Mr. Kissinger served somewhere else.

I say that since that point has been raised to me.

Mr. RYAN. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. JOHN L. BURTON) for making the point.

Whatever the gentleman's particular opinion is of Mr. Kissinger, this Con-

gress, acting as a body, is much less able to make determinations regarding compliance with congressional limitations on a day-to-day basis than is someone in the executive branch.

How well the State Department does its job is our prerogative to comment on, but we should not be doing those day-to-day evaluation ourselves.

[Mr. OTTINGER addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I listened to the explanation of the author of the amendment, but I am just wondering about this: Do I understand that the gentleman from California (Mr. RYAN) is putting the responsibility of making the determination upon the President of the United States and that before any of the \$185 million that is in the pipeline could move, there has to be a determination by the President of the United States that it is in the national security interest?

Mr. RYAN. The assumption of the Chairman is correct.

Mr. MORGAN. Do I understand, further, that this only pertains to section 2 of the bill?

Mr. RYAN. That is my understanding.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I see nothing really wrong with the amendment as far as this side of the aisle is concerned.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I would rise in support of the amendment.

I think the gentleman from California (Mr. RYAN) has improved the amendment, and we accept the amendment on this side.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. RYAN).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FRASER

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FRASER: Page 3, line 8, strike out "any other provision of law" and insert "section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961".

(Mr. FRASER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment clarifies the matter that was in contention a few minutes ago as to the meaning of the proviso, "any other provision of law." It would limit the waiver to only section 620(x) so that it could not be argued, if this amendment is adopted, that we are waiving other provisions of law which might open questions which would be of concern to many of us.

In my judgment the committee report is accurate with regard to the intention of the bill, but this amendment would simply assure that the intention stated in the report is, in fact, enacted into law.

So this is a clarifying amendment to remove the uncertainty that the gentleman from New York was concerned with. There is no need to have that uncertainty. Thus I think the amendment should be adopted, and I would hope the Members would support the amendment.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure the members of the Committee on International Relations are familiar with this discussion. This amendment was offered during the markup of this legislation by the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM). Because the phrase "Notwithstanding any other provision of law" is mentioned in the Foreign Assistance Act many, many times, the committee felt that this was not necessary. But if there are any Members who feel strongly about eliminating the provision "notwithstanding any other provision of law", this amendment would do it and spell out what we are talking about. If that is the wish of the House, then the majority has no objection to the amendment. But we want to make it clear that this does not negate the purposes of the bill as outlined in the legislation before us. The pipeline and commercial licenses could go forward under the amendment as the committee intended.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) feels that in accepting the amendment we are in any way doing anything that would jeopardize the original purpose of the bill so far as aid going to Turkey is concerned?

Mr. MORGAN. That is right; it would not jeopardize the aid going to Turkey.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, under those conditions, we on this side accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, the decision which faces the House today is difficult to make but easy to articulate.

If the President, the Secretary of State, and our Committee on International Relations are correct, a vote for this compromise bill will open the way for negotiations between Prime Minister Caramanlis of Greece and Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey, which negotiations the President has promised to push in his meetings with both Prime Ministers in Helsinki next week.

If the President, the Secretary of State and the committee are correct, then by voting in favor of the bill we will have done a great service for the Greek Cypriots.

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Cyprus, that Turkey is permitted to have our weapons on Cyprus, because we say that they will not be allowed to increase them. But that means that they are allowed to retain what they have there.

We say that they shall obey the cease-fire, which means we are voting to allow them to remain in 40 percent of Cyprus.

So this wording is dangerous because we are, in effect, ratifying what already has been done.

For these reasons, I think that we must oppose the bill.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I appreciate the gentleman's concern in pointing to the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," and I would like to give the gentleman my interpretation of it and point out one additional fact which I think changes the interpretation that the gentleman has given to that provision.

The authorization to complete the delivery of previous contracted-for goods, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," simply makes clear that existing statutes are not going to be an impediment to such delivery.

But the important thing is that Turkey is not relieved from its obligation under existing contracts and agreements which contain all the conditions on use and transfer and security of the U.S.-furnished arms required by U.S. aid policy.

So I do not think we are releasing Turkey from those obligations.

Mr. BADILLO. The gentleman has just confirmed what I said. The gentleman said all this means is that existing statutes shall not be an impediment to the delivery of arms. The existing statutes are section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act states that—

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the charter of the United Nations.

The gentleman is repealing that section by the words "notwithstanding any other provision of law."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman in the well is absolutely correct that those words "notwithstanding any other provision of law" for the first time repeals section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act and section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Mr. HAMILTON. If the gentleman will yield, the obligation of Turkey exists because of the existing contracts and

agreements that they sign when they get this equipment.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps we had better settle the controversy raised by my good friend, the gentleman from New York.

If the Members will take the committee report and turn to page 16, section 2, I am sure they will find a full description of the meaning of the words, "notwithstanding any other provision of law."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, what this does, if I may suggest this, is to say that the restrictions on Cyprus contained on lines 15 to 19 are still there. These words, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," waive all other existing laws as to this \$185 million. What it means is that Turkey could use these weapons, \$185 million worth of weapons, for aggressive purposes and not then be in violation of American law if they were used anywhere other than on Cyprus.

In other words, if they used them against Greece or against any other country, they would not be in violation of existing American law. That is exactly what it provides.

Mr. MORGAN. No, sir, they would be. The report says:

This permits deliveries to be made without regard to section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It should be emphasized, however, that the items to be delivered were purchased under contracts containing all of the assurances and undertakings required by applicable legislation.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, the words, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," are to me very self-explanatory. They waive all other provisions of law that would amount to a restraint or a constraint on this \$185 million worth of weapons.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I think it is terribly important to clarify this fact, because if in fact the restrictions on the use to which the \$185 million worth of weapons in the pipeline could be put which have been imposed by American law were removed from that phrase, then there might be a very good reason for voting against this legislation.

But in that regard I think there are two points to be made. The first is that the very same restrictions provided for in American law have already been written into the contracts which Turkey had signed at the time they purchased these weapons.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. But, if the gentleman from Pennsylvania will yield, any alteration in the law after that would nullify any other restrictions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, the restrictions had already been agreed to by Turkey when it signed the contracts. So

even if the gentleman's interpretation is correct with respect to the repeal of American law, the contractual obligations into which Turkey had entered would still be binding.

Second, I think it is very important to call the attention of the Members of the House to the language on page 16 of the committee report which goes directly to the question of legislative intent.

On page 16 the committee makes it very clear—and I am now quoting—that—

It is the committee's intention that these assurances and undertakings shall remain fully applicable.

Consequently, I do not think that there is any danger that the inclusion of this phrase, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," will result in a situation where the Turks are free to use these weapons for any purpose they want, because they are contractually prohibited from doing so, and the committee makes it clear they are not to be relieved of those obligations by virtue of this legislation.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

When I made my remarks, I want every Members here to understand that I did not get these provisions as the result of any obscure research; I got them from the committee report itself. The proper place to refer the Members is not page 16; it is page 20.

On page 20 the committee says:

Following are the relevant provisions of law associated with the Turkish aid ban.

The committee has said it. I am quoting their own words. They cannot now say this is not relevant.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York is quoting from the minority report, not from the majority report.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this cites section 3(c), and that is the section of the act we approved. That section says that anybody who uses defense articles or defense services in violation of the act shall be immediately ineligible for further aid at any time in the future.

That does not apply only to the minority report. That applies to Turkey. That applies to all countries. That is a section of the Foreign Military Sales Act.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. RYAN

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. RYAN: Page 3, line 19, after "war" insert the following:

"": Provided further, That the authorities contained in this section shall not become effective unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services, and the issuance of licenses for the transportation of implements of war, arms and ammunition under this section are important to the national security interests of the United States".

Less than 12 hours later there was an announcement made at a Presidential breakfast by the chairman of the committee and the President that a compromise had been worked out.

It seemed strange to me at that point that we had just that previous evening been brought into a dialogue about how important that compromise was and then within a very short period of time that compromise was laid out on the table and, in fact, was not a compromise at all. In fact, it gave to the Turkish Government everything that they had been asking for. It held very little back.

It was very much like having a dollar and compromising with someone who wants to steal that dollar by giving them 95 cents.

I think it is strange that the Administration has sought to orchestrate a compromise which, in fact, is not a compromise.

I think it is strange that the Turkish Government has employed American guns provided by American taxpayers to invade and occupy Cyprus. At this moment American guns are trained on Greek Cypriots and American bullets are being used to deny Cypriots their right of self-determination.

Mr. Chairman, today we will be voting on S. 846, a bill to lift the embargo on military assistance to Turkey which was imposed on February 5, 1975 in response to the use of American arms by Turkey in her invasion of Cyprus.

This legislation would allow the delivery of all military arms contracted for sale to Turkey up to the arms embargo and the renewed sale of arms from American manufacturers to Turkey. This legislation further provides for the eventual resumption of the sale of arms subsidized by our Government to Turkey so that the Turkish Government can buy on credit at lower interest rates.

I am firmly opposed to providing arms for the Government of Turkey. Providing aid to Turkey violates the principles of our foreign military assistance program, endangers world peace, and jeopardizes even our own domestic peace.

When President Truman proclaimed the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, he recognized the danger of Soviet aggression against our Greek and Turkish allies. Our military assistance has always been intended to be solely for the defense of our European allies against the aggression of other states.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act specifically state that U.S. military assistance is only available for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Why then should our President permit—let alone encourage—military assistance to Turkey in flagrant violation of the law?

Mr. Chairman, the Turkish Government warns us that if the U.S. Congress does not concede to their demands for arms, they will not permit American bases to remain on Turkish soil.

I know that this is a highly sensitive political issue and that these bases are

vital to our national security, but if we yield to Turkish extortion today, what demands will other governments who host American military facilities press on us tomorrow?

If our defense agreements require that our Government bribe tyrants and appease aggressors, then we are as corrupt as those we are quick to condemn.

Frankly, I do not believe the Turkish threats. Ordering the removal of American defense facilities would certainly squash all Turkey's future hopes of obtaining military aid from the United States. The weak Demirel government cannot afford to toss out their trump card so early in the game.

If we deny this aid, the Demirel government will try again to obtain American aid, and next time they may realize that they have to make concessions concerning Cyprus to demonstrate their good faith to our Government.

But if we grant this aid, U.S. personnel will most certainly be expelled from our Greek military installations, and our relations with our Greek allies will be irreparably damaged.

Moreover, restoring military aid to Turkey would seriously undermine the stability of the Greek Government. One of our country's most distinguished statesmen, former Under Secretary of State George Ball has stated that lifting the arms embargo to Turkey would have a "catastrophic" effect on the new democracy in Greece.

Will this Congress permit our defense agreements with our allies, which form a net against foreign aggression, to entangle us in endless acts of aggression between and among our allies? If so, then today's vote will begin the slow undoing of American power at the expense of our Nation's security.

Second, lifting the arms embargo to Turkey would jeopardize world peace.

There has been no progress in the peace negotiations. The Turks will not offer concessions to the Greeks. Yet the President insists that the Turks must be given more American arms before they will make peace.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have done nothing to compel the Turks to make peace. Since the arms embargo was imposed, the administration has continually assured the Turkish Government that the arms embargo would soon be lifted. Only 11 days after the ban became effective the administration proposed the repeal of the ban. Knowing this, why should the Turkish Government have felt compelled to make any concessions? The administration never gave the arms embargo a chance to succeed in forcing the Turkish Government to negotiate.

The President is responsible, therefore, for Turkey's intransigent attitude toward the peace settlement. The President's appeasement of the Turks may lead to still more fighting and bloodshed among the southern flank of NATO, if we concede to the repeal of the arms ban.

Finally, military aid to Turkey would condone the Turkish Government's unilateral breach of the 1971 agreement to terminate poppy growing. The Turkish Government has permitted the resump-

tion of poppy growing, extended it to three more provinces, and granted a general amnesty for all Turkish citizens previously convicted of drug traffic.

We cannot tolerate this violation of an international agreement, nor can we vote for military assistance to a government which is directly responsible for millions of dollars worth of illegal heroin traffic in the United States. My distinguished colleague from California, Mr. EDWARDS, has stated that at the present rate of heroin addiction there will be 1½ million addicts in the United States by 1980.

Section 2291 of title 22 of the United States Code provides for the suspension by the President of military and economic aid to any country which fails to take adequate measures to control illegal drug traffic. But the President will not exercise this authority. By voting to continue the arms embargo to Turkey, we will signal to that government that their poppy-growing policies will not be tolerated.

A vote to suspend the arms embargo is a vote against America's people, against our cities, our youth, and our future.

Mr. Chairman, to preserve the principles of our NATO defense pact, to restore peace to our Mediterranean allies, and to protect our Nation's cities from the scourge of heroin addiction, I urge my colleagues to vote against S. 846.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I think compromise is in order. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote down the committee bill, and force the administration and Congress to work out a compromise that makes sense and not the so-called compromise they offer in this position.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDGAR. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, of course, other compromises are possible, but I think the Members of the House ought to recall that the condition that we added to the bill which is now the law, that became effective in February, was itself a compromise, because we said that we would suspend the operation of our law if the President certified that there was substantial progress in the negotiations for a settlement on Cyprus. In other words, we were willing to waive the provisions of our law, not for final settlement, but just substantial progress. But there has been no substantial progress.

Now, I attended one of the White House breakfasts. I have been searching my soul ever since to figure out the right thing to do here. Each time I come out at the same place as before. We are asked to give up on two principles; one, that we will not be blackmailed by every country that has our bases; second, that we will give or sell arms only to be used for defense. All we get in return for abandonment of these principles is the President's assurance that Mr. Demirel will negotiate. But they have already been negotiating. When I asked what is the difference between what they have been doing and what they have said they would do I was told, "Well they have not been seriously negotiating."

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If, Mr. Chairman, the President, the Secretary of State and the committee are wrong, then the Congress can reimpose the embargo in October or November when the Congress must act on the Foreign Military Sales Act. Such reimposition of the embargo will have my full and total support.

On five separate occasions last year I voted in favor of the embargo against Turkey. The club of embargo has not worked. Let us now on a short term, limited basis try the velvet glove. I think there is a reasonable chance for success because of the change in governments of both countries since the invasion of Cyprus. Prime Minister Caramanlis was elected after the invasion of Cyprus; Prime Minister Demirel came to office this year. We are not dealing with Prime Minister Ecevit, who was Prime Minister at the time of the invasion of Cyprus.

I know that Greece wants a peaceful settlement on Cyprus. I believe that Prime Minister Demirel would like a peaceful settlement if he can do so without adverse political repercussions in his own country.

I believe that a peaceful settlement of the dispute between our two NATO allies is not only in their best interest, but also in the best interests of the United States.

I believe that enactment of this bill today will enhance the chances of this much to be desired outcome.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The difficulty with reimposition of an embargo is that it is subject to presidential veto. At the breakfast we attended with the President, he refused to commit himself not to veto the bill. So is that not elusive?

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. The gentleman from Pennsylvania and the chairman cannot tie this reimposition to a nonvetoable bill. If he does, he will not have the continued respect that I expect to have for him.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORGAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Of course, the Foreign Military Sales Act is a total package, and I do not believe there will be any veto of that bill. If there is a veto, I imagine it will be overridden in this body.

Mr. OTTINGER. If the gentleman will yield further, that bill has not even been passed.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GOODLING

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GOODLING: Page 3, strike out line 20 through line 23 and insert in lieu thereof:

"(2) the President is requested to initiate

discussions with the Government of Greece to determine the most urgent need of Greece for economic and military assistance and in such discussions the President shall express the sense of the Congress that if Turkey has withdrawn all Turkish forces from Cyprus, no additional military assistance shall be provided to Greece until all Greek military forces are withdrawn from Cyprus.

In exercising the authority granted by paragraph (1), the President shall take steps to insure that the percentage, on a dollar value basis, of the defense articles and defense services authorized to be furnished by paragraph (1) which have been delivered to Turkey at any given time does not exceed significantly the percentage by which the Turkish forces which are on Cyprus on the date of enactment of this section have been reduced prior to such time."

(Mr. GOODLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I have a slight problem with the resolution or the act as it is presented. I have been lobbied by all of the Greek forces and all the Turkish forces, the White House, the Department of State, the committee, and other Members of Congress.

If it is appeasement we are talking about, then I am concerned about Chamberlain going in that direction and we had World War II. If it is fear we are talking about, I am concerned because we feared China and Russia and therefore extended the Southeast Asia conflict for years and years when it could have been ended quickly.

This resolution is intended to demilitarize Cyprus by allowing Turkey to receive arms already purchased and in the pipeline contingent upon the removal of Turkish forces in a directly proportional plan. For example, if Turkey removed 25 percent of its troops in a month, I would receive 25 percent of the armaments authorized. This amendment also provides if Turkey withdraws its forces from the island Greece must do likewise. If Greece fails to remove its troops, now numbering 1,200, and depending on who one talks to one can get different numbers, further assistance would be denied Greece.

I believe such treatment would be evenhanded to both Greece and Turkey and more importantly to Cyprus.

Demilitarization of Cyprus would be a necessary first step in achieving settlement whereby the Cypriots could best determine their own future. My worry and concern is that somewhere along the line we have given up that right of self-determination and I think it is that right of self-determination which separates America from most other countries in this world.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. GOODLING. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Chairman, I am interested in what this amendment says. I want to be sure I understand it. The gentleman says in this amendment for instance that if the Turks were to withdraw 10,000 troops, which would be approximately 30 percent of what they have now on the island, that then they would

be eligible for 30 percent of what is in the pipeline for them as far as military supplies?

Mr. GOODLING. That is correct.

Mr. PEYSER. And then the Greeks on the island would have to remove 30 percent of their troops. In other words this will keep the ratios equal as they go along on all accounts?

Mr. GOODLING. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

First of all the amendment is unrealistic. It seeks to dictate one of the terms of the agreement for a Cyprus solution. Obviously neither the Greek nor the Turkish troops will withdraw while troops of the other country remain. The objectives of this amendment could be achieved only if the parties agreed to a simultaneous and complete withdrawal as part of an agreement. Under the 1960 arrangement both Greece and Turkey are permitted to maintain small garrisons on Cyprus and the troops of both nations have been present there since 1960. It is extremely unlikely, in view of the past history, the existing agreement, and present tensions that a complete withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops would take place in the near future under any foreseeable settlement agreement.

The bill is intended to promote a favorable climate for negotiations and encourage an early negotiated solution. But Congress cannot dictate what the terms of an agreement between the Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot parties should be. U.S. assistance should not be conditioned upon the inclusion of specific terms in the agreement. Moreover, the terms contemplated by this amendment—immediate withdrawal of all forces by both sides—are most unlikely. The amendment would not be effective in determining the provisions of the settlement agreement. It would only produce resentment and diminish U.S. influence with all parties.

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. EDGAR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I hope not to take the full 5 minutes.

I stand not only in opposition to the amendment, but also in opposition to the committee bill.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the issue here at stake is the issue of action involving what our foreign policy should be toward Turkey, toward Greece and toward Cyprus. I think one of the major words in that action should be the word "compromise."

I was pleased a few weeks ago with the briefing that was held in the State Department with Henry Kissinger. I think he shared honestly with us the political situation in Turkey and his perception of the importance of the bases in Turkey. At that time he leaned in the direction of compromise.

I know some of my colleagues stood and asked precise questions of Mr. Kissinger. Those questions dealt with the consideration of compromise and how that compromise might be worked out.

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In other words, there has been no substantial progress. So the President was quite right not to sign any such certification.

Let us have a compromise. Let us have a commitment, maybe not a public commitment, but a private assurance, if necessary, that Mr. Demirel's government will withdraw unilaterally from the land they occupied in violation of the U.N. cease-fire line. Then the President can make the certification and we will not have to go through this exercise.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. MOFFETT).

Mr. MOFFETT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. EDGAR).

I was most pleased that the gentleman mentioned the meeting that the new Members had with Secretary of State Kissinger. It is important to point out there has been an effort, not only from us, but from many Members on both sides of the aisle, to compromise, to adopt a conciliatory attitude in this matter. I think the resolution, with all due respect to the committee, simply does not reflect that.

Yet, the resolution, with all due respect to the committee, simply does not reflect that.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GOODLING). As another Member has said, this amendment is unrealistic and misguided. Under the Zurich Treaty, Greece has the right to have 950 troops on Cyprus. Under the same agreement, Turkey has the right to have 650 troops.

They must be there, because if we follow the Goodling plan and adopt the Goodling amendment, neither country would have any military forces on Cyprus and we could see the worst bang-up fight we ever saw in our lives, and more people could get killed than perished in the Turkish invasion. This is an amendment that the committee should not accept. It is an amendment that even King Solomon would have difficulties applying, and I think it would be tragic for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I do not intend to get into a discussion of the merits or demerits of the proposal before us. I just want to talk to the Members for a little bit.

In all my years, whenever an issue came up, I tried to use what I thought was my best judgment, measuring it from all the angles. In the first five votes on this question, I voted for the arms embargo on Turkey, my best judgment of the situation at the time. It was said I voted for the Greeks; if so, I thought they were right at the time.

In recent days, I have had some in-house conversations with some Members, and I looked at it from another view on the basis of what information they gave me. I have always had a very fine relationship with the Greeks and Italians, Irish, Jews and all my neighbors, but I

never considered them as ethnic groups, coming from an ethnic group myself that has never in its history in my area of the country formed a pressure group based upon its ethnic background. I think my Greek friends are American as I believe myself to be.

What happened last evening and this morning came at a very bad time. I just happened to be reading an article in the paper that was laying on my desk, which was about ethnic pressure and lobbyists getting into foreign policy. It was very interesting. I did not realize how significant it was until one of my girls came in. She was in tears and said that she just could not take it any longer. She was getting telephone calls, and as fast as she would hang the phone up, she would get another one, and the language was rather abusive in some cases.

One would think that I had never done a favor for anybody of Greek extraction. In the 43 years of being a legislator I thought I was their friend when they came with problems I could help with. All of a sudden someone calls my district and tells them that they heard I was going to vote for what would now be called the Turkish position. I had never voted that way before, so whoever called must have had some information I myself did not possess at that moment.

I told the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) that I was going to vote against him on the proposal until I heard some very disturbing things, and I questioned the gentleman from Pennsylvania. He sincerely believes that it is for the welfare of my country and his and that of all the people. It seems the only thing to do to break a stalemate on Cyprus I had decided to vote, not for the Turks or against the Greeks, but for what I think is best for my country.

I do not like to be intimidated. I do not like to be called foul names, and I do not like my girls to hear threats. It is not necessary and does no one any good.

Mr. Chairman, at the proper time I am going to ask permission to revise and extend my remarks to put this article in the Record. It came at a moment which caused me to stop and think.

It is time we quit, voting on the basis of our ethnic, color, or religious beliefs. That should be relegated to the long dead past.

These divisions are destroying the whole legislative process.

I would like to read Kevin P. Phillips' article on "Ethnic Lobbyists":

MEDITERRANEAN—ETHNIC LOBBYISTS DIG IN
FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
(By Kevin P. Phillips)

There is a longstanding concept that the United States is the richer for being an ethnic meltingpot—a nation of strength through diversity.

In recent years, it has become apparent that the meltingpot is an illusion, and that ethnic identity is not only persisting but taking on renewed importance. Unfortunately, this same trend carries over to the international sphere. More than at any time since World War II, ethnicity is a major factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

Consider the Eastern Mediterranean. It is probably one of the most volatile and strategic

areas in the world, but our policymakers cannot pursue national interests without first fighting their way through powerful ethnic lobbies—notably Greek and Jewish—whose interests are more parochial than those of the United States.

Time Magazine recently ran an instructive piece on the "Greek Lobby" captained by Democratic Congressman John Brademas of Indiana and ex-GOP Treasury Department official Eugene Rossides. Washington representative of the American-Hellenic Institute. Angry at Turkish activities in Cyprus, the Greek Lobby is trying to convince Congress to maintain the ban on arms to Turkey. In response, the Turkish government—if the U.S. does continue the arms embargo—may close U.S. military bases that Washington considers vital. When the votes in Congress are counted, what happens to American interests in Turkey may depend less on strategic considerations than on the maneuverings of the Greek lobby.

Only a few hundred miles away, a kindred situation prevails with regard to Israel and the Arabs. American policy is strongly affected by the influence and power of the U.S. Jewish community. Back in 1973, before he retired from the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright appeared on the program "Meet the Press" and was asked if under certain circumstances, the United States might not be wise to cut off aid to Israel. Fulbright said "Yes, but the United States Government is not capable of doing that, because the Israelis control the policy of the Congress and the Senate . . . the emotional and political ties are too strong. I have witnessed that. I can speak from my own experience in the Senate." In November, 1974, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz ran a detailed article on the operations of the Washington lobby—the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. Said Haaretz: "The office looks like an operational center. The walls are covered with maps, a board and different signs; this enables those in the office to know the status of every bill or amendment brought to debate in both Houses of Congress."

Here it is appropriate to note, however, that ethnic debate is not so one-sided as in the Greek-Turkish conflict. There are hardly any Turkish-Americans (and the Washington Turkish lobby is non-existent), but the Arab lobby in Washington is growing. Officials of the National Association of Arab-Americans met with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger several weeks ago.

Looking westward from Israel, one can find several other American ethnic influences on foreign policy. Take the case of Portugal, where the mid-Atlantic Azores Islands are totally out of sympathy with the Communist-tilted Lisbon regime. There is a big U.S. Air Force base in the Azores, and most Azoreans have relatives in the United States—as many people of Portuguese-Azorean descent live in Massachusetts and Rhode Island as in the islands themselves. Not surprisingly, there has been talk among Azorean islanders of seceding from Portugal and attaching themselves to the United States. Azorean-Americans in New England have picked up this idea, and the U.S. State Department is understandably nervous that such speculation might upset Portugal.

Some of the ethnicity in U.S. foreign policy is benign like the recent visit to Norway of Senators Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale, both of Norwegian descent. But in Mediterranean policymaking, ethnic lobby operations are something less than a boon to clear-minded pursuit of American interests.

That is why I sincerely sought language in grammar school, because I know, from my own life, that it is a serious matter and one that we had better

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take a look at. I wish the Members would read it in the RECORD.

It has not strengthened my resolve to vote the way I am going to vote, but it is a matter that is so serious to my principles, because I believe that we should disengage ourselves from addressing Americans as Greeks, Italians, Jews, or Irish, and we should not go back to the days of the early 1930's and live through that type of thing.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, unlike other speakers who have referred to the earlier votes on the cutoff of aid to Turkey and have now looked at it retrospectively as a mistake, I think it was the right thing to do at that time. Mr. Sisco told the Turkish Government at the time the Cyprus crisis was in progress that if the Turkish Government went too far, a likely reaction would be an aid cutoff by Congress.

So when we cut off the aid, in effect we were reinforcing the diplomacy of the executive branch.

I supported the aid cutoff because it seemed to me it did give some force and vitality to the American law which said that our weapons shall not be used for offensive purposes.

The bill in front of us does not restore the aid. The bill in front of us is a partial restoration only for pipeline aid, but no new sales are authorized, and the pipeline aid attributed to grant aid is withheld completely. In my view, one can have a good argument either for or against the bill without any difficulty. The central issue, in my judgment, centers on the welfare of the refugees on Cyprus and the problems facing both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. They are at the center of this controversy and it is their welfare that should be our concern.

In my view, the United States is one now of three parties, the United States, Greece and Turkey, and we are the ones who can show that we are not frozen in cement. We are the ones who are somewhat removed from the emotions of the controversy and can indicate some modest movement, in the hope of getting negotiations started.

I am not optimistic the negotiations will start if we pass this bill, but I am reasonably convinced that if we fail to pass the bill there will be no help to the refugees of Cyprus and no movement toward a resolution of the political problem, and this is what concerns me very deeply.

George Ball testified before our committee against the bill when it was in the committee. He said that we have to uphold the American law that forbids the use of American weapons for offensive purposes. But he said the United States should do something. He said the United States should move, we should not remain fixed and frozen.

I called him yesterday and I asked him what his view was of the committee bill after we had amended it so that no new sales would be permitted until after the authorization bill is passed this fall. He said that, in his view, it would be wiser to pass the bill in the amended form than to kill it.

I refer to George Ball for two reasons. One is that, in my judgment, throughout the past decade his wisdom on foreign policy has been demonstrated to be considerably greater than that of many other people who seek to advise us.

He was right on Vietnam from the beginning. He was one of the very few who were right from the beginning.

He was also against this bill in its earlier form, but he now thinks we should pass it because of the added provisions which the committee has adopted.

Let me add that the military aid is not a significant factor in the military balance. Greece has over \$600 million in the pipeline. That is money which is flowing to Greece today. Greece continues to be eligible for new sales every day. The pipeline amount we would release for Turkey is one-third of the pipeline amount currently available to Greece, and no new sales are available until we take a second look at this problem later in the fall.

Mr. Chairman, let us consider as the principal problem the welfare of the Cypriots, both the Greeks and the Turks, and let us recognize that we are the only one of the three parties that can show a modest degree of movement on this issue—the same kind of movement we have asked of Israel, the same kind of movement we asked of Egypt, and the same kind of movement we asked of Syria. We ask this of other countries in the Middle East and elsewhere; we ask them to show movement when it comes to these political problems.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we can now show some movement of our own.

Mr. RUSSO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. RUSSO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RUSSO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to S. 846. In February of this year we imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Turkey because a principle and a rule of law was violated.

Let us look at history since February 5 of this year. What reason can we give our constituents and the American people for us to change our position on this matter? Why should we change our stand now? What has Turkey done to prove its good faith to justify such a change now?

I will tell the members what they have done. They have brought in Turkish citizens to increase their population on Cyprus in order to later justify holding 40 percent of that island. They have grown poppies in the section which is occupied by the Turkish army. They are circulating Turkish money, and operating on Turkish time in the occupied section. In addition, they are oppressing 200,000 refugees. That is what they have done since February 5 of this year.

So now it is suggested we go to the American people and tell them that the Congress in all its wisdom, based on all the things we have seen since February 5, is now going to reverse its stand and principles and the rule of law.

What kind of precedents are we going to set in this Congress today if any country, no matter how large or no matter

how small, can blackmail the United States by saying, "We are going to take away your bases if you do not do what we want"?

I asked the President and I asked the Secretary of State:

What assurances do we have that if we give them the arms, 6 months from now they will not still be violating this agreement and they will not still be suppressing the population of Cyprus?

And he said:

Well, you know you can just change the law. You can reimpose the embargo.

Mr. Chairman, let me tell the members what will happen 6 months from now if we do that. They can still take away our bases. So what have we accomplished at the end of 6 months? We will have destroyed our image throughout the world; we will have destroyed our prestige and our standing in the world.

We have had the experience of what has happened in Vietnam, and now it is proposed that we cave in to foreign pressure once again. We will see other countries imposing this will on us by blackmailing us with the threat of closing our bases.

The Turks say that they want some sign from the United States. We have given them a great sign. The Senate has passed the raising of the embargo.

What else do they need? All we ask is that they show us some good faith—just some. They do not want just a little give-and-take on their part; they want the entire ball of wax. They say, "Either it is our way or no way."

The gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES) asked:

What does this do to America? I will tell the minority leader what this does to America. It makes us succumb to blackmail; it compromises our position in the world.

The gentleman from Arizona agrees with certain statements that were made that the Turks had a right to move in. I may not agree with him, but I will give him the benefit of the argument and say that maybe in the initial stages they had some reason to move in.

But why was it necessary to take over 40 percent of the island—using U.S. arms and U.S. military equipment in doing so. There was no need for that aggression.

So, Mr. Chairman, I will just re-emphasize to my colleagues of the House that this is a question of law, this is a question of principle. These are the things we ought to be voting on here. This is not a Greek question or a Turkish question. It is a question of principle of law, a question of what this Government stands for.

I urge that the House defeat S. 846.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether we can dispose of the amendment. I think it is a good one. I do not think anybody is objecting to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from Pennsylvania making a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. MORGAN. I am, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur right now on the Goodling amendment and all amendments thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection

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to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GOODLING).

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. HAYS of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reply to some parts of the speech made by my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Russo).

In the beginning, let me say that I have been expecting a poppy to sprout on the floor here all day, and finally one did.

There is not a scintilla of evidence that I have been able to find anywhere at all that the Turks have grown one poppy on Cyprus that was not already an ornamental flower in somebody's front yard. In fact, Cyprus does not have the right climate for poppies.

However, while I am on the subject of poppies, as we know, the Turks banned their farmers, who have been growing them for years, from growing them for 2 years. The farmers are a very peculiar breed. They are like the American farmer. They do not want to be told what they can grow and cannot grow.

There was a big political uproar about it. I brought this matter up with Turkish Government officials, and they said:

We quit growing poppies, but your drug problem just kept going on. They grew more in Thailand, to whom you are giving arms and aid. They grew more in Latin America, to whom you are giving arms and aid. We don't understand your problem, really.

I said:

What do you mean, that you do not understand it?

They said:

We do not have any drug problem in Turkey.

I said:

How do you handle it?

They said:

Anybody who is caught with heroin or opium on his person and does not have it through a doctor's prescription gets 25 years in the slammer, and there is no time off for good behavior.

If any Member thinks that that is not a deterrent, let me take him for a look inside of one of the Turkish jails.

Members of the House, that makes a lot of sense.

What happens to a pusher in this country, up in New York or out in Ohio, in my State?

The gentleman from New York (Mr. KOCH) said that they do not have any, but I do not think he has been there lately. I know that he goes home every week, so there has to be some discrepancy somewhere.

Anyhow, they make an arrest of a pusher. He gets a good lawyer and gets out on bail. He makes enough to pay the lawyer while out on bail. They get a continuance. They get another continu-

ance, and they get another continuance. Finally, they get a suspended sentence.

That is about what happens, and we are not going to solve the drug problem by trying to shift it over to the Turks. In no way are we going to do that. Therefore, I do not think that that is really an issue.

Mr. Chairman, many times the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) and I have disagreed vehemently about things, but I want to associate myself with his statement that the key thing out there is the same thing that has been the key to the festering situation in the Middle East for 25 years. The thing we ought to be thinking about is those 120,000, 140,000, or 160,000—depending upon whose figures one takes—Cypriot refugees.

As the gentleman from Minnesota said, we are about the only party that is not frozen in concrete and who can make a small gesture to try to get negotiations started. I am a little more sanguine than he is that we will get them started, but I am not blatantly optimistic. However, for 5 months nothing has happened.

If we go on in this way for another year, nothing more will happen, and in another year the problem just gets worse.

George Ball and Cyrus Vance suggested a 3-month lifting of the ceiling, and that would be kind of offensive to the Turks and would be putting them under the gun for 3 months again, but that is, in effect, what this bill is doing.

It is a suspension. But let me add that the whole arms sales agreement will expire at the end of this month, and unless it is renewed nobody will be able to buy any arms or get anything on credit, or anything else. So we will have a chance in October to take another look at this. If there has not been any movement by that time then we may want to decide to do something. But right now I think this is the one thing that will give the present Prime Minister of Turkey—and please remember, this is not the same man who was the Prime Minister when the invasion of Cyprus occurred, and he is not the same man who took the extra territory.

I think this will give him a little flexibility to go to his people and say, "The Americans have broken the stalemate, I am going to make a concession."

I believe that he will do that, and I think he can do it.

But at the moment, Mr. Chairman, I submit that he is getting the same arguments that we are getting here today, only in reverse. The former Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Excevit, is running all over Turkey saying:

I'm the hero of Cyprus. I'm the one who rescued the Turks from the Greek barbarians.

I do not agree with that, but that is what he is saying. And he is saying:

And now the bum wants to give it away. And why is he giving it away? Because the Americans are threatening him that if he doesn't do it he can't have any more arms. They are blackmailing him.

He is using the same language.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HAYS of

Ohio was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. So, Mr. Chairman, the people over there in Turkey are saying the same thing in reverse that the Members on the floor are saying here today, that he is yielding to blackmail.

I am a pragmatic enough politician to think we have got to give the present Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Demirel, some maneuver room.

I do not know how familiar the Members are with the Turkish Constitution, but the former Prime Minister, Mr. Excevit, evidently was not familiar with it at all. He resigned in the expectation that there would be a new election, and he would get an overwhelming mandate as the hero of Cyprus. He had not read the new Constitution that says that sure, you can go ahead and resign, but before there can be a new election a majority of the Parliament has to vote for it. And he did not have a majority.

So then Mr. Demirel, the leader of the opposition party, was able to put together a coalition.

So I just wanted to inform the Members that this is not the old Government of Turkey that did the deed, this is a new government. It is just the same as the fact that we cannot blame the next administration for the sins of Watergate. So it is an analogous situation and a comparable situation.

Mr. Chairman, I think we have it within our grasp today to make a move that may well get the negotiations started so that we can get a majority of these refugees back home again and really get some progress made. I think this is in the interest of the United States, I think it is in the interest of Turkey, and I think the bottom line is it is in the interest of Greece.

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. LEVITAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Chairman, I hope that soon we will be able to proceed with a vote on this bill, on the merits of this bill, without regard to the possible amendments that might have been offered, one of which I had hoped to offer as an effort to find a means of compromise. But after evaluating the possibilities available to us it seems to me that the most advantageous approach to take is to determine whether this is, in fact, a compromise that we are considering, and if we reject it, then move to a position which would in fact be a true compromise.

The Turks have been valiant and strong allies of the American people. The ties of friendship with the Greek nation have also been strong with the United States.

This is not a Greek or a Turkish issue, it is an American issue, Mr. Chairman.

One of the things that has disturbed me and apparently has disturbed other Members of this House, is that over the last number of years there has been a tendency to show greater and greater demonstrations of America's weakness and vacillation both in our domestic and in our foreign policies.

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This is another example of what we are about to do should this bill be enacted. We say and do one thing. We take one position, and then when somebody around the world says, "Boo!" to us, we cower, reverse our position, and go off in another direction.

If we lose our credibility and back off of the position that was taken for good reason earlier by this Congress and this Nation, then I say to the Members that other nations around the world will have sufficient justification to do the same thing in the future, and there will be no assurance that we will ever have a credible foreign policy established.

On June 23, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of State, speaking at Atlanta, Ga., said this:

No country should imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with us. Any ally whose perception of its national interest changes will find us prepared to adapt or end our treaty relationship. No ally can pressure us by a threat of termination; we will not accept that its security is more important to us than it is to itself.

Those are very persuasive words by the Secretary of State. He convinced me, and he convinced millions of Americans, but he seemed to fail to convince himself about this same principle, because after making that statement on June 23, he has brought to this House a bill which is a retreat, which is a backdown in the face of blackmail for the reasons that he rejected on June 23.

I had prepared an amendment to offer which I think would have been a good compromise, Mr. Chairman. It would have provided that the arms which are in storage and which have been paid for could be immediately delivered, but the rest would be deferred until September 30 of this year to see whether any movement toward a Cyprus solution took place.

Then, at the breakfast the other day at the White House, I had the occasion to ask a question of the President, who had said that if the Congress did not think that this bill and its concessions were working out well, then Congress could reimpose the embargo. That was the substance of the words of the President. I said:

Mr. President, if we should permit this embargo to be lifted and arms to be sold, and those arms were misused, or there were no substantial gestures made to resolve the Cyprus issue, what assurances would we in America and Congress have that something could be done about it, because the same bases and the same installations would still be held hostage in Turkey and still vital and still the subject of threat? What, then, would we be able to say? What would we be able to do about it?

I said:

Mr. President, would you give me and the other Members of Congress your assurance that if the embargo were reimposed by an act of Congress—as you said we could—adopted by a majority of the Congress, that you would not veto it and thereby shift the numbers game from a majority in Congress to a two-thirds majority? We are all familiar, Mr. President, with the consequences of that shifting majority.

The President said:

I cannot give you that assurance.

That was the substance of his response. I say to the Members, Mr. Chairman, if we cannot get that minimum assurance from the President that he would not frustrate the will of the majority of Congress about reimposing an embargo, then it becomes absolutely necessary for this bill to be defeated, and then immediately for us in Congress, together with the President, to move to a real, meaningful, and viable compromise so that the Turkish nation can have some flexibility and some moving room. But this Nation will not be blackmailed into retreat.

We are told that Turkish people are proud and will not be coerced. The present embargo is not a coercion. It was merely the carrying out of the provisions of our law. I would like to see this Congress pass a bill that would be a meaningful compromise. This bill is not. It is a surrender under threat. Americans, like our Turkish friends, are proud and strong people as well. Our weakness and vacillation would lead only to greater loss of credibility of our determination and ability to be credible. We will not be blackmailed into retreat.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. RIEGLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. AMBRO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIEGLE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. AMBRO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

(Mr. AMBRO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. AMBRO. Mr. Chairman, today, we are being asked to cast a vote in favor of resuming the granting and the sale of military equipment to Turkey. It is indeed ironic that we are being asked to take this action nearly a year to the day after that infamous Sunday—July 20, 1974—when the Turkish armed forces violated international and U.S. law by using American arms to invade the Island of Cyprus. As a result of this, and of the continued failure of our diplomatic efforts to bring about a resolution of this crisis, the Congress, in December 1974, attached a provision to the Foreign Assistance Act which had the effect of embargoing all further sales and shipments of military equipment to Turkey.

Since September, when the Congress first expressed its concern over these violations by means of mandating a cutoff of arms shipments, the administration has mounted a well-orchestrated public relations campaign aimed at reversing this policy. At times the campaign has been carried out by means which are unprincipled and of dubious legality. Thus, we have been treated to the spectacle of the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey appearing on a morning news program—CBS—and acting as a lobbyist for the Government of Turkey, urging the resumption of military aid. In addition, the integrity and patriotism of the ad-

ministration's opponents, both within and without Congress, has been impugned, and it has attributed the strength of its opposition to "ethnic politics." I resent this as an attempt to demean those who stand for an international posture on the part of our Nation that opposes aggression, whether by friend or foe. To do otherwise would be a betrayal of a fundamental principle of our foreign policy—to oppose aggression, not aid or acquiesce in it.

Unfortunately the leadership of our State Department is less concerned with principles than it is with displaying its dazzling diplomatic footwork on the world stage. Perhaps, we should borrow a quotation from a statement issued on July 20 by Adm. E. R. Zumwalt, retired Chief of Naval Operations, that "peace is too complicated to be entrusted to any single diplomat." Surely, the Secretary of State has not shown, in this recent lobbying attempt, that he understands the subtleties and complexities of waging a peace. In fact, I suspect that the attitude of the administration is the direct cause of Turkish intransigence.

Mr. Chairman, I am strongly opposed to the resumption of American military sales and aid to the Turkish Government while that Government refuses to abandon the aggressive posture it has assumed with respect to the island of Cyprus. We are told, in favor of ending the embargo, that we cannot expect Turkey to negotiate under the cover of our ultimatum. At the same time, we are treated to the Turkish Government's threats to terminate our military bases, if we do not resume the arms shipments.

I find this to be an interesting and rather tortured piece of foreign policy logic: Do not expect Turkey to succumb to threats, but we must give in, because we are being threatened. I suggest that this kind of capitulation to blackmail is unworthy of our country, and I reject it.

It is my strong feeling that the ban on future American arms to Turkey is not an "ethnic" and certainly not a Greek issue. It is a matter of fundamental American policy. S. 846 ill serves our longrun interests, and it is simply wrong in terms of morality, our traditions, our longrun interests as a civilized nation, and I rise to express my opposition to it.

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman. I want to address my remarks, if I may, to anyone who is left in the Chamber who has not made a final judgment on this issue, because I think it is an issue that could be argued both ways. But I think there are a number of basic reasons that ought to lead one, whose mind is still open, to decide to vote against the lifting of this embargo.

I think one of the points that is important is the one just made by the gentleman from Georgia, and that is that he was unable in direct conversation at the White House with the President to secure a commitment that we could have a good-faith implementation by the executive branch of a move by this Congress later to reimpose the embargo, should we decide to suspend it at this time. That gets right to the heart of how the embargo has worked up until this

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time. It was the expressed will of the Congress to impose this arms embargo because of the illegal use, the violation of our laws and agreements, by the Turks in terms of this movement, the second movement, into Cyprus in which they took and have held some 40 percent of the land there.

But that embargo has not meant very much and has not produced very much progress, because it has been absolutely clear that the Secretary of State of the United States did not think that was the right thing to do. He said it was not the right thing to do and in every way, shape, and form, along with the President, has transmitted the message to the Turks that if they just stand firm this administration, taking their side, would be able to come here and twist our arms and otherwise pressure the Congress to remove this arms embargo without 1 inch of progress on the Cyprus question.

That has happened. We are being asked to violate our own laws which we made. I think we wrote these prohibitions in our laws in the beginning because they were right and served national interests. I do not want to see any ally use our arms to bully another of our allies. That has happened in this case. That is wrong and we must object to it.

Now many, many months have passed. We have this civilian refugee population, some 200,000 people on Cyprus, who are homeless. There are various estimates as to the numbers. There are no private assurances of progress. If there are any I do not know about them. They have not been conveyed to the International Relations Committee on which I serve.

Now I have been a Member of the Congress for 9 years and I served 6 years on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and I have sat through the testimony by various Secretaries of State and other State Department officials who work on foreign policy questions. I cannot recall when the executive branch has done more to undercut a legal move by this Congress than in this instance.

I do not see any progress resulting from the time that these steps have been taken until now—principally, in my judgment, because of a less than good faith implementation by this administration.

There are two other things I want to say. There has been a great deal of talk about base rights. We have bases in Greece and bases in Turkey and both are important to us. I would like to see us keep both. In recent weeks I have had discussions with the Ambassadors of Turkey and Greece and Cyprus. I have listened to Mr. Colby talk at length about the importance of these bases. I would not like to see us sacrifice bases in either country.

But the real question is, can we be blackmailed on this issue? Because that is what is happening. If we lift this embargo, what is the message, not only to the Turks, but also to most other nations that get arms from us—as most do, sadly. They will know they, too, will be free to violate their agreement with the United States. They will know they can do whatever they want, sign any agreement with

us, and yet do whatever they want because we will sanction that behavior if we lift this embargo. We will be saying these agreements do not mean anything.

I think it will be an open invitation for countries in Latin America and other countries around the globe that receive arms from us to do whatever they want with those arms. They know they will be able to get away with it, just as Turkey will get away with it today if we lift this arms embargo.

So of course we ought not to do it.

There is no valid reason why progress cannot be made on Cyprus at the same time as we talk about lifting the arms embargo. The two things are linked. They have to stay linked. We have to have progress on both at the same time.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, we have been hearing a lot of talk about upholding principles. Of course, everybody is in favor of holding fast to our principles.

But holding to one's principles does not mean that we cannot change the law.

To the contrary, Mr. Chairman: The whole history of the United States is filled with examples of where we have maintained our cherished principles—and to do so, we have had to change the law.

I will cite not less than the Constitution of the United States—adopted nearly 200 years ago, for principles we hold just as dear today—

In order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

No fewer than 26 times have we amended this Constitution—in behalf of our principles, not against them. The same is true of countless laws.

So, I say, let us take a good hard look at just what principle it is that we are trying to uphold here.

The principle is, we do not want our weapons used by our allies except for self-defense.

Well, if we leave the law the way it is, we are not helping that principle one bit when it comes to our two good allies, Greece and Turkey.

We do not want our two close friends and treaty comrades to turn against each other, with our arms or any others.

That is the principle we want to uphold here.

And to do so, we have to change the law.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KOCH. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I understand there are no more amendments. I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute close at 4:15.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania asks unanimous consent that all debate on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute close

at 4:15. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York has been recognized already. The limitation of time cannot apply to the gentleman.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. KOCH).

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important at this time to reemphasize a point we often make in the well, that there are some things that are right and there are some things that are wrong. It is wrong when we run out on a friend, when we leave simply because it becomes expedient or because we submit to extortion, and it is extortion that is being exerted at this time and we all know it.

Now, if we give in to that extortion, then the administration will use the very same arguments that it uses today vis-a-vis Turkey, toward Spain when Spain says that it demands certain onerous conditions if we are to continue our bases there. Are we going to submit to onerous conditions? The answer should obviously be no.

The same arguments could be used by the administration vis-a-vis Israel because of Arab blackmail. Hopefully, we will not submit to that extortion.

Then the President not very long ago said he would not see Alexander Solzhenitsyn because the Soviet Union would be distressed, and not go forward with détente, a kind of Soviet blackmail. I think most of us would agree it was wrong for the President to give in to that kind of implicit extortion.

So what I am saying is that there are positions which involve morality that ought not to be surrendered, because we are told that if we do not surrender that we are going to be suffering severe consequences.

Mr. Chairman, we have to stay with our friends when our friends are right. We cannot be summer soldiers. To those people who would leave in the middle of this fight that this Congress won on four different occasions, I say to give up on that fight on July 24 would make us summer soldiers. Let us hang in there with our friends and continue not to yield.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KOCH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman in the well.

(Mr. MIKVA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge the defeat of S. 846, as amended, the bill to resume arms shipments from the United States to Turkey. What is at stake today is not only a just resolution of the conflict on Cyprus but the integrity of American foreign policy. The use of American arms by Turkey in the invasion and subsequent occupation of almost half of Cyprus is in clear violation of American law. To resume the arms flow would legitimize the Turkish violation of our arms agreement which

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specifically prohibits the use of these arms for offensive purposes.

Mr. Chairman, on July 15, in Minneapolis, Secretary of State Kissinger gave a major foreign policy speech in which he said:

We have found ourselves doubtful of our virtue and uncertain of our direction largely because we have suddenly realized that like other nations before us we must now reconcile our principles with our necessities.

But if the administration's so-called compromise on Cyprus is a typical example, perhaps the real problem is a failure to realize that commitments to principles are necessities for a foreign policy worthy of respect and support by the American people.

The proposal to resume the flow of arms to Turkey has been labeled by the administration and Dr. Kissinger as a "compromise plan." But it is really a plan which compromises the principle of respect for duly passed laws. It is a plan which compromises the principle of moral responsibility of the United States to place and enforce restrictions on arms that we sell around the world. Without such restrictions, we are likely to witness the ever more frequent spectacle of American arms bringing down casualties on both sides of a confrontation. And it will be our sense of mortality which will be caught in the crossfire.

The proposal to lift the embargo is sure to compromise the trust that we want other people and countries throughout the world to have in the United States. In his speech, Dr. Kissinger said that an involved America is essential to peace and progress. I agree. But our involvement must be based on principles which are not conveniently brushed aside by necessities which are more illusionary than real.

Mr. Chairman, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus has caused untold suffering on the island. We will only increase the likelihood of more acts of aggression and more suffering elsewhere if our message to other countries is that they can use American arms for aggressive purposes with impunity.

Perhaps the saddest aspect of the administration's "compromise plan" is that it compromises the long friendship between the people of Greece and the American people. It is not difficult to understand why the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees would view this plan not as a compromise but as a sellout, a sellout of what is right and just and decent. And I believe that millions of Americans would agree.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to yield my time to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. YOUNG).

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent also to yield my time to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. YOUNG).

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. YOUNG).

Mr. YOUNG of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I want to make three things very clear. One, I decided I would support this amendment. I thought I would have some trouble with this so-called Greek lobby, so I asked my staff to get the files on the votes and the letters that we received from our district the last time we voted this amendment, because I wanted to inform my constituents in advance that I thought it was in the best interest of this Nation to vote arms for Turkey. When I got this voluminous file and communications from the Greek lobby in my district, I had the sum total of 11 letters. So I have no political problems on the facts. I do not even need to write a letter.

Then I got the newspaper the next morning and I saw a \$385 million arms sale to Jordan. I said, "What have we got here?" There is no way to make peace by giving guns to everybody.

Then I remembered that almost identical arguments of national security and support of a NATO ally were used to supply Portugal with arms, in spite of their use in Mozambique and Angola.

What looked like national security in the short run has left Portugal Communist and the United States alienated from three new nations in Africa with tremendous resources.

I suggest Mr. Chairman, that the present pragmatic considerations may also backfire against our national interest and that this amendment be rejected.

The House should maintain its integrity and insist on the rule of law.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, if this bill is rejected, in all probability that action will strengthen the radicals in Turkey. It will harden the position of the Turkish elements on Cyprus to the disadvantage of the Greek refugees. It will deny the United States leverage upon Turkish policy. It will intensify the feelings between Greece and Turkey on the offshore islands.

Mr. Chairman, for many reasons this bill must be approved.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BIESTER).

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROOMFIELD).

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, just a few moments ago I received a letter from the President of the United States. Of course, he is very hopeful that Congress will take favorable action on this legislation. He says in his letter:

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, D.C., July 24, 1975.

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: Over the past several weeks, the Members of the House of Representatives have been giving close attention to the very important matter of restoring military assistance to Turkey.

As a result of my several meetings with Members, the top priority I attach to favorable action by the House is clear. It is an issue in which the strategic situation must be weighed, as well as the situation in the Middle East. Our facilities in Turkey and our mutual defense arrangements have played and continue to play a vital role in the security of the area and, more directly, in the security of our own forces. Mutual defense arrangements that have stood us well for thirty years should not be cast aside.

As we have devoted attention to this subject of such great importance to U.S. interests, I have been impressed by and I wish to commend the Congress for the bipartisan approach which has been taken. The restoration of U.S. military assistance to Turkey is a foreign policy issue in which many important factors must be weighed, and an issue with ramifications affecting all Americans. Restoration is clearly in the interests of the United States. It is in our interests as a member of the Atlantic Alliance and it is in the interests of all seeking a reduction of tensions in the Mediterranean region. I urge a favorable vote on this legislation by the House.

At the same time, I pledge my total commitment to working with the parties involved—Turkey, Greece and Cyprus—to assist in finding a just and equitable settlement to this dispute which is of such great concern to all Americans.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the Chair, Mr. SISK, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the Senate bill (S. 846) to authorize the further suspension of prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 626, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, the Chair will put them en gross.

The amendments were agreed to. The SPEAKER. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to. The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 206, nays 223, not voting 5, as follows:

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[Roll No. 429]

YEAS—206

Abdnor
Alexander
Anderson, Ill.
Andrews,
N. Dak.
Archer
Armstrong
Ashley
Baldus
Beard, Tenn.
Bell
Bevill
Biester
Bingham
Boiling
Bowen
Breaux
Breckinridge
Brinkley
Broomfield
Brown, Mich.
Brown, Ohio
Broyhill
Buchanan
Burgener
Burlison, Tex.
Burlison, Mo.
Butler
Casey
Cederberg
Chappell
Clausen,
Don H.
Cleveland
Cochran
Cohen
Collins, Tex.
Conable
Daniel, Dan
Daniel, R. W.
de la Garza
Dent
Devine
Dickinson
Duncan, Oreg.
Edwards, Ala.
English
Erlenborn
Eshleman
Evans, Colo.
Evins, Tenn.
Fenwick
Findley
Fish
Flowers
Flynt
Forsythe
Fountain
Fraser
Frenzel
Frey
Fuqua
Gibbons
Gilman
Goldwater
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gradison
Grassley
Guyer

Hagedorn
Hamilton
Hammer-
schmidt
Hansen
Harsha
Hastings
Hays, Ohio
Hebert
Henderson
Hicks
Hightower
Hillis
Horton
Hubbard
Hungate
Hutchinson
Ichord
Jarman
Jeffords
Johnson, Colo.
Johnson, Pa.
Jones, Ala.
Jones, N.C.
Jones, Okla.
Jones, Tenn.
Karth
Kasten
Kazen
Kemp
Ketchum
Kindness
Krueger
Lagomarsino
Landrum
Latta
Leggett
Liton
Lloyd, Calif.
Long, La.
Lott
McClory
McCloskey
McCullister
McCormack
McDonald
McEwen
McFall
McKay
Madigan
Mahon
Mann
Mathis
Matsunaga
Mazzoli
Meeds
Melcher
Meyner
Michel
Milford
Mills
Mitchell, N.Y.
Montgomery
Moore
Moorhead, Pa.
Morgan
Mosher
Murtha
Myers, Ind.
Myers, Pa.

Nichols
Obey
Passman
Perkins
Pettis
Pickle
Poage
Preyer
Pritchard
Quile
Quillen
Rallsback
Randall
Rees
Rhodes
Risenhoover
Roberts
Robinson
Rogers
Ruppe
Ryan
Satterfield
Schneebeil
Schulze
Sebelius
Shriver
Shuster
Sikes
Sisk
Skubitz
Slack
Smith, Nebr.
Snyder
Solarz
Staggers
Stanton,
J. William
Steed
Steiger, Wis.
Stephens
Stratton
Stuckey
Symington
Symms
Talcott
Taylor, Mo.
Teague
Thone
Thornton
Treen
Ullman
Van Deerlin
Vander Jagt
Waggoner
Walsh
Wampler
Whalen
White
Whitten
Wiggins
Wilson, Bob
Wilson, C. H.
Wilson, Tex.
Winn
Wright
Wylie
Young, Alaska
Young, Fla.
Young, Tex.
Zablocki

NAYS—223

Abzug
Adams
Addabbo
Ambro
Anderson,
Calif.
Andrews, N.C.
Annunzio
Ashbrook
Aspin
AuCoin
Badillo
Baralis
Barrett
Baucus
Bauman
Beard, R.I.
Bedell
Bennett
Bergland
Biaggi
Blanchard
Blouin
Boggs
Boland
Bonker
Brademas
Brodehead
Brooks
Brown, Calif.
Burke, Calif.

Burke, Fla.
Burke, Mass.
Burton, John
Burton, Phillip
Byron
Carney
Carr
Chisholm
Clancy
Clawson, Del
Clay
Collins, Ill.
Conlan
Conte
Conyers
Corman
Cornell
Cotter
Coughlin
Crane
D'Amours
Daniels, N.J.
Davis
Delaney
Dellums
Derrick
Derwinski
Diggs
Dingell
Dodd
Downey, N.Y.

Downing, Va.
Drinan
Duncan, Tenn.
du Pont
Early
Eckhardt
Edgar
Edwards, Calif.
Ellberg
Emery
Esch
Evans, Ind.
Fary
Fascell
Fisher
Fithian
Flood
Florio
Foley
Ford, Mich.
Ford, Tenn.
Gaydos
Gialimo
Ginn
Green
Gude
Haley
Hall
Hanley
Hannaford
Harkin

Harrington
Harris
Hawkins
Hayes, Ind.
Hechler, W. Va.
Heckler, Mass.
Hefner
Helstoski
Holland
Holt
Holtzman
Howard
Howe
Hughes
Hyde
Jacobs
Jenrette
Johnson, Calif.
Jordan
Kastenmeier
Kelly
Keys
Koch
Krebs
LaFalce
Lehman
Lent
Levitaz
Lloyd, Tenn.
Long, Md.
Lujan
McDade
McHugh
McKinney
Macdonald
Maguire
Martin
Metcalfe
Mezvinzky
Mikva
Miller, Calif.
Miller, Ohio
Mineta
Minish

Mink
Mitchell, Md.
Moakley
Moffett
Mollohan
Moorhead,
Calif.
Moss
Mottl
Murphy, Ill.
Murphy, N.Y.
Natcher
Neal
Nedzi
Nix
Nolan
Nowak
Oberstar
O'Brien
O'Hara
O'Neill
Ottinger
Patman, Tex.
Patten, N.J.
Patterson,
Calif.
Pattison, N.Y.
Pepper
Peyster
Pike
Pressler
Price
Rangel
Regula
Reuss
Richmond
Riegle
Rinaldo
Rodino
Roe
Roncalio
Rooney
Rose
Rosenthal
Rostenkowski

Roush
Rousselot
Roybal
Runnels
Russo
St Germain
Santini
Sarasin
Sarbanes
Scheuer
Schroeder
Seiberling
Sharp
Shipley
Simon
Smith, Iowa
Spellman
Spence
Stanton,
James V.
Stark
Steelman
Steiger, Ariz.
Stokes
Studds
Sullivan
Taylor, N.C.
Thompson
Traxler
Tsongas
Udall
Vander Veen
Vanik
Vigorito
Waxman
Weaver
Whitehurst
Wirth
Wolf
Wyder
Yates
Yatron
Young, Ga.
Zeferetti

NOT VOTING—5

Carter
Danielson
Fulton
Heinz
Hinshaw

So the bill was not passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs.

Mr. Danielson with Mr. Heinz.
Mr. Fulton with Mr. Carter.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members desiring to do so may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks in the course of the consideration of the Senate bill, S. 846, which was just defeated.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. ANDREWS of North Carolina asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. ANDREWS of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, today I have voted in opposition to S. 846 fully cognizant of the serious implications which this legislation poses for the United States. My review of the legal and foreign policy aspects of the problem indicate that each of the conflicting positions has considerable merit. This is an extremely complicated measure reflective of the events which have taken place in a region of complexity involving two of our Nation's

most valued allies. I am continuing my study of this matter with a view to developing a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of these issues.

AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 5447) to amend the act of August 16, 1971, as amended, which established the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, to increase and extend the appropriation authorization thereunder, with Senate amendments thereto, and concur in the Senate amendments.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate amendments, as follows:

Page 2, line 1, strike out "two" and insert: "2".

Page 2, lines 4 and 5, strike out "each of".

Page 2, line 5, strike out "years" and insert: "year".

Page 2, line 5, strike out "1977, and 1978." and insert: "1977.".

Page 2, after line 5, insert:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of such Act (33 U.S.C. 857-9) is amended—

(1) by inserting after "review of" and before "the progress" the following: "national ocean policy, coastal zone management, and"; and

(2) striking out "the President." at the end of the second sentence thereof and inserting in lieu thereof "the President and the Congress."

Amend the title so as to read: "An Act to amend the Act of August 16, 1971, as amended, which established the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, to increase and extend the appropriation authorization thereunder, and for other purposes."

Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, I agree with my subcommittee chairman, Mr. MURPHY, in supporting the conference report on H.R. 5447, a bill to extend the authorizations for the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere. I agree with only a minor reservation.

Our Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries approved H.R. 5447 on May 16 of this year. The House subsequently considered and approved this authorization on May 19. The bill as passed by the House would have increased the level of authorizations from \$400,000 to \$445,000 for the fiscal years to and including 1978.

The other body has considered this legislation and has passed favorably upon it with the addition of three amendments. These Senate changes to our original bill would accomplish the following:

First. It would extend authorization for NACOA for 2 years as opposed to our suggested 3 years;

Second. Instead of requiring NACOA to be exclusively responsive to direct requests by the President, it would add a section to require that the Advisory Committee would have to respond to requests from the Congress and the President.

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This amendment would permit Congress to request reports on specific subjects from the Advisory Committee; and

Third. The responsibilities of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere would be broadened to include coastal zone management issues and national ocean policy.

None of the above amendments concern me greatly enough to request a conference with our Senate colleagues—as a matter of fact, I feel that the other body's amendatory language does strengthen our original bill in some respects.

My only reservation in this matter rests with the so-called "broadening section" of the amended bill.

By adding specific subject areas upon which we expect NACOA to concentrate, I fear that we may be restricting this committee to a more limited scope than was originally intended.

When the Advisory Committee was established in the 92d Congress, we directed them to undertake a continuing review of the progress of marine and atmospheric science and service programs of the United States. They were also directed to advise the Secretary of Commerce with respect to the carrying out of the purposes of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Since the Coastal Zone Management Office is an integral part of NOAA, it is clear to me that NACOA has the necessary mandate to oversee and comment upon coastal zone management issues. NACOA has, in fact, addressed coastal zone issues in two of their four annual reports to the Congress.

This committee presently has the broadest possible scope upon which to focus its activities. I feel that they have done an exemplary job in accomplishing their intended objectives, and I want them to continue to have the necessary flexibility and independence to continue their work productively.

I have chosen to concur with the amended version of H.R. 5447, but I do so with the reservations I have indicated today.

I trust that this broadening language will not be interpreted by the Congress or NACOA to restrict their activities in any way. I am very impressed with the job they have done so far, and I feel strongly that our Nation needs to continue to receive advice from groups of this stature.

Let us not, even by implication, limit their mandate as they proceed in advising us and the President on the crucial issues which we all must face in today's complex world.

The Senate amendments were concurred in.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members desiring to do so may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill, H.R. 5447, just considered by the House.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES TO FILE CERTAIN REPORTS

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services have until Saturday midnight, July 26, 1975, to file a report on H.R. 1287, a bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act, and House Concurrent Resolution 198, expressing the opposition of the Congress to any change in the present method of providing financial support for military commissaries through appropriations to meet their payroll costs, and H.R. 7642, a bill to amend chapter 5, title 37, United States Code, to extend the special pay provisions for veterinarians and optometrists.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION TO HAVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT FRIDAY, JULY 25, 1975, TO FILE REPORTS ON H.R. 8564, AMENDING FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958 RELATING TO WAR RISK INSURANCE

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Public Works and Transportation have until midnight Friday, July 25, 1975, to file a report on H.R. 8564, amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 relating to war risk insurance.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. JOHN L. BURTON). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California (Mr. ANDERSON)?

There was no objection.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF FURTHER LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. O'NEILL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to announce the program for the remainder of the day.

Mr. Speaker, at this particular time we intend to follow with H.R. 5900, equal treatment of craft and industrial employees. We will vote on the rule and debate the bill. We will rise at 6:30. Tomorrow morning we will meet at 10 o'clock, and we will continue with the legislation H.R. 5900. Following that we hope to take the rule on H.R. 5210, military construction authorization, and follow with general debate only.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. O'NEILL. I yield to the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. RHODES. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Is it the intention of the distinguished majority leader to proceed to conclusion with action on the bill tomorrow?

Mr. O'NEILL. The answer is in the affirmative.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5900, PROTECTING ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF LABOR

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules I call up House Resolution 631 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 631

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 5900) to protect the economic rights of labor in the building and construction industry by providing for equal treatment of craft and industrial workers. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Education and Labor, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Education and Labor now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of such consideration, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommmit with or without instructions.

The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. PEPPER.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the able gentleman from California (Mr. DEL CLAWSON) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, this rule is the usual rule providing for an open rule with 2 hours of general debate on H.R. 5900, a bill protecting the economic rights of labor.

House Resolution 631 provides that it shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Education and Labor, now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment, under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Speaker, as the committee report in this matter makes it clear on page 3, H.R. 5900 is necessary in order to overrule the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Denver Building Trades Council decision. It that case as it appears in the report, a general contractor in Denver named Doose & Lintner had a contract with the Denver Building