

OLC 75-2534
HSC

8 October 1975

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman

[Redacted]

Mr. Cary
Mr. Thuermer

SUBJECT : Lehman's Draft DCI Statement

1. The IC Staff, like other components, is impressed by this draft and we are hopeful that the message can be imparted, if not before the HSC, then before some other public bodies.

2. In an effort to be helpful, I asked a few members of the IC Staff to research Chairman Pike's modus operandi during the Pueblo hearings and in the HSC to date and try to come up with questions that he (or other critics) might raise in challenge to some of the points in the draft.

3. Attached for what they are worth are the questions. In virtually all cases, we have not tried to come up with the answer. We hope this will permit some tightening of the draft where it might be appropriate, and we hope too that these questions may serve to forewarn of some of the challenges that lie ahead.

[Redacted]

STATINTL

E. H. Knoche

Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

Sample of Kinds of Questions Which
Might be Asked by Mr. Pike After Reading
Mr. Colby's Prepared Statement to the HSC

Mr. Pike: Mr. Colby, on page 1 of your prepared statement you say that this Committee is "using the wrong measure for intelligence effectiveness."

What is the right measure?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: Again on page 1 and on page 2 you state that "the primary function is not simply to predict events, but to provide the policymaker with the deepest possible understanding of the foreign environment..."

Then you follow that with "one important aspect of this task is to prevent the policymaker from being taken by surprise by an event." But then you say that "this is quite different from the prediction of the event." How is it different? Isn't this what warning is all about? What is your definition of warning?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 2 you go on to say that "The traditional-- or pre-1939--view of intelligence was one of the spy seeking out of the enemy's war plans...This concept is totally out of date." Perhaps that

is why we failed at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Perhaps that accounts for the fact, according to your October war postmortem, that you didn't make use of the reports on the Arab war plans. Do you have any comment?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 3 you say: "The task for intelligence is to analyze and integrate this material into assessments and judgments relevant to our nation's concerns abroad." Where is all this material integrated? In the CIA? What about material from NSA and DIA and State INR--who in the intelligence community brings it all together?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On pages 5 and 6 you mention the necessity of "clandestine collection or espionage" that is "focused largely on the major closed societies that could threaten our security, that do not have a free press" and so on. Does Chile now have a free press?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 7 you say that intelligence "must be independent of partisan preference or loyalty to preconceived judgments." How do you manage the inevitable dissents which must arise if this principle is really operating? For example, did everyone in the Watch Committee agree with their report of 6 October that there would be no hostilities even though the war had already started? Over the years of its existence, how many written dissenting views came out of the Watch Committee?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 14 you discuss the Soviet grain problem. Did you warn of the Great Grain Robbery? Is this type of intelligence problem domestic or foreign?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: You point out on page 17 how well you did in predicting the types of Soviet missile systems. How well did you do on the numbers of weapons?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On the next page you say "The Soviets can and do acquire from a subscription to Aviation Week information which may take us several years and many millions to obtain." Why don't you take

out a subscription?

Answer: [Forced laughter]

Mr. Pike: On page 25 you indicate that your aerial photography proved that we did not bomb the dikes in North Vietnam. Were these pictures made public? Did the North Vietnamese ever put their antiaircraft artillery on dikes, and, if so, did we bomb them?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: Also on page 25 you say "At least one foreign leader, no particular friend of the US, is alive today because the CIA warned him of a plot against his life." Who was this? Who were the plotters? What happened to them?

Answers: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 27 you discuss the Indo-Pak war. Were you informed by the policy makers ahead of time of the decision to move part of the US 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean? Were you asked to assess possible Indian (or other) reactions?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 30 you say the date of the Czech invasion was on 22 August. Are you sure?

Answer: No, Mr. Chairman, it was the 20th.

Mr. Pike: On this matter of coups on page 31, you say "But [US intelligence] can only rarely predict with confidence precisely who will act, how and when." I assume you are not including those coups which the CIA themselves instigated. By the way, how well did we predict the coup in Chile?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On page 35 you discuss the case of Mr. Adams. He gave figures in his testimony; you did not. You say "But nevertheless he had succeeded in forcing the figure up." May we ask, from what figure to what figure?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: Did the discussion of the issue reach the highest policy levels? Did they know of the disagreement?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On the same issue, you say the figure was reached by "compromise." Is this usual in assessing estimates, by a process of negotiation?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: Again, on page 36, you say the "CIA was able in subsequent estimates to raise the figures further." From what to what?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: In your discussion of the October War you discuss the action-reaction cycle where each side mobilizes and go on to say "It is in this context that our analysts interpreted the events of October 5 and 6. They were concerned that war was breaking out by inadvertence." This seems at odds with your post-mortem which implies that the Israelis failed to go on alert or mobilize until the last minute thus giving the Arabs an invitation to attack. Any comment?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: Also who in the intelligence community was concerned about an attack? Your post-mortem indicates that almost everyone thought war would not break out. Any comment?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: You also refer on page 38 to "plans and more plans" generated by the Arabs. Did any single person analyze all the successive Arab plans? Did they recognize that the plans called for a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: On the next page you refer to a report, which you say turned out to be correct, but that you

"could find no corroborative evidence." How did this report fit with the plans mentioned earlier?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: I have heard that the J-3 in the Joint Staff went on a mini-alert about the 30th of September based on the report and one of the plans mentioned earlier. Did you know of the J-3's action at the time?

Answer: ?

Mr. Pike: How good are your communications with the J-3?