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NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

TV GUIDE

20 Dec. 1975

News Watch

Season's Greetings! (Things Could Be A Lot Worse)

By John P. Roche



This is obviously the week to ask the networks for a Christmas present. Not, of course, anything which might be construed as a payoff, but rather a psychological favor. Please, please, dear friends, get off the paranoid bandwagon. It was kind of interesting for a while, but right now the American people have signed off. It may well be conceivable that Vice President Calvin Coolidge shipped President Warren Harding some poisoned crab meat—and Coolidge's alibi was so solid that it might bother Dan Rather—but frankly we don't care.

Sitting as I do hundreds of miles away from those great opinion centers, New York and Washington, I find my views of the public need are often very different from the accepted wisdom. My Tory brethren Kevin Phillips and Pat Buchanan, for example, seem to think that Western Civilization is going down the greased chute, while various liberal dervishes indicate that, as payment for our sins, we should be volunteering for execution. Maybe I lack the appropriate perspective or conscience, but I would much rather be alive in 1975 than in 1675 and I don't feel a fearful burden of guilt about the misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Chairman Kissinger.

After all, life in 1975 isn't all that bad. Sure, the death rate from cancer and heart attacks is up, but (auto accidents aside) it is hard to die of anything else. To be specific, in 1675 the odds are I would be already among the angels (or—well, let's drop that). The life expectancy of the American white male in 1900 was 45, so you can only guess what it was three centuries ago. Moreover, if I were alive in 1675, I would probably be digging peat out of some bog and living in a thatched hut with no television to criticize.

The problem with my friends who think Western Civilization faces extinction is that they implicitly assume that in 1675 they would have been dukes, not sod cutters, serfs or slaves. I admit a certain anger when I note that my electricity bill has doubled over the past couple of years, but then I recall that had there been electricity a couple of centuries ago, my ancestors could not have afforded it. What I am saying runs up against some polling data that indicates Americans are unhappy about the general State of Things, but take a look at the questions. If asked, "Do you think things could be better in the United States?" what red-blooded citizen could conceivably say, "No!"?

So much for Western Civilization.

Now what about all these calls for collective penance and flagellation? What about all these efforts to reopen the "Strange Death of President Harding" (a book I remember seeing as a kid),→

the puff of smoke on a grassy knoll in Dallas, and (at the rate things are going) every other political murder in American history? Efforts to reassess the guilt of Jack the Ripper, Aaron Burr, John Wilkes Booth, Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs and—at the United Nations of all places—Idi Amin's hero Adolf Hitler, seem to be a great growth industry, but the American people are yawning by the million. (American folk wisdom puts a low premium on conspiracy theories, in general accepting Roche's Law: "Those who can conspire haven't got time; those who do conspire haven't got talent.") Let us take Eunice Kennedy Shriver's sound advice that this search for second guns and third bullets is "such a waste of the minds of brilliant men and women. It doesn't lift us up or solve anything."

Well, now that we have disposed of Western Civilization and the grave robbers, what about the tremendous campaign against the CIA and the FBI? For starters, let me note that if you pump out a septic tank only once every quarter of a century, you are likely to find some strange detritus. With that in mind, the first question should be, "Why didn't Congress fulfill its obligation to the American people by keeping these outfits on a tight leash?" (The answer is that Congress didn't want to, an attitude that reflected the views of the public at large. To say this is not to justify the position: when I was national chairman of Americans for Democratic Action I flayed FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in season and out. Unfortunately I played to an empty house.)

Today it's open season on the CIA and FBI and there is a real risk that these agencies will be effectively destroyed. This would be a disastrous eventuality, particularly since most of the work of the CIA and the FBI has not been remotely lawless. But as President Lyndon Johnson once observed about his former colleagues on the Hill, "Once that pack tastes blood, they go wild." Moreover, if my reading of the public need (which is not obtained by lunching daily with those who agree with me) is accurate, the American people want effective intelligence agencies. The big complaint I have heard about the CIA, for example, is not that it tried to knock off Fidel Castro (whom few confuse with St. Francis of Assisi), but that it couldn't do the job right!

To put it differently, the people of this country are not innocents. While they don't articulate their views on "The Necessary Amoralty of Foreign Affairs" in the convincing fashion of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., like him they assume that "saints can be pure, but statesmen, alas, must be responsible." (Harper's, August 1971.) Thus when Sen. Frank Church comes on like the Avenging Angel, suggesting we are all neck-deep in Sin, the average response is, "What world does he live in?" It's not a bad question.

Naturally nobody is going to get up in this atmosphere of piety and advocate political assassinations, but there are 12 or 13 million of us who in our sinful hearts wish that in 1937 some intelligence agent had put a slug into Adolf Hitler. And those who have read Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago" must have a similar attitude toward Joseph Stalin. Interestingly enough, there is an elaborate literature on the appropriate Christian grounds for tyrannicide. From my reading of it, I suspect the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, might condone an attempt on Castro as a tyrant "ex parte exorciti," for having promised the Cuban people freedom and creating a dictatorship.

Before someone starts a move to expel me from Sunday school, let me make it clear that I have grave moral reservations about many of the actions of the CIA and the FBI, and I trust that Congress will establish strong controls over their activities. But let's stop beating our breasts and moaning over our collective guilt—things aren't all that bad. Season's Greetings! (END)

NEW YORK TIMES
19 Dec. 1975

Panel Backs Bush For C.I.A. as Ford Bars Political Bid

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18—The Senate Armed Services Committee voted today to approve the nomination of George Bush as Director of Central Intelligence, after President Ford ruled out the 51-year-old former member of Congress as a possible running mate in 1976.

The committee's 12-to-4 approval of Mr. Bush presumably assures his confirmation by the full Senate early next year, but several senior Congressional sources said that the political "cost" to President Ford was "excessive."

In ruling out Mr. Bush from consideration as a running mate, Mr. Ford reversed a position taken last November during an appearance on the television panel show "Meet the Press." At that time the President said he would not rule out Mr. Bush because "I don't think people with talents, individuals with capabilities and a record ought to be excluded from any further public service."

Mr. Bush said today that he had not contemplated his future beyond service in the C.I.A. Since it was President Ford ruling out Mr. Bush as a running mate in 1976, rather than Mr. Bush making a pledge not to run, Mr. Bush presumably would be free to accept a Vice-Presidential nomination from any other Republican or Democrat. But there is no serious suggestion that one will be offered.

Mr. Ford's action today, however, was credited with getting the nomination four votes in the Armed Services Committee and thus permitting it to be reported to the Senate floor with the committee's recommendations.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a leading opponent of Mr. Bush's nomination, said that though he would vote against confirmation, he would not lead a floor fight to halt the appointment.

Mr. Bush said in an interview that he hoped the President's action would remove "legitimate doubts of his willingness to concentrate on the intelligence post. He said he had "urged and supported" Mr. Ford's decision to take him out of the running. "I have no worries about my own future," he said.

Mr. Bush said he hoped that the full Senate could consider the matter before the Christmas recess, but that several Senators had told him that it

was clear his appointment and several others would be held over until January.

Letter to Stennis

From the moment Mr. Bush was nominated in November to head the C.I.A., White House strategists have known that he faced stiff opposition from Democrats who believed his political background was unsuitable for the position.

But when the committee's public hearings on the nomination opened Monday, the opposition among Democrats to Mr. Bush seemed, one source said, "manageable," in the sense that the White House "had the votes to win in committee and on the floor."

By late Tuesday, however, the White House had learned that seven, and possibly eight, of the committee members would vote against Mr. Bush. The nominee met with Mr. Ford several times Wednesday for a total of about an hour and a half. It was the advice of White House strategists at those meetings that if Mr. Bush wanted to become C.I.A. director without a massive battle and long delay in 1976, he must be willing to give up hopes of becoming Mr. Ford's running mate.

Senator Henry M. Jackson,

Democrat of Washington, who is a committee member, had given the President a relatively graceful opening to deal with the situation the day before when he suggested that although Mr. Bush might not want to give up his "right" to run for the Vice-Presidency, Mr. Ford could simply rule him out. By 7 P.M. yesterday, the decision had been made and Mr. Ford drafted a letter to John C. Stennis, the Mississippi Democrat who is chairman of the committee.

"Ambassador Bush and I agree that the nation's immediate foreign intelligence needs must take precedence over other considerations and there should be continuity in the C.I.A. leadership," Mr. Ford's letter said in part. "Therefore if Ambassador Bush is confirmed by the Senate as Director of Central Intelligence, I will not consider him as my Vice-Presidential running mate in 1976."

The committee met shortly before 10 A.M. and debated some 45 minutes in closed session. It voted in public session and the President's letter was given to the press.

The core of objection to Mr. Bush has been that his partisan political background might create conflict of interest prob-

lems for a Director of Central Intelligence. And a possible Vice-Presidential candidacy raised the question that Mr. Bush might leave the C.I.A. in so short a time that his service would be, as Senator Jackson put it, "merely transient."

Responsible Republican Congressional sources believe that the White House made a "strategy error" in sending up Mr. Bush's name without being "immediately willing to forget the Vice-Presidential matter" and that it hurts the President's credibility on Capitol Hill when he has to reverse his position completely to get his nominee through.

If confirmed, Mr. Bush will be a departure from the kind of men chosen to head the C.I.A. in the past. He will be the first director with a strongly partisan political background since the agency was formed in 1947.

In addition to having served as a member of Congress from Texas, Mr. Bush was chairman of the Republican National Committee and United States ambassador to the United Nations before Mr. Ford sent him to the People's Republic of China as chief of the United States Liaison Office.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1975

1973 Arms Cover-Up Is Laid to Kissinger

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17—Some 1973 intelligence reports that the Soviet Union might have violated the agreements on strategic-arms limitation were withheld by Henry A. Kissinger from certain top Administration officials and Congressional leaders, according to documents and testimony at a House hearing today.

Documents produced at the hearing showed that shortly after the arms-limitation accords were signed in Moscow by President Richard M. Nixon, Mr. Kissinger, then the Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, arranged to limit the circulation of intelligence reports on possible Soviet violations. Among those affected, it was disclosed, was William P. Rogers, then the Secretary of State.

The documents, from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the testimony were given to the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

The charge against Mr. Kissinger has also been made on several occasions by Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., retired chief of naval operations, who told a House panel early this month that the Russians had committed "gross violations" of the 1972 accords but that the Secretary of State had not prop-

erly informed President Ford.

According to C.I.A. documents, an intelligence report on Russian missile-silo construction was withheld from certain top Government officials and Congressional leaders from June 9, 1973, until Aug. 8, 1973.

The committee staff members said there were indications of "numerous other withholdings" in the files they examined. According to the testimony, since the "hold system" meant that the person barred never knew the information was developed, in effect he never knew that he had not been briefed.

In the 1973 instance, Edward Proctor, deputy director for intelligence at C.I.A., became so concerned about the withholding that he wrote Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, then acting director of the C.I.A., that "at minimum I think you should seek Dr. Kissinger's assurance that he has informed or will inform the President of this situation and the concern it generates."

A 'Strong Case'

At another point in the same memorandum, he said he would not "presume" to suggest whether key members of Congress should be briefed, but he said there was a "strong case" for informing Mr. Rogers, U. Alexis Johnson, the chief of the United States delegation at the arms talks, and Sidney N. Gray-

beal and Brig. Gen. William Georgi, the commissioner and deputy commissioner of the United States-Soviet group assigned to monitor compliance.

Under questioning today by A. Searl Field, staff director of the committee, William R. Hyland, chief of the State Department's intelligence office, acknowledged that even though these officials were not told, the matter was raised with the Russians on two occasions.

"You mean the Russians were told about this?" Mr. Field asked. "Well, who were we keeping the secret from?"

Mr. Hyland said the "hold system" kept the material from United States officials who had the clearance to read the intelligence report but had "no policy considerations in this area, no particular need to know."

It was unclear from today's questioning just who had the power to remove the names of officials from the C.I.A. circulation list. Nominally, Mr. Proctor agreed, the Director of Central Intelligence, at that time General Walters and later William E. Colby, designated the persons; but the memorandums made it clear that the National Security Council staff gave the names of persons who could be told or who could not be told.

Arrangements by Cline

It was reported today that when the first hold arrangements on the arms matter were made in 1972, Ray Cline, then chief of the State Department's intelligence office, told members of one intelligence group that he "must keep Rogers and

Friday, Dec. 19, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Senate Intelligence Panel Plans for Its Successor

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate intelligence committee is drafting legislation to create a successor committee that could pick up any unfinished investigations early next spring. The proposal would create a permanent Senate oversight committee with far-reaching jurisdiction over the CIA and all other intelligence agencies and with investigative authority over spy work conducted by the FBI or any other federal law enforcement agency.

Intelligence committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said the recommendation will be submitted next month—before his committee's final report—and will be scheduled for immediate hearings before the Senate Government Operations Committee.

"Now is the moment for reforms," Church said in an interview. "If we wait, the shock effect of the revelations we've made will wear away."

He said he hopes for Senate action on the bill by March 1, the day after his committee is scheduled to complete its work. The legislation would also require action by the House, since the proposed new committee would have statutory authority.

"The committee would then have powers beyond what a Senate resolution could confer," Church said. "For example, the legislation would

impose an affirmative duty on the CIA to keep the committee fully advised of all significant activities."

Other senators on the Church committee have privately voiced concern that their investigation is being wrapped up too quickly, to meet Church's desires to run for the presidency.

Staff investigations into a number of areas, ranging from the super-secret National Security Agency to problems of executive branch "command and control" over the intelligence community, have received only limited exposure at public hearings.

Church insisted that enough momentum for reforms has already been generated and that no further public hearings are needed. The committee is scheduled to spend its last 2½ months behind closed doors. New public disclosures are to be limited to printed reports.

"There'll never be a point where we can finish this work," Church said of the abuses that might be uncovered. "We've already extended our charter six months past the original (Sept. 1 expiration) date. The function of the committee has been discharged when we have sufficient basis for legislation, for reforms. If Congress follows through with an oversight committee, that committee will have the time to devote to any unfinished business."

The permanent oversight legislation, still being drafted, would put the new Senate committee in charge of all laws, including budget authorizations, for the CIA, the NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and all other agencies devoted to strategic intelligence. The oversight committee would, for example, take over the confirmation hearings for CIA director, now handled in the Armed Services Committee.

For the FBI and other law enforcement agencies now largely under the Judiciary Committee, the Church committee is considering asserting only the power to investigate their intelligence-gathering activities.

The House could amend the bill to provide for a joint congressional oversight committee, but Church indicated that he thought it safest to propose only a Senate committee.

The House intelligence committee, headed by Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), is expected to submit its final report and recommendations at the end of January, including perhaps a joint oversight committee. Its proposals may run into far heavier opposition. It seems likely, however, that the House would let the Senate set up whatever kind of committee it wants.

Johnson informed about" all substantive findings on the arms issue.

He asked for clearance to do so and was, in effect, told to handle the matter informally. Mr. Cline was one of the men who testified today.

Mr. Cline said his concern with the "hold-down system" was that it did not have "certain checks and balances" that would rule out the possibility of "suppression of information unattractive to policy-makers."

This has been the thrust of the investigation by the committee headed by Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk. It has conducted several hearings on whether Mr. Kissinger and others in government and the intelligence community could withhold vital data from the President, thus affecting his decision-making.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 Dec. 1975

Cuban Party Talks Open With Castro Accusing the C.I.A.

MIAMI, Dec. 17 (AP)—Prime Minister Fidel Castro opened the First Cuban Communist Party Congress before more than 3,000 delegates and 86 foreign delegations in Havana today by listed crimes he said had been carried out against his country by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

"The Central Intelligence Agency organized dozens of attempts against the lives of the leaders of the Cuban revolution," Mr. Castro said in part of a long, historical account of his regime's 16 years.

Mr. Castro read his statement in an emotionless, steady monotone; it was carried over nationwide radio and television and monitored in Miami.

"Leading members of the Mafia were also contracted for these ends," Mr. Castro said in his first public comment on reports of assassination plots against him.

Among the actions to be taken during the six-day gathering is the adoption of a new Marxist-Leninist constitution, endorsement of the country's first five-year economic plan and appointment of new members of the party's Central Committee.

WASHINGTON POST
14 DEC 1975

Colby Scores British TV Show

By Morton Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA Director William E. Colby went on local public television last night to charge that a British TV program of the agency was "tendentious, partial and biased."

Colby made the charge in an interview on WETA, which had carried the British program, produced by Granada Television, last week.

Replying to a question about assassination CIA Colby told interviewer Paul Duke that it "is not justified, and I've issued directives against it,

and I've turned down suggestions from high officials in the past that that be done. I have no question about that. Certainly it should not be done, except in time of war, of course."

After the interview, which Colby had proposed, a reporter asked him about the suggestions for assassinations he had turned down.

The director made clear that he was referring to a period of time after he became a CIA operations officer 25 years ago, but before President Nixon named him to head the agency.

Colby declined to provide details. He said he had made the statement before and had read it in print, although he could not immediately recall where.

A CIA spokesman who accompanied Colby to the interview said he had been present on occasions when Colby had made the statement to reporters, but could not say where it had been printed.

The Granada Television program was produced several months ago and was shown on public television in New York in September.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Dec. 18, 1975

SALT Data Kept From High

But Secrets Were Shared With Russia, Probe Told

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

High-ranking government officials, including a Secretary of State, have been routinely denied top-secret information even after it has been shared with the Russians, the House intelligence committee was told yesterday.

White House aide William G. Hyland told the committee that he saw nothing wrong with the practice and said it was much less ominous than House investigators seemed to think.

Former State Department intelligence chief Ray S. Cline said, however, that he fought against the system unsuccessfully before leaving the government and said he considered it "contrary" to the 1947 law creating the Central Intelligence Agency.

The practice was applied to intelligence concerning the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation agreement under strict rules laid down by Henry A. Kissinger's National Security Council staff, primarily to guard against "leaks" of such information.

As a result, Hyland acknowledged, in mid-1973

reports of possible Soviet arms control violations were kept from then Secretary of State William P. Rogers and other top government officials even after the Russians themselves had been told of the information in two separate diplomatic notes.

The House committee's staff director, Searle Field, protested repeatedly that the system kept "our people," including officials closely connected with SALT negotiations and monitoring, in the dark without any justification.

"Who were we keeping it (the information) secret from?" Field demanded.

"The people who read the (U.S.) intelligence bulletins," responded Hyland, a former State Department aide to Kissinger and now deputy White House assistant for national security affairs. He contended that there was "no particular need" for Rogers or others, such as the U.S. ambassador in charge of continuing strategic arms negotiations, to have been informed of the possible Soviet violations.

Field pointed out that the information was not even included in the daily intelligence bulletins given President Nixon at the time, but CIA Deputy Director Edward Proctor, who also testified, said Nixon was informed through "other channels."

The secret information at issue concerned the detection of Soviet construction of several silos in June, 1973, while Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev was visiting the United States. It later turned out that the silos were not for missiles.

Proctor wrote a three-page memo to the acting CIA director on July 13, 1973, expressing growing concern about the information's being kept in a tightly restricted "hold" status for so long. He said he thought "a strong case" could be made at that point for informing, at the least, Rogers, SALT ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, and the top officials of the standing consultative commission that had been set up to deal with arms control compliance.

Apprehensive that the furor over the Watergate scandal and other problems may have left Nixon unaware of the problem, Proctor also recommended that Kissinger be pressed for assurances that "he has informed or will inform the President of this situation and the concerns it generates."

Officials

The testimony at yesterday's hearing indicated that Ambassador Johnson and Sidney M. Graybeal, the arms control agency's special assistant for SALT, were subsequently brought up to date, but that Rogers may never have been.

Both Hyland and Proctor said that the restrictions on arms-control information stemmed from an agreement that there be no public disclosures of suspected violations until the Russians had been queried first.

The two witnesses also contended that in practice it was assumed that the underlings at the State Department, such as Cline, who were privy to such information, would inform their superiors about it even though this was not, on paper, permissible.

Cline denounced such logic and said it overlooked the fact that a system denying the Secretary of State information he "had every right to have" had been established.

Although he could have ignored it and informed Rogers, he said, "any violation of instructions from the White House were met with great wrath from the National Security Council staff."

JOURNAL, Lansing, Mich.
29 November 1975

Next job: Rebuilding the CIA

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has good reason to be upset about ongoing investigations of the strange past activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some recent revelations made by the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence not only have been extremely damaging to the CIA's credibility but also could have a strong impact on the nation's foreign policy.

Kissinger, obviously concerned about the future of detente policies, told a Detroit audience the other day it was time for Congress to direct its attention away from "disruptive" investigations of

intelligence agencies and toward an aggressive detente policy as well as a strong defense policy.

President Ford has also been stressing that the nation's foreign intelligence system, whatever the problems of the past, must not be damaged beyond repair in the present investigations.

Certainly the CIA needs some regrouping and a chance to repair the damage resulting from recent public testimony about past CIA operations, including a series of assassination plots.

The nature of some of the plots apparently proposed but never carried out against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro were so bizarre that one wonders what kind of mentality dreamed up such measures and how they were given any serious thought in such a formidable intelligence organization.

The CIA has rightly been put through the meat grinder. But, as Kissinger suggests, it is time to start trying to put the pieces back together. We hope Congress will do that, and a first step would be the re-establishment of a tough congressional committee to oversee CIA operations so that such abuses of power can never happen again.

It is also essential that a weeding out process take place to fire any of those still around who played any major role in the clandestine assassination plots. We hope the Senate committee will start moving in that direction soon.

Los Angeles Times Wed., Dec. 17, 1975

'Close Friend' of JFK Linked to Mafia Figures

BY JACK NELSON and RONALD J. OSTROW
Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—The Senate Intelligence Committee's report on CIA assassination plots disclosed that President John F. Kennedy had a "close friend" who also associated with two underworld figures that were principals in one death plot.

But the report concealed that the friend was a California woman, Judith Campbell Exner, who in response to recent reports of her relationship with Kennedy has called a press conference for today in San Diego.

Officials of the Senate committee Tuesday confirmed published reports that the friend was a woman who met Kennedy—then a senator—at the 1960 Democratic convention in Los Angeles, which nominated him for the Presidency.

She was in contact with him frequently thereafter, according to the Senate committee reports. It said that records showed a total of 70

telephone calls between her and the White House over 54 weeks in 1961 and 1962.

The woman was identified by a committee source Tuesday as Mrs. Exner, a dark-haired artist who, according to her attorney, has been living in San Diego for the past year.

The committee discovered Mrs. Exner's relationship with Kennedy while investigating a Central Intelligence Agency plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. The plot involved two underworld figures, Sam Giancana and John Rosselli, who the FBI learned were friends of Mrs. Exner.

Giancana, a Chicago Mafia leader, was murdered last June shortly before he was scheduled to testify before the Senate committee. Rosselli, once a protege of Giancana, testified in secret session about a week after Giancana's slaying.

Both Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Ida.) and Vice Chairman John G. Tower (R-Tex.) denied Tuesday that there had been any effort to cover up any information pertinent to the committee's assassination enquiry.

Church said that there was no evidence that the woman knew anything about the plot against Castro and that "no one on the committee thought that the President's personal relationships with her, whatever they were, were the proper business of the committee.

"We would have been accused of being salacious and sensational and rumor-mongering if we had tried to go into personal relationships and it would have been highly improper," Church said. "Any attempt to characterize the report as a coverup is really outrageous."

The Senate committee's two-page reference to Kennedy's "close friend" in its 347-page assassination report went largely unnoticed when the report was issued Nov. 20. Attention focused on the committee's central findings that the CIA under four American Presidents had plotted the death or overthrow of five foreign leaders.

Kennedy's telephone contacts with Mrs. Exner were cited in a section of the report entitled, "Did President Kennedy learn anything about assassination plots as a result of the FBI investigation of Giancana and Rosselli?"

The report concluded that there was no way to know for sure, but said that Kennedy could have learned about the Castro plot from the FBI investigation.

Shortly before the committee's report was released last month the Washington Post and Scripps-Howard newspapers reported that the committee had established a link between Kennedy and a Judith Campbell. The news accounts also mentioned her relationship with Giancana and Rosselli and said that the committee was attempting to determine whether Kennedy could have learned from her about a CIA plot to kill Castro.

The report, however, gave few clues to the identity of Kennedy's "close friend," mentioning neither sex nor age.

That prompted New York Times Columnist William Safire to charge Monday that the committee "has attempted a coverup from the government's end; the Mafia, by silencing Giancana forever, has clamped down the lid from its end."

Safire, who served in the White House under former President Richard M. Nixon, said it was "the public's business" when a President shares a close friend with a Mafia figure selected by the CIA to arrange the assassination of

Castro.

Church denied Safire's charge of coverup.

Mrs. Exner, who was in her mid-twenties when she first met Kennedy, testified in close session that she had no knowledge of any assassination plot against Castro. Rosselli also testified that the woman had no knowledge of the plot.

Rosselli could not be reached for comment Tuesday, but a source close to him said, "Rosselli became very annoyed at the committee for trying to defame American womanhood and the reputation of a past President."

The source said that Rosselli refused to answer some questions about the Kennedy-Exner relationship.

The committee report noted that all living CIA officials who were involved in the underworld assassination attempt or who were in a position to have known of the attempt had testified that they never discussed the assassination plot with the President.

By May, 1961, however, the President's brother, Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had reason to know that Giancana was involved in the plot, the committee reported.

Although there was no evidence to indicate that anyone in the FBI had concluded that Giancana was involved, the report continued, the committee uncovered "a chain of events . . . which would have given Hoover an opportunity to have assembled the entire picture and to have reported the information to the President."

The committee reported that it had evidence indicating "that a close friend of President Kennedy had frequent contact with the President from the end of 1960 through mid-1962. FBI reports and testimony indicated that the President's friend was also a close friend of John Rosselli and Sam Giancana and saw them often during this same period."

Mention of the telephone calls between Kennedy and his friend was made in a footnote:

"White House telephone logs show 70 instances of phone contact between the White House and the President's friend whose testimony confirms frequent phone contact with the President himself."

On Feb. 27, 1962, the report continued, Hoover sent identical copies of a memorandum to the attorney general and Kenneth O'Donnell, special assistant to the President, stating that an FBI investigation of Rosselli had shown that Rosselli had been in contact with the President's friend.

"The memorandum also reported that the individual was maintaining an association with Sam Giancana, described as 'a prominent Chicago underworld figure,' the report said.

"Hoover's memorandum also stated that a review of the telephone calls from the President's friend's residence revealed calls to the White House. The President's secretary (Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln) ultimately received a copy of the memorandum and said she believed she would have shown it to the President."

(Mrs. Lincoln, interviewed Tuesday by The Times, said she received a copy of the memo from O'Donnell, but could not recall sending it to the President and so testified before the Senate committee. O'Donnell told The Times that he never sent a copy of the memo to Mrs. Lincoln and did not believe the President ever knew about it).

The committee reported that the association of the President's friend with the "hoodlums" and "that person's connections with the President was again brought to Hoover's attention in a memorandum preparing him for a meeting with the President planned for March 22, 1962."

By that time, the FBI's files on Giancana contained information disclosing Giancana's connection with the CIA as well as his involvement in the Castro assassination plot, the committee reported.

Hoover and President Kennedy had a private luncheon on March 22, but there is no record of what happened at the luncheon, the committee said. According to White House logs, the last telephone contact between the White House and the woman occurred a few hours after the Kennedy-Hoover luncheon.

Although what actually happened at the luncheon may never be known because both principals are dead, the committee said that one topic presumably was that the President's friend was also a friend of Giancana and Ros-

selli and that this "raises several possibilities."

"The first is, assuming that Hoover did in fact receive a summary of FBI information relating to Giancana prior to his luncheon with the President, whether that summary reminded the director that Giancana had been involved in a CIA operation against Cuba that included 'dirty business' and further indicated that Giancana had balked about an assassination attempt against Castro.

"A second is whether Hoover would then have taken the luncheon as an opportunity to fulfill his duty to bring this information to the President's attention."

Still theorizing, the committee mentioned in a footnote that if Hoover had so notified Kennedy, the President "might then have inquired further of the CIA. The Presidential calendar indicates that the President had meetings at which most CIA officials witting (sic) of the assassination plot were present during the period from February 27 through April 2, 1962. All of those persons, however, have testified that the President never asked them about the assassination plot."

Mrs. Lincoln told the Times that when the President's friend (Judith Campbell, now Mrs. Exner) telephoned the White House, "I never put any of her calls through to the President."

She said she so testified before the Senate Committee. "She was a campaign volunteer and she called many times, but I don't think there are records that the President ever talked to her at the White House, although I did put through calls from her to him when he was in the Senate."

"I have no way of knowing what she did or how she came to know him," Mrs. Lincoln said. "She was just one of many, many workers in the campaign. He was a very attractive man, you know, and there were a lot of girls who wanted to work for him."

Mrs. Lincoln said the woman "called so many times she became a pest," but that she always accepted her calls and talked to her until receiving the FBI memorandum following the Hoover luncheon with President Kennedy on March 22.

"I've never seen the girl, you know," Mrs. Lincoln said,

"She would just call in and want to know how the campaign was going."

However, a committee source said that the relationship between Kennedy and the woman was much closer than that and that there was ample evidence they had been in frequent contact. The source indicated that the committee thought Mrs. Lincoln's testimony was somewhat colored by her close association and deep loyalty to Kennedy.

Some other former aides to Kennedy questioned whether Campbell's calls were put through to the President and said they could not recall Hoover's memorandum on Campbell and the underworld pair.

"I never would have given that memo to the President of the United States," said O'Donnell, who was a special assistant to Kennedy and the man who controlled the flow of persons into the oval office.

"The Russians were stopping our convoys, there were problems in Cuba, in the Congo and all over the world," O'Donnell said. "I really thought the FBI director and the attorney general could handle organized crime."

While O'Donnell said he had no recollection of any Judith Campbell, he added that he thought Dave Powers, another long-time Kennedy aide, had met the woman.

Powers, now curator at the Kennedy library in Waltham, Mass., said O'Donnell was wrong.

"I've always been a name man, and I never, ever met her," Powers said. "The only Campbell I ever met was on a soup label."

Powers said that when Senate committee investigators examined White House logs of telephone calls, now stored at the library, he saw no indication the calls went beyond Mrs. Lincoln and into the President's office.

John Stewart, chief archivist at the library, studied some of the logs Tuesday and said: "We have no way of telling (from the logs) whether the calls went through directly or indirectly to the President."

"It's our impression that Judith Campbell's name only appeared on Evelyn Lincoln's logs," and not on Kennedy's, he said. He added, however, that this did not take into account any calls Mrs. Lincoln decided to pass through to Kennedy, an act that would not have resulted in a log entry.

NEWS & OBSERVER, Raleigh
24 November 1975

New Intelligence Agency Needed

The Central Intelligence Agency's reputation is in such a shambles that it's hard to see how a change in leadership alone can make it credible and effective again. What America's foreign intelligence function appears to need is such thorough change in oversight, leadership and internal accountability procedures — even if 50 per cent of its staff is retained — that a new agency name would be justified.

The grisly climax of the wave of CIA disclosures came on Thursday with release of assassination-plot findings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The panel did not quite nail down connections between presidents and CIA efforts to murder foreign politicians. Evidence of White House sanction was very strong in several cases, however. And the findings do show, beyond doubt, that the CIA saw assassination as an appropriate

tool, and was quite willing to use it.

Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi is contemplating criminal charges against those involved in the plots. If the law permits, Levi should proceed, by all means. Unless the participants were brainwashed robots, they should have known they were doing wrong. Those still alive (several are not) should be held accountable.

Still, there's no use pretending that this mess can be tidied up with prosecution of a few individuals or with passage of laws recommended by the Senate committee. It's clear that the any-means-to-our-ends attitude got the entire CIA in its grip. Otherwise we wouldn't now be confronted with the long list of CIA transgressions at home and abroad; wiretapping, tampering with mail, nightmare drug experiments, interference in other nations' elections, poison-boarding,

murder schemes and, on top of all that, notorious intelligence-gathering failures in several cases. The mentality so clearly at work in the CIA, from top to bottom, requires a drastic antidote.

The Senate panel's report ought to trigger the most serious look at the proper role of intelligence in U.S. defense and foreign policy. For that role, a new agency seems appropriate. This would not be just another CIA with a different name; but an agency operating under a new charter and with firm guidelines on what it could or could not do to carry out its function.

It would be no simple chore remodeling the agency and providing for sufficient control of it by the White House and the Congress. But this probably is the only adequate response to the catalog of CIA wrongdoing published by the congressional inquiries.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 2 DEC 1975

Justice Hires Lawyers for CIA Suits

Outside Help Is Provided Officials in Mail Opening

By Orr Kelly

Washington Star Staff Writer

Nine private lawyers have been hired by the Justice Department to represent 34 present and former government officials who are being sued for damages because of their alleged participation in CIA mail-opening programs.

The lawyers will be paid from \$50 to \$75 an hour under contracts negotiated by the department.

Some of those involved in the mail-opening program are also the subjects of a criminal investigation, a department spokesman said today. If any of those under investigation should be indicted, their government-sponsored representation in the civil suits would be cut off.

THE DEPARTMENT announcement said the decision to hire the private attorneys is consistent with a policy under which present and former employees are represented in cases involving actions they took while they were federal officials.

The decision to hire the private attorneys was made after Asst. Atty. Gen. Rex E. Lee, who is in charge of the civil division, determined that it would be a conflict of interest for the department to represent the individuals in civil cases while a criminal investigation is under way.

The CIA has confirmed that it opened mail between the United States and Communist countries for about 20 years, from 1953 to 1973. The largest single recipient of information from the opened mail — 57,846 items — was the FBI.

Those named in lawsuits filed in Providence, New York City and San Francisco include CIA Director William E. Colby, his immediate predecessors, James R. Schlesinger and Richard Helms, and a number of other CIA officials. Also named in the suits are top postal officials of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations as well as Justice Department, FBI and White House officials of those administrations.

THE WASHINGTON lawyers are Jon T. Brown and J.R. Weill, of the law firm of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg & Palmer; Plato Cacheris, of the firm of Hundley, Cacheris & Sharp; Alan Y. Cole, of the firm of Cole & Groner; Charles R.

Donnenfeld, of the firm of Arent, Fox, Kinter, Plotkin & Kahn, and William E. Nelson.

The lawsuits were filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and Grove Press after the Rockefeller Commission and the Senate

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Dec. 19, 1975

Family Accepts \$1 Million In Death of CIA Biochemist

By B. D. Colen

Washington Post Staff Writer

The family of a civilian biochemist who died in 1953 following his participation in a CIA drug experiment has agreed to drop all claims against the government in return for a payment of \$1.25 million and the release of all CIA files concerning the case.

The attorney for the family of the late Dr. Frank R. Olson issued a statement yesterday for Olson's widow and three grown children in which the family said it has been "assured by the administration that all of the agencies concerned, including the Department of Justice and the CIA, fully support (legislation to provide the money) as a fairly arrived at settlement of our claim."

Olson plunged to his death from a 10th floor New York hotel window about a week after being given LSD as part of a CIA experiment without his knowledge. His family was never told the cause of his death, and was paid \$150,000 in death benefits over the 22 years.

A spokesman for Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) said yesterday that Mathias, Sen. J. Glen Beall Jr. (R-Md.) and Rep. Goodloe Byron (D-Md.) plan to introduce a private bill after the Christmas recess to provide the compensation to the Olson family.

The settlement calls for the money to be divided equally among Olson's widow, Alice, two sons, Eric and Nils and daughter, Lisa.

Attorney David Rudovsky refused to say how much he will be paid, other than to say that the bill will limit attorneys' compensation to 10 per cent of the settlement. The family's portion of the money will be tax free, Rudovsky said.

In its statement the Olson family said it had originally sought to "institute legal proceedings aimed at obtaining:

—Monetary damages for (Frank Olson's) wrongful death and for the following 22

years of governmental deceit and misrepresentation;

—Full disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the death of Frank Olson;

—Formal acknowledgement from the United States government that the drug experimentation practiced by the CIA was illegal and unconscionable.

"At the same time," the Olsons said in their statement, "we sought to find a way to express our outrage over the CIA's actions. The disclosure of the true facts concerning Frank Olson's death and the CIA cover-up was, to put it simply, staggering to us, and, judging from the public response, to the American people as well. We intended, therefore, that the steps we took in this case would help us to focus public concern upon the political and moral issues surrounding the activities of the CIA."

For 22 years the Olsons had no real idea why Frank Olson, a usually happy, outgoing and loving father, plunged through a closed 10th story hotel window on Nov. 28, 1953.

For 22 years the Olsons had refused to believe that Frank Olson had simply committed suicide, and had wondered what really caused his death. Last June 11, when Alice Olson read the Rockefeller report on CIA activities, she began to understand.

In the report Mrs. Olson read that "on one occasion during the early phases of this (drug experiment program) (in 1953), LSD was administered to an employee of the Department of the Army without his knowledge while he was attending a meeting with CIA personnel working on the drug project . . . He developed some serious side effects and was sent to New York with a CIA escort for psychiatric treatment. Several days later, he jumped from a tenth floor window of his room and died as a result."

Mrs. Olson knew her husband had acted moody and withdrawn during the last week of his life. And she knew that the last time his family saw him, Frank Olson was

being driven away in a CIA-supplied car. When she then spoke to Olson's former boss, Col. Vincent Ruwet (USA-ret.), Alice Olson learned that her husband was the man mentioned in the Rockefeller report.

The Olson family held a press conference to tell the story of Frank Olson and the CIA's role in his death.

After the revelations by the Olsons, news articles reported that thousands of persons, both knowingly and unwittingly, had been participants in CIA and armed forces experiments with hallucinogenics and other drugs.

The Olsons had originally said they were going to file a multi-million dollar suit against the government in the hope of collecting damages for Olson's death and in the hope of revealing more about the CIA's drug experiments.

Rudovsky said the family decided to settle the suit because they succeeded in eliciting an acknowledgement that the experiments were "illegal and unconscionable" during a meeting with President Ford and then CIA Director William Colby, because the family and the government agreed to release the information and because litigation would be long, costly and might, ultimately, fail.

In his statement yesterday Sen. Mathias said "we cannot erase the years which (the Olsons) have endured under the cloud for which government agencies have a clear responsibility. We can, however, show that our government is capable of admitting its own injustices and taking steps to right the wrongs for which its own officials are to blame."

Sen. Beall said that " . . . the willingness of the Administration (to agree to the settlement) will do much to eradicate the stain of tragedy and to insure that no other American family is ever again victimized by thoughtless acts and calculated duplicity on the part of its own government."

Intelligence Committee revealed that the CIA had carried on a long-term mail-opening operation in which thousands of letters to and from the Soviet Union and China were opened and their contents photographed.

WASHINGTON STAR

13 DEC 1975

It's Really Been a Year for Trimalchio and the CIA

By Trimalchio

It's been a brutal year for the CIA what with one thing and another, and while Trimalchio has no wish to bring succor to the Company, he feels obliged to let the cards fall where they may. And in this instance that means bringing some good news to the embattled agency out in Langley.

Fellows, with only a reservation or two Trimalchio Jr. wants to stand up and be counted in your corner. He doesn't go whole hog and come right out and say that sending Fidel a box of poison cigars was a helluva brainstroke, or that forming a limited partnership with the Mob was a nifty inspiration, but he does think you guys have been getting a bad rap. And what's more, as far as Trimalchio knows, Trimalchio Jr. has never read a newspaper column, so his position on the

CIA appears to owe no debt to the ruminations of William F. Buckley and other editorial page apologists.

WHAT TRIMALCHIO Jr. says is this: "Okay, getting rid of the CIA may not be a bad idea, but are the Commies going to get rid of the KGB? I mean, look at it this way, if the Commies come up with all the atomic secrets, that's the ballgame. Now as far as domestic snooping is concerned that's the FBI's job, isn't it? And since the FBI's speciality is kidnapping cases and that sort of stuff, I can see why the CIA figured the FBI wouldn't be any good doing domestic snooping on the atomic secrets front. The thing is, the CIA needs a better brand of agent, that's all. The guys they got now, well, they seem a little screwy, if you get my meaning."

These and other reflections on the intelligence community were induced by a recent \$7 father-and-son outing to the Cinema to catch "Three Days of the Condor." Now, as readers are doubtless aware, this flick hardly qualifies as a recruitment device for the CIA; indeed, if the audience chortles over the film's digs at the Agency are any guide, part of the movie's commercial success may well derive from the fortuitously baleful view it takes of CIA activity.

THE PLOT concerns a CIA employe code-named Condor whose job is analyzing the plots of espionage thrillers and detective stories to see if they contain any wrinkles that might be of interest to the agency. Condor, played by Robert Redford, leaves his scholar's cubicle in the office one day, runs around the corner to grab a carryout lunch for his officemates and returns to find that all of them have been mysteriously wiped out by sub-machine gun carrying intruders. It soon develops that this massacre of harmless agency technicians and white-collar bureaucrats has been ordered from within the Agency and Condor spends the rest of the flick on the run, attempting to figure out who is trying to bump him off and why.

The movie employs the paraphernalia and trappings that in another age were used to glorify the CIA and James Bond's British Secret Service. The government spooks drive around in vast chauffeur-driven limousines, merely press a button

for door to door helicopter service, spend their off hours in baronial estates. The camera lovingly dwells on the complicated technological gear at the Agency's disposal. The same old spy hype, except that in this instance the whole power of the CIA is bent on destroying one of its own loyal minions. So this is not the ordinary espionage puffery thriller a la James Bond and Matt Helm, not even the psychological espionage thriller of betrayal a la Graham Greene and John le Carre. It is the thriller as political allegory, and for that reason it has something of the immediacy and superficiality of today's headlines.

THE WEAKNESS of allegory lies in its impersonality, its mechanistic

treatment of fixed ideas, preferably ideas of some magnitude and universality. And if Trimalchio was willing to grant the premise of the CIA's antihuman menace, he was nevertheless unwilling to concede its overriding seriousness.

That flawed the movie for him, made its attempts to present an important allegorical statement a bit strained. He had, however, grown up in an era when the CIA was riding high, when journalism and pop culture so exalted the agency as to make it ridiculously overdone, unworthy of serious consideration.

Trimalchio Jr., on the other hand, had never known the mythology of American innocence. His idea of the cowboy came

not from Zane Grey, but from "McCabe and Mrs. Miller." To him the FBI was the government agency in charge of spying on Martin Luther King. As for the CIA, if it spent part of its time orchestrating schemes to waste its own employes, well, the KGB wasn't perfect either. Oh sure, he was pulling for Robert Redford all the way, but that didn't mean that the CIA was all bad, just because of one isolated booby. To him "Three Days of the Condor" wasn't allegory, just realism, part of a world he never made, and has no trouble living with.

Trimalchio is a Washington-based pleasure seeker with a monthly entertainment budget of \$30.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
11 DECEMBER 1975

Undercover Needs Cited By Bundy

WASHINGTON—Some CIA covert operations have cost more than they were worth, but others may be needed to check international terrorism and nuclear danger, McGeorge Bundy, former special aide to President Lyndon B. Johnson, said yesterday.

Bundy, head of the Ford Foundation, also told the House Select Committee on Intelligence that the agency's covert branch might be improved by reducing its size.

Bundy, one of the architects of U.S. policy in the Vietnam war, warned against eliminating all covert activities.

"It is at least worth consideration whether there may not be need for some highly secret activity in emerging fields like those of international terrorism and nuclear danger,"

Bundy said.

"I find it hard to exclude the possibility that in these fields, situations could arise in which covert action of some sort would be the least evil choice available," Bundy said.

He said past CIA activities in assassination plotting were "inexcusable and unauthorized."

However, he said, such operations as the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and Cuba, although "in direct opposition to international law," were critically important for intelligence collection.

"The strategic arms race of the 1950s and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 would have been enormously more dangerous without covert intelligence overflights," Bundy said.

Nicholas Katzenbach, former undersecretary of state and Justice Department official in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, said "abandoning secret activities abroad would help to restore public confidence in government in this country."

Katzenbach also said that "the public revelation of past CIA activities, while essential to restoring confidence in government in this country, has done much to destroy the CIA's capacity successfully to conduct covert activities abroad."

The Washington Star Thursday, December 18, 1975

How CIA Helped Torpedo An Onassis-Saudi Oil Deal

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate Intelligence Committee has learned the CIA played a secret role in a successful effort by U.S. oil companies to break a rich shipping contract which Aristotle Onassis negotiated with Saudi Arabia.

Robert Maheu, whose ties with the intelligence community go back to World War II, testified that he worked closely with the CIA in a complex international campaign to undermine the deal between Onassis and King Saud.

Maheu said his techniques included planting a hidden microphone in a room occupied by Onassis and using an Italian newspaper secretly owned by the CIA to float stories damaging to the Greek tycoon.

Although the action took place more than 20 years ago, the CIA's part in it has never been disclosed. The Intelligence Committee hinted at the story in a footnote to its assassination report last month, but the lawmakers decided to withhold most of the details.

MAHEU TESTIFIED for more than five hours to a closed-door committee session July 30. The transcript has never been released.

A committee aide said the campaign against Onassis was considered only tangential to the assassination investigation. He said the committee might give additional consideration to the events when it probes the CIA's use of newspapers and other communications media.

According to the assassination report, Maheu testified that he "provided impetus for termination of the (Onassis) contract by publicizing its terms in a Rome newspaper which he said he had been purchased with CIA funds." The newspaper was not named, but the committee has learned that the CIA purchased several newspapers in Italy, France and Germany following World War II.

In addition to revealing secret CIA participation in the effort to break the contract, the incident provides a case study of Maheu's method of operation. Although never an acknowledged CIA official, Maheu performed a variety of tasks for the agency, serving as the go-between who recruited mobsters Sam Giancana and John Rosselli for a series of plots on the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

The committee concentrated on Maheu's partici-

pation in the Castro plot, treating other matters only as side issues or footnotes. But the report makes it clear that Maheu frequently made use of his relationship with the CIA, sometimes capitalizing on it for his own private benefit.

THE REPORT said, "Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Sen. Edward Long's committee investigating invasions of privacy in 1966.

According to the (CIA) inspector general's report, when Maheu learned that the committee intended to call him, he exerted pressure on the agency in a variety of ways — suggesting that publicity might expose his past sensitive work for CIA. . . the Long committee did not call Maheu to testify."

The committee's report did not mention Onassis by name. But sources outside of the committee identified Onassis as the person involved. This was subsequently confirmed by a committee source.

The Onassis story involves several of the world's richest men and some of its most powerful

corporations. The main characters are Onassis, the late business magnate who married President John F. Kennedy's widow and enjoyed the friendship of powerful men like Kennedy and Winston Churchill; Saud, the playboy monarch of Saudi Arabia in the 1950s when that nation was just beginning to realize the potential of its vast oil reserves; and Stavros Niarchos, Onassis' brother-in-law and arch-rival for mastery of Greek shipping and other business interests.

Maheu's part also raises the suspicion that Howard Hughes may have played at least a passive role. Maheu became known as an associate of Hughes shortly after the Onassis story had run its course. Hughes is also known to have close ties with the CIA.

MAHEU BROKE with Hughes in 1970 after serving as a top aide for more than a decade. The men are now apparently bitter foes. Maheu recently won a \$12 million libel judgment against Hughes. Hughes appealed the decision and the matter is before the 9th U.S. Circuit Court.

In 1954 Onassis and Saud signed a contract which

gave Onassis a virtual monopoly in transporting Saudi oil in exchange for creating a shipping company which would, in effect, serve as the merchant marine of the desert nation.

The pact was opposed by Aramco — the firm owned by Exxon, Standard of California, Texaco and Mobil, which then dominated Saudi oil production — and Niarchos.

Aramo was concerned that the Onassis contract was intended to clear the way for Saud to nationalize oil production and, in the meantime, would divert cargo away from ships owned by the firm's four parent companies. Niarchos was opposed to any deal that would extend Onassis' power, influence and wealth.

Niarchos hired Maheu as a combination private detective and public relations man to oppose the Onassis deal. Maheu's contract with Niarchos has been known for years. But according to the Intelligence Committee, Maheu cleared his more exotic activities with the CIA before going ahead.

"Maheu testified that, after consulting with the agency, he arranged for a listening device to be placed in the room of the contract holder (Onassis)," the report said.

The Onassis contract was canceled in 1955.

AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Austin
22 November 1975

Get Smart

The Senate Intelligence Committee's report on CIA involvement in plots against foreign leaders exposes the agency to deserved criticism and ridicule.

It is a good thing to have it all out in the open, because the result may be to get the CIA back on the track, gathering intelligence about foreign powers.

Some of the more fanciful CIA plots involved means so ludicrous they would have been rejected by the producers of the "Get Smart" spy spoof television series of a few seasons ago as stretching credulity beyond the breaking point.

Poison pens, fungus-dusted diving suits, bomb-rigged exotic sea-shells, chemicals to make Fidel Castro's beard fall out — all were considered, according to the report.

Perhaps Americans are just not very good at labyrinthine plots or James Bond-type disguised weaponry. We'd settle for expert gathering of intelligence material.

Assassinations are most objectionable during peace time but are perhaps

justifiable during war, in our view.

In any case, contemplation of assassination is serious enough to warrant senior officials being told in clear, unmistakable terms what is up. In that connection, the Senate Intelligence Committee report urges the use of clear, precise language.

The report cited former CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell saying "plausible denial" required subordinates to use circumlocution and euphemism when speaking to senior officials.

The report warned of the dangers of such a doctrine:

"Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. . . It assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out."

Such policies have been instrumental in getting the CIA into its current hot water bath; the dangers of lying to the men at the top cannot be overemphasized.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1975

Report on Alleged U.S. Involvement in Assassinations

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15—Following is the text of a section of the report on alleged United States involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders that was released on Nov. 21 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations:

(1) Did President Kennedy Learn Anything About Assassination Plots as a Result of the FBI Investigation of Giancana and Rosselli?

As elaborated in the previous sections of this report, all living C.I.A. officials who were involved in the under-world assassination attempt or who were in a position to have known of the attempt have testified that they never discussed the assassination plot with the President. By May 1961, however, the Attorney General and Hoover were aware that the C.I.A. had earlier used Giancana in an operation against Cuba and F.B.I. files contained two memoranda which, if simultaneously reviewed, would have led one to conclude that the C.I.A. operation had involved assassination.¹ There is no evidence that any one within the F.B.I. concluded that the C.I.A. had used Giancana in an assassination attempt. The Committee has uncovered a chain of events, however, which would have given Hoover an opportunity to have assembled the entire picture and to have reported the information to the President.

¹The two memoranda, which are discussed in considerable detail supra, were the October 18, 1960, memorandum linking Giancana to an assassination plot (but not mentioning CIA) and the May 22, 1961, memorandum linking Giancana to a CIA operation against Cuba involving "dirty business" (but not mentioning

assassination).

Evidence before the Committee indicates that a close friend of President Kennedy had frequent contact with the President from the end of 1960 through mid-1962. FBI reports and testimony indicate that the President's friend was also a close friend of John Rosselli and Sam Giancana and saw them often during this same period.

²White House telephone logs show 70 instances of phone contact between the White House and the President's friend whose testimony confirms frequent phone contact with the President himself.

³Both the President's friend and Rosselli testified that the friend did not know about either the assassination operation or the wiretap case. Giancana was killed before he was available for questioning.

On February 27, 1962, Hoover sent identical copies of a memorandum to the Attorney General and Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President. The memorandum stated that information developed in connection with a concentrated FBI investigation of John Rosselli revealed that Rosselli had been in contact with the President's friend. The memorandum also reported that the individual was maintaining an association with Sam Giancana, described as "a prominent Chicago underworld figure." Hoover's memorandum also stated that a review of the telephone toll calls from the President's friend's residence revealed calls to the White House. The President's secretary ultimately received a copy of the memorandum and said she believed she would have shown it to the President.

The association of the President's friend with the "hoodlums" and that person's connections with the President was again brought to Hoover's attention in a memorandum preparing him for a meeting with the President

planned for March 22, 1962. Courtney Evans testified that Hoover generally required a detailed summary of information in the FBI files for drafting important memoranda or preparing for significant meetings. (Evans, 8/28/75, pp. 70, 72). The FBI files on Giancana then contained information on disclosing Giancana's connection with the CIA as well as his involvement in assassination plotting. (Memoranda of 10/18/60 and 5/22/61).

On March 22, Hoover had a private luncheon with President Kennedy. There is no record of what transpired at that luncheon. According to White House logs, the last telephone contact between the White House and the President's friend occurred a few hours after the luncheon.

The fact that the President and Hoover had a luncheon at which one topic was presumably that the President's friend was also a friend of Giancana and Rosselli raises several possibilities. The first is, assuming that Hoover did in fact receive a summary of FBI information relating to Giancana prior to his luncheon with the President, whether that summary reminded the Director that Giancana had been involved in a CIA operation against Cuba that included "dirty business" and further indicated that Giancana had talked about an assassination attempt against Castro. A second is whether Hoover would then have taken the luncheon as an opportunity to fulfill his duty to bring this information to the President's attention.⁴ What actually transpired at that luncheon may never be known, as both participants are dead and the FBI files contain no records relating

to it.

⁴The President, thus notified, might then have inquired further of the CIA. The Presidential calendar indicates that the President had meetings at which most CIA officials willing of the assassination plot were present during the period from February 27 through April 2, 1962. All of those persons, however, have testified that the President never asked them about the assassination plot.

On March 23, 1962, the day immediately following his luncheon with the President, at which Rosselli and Giancana were presumably discussed, Hoover sent a memorandum to Edwards stating:

At the request of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, this matter was discussed with the CIA Director of Security on February 7, 1962, and we were advised that your agency would object to any prosecution which would necessitate the use of CIA personnel or CIA information. We were also informed that introduction of evidence concerning the CIA operation would be embarrassing to the Government.

The Criminal Division has now requested that CIA specifically advise whether it would or would not object to the initiation of criminal prosecution against the subjects, Balletti, Maheu, and the individual known as J. W. Harrison for conspiracy to violate the "Wire Tapping Statute."

An early reply will be appreciated in order that we may promptly inform the Criminal Division of CIA's position in this matter.⁵

⁵This memorandum is peculiar in two respects. First, the CIA had already orally objected to prosecution on two occasions. Second, Hoover was quizzing the CIA on behalf of the Department of Justice, a task that would normally be performed by the Department's Criminal Division.

As a result of this request, the CIA did object to the prosecution of those involved in the wiretap case, thereby avoiding exposure of Giancana's and Rosselli's involvement with the Agency in an assassination plot. We now turn to events which occurred during April and May 1962 which culminated in the formal decision to forego prosecution in the wiretap case.

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Dec. 7, 1975.

'Reflections on the CIA Report'

In the article (Editorial Pages, Nov. 28), "Reflections on the CIA Report" James Kilpatrick harps on the theme that in spite of its excesses we should not let the machinations of the CIA become public. He cites the dangerous condition of the world, and says that this justifies concealing their assassination attempts.

How can we keep these things secret? Harry S Truman created the organization and by the time his administration was over it had already gained such notoriety that its excesses were common gossip in the rest of the world. When Castro protested the training of Cuban exiles for an invasion, federal spokesmen tried to laugh it off as the nervous imagination of a frightened dic-

tator.

When the invasion came off—not quite as expected, but still an attempt—everyone began to suspect that foreign gossip is more reliable than federal publicity. Since then enough of this gossip has checked out so that the reports of our legislative committees have hardly been surprising.

The CIA will not be able to save its reputation by muzzling the legislative investigations as long as the rest of the world knows what it is doing.

The United States got along without the CIA for more than 170 years, and during times more hazardous to our nation than we now face. Our common border with Canada, populated in part by the Tories, who had good reason to hate us, was certainly a bigger threat to our then weak government than Russia is to our present military might. We even sur-

vived the Civil War without Britain taking advantage of our weakened condition.

It is quite possible that the international situation would be less threatening if we didn't have the CIA stirring up trouble for us all over the world.

ALFRED LARSON
Temple City

Kilpatrick feels "that in the dangerous world we live in, our leaders must occasionally think unthinkable thoughts; and in the overriding necessity, must not flinch from doing the unthinkable deed." I doubt that it ever occurred to him that these bad elements, along with other bad elements, create and abet a "dangerous world."

MARIO R. CORONA
Pacific Beach

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1975

The President's Friend

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Senators Frank Church and Gary Hart, acting like a couple of frightened men, have been forcing intelligence committee staff members to sign affidavits swearing the staffers were not the source of leaks of the committee's most closely guarded secret.

The secret was hinted at on Page 129 of the committee report on C.I.A. assassination attempts. While straining to show that President Kennedy did not know that the C.I.A. had hired Mafia chiefs John Roselli and Sam Giancana to arrange the assassination of Fidel Castro, the committee report reluctantly and guardedly revealed a Kennedy-Mafia connection.

"Evidence before the committee," the report reads, "indicates that a close friend of President Kennedy had frequent contact with the President from the end of 1960 through mid-1962. F.B.I. reports and testimony indicate the President's friend was also a close friend of John Roselli and Sam Giancana and saw them often during this same period."

The report footnotes that "White House telephone logs show seventy instances of phone contact between the White House and the President's friend whose testimony confirms frequent phone contact with the President himself. Both the President's friend and Roselli testified that the friend did not know about either the assassination operation or the wire tap case. Giancana was killed before he was available for questioning."

There the Church committee hoped the matter would rest. But the reason for the plumbers' operation—complete with threats of perjury and warnings of lie detector tests—was the investigative reporting of Dan Thomasson and Tim Wynaard of the Scripps-Howard Washington bureau.

According to their sources, which they say include F.B.I. documents, "the President's friend" was a beautiful girl who divided her time between the Chicago underworld leadership and the President of the United States. The President's secretary, Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln, is reported to have testified that the purpose of the almost twice-weekly calls over a year's time was to set up meetings between the President and his friend.

The private life of any public figure is nobody's business but his own, and salacious gossip of White House kennelkeepers and self-described intimates can be dismissed as offensive. But when the nation's Chief Executive receives even a few calls from the home telephone of the leader of the Mafia in Chicago, that crosses the line into the public's business.

That is particularly the case when —of all Mafia leaders around—the one with whom the President shared a close friend turns out to be the one whom the C.I.A. selects to handle the arrangements for the assassination of Fidel Castro, and the one who is murdered just before testifying.

F.B.I. documents show that J. Edgar Hoover, whose agents were watching "Momo" Giancana and John Roselli as part of Attorney General Robert Kennedy's war on organized crime, discovered the link between the President and the Mafia leaders. On Feb. 27, 1962, Mr. Hoover alerted Robert Kennedy and aide Kenneth O'Donnell to the associations of the President's friend, and on March 22, the F.B.I. director took another memo on this subject to a luncheon meeting with President Kennedy. After that, the relationship was abruptly broken off. That must have been some lunch.

But substantive questions remain: (1) Since gangland figures are concerned about the liaisons of their girlfriends, did the Mafia figures encourage the girl's White House relationship, and if so, to what end? (2) Did Director Hoover's obvious concern with Mr. Giancana's White House connection suddenly cut off just short of knowledge of the Giancana-C.I.A. plot to get Castro? (3) Why did Mr. Hoover check in with the C.I.A. and then tell a Las Vegas sheriff to stop prosecuting Giancana for wiretapping an unfaithful girl friend—right after his luncheon showdown with President Kennedy?

Too many coincidences here. When Mafia leaders and a President share the same girl's attentions; when those two Mafiosi are chosen to make the hit on a foreign leader by our C.I.A.; when the delivery of poison pellets is made to one of them on the weekend; the President is with the girl in Florida; when the F.B.I. is listening in, and cautioning the President—and when the President winds up murdered by a supporter of Castro, target of the aborted C.I.A. assassination plot, the matter is worth a thorough public examination.

The Church committee has attempted a cover-up from the Government's end; the Mafia, by silencing Giancana forever, has clamped down the lid from its end.

Thanks to the Thomasson-Wynaard reporting, however, the story of the President's friend gives us a useful clue to a related mystery: why the Kennedy men were so ready to acquiesce in the wiretapping and bugging of Dr. Martin Luther King.

The clue: After that luncheon in March 1962, when the F.B.I. director laid out the evidence of the Mafia connections of the President's friend, the Kennedys must have been prepared to do anything and everything J. Edgar Hoover wanted.

WASHINGTON POST

14 DEC 1975

SS Sore Thumb

ON AUG. 4, 1974, the "Hughes Glomar Explorer" and an accompanying barge that looked like an overgrown dairy barn began secretly lowering a giant steel claw to the bottom of the Pacific.

Four days later the law reached and grabbed its prey, a Soviet submarine that had gone down with all hands six years earlier. The object was to lift the sub, complete with its nuclear-tipped missiles and electronic guidance and decoding systems, into the well of the ship and spirit it off to the CIA for dissection.

It was, according to stories that finally surfaced the following March, a \$350 million failure. The sub

after/words

reportedly broke apart on the way up and only a third—a non-essential third—of the sub was salvaged.

There followed a flurry of news stories: the city of Los Angeles tried to hit Howard Hughes' Summa Corp. for \$9 million in back property taxes for the vessel; the government admitted that the Hughes ownership was a ruse.

There was speculation that the Glomar would attempt to ingest the remaining two-thirds of the Soviet sub last summer. But apparently nothing happened. Then the ship began to slip back into mystery.

It went out in August, one story said, to practice on a 16th Century Spanish vessel in the deep near Santa Catalina Island. Then in early September it was reported to have a new secret mission: to scoop up Soviet sensors planted on the ocean floor to spy on the Navy's planned testing of the new Trident missiles.

Since then the ship, its cover blown, has rested quietly at its berth at Long Beach harbor. It sticks out like a sore thumb and can't go anywhere without attracting attention. No one could be found who would shed light on its future.

Jack Nesbit, spokesman for Global Marine, Inc., the ship's Los Angeles builder, said, "We're kept at arm's length and deliberately maintain that position; we're not allowed to be privy to what's going on." He suggested a call to Global Marine Development, the firm's Newport Beach subsidiary which actually operates the ship.

But that was even less productive. "I have no comment on anything," said Curtis Kirk, the firm's president.

The Washington Star Wednesday, December 17, 1975

Surplus Spy Ship: Any Takers?

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

The government is looking around for a way to put the sophisticated and expensive CIA spy ship Glomar Explorer to work. But after all the hoopla, the vessel could wind up in mothballs.

The government itself cannot yet answer the questions raised about the future of the vessel, which aroused attention in March as the centerpiece of an explosive story about its use by the CIA to recover part of a sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific.

A General Services Administration spokesman acknowledged yesterday that the agency has been "asked informally to take a look at the ship and formulate some ideas on possible disposal." But he said "it's too early in the game for us to have anything to say about proposals or whatever."

A GROUP OF government experts toured the vessel in late summer and came away impressed with its potential for advancing knowledge about undersea mining. But the experts also came away with the feeling that the ship would be too costly for any one private purchaser to buy and operate.

The Coast Guard has changed its records to support the federal government's claim that it owns the Glomar Explorer, and that change may affect attempts by local officials in California to collect taxes on the ship as the property of Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation.

But the Los Angeles County tax assessor who is pushing the issue sees the Coast Guard's action as simply another CIA ploy to help Hughes avoid taxation. The claimed tax bill now approaches \$8 million.

According to the reports on the CIA salvage project, ocean exploration and mining for Summa was just a cover story, and the real purpose of the ship was submarine recovery. The Los Angeles tax assessor, however, argues that the Explorer was designed for Summa as a commer-

cial vessel, and should be taxed as such.

THE FORMAL claim of government ownership came in August. Summa and the Coast Guard exchanged letters about the ship in which Summa disclaimed ownership and the Coast Guard said it had decided that the vessel's documentation had been improper all along.

The Coast Guard wrote to Summa that "it is our understanding that the Hughes Glomar Explorer is not and has never been the property of Summa Corporation but is and at all times has been the property of the United States government."

The Coast Guard did the same thing for Lockheed Aircraft Corp.'s Missiles and Space Co., Inc., which had been the registered owner of a barge that worked with the Glomar Explorer.

Los Angeles County Assessor Philip Watson says the Coast Guard shift in documentation amounts to nothing more than the CIA making good on a threat. Watson said he met with CIA representatives in July and cited the Coast Guard records as evidence that Summa owned the ship. Watson said the CIA officials merely announced that the Coast Guard registration would be changed.

"That's the crap they're trying to hand us," Watson said in a telephone interview last night. "We're not buying it."

THE TOUR by non-CIA government experts took place in August, according to Leigh S. Ratiner, head of the Interior Department's Ocean Mining Administration. "We were asked to sort of look it over and see what value it had," says Ratiner, who put together experts from the Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey.

They found a "first-rate ship" with unique ocean mining and drilling capabilities, says Ratiner.

"I don't mean to suggest that it would be a good ocean mining ship because it wouldn't," Ratiner added, however. "It is much too sophisticated.

ed. It's more of a research vessel than it is a commercial-type vessel. It has significant features which would make it particularly useful for the testing of ocean mining recovery systems in very deep water." The target of such mining would be mineral resources such as manganese nodules.

But even given its desirability as a test platform, no one firm could pick up the tab.

RATINER SAYS there's been no decision to sell the Explorer, and even if there were, companies would find it cheaper to rig their own test platforms. One company doing just that is Tenneco Inc.'s Deepsea Ventures, Inc.

Deepsea Ventures was represented when corporate officials from related areas were given their own tour of the ship, during which one participant told Business Week magazine: "Our host was the CIA."

A Deepsea spokesman says the Glomar Explorer is "a first-class ship with all kinds of very sophisticated gear on it." But, the spokesman continues, it is "a very, very expensive ship," one that is too rich for Deepsea Venture's blood. Rather, the firm is presently putting together its own test platform to try out a mining system.

Ratiner says the Glomar Explorer has come available at a time when the industry is on the verge of putting its recovery systems to the test in deep water. He suggests that the Glomar Explorer might be more attractive to private industry if the government operated it and leased it out.

RATINER SAYS it would cost about \$13 million a year just to keep the vessel operating. But, he notes, that cost could be reduced to perhaps \$5 million or less by leasing the ship. Additional costs would be accrued if government programs were operated on the ship. A full-fledged government ocean-mining program could add as much as another \$10 million to the annual cost, he said.

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
11 DECEMBER 1975

Letters to the editor

Thank God for J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI and the CIA, despite their alleged mistreatment of domestic organization and persons. The FBI and CIA may need some guidelines and restraints, but the Russian Communists must be laughing all the way to their bank of ICBMs at the antics of the blabbermouths now gathering on Capitol Hill.

George W. Moore
Glenn Dale, Md.

WASHINGTON POST
12 DEC 1975
Denial in Chile

SANTIAGO—The head of the Chile's Christian Democratic Party denied any involvement by his party with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. A Senate intelligence committee report said the CIA worked with Chilean opponents of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende.

Patricio Aylwin said that although his party opposed Allende, "It was an opposition within the constitutional framework. No one can suppose, under these circumstances, connections with foreign plans to depose that government."

BALTIMORE SUN
11 Dec. 1975

As the CIA squirms the KGB chortles

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Washington.

Almost a year ago the KGB, the huge Soviet espionage conglomerate, received a totally unexpected bonus in its seesaw battle with the Central Intelligence Agency, its American rival.

The CIA director, William E. Colby, fired James J. Angleton, the veteran counter-espionage chief, and three of Mr. Angleton's senior deputies in a power struggle marked by press leaks of suspicious accuracy from the CIA's highest levels.

Mr. Angleton was a veteran of 31 years who had helped detect such top KGB spies as Harold (Kim) Philby and George Blake.

According to Mr. Colby's associates, Mr. Angleton was too independent and too intent on expanding his authority. Moreover, it is said he had developed intimate cooperation with Israeli intelligence, one of the world's best, and both Mr. Colby and Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, had decided to wrest this plum back for themselves.

The abrupt dismissal of Mr. Angleton and his three top aides—Raymond Rocca, Newton Miller and William Hood—represented the loss of more than 100 years' combined experience in possibly the most secret aspect of U.S. government operations: counter-espionage. Without it there can be no true security.

For the last year the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies have been reeling between internal squabbles, press exposes, and vice presidential and congressional investigations.

What has the KGB been doing in the meantime? "Expanding steadily," say those in a position to know, and maintaining a highly professional silence. The controlled Soviet press merely reprinted brief news extracts for the CIA.

A huge, rich and powerful bureaucracy, the KGB numbers 300,000, including border police and internal security detachments. Created in the 1920's, even before the Red Army, it is the U.S.S.R.'s "senior" service and, despite various name changes, has remained all-powerful. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, holds Politburo (Cabinet) rank.

Its colleague service, the GRU, the arm of military intelligence, is smaller, defers to the KGB, and in fact is headed by an ex-KGB officer, Piotr Ivanovich Ivashutin.

Between the KGB and the CIA there is a fundamental difference. The CIA is licensed by the 1947 law creating it essentially to conduct espionage, counter-espionage, and political subversion overseas—not against Americans at home. It would appear, however, that the law has been violated.

The KGB, by contrast, is empowered both to police 200 million Russians at home and also to carry out espionage abroad, counter-espionage, disinformation and "wet affairs" (Soviet jargon for personal violence). It runs two types of spies: "legals" and "illegals."

The "legals" have official cover inside embassy, trade, or airline offices, or even as Soviet newsmen. The "illegals" are the "moles" who burrow deep and stay hidden deep in various private guises for years until activated.

The better trained are virtually undetectable unless betrayed by defectors, and their numbers are unknown. The "legals," however, are easier to follow.

NATO intelligence in 1959 detected 3,500 KGB legals outside the Soviet Union and today has its eyes on, perhaps, 9,000. In the U.S. alone, the United Nations, Washington and in Soviet offices across the country, there were some 300 known legals in 1959; today there are at least 900.

Ever since 1959, specialists say, the KGB has been cooperating closely with services it has trained to high proficiency, such as the ones in Cuba, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Each service relentlessly seeks recruits among its own ethnic refugees in the U.S.

The Western intelligence community, using meticulous record-keeping such as time-tested passport controls, can often track KGB officers from post to post despite false names—or even false beards. Their operating methods are closely studied.

The KGB has a simplistic slogan: "Any American can be bought." The annual visit of more than 130,000 American tourists to the U.S.S.R. makes recruiting easier, although the KGB's main interest lies in American officials such as code clerks or diplomats with access to government information.

College-age Americans ideologically hostile to their own administration also are sought as long-term penetration agents into key government divisions such as the FBI or CIA.

By rough rule of thumb, Western intelligence officials estimate that 40 per cent of Soviet citizens abroad are on KGB assignment. Why so many? Essentially, they say, because espionage is relatively cheap and highly cost-effective. By stealing U.S. military and industrial secrets the U.S.S.R. can save billions of rubles, manpower and time.

"Detente" may be a convenient cosmetic to the political leaders in Washington and Moscow, say the experts; to the intelligence professionals it means nothing. Their work goes on, irrespective of political climates.

Soviet dignitaries who meet U.S. industrialists, bankers, politicians, union leaders, or artists are either KGB graduates or on KGB assignment.

One typical example is Aleksandr Shelepin who has successively headed the Young Communists (Komsomol), the KGB and, latterly, the so-called Soviet trade union movement. In this latest role, his mission was to penetrate and destroy the ICFTU, the non-Communist international trade union movement.

Ostensibly Mr. Shelepin was retired "in disgrace" after a recent visit to Britain where his sinister fame led to noisy protests. But he is reported active again in the KGB "illegals" directorate.

The only effective answer to steady KGB expansion is counter-espionage, say U.S. intelligence veterans: recruiting agents already in the enemy service—admittedly difficult, though not impossible—or luring defectors for their information.

During the "cold war" 1950's and 1960's, defections were frequent and helped the CIA catch such KGB spies as Philby and Blake in Britain, and others in NATO and West Germany.

It was in 1950 that the CIA's Mr. Angleton and his staff ascertained on the basis of defectors' reports that Philby, the British Embassy's liaison man in Washington, was a top KGB agent. But successive British governments were loath to believe it, and not until 1963 did Philby's bluff end in his flight to Moscow.

Today, 25 years after his exposure, Philby is still "in," working for the KGB-controlled press service Novosti on U.S. and British developments. His nemesis, Mr. Angleton, on the other hand is "out."

Starting in the mid-1960's, however—along with the U.S. escalation in Vietnam—defections such as the ones that unmasked Philby began falling off, and with them authoritative insight into the KGB.

Moreover the U.S. intelligence community began squabbling within itself. In 1969 the late J. Edgar Hoover abruptly canceled all FBI liaison work with the CIA on counter-espionage because President Johnson had refused to defend him against wiretapping charges.

The climate of defection has been ruined. Why should a KGB officer come over to us now? They're running ahead—in intelligence work, anyway," said an experienced informant.

LONDON TIMES
2 Dec. 1975

America's new inquisition: Truths that can kill a nation

Washington

The Senate's ultimate let-it-all-hang-out venture in publishing its report on the Government plotting assassinations is based on the supposition that sunshine is the best disinfectant. "The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear the story and to learn from it", Senator Church's committee declared.

A notable dissenter has been Mr William Fulbright. The former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee deplored this need to know complex. In a much-discussed article in the *Columbia Journalism Review* he likened the current relish in the press and Congress for such investigations to a new Inquisition. And, in advance, he treated the revelations themselves, in Giraudoux's words, as possibly "truths which can kill a nation".

Confessing, typically, to a heresy, Mr Fulbright came out of retirement to reach beyond the immediate investigations. He roundly denounced as neo-Puritan a witch hunt which seeks not just to expose for the sake of reform but to punish the wrongdoers.

Since it was Mr Fulbright, after being deceived over the Tonkin Gulf incident, who started the sixties fashion for Congressional exposure, his words have gained more than usual attention. And he is deliberately heretical. He suggested for instance that "it is far from obvious . . . that Watergate will prove to have been as significant for the national interest as President Nixon's extraordinary innovations in foreign policy".

He also refuted the idea that foreign bribery by American corporations was of "cosmic significance" and said it is hypocritical of the country's moralists, once again, to wish to set the world to rights.

Mr Fulbright's main complaint is that the criticism has shifted from policies to personalities, from matters of national consequence to matters of often irrelevant personal morality. He admitted that his own protest against Vietnam engendered current practice. But he said he never construed mistakes of judgment "as acts of premeditated malevolence"—and he expressed concern over the "surge of vindictive emotionalism" which he saw as taking on a life and virulence of its own.

The trouble was that actions had moved to extremes. Where once the press was unquestioning, now it had become "too sweepingly iconoclastic". Where once there was apathy in Congress there was now zeal when all that was needed was reforming legislation.

Mr Fulbright wrote challengingly that even "justified" (his italics) moral indignation "if unrestrained, becomes self-righteous and vindictive and he moved to a provocative conclusion. Given Vietnam and Watergate it had to be questioned, he said, whether it was desirable

'We must
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human
failing and stop
conducting
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to policy'

now "to sustain the barrage of scandalous revelations".

Mr Fulbright sees nothing but cynicism and disillusion, especially after Watergate. He wrote: "The American people are too shaken up by that epic scandal, and their need and desire now are for restored stability and confidence".

Mr Fulbright did not confront the question of whether this attitude itself is not redolent of the cover-up mentality. His point, simply, was that "no one should get everything he deserves—the world would become a charnal house". He appealed for some understanding of human failings.

The remedy, if such it is, lies in the hands of the press. He complained that the substance of issues is neglected in the news for which the crucial ingredient now seems to be "scandal—corporate, political and personal".


He wrote: "We really must try to stop conducting our affairs like a morality play . . . bitter disillusionment with our leaders is the other side of the coin of worshipping them, if we did not expect our leaders to be demigods we would not be nearly so shocked by their failures and transgressions".

He said the "personal qualities of statesmen is relevant only as they pertain to policy, to their . . . capacity as public servants". Freedom can only be maintained if it is exercised with self-restraint he said—because, in the United States, "The press cannot, and should not, be restrained from outside—it bears a special responsibility for restraining itself".

Mr Fulbright, essentially, made an appeal for civility, and what he called a social contract between all the powers in the land not to try lordling it over others. So far his heresy has not led to his burning, nor even to a great counter-clamour. There is a feeling in parts of the press that while it must not shrink from exposure, Mr Fulbright's warning "publish and be damned" does have a chill meaning.

Fred Emery

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
26 November 1975



Barry Norman

Central casting

THE SCENE: CIA headquarters in Washington. The head of that noble organisation picks up the phone. . . . "Yeah? Who? I see. Listen, hang in there a minute, will you, feller? . . ."

Hey George, grab the extension. This is Homer from Havana. It's gonna be good, I promise. . . . Okay. Hi, Homer, how's it going, baby? What? You got a plan for fixing Castro? Why, sure I'm interested. What do you have in mind, Homer?

"Sorry, you're gonna what? You're gonna put poison on his boots to make his beard fall out? Oh boy, that's a lulu, Homer, but. . . . Hey, listen, I got a better idea: why don't we put something in his underarm deodorant to give him athlete's foot? No, Homer, don't get sore. I'm not putting you on, only I don't actually know any guys who clean their boots on their beards but if you're sure that's what Castro does. . . . Oh, you're not sure? But you figure that while there's even an outside chance that he might, then. . . . Yeah, but. . . ."

"No, I do understand, Homer. Hold him up to ridicule, right? Only, see, what I'm thinking is: suppose his beard does fall out and nobody laughs? See what I mean, Homer? All we got then is Castro with a bald head and with our luck that could make him bigger than Kojak. . . ."

"Ah, you thought of that already? You got a contingency plan, right? I knew you'd still be in there pitching, feller. . . . What? . . . Poisoned cigars. Now you're cooking with gas, Homer. Smokes a lot of cigars, does he? Oh, not too many, huh? But you think he smokes some. You're not sure but you think you once saw him smoking a cigar on television? Well, okay, I'll go along with the poisoned cigars and. . . . Sorry? A poisoned diving suit?"

"Okay, hold it, feller: I'm beginning to get the picture. Castro's on the beach smoking his poisoned cigar and wearing his poisoned wet suit, right? Now is this before or after he's cleaned his poisoned boots on his beard? Oh, I see—we forget the poisoned boots. Yeah, well, maybe you're right at that, Homer. I never was too crazy about those poisoned boots. . . ."

"Okay, Castro's on the beach with his poisoned cigar and his poisoned diving suit. He's had his poisoned breakfast already, I suppose. What do you mean, you hadn't thought of a poisoned breakfast? I'm surprised at you, Homer, a CIA operative of your experience. Put it on your list right away, feller. No. 1—poisoned breakfast. No. 2—poisoned. . . . Right, you got it now? Good. So Castro's stomach is killing him because of the poisoned Weetabix, the poisoned cigar is screwing his lungs and he's scratching himself to death on account of the poisoned wet suit. Yeah, well, I like it so far, Homer. But then what?"

"Exploding what? Listen, Homer, I guess this is a pretty bad line. I could—"

The Washington Star Thursday, December 18, 1975

Letters to the editor

CIA probe hurts Cuban friends

The unquestionable right of Congress to investigate the C.I.A. obscures the fact that the report recently made public by a Senate committee about plots against Fidel Castro's life is likely to have serious consequences for men who collaborated in good faith with the United States government, and who are now, because of those activities, in Castro's jails.

Many of these Cubans perceived themselves in the early 1960s as a new "resistance," receiving aid from the United States just like the Free French received aid and plotted with the British and American intelligence services during World War II. To this day, many have refused to provide the Cuban regime with the additional information it has sought.

At least in one famous case, the disguise used by the Senate committee is so transparent that the individual's identity can be easily ascertained by any academic researcher, let alone the Cuban intelligence apparatus. Undoubtedly, the Soviet controlled Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI)

will take note of the senators' report, and in due time use it for the "reviewing" of sentences, which often means additional years in prison after the prisoners have completed their terms.

These men were not convicted of plotting against the life of an ordinary politician; their target is a man responsible for thousands of executions, more than 50,000 political prisoners and 800,000 exiles. And the plotters have paid with years of agony, beatings, denial of medical attention and the persecution of their relatives for their fateful decision.

On the eve of the bicentennial year, it is quite proper for a great

nation to cleanse its soul, giving full exposure to its past mistakes. Care should be taken, however, that in the cleansing process, the errors of the past are not compounded with new infamy.

The senators must now carry forever the responsibility for whatever happens to the men they betrayed, now at the mercy of a ruthless dictator.

Manuel Iglesias,
Chairman, Georgetown University
Cuban Students Association

(NOTE — This letter was also signed by the presidents of Cuban student groups at Fordham, Cornell, and Florida International U.)

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Monday, November 24, 1975

Assassination plots and remedies

No one said the United States of America was perfect. But it does have a self-correcting form of government. And it almost seems to have set out to start its third century with all the sins of the past brought to light so that the future can be brought back into line with the founders' noble vision.

The abhorrent nature of the past governmental abuses most recently disclosed should not blind the world to the fact that in America such abuses still can be made public.

Nor should the American people, seeing the exposed deceptions of Watergate and Vietnam followed by a litany of others, be numb to the Senate intelligence committee's confirmation of assassination plots that had begun to seem like old news.

The committee recognizes that these plots against foreign leaders — during both Republican and Democratic administrations — took place in the Cold War context. This does not justify the plots, as the committee rightly says. But "those involved nevertheless appeared to believe they were advancing the best interests of their country."

What the committee convincingly argues is that the plotters were not advancing the best interests of their country. Not pragmatically — they found, for example, that they could not control dissident groups they encouraged. Certainly not morally.

It is good to hear President Ford's spokesman say that Mr. Ford "absolutely abhors government officials' being involved in consideration of those kinds of things." But Mr. Ford's opposition to releasing the report appeared to contradict his assurances of supporting open government. To make such assurances credible he needs to follow through now in behalf of legislation to correct the misuse of secrecy and secret agencies in the past.

For one of the most alerting findings of the Senate committee was the way government officials, presumably including presidents, sought "plausible deniability." That is, they spoke in euphemisms and ambiguities, so that it was difficult to say who actually authorized what.

This means of evading responsibility must be attacked in the forthcoming legislation. A joint congressional oversight committee, similar to the one on atomic energy, sounds like a good proposal. Other machinery for lines of accountability can help. But the quality of the leadership up and down the line will finally determine whether responsibility for over-seeing secret activities is exercised more effectively than in the past.

Surely, for example, there should be no tacit understandings permitting the CIA to recruit Mafia figures again. The unholy alliance between government and the underworld not only is morally wrong. It also opens the government to blackmail. The committee notes that crime figures in the Castro assassination plot used their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution.

"Crime is contagious," says the committee, quoting former Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court. "If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself."

Thus it has been important for the U.S. to expose wrongdoing within its government, however wrenching and disillusioning the exposures may be. If effective steps are now taken to prevent further abuses, the whole effort will have been worth it in terms of confidence restored and integrity regained. These are weapons more powerful in the world than poison pens and contaminated diving suits.

have sworn you said exploding seashells. You did say exploding seashells? I see. He sells them, right? You're telling me Castro does a little moonlighting on the beach? He sells seashells by the seashore . . . Oh, he doesn't? You just figure on mining all the shells in the hope he might tread on one. . . .

"Well, it could work at that, Homer. Only, see, what if it doesn't? What if he skips breakfast, gives away his cigars, wears a bikini instead of his wet suit and the seashells blow up somebody else—like one of the CIA agents we got crawling all over the beaches down there?"

"Ah, you thought of that, too, I gotta hand it to you, Homer. You're really put in time on this problem. . . . You want what? A nuclear submarine?"

Well, I guess we could manage that but. . . . It what? It comes up on the horizon and fires starshells into the sky? I can see that'll make a pretty sight, Homer, but do you really think we should be giving the Cubans free fireworks displays at this moment in time?

"I'm sorry, what did you say? Castro will see those shells going off and he'll think it's the second coming of who? Of Jesus Christ? And that'll scare the crap out of him?"

"Well, gee, I dunno, Homer. Are you really sure he's that gullible? Look, why don't we just go back to the poisoned boots, huh? On mature consideration, I really think I like the poisoned boots best. I mean, to be honest, feller, I think about the poisoned cigars and the poisoned wet suit and the exploding seashells and the return of Christ and there seems to be a kind of cold logic about those poisoned boots after all. So, listen, Homer: why don't you get off the line and put a little more thought into the boots, okay? Oh, and Homer — don't call us, baby, we'll call you."

NEW YORK TIMES
19 Dec. 1975

CASTRO DECLARES ARMY AIDS ALLIES

Says Cubans 'Shed Blood'
in Foreign Countries

HAVANA, Dec. 18 (Reuters)—Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba speaking for the second day to his party's first congress, received a standing ovation today when he declared that the Cuban Army had "shed blood more than once in other countries threatened by imperialist aggression" and had helped to organize the armed forces and militia of "other progressive countries."

"The history of the world revolutionary movement will recall this example of selflessness and heroism," he said, in an apparent allusion to the Cuban military role in Angola. In Cuba, he added, "every soldier is a revolutionary and every revolutionary a soldier."

In his speech, broadcast on television, Mr. Castro paid an emotional tribute to the Cuban Army and intelligence service, which had protected his life, he said, against "countless foes" and murder plots.

He spoke at length of the Cuban intelligence service's fight against counterrevolutionary groups, sabotage and infiltration organized by the Central Intelligence Agency.

He said the C.I.A. set up an operations center in Miami in 1960 to work against Cuba.

The center organized counter-revolutionary networks and supplied them with equipment and led special missions, Mr. Castro said. After agents were captured and punished, infiltration dropped off substantially after 1965, he went on.

The C.I.A. then ordered its best elements to operate independently in counterrevolutionary groups and the center became inoperative in 1969, the Prime Minister added.

The C.I.A. then turned to longer-term tactics, including economic sabotage, he continued.

Speaking of attempts against him with poisoned pens, explosive sea shells and other "diabolic projects," Mr. Castro said these activities had no precedent in the history of any modern country.

HERALD, Miami
22 Nov. 1975

Ugly Side of Unreined Power Is Revealed in the CIA Report

WITHIN the last half century, a high-ranking official in Washington was astonished at the news of foreign intelligence activities by American agents. "Gentlemen, do not read each other's mail," he sniffed.

There can be no more of that innocence with the release by Sen. Church's Intelligence Committee of a report on activities of the Central Intelligence Agency over the last 20 years. Once only rumored, it now is documented that American intelligence agents had orders from the highest level of government to assassinate foreign leaders and to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.

It is also clear that the billions of tax dollars spent on intelligence missions have also bought the services of some incompetents and weirdos who put to shame TV's Maxwell Smart. When you count the federal tax deductions from your pay check this month, think of that money in terms of what was spent on a CIA plot to dose Fidel Castro with a depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out and deprive him of his macho image. Or that scheme to disguise an explosive device as a large seashell to be planted in waters where the Cuban leader swims.

There is a danger that these situation comedy antics could turn the spotlight from the truly serious revelations of the Senate report.

Every President going back to Dwight Eisenhower is compromised and tinged. Worse perhaps only because of immediacy are the continuing denials by Richard Nixon that he was connected in any way with the misdeeds of the CIA. The current issue of Ladies Home Journal has Mr. Nixon saying, "We had nothing to do with Chile or Allende." That's the same article in which the disgraced President talks

about the need to restore the spirit of America.

The truth is that Mr. Nixon personally ordered the CIA to do anything and everything to prevent the democratic election of Sr. Allende in Chile in 1970. The Senate findings also strip away much of that highbrow mask Henry Kissinger wears when he tries to set himself apart from the grime of the real world. The Secretary of State appears to have been up to his starched collar in the plottings against the Allende regime in Santiago.

We don't see it as a serious threat, but some people may get the idea the CIA should be abolished because of its dirty work against foreign governments and American citizens. It is ridiculous to think that a major power in a fear-some world can survive without an agency to gather intelligence data on both the activities and potential of possible attackers.

That is the role intended for the CIA when it was established in 1947 to pull together the haphazard assortment of intelligence that blossomed during World War II.

It is a role Congress should mandate for the CIA, restricting the agency to that role. The CIA went wrong because it was allowed responsibility for both gathering and evaluating information. It was not a capable or honest judge of its own actions. If you spend a couple million dollars on a spy caper or a plot to overthrow a foreign government, you are not going to second-guess yourself no matter how shoddy the results.

We see a similar danger in proposals to allow the Pentagon to take back responsibility for spying abroad. Military leaders would surely be tempted to manipulate intelligence data for political reasons and to justify increased spending for more and more new weapons systems. That is what happened in Vietnam when intelligence reports on the numbers and strengths of the Viet Cong were doctored to conform to the Lyndon Johnson-Pentagon lies about victory being right around the corner of another 100,000 American troops.



Church

WASHINGTON STAR
17 Dec. 1975

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Wednesday, December 17, 1975

'This was cheap'

News items state that the CIA spent some \$13 million to prevent the election of Allende in Chile and to remove him from office. This was cheap. I wonder how many millions the Communists spent in their attempt to make Chile a satellite of the USSR.

Frank Church, head of the Senate committee investigating the CIA, FBI and other security agencies, was featured on television decrying, in a very emotional voice, the United States' supposed action in the downfall of Allende. He accused former President Nixon of acting in an imperial manner, as did ancient Rome, in interfering with the domestic policies of other nations. He conveniently failed to mention that Allende was a tool of the Communists, working with the active support of Cuba and the USSR to bring Chile under their iron dictatorships.

I venture to estimate that far more Chilean citizens would have been slaughtered had Allende had his way than met their deaths under the present regime.

Otis McCormick,
Col., U.S. Army, Ret.

Arlington, Va.

Criticism that the CIA is receiving about its part in the ouster of the Allende regime in Chile would be ludicrous if it were not so tragic. In a desperate attempt to preserve his increasingly authoritarian regime, Allende imported Cuban thugs to subjugate his own people. The Chilean military reacted against this outside threat to preserve their country from communism. We should applaud any help we gave these patriotic Chileans.

C. T. Hellmuth, C.L.U.
Washington, D.C.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 Dec. 1975

Ford Names Samuel Lewis Assistant Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 (Reuters)—President Ford today named Samuel W. Lewis, a senior State Department official, as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Mr. Lewis, 45 years old, who is deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff, has had extensive experience in Latin-American affairs.

If confirmed by the Senate, he will succeed William B. Bufum who has resigned.

President Ford also named Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, as the new United States Ambassador to Canada. If confirmed, the 44-year-old Mr. Enders will succeed William J. Porter. Recently named Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

And now—laws for FBI, CIA

The congressional intelligence investigation committees have concluded the public-hearing phase of their responsibility. Now, in a sense, the real work begins. They must analyze their findings as a basis for Congress to come up with the appropriate strong and clear legislation to prevent a resurgence of the abuses of the past.

The need for such legislation on the FBI is emphasized by the vagueness of the proposed Justice Department "guidelines" announced by Attorney General Levi. They do put broad limits on FBI methods. But they also appear to expand the limits by legally allowing the FBI to act against groups or individuals before they have committed crimes. This sounds like an authorized revival of the Cointelpro approach, which in its old form had included activities which Mr. Levi himself regarded as outrageous.

Certainly it should be up to Congress to authorize the revival of any such program — with a precise spelling out of what the FBI can or cannot legally do, and with the means to detect and punish violations.

As for the CIA, legislation is also needed to define and oversee proper intelligence and counterintelligence activity. CIA director-designate George Bush said in his confirmation hearings that he would not rule out covert support of political overthrows in other countries or paramilitary operations "in the best interests of the free world," though he would stop short of going along with any presidentially ordered assassination plots against foreign leaders. It is up to Congress, having exposed past abuses in such realms, to

spell out exactly how the country's intelligence needs can be legally and effectively met.

One likely part of the solution is a joint congressional intelligence committee such as Mr. Bush and many others prefer to the fragmented responsibility among many committees. He rightly supports complete frankness with such a committee, which for its part would have to respect legitimate secrecy.

But there should be legislative means to enforce frankness from the intelligence community. The standards for what material, if any, may be properly withheld from the representatives of the people should be defined by Congress. One basic step would be legislative criteria for the classification and declassification of materials in all governmental departments.

But in addition to all the necessary legislative steps there has to be a continuation of the aroused ethical and moral sensitivity to the abuse of government agencies which it now turns out was too dormant not only during Watergate but during at least five previous administrations. Mr. Bush, whose reputation as a politician has been regarded so warily in regard to the CIA directorship, made a point about politics in the best sense that is worth following through on. He suggested that "political judgment" might have avoided some CIA difficulties: "I am not talking about narrow political partisanship. I am talking about the respect for the people and their sensitivities that most politicians understand."

GLOBE, Boston
3 Dec. 1975

... A political ace for CIA

In naming George Bush as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, President Ford has evidently decided to accept some political risks for an institution that is in the throes of deep reexamination, both internally and externally.

George Bush's competence is not an issue. Democrats as well as Republicans have praised his personal qualities. He has showed great energy, imagination and a certain flair for the unexpected in his present job as chief US representative in Peking. His personal integrity stood up commendably during his tenure as national chairman for the Republican Party in the year of Watergate. And he has a proven background as a hard-headed businessman and fine Congressman from Texas.

It is probably unfair that some Democrats have singled out his partisan past as the grounds for categorical opposition to his confirmation as head of the CIA. But that is a fact which the President will have to think about, exactly because of the reorganization crisis facing the agency. There is a danger that departmental nominations may be unduly scrutinized for their partisan content —

and that partisan content may be seen where none exists.

There are distinct plusses in Bush's background. Reorganization will mean compromise and Bush, the political figure, is familiar with that kind of give and take. Morale at the CIA is low because the agency is under attack. But a politician, highly tuned to public accountability, could help bridge the confidence gap between the agency and the public. Twice defeated as a candidate for the US Senate, George Bush has the reputation of being able to play the role of loser with grace and resilience. These are qualities that could be very useful in rebuilding the nation's intelligence agency.

In acting on the confirmation, the Senate ought not assume that Bush's political background automatically disqualifies him for the post. The Senate has every right to explore the question and it should do so in the course of confirmation hearings. That process should help both Congress and the Administration understand just what is expected from Bush in a CIA role. If that happens, the confirmation process will have served a creative purpose.

TIMES, Hartford
28 Nov. 1975

Murder plots disturbing, but not always unwise

There are many aspects of the Select Senate Intelligence Committee's report on Central Intelligence Agency involvement in assassination plots that are deeply disturbing, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to issue a blanket condemnation of the CIA.

The committee conducted an exhaustive investigation and the report obviously was not written lightly, but the blanket contention in the report that assassination must never become a tool of United States foreign policy is, perhaps, too strong: There are instances where an assassination engineered by one individual, or group of individuals, could prevent tens of thousands of deaths.

BUT UNDER NO circumstances should assassination be approached lightly or without the most compelling justification, circumstances which most definitely appeared to be lacking in at least several of the situations revealed by the Senate committee.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine how Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo or General René Schneider could have been such serious threats to the United States or its security interests to merit their assassinations by agents or appointees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

That is not true of Fidel Castro and is, perhaps, less true of Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam.

In Diem's case, the fact is that the United States was deeply committed to a war in Vietnam and American lives were being lost. If Diem's leadership, or lack of it, was endangering American lives, and the commitment was felt so great that the United States could not withdraw—as history has now indicated it might as well have—then perhaps, just and only perhaps, an assassination attempt might have been justified, though the evidence revealed to this point would not have justified it.

In Castro's case, the evidence much more clearly favors the Central Intelligence Agency, given the time in history when the plotting was under way.

In the committee's words: "The Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we described the perception generally shared within the United States during the depths of the Cold War, that our country faced a monolithic enemy in communism."

The committee went on to note that while the context helped explain the plots, it was not sufficient to justify them, but that is a point, again, in Castro's case, that is debatable.

REMEMBER THE CUBAN missile crisis, and how close the United States was to the ultimate nuclear war. Fidel Castro and his Communist regime was located a mere 90 miles from the United States' mainland, and he presented a clear and ever-present danger.

But even in attempting to defend the possible use of assassination in certain instances, it is impossible to defend the manner in which the CIA handled discussion and plotting of the assassination attempts, particularly the lack of clear authorization from the very top, the President himself, and the careful reporting through channels that so obviously did not occur.

Under no circumstances would it ever be possible to justify the CIA's use of organized crime figures or international criminals in its plotting. As the committee said: "There is a danger that the United States government will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their association with the government to advance their own projects and interests. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society forbid."

TIMES, Roanoke
25 Nov. 1975

The CIA, and a Saving Grace

There is no use pretending that a lot of dirty things don't go on under the cloak of intelligence-gathering abroad. Agents of many nations—certainly of all the superpowers—are spending money and fostering activities on-scene to try to influence events and policy in other countries where their interests are at stake.

Sometimes, especially when opposing agents work at cross purposes, there are attempts to kill or maim one another; conflicts like this may be unavoidable. Even before the CIA's guts began to spill over congressional conference tables, it would have been insufferably prissy to claim that U.S. agents are never involved in such as this.

But no matter what other nations do, it should simply be out of the question for the United States to plot peacetime assassinations of heads of state or other key political figures in foreign countries. To strike at a chief of state is to aim at the underbelly of an entire people, to try to upset their country's political stability, to set off a chain of events that could produce civil war or even war with a neighbor.

The consequences of such actions cannot be predicted or controlled. It is

It also is dangerous and undesirable for the CIA to believe, as it did, based on its own 1954 report, that "another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accomplishment of this mission. ... It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost."

THAT IS INDISPUTABLY true, but it cannot be construed as justification for the United States to discard all of its rules and all of its moral purposes simply to compete on the same animal level.

As the committee concluded: "The United States must now adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened."

There are circumstances where assassination may be necessary, in fact, imperative, but with the possible exception of the CIA's activities against Castro, it is more than obvious that the CIA overstepped the unwritten limits that now need to be written more clearly and enforced more stringently for the future.

callous and arrogant for a great power—especially one that makes much of its own morality—to consider throwing a smaller, weaker country into turmoil on the chance that this would somehow advance our own interests.

More than that, such tactics can boomerang. A nation that is willing to slash at another's political jugular had better protect its own throat. A pattern of events can create a climate of international violence and intrigue, similar to the climate Americans seem to be experiencing at home as a presidential campaign nears, but a lot more dangerous.

Amid the shame that U.S. citizens should feel about the Central Intelligence Agency's immoral and reckless tactics, there is one gratification. No other nation, surely, would openly own up to such misdeeds. Some will consider that our weakness. Not so; it is our strength, this ability to conduct a more open society and government than any other country ever has. It is a tradition that allows us to drag error into the open, the better to correct it—as these CIA tactics must now be corrected.

Africa

NEW YORK TIMES
19 Dec. 1975

FORD SUPPORTERS START FILIBUSTER FOR ANGOLAN AID

Conservative Senators Seek
to Halt Cutoff of Covert
Funds to 2 Factions

COMPROMISE IS SOUGHT

Kissinger Meets Congress
Leaders in an Attempt
to End the Stalemate

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18—The Ford Administration sought today to reach a compromise with the Senate that would allow the United States to continue covert support operations in the Angolan civil war.

The move was initiated by Senator Robert P. Griffin, Republican of Michigan, after John L. McClellan, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, failed to induce President Ford to concur in a system that would enable the Congress to play a larger role in deciding on such secret operations.

On Senator Griffin's invitation, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conferred with about 25 leading Senators on an arrangement that would end the present stalemate. A filibuster is being conducted in the Senate against an amendment that would immediately cut off funds for assistance to two Angolan factions.

No 'Meeting of Minds'

Emerging from the meeting, Mr. Kissinger said that it had not been "a meeting of minds," but that he was taking the Senate leadership proposals to Mr. Ford.

Senator John Tunney, a California Democrat, who is leading an attempt to cut off all funds for Angola, said he intended to push for the cutoff tomorrow.

"Nothing is acceptable that won't result in a cutoff of all funds for military aid to Angola," he said. "I don't want to see more money down this

rathole."

The filibuster began about 2 P.M. when Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic majority leader, requested a vote on the cutoff amendment submitted by Senator Tunney and 12 others.

Senator McClellan, the Arkansas Democrat who has been managing the \$112 billion defense appropriations bill, slipped out and telephoned President Ford, appealing for his approval of a procedure involving Congress in the funding of covert operations.

The funds for the Angola operations have come out of the defense appropriations, according to officials of the Central Intelligence Agency in testimony before a Senate committee.

According to other Senators, Mr. McClellan proposed that in future requests for covert funds, the President should first seek the approval of the Appropriations Committee and, upon approval, the request would go directly to the full Senate.

Under the present system the Administration simply informs Senator McClellan and his minority colleague on the Appropriations Committee, Senator Milton R. Young, Republican of North Dakota, and they either approve or disapprove without any further airing in committee or in the Senate as a whole.

A White House spokesman, William I. Greener, said President Ford had discussed the proposal with Senator McClellan, but "no arrangement could be reached."

As the filibuster by conservative Senators wore on, Mr. Kissinger arrived at the office of Hugh Scott, his Republican Minority Leader from Pennsylvania, and agreed to provide the leadership with more information about the Angola situation, as well as the Administration's view on the covert operations, on which \$33 million has already been spent.

Kissinger Conveys Offer

After two hours of discussion, Mr. Kissinger promised to convey a refined compromise proposal to the President and to return tomorrow with a response. The compromise was described by a Senator as involving a concurrence of the Senate in a \$10 million increment for Angolan aid, after which the Administration would have to obtain regular Senate approval of any further funding.

The Administration is seeking \$28 million in additional funds for the Front for the National Liberation of Angola in the north and the National Union For Total Independence of Angola in the south. The two

NEW YORK TIMES

19 Dec. 1975

EARLY ANGOLA AID BY U.S. REPORTED

Officials Say C.I.A. Received
Approval to Give Funds
Before Soviet Build-Up

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18—The Ford Administration's initial authorization for substantial Central Intelligence Agency financial operations inside Angola came in January 1975, more than two months before the first significant Soviet build-up, well-informed officials

groups are opposing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which has the support of the Soviet Union and has established a government in Luanda, the capital of the former Portuguese colony.

The total aid projected by the Administration for Angolan aid this year comes to \$60 million.

But, the Central Intelligence Agency's contingency funds for covert activity are said to total only \$50 million, of which two-thirds is already exhausted, either through expenditures and commitments.

It is the belief of Senator Tunney and his Senate allies that by amending the defense appropriation to bar further covert expenditures it can deny the C.I.A. the capacity to continue Angola operations.

The Tunney forces showed their strength early in the afternoon in defeating a substitute amendment by Senator Griffin that would have allowed the covert operations to continue. The vote was 72 to 26.

This left the pro-Administration Senators with the filibuster as their only weapon, made more effective by the nearness of the Christmas holidays and the desire of a number of Senators to go home tomorrow or Saturday.

Senator Tunney and some of his allies said they were determined to force a resolution of the issue, even if it meant staying in Washington. Several said they believed they had the 60 votes needed to bring about cloture, ending the filibuster and compelling a vote on the cutoff amendment.

It was this threat, according to Administration officials, that caused Secretary Kissinger and the White House to agree to the compromise attempt.

While the Senate prepared for its third day of debate on the Angola issue, the House International Relations Committee approved an amendment to the foreign assistance bill that would require the Administration to clear future Angola expenditures with the Congress,

report.

It could not be learned on what specific basis the agency won approval to deepen its clandestine involvement in Angola at that point, but William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, told a secret Congressional hearing two months ago that the January increase in C.I.A. activity was needed to match increased Soviet activity.

The Soviet Union has been involved in Angola since 1956 but, according to well-informed American intelligence officials, did not substantially increase its support for one of the liberation armies in Angola until March and April of this year. At that time at least two shiploads and two plane loads of Soviet war matériel were sent.

Told of the Administration's decision, of January, 1975 a number of Government officials and lawmakers contended that it was impossible without more information to determine whether the subsequent Soviet build-up had been purely aggressive and expansionist, as Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and others have contended, or whether it might have been in part a Soviet response to the action by the United States.

The Administration's high-level intelligence-review panel, known as the 40 Committee, discussed Angola at its January meeting—the first such discussion of the African nation since the mid-1960's, officials said. They said the group agreed to permit the C.I.A. to provide \$300,000 clandestinely to Holden Roberto, the leader of one of three factions now seeking control of Angola.

At the time, Mr. Roberto, whose links with the C.I.A. began in 1961, was on a \$10,000-a-year agency retainer for "intelligence collection," the officials said. Mr. Roberto leads the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, which also has been aided by Zaire and China.

During the same 40 Committee meeting in January, the officials said, the C.I.A. unsuccessfully also sought authority to provide a \$100,000 subsidy secretly to Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

At the time, the movements led by Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi—since merged—were trying to negotiate a settlement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a third liberation group, which has been supported by arms and aid from the Soviet Union since its formation in 1956. Those talks failed.

There was a sharp division today among Government officials and some lawmakers about the significance of the 40 Committee's decision in January to increase the funds available to Mr. Roberto.

Some officials belittled its importance and argued that the

funds, which reportedly were not meant for direct military support, were supplied merely to reassure President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire that the Ford Administration was not going to permit the Popular Movement to win the Angolan civil war. Mr. Mobutu, who is Mr. Roberto's father-in-law, was an early advocate of American intervention.

Many others, including Senators and Representatives who have had access to secret C.I.A. briefings on Angola, believe that disclosure of the January decision to increase the American involvement raises new questions about which nation — the United States or the Soviet Union — initiated what inside Angola.

"I think it's very important," one well-informed official acknowledged. "That money gave him a lot of extra muscle. He'd been sitting in Kinshasa for nearly 10 years and all of a sudden he's got a lot of bread — he's beginning to do things."

Since the early 1960's Mr. Roberts had maintained his headquarters in Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire.

The official's point was that the C.I.A. source of the revitalized flow of funds for the Roberto movement would be quickly perceived by the Popular Movement and its Soviet supporters.

The disclosure further contradicts the insistence of Secretary Kissinger in Senate testimony that is still secret that the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs had, in effect, withheld information about Angola from him early this year. He suggested that the bureau had done so in an effort to limit the options available to the Ford Administration.

In January Mr. Kissinger was Secretary of State and also President Ford's adviser on national security. As adviser, he was chairman of the 40 Committee when the decision was made to increase greatly the C.I.A. cash subsidy to Mr. Roberto.

In an extensive recounting of Washington's Angola decision-making, well-informed officials also made these points:

C.I.A. statistics as of early last month show that the agency had paid \$5.4 million to ship what was listed as \$10 million in arms to Angola between late July and October. The high shipping costs were described by many knowledgeable officials as evidence that the agency had been systematically underestimating the value of the weapons shipped thus far, in an effort to make the United States role appear as minimal as possible.

The intelligence agency was explicitly authorized by President Ford on July 27, 1975, to begin a \$500,000 information program inside Angola as part of a 40 Committee decision to begin major shipments of United States arms there.

The precise date of the 40 Committee's meeting in January, 1975, could not be learned, but January was a pivotal month in Angola.

On Jan. 5, leaders of the three liberation movements met in Kenya and signed a political

accord that was viewed as paving a way for independence for the Portuguese territory. On Jan. 10 Portugal formally agreed to grant independence in Angola in the following November.

On Jan. 31 the three liberation movements agreed to share cabinets posts and power equally with a Portuguese contingent until the formal date of independence.

The three liberation movements further agreed to prepare for and hold national elections for a constituent assembly. Those elections were never held, however, as the coalition dissolved over the next few months and warfare broke out.

American officials were interviewed repeatedly by correspondents of The New York Times in recent weeks, but none suggested what Mr. Colby and other C.I.A. officials have said in recent secret briefings in Congress—that Soviet build-ups in Angola before this year were in any way a factor in the subsequent United States decision to intervene directly in July 1975 with shipments of arms and aid.

More than 10 Otons of arms were reported to have been landed by Soviet planes in southern Angola and the Congo in March and April. It was these shipments, American officials have contended up to now, that led to rapid military advances by the Popular Movement and the subsequent decision by Secretary Kissinger and President Ford to intervene directly.

Throughout the spring, a number of officials have said, the C.I.A. lobbied intensively for a larger United States role in Angola, justifying its argument on increased Soviet activities. Specifically, the C.I.A. was seeking high-level approval to begin supplying funds directly to Mr. Savimbi.

The matter was discussed at a 40 Committee meeting in June, officials said, with no resolution, although a full-scale National Security Council study of the issues and the various options was authorized.

It was at this point, State Department sources said, that opposition to further United States involvement was repeatedly raised by Nathaniel Davis, then the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

Mr. Davis, who resigned in protest over the Administration's policies on Angola, is now Ambassador to Switzerland. He explicitly argued in June that the decision by the 40 Committee to support both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi would be perceived as an escalation by the Soviet Union and lead, in turn, to even more involvement by the Russians.

Following the National Security Council review, officials said, the 40 Committee met on July 17, 1975. By then the Popular Movement, using the Soviet supplies shipped since March, had seized firm control of Luanda, Angola's capital, and had won significant victories elsewhere.

The Popular Movement was claiming control of 11 of Angola's 16 provinces.

The 40 Committee authorized the following steps:

¶The direct shipment of arms to the forces led by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto and the replacement of arms that had been previously supplied and would continue to be supplied by Zaire and Zambia, the two neighboring African nations that supported the American intervention. It was agreed to permit Zambia and Zaire to provide as much non-American equipment as possible at first in order to minimize the overt link with the United States.

¶Exposure through information programs and other means

of the Soviet arming of the Popular Movement, with emphasis on the possible embarrassment of African nations relaying the Russian arms or in other ways serving as conduits for such aid.

¶The use of an information program to build the abilities and integrity of the forces controlled by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto.

¶The dispatch of cash in two stages to Angola, with \$6 million to be expended in Stage 1 and \$8 million in Stage 2. The significance of the two-tiered approach has not been made clear by the sources.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 Dec. 1975

Congressmen Tell of Irritation Over Covert U.S. Angola Aid

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12—Several members of Congress said today that they were irritated over covert United States assistance in the Angolan civil war. There appears to be dissent in the Ford Administration, too, over the \$50 million program.

However, after a lengthy discussion, a key Senate subcommittee put off until Tuesday action on an amendment that would end assistance supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency to two anti-Communist factions in Angola fighting—unless Congress specifically authorized that assistance.

The proposal was submitted earlier by Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa, as an amendment to the Government's \$4.7 billion security assistance bill.

Senator Clark told his six colleagues on the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Assistance that the Angola war was expanding and it should be up to Congress to decide the proper degree of United States involvement.

The amendment might have the effect of halting the shipment of \$25 million in military equipment and support money from the C.I.A.'s contingency funds, authorized early this month by President Ford as an increment to the original \$25 million in American supplies sent to Angola since last summer.

While sentiment on the sub-

committee appeared to favor Senator Clark, he was sharply opposed by Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, who warned that the Soviet Union was bent on "expansionism." Senator Case added that it would be preferable to continue American covert assistance while, at the same time, making efforts to get all sides in the African country to disengage. "If that makes me a cold warrior, let it be so," he said.

C.I.A. Is Criticized

The Senators and Representatives who expressed annoyance over the American effort in Angola had been briefed early this week by William E. Colby, Director of the C.I.A., on the scope of the covert program and on Soviet and Cuban assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Senator Clark and Representative Otis G. Pike, the Suffolk Democrat who is chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, have publicly expressed displeasure over the American program, particularly its covert quality.

But other legislators, who asked that their names not be disclosed, said they had expressed criticism to Mr. Colby that the C.I.A. operation was too small to have any real effect and that his agency had made a bad record in similar covert operations.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Dec. 18, 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

...and the U.S. Response

Behind the Congressional rush to tie the Ford Administration's hands on Angola lies a more ominous problem now hotly debated at highest levels: how can the United States compete against the political offensive of its rival superpower, the Soviet Union?

That political offensive is certainly not centered on rich, strategically placed Angola. The newly independent state on Africa's west coast is only one example of Moscow's offensive. The Kremlin's battle plan includes rising pressures on Yugoslavia, more complete economic domination of Eastern Europe and political-economic forays almost everywhere the world map reaches.

Angola, in the view of high administration officials, exactly defines the agonizing problem of how the U.S. should respond. As such, it reflects a superpower in decline, still recovering from the Indochina debacle and unable even to approach the speed and unity of its reaction to Soviet pressure after World War II.

The stampede to isolationism by anti-administration Democrats such as Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana, a leading Presidential candidate, seems politically expedient, compounded by dangerous ignorance.

In a Nov. 28 statement, Bayh equated U.S. "involvement in the brutal civil war in Angola" with "intervention" of the Soviet Union, Cuba, Communist China and South Africa. He also equated small (up to \$50 million) U.S. aid for anti-Soviet political movements with incomparably larger U.S. involvement in the earliest stages of the Vietnam war.

In fact, the Soviets for years have financed the popular movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the absence of any U.S. involvement at all with any other Angolan faction. Washington's policy had been to support the Portuguese, whose original plan for slower Angolan independence was wrecked by the 1974 revolution in Portugal.

The Congressional rampage against President Ford's comparatively modest efforts to slow the MPLA's rise to total political power carries ominous implications for the whole world, not just the "third" or uncommitted world. It symbolizes U.S. inability to respond to Soviet challenges because of the ravages of Vietnam and ten years of internal political upheaval.

Actually, it is extraordinarily difficult to prescribe the correct U.S. reaction to the Soviet challenge in Angola, including its portentous decision to use 3,000 Cuban troops and technicians. That helps explain the decision of Nathaniel Davis, now Ambassador-designate to Switzerland, to resign as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

Davis objected to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's decision to send clandestine aid through CIA channels to neighboring Zaire for use in the Civil War against the Soviet-backed MPLA. He

reasoned that the Soviets were too far ahead in Angola for any other political faction to win, particularly with Peking withdrawing once Angola achieved independence.

Many U.S. officials agreed with Davis. But Kissinger and the President agonized over the world political impact of the U.S. appearing impotent to challenge Soviet penetration of one of Africa's most strategically important countries. He opted for U.S. aid, not really hoping it would change the course of the Civil War but seeking to enhance the non-communist bargaining position for a political solution.

Such subtleties are entirely lost on Sen. Bayh. He and other Democratic presidential hopefuls appear intent on cashing in on the tragic legacy of Vietnam. They show no interest in a U.S. policy to reassure a world fearful that the U.S. is fading as a super power, leaving the field to the Soviet Union.

Precisely such fears strain the

BALTIMORE SUN
16 Dec. 1975

From Covert to Overt in Angola

A Congress whose first weeks were dominated by the collapse of South Vietnam has every right to share in basic policy decisions about the United States role in Angola. So far the "covert" U.S. involvement in Angola's civil war has been strikingly overt. The executive branch has not tried to make much of a secret over the fact that American arms have been flowing through Zaire to Angolan forces battling the Soviet-backed regime in Luanda. And the reasons are paradoxical. Some well-placed officials wanted it known they opposed the decision to send military aid to anti-communist forces, a course that reminded them of the early U.S. involvement in Indochina. But others were so concerned about the Soviet threat to Africa and its strategic sea lanes that they felt the alarm bell should be rung. With the administration divided and the war heating up, Congress was bound to be faced with grave foreign policy questions.

Should congressional approval have been sought before Secretary Kissinger dispatched the first \$25 million in arms? Should its okay be required before any more weapons are shipped? Can the administration's initial secrecy be justified on the ground that Angola was a "covert" operation not subject to express congressional approval? Does an operation remain "covert" and thus privileged under current law when it is

Washington-Peking connection. The Communist government of China, led by power-conscious realists, is far more worried than are the Birch Bayhs of American politics about signs of U.S. decline. So, too, are realistic Communist bosses in Yugoslavia, wary of rising Soviet pressures in anticipation of aging Marshall Tito's death; Tito has ordered a massive education program to remind all party cadres of heavy post-war Soviet pressure against Yugoslavia.

Simultaneously, Moscow is tightening its hold over Eastern Europe. According to Communist sources, the Soviets feel more freedom today than before Vietnam to demand economic concessions from Eastern Europe.

In response, the U.S. has devised no sure way to slow the Soviet global offensive or make credible efforts toward slowing it. Detente was enshrined in the theory that Moscow, like Washington, genuinely desires a mutual respite from costly and frequently bloody competition. Angola suggests Moscow has different fish to fry, a frightening fact that Birch Bayh may soon have to deal with.

Field Enterprises

openly discussed by high-ranking government authorities? Or is Angola further evidence that the law should be changed to bar the executive branch from unilaterally embarking on foreign adventures under the cover of being covert?

These are not theoretical questions. The House Intelligence Committee has demanded an immediate policy accounting from the Ford administration; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering a ban on further weapons shipments until it is convinced by administration testimony that they are justified.

Congress is correct in asking whether it is wise to respond in kind to the Soviet military intervention or if relatively small amounts of U.S. weaponry could alter the military situation. More positively, it should inquire what specific diplomatic and economic pressures the administration is prepared to bring against a Kremlin regime that mouths detente and promotes conflict in selected "hotbeds of tension." The newest Soviet five-year plan, with its disclosures of shortfalls in agriculture and manufacturing, is further proof that the Russians need U.S. trade and technology. These should be held on a short leash, pending better Soviet behavior in Angola. Finally, Congress should do its part in exposing the Soviet Union as the most troublesome outside power meddling in Africa's affairs.

The Fallacy of Our Angolan Involvement

America Keeps on Reacting Mindlessly Every Time the Russians Act

BY JOHN D. MARKS

Once again, an American President has ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to become deeply involved in a secret war in a far away place. This time the President is Ford, and the country is Angola, but there is a feeling of *deja vu* about the whole affair.

Eisenhower made a similar commitment when he sent in the CIA to shore up the Diem regime in South Vietnam; Kennedy did the same when he authorized the CIA to organize tens of thousands of Laotian tribesmen into a "secret army"; ditto Johnson, by dispatching CIA-hired mercenaries into battle in the Congo, and Nixon, by approving covert shipments of guns to Kurdish rebels fighting in Iraq.

Covert presidential war-making was supposed to have stopped with the end of the Indochina war. According to conventional wisdom, Americans had recognized the perils of being led blindly into undeclared war by the executive branch, if only because the country had learned it could not serve as the world's policeman. Reflecting this mood, Congress passed a law in 1974—overriding Nixon's veto—defining and limiting any President's power to wage-war on his own.

Thus, when Saigon fell last spring it seemed the United States might stay out of wars for a while. But in official Washington, the spirit of Mayaguez was in the air, as the Ford Administration felt compelled to show how tough it really was. It was in this period that Ford personally ratified a decision made by the supersecret 40 Committee (chaired by Secretary of State Kissinger) to have the CIA covertly supply arms and money to two of the three independence groups fighting for control of Angola.

An Administration official who participated in the policy-making process told me that Kissinger pushed hard for the expanded CIA programs. "Henry wanted to be told why we should intervene," said the official, "not why not."

However, most of the State Department's experts on Africa, including Nathaniel Davis, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, fought hard within the Administration against CIA intervention. In fact, in August, Davis finally resigned in protest over it.

Davis and his colleagues among the State Department's African specialists opposed the policy because they felt that, even with CIA help, the U.S.-supported groups could not win, and that the American position all over Africa would be severely damaged.

And so the U.S. government has come to treat a civil war in a newly independent country as a cold war conflict, in which American resolve is being tested. Since the Russians were aiding one faction, the United States had to help the others. No matter that all three of the Angolan groups call themselves African socialists and that all three are organized on a tribal basis. Now, however, the tribes are fighting it out with Soviet-made rockets, fired by Cuban "advisers," at South African-supplied armored cars, driven

by white mercenaries in behalf of two Angolan factions funded by the CIA.

As Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) has said: "Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Russians do it, we must do it, too. The time is at hand to reexamine that thesis."

Almost every day lately, high U.S. officials have been strongly condemning Soviet intervention in Angola. Yet, for a long while they publicly ignored the CIA's involvement there, which goes back to 1962 and which has now grown into at least a \$50 million paramilitary program. Even now, Administration officials do not mention the fact that the National Security Agency has intercepted radio messages proving that regular South African troops, along with a South African-backed mercenary column, have invaded Angola on the side of the same two independence groups that the United States is backing, nor do these officials mention that the total U.S., South African and Zairean involvement on the one hand is at least comparable to the combined Soviet, Cuban and Algerian on the other.

Yet incredibly—as if Vietnam had never happened—the Administration has been get-

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ting away with saying that the problem in Angola is what the other side is doing. "We are most alarmed," says Kissinger "at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well"—and no one points out that Kissinger's description seems to fit the United States as well as the Soviet Union. Kissinger warns the Russians that their interference in Angola threatens detente, but no one questions whether American intervention might not also jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations.

U.N. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, too, has expressed the Administration's fear that Angola will become a Soviet "colony," and on Sunday presented an updated version of the domino theory. He warned that a victory by the Soviet-backed group would result in Communist control of "the oil shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf to New York," and even a military threat to Brazil.

These scenarios fail, however, to take into account a number of important facts:

—The Russians had had almost no success in winning (or buying) long-term friends in Africa.

—Large-scale Soviet aid programs such as in Egypt and Nigeria have had the effect of seriously souring the recipient country on the Soviet Union.

—The Russians have sent considerable aid to ultimately victorious leftist liberation groups in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau without un-

duly disturbing the United States, which has recognized both regimes.

—Soviet ships *already* circulate freely in the South Atlantic.

—Any future war with the Russians is not going to be fought at the level of naval blockades.

—The Soviet-supplied independence group has repeatedly said it has no intention of exchanging 500 years of Portuguese domination for a new colonial overlord.

Instead of admitting that, really, no matter what happens in Angola, the United States has no vital interest there, the Ford Administration has chosen to reflexively jump in, and had even entered into (at least) a tacit alliance with that international pariah, white-supremacist South Africa. Indeed, South African leaders would like nothing more than to formalize this relationship and, ultimately, to win open U.S. support in their own internal struggle against majority rule. Already, the South African forces have bogged down inside Angola, and South Africa has called on the United States to provide direct assistance.

Kissinger has dismissed as unworthy of a great power concern that the U.S. position in Africa would be damaged by close association with South Africa. He apparently is not overly worried by black Africans' extremely strong feelings against South African apartheid or the use of white mercenaries. Kissinger's overriding interest, as usual, seems to be the relationships between the superpowers.

The great irony of the once-secret American involvement in Angola is that it need not have been secret. If the outcome truly were so important to American security, then presumably the Administration could have convinced Congress and the American people that Angola was worth fighting for. Our Angolan allies could have been openly aided in accordance with U.S. law and the constitutional proviso that only Congress shall declare war.

But, the Administration obviously was not willing to take the chance that Congress and the public would not go along. For the Ford Administration, like its immediate predecessors, the democratic process was not to be trusted where "national security" is concerned.

To be sure, the Administration has been obliged by law to secretly brief senior members of six House and Senate committees about the Angolan involvement, but none of these congressmen has raised a fuss. Most of them seem to agree with the Administration that "communism" must be stopped in southern Africa. The few who disagree can do little about stopping U.S. participation in the war because all the information about it is still classified.

Meanwhile, the war rages on in Angola, and the result so far of CIA intervention has been, in the words of one knowledgeable official, "a mutual ante-raising, an inconclusive situation and a hell of a lot of dead Angolans."

The Americans—as well as the Russians, South Africans and the other outsiders—give every indication of being willing to fight on to the last Angolan.

WASHINGTON POST
14 DEC 1975

Jack Anderson

The Agony of Angola

Behind the agony of Angola, which is turning tragically into a no-man's-land, is a greater struggle for the soul of Africa itself.

Secret intelligence reports reveal how the great powers have been maneuvering behind the scenes in Africa, how the Soviets have been using Cuba to train black guerrillas to fight on the African continent and how the United States and Communist China have established a belated, uneasy alliance to counter Soviet influence in Africa.

Now the big powers are focusing on sub-equatorial Angola, a Garden of Eden rich in minerals, oil and coffee. The conflict in Angola is no mere civil war. It is becoming an international exercise, like the Spanish civil war of 40 years ago, to test weapons, tactics and policies.

Behind the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola are the Soviets. They are pouring deadly new Kalashnikov rifles, heat-seeking missiles and light armored equipment into the port of Luanda.

The Soviets have managed, nevertheless, to keep a low profile. As their shock troops, they use blacks from Cuba who have been preparing for more than a decade for action in Africa. The Cuban expeditionary force is estimated at 6,000 and still counting.

Behind the National Front for the Liberation of Angola are the Chinese and Americans who have joined somewhat uncomfortably in common cause. American arms and a polyglot of white mercenaries, including Americans who didn't get enough of war in Vietnam, are beginning to filter into Angola from neighboring, pro-Western Zaire.

Behind the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola are the South Africans who are marching into Angola from the south under the pretense of guarding civil installations.

The Popular Movement, with their Soviet arms and Cuban troops, were ready for action when the Portuguese abandoned Angola. The pro-Soviet guerrillas took over the main centers, therefore, from the withdrawing Portuguese troops.

This has united the National Front and the National Union in a strange, motley alliance of black guerrillas, American mercenaries, South African troops and Red Chinese advisers.

The stakes are high. Not only is Angola one of the richest countries in Africa, but the outcome could affect the ideological tilt of many neighboring African nations. Zambia also ships its precious copper by rail through Angola.

But the cost is also high. The brutal conflict not only is devastating Angola but is undermining the Soviet-American detente and endangering the Cuban-American diplomatic thaw.

The Soviet-Cuban operations in Africa, according to intelligence reports, go back more than a decade. The late legendary Cuban guerrilla hero, "Che" Guevara,

actually fought in the Congo for a time. He and Fidel Castro's brother, Raul, helped to plan Cuba's African strategy.

Intelligence reports in our possession show the first major penetration was made in 1963 when the Cuban transport ship Aracelio Iglesias unloaded 400 to 450 combat-ready Cubans at Oran, Algeria.

Ostensibly, the force was supposed to assist Algeria during a confrontation with neighboring Morocco. But the actual destination was the Congo (Brazzaville), where the Cubans set up a secret training camp to indoctrinate young guerrillas from all over Africa.

Through the Congo beachhead, Cuban military advisers began to fan throughout Africa. Before they were drawn into the Angolan conflict, there were an estimated 250 Cubans in Somalia, 150 in Mozambique and another 300 to 400 scattered among Cameroon, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi and Mali.

Most are black native Cubans, who have encountered some problems with African tribal customs but generally have hit it off well with the Africans. They have trained thousands in Africa and have recruited thousands more to come to Cuba for training.

"The Cuban government has undertaken a vast program of training cadres," explains an intelligence document. "The actual exchange program (is) oriented mainly in preparing cadres for subversion in Central Africa."

Another document, based on an interview with a defector from the Cuban diplomatic service, alleges that Fidel Castro has squandered a fortune on "diplomatic" missions in Africa.

"The operational funds for these missions are almost certainly supplied by the Soviet Union," the diplomat reported. The Cuban effort in Africa is directed by Armando Estrado Fernandez, who goes by the code name "Ulysses." He heads the African section of the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) and works closely with the Soviet KGB.

When the rival Angolan factions began maneuvering to take over the country, Cubans immediately began trickling into Luanda from other African countries. Transports also brought over a Cuban expeditionary force from Havana.

Some of the arrivals, who were spotted, tried to pass off their Spanish as Portuguese. They claimed they had come from Portugal's Cape Verde island. But intelligence sources pointed out: "Nobody can hide a Cuban Spanish accent. They couldn't even pass for Spaniards."

The Central Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, has become so mired down in its past transgressions that it dare not play an active role in Angola. Even the inventive Henry Kissinger has come up with no plan to keep the strategic land out of Soviet hands, short of turning it into another Spain or Vietnam.

United Feature Syndicate

NEW YORK TIMES
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Coming Clean on Angola

One thing ought to be beyond debate about United States policy toward the catastrophic civil war in Angola: If there is a case for American help for the forces resisting the Soviet-aided Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), it should be made openly before the Congress and the country.

With the Indochina disaster still fresh in American consciousness, it should hardly be necessary to cite the perils of intervention in an African civil war at least as complicated as the ones that despoiled Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Yet, without public debate or Congressional sanction, the Administration has undertaken a program of indirect military aid to two Angolan factions that could easily slide into open American involvement.

Secretary of State Kissinger has pledged that the United States will "not intervene militarily" in Angola; but it was evidently on his insistence—and against other State Department advice—that President Ford last summer authorized the start of substantial arms shipments via Zaire to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which are fighting against the MPLA and have teamed up to form a rival Government.

American arms, along with arrival of some white mercenaries from Portugal and South Africa, undoubtedly helped the recipients stabilize their fronts and recover important territory. Yet, instead of bringing an enduring stalemate that might have given diplomacy a chance, these successes simply provoked a massive escalation of Soviet arms shipments and arrival at the fronts of Cuban combat soldiers, now believed to number about 4,000.

In light of recent tragic experience, Americans are entitled to ask: Where will Washington's side of the escalation end and what will happen to Mr. Kissinger's pledge if—in spite of American aid to its rivals—MPLA begins to advance toward total victory in Angola? Mr. Kissinger was reported yesterday by a "senior United States official" in Paris to believe American support for FNLA and UNITA will eventually persuade the Soviet Union to back off in Angola, provided the Administration's policy gains public support.

But the policy will have no chance to gain that support unless the Administration promptly goes public with a clearer explanation than any offered thus far about what American interests are at stake in Angola. In any case, the President and Mr. Kissinger have a clear obligation to seek the approval of Congress for the actions they propose to take in defense of this country's interests.

Moscow's evident determination to bring about a complete MPLA victory in Angola is indeed cause for concern, even as the establishment on the other side of Africa of Soviet bases in Somalia presents a worry for the West. But the Kremlin has fallen on its face more than once in efforts to penetrate Africa; and many African Governments have no relish for its effort in Angola.

In that connection, two of Africa's leading statesmen—Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Kenyatta of Kenya—provided a smidgin of hope in a statement issued yesterday after talks in Nairobi. They appealed again for a cease-fire in Angola and a fresh effort by the leaders of the three movements to come together in a government of national unity.

It would take a near-miracle to bring this about; but it is encouraging that Messrs. Kaunda and Kenyatta have not given up. Their statement also serves notice that, despite Nigeria's untimely decision to recognize only the MPLA regime, other moderate African Governments are not yet ready to join the bandwagon which the Soviet Union has tried so desperately to get rolling.

Chief of State Department African Bureau resigns

U.S. aid to Angola grows more controversial

By Dana Adams Schmidt

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Fallout is spreading from American policy in the war-torn West African country of Angola.

On one side, leading the advocates for sending military aid to Angola, are Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and CIA director William E. Colby.

Opposing are a wide variety of critics, in Congress and in the State Department, some of whom charge that military aid will lead to "a new Vietnam" in Africa.

According to unofficial but well-authenticated estimates, the administration has secretly sent \$35 million worth of arms to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Unita, two groups allied against the Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Some \$25 million in aid have been sent since April, but African experts say that \$10 million went out to FNLA and Unita before April. (Secretary Kissinger has admitted U.S. assistance only since April.) Washington also is reportedly preparing to send another \$25 million worth of aid.

Soviet aid to MPLA is believed to be far larger and is supplemented by at least 3,000—some say 5,000—Cubans.

Opposition to U.S. military aid has led to the resignation of Nathaniel Davis, director of the State Department's African Bureau, and to the introduction of legislation that would force the administration to obtain congressional approval for this and other covert operations.

Differences acknowledged

Mr. Davis, the former assistant secretary for African affairs, who has been named Ambassador to Switzerland, speaking by telephone from London, did not deny the report that differences over Angola were a cause of his resignation. He said only that he preferred not to comment.

Mr. Davis's suitability for the post had originally been questioned by the Black Caucus in Congress and by some African leaders because he was Ambassador to Chile at the time the CIA is said to have assisted in the overthrow of the

former government.

"The U.S. effort [in Angola] ought either to be much larger — and for that it would have to go public — or it ought to be ended quickly," observes one high-ranking administration official.

"The tragedy," says Sen. Dick Clark (D) from Iowa, "is that by the time anything Congress does takes effect, probably next January, it will probably be too late to do much good either way."

Senator Clark in the Senate and Michael J. Harrington (D) of Massachusetts in the House are sponsoring amendments to the military-assistance bill that would oblige the Ford administration to come to Congress for approval of its Angola operation.

Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., the Massachusetts Democrat who is Speaker of the House, asserted on the NBC program "Meet the Press" on Sunday that Congress would never acquiesce in involvement in Angola by American manpower or advisers and would insist in the coming week on being fully informed about what is going on.

"Young members of the House are appalled," he declared.

Some arguments against continued and even expanded U.S. involvement in Angola made by critics of U.S. policy in the State Department are these:

1. The policy is almost sure to fail. Holden Roberto of FNLA and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA are not competent military leaders. It is noted that Communist China, which had for some years backed both of them, has backed away as though anticipating failure.

2. The policy the United States now is pursuing will surely damage this country in the eyes of black Africa who see the United States identified with white-ruled South Africa.

3. Also "tainted" will be black African leaders who have tended to support the United States, particularly President Mobutu Sese Seko of neighboring Zaire, where FNLA is based, and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

NEW YORK TIMES

17 Dec. 1975

Angola Confusion

The essentials of the Soviet, Cuban and American involvement in Angola have finally become public knowledge. The crucial need now is to arrive at a sensible policy.

Secretary Kissinger has argued that financial and arms aid to the factions fighting the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is needed to achieve a military stalemate and prepare the ground for a negotiated settlement. Whether the aid is covert—or open, as in Vietnam from the beginning in the 1950's—the danger is feared by many of being dragged into another Vietnam war.

What is essential now is to take steps to assure that Angola does not become another Vietnam. Does this require cutting off all financial and arms aid? Or does it merely require keeping American personnel out of the combat area? The Congress should address this question today, not just the technical matter of whether any C.I.A. funds in the defense budget can be used in Angola.

Furthermore, Congressional discussion is needed on what, if any, measures the country is prepared to take to discourage the intervention of the Soviet Union and some 4,000 Cuban troops in this African civil war.

What about the impact on détente? Should the United States be shipping grain to Russia in the face of such lawless behavior? Why has not the United States—or one or more African states—indicted the Soviet and Cuban intervention before the Security Council? West Europe and the United States undoubtedly can bring non-military pressure to bear upon the situation. There is every reason to move vigorously in this direction.

Both the White House and the Congress ought also clear up their own administrative confusion. Eight Congressional subcommittees were allegedly briefed last summer and some of them were evidently informed again within recent days of covert Administration activities, as required by last year's amendment to the foreign aid act. Yet the Speaker of the House stated this week that he had not been informed and Senator Mansfield, the majority leader, who heads one of the eight committees briefed by the Administration, has implied lack of knowledge as well.

It is evident that the Congress should create a single, responsible joint committee, similar to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, that can act for the Congress in overseeing intelligence and covert operations. As for Angola, the Congress as a whole is at last in a position to assume a joint responsibility with the Administration for American policy there. The first task is to shape a policy, then to see that it is carried out.

BALTIMORE SUN
14 Dec. 1975

How will the U.S. handle Angola's 3-headed 'snake'?

By CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM
and FREDERIC B. HILL

A three-sided, confusing war in Angola threatens the peace of southern and central Africa, raises the specter of racial warfare and could jeopardize the fragile detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

For the past 15 years, Portuguese colonial forces have struggled to contain three liberation movements and to maintain a tenuous hold over this potentially rich territory which is over 13 times the size of Portugal and larger than Texas, New Mexico and Utah combined. With the recent coup d'etat in Portugal last year and the rapid decolonization of its African territories during 1975, Angola experienced a terrible and bloody slide toward independence and civil war.

The three major groups currently contending for control of Angola all share a history of anti-colonialism and bitter rivalry. Due to ethnic, linguistic and personality differences, the groups have spent almost as much time during the past decade fighting among themselves as they have against the Portuguese.

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) led by Holden Roberto is based in Zaire and controls a major portion of the northern area of Angola, principally among the Bakongo people. During the past year, the FLNA made a hasty marriage of convenience with a second liberation movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of

through—UNITA has always been based inside Angola, principally but not exclusively among the Ovimbundu people of central and southern Angola.

Over the past month, the FLNA has moved south from its bases and threatened the Angolan capital of Luanda, and UNITA, backed by South African and ex-Portuguese soldiers, has moved north in a 1,000-mile drive to link up with FLNA.

The third liberation movement, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which occupies the capital and a narrow strip across the country running to neighboring Zambia where it was based for many years, suddenly found itself on the defensive as FLNA and UNITA occupied nearly three fourths of Angola. MPLA's leader, the poet-revolutionary, Agostinho Neto, while proclaiming that the movement was not Communist-inspired, has nevertheless accepted vast quantities of Russian arms, and its slogans and proposed programs seem Marxist indeed.

Faced with the successes of FLNA and UNITA, the MPLA has sought help not only from the Russians but from Cuba, Mozambique and the Congo as well. The Russians have poured in extensive amounts of sophisticated weapons, including long-range 122-mm. rockets and heavy artillery, and the Cubans have sent at least 3,000 troops to Angola. Stiffened by this support, MPLA has in recent weeks gone over to the offensive and has pushed back its adversaries along an extended front.

Although the present situation is in flux, a long and bloody struggle is ahead. With the other superpowers, the United States and China already at least indirectly involved through their support of Zaire (which in turn has aided FLNA) and UNITA, the internecine warfare may have severe international repercussions and large-scale foreign intervention reminiscent of the old Belgian Congo in the 1960's could result.

There is a lot at stake. Economically, Angola is one of the potentially richest countries in Africa. Its northern appendage, Cabinda, already produces over 7.4 million tons of oil annually and estimates of reserves in Angola proper exceed those of Cabinda tenfold. In addition, there are other mineral deposits, much of it untapped, including extensive iron ore, diamonds and coal.

Strategically Angola is also important. Its ports of Luanda and Lobito are among the best on the entire central and southern coast of Africa. And for the neighboring countries of Zaire and Zambia, these ports and the Benguela railroad that serves them are vital for the export of their copper. Neither country could afford to have Angola fall into hands of a government which would interrupt that flow. For this reason (as well as the lure of oil), Zaire seems ready to invade if necessary to achieve its objectives and Zambia has wavered

from its earlier support of MPLA until it has a clearer picture of who will emerge victorious. In the meantime, the fighting has severely disrupted the traffic on the railroad.

South Africa, already concerned over a Marxist-oriented regime in Mozambique and the possible loss of Rhodesia as a buffer between it and the rest of black Africa, is determined to fight in Angola rather than face the possibility of escalating guerrilla operations in Namibia. As many as 1,000 South African troops and police are already in Angola.


Conversely, the black governments in Brazzaville and Mozambique are anxious that their allies within MPLA should emerge victorious. They would regard either FLNA or UNITA as "reactionary" and hence a threat to the future decolonization of southern Africa. Brazzaville is also bent on exposing the expansion of Zaire. The former fears the latter will take over Cabinda or establish a secessionist regime in northern Angola.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is likewise divided over the claims of the rival organizations. While no one is very pleased with South African involvement, a number of governments are also opposed to a MPLA take-over, either because their sympathies lie with one of the other groups—Savimbi in particular has a number of influential friends—or because they fear the rise of more "radical" states on the continent.

Gen. Idi Amin, presently the head of the OAU, has openly expressed opposition to official sponsorship of MPLA, much to the displeasure of the Russians who are the major suppliers of his Ugandan military. Likewise, other African states such as Nigeria oppose the intervention of any outside forces but support MPLA, obviously less troubled by the arrival of the Cubans than by the involvement of the South Africans.

For the United States, the situation in Angola is fraught with unpleasant options. Whatever the U.S. chooses to do—or not to do as the case may be—there are serious drawbacks and potentially dangerous side-effects. If the U.S. avoids any further involvement and refuses to respond to the demands of Zaire for the support of FLNA and UNITA, Angola may well end up in the hands of the MPLA.

While the governmental type of most African countries is of little consequence to the global posture of the U.S., an unfriendly regime in Angola, willing to deny the U.S. access to black Africa's second richest deposit of petroleum, could have more serious repercussions. Further, despite its rhetoric and claims, the MPLA has no more valid claim to represent the total population of Angola than either of the other movements and would probably lose decisively were there to be anything like free and open



Christian Science Monitor
map—Joan Forbes

Angola (UNITA). Led by Jonas Savimbi, a radical turned moderate—he is reported to have said that his youthful Marxism was simply "a phase we all go

Mr. Potholm is associate professor of government and legal studies at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine, and the author of three books and numerous articles dealing with Africa. This year he made an extensive trip to southern Africa. Mr. Hill, chief of The Sun's London Bureau, was in Angola and Rhodesia earlier this fall.

elections.

More troubling is the importance of Angola for the future of American-Soviet relations. The Russians have clearly chosen to become directly involved in a situation which challenges American interests, pouring in over \$100 million worth of military hardware in a matter of a few months. Why the Russians have done so at this time is unclear. Why risk the SALT talks, grain deals, the acquisition of American technology and possible American-Chinese reapproachment in order to install a regime in Angola? Why put so many chips on the table in a heretofore tertiary area of Soviet interest? The Russians, who have had their ups and downs in Africa, may simply be testing American resolve in foreign affairs following Vietnam. The question then arises, were the Russians to operate unchecked and so blatantly threaten what are perceived as American inter-

ests in the area, would they be encouraged to try other probes elsewhere?

On the other hand, the option of further American involvement is most disturbing as well. The very size of the Russian involvement and the complicating factor of Cuban troops means the United States would have to up the ante significantly in order to neutralize it. Ironically, the Angolan situation developed at precisely the same time as the CIA was under intense pressure to cut back and even eliminate paramilitary, covert intervention of the type that effectively blocked Russian efforts in the Congo during the early 1960's. For better or worse, the moment for such manageable involvement has passed and a far greater involvement would have to be contemplated if the United States were to ensure that MPLA would not succeed over the longer term.

Any involvement beyond supplying arms to Zaire might well draw the United States into a long and bitter struggle, opening the country up to charges of intervention in Africa. Even worse, the specter of the American government openly lining up on the same side as the South Africans (no matter how many other parties were involved and no matter what their colors) might have disastrous consequences for the future of American-African relations.

Moreover, coming on the heels of Vietnam, any American involvement in a foreign conflict might well produce a significant backlash, not only among those opposed to intervention per se, but also among many black Americans who would see the effort as designed to maintain the present status quo in southern Africa and the hegemony of racist South Africa.

The Washington Star Monday, December 15, 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.

The Cuban 'liberation' of Angola

Do you remember the talk about the "new Cuba"? The Cuba we should "normalize our relations with"? The Cuba that promises no longer to interfere in other people's politics? The Cuba a couple of trendy senators opened their arms to on a recent visit, even as the chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations committee was lobbying for Cuba's integration into the Organization of American States?

Pat Oliphant, whose cartoon usually appears on this page, is on a brief vacation. His cartoon will resume Wednesday.

Well, it transpires that the reason Cuba doesn't have guerrilla fighters roaming around such countries as Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela these days is that Cuba's resources are strained. You see, Cuba is off liberating Angola.

From the Portuguese? No; from other Angolans. Cuban troops and Russian advisers are, as we sit here toasting the delights of detente, turning the tide of battle in Angola toward the tough Communist-backed and oriented MPLA, against the more moderate (if hardly democratic) coalition (FNLA-UNITA), which is being backed by food parcels and a few

rounds of ammunition from the United States (dispatched via Zaire, which for all its strutting anti-Westernism plainly does not desire a Soviet satellite state as a neighbor); and a few South Africans, mostly Portuguese mercenaries. The Cuban detachment is a whopping 3,000 men. In relation to its size, it is as though we had sent 100,000 men.

The American people have lost interest in Africa, have you noticed? It happened some time after the trauma of the Congo, and Katanga, in 1962. Pretty soon the endless changes in government, the coups, the fixed despotisms, the strident rhetoric, turned us off, and we have simply ignored the continent

Although that stance is morally itchy, it is grounded in solid geopolitical doctrine. "We are friends of liberty everywhere in the world," John Quincy Adams wrote, "but custodians only of our own." An update from that was spoken not long ago by then-Sen. Fulbright. "We have no quarrel with any country in the world, no matter how repugnant its policies, unless that country seeks to export those policies."

But this of course is different. It isn't as though the

bad guys were winning in a purely local context. If the Luanda government prevails, it will be the direct result of Soviet-Cuban interference. That interference gives the lie to Soviet protestations made publicly by Leonid Brezhnev when he last visited this country; and to public protestations made by Fidel Castro every week or so.

Secretary Kissinger has of course protested. And Ambassador Moynihan has used the toughest language against the Soviet Union heard in the United Nations since the day that Henry Cabot Lodge lost his cool during the great October crisis. Brezhnev has retaliated by denouncing our bellicose policies, and our violation of the spirit of detente in Warsaw, where he addressed the satraps of another of his colonies. I do not know how we will react to the challenge. If we are to judge from past performance, we shall immediately step up our shipment of grain to Russia, perhaps extending better credit terms.

What in fact could we do about it, if we had the will? The strategic situation is as follows: The Soviet Union has perfected a mighty naval base in Somalia, the purpose of which is to dominate the Indian Ocean. With the political conquest of Angola, it could situate a

second major base on the African continent at a southwestern diagonal, dominating the South Atlantic; a Gibraltar, regulating traffic around the Cape of Good Hope. It is a textbook example of the worst thing a major naval power can do to another major naval power: against which, under the rubric of detente, we are powerless except to sneak in a few slingshots through Zaire, and do a little tablepounding at the U.N.

James Burnham remarks the anomaly: that the same people who are always talking about the interdependence of the world, are those who fail to draw the logical conclusion from it. If we are dependent on a peaceable Africa, for raw materials, for freedom of the seas, why do we permit to happen what is now happening to us?

Secretary Kissinger no doubt believes that the American will is not there to act in Angola. Perhaps — whoever said our missionary spirit burns as bright as Cuba's? But he should try asking the American people whether they would support sanctions — I mean real sanctions — against the Soviet Union and Cuba, to be continued for as long as they seek to colonize Angola.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 Dec. 1975

The War in Angola

Ideology Plays Minor Role Compared With Regional and Tribal Loyalties

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN
Special to The New York Times

HUAMBO, Angola—Civil war is being waged in Angola by three competing factions that are divided more by tribal affiliations, regional loyalties and yearnings for power than by ideology. The issue of foreign involvement has overwhelmed the nationalist aspects of the conflict in this former Portuguese territory, which became independent on Nov. 11. With each faction accusing the others of selling out to different countries, the issue of foreign intervention has inflamed antagonisms that developed over the 14 years during the fight against Portuguese rule.

Two competing governments were proclaimed last month—one in Luanda by the Popular

they have been too preoccupied in actual fighting—first with the Portuguese and now with the Popular Movement—to concern themselves with ideology.

But Dr. Savimbi says his vision for Angola is an anti-Communist social democracy, with ties to the West and an emphasis on land distribution and education. As a model he would suggest the kind of society that President Kenneth D. Kaunda is attempting to create in neighboring Zambia.

Dr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto concede that the Popular Movement counts as its members most of Angola's educated and skilled people, needed to organize the bureaucracy of an emerging state.

The reason, Mr. Roberto and Dr. Savimbi say, is that the Popular Movement has the support of only a minority of the six million Angolans. The two leaders claim the allegiance of 80 percent of the people.

The two leaders insist that they have from the outset advocated a political solution in which these people would be incorporated into a government of national unity. But they assert that the Popular Movement scuttled two coalition attempts in the last year, choosing instead to press for military victory for itself.

The Popular Movement, Mr. Roberto charges, is nothing but a Soviet puppet that has compensated for its scant popular support by using Cuban soldiers and military equipment from the Soviet bloc.

Conversely, activities of the Popular Movement in Luanda depict Mr. Roberto as a puppet of murky Western interests. They cite his close ties to President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, who is portrayed as an agent and creation of the United States.

They charge also that Mr. Roberto and Dr. Savimbi are accepting assistance from South Africa, and that by belying on the nation of apartheid they have forfeited any claims as African nationalists.

The issue of aid from South Africa has also led to charges and countercharges between the two allied groups here. Partisans of the National Union have charged privately within the last two weeks that it is not their group but the National Front that has ties with South Africa, while Mr. Roberto's deputies say it is the other way around.

Popular Movement activists answer charges of Soviet influence by saying that Mozambique also received Soviet support, but has maintained autonomy and Chinese influence remains strong.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 Dec. 1975

FORD IS OPPOSED TO COMBAT ROLE IN ANGOLAN WAR

Officials Assert Involvement Will Not Go Beyond Aid to Anti-Soviet Groups

AFRICAN PLEA REVEALED

Washington Moved to Allay Fear by Mobutu of Zaire and Kaunda of Zambia

By LESLIE GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 — President Ford has ruled out any form of combat intervention in Angola, including the sending of advisers, according to high and authoritative Administration officials, and will not go beyond the current program of aiding two factions fighting a group supported by the Soviet Union.

The officials said they were willing to make this disclosure although anonymously because the public and Congressional fear that "another Vietnam" might be developing in Angola went far beyond what the Administration sees as the limited interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the outcome of the civil war in the

While the Popular Movement is supported by the Soviet Union, its bookstore in Luanda has sold the writings of Mao Tse-tung. Such works were on display at a time when the rival National Front troops in Kinshasa, Zaire, were being trained by Chinese.

In some respects, there appears to be a strong link with Cuba. Ernesto Guevara, the Latin revolutionary visited the Popular Movement forces in the middle 1960's and is still cited as a major influence. Popular Movement soldiers have adopted single nouns de guerre like Cinkongo, Gika or Cowboy in homage to Che, who was killed in Bolivia in 1967.

The Popular Movement, the least tribally oriented group, is composed largely of urban people and has the loyalty of the Mbundu people around Luanda.

Mr. Roberto, the leader of the National Front, is primarily backed by the Bakongo people of the north. The strength of Dr. Savimbi's National Union has traditionally been in the south among Owambundu tribesmen.

former Portuguese colony.

Interests Held Limited

According to the officials, the United States began aid in arms and cash in response to the entreaties of two key African Leaders President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia. The officials acknowledged that the Angolan situation was now in danger of growing into a test case of Soviet and American will in Africa.

Even as a test of will, the officials insisted, Mr. Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger believe that American interests are limited, and the Angolan situation does not yet bring the whole relationship with Moscow into question.

A Warning to Soviet

Mr. Kissinger has publicly warned the Soviet leaders that intervention in Angola "must inevitably threaten other relationships." And today President Ford expressed serious concern over Soviet and Cuban action in providing equipment and men in Angola. [Page 4.]

The only specific American interest cited by the officials was that a military settlement imposed by Moscow would have serious consequences for South Africa. As one official put it, "another radical regime on South Africa's borders would bring fighting, and black-white relations to a boil."

Some Pentagon officials do not even see any significant strategic stakes for the United States. One ranking Pentagon official said, "it's not a Soviet-American test of wills, but a test case between Henry Kissinger and Moscow."

A variety of officials said they thought Soviet interests were also limited, but Moscow, like Washington, had been caught up in the public exposure of the conflict and was trying to find a face-saving way out.

But these officials acknowledged that Moscow had not communicated this view and continued to airlift Cuban soldiers and arms to Angola even after Mr. Kissinger began his public warnings five weeks ago.

In sum, while high administration officials deny that Angola will turn into another Vietnam, they are using much of the Indochina rhetoric of the early 60's—warnings to others to stay out and protestations of limited American goals—to try to persuade Moscow that further involvement in Angola is risky and that compromise is possible.

The officials recognize, they said, that their justification of involvement in terms of Soviet-American rivalry and the impact on other African states sounded like familiar cold war rationales. They cited numerous statements by Mr. Kissinger to the effect that if the United



The New York Times/Dec. 17, 1975
Groups getting U.S. aid are based at Huambo.

Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which has Soviet support, the second here in Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) by the two other factions, which are linked in a shaky alliance of necessity.

Of these, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola has been backed by the United States. The other, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, has been supported by China and Zaire.

It is the Luanda-based Popular Movement that has the most sharply defined ideological position of the three factions.

"We are African Socialists, not Marxists," their youthful activists say in an often repeated refrain. They insist that the Soviet aid they are receiving has been given without strings, and their leader, Dr. Agostino Neto, who was installed as President of the People's Republic of Angola, has stressed that his plans include continued Western economic investment and no nationalization of property.

Both Holden Roberto, the head of the National Front, and Dr. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union, note that

States were not to act in situations as these, it would no longer be a great power.

Aims Termed Limited

But they insisted that what was new and different was the limited aims and means of American involvement. The officials asserted that the United States would not go beyond a program of indirect aid and was prepared to accept any solution acceptable to the Angolan parties themselves.

The officials say that they realize that Mr. Kissinger's public statements and the recent statements of Daniel P. Moynihan, the delegate to the United Nations, tend to increase the American stake in Angola.

They say they are, completely confident, however, that the rhetoric will not be transformed into direct American involvement, if only because they are convinced that Congress would never agree to it.

All of the officials interviewed said they were less confident of Soviet restraint. Some noted that Moscow has insisted on its right to support "wars of national liberation" since the beginning of détente and must continue to do so in view of its ideological competition with China.

Others stressed that the Soviet leaders probably believed that their aid to one of the Angolan factions, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, was a low-cost effort for easy gain.

"They probably said that here's a group we've supported for 15 years, it's aligned with us and not the Chinese, it's already recognized by many African states and more will follow," these officials suggested.

The general view seems to be that the Russians did not count on American counter-aid and did not sufficiently calculate the risks of their intervention to détente.

"We haven't made a decision to hook Angola to détente nor have the Russians," one high official said. "So far, we're both trying to keep the nuclear arms talks, the negotiations or force reductions in central Europe, and trade matters, out of this."

The officials said Mr. Kissinger's public warnings to the Russians did not represent a change in policy.

"What Henry has been saying," one official said, "is that the Russians should realize they can't do this in general, but certainly not in an election year, and if they want to give us a black eye in Angola, it will strengthen the hands of the American critics of détente."

There is no particular concern in the Pentagon or in many parts of the State Department that Soviet control of Angola would put the United States at a military or economic disadvantage.

Pentagon officials would not like to see a Soviet naval base in Angola, but they do not believe that such a base would give Moscow control of shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf, as Mr. Moynihan contends.

State Department and Pentagon

officials would not like Moscow to exert influence over the disposition of the oil and other resources of Angola, but they point out that the United States is not dependent on resources from that area of the world.

"Of course, we want access to the vast wealth of Angola and the bordering areas," one State Department official said, "but that in itself, or with the Soviet base business, is not nearly enough to justify our involvement."

History of Involvement

Officials traced American interest in Angola back to last spring. At that time, they said, the Administration did not care what happened an Angolan independence approached. The prevailing view was that the National Front for the Liberation of Angola in the North and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in the South were tribally based and would be able to hold their own against the group that has Soviet backing. The assumption was that the war would end in a stalemate and result either in a coalition government or in de facto partition.

At that point, the officials said, American diplomats were approached by President Mobutu of Zaire and President Kaunda of Zambia and were asked whether the United States was prepared to do anything to prevent what they judged as an impending victory by the Popular Movement in Angola.

Mr. Mobutu was said to be concerned about a new insurgency against him from Angola and wanted a hand in the disposition of Angolan resources. Mr. Kaunda was alarmed by the prospect of unfriendly control of the railway linking his nation to the sea through Angola.

Then, as now, the officials stated, Mr. Mobutu was the linchpin of American policy in Africa. Zaire is rich in resources and centrally located, and he has been ready to help smooth American relations with other African nations in international forums.

Thus, the officials said, the first phase of America covert involvement was designed to please the leaders of Zaire and Zambia. In October, the Soviet Union further increased aid and began flying in Cubans. South Africans joined the fighting, and Mr. Kissinger began issuing his public warnings to Moscow.

The officials said the American objective remained a stalemate, not victory. They are waiting for Moscow to define its objective as something less than victory.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 Dec. 1975

Soviet Officials Playing Down Russian Involvement in Angola

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 17—Officials here have been attempting privately to play down the importance of Soviet military involvement in Angola, asserting that it is only tangential to the course of foreign policy and should not be allowed to damage Soviet-American détente.

Simultaneously, the officials have stressed in recent conversations with Western diplomats and correspondents that Soviet support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola in Luanda has become a matter of prestige and cannot be abandoned, especially not in the face of American criticism.

In the Soviet view, the involvement began almost reflexively more than a decade ago as a token support of an anti-colonial movement, then deepened through the years until withdrawal became diplomatically unthinkable. This account was offered the other day by a well-placed Russian, and its tone would have seemed familiar to anyone who had heard an American in the early 1970's try to defend, unenthusiastically, the involvement in Vietnam.

There is no outward sign that the Kremlin is at all reluctant in its support of the Luanda Government or that it would find disengagement attractive. On the contrary, the reported upsurge in deliveries of Soviet weaponry that began a few months before Angola's independence from Portugal, appeared to demonstrate Moscow's confidence in the prospect of a clean victory that would enhance the Soviet Union's reputation in Africa and the rest of the third world.

Furthermore, aside from the uncertainty of the outcome of the civil war, the risks of continued Soviet support must seem minimal to the Kremlin leadership. Despite the hard words of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger about the danger to détente and the fiery attack of Daniel P. Moynihan, the United States representative at the United Nations, who accused Moscow of trying to colonize Africa, diplomats report no American attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.

"The Soviets were right in their calculation that there would not be much of a stink from the Americans," said one West European diplomat. "They

have said a lot, but there has been no twisting of arms."

The central themes of American-Soviet relations remain untouched by the Angola issue, he observed. Soviet withdrawal has not been made a prerequisite to a new nuclear arms limitation treaty, he noted, nor to continued trade and sales of grain to the Soviet Union.

U.S. Aversion Assessed

As careful students of American politics, the Russians are thought to have based their stand on aversion in the United States to direct involvement in anything that resembles another Vietnam. The assertion by the Ford Administration against any American combat role in Angola reflects that mood, and makes the Soviet position less risky.

Although American arms continue to flow to the two anti-Luanda factions, Soviet aid is believed to be more substantial.

According to Western military experts, it includes mortars, rockets, old T-54 tanks and new amphibious PT-76 tanks, and MIG-21's flown by Soviet-trained Algerian pilots. Some 1,800 to 3,000 Cuban soldiers are reported in Angola firing rockets and training Luanda troops.

Some diplomats here doubt that the Soviet Union will send its own troops or increase its aid, and one experienced Westerner said he thought Moscow might ultimately back a coalition of the three factions, provided the Popular Movement in Luanda had a major role.

The Kremlin's desire for dominance in Angola appears to derive from a desire for worldwide influence that predates détente, and from an appetite for competition with the United States that has endured through the relaxation of Soviet-American tensions.

First, Angola could provide the Russians with naval and air bases that would enhance Soviet military power in the South Atlantic.

Second, Angola's oil and mineral wealth makes it a valuable card to have in hand, if only to deny these resources to the West.

Third, such a foothold in Angola would improve what has been, so far, a dismal diplomatic record for the Russians in Africa and would represent a defeat for Moscow's ideological enemy, China.

Finally, it would place Soviet strength on the geographical dividing line between white and black Africa so if that simmering confrontation erupts, Moscow could play a role.

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Dec. 16, 1975

Angola War Victims Get Aid

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Foreign Service

KINSHASA, Zaire, Dec. 15—Two to four times every day, an old battered DC-6 cargo plane takes off from Luanda airport and flies with emergency medical supplies, food and blankets deep into one of the three regions in which Angola has been effectively sliced by the unrelenting civil war.

This pittance of much-needed relief for the hundreds of thousands of war victims suffering from famine, bullet wounds and other man-made disasters of the war is the quiet work of the Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross, the only relief organization still permitted to work in all three war zones.

But even this meager effort is in danger of collapsing because, as one source here familiar with the Red Cross operation put it, "Angola doesn't sell anymore" with the traditional fund-providing international relief organizations.

While Portugal was able to move the hearts and dollars of various Western governments and relief groups to save nearly 300,000 white Portuguese from the Angolan war, the International Red Cross is having tremendous difficulty finding even the equivalent aid for far more African victims of the same war.

The United States, for example, provided two, and then four, chartered aircraft to help Portugal in the massive evacuation of Portuguese settlers from Angola.

The operation reportedly cost upwards of \$6 million and was apparently in addition to a \$35 million aid package for Lisbon to help in the resettlement of white refugees back in Portugal.

Since then, the United States has apparently concentrated on covert military aid for the Western-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, reportedly spending \$50 million since early 1975 on this operation.

By contrast, the United States has given little, if anything, to sustain the Red Cross operation aimed at aiding the victims of the civil war. "The relief groups and Western governments don't seem to want to give much for Angola," said this source. "Some say they don't have any money left after Vietnam and because of the economic recession. Others say they already gave a lot for the evacuation of the Portuguese."

Whatever the reasons, hundreds of thousands of Angolans are suffering from growing food shortages and the near total absence of doctors throughout Angola.

"The biggest problem right now is the medical one, but there is a very difficult food situation in northern and eastern Angola and it is getting worse and worse," said this source, who asked not to be identified because of the delicate nature of his position.

He estimated that at least 100,000 persons now were in

need of emergency food relief in northern and eastern Angola and that one million others — one sixth of the total population — had been displaced and were suffering because of the fighting.

Right now, the International Red Cross is spending \$400,000 a month on its Angolan relief operation, but fully half of this is consumed just to keep the DC-6 running (including 15 per cent of its value just for war insurance).

In terms of manpower, Angola is now the Red Cross' largest operation, with a total of 43 persons, 15 of them medical personnel, committed there.

Perhaps its most valuable service to all three of the warring nationalist groups is providing a five-member medical team (a doctor, nurses and an anesthetist) in each zone. The teams are located in Carmona in the north, Salazar in the north-central region and Huambo (Nova Lisboa) in the south. Each town is under the control of a different faction.

In a country that once had 400 doctors and now is thought to have only 50 or so, the Red Cross teams are obviously a blessing, but still only a drop in the medical vacuum. "Modern medicine has left Angola," said the source.

The region probably the best off medically, he said, is the Angolan capital of Luanda and north-central Angola, which is under the Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. This group was able to attract many leftist Portuguese in-

tellectuals including doctors who have stayed on in Angola and are aiding it.

The Red Cross has taken on a number of other tasks as well as medical and food relief. It carried out the exchange before independence of about 1300 political detainees from one zone to another, and it is now providing food and blankets for about 3000 prisoners being held by the three nationalist groups.

This source said the war prisoners in camps were all generally well treated and getting about as much to eat as the soldiers of the group holding them, which in some cases is apparently not much. All three groups have agreed to abide by the basic principles of the Geneva convention regarding prisoners, he added.

One of the Red Cross' major preoccupations, according to this source, is maintaining a balanced aid program for all three groups so that it will not be accused of indulging in politics and be expelled from any of the three regions as was the United Nations High Commission for Refugees from Luanda after Angola's independence Nov. 11.

Efforts by the U.N. Commission to obtain permission from the Popular Movement to fly relief aid to refugees returning from Zaire into northern Angola went to no avail. Popular Movement officials felt the agency was biased in favor of its main rival, the National Front, which is based in the north.

WASHINGTON POST
13 DEC 1975

Colby: No American In Angola Fighting

United Press International

CIA Director William E. Colby said yesterday no Americans are fighting in Angola but implied there is some U.S. effort to counter Soviet involvement there—presumably with arms and money—within the limits of the War Powers Act.

Colby's statement at House intelligence committee hearings came during a heated exchange with Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.), who asked, "How, when and why are we involved (in Angola)? How do you justify this? This is not a skirmish but a war."

Colby responded: "There

are no Americans involved in Angola. The War Powers Act requires notification for involvement of the armed forces."

Colby said the War Powers Act no longer prevents the dispatch of "paramilitary" aid to allies without congressional approval, however, because Congress struck the provision from the act. Dellums called this answer "hypocritical" and tried to pin Colby down on what he meant by reference to the War Powers Act.

"There might be no American uniforms, but do we put weapons in the hands of

others?" Dellums asked.

Colby replied: "The CIA and the U.S. government are in compliance with the decision made by Congress how this would be carried out."

He did not elaborate. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger disclosed last week the United States was trying to "help" neighbors of Angola who are trying to stop a Soviet-backed victory there, but he would not elaborate either.

There have been news reports that the United States is funneling \$50 million in aid to armed forces in Angola.

Monday, December 15, 1975 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

American involvement in Angola deepens

By David Anable
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, New York

The American Government, American business, and American citizens appear to be getting deeply involved in the raging civil war in Angola.

Ironically, these American elements are aiding and bankrolling opposing sides. And the administration's own reported undercover operation is the target of strong criticism from some members of Congress and, apparently, from within the State Department itself.

This U.S. involvement at varied levels is neither so well known nor perhaps so vast as Soviet and Cuban military aid to the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) whose Luanda-based "government" has been recognized by at least 13 black African countries.

But its scope is becoming daily more evident:

- Gulf Oil Company, which has oil wells in the MPLA-controlled enclave of Cabinda, has confirmed that it has handed over hundreds of millions of dollars this year in royalty and tax payments to the Luanda-based "tax collector of the State of Angola."

The latest payment (about \$100 million) was made in September when the MPLA was in full control of Luanda. MPLA finance minister Saydi Mingas, according to highly reliable sources, has confirmed receipt of this payment.

- Hundreds of Americans have responded to newspaper advertisements calling for mercenaries for action in Africa. One advertiser, David Bufkin of Fresno, California, told this correspondent that he himself had dispatched nearly 100 Americans to join the Angolan liberation movements fighting against the MPLA.

According to Mr. Bufkin, a California crop duster, most of these combat veterans headed for Angola via South Africa. A few went via Zaire. The initial funds (about \$800 to \$1,200 per person travel costs), he said, came from Africa. He reckoned a total of about 300 Americans had left for Angola over the past month or two.

American officials say that the FBI is investigating the matter. Recruiting American citizens to serve in a foreign army is illegal under Title 18 of the U.S. Code.

- The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) also has been recruiting Americans with combat experience; in this case, blacks, to go to Angola. But Arthur Fitzjohn, head of CORE's international department, insists that the aim is solely to provide medical assistance — "It's entirely peaceful, nonmilitary, humanitarian involvement."

Mr. Fitzjohn estimates that some 500 to 600 unpaid volunteers will be recruited as "medics" at a cost to CORE of from \$100,000 to \$1 million. He categorically denied a Newsday (Long Island) report that said that Central Intelligence Agency sources claimed CORE was recruiting for the CIA.

- According to a New York Times story published last week, a high-ranking U.S. Government official said that the United States has already sent \$25 million in arms and support funds to Angola over the last three months and plans to send another \$25 million.

The funds and military supplies were said to have been distributed by the CIA via Zaire to

the two uneasily allied factions fighting the MPLA — the FNLA (National Front) and UNITA (National Movement). State Department sources subsequently would neither confirm nor deny the report. The official U.S. position remains as enunciated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Nov. 28: "The United States will not intervene militarily in Angola."

However, a further New York Times report Sunday said that the August resignation of Nathaniel Davis, head of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, was made in protest against the Kissinger-sponsored growing U.S. covert involvement. Mr. Davis's recommendation of a purely diplomatic approach to Angola was said to have been rejected.

The Gulf Oil concession agreement with Angola calls for royalty and tax payments this year of some \$500 million — about half Angola's total foreign-exchange earnings in a normal year.

The company's 120 Cabinda wells have been pumping at near-normal rates (about 140,000 barrels a day) most of the year despite the war. About 100 foreign personnel, including some 50 Americans, are at work there. MPLA troops occupied the installations for only one day and now control the area from outside them.

Gulf spokesmen deny that the company's quarterly payments have been made to the MPLA. But that is clearly the effect, at least for the September payment. At the time of earlier payments Angola had a shaky "transitional" coalition government of all three factions plus the Portuguese. But the MPLA's Mr. Mingas was finance minister then, too.

Mr. Mingas is reported to have remarked

recently that MPLA's relations with Gulf were "very good." And Gulf is said to have quietly communicated to the State Department its concern about U.S. intervention on the other side.

Gulf now has a major problem on its hands: what to do about the next quarterly payment due at the end of this month? Since the September payment, the MPLA has declared independence (Nov. 11) and set itself up as the official government in the capital, Luanda. There is no longer any conceivable doubt as to who would receive the next check — if it goes to the usual address in Luanda.

The U.S. administration also has a problem, in this case of maintaining its alleged covert supply of funds and materiel to the anti-MPLA forces. Concerned both about a burgeoning, possibly Vietnam-type U.S. entanglement in Angola and about too-close U.S. identification with South African aid to the anti-MPLA groups, some U.S. senators and representatives are voicing opposition.

The Senate foreign-relations subcommittee on assistance is scheduled Tuesday to debate an amendment by Sen. Dick Clark (D) of Iowa to the Government's security-assistance bill. This would have the effect of bringing any such CIA disbursements under congressional control.

CORE, too, is finding Angola a prickly assignment. Mr. Fitzjohn says that Core wishes to retain a neutral mediatory stance throughout its involvement.

Yet the plan to send hundreds of black volunteers into Angola flowed from a CORE official's attendance at the UNITA-FNLA independence celebrations. CORE did not attend the MPLA celebrations, although Mr. Fitzjohn says that it is in contact with the MPLA, too.

NEW YORK TIMES

17 Dec. 1975

POLICY OVER ANGOLA IS EXAMINED BY CBS

Seeing similarities to Vietnam in the United States policy dilemma over Angola, CBS News executives have scheduled a special series on the Angola conflict to run on the "Evening News With Walter Cronkite" every night this week.

The segments will cover the background to the civil war in Angola, the diplomatic and military aspects, world attitudes toward the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conflict and, on Friday, a report on how blacks in this country view the situation in Angola.

In introducing the series on Monday, Mr. Cronkite spoke of a widely held belief "that America became so heavily involved in Vietnam because the government did not share enough of its decisions with the people." He said also that the people did not pay enough attention when they were told what was going on.

Mr. Cronkite said the purpose of the series was "to try to play our small part in preventing that mistake this time."

NEW YORK TIMES
18 Dec. 1975

ANGOLA COST PUT NEAR \$60-MILLION

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17— Senator Hubert H. Humphrey said today that covert United States operations in Angola were currently projected by the Administration at a total of \$60 million for the current fiscal year.

Some Senate members are attempting to block funds for the operations that would be made available under the Defense Appropriation Act, the Minnesota Democrat said.

According to Senator Humphrey, who was among those briefed yesterday by Central Intelligence Agency officials on the Angola situation, the Administration has already spent \$26 million in weapons and support funds in Angola and has \$7 million in the pipeline.

He said William Nelson, the C.I.A. director of operations, had disclosed that the Administration was planning to put \$28 million more into Angola.

"The total sum is \$60 million," Mr. Humphrey said. "Next year they'll want \$150 million. Personally I think this is a threshold matter."

"We don't want policy made on a piecemeal basis as in Vietnam," Mr. Humphrey said, suggesting an analogy that is very much on the minds of the Congress in connection with

Two other Senators said they had reason to believe that covert expenditures in Angola far exceeded what had so far been disclosed to the Congress.

Senator John V. Tunney, Democrat of California, declared:

"Maybe a good deal more has been spent than we have talked about, through Zambia and Zaire and manipulations in currency."

Payoff to Mobutu Seen

Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, said he thought the involvement in Angola was a payoff by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire for services rendered to the United States.

Senator Weicker said he had learned from private sources that the Administration had sought \$100 million for Angola operations for a three-month period starting in September, but Congressional intelligence overseeing committees had scaled down the request.

He told a reporter that up to now the C.I.A. had sent \$17 million in ordinance to Angola on behalf of two factions fighting against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which has Soviet support.

"But the posting was low," he went on. "For example, they list a .45 caliber pistol at \$5. So maybe the actual amount of arms was much higher."

Countering Congressional accusations that the Administration was pushing the United

Carl T. Rowan

Shutting up Moynihan would help in Angola

There is an old African proverb that "when two elephants fight, the grass gets bruised."

Well, Angola is going to wind up with a lot of bruises, because the pachyderms of international politics have made this former Portuguese colony the latest of their international battlegrounds.

The Soviet Union is pumping in lots of sophisticated arms along with some 4,000 Cuban mercenaries to try to ensure that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) becomes the ruling force in this new nation.

The United States is giving money and arms to Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), even though Roberto seems to have more support in neighboring Zaire than he does in Angola.

The U.S. seems to be hedging its bets by also supporting the National Front for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with the Chinese ironically working the same side of the fence, trying to prevent the Soviet Union from using the Popular Movement to establish a firm beachhead in black Africa.

Fear of a Communist Angola has provoked South Africa to aid UNITA, with some reports claiming that at least 1,000 South Africans

are involved in the fighting. South African involvement automatically makes the MPLA more palatable to Africans.

And now, as though poor Angola were not being ravaged enough, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and its chairman, Roy Innis, have hustled up funds from someplace and is recruiting black U.S. Vietnam veterans to fight in Angola.

There are two special elements of tragedy here.

The first is that personal greed and lust for power can so divide Angolan leaders that they become pawns in the power struggles of the big powers, neither of which means Africans any good. And greed and stupidity are the controlling factors, because time surely will show that there isn't a lot of ideological difference between Roberto, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA and Agostinho Neto of MPLA.

The second pitiful reality is that U.S. actions regarding Africa in recent years have been so bereft of respect, sensitivity or morality that the U.S. is without real or lasting influence in this situation.

Secretary of State Kissinger has, by his own admission, gone for years without an African policy. So, with regard to Angola, Kissinger is reduced to futile pleadings that if the Russians

truly believe in detente they will halt their intervention in Angola.

And Kissinger is being upstaged by U.N. Ambassador Patrick Moynihan's rantings about how the Soviet Union is colonizing Africa and Moynihan's challenge to the U.N. to do something about it.

Moynihan knows, of course, that a U.N. that was too weak to control Soviet actions in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, or U.S. actions in Vietnam or the Dominican Republic, remains too weak to dictate to the Soviets about what they may do in Angola.

If our goal is to keep the Soviet Union out of Angola and the heart of Africa, few things could be more counterproductive than these speeches by Moynihan. His anti-Third World diatribes have gone over well in Podunk and the country clubs of Fatcat, America, but Moynihan is held in contempt by those Africans who ultimately will decide whether Angola and the rest of that continent turn to communism, socialism or something else.

Officials in Washington report that the U.S. already has spent more than \$50 million in covert operations to block the Soviet-backed Popular Movement in Angola. If we could keep Moynihan quiet, that would be the equivalent of sending in at least another \$50 million.

States into another Vietnam, President Ford said through a spokesman:

"We do not have nor contemplate sending military or non-military advisers to Angola."

"We have no exploitative intention in Angola," William J. Greener, the spokesman, continued, "nor do we contemplate any United States combat intervention there. There are no parallels between Vietnam and Angola."

The senate held a closed session on the Angola issue for more than three hours this morning, listening to liberals defend a proposal submitted by Senator Tunney that would lead to trimming \$33 million out of the defense appropriations and bar further funding of covert actions in Angola out of defense funds.

The discussion turned to an acrimonious debate over whether committee chairmen privy to intelligence information had an obligation to report to the full Senate on what they knew

about covert operations in Angola.

According to a number of Senators who attended the session, John V. McClellan, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who has received regular briefings on the covert actions, steadfastly refused to inform the Senate on what he knew.

Senator Humphrey, who had also been briefed in his capacity as chairman of a Foreign Relations subcommittee on security assistance, said he interpreted the Senate rules differently—that as "an agent of the Senate" he had the duty of disclosure.

But the question was unresolved by the session, which left many Senators confused over what was being debated—the Angola issue or the Senate's practices.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 DEC 1975

Angola—can of worms

It is time to blow the whistle on the growing American involvement in the civil war in Angola. There is no conceivable American interest that would justify a commitment to one or another of the contending nationalist factions in the former Portuguese colony. There is every reason to limit the scope of an international intervention that threatens to reach the proportions of the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s.

The American involvement so far has been discreetly limited. The well-publicized "covert" operation of the Central Intelligence Agency appears to have been confined to the shipment of some \$25 million in small arms for the more pro-Western (or more anti-Russian) of the three nationalist factions, with another \$25 million worth supposedly on the way. This American aid, sent indirectly through Zaire, is small potatoes compared to the massive shipments of heavy armaments and rockets supplied by the Soviet Union to its proteges in the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the presence in the country of some 200 Soviet advisers and more than 4,000 Cuban combat troops.

But this is only the beginning of foreign involvement in the civil conflict in Angola. In one way or another, China, Western Europe, South Africa, former Portuguese colonists and troops from Zaire are lined up in support of the anti-Russian elements, represented by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence

of Angola (UNITA). Most recently, there have been reports that the Congress of Racial Equality is recruiting black American volunteer Vietnam veterans for service in Angola as a neutral "police force" under the direction of the Organization of African Unity, which has been trying to mediate the conflict.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been making ominous pronouncements about the situation. The Soviet intervention in the war in Angola, he told the NATO meeting in Brussels, represents a potential shift in the world balance of power to which the United States cannot remain indifferent. The possibility of the Soviet Union's establishing a foothold in southern Africa, he says, is "inadmissible" so far as the United States is concerned. Other officials have said that the Russians are out to "win all of Angola," suggesting that this amounts to a challenge to the United States on a global scale.

For our part, the situation in Angola strikes us as a classic can of worms that the United States would do well to steer clear of. We do not see what American interests are served by any of the factions contending for power there. We are doubtful that, even if it should "win" there, the Soviet Union would find Angola much of a long-range asset. A modest contribution of money and arms in the hope of achieving a stalemate in the civil war and a negotiated solution of the conflict may still be justified. Anything more than that, in our view, would not.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1975

Ford Concerned About Soviet, Cuban Aid to Angola

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 —

President Ford expressed "serious concern" today over "action taken by the Soviet Union and Cuba in providing large quantities of equipment and men to Angola."

A White House spokesman, William I. Greener, said Mr. Ford "feels a need for discussion in the Congress of the geopolitical significance of that part of Africa to the United States and the West."

Meanwhile, the senators listened to administration officials defend a limited American involvement in Angola to counter Soviet moves there.

"The State Department and the C.I.A. have been urging us not to cut off economic or military aid to Angola," said Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, after emerging from more than three hours of closed-door testimony by William Nelson, head of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations directorate, and other Administration officials.

A group of liberal Senators is seeking to strike \$33 million from the \$120.9 defense appropriations bill when it comes before the full Senate tomorrow, on the ground this action would wipe out the C.I.A.'s contingency funds for Angola operations.

A resolution submitted by four Democratic Senators, John V. Tunney and Alan Cranston of California, Dick Clark of Iowa and Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, if adopted, would send the Senate-House Conference report back to the House with new language specifying not only the \$33 million in arms and support funds to Angola since July, and that \$7 million more was "in the pipeline."

"By cutting off \$33 million we make the C.I.A. eat what they have already spent—they don't get it replenished," a Senate aide contended. He explained that C.I.A. contingency funds had already been exhausted.

Senate aides said President Ford was seeking an additional \$25 million for covert operations in Angola, bringing the total of committed and intended funds to over \$50 million. It is believed the \$7 million "in the pipeline" comes out of the second \$25 million.

There was a degree of confusion in both the Senate and the House over what to do about Angola, a former Portuguese colony where three factions have been battling for control since mid-July, as various legislators acted to hasten or to delay a termination of American support.

Late in the afternoon, the Senate Foreign Relations sub-

committee on security assistance voted unanimously for an amendment and a joint resolution that would eliminate covert military assistance for any party in the Angola conflict.

However, the language of the amendment would not immediately cut off covert assistance since it is related to the \$4.7 billion security assistance bill, which does not reach the floor until January.

A Senate aide remarked that the joint resolution did not rule out ongoing aid to Angola. "It leaves a breathing space until the Organization of African Unity meets in January and votes on the Angola issue," he said. "It is drafted to make sure we preserve the African options before they meet."

The resolution declares that future American involvement in Angola should be open, that there should be no more covert aid, and that any assistance sought by the Administration would require Congressional approval in 30 days.

This is a somewhat less radical approach than that sought by liberal senators and representatives, another Congressional aide said, and he attributed the moderate influence to

Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, Gale W. McGee, Democrat of Wyoming, and Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of the Bronx.

Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican-Liberal of New York, who participated in the subcommittee vote of 7 to 0, said the intent was "to see that Congress is in on the take-offs" of operations like the Angola involvement. "We're not passing judgments on Angola, but saying this cannot be done in camera, without public disclosure."

There were other legislative moves on the Angola issue.

Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, Democrat of Missouri, submitted an amendment to the foreign assistance bill that would prevent the Administration from sending civilians into "paramilitary operations" like that in Angola.

Senator Eagleton said his amendment would close a "loophole" left by the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which bars the President from sending armed missions without prior consultation with Congress.