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No. 2 20 January 1975

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Governmental Affairs

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

PROGRAM Issues & Answers STATION WMAL TV ABC Network

DATE December 29, 1974 1:30 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

AN INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR PROXMIRE

BOB CLARK: Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, here are the issues: Will charges of widespread domestic spying destroy the CIA? How can Congress tighten its control over intelligence operations? Will Congress vote an anti-recession tax cut?

* * *

ANNOUNCER: Senator William Proxmire, who has demanded an investigation into alleged domestic spying by the CIA and has called for the resignation of former CIA Director Richard Helms, Ambassador to Iran, will be interviewed by ABC News Capitol Hill correspondent Bob Clark and ABC news correspondent Bill Gill.

BILL GILL: Senator, in this week of charges against the Central Intelligence Agency on alleged domestic spying, you have had a research staff at work. Now most of the charges have been from unknown or unnamed sources in news reports. Have you been able to determine exactly what the Central Intelligence Agency may have been guilty or not guilty of?

SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE: Well, I think I can say on the basis of the information I have, and I think it's very good information, very reliable people that I've found to be reliable in the past, that the stories and the allegations in the New York Times about the 10,000 -- the file of 10,000 names of people who had been under investigation by the CIA, about the surveillance -- surveillances, I should say -- about the breaking-and-entering, and about wiretaps, that those are accurate and correct. I think I can confirm that on the basis of the information that I've had, and I think, as I say, that's good information.

GILL: Well, the latest report is the Central Intelligence Agency was shadowing or putting under surveillance Congressman Claude Pepper, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, some other of the highest-ranking American officials. Can you confirm that?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. That goes back quite a bit, especially the Douglas surveillance. So I don't have information on that.

GILL: Well, suppose you evaluate that kind of action by the Central Intelligence Agency. Let's assume for a moment that they might have investigated, put under surveillance these two particular people, Claude Pepper, a congressman of the United States, at the time when he was

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holding office; William Douglas, a Supreme Court Justice. Is this part of the CIA's province?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. What's outrageous about this is exactly what your question implies at the end, this is not part of the CIA's responsibility or their legal right. The CIA is responsible for foreign intelligence-gathering, primarily, and they have absolutely no right to engage in this kind of surveillance, and not only with respect to United States senators, but any American citizen in this country. It's wrong.

And I think I should be very careful in saying that I do think that internal security is an essential function. It has to be performed. We don't live in a Sunday school world. The Russians undoubtedly have their agents in this country and they should be under the closest kind of surveillance, but that should be done by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And it's most important that the CIA, which is a secret agency -- we don't even know its budget. It has hundreds of millions of dollars, tens of thousands of people working for it -- that if this agency begins to engage in this kind of thing without the controls the FBI has, without court orders for mail cover, for example, and wiretapping, then we're in a very dangerous position. And I think that distinction has to be made.

CLARK: Senator, as you know, we don't even know the budget of the CIA, and when you say "we," you mean the U.S. Congress. There are a few members of the House and Senate who form subcommittees on the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committee who theoretically oversee the CIA budget. But...

SENATOR PROXMIRE: I'm glad you said theoretically. I mean it's pretty theoretical. They don't...

CLARK: That's sort of the heart of the question. I know these rarely meet and they're dominated by two or three senior members. But what do you do about it? How does Congress tighten its control over the CIA so it knows what it's doing and what it's spending?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, number one -- I think there are a number of things we should do. Number one, we should clear up this so-called gray area that you have. We should make it absolutely clear by law that the CIA cannot engage, must not engage in any kind of domestic police activity at all, any kind of domestic activity. I got that kind of an amendment through the Senate and Senator Stennis cosponsored it with me, the Proxmire-Stennis Amendment. It was unfortunately dropped in the House, but I think we can get that adopted in the coming year, thanks very largely to the story in the New York Times, the series of stories and exposes in the New York Times. So I think that's number one. But that's just the beginning.

I think, in addition to that, we must act to establish an independent special prosecutor with subpoena powers who will prosecute every illegal action by CIA agents, past or present.

CLARK: Now are you talking about a special prosecutor under the Justice Department or under Congress, as a creature of Congress?

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SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I think it ought to be a creature of Congress. I think it ought to be created by us. I think it would be working with the Justice Department, but I think it ought to be independent, and I stress the independence. I think we have a framework for that, of course, in the Watergate situation, where we had both Cox and Jaworski in this position, where there was a Justice Department responsibility, but where it was clear that the independent special prosecutor could not be fired without informing the Congress about it and giving the Congress an opportunity to act. It must be independent of the Executive because this is where the problem has developed.

CLARK: Well, would you have this special prosecutor conduct the investigation that almost everybody agrees is now needed of the CIA?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I think that's part of it. I think he should conduct the investigation of illegal activities, but I think that's only part of what has to be done. And in addition to that, I'd like to see the establishment of a joint committee that has the exclusive job and the sole job of investigating this whole operation and what's been done in the past.

You see, we've had these flurries of saying "Let's control the CIA" again and again. We had it when the Bay of Pigs thing happened. We had it with the U-2 fiasco. We had it with the secret war in Laos conducted by the CIA. And nothing happens. People complain about it for a few days or a few weeks, and it goes away.

So I think we should take action to make sure that you have that kind of a committee established with the responsibility, a limited responsibility, but a specific responsibility, in this case.

Then in addition, I think it would be desirable to have an oversight committee that would be permanently assigned to oversee the CIA, because as you implied before, there just isn't the kind of congressional control of the CIA that we must have.

GILL: Well, Senator...

SENATOR PROXMIRE: In addition to that, one other thing. I introduced legislation and got substantial support in the Senate, although it didn't pass, that would provide for an overall budget of the CIA so that we know how much money is being spent. And we have the word of both Schlesinger and Colby, the former directors, that this would not have a serious effect in compromising the security of the CIA.

GILL: Just so that we -- for clarity, up until this past week the central criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency over recent times has been covert activity in foreign countries a la Chile, the Bay of Pigs, the Laos war, with a great sentiment being expressed by some that even this should be absolutely prohibited. But now we're concentrating on a new area and that particular phase of the CIA operation seems to have faded away for the moment.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. Bill, these are very, very closely related. I think the covert activity should be stopped, the so-called -- the paramilitary activity, the murder, the kidnaping, or that kind of thing to destabilize,

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overthrow governments. It's wrong. It's counterproductive. It failed with the Bay of Pigs. It failed in the Chilean situation. It's failed over and over again. It's succeeded sometimes, but even where it succeeds, I think it erodes our...

[Confusion of voices]

SENATOR PROXMIRE: ...throughout the world.

GILL: Well, didn't it succeed in such places as Turkey, Greece, Iran...

SENATOR PROXMIRE: It succeeded in some places, that's correct. But even where it succeeded, it's something that leaves such a bad flavor and taste and attitude toward this country that I think it's wrong. We have no right to play God.

The reason it's related, however, is because if we're going to have people with that kind of experience, that kind of knowledge, that kind of ability engaging in subverting foreign countries, then we're asking for it here in this country. I think one of the most serious threats we have to our free system is subversion from trained subversive agents who've been trained to do the job abroad and then transfer that ability here.

I think the Watergate experience is one that should remind us of this.

GILL: What I'm asking you pointedly is can you briefly give me your concept of what Central Intelligence should be?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Yes. Briefly, what the Central Intelligence Agency should be doing is gathering intelligence, gathering information, gathering it in every way they know. And, of course, the technological advances we've had in recent years, where we have satellites that can be a hundred miles above the earth, can photograph something literally inches in size, has given us the most reliable kind of objective information about what's going on in foreign countries. And I think that that kind of intelligence-gathering and any other kind of foreign intelligence-gathering is right, useful, desirable; we have to have it.

But the paramilitary action abroad that Congress knows nothing about is, I think, vicious, wrong and unjustifiable, and we ought to stop it.

CLARK: Senator, let me play devil's advocate here for a moment, and I know the position you're taking is essentially that of Chairman Fulbright as he leaves the Foreign Relations Committee, that the CIA should confine itself only to gathering intelligence. But the rebuttal that is made to that is that we live in a dangerous and sometimes a dirty world where it takes a dirty tricks operation to remain competitive with the intelligence operations that are manned by the Iron Curtain countries. How do you answer that?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I'd answer that by saying that this is -- we've always lived in a dirty world in which tough and mean, cruel people operated this way. That's the way the world has been. There's nothing new about that. We

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got along without the CIA operation for most of our history, the great majority of our history.

When President Truman discovered that this covert kind of operation was going on, he expressed real shock. He was concerned about it. He thought it was wrong.

And I don't think that there's -- it's ever been shown that his is necessary or that this kind of activity has at any time been really useful in the long run for the interests of our country. I think we can protect ourselves with our defense establishment. I think we can protect ourselves by getting information about what's going on, which is what the CIA should do. And we do not need to engage in that kind of activity abroad. I don't think it works for us; I don't think it works for other countries trying to operate in this country.

CLARK: I want to get a little clearer on your views as to what sort of an investigation should be mounted into the CIA. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State Kissinger, who is also the chief wheel of the private oversight operation within the Administration of the CIA, the so-called Committee of 40 -- but he reportedly favors an investigation by a panel -- a blue-ribbon panel, so-called, of private citizens. What would you think of that idea?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, now we've had an investigation by the CIA itself of itself, and I think we have to discount that, although I have great respect for Mr. Colby, who I think is doing a good job, on the basis of everything I've seen, as Mr. Schlesinger did. He's a good man. But I think that the CIA to investigate itself obviously isn't it.

Now if you have a panel -- we have a panel, a board, an intelligence board whose job it is to brief the President on what's going on in the intelligence community, and it just hasn't worked. We wouldn't have situation that has just been exposed by the New York Times.

What I'm concerned about is that if the President appoints a panel, with Mr. Kissinger's advice -- and Mr. Kissinger, as you say, is partly responsible for the CIA -- that it's likely to be a whitewash. I just wouldn't have faith that they would do the job.

I think, in addition to that, you should have what I have suggested, which is a vigorous independent special prosecutor with the job of going after what's wrong and illegal and taking action, and a congressional committee with its specific responsibility for acting here.

I wouldn't have any objection to that, but I don't think it'll do much.

CLARK: Senator, you are going...

SENATOR PROXMIRE: I wouldn't have any faith in their finding.

CLARK: In the new 94th Congress you're going to move on to a new job as Chairman of the Banking Committee. We want to ask you a number of questions about that....

* * *

GILL: Senator, before we go on to your new duties as Chairman of the Banking Committee, this CIA proposition that

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you mentioned is rather intriguing, I think, and I'd like to ask you this: If you were to have a special group of oversight action created in the Congress, could the CIA, under your premise, then come to that organization for sanction of its dirty trick operations, its paramilitary operations, if it felt that it's absolutely essential to the country? Would there be any mechanism at all that they could get the permission or the consent or the agreement of that legislative body to go ahead with such a paramilitary operation? Or are you speaking of making it absolutely prohibited?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I'm saying I'd like to get the legislation adopted prohibiting that kind of activity. As I say, I don't think it's worked.

But obviously, at any time the President of the United States or the CIA or anyone else wants to come before the Congress and ask for permission to do this, they could get the law changed to permit them to do it, and I think that that should be the requirement.

GILL: But then it would have to go before the entire Congress and be laid out on the table, and then there is no secrecy to it. Aren't you really getting to the point now where you're in danger of just totally emasculating the CIA in some foreseeable future when something such as [unintelligible] is absolutely necessary?

SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. I don't think -- this is the way free societies perish. I think by getting into activities which are so wrong, the means are so wrong, they just devour your ends. I think what we have to do is recognize that this country survived very well for 170 years without any CIA. We also have to look at what the covert activities have told us for the last 20 years or so since we've been engaged in them. What is the result? It's been counterproductive. It has not given us a single instance which, it seems to me, Americans can be proud of in advancing our position.

Sure, we have gotten a little more friendly governments in one place and another, but we're playing God when we do that. How can we possibly justify removing a government that's been elected, or, for that matter, any other government?

I think that this covert activity is wrong and it's really a more likely threat to the free institutions than the invasion of a foreign power.

And I just want to make one more thing clear: I feel very strongly about internal security. I think we do live in a tough world, but I think that the FBI has the professionalism, the competence, the track record and they can protect this country.

WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1975

CIA Reportedly Asked Firms to Spy

Reuter

The Central Intelligence Agency recently asked American firms to engage in industrial espionage on civilian transportation systems in Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union, it was asserted yesterday.

Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.) charged that research contract proposals sent by the CIA to American firms last month linked the CIA to "planned industrial operations."

The CIA document outlining the proposed study said "the U.S. may be faced with competitive threats, in both the U.S. and international market, evolving from rapid technological advances in other countries."

A copy of the CIA's seven-page document requesting American firms to submit proposals for participating in the project said "the emphasis will be placed on the identification of specific foreign developments in transportation technology that could provide the most serious economic competition for the United States."

Schweiker said in his statement "I do not question our government's interest in foreign civilian mass transportation technology, but I do question why this information isn't being openly obtained by the Departments of Commerce or Transportation instead of secretly procured by the CIA.

"This latest discovery adds new weight to the charges that the CIA has exceeded its charter and established an invisible government of its own," Schweiker said.

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NEW YORK
20 Jan. 1975

How Nixon Used the C.I.A.

By Tad Szulc

"...Nixon tapes would speak for themselves. The C.I.A. will tell the blue-ribbon panel as much, or as little, as it chooses..."

President Ford no sooner said that he wished to know and tell the whole truth about the illegal domestic operations of the Central Intelligence Agency than he placed this investigation in the hands of an eight-man blue-ribbon commission whose immediate problem may lie in its own unreality. Its chairman, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, and several of its most knowledgeable members have long, intimate, and protective ties with the U.S. intelligence community, which could conceivably lead them to see the C.I.A.'s controversial doings in a relatively charitable light.

The crucial question to be answered by the commission is this: who knew about the C.I.A.'s portion of what John Mitchell characterized as the Nixon White House "horrors"? Was it Richard Nixon himself, orchestrating a comprehensive plan to push the United States toward a police state? Was it former C.I.A. Director Richard Helms? Was it General Robert Cushman Jr., a close associate of Richard Nixon's and, at the time, the agency's deputy director? Or was it Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the man who, in effect, runs the entire U.S. intelligence community? Charity may not be the most necessary attribute for a group whose mission includes determining whether sufficient safeguards surround the C.I.A.

In any event, this commission can hardly do its work adequately unless, along with the Watergate special prosecutor, it gains access to the treasure trove of Richard Nixon's materials held back by the Ford White House because of Nixon's own legal challenges.

Federal investigators are convinced that among the 900 reels of tapes (adding up to some 5,400 listening hours) and 42 million documents in the White House complex there is ample evidence to verify how and why the former president and his associates went about misusing and abusing the American intelligence community for their own political ends—at the expense of the civil rights of American citizens.

The C.I.A. and military intelligence have been snooping around the United States for a long time, but there has been nothing quite like the carryings-on under Nixon. These activities far transcend in importance recently reported "massive" C.I.A. spying on antiwar militants, if it really occurred. They included direct domestic police functions in support of local police forces, White House-directed surveillance of selected individuals for political reasons, considerable cooperation with the "plumbers," and the management of a $200-million-a-year top-secret C.I.A. corporate empire.

The existence of this vast international corporate empire has a new relevance, presumably of interest to the Rockefeller commission. Present foreign aid legislation prohibits the funding of covert C.I.A. operations abroad unless the president certifies to Congress their need for U.S. national security. The availability of funds in C.I.A.-owned and profit-making businesses could circumvent the intent of Congress.

New York Magazine has learned details of these and other hidden intelligence operations through recent research and wide-ranging interviews throughout the United States intelligence community. A presidential commission seriously interested in getting to the bottom of things surely could do much more. Curiously, though, the contents of the Nixon cache, which would be the most vital aspect of its investigations, were referred to by neither Ford nor any other senior administration official in the course of announcing formation of the commission. The commission's present plan is to interview C.I.A. Director William Colby as its first witness, then move on to Kissinger and others. The Nixon tapes would speak for themselves. The C.I.A. will tell as much, or as little, as it chooses to the blue-ribbon investigators, a potentially sympathetic group. The chairman, Rockefeller, served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, theoretically a supervisory group for U.S. intelligence-gathering activities, from 1969 to 1974. Its membership includes such old friends of the C.I.A. as former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, former California Governor Ronald Reagan, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer. As J.C.S. chairman, General Lemnitzer was on the White House's "303 Committee"—now known as the "40 Committee"—which supervises the most secret United States foreign covert intelligence operations.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O., whose secretary-treasurer, Lane Kirkland, is on the panel, provided in the sixties an umbrella for C.I.A. activities in Latin America by setting up the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Kirkland is also a member of Rockefeller's earlier commission on "critical choices."

Nixon's legal suits to prevent access to his tapes and documents constitute a legal cover-up. It is aimed at voiding an agreement signed last November between the Ford White House and the special prosecutor to make the pertinent files available for the preparation of additional Watergate indictments.

Inasmuch as one of Nixon's suits challenges the constitutionality of a recent congressional act which ratifies, in effect, the Ford–special prosecutor agreement, the case may go all the way to the Supreme Court, indefinitely delaying all the investigations. The blue-ribbon commission must report by April 4 (even though it is unlikely that litigation over Nixon's materials will be resolved by then).

The White House tapes and documents are also believed to contain juicy material that would document other areas of Nixon abuses — most notably concerning illegal wiretaps, violations of the Internal Revenue Service's statutes on the secrecy of tax returns, and other startling attempts to subvert the functions of government departments for the former president's political advantage.

If the tapes are obtained, the special prosecutor hopes later this year to come up with new indictments against, among others, those who during Nixon's reign installed what are believed to have been illegal national security wiretaps against administration officials and Washington newsmen. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, Justice Department Internal Security Division officials, Washington police officers, or even C.I.A. operatives may have done the work. Should the wiretap case go to trial, the special prosecutor is certain to call as witnesses Kissinger and his former deputy, General Alexander M. Haig Jr., who is now commander-in-chief of NATO forces. Both have already acknowledged recommending the names of those to be wiretapped.

The Nixon tapes might also explain why the Nixon administration late in 1972 created a mysterious military intelligence office known as Defense Investigative Service (D.I.S.) located in the Forrestal Building in downtown Washington. The D.I.S., reportedly staffed by a number of ex-C.I.A. agents from domestic intelligence units, reports directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, significantly by-passing the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Inquirers at the Pentagon about the D.I.S. are told that this office cen-

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tralizes security clearance for defense contractors. But there is doubt that this is its only function. Until his retirement late in 1974, the D.I.S. was headed by Air Force Brigadier General Joseph Cappucci, formerly chief of the air force's Office of Special Investigation. Insiders say that clearing defense contractors would hardly be a task given a senior military intelligence officer. Political intelligence within the air force was a responsibility of the Office of Special Investigations.

Officials familiar with the situation suggest that new disclosures from the Nixon materials may create acute embarrassment for Henry Kissinger. Inasmuch as the C.I.A. reports to the president of the United States through the mechanism of the National Security Council, headed by Kissinger since 1969, and since he is chairman of the N.S.C.'s "40 Committee," concerned with the most secret intelligence operations abroad, it is a valid question how much he might have known about the agency's secret operations.

Privately, many officials further argue that Kissinger probably had to be aware of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities. For example, the dividing line between the agency's foreign and domestic counterintelligence work—the tracking of foreign intelligence operatives—is completely blurred, particularly since J. Edgar Hoover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's late director, suspended all counterespionage cooperation with the C.I.A. in 1969. If indeed other C.I.A. units aside from the Counterintelligence Staff belonging to the office of the Deputy Director of Operations (D.D.O.), also known as the Clandestine Services, became engaged in purely domestic operations between 1969 and 1972, it would have been an affront to Kissinger to keep him in the dark. It must be remembered that from the moment he moved into the White House, in 1969, Kissinger insisted on maintaining full control of the C.I.A. to the point where successive C.I.A. directors had no direct private access to Nixon; the present director, William E. Colby, usually sees President Ford in Kissinger's presence.

After Ford requested a report from Colby on the C.I.A.'s illegal activities following publication in *The New York Times* on December 22 of the "massive spying" charges, it was Kissinger, as the head of the N.S.C. mechanism, who was instructed to transmit Colby's response to the president. In this sense, then, Kissinger is part and parcel of the whole intelligence controversy. As of now, so is his friend and benefactor, Vice-President Rockefeller.

There are also some reasons to suspect that the whole affair is immensely more complex and sensitive than the simple possibility that the Counterintelligence Staff ran private spying operations against the antiwar movement. There have been a number of unexplained moves both by the C.I.A. and the White House suggestive of a no-holds-barred power struggle within the intelligence community, possibly involving Kissinger himself. Ford's decision to "get to the bottom" of the present C.I.A. affair—an abrupt departure from past White House practice in C.I.A. matters—is an element in the mystery.

One possibility, insiders say, is that the need was perceived at the highest levels of the government to hide the *real* C.I.A. enterprises during the Watergate era—such as undertaking direct police functions and dirty work for the Nixon White House. Because bits of information were beginning to surface, these insiders say, it was judged less damaging to go along with the limited charge of "massive spying" against the antiwar movement.

A related possibility is that the "massive spying" disclosures last month were the result of deliberate C.I.A. leaks. Their objective: to help eliminate James Angleton, the head of the Counterintelligence Staff, one of the C.I.A.'s most powerful and independent senior officials and long a thorn in Colby's and Kissinger's sides.

Angleton and his Counterintelligence group were initially singled out as culprits in the spying scandal despite the high probability, as it now appears, that an entirely separate C.I.A. branch, the Domestic Operations Division, conducted domestic operations.

Published reports early this month indicated that both Colby and Kissinger resented Angleton's personal control of all intelligence liaison with Israel. Unlike all other cases involving foreign intelligence, the C.I.A.'s relations with Israel were handled by Counterintelligence rather than a geographic division of Clandestine Services.

Some knowledgeable State Department officials say that Kissinger felt that Angleton's operations interfered with his Middle East diplomacy. Counterintelligence was apparently the only area in the C.I.A. that resisted Kissinger's sway. In addition, Angleton was known to hold a low opinion of the détente engineered and negotiated by Kissinger with the Soviet Union.

Angleton himself told newsmen that Colby had asked him to resign in the wake of the domestic spying charges (although he was to remain with the agency as "a consultant" while the Counterintelligence Staff is being reorganized and a new chief named). Three of Angleton's deputies were also asked to resign. But *New York* Magazine has learned that Colby actually moved to fire him two or three days before *The Times* published its report on domestic spying naming Angleton as the man responsible.

If this theory is correct, we may be facing an extraordinary combination of a cover-up of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities on Nixon's behalf with esoteric intrigues within the agency itself—indeed, within the entire American intelligence community—a combination that cannot help but affect the conduct of American foreign policy.

The very structure of the agency's "Clandestine Services," the secretive Directorate of Operations (see table on page 33), helps explain how such things are possible.

So that perfect security and secrecy may be assured, the agency frequently insists on the right hand's not knowing what the left hand does—the principle of "compartmentalization." In all D.D.O. operations, knowledge is confined to those with "the need to know"—and it can't even be ruled out that in some cases the C.I.A. director himself may have looked the other way on the theory, as a C.I.A. veteran put it, that "what you don't know don't hurt you."

During the Nixon period—until his removal early in 1973—the C.I.A. director was Richard Helms, a lifelong clandestine operator. His deputy director of Central Intelligence (D.D.C.I.) was Lieutenant General Robert Cushman Jr., once Nixon's military assistant and now commandant of the marine corps. Helms and Cushman were supported by four C.I.A. deputy directors, one of whom was the deputy director for plans (recently the title was changed to deputy director of operations).

This post was held until early 1973 by Thomas Karamessines. He and his deputy, Cord Meyer Jr., were in charge of all clandestine operations. The directorate was divided into four main branches reporting directly to Karamessines. (A fifth branch, the Science and Technology Office, was subsequently added.)

For specific operational purposes, however, Karamessines also ran two parallel groups of divisions, one foreign and one domestic. These were hierarchically separated from the special staffs such as Counterintelligence or Covert Action. Six regional divisions supported by subregional and country desks formed the geographic group and worked with the special staffs on specific overseas operations.

On the domestic side, the directorate had—and still has—four divisions. In varying degrees, they were all involved in Nixon-era secret domestic operations.

The little-known Domestic Operations Division (D.O.D.) and the mysteriously named "Division D" (now renamed "D Staff") carried out the bulk of domestic activities, ranging from wholly legitimate ones to some that were quite shady. They were logistically aided, as the rest of the C.I.A. is, by the specialized Technical Services Division (T.S.D.) and Records Integration Division (R.I.D.).

The Domestic Operations Division is in charge of a network of C.I.A. offices located in at least fifteen American cities. Some of these offices are overt and even listed in local telephone directories (under "Central Intelligence Agency"). The division's so-called "00" offices, for example, concentrate on debriefing American travelers returning home from trips to countries in which the C.I.A. has a special interest. Inasmuch as the Counterintelligence Staff worries about foreign agents, such as Soviet K.G.B. operatives, entering the United States, it may occasionally request the D.O.D. to lend a hand in

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tracking them. Such interceptions were once made by the F.B.I., but when Hoover gave up his counterespionage functions, this follow-up was made by C.I.A. Counterintelligence or the D.O.D.

That which C.I.A. officials speaking privately have conceded to be the "gray area" of operations is the surveillance of American citizens suspected of contacts with foreign intelligence. Although the 1947 National Security Act, which created the C.I.A., specifically forbids domestic police functions by the agency, it is argued that such activity is simply an extension of foreign counterintelligence.

It is widely known in Washington intelligence circles that the C.I.A., and especially Counterintelligence, suspected a number of dissident and radical American groups of ties with Communist intelligence services—and not only in the antiwar movement context. The Black Panthers, for example, were under close C.I.A. surveillance based on the suspicion—never proved—that many of its members traveled to Algeria and Moscow for ideological indoctrination and then to North Korea for sabotage and guerrilla training. Similar suspicions surrounded young Americans who had visited Cuba.

The C.I.A. increased this surveillance under Nixon even though the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, formed by former President Johnson, had concluded that there was no foreign subversive conspiracy behind racial riots. The C.I.A. had worked closely with the commission. Cord Meyer, the Clandestine Services' deputy chief, was the agency's liaison official.

But although it engaged in financing such groups as the National Student Association for intelligence operations abroad, and publishing houses, magazines, and news agencies for foreign propaganda in pre-Nixon days, former Director Richard Helms and the C.I.A. drew a line at "targeting" Americans at home. Nor would the C.I.A. busy itself abroad on essentially domestic matters. In the 1960's, for example, Helms personally refused a request from the Internal Revenue to establish surveillance in South America on a tax evader, an American citizen, who had skipped overseas owing hundreds of thousands of dollars in back taxes.

Under Nixon, however, the climate changed totally. In December, 1970, Helms fitted the C.I.A. into the secret Intelligence Evaluation Committee at the White House. The unit grew out of the secret domestic intelligence plan drafted for Nixon by his aide Tom Huston six months earlier. Under enormous White House pressure, the C.I.A. began to become involved in domestic activities, often in clear violation of its own statute. For example:

1. *Police functions.* During the 1969-1972 period of massive antiwar demonstrations, particularly in Washington, the C.I.A., responding to White House requests, trained and advised local police departments in the arts of intelligence and communications. The C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division, the Technical Services Division, the Records Integration Division, and the "D Staff" were all involved. The "D Staff" was in charge of communications and intelligence collection for local police forces. This presumably included direct surveillance of Americans, but as an ancillary rather than principal function. The R.I.D. helped out with computer read-outs from files kept by the C.I.A.'s Counterintelligence, the F.B.I. (which did work on domestic riot control), and the military intelligence services. The Technical Services provided highly sophisticated equipment, such as devices showing whether a person had held metal—a gun—in his or her hand hours earlier.

The C.I.A. doesn't actually deny its training and equipment support for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington. The C.I.A. claims, perhaps lamely, that it had acted in the belief that it was meeting the requirements of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

There is no question but that this C.I.A. police function, also carried out in New York and Chicago, specifically violated the National Security Act. C.I.A. training of U.S. police forces ended early in 1973, after a *New York Times* article alluded, in general terms, to such assistance.

2. *Plumbers.* The record of Watergate investigations shows that acting on a telephone call from John Ehrlichman, then Nixon's chief of the Domestic Council, the C.I.A. provided one of the plumbers, Howard Hunt, with disguise equipment on a "one-time basis." This was authorized by General Cushman, then the C.I.A.'s deputy director, and the material was provided by the Technical Services Division.

But private investigations suggest that in addition to the help obtained from the C.I.A. headquarters on this particular occasion, the plumbers were equipped for other missions by the agency's clandestine offices in Miami and outside San Francisco. The so-called "green light" group in the C.I.A.'s Miami office reportedly provided Hunt with some of the equipment for the June, 1972, Watergate break-in. The C.I.A. office in Burlingame, near San Francisco, apparently did likewise in connection with the plumbers' break-in, in 1971, into Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's offices. In 1973, when investigations uncovered the agency's role in equipping Hunt, a senior officer of the Technical Services Division, Howard Osborne, was quietly fired from the C.I.A.

In Las Vegas, Nevada, where the plumbers had planned an operation against newspaper publisher Hank Greenspun, the C.I.A. maintains one of its largest domestic clandestine offices, run by the D.O.D. It remains unclear why Las Vegas, hardly an espionage center, rates a big C.I.A. station.

3. *The corporate empire.* This is one of the C.I.A.'s most sensitive secrets. The network of C.I.A.-owned companies was created in 1950, at the height of the Cold War, to provide fireproof covers for overseas operations. In the 1960's, it was used to disguise the financing of such enterprises as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the use of anti-Castro Cuban pilots and B-26's in the Congo, the "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in Laos, and a variety of other covert activities. Under Nixon, funds for domestic operations, including some plumber-type operations, were channeled through the C.I.A.'s "proprietary" or front corporations. The most famous, though not necessarily the most important, of them was the Robert R. Mullen & Co. in Washington, where Hunt was "employed" after leaving the C.I.A.

The holding company for the C.I.A.'s corporate empire is the Pacific Corporation located in Washington. Pacific, whose subsidiaries are said to employ some 20,000 people worldwide, was incorporated in Dover, Delaware, on July 10, 1950, by the Prentice Hall Corporation (no kin to the publishing firm of that name), an incorporating agent for hundreds of firms that enjoy Delaware's tax advantages. A C.I.A. official familiar with the Pacific Corporation explained that in this and every other case where a C.I.A. company is incorporated in a state capital, the local secretary of state is informed of the true nature of the enterprise to avoid tax or any other inquiries. Thus Delaware's secretary of state refuses to disclose the names of Pacific's directors at the time of the incorporation.

The Pacific Corporation owns such operational C.I.A. companies as Air America, Inc., whose planes supported all the agency operations in Indochina; C.A.T. (Civil Air Transport) Co., Ltd., a Taiwan-based airline often used by the C.I.A.; Air Asia Co., Ltd., specializing in aircraft maintenance; the Pacific Engineering Company; and the Thai Pacific Services Co., Ltd.

The Pacific Corporation and these five other companies have headquarters in a third-floor suite at 1725 K Street, Northwest, in Washington. Oddly, all six are listed in the building directory and in the Washington telephone book. But to a casual visitor to the K Street building lobby, all these names are wholly meaningless, as are those of nine officials listed under Suite 309. Curiously, however, the name of

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C.I.A. insiders say that the Pacific Corporation may own dozens of other companies elsewhere in the United States and abroad. It may be impossible to unravel all the corporate ramifications of the Pacific firm without a detailed inspection of the C.I.A.'s books, something a determined presidential commission could do.

It is known that the Pacific Corporation had about $200 million in "sales" in 1972. This fact emerged when the Price Commission, engaged in classifying companies by their size for reporting purposes, came upon the Pacific Corporation's tax returns.

Tax returns? Of course. Because the corporation serves as a C.I.A. cover, it has to behave like all other companies. Thus it pays taxes. The C.I.A. realized, however, that the Pacific Corporation's cover was in jeopardy if the Price Commission applied to it the rule that all companies with sales in excess of $50 million annually must report their activities. Accordingly, the Pacific Corporation sent a letter to the Price Commission advising it that its domestic sales were below $50 million—that the balance was in foreign operations.

All American citizens living continuously for eighteen months abroad, except for government employees, have a $20,000 exemption from their taxable income. To maintain their cover, the employees of the Pacific Corporation and its subsidiaries theoretically enjoy this advantage. But because they are in fact government employees, they must pay the tax differential to the C.I.A., which, in turn, refunds it to the Internal Revenue under a secret arrangement.

The final irony is that the Pacific Corporation actually makes a profit on its different operations: the problem is how to feed it back, discreetly, to the U.S. Treasury. The empire also finances secret overseas operations. To disguise the movement of a large volume of dollars—as was the case in Vietnam and in the preparations for the overthrow of the Chilean regime in 1973—friendly American banks and currency houses discreetly handle this flow of funds.

Other activities emanating from the C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division have included the use of Cuban exiles, many of them former or present agency employees, to picket the diplomatic missions in the United States and elsewhere of foreign countries dealing with the Castro regime. In this instance, the C.I.A. was both carrying out its private foreign policy toward Cuba and illegally engaging in domestic operations.

Break-ins into foreign embassies and United Nations missions are justified on counterintelligence grounds. (On one oc-

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

casion C.I.A. raiders found $300,000 in purloined stock certificates instead of diplomatic codes in the safe of a Latin American diplomat in New York; they left the certificates in the safe and fled.) The same explanation applies to one or two break-ins into the homes of C.I.A. officials suspected of leaks or other ties with foreign intelligence services.

As we have seen, one hand at the C.I.A. often doesn't know what the other does. This surely applied during the Nixon period, when the White House may have been dealing directly with senior C.I.A. officials friendly to it and willing to twist the statute to please the president. But at this point in time, as they say, the C.I.A. looks very much like a public agency of awesome power that is now beyond effective public control. And there is reason to wonder whether the Rockefeller commission may be up to the job of checking it and providing the safeguards promised by President Ford. ■

WALL STREET JOURNAL
13 JAN 1975

World-Wide

CIA INVESTIGATIONS by five groups will get under way this week.

The Rockefeller commission appointed by President Ford will convene today to look into press charges that the intelligence agency has repeatedly violated its 1947 charter ban on domestic oeprations. The panel is expected to question CIA Director William Colby, ex-director Richard Helms and Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger. A Des Moines lawyer, David Belin, is to be named executive director of the eight-member commission.

If there appears to be doubt whether certain activities are barred by the CIA charter, Belin told the Des Moines Sunday Register, "that doubt will be resolved against the agency."

Four congressional committees plan CIA hearings soon after the 94th Congress opens tomorrow. Sen. Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the assistant Democratic leader, suggested on ABC's "Issues and Answers" that a single joint committee be formed. He expressed a fear that vital CIA operations could be exposed through "one-upmanship" by rival investigators.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 JANUARY 1975

SCIENTOLOGY CHURCH GIVES EDICT TO C.I.A.

WASHINGTON, Jan 4 (UPI) —The controversial Church of Scientology said today that it had delivered to the Ceneral Intelligence Agency a court order forbidding the agency to destroy any files it has on the church.

The temporary restraining order was signed in December by a Federal judge in Hawaii after the church was found to be on the Internal Revenue service's list of 99 organizations considered "enemies" by President Nivxon's administration.

The court order prohibits any government agency from destroying files on Church of Scientology organizations in the United States.

"Although we will be serving each agency covered by the court order," a church spokesman said, "we have servied the C.I.A. first. They are presently under heavy fire for domestic intelligence activities and we want to make sure they don't destroy incriminating evidence relting to their activities against our church or parishioners."

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The spokesman said the church had been a target of "C.I.A. misinformation and spying tactics similar to those American citizens."

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BALTIMORE SUN
6 January 1975

Rockefeller to head CIA investigation

By ALBERT SEHLSTEDT, JR.
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—President Ford yesterday named Vice President Rockefeller chairman of a new commission to investigate allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency illegally spied on American citizens within the United States.

Mr. Ford also disclosed the names of seven other men who will serve on the commission, established Saturday by the President, to determine whether the CIA violated its charter with operations inside this country.

The commissioners, as a group, have backgrounds in business, the military, labor, academe and government. Among them is Ronald Reagan, the retiring Governor of California who is acknowledged to have an interest in running for the presidency in 1976.

Ron Nessen, the White House press secretary, said each of the commissioners was contacted personally by President Ford, who wanted "respected public citizens without any affiliation with the CIA."

Other members of the commission, ordered by the President to make a final report on its inquiry by April 4, are:

• John T. Connor, the chairman and chief executive officer of the Allied Chemical Corporation, who was secretary of commerce in the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson and counsel to the Office of Naval Research from 1945 to 1947.

• C. Douglas Dillon, the chairman of the executive committee of Dillon, Read & Co., a New York investment firm, who was secretary of the treasury from 1961 to 1965, and before that held two high posts in the State Department.

• Erwin N. Griswold, now in private law practice, but formerly solicitor general of the United States, dean of the Harvard Law School and a member of the United States Civil Rights Commission.

• Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, and supreme allied commander in Europe from 1962 to 1969, when he retired.

• Edgar F. Shannon, president of the University of Virginia until his retirement last year and a former member of the Harvard University faculty.

• J. Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO since 1969 and a graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

Mr. Nessen was asked if General Lemnitzer might have had dealings with the CIA in his military work, and replied; "Not in a sense that would hamper his role on the commission."

The press secretary also was reminded of the friendship between Vice President Rockefeller and Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, who has dealt with the intelligence community as head of the National Security Council.

Mr. Nessen was asked if that friendship might present a potential conflict in the commission's investigation. "The President didn't think so," Mr. Nessen replied.

[A spokesman for Mr. Rockefeller, who was at his Westchester (N.Y.) estate yesterday, said the Vice President was "talent hunting" on the telephone for people to serve on the commission's staff, according to the Associated Press.]

The principal job was finding a person to be executive director of the commission, a post that Mr. Ford's executive order of Saturday said will be designated by the President.

However, the recommendation for the job of executive director will come from Mr. Rockefeller.

Mr. Nessen, asked about the budget and size of the commission's staff, had no ready figures. The eight commission members each will receive a consultant's fee of $138.50 a day on days worked.

Money to pay for the investigation could come from either a White House contingency fund or from a supplemental appropriation that President Ford would have to request from Congress, Mr. Nessen said.

The press secretary said the list of commissioners was drawn up by President Ford. His original list was slightly longer than the one announced yesterday, but Mr. Nassen did not disclose who was eliminated or who might have declined to serve.

President Ford's executive order of Saturday directed each department and agency of the government to give the commission any information or assistance necessary to carry on its investigation.

The commission, in turn, will give to the attorney general any evidence "which may relate to offenses under the statutes of the United States," according to the executive order.

The commission was established by the President following published reports over the past two weeks that the CIA carried out burglaries during the 1960's and early 1970's, and that it spied or kept files on as many as 10,000 Americans, particularly persons opposed to the Vietnam war.

In addition to the presidential inquiry now under way, at least four committees of Congress are expected to conduct probes of their own.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 JANUARY 1975

8 on the President's Panel Span Wide Range of Belief

Members Include Former Government Aides, Retired General, Gov. Reagan, Educator and Labor Official

By PETER KIHSS

The eight members of a commission named yesterday by President Ford to investigate alleged domestic activities by the Central Intelligence Agency include redoubtable spokesmen for cold war policies as well as crusaders for civil liberties.

Perhaps the least-known member is Edgar F. Shannon Jr., 56 years old, who retired as president of the University of Virginia last year after 15 years to resume teaching 19th-century English literature.

Under Professor Shannon's lyeadership, the all-male, all-white institution admited women and blacks. Professor Shannon quoted Thomas Jefferson at his inaugural: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."

Erwin N. Griswold, 70, was a member of the United States Civil Rights Commission from 1961 to 1967 and Solicitor General of the United States from 1967 to 1972.

As dean of the Harvard Law School from 1950 to 1967, he opposed the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's attack on the use of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination by persons refusing to answer questions about alleged Communist ties.

"If we take these rights for granted," Dean Griswold said, "if we accept them as a matter of course, we may simply fritter them away and end by losing them, and possibly we deserve to lose them."

Vice President Rockefeller, 64, commission chairman, monitored at least some C.I.A. activities as a member of the 11-member President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as late as last year under President Nixon.

As special assistant to President Eisenhower in 1955, Mr. Hockefeller set up top-secret seminars at the Marine Corps School in Quantico, Va., to devise cold war tactics and strategy. One of there led to the "open skies" proposal to allow unarmed Soviet and American planes to fly over each other's territory to check on military preparations and disarmament.

'68 Rockefeller Rival

Ronald Reagan, 63, who steps down today as Governor of California after serving since 1967, was a rival with Mr. Rockefeller for the Repubican Presidential nomination in 1968, won by Mr. Richard M. Nixon. Both Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Reagan have been mentioned as possible candidates for the '76 nomination.

Mr. Reagan has been a favorite of the Republican party's conservative wing. He was president of the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952 and again in 1959. He headed a successful 1959 strike over television residual pay for actors, and fought to eliminate Communist influence in movie industry unions.

C. Douglas Dillon, 65, is chairman of the executive committee of Dillon, Read & Company, investment bankers. He was Under Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration from 1958 to 1961, and served as President Kennedy's Secretary of the Treasury from 1961 to 1965.

As Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Dillon let his press officers put out a report in 1960 that a C.I.A. U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union was on weather reconnaissance.

He took part as a Kennedy Cabinet member in planning in 1962 in the crisis over Soviet "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks,

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which was published last year said Mr. Dillon presided over off-the-record meetings at the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968 when former intelligence professionals and others discussed the C.I.A. role in foreign policy and apparently C.I.A. relations with private institutions.

Oldest Commissioner

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzetr, aldest commissioner at 75, was a high-ranking commander and staff officer in World War II and the Korean war, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962 and then then supreme commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces until he retired in 1969.

He presided over the Joint Chiefs when they were briefed in 1961 on ill-fated C.I.A. plans for an invasion by exiles seeking to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba, and when the chiefs agreed there was a chance of success.

John T. Connor, 60, is chairman of the board of the Allied Chemical Corporation and was Secretary of Commerce from 1965 to 1967. As president of Merck & Company, pharmaceutical manufacturers, he had earlier helped collect millions of dollars of drugs to ransom the Bay of Pigs prisoners from Cuba.

In 1970, he and Mr. Shannon, the Virginia educator, were among vigorous public opponents of the invasion of Cambodia and both urged a quick end to the Indochina war.

The youngest commissioner, Lane Kirkland, 52, has been secretary-treasurer of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations since 1969, and a member of its staff since 1948.

Mr. Kirkland, operating quietly and behind the scenes, served eight years as executive assistant to George Meany, the labor organization's president.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 Jan. 1975

EX-C.I.A. AIDE CITES JOHNSON AND NIXON

PARIS, Jan. 6 (Reuters)—Victor Marchetti, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, said in an interview today that Presidents Johnson and Nixon had pressed the agency into domestic spying activities.

In an interview with the weekly magazine, Le Point, Mr. Marchetti said, "I saw very well how the agency, pushed by the White House and especially Lyndon Johnson, began to mount its operations in the United States, even spying on such organizations as the civil rights movement.

"Nixon carried on in the same way and there was nothing astonishing in the fact that a growing number of young officials like myself should become indignant at these practices." Mr. Marchetti resigned from he agency in 1969 and later wrote a book on its activities.

WASHINGTON POST
6 January 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Tragedy of the CIA

The crisis of the Central Intelligence Agency that may wreck its effectiveness with tragic consequences for the nation can be traced back to a secret, politically inspired command from a troubled President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968.

Johnson's order to CIA stemmed from his political fear of anti-Vietnam dissidents, eroding his presidency and endangering his Vietnam policy. He wanted CIA to establish a link between the Soviet KGB or other Communist intelligence apparatus and violent anti-war activity in the United States. No link was established, but the CIA's legal counterintelligence operations fatally overlapped into the forbidden area of internal security.

Now that this overlap has been revealed, the CIA's ability to fulfill vitally necessary functions in a still dangerous world is deeply compromised.

"There never was real substance to Johnson's fear of a link to foreign agents," an American intelligence expert told us, "and the CIA bitterly resented his order." While pursuing LBJ's command diligently until the anti-war movement died out, CIA never once established "conclusive evidence" of foreign control over any American student dissidents.

But in his zealous pursuit of the elusive link, CIA's Counter-Intelligence Counter-Espionage chief, the superconspiratorial James Angleton, went to extremes. Known American anti-war agitators, including the notorious Weathermen, were placed under surveillance during contacts with leftist student leaders in Europe and then kept under CIA surveillance when they returned to the United States.

This suveillance, including bugging clandestine anti-war meetings, created a huge file of names which was stored routinely in secret CIA vaults in Langley, Va.

Much of this stemmed from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's bitter feud with CIA, choking communications between the two agencies. CIA specialists say there was often "no bureaucraic way" to turn domestic surveillance over to the FBI once an anti-war activist returned to the United States. Instead, Angleton's counter-intelligence agents continued the job started abroad.

A full briefing on the "worst case" examples of this highly illegal CIA activity was given more than a year ago to congressional watchdogs by William Colby, then newly appointed CIA director. Since these abuses had occurred years before, no public airing was demanded.

The reason: A full-fledged CIA scandal in the midst of Watergate (which itself tainted the agency) would severely damage the CIA and most particularly its counter-intelligence operations.

Now, that damage to CIA's credibility and efficiency in the wake of The New York Times expose is in full bloom, ironically abetted by the ouster of Angleton and the sympathy resignations of his high command: Ray Rocca, William Hood and N. Scott Miler.

Angleton's suspicious conspiratorial nature had brought him into high-level disfavor long ago. Yet, that aspect of his personalty was essential to his invaluable connections with such foreign intelligence agencies as the West German BFW, the British MI-5, the French Deuxieme Bureau — and, most intimately, the Israeli Intelligence Service.

Angleton's single most valuable postwar heist— the first Western copy of Khrushchev's historic 1956 attack on Stalinism at the 20th Soviet Party Congress—resulted directly from his secret contacts with Communist and Israeli agents.

Such brilliant exploits tend to be shrugged off today as relics of another world. But intelligence experts here say dismantling the top echelons of Angleton's operations alone will prove priceless to the Soviet KGB and immensely costly to the United States.

That, however, is but the first cost of CIA's tragic errors of the late 1960s. CIA's scandal, following a blackened eye from its Chilean operations, now threatens to close off not only foreign intelligence sources but routine information from traveling American citizens—invaluable the past 20 years.

In addition, morale at CIA today is at quicksand levels with recruitment endangered. Worst of all, CIA's credibility as a tight ship — vital to every aspect of its work — has been grievously undermined.

The first results of this will show up early in the new Congress. Efforts that have failed in the past to cut down CIA may now succeed. To a generation that never knew the cold war, that will be welcome. In truth, it may cost this country dearly in the grim world of 1975.

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New York Times
14 Jan. 1975

Pravda Says C.I.A. Spurs Activities in Middle East

MOSCOW, Jan. 13 (UPI) — The Communist party newspaper Pravda said today that the Central Intelligence Agency was increasing its activities in the Middle East.

The article was the latest in a new press campaign against the agency.

Pravda said an American espionage network had recently been exposed in Southern Yemen, a group acting on instructions from American intelligence had been arrested in Iraq and an anti-Government conspiracy inspired by the C.I.A. had been uncovered in Afghanistan.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

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WASHINGTON POST
6 January 1975

CIA and Cult of Technology

Bulk of Intelligence Gathered by Equipment

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The five-story yellow building with the shrouded windows at 1st and M streets SE—just down the hill from the Capitol—is where much of the Central Intelligence Agency's super-secret and super-valuable work goes on.

Technocrats in the spy business note with pride that most of the windows are cemented over — to foil any enemy agent who might try to record conversations inside by focusing a laser beam on window panes to detect and reconstitute the vibrations voices would make on glass.

To the casual visitor the yellow edifice of secrecy is "Building 213". For some reason, the public is not supposed to know what the Soviets' counterpart agency, the KGB knows—Building 213 is the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation center, known to insiders as N-Pic.

N-Pic is just one arm of the mechanical giant the United States has built to spy on the rest of the world. This giant also has eyes in space, ears all over the globe, an operation that costs billions of dollars each year — dollars that are only minimally accountable to anybody outside the CIA.

It is this mechanical giant — not the James Bonds of the CIA who meet foreign agents at bars at midnight — which gathers the most valuable information for the United States.

"Technology has revolutionized the intelligence business, there's no question about it," CIA Director William E. Colby has said.

"If I had to rate everything we did on an A through Z value scale," said a CIA executive who quit the agency a few months ago, "I would give A through U to technical intelligence" — gathering information by satellite, plane, ship, submarine and eavesdropping radio outposts.

Next in terms of productivity, he listed reading foreign publications and analyzing them in a systematic way. Last, the CIA alumnus named covert operations like buying information from foreign agents.

"On a scale of 100," said another former CIA officer in an interview, "I would give at least 70 per cent to technical intelligence; 25 per cent to reading open literature and assessing information obtained through diplomatic contact. No more than 5 per cent to all the covert stuff."

The counterintelligence operations which have provoked the current controversy—with allegations that the CIA has put Americans under surveillance—"is not producing anything at all for the country," he said. "It's just looking up each other's sleeves—personnel management in the whole creepy, backroom world."

He added. "It's time to drop all this Mickey Mouse."

In the bland looking yellow building, N-Pic has processed film from high-flying spy satellites. These satellite and other reconnaissance pictures, analyzed by photo interpreters, have helped answer such questions as these asked by anxious Presidents and other top government officials:

- Do the Israelis have the nuclear bomb (they do) and are their nuclear-capable Jericho missiles targeted on Egypt's Aswan Dam (they once were) so Cairo and the Nile Valley could be flooded if all seemed lost?
- Is Russia mobilizing for war (a constant question)?
- Is Russia building a new missile system or just improving the old one (photographs showed the latter)? How many intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers do the Soviets have?
- Could U.S. Green Berets rescue American prisoners from the Sontay prison camp outside Hanoi?

N-Pic, in answer to that last question, made a giant photo montage of the Sontay camp and proudly showed it off to CIA trainees to demonstrate what the agency could do inside the intelligence factory on M Street.

The Pentagon, in turn, used N-Pic's montage to build a replica of Sontay at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida so the Green Berets could rehearse the POW rescue. The Sontay replica was taken down during the day so Soviet satellites would not see it and tip off Hanoi —testimony to this era of open skies where super powers keep track of each other through camera eyes in space.

N-Pic's effort proved in vain, however, because Hanoi had moved American prisoners out of Sontay by the time the raid was launched on Nov. 24, 1970.

Thus, it can be said that the N-Pic arm of the intelligence giant stretches all the way from M Street to the cold void of outer space, where both American and Soviet cameras look down through portholes of spacecraft whipping around the earth once every 90 minutes.

Other parts of the mechanical giant require personnel inside—such ts the surface electronic intelligence (ELINT) ships that took over from the ill-fated U.S.S. Liberty and U.S. Pueblo; the American submarines which remain close to foreign shores, recording messages and radar signals; the U-2 reconnaissance plane Francis Gary Powers flew over the Soviet Union and its higher-flying successor, the SR-71; communications intelligence (COMINT) outposts around the world where specialists with earphones clamped on their heads listen hour after hour to foreign fighters pilots talking to ground commanders.

Both the successes and failures of technical intelligence have been spectacular. The U-2 was both. It brought back the hard information on Soviet missile progress—although Sen. John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.) kept charging "missile gap" even as U-2s were bringing back contrary evidence in flights from 1956 until 1960.

And it was a failure in the sense that its intrusion into Soviet airspace prompted Premier Khrushchev to cancel the 1960 summit conference with President Eisenhower.

Even without failures, technical intelligence has its limitations. Said one former high ranking CIA executive:

"What technology doesn't do, won't do, and can't do is tell you what people are thinking and what their plans are. We can't read minds with technology, but that's our business—reading minds. The whole purpose of espionage is to find out what people are thinking and doing."

He could have added that the clearest U-2 or Samos satellite photograph does not tell the United States what weapon the Soviet Union or China is working on under the laboratory roof.

But neither the failures—like the U-2 incident, Liberty attack and Pueblo capture—nor the built-in limitations have kept the intelligence community's technical giant in bounds, according to its critics.

Wrote former CIA officer Patrick J. McGarvey in his book, "C.I.A.—The Myth and the Madness":

"In intelligence, the reverence accorded technology is open to serious questioning . . . The vaguest hint that something new will afford an opportunity to open another peephole into a potential enemy's domain prompts the loosing of intelligence money and the approval of 'feasibility tests'—which invariably lead to 'further development tests' and finally implementation of a new collection program.

"Critics of these efforts are few," McGarvey added, "for few wish to confront 'the national security' argument flaunted by supporters of intelligence . . . In intelligence, technology has allied itself with bureaucracy, and together they ride roughshod over reason and logic. The result is a maddening, self-perpetuating chaos which has distorted the entire intelligence process to the point that technology has become the goal rather than the means to a goal . . Our almost limitless ability to collect information has prompted only a few to question the utility of the information that is collected. . .

"The results are frightening . . . As the programs expand, they defy rational management. And we have international incidents resulting from collection programs designed to provide information that will allow the United States government means to avoid such incidents. Intelligence today in almost the ultimate irony . . ."

One man who had a lot to do with making technology so imperious within the CIA specifically and intelligence community generally is Richard Bissell, the former head of the CIA's U-2 program who fell from official grace because of his role as operational director of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles in 1961.

Bissell, now an executive at Pratt and Whitney Aircraft in Hartford, Conn., in an interview traced the birth of the U-2 and how its success blazed the way across the sky for such other technical collection systems, like the SR-71 and satellites.

Back in 1954, Bissell recalled, James R. Killian Jr. was asked by President Eisenhower to head a committee which would recommend ways to preclude another Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack on the United States.

"The intelligence panel of that committee," Bissell said, "became convinced that we needed an overflight capability. They also came on the U-2 design as it had been submitted" to the Air Force in 1953 or 1954 by Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson of Lockheed.

"In the autumn of 1954," Bissell said, "the members of that intelligence panel — and with them the whole Killian surprise attack committee — endorsed a proposal that a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft configured exclusively and expressly for reconnaissance be built based on the Kelly Johnson concept — and that it be built with maximum security and maximum speed."

The concept was to put glider-like wings on a jet aircraft so it could fly in the thin air of high altitude, out

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of the range of anti-aircraft guns and rockets. Also, the theory was that the new spy plane would be safe from other interceptor fighters because their engines could not push them to the 14-mile altitude of the U-2.

Put in direct charge of the U-2 project Bissell in the spring of 1955 placed an order with Lockheed for 20 U2s at a total cost of $21 million.

The U-2 contract may have been the last time a military plane was built for less than the agreed upon amount. Bissell said "there was a $3 million underrun." Today, each reconnaissance plane and satellite — like the Big Bird satellite lofted into space this year by the giant Titan IIIAD rocket—costs more than the whole $18 million paid for the first 20 U-2s, minus engines.

With the U-2 on the way CIA photo-interpreters, like the one in Building 213, studied photographs of the Soviet SA-2 Guideline rocket that Russian gunners would shoot at the U-2 if their radar detected it. The missile's fins, the specialists concluded, were too small to guide it accurately in the thin air where the U-2 would fly.

"This was one of those things they call a calculated risk," said Bissell in discussing the conclusions about the threat of the SA-2 to the U-2.

The CIA's U-2 started flying over Russia in June, 1956, Bissell said, and enjoyed success until May 1, 1960, when one of those supposedly inaccurate SA-2 rockets shot Powers out of the sky and into a diplomatic uproar.

Looking back over the whole U-2 program and acknowledging its value in settling the missile gap question, Bissell said "the greatest value" for the country was the "proof you could learn as much as you could by looking down from above.

"It whetted the appetite of this government and increased its willingness to develop systems of this sort of intelligence collection," Bissell said.

Given this appetite, the Soviets' Sputnik 1, launched on Oct. 4, 1957, looked appealing as another way to look down on the other country.

Aerial intelligence-collection in the two decades since the U-2's birth quickly advanced to the SR-71 and an entire family of satellites ranging from the comparatively simple Samos to the sophisticated Big Bird which can take pictures and do various other things—like intercept communications.

The technological explosion also advanced to intelligence-collecting from ships, submarines and land listening posts. The CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Army, Navy, Air Force and the military-industrial-scientific academic complex have become enmeshed in the American intelligence collection effort over the last 20 years.

The citizens commission President Ford has named to investigate the CIA is chartered to focus on the agency's domestic activities, not the overlaps in the American intelligence community as a whole. But Congress is expected to look into the duplication between CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. NSA is the sprawling intelligence complex headquartered at Fort Meade, Md., which is believed to have a worldwide payroll of 100,000 people, one big reason the total bill for American intelligence agencies is estimated at around $15 billion, not counting the missiles and ships and other support the Pentagon furnishes.

The intertwining charge congressional and other critics, is inefficient, costly, and sometimes fatal. The overlapping showed up embarrassingly for the intelligence community when NSA's warning against sending the Pueblo out on a mission off North Korea in 1968 got lost in the DIA maze in the Pentagon.

Also, the post-mortems on the Pueblo spy mission failed to show that the trip was necessary from an electronic intelligence standpoint—bitter news for the Navy crew imprisoned and tortured in North Korea for 11 months and the family of the sailor who was killed during the ship's capture off Wonsan in January, 1968.

The late Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), while chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, told a reporter that the amount of money the intelligence community spends for information nobody has time to process or read is "a national scandal."

The next few months will tell whether Congress, during its reapprisal of the CIA, will attempt to rein in the technical giant.

In the meantime, it will be business as usual at places like N-Pic within the CIA's far-flung complex.

"Honest, Sir," said the policeman at the gate of N-Pic. "I don't know what that place is other than Building 213." By contrast, two women behind the gate said, "Yes it is," when asked if the place was indeed N-Pic.

WASHINGTON STAR
03 January 1975

Ex-Agent's Book Hits CIA Role

By Mark Hosenball
Special to the Star-News

LONDON—A disillusioned ex-CIA agent, in a book he has made clear in recent interviews is deliberately intended to hurt his former employers, has bared a host of agency activities in Latin America, where he served in the early 1960s.

"The conflict with my residual loyalty to the CIA is far outweighed by the people who have been killed or tortured as a direct result of CIA operations," says Philip Agee.

"Exposure of CIA methods could help the American people understand how we got into Vietnam and how other Vietnams are germinating whereverthe CIA is at work," says Agee, whose "Inside the Company—CIA Diary"was published here this week.

Agee claims the CIA had him followed after it was discovered he planned such a book and that, at one point, he discovered a bugged typewriter had been planted on him. Attempts by him and his British publishers to have the book published in New York failed, but in late October, Straight Arrow, the book division of Rolling Stone, bought the American rights and release in the United States is planned in May.

AFTER JOINING the CIA in 1957, Agee was posted to "stations" in Quito, Montevideo and Mexico City, where he served eight years as a full-fledged, apparently dedicated career spy.

But he said he became disillusioned with such things as CIA support of the Brazilian military junta and U.S. militajy intervention in the Dominican Republic, and in 1969 he abruptly left the agency.

Since then, he has professed himself a revolutionary Socialist. He spent four years in libraries preparing his day-by-day account of life as an "operations officer."

He has sprinkled the pages with what seems to be every name he could recall, including some of men still chiefs of station in various capitals. His aim, he said in an interview, "is to neutralize these people completely."

GEORGE MEANY, president of the AFL-CIO, and the late Joseph Beirne, who headed the Communications Workers of America, are accused by Agee of having been "effective, witting collaboraters" in promoting CIA interests within international labor circles.

He says the CIA arranged "with Beirne" for conversion of a CWA school at Front Royal, Va., for the use of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, which he said was organized in 1962—with Meany and Beirne on its board of directors—to "organize anti-Communist trade unions in Latin America."

Three Mexican presidents —Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Adolfo Lopez Mateos and Luis Echeverria Alvarez—are among those Agee says collaborated closely with the CIA. All were close friends of the station chief in Mexico City, he says, and in return for such favors as being fed daily CIA intelligence reports and having a secret communications network set up for their use, authorities were cooperative when the CIA needed to tap phones or check travelers—in some cases to the point of being provided photos of every traveler to a given point.

IN URUGUAY, after bugging the headquarters of the Communist party in Montevideo, the CIA bugged the Egyptian Embassy's code room—by using the ceiling of the U.S. AID office on the floor below in the same building. Agee said this also brought in messages from Egypt's embassies in London and Moscow, which were on the same cable circuit.

He claims he participated in CIA activities which helped cause Uruguay and Ecuador to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, and says he came across CIA dealings with American bank officials to get Chilean currency to Uruguay so it could be sent back into Chile to help opponents of the late Salvador Allende.

His first assignment in Mexico City, Agee wrote, was to spot potential CIA agents among the competitors at the 1968 Olympics—foreign and American, coaches and officials.

"WE'VE BEEN IN every Olympics since the Soviets appeared in Helsinki in 1952," he wrote.

It doesn't take the skill of James Bond to get inside the lobby of Ni-Pic, note the CIA employees on coffee break in the cafeteria and read the Christmas greeting of "peace, peace, peace" and "joy, joy, joy" on the wall behind the guard.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Book by Ex-C.I.A. Man Links Latins to Spying

By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Jan. 13—A former employe of the Central Intelligence Agency has published what he describes as a detailed, almost day-by-day account of his work and that of his colleagues in three Latin-American countries.

The author, Philip Agee, who has been interviewed widely before publication, served successively in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico from 1960 to 1968. He then resigned and, after going briefly into business in Mexico City, began a series of trips to France, Cuba and Britain, seeking research materials and a publisher.

He found both in London. At the beginning of this month, Penguin Books published his manuscript, entitled "Inside the Company: C.I.A. Diary." Straight Arrow Press, a San Francisco house linked to Rolling Stone magazine, is planning to bring it out in the United States this spring. No contract has yet been signed, however.

The book, in the form of a diary, describes the author's disillusion, both with C.I.A. methods in particular and more largely with United States policy around the world. The writer, originally a conservative Catholic, has become a revolutionary socialist.

Mr. Agee says that his book is intended as a contribution to the cause of world revolution. He sees in the C.I.A. an agency designed to frustrate revolution and protect capitalism. The book contains a list of nearly 250 persons he identifies as C.I.A. officers, local agents, informers and collaborators.

Inside Political Parties

Besides revealing the names of dozens of members of the agency staff, most of whom operated from United States embassies in Quito, Montevideo and Mexico City, the book identifies local businessmen, labor and student leaders and politicians as C.I.A. agents.

In Ecuador, for example, Mr. Agee says that the agency had men in leading positions in several of the major political parties — including the Communist party — and controlled virtually the entire top leadership of one group, the Popular Revolutionary Liberal party.

Mr. Agee lists as collaborators such figures as two former Presidents of Mexico —Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and Adolfo López Mateos—and the current president, Luis Echeverría Alvarez. In Mr. Echeverría's case, according to Mr. Agee, the relationship existed only while he was Minister of the Interior.

In Mr. Agee's usage, the term "collaborator" appears to indicate a more voluntary imparting of information or assistance than in an agent's case. Presumably, the "collaborator" dealt with the C.I.A. as the most appropriate representative of the United States Government for a particular purpose, not because he was under the agency's control.

In his index, Mr. Agee refers to George Meany, head of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., as an "agent collaborator." Questioned about this today, Mr. Agee said that he was referring to the close cooperation between Mr. Meany's organization and the intelligence agency, and that perhaps simply "collaborator" would have been a more appropriate term.

Tributes by Ex-Colleague

A considerable if grudging tribute to the book was paid by Miles Copeland, formerly a high-ranking C.I.A. man himself. In a review published in The Spectator, Mr. Copeland assailed Mr. Agee for, in effect, betraying all his former associates. But, he added:

"The book is interesting as an authentic account of how an ordinary American or British 'case officer' operates." Mr. Copeland went on to say: "All of it just as his publisher claims, is presented with 'deadly accuracy.'"

In the years Mr. Agee spent working in Latin America, the main objective of C.I.A. stations around the hemisphere was to counteract the effects of Cuban influence.

He tells of his own awkward attempt to recruit the leader of an Ecuadorean-Castroite group, José María Roura. When Mr. Roura was freed from jail and expelled, Mr. Agee arranged to sit next to him on the plane. C.I.A. stations, writes, made it a point to get the close cooperation of local airline executives.

The plane was virtually empty, however, and Mr. Agee felt it would be too obvious to sit right next to his quarry. So he sat several rows away, trying miserably to think up an excuse to strike up a conversation.

"I felt more and more glued to my seat," he writes. "I was going into a freeze and beginning to think up excuses, like bad security, to offer later for not having talked to Roura. But somehow I had to break the ice, and I finally stood up and began walking back to Roura's seat, in mild shock as when walking into a cold sea."

Mr. Agee did manage to get talking, and thought that "we seemed to be developing a little empathy." However, Mr. Roura refused to take up the suggested contacts, and later Mr. Agee learned that the Ecuadorean had complained about his C.I.A. seat-mate and threatened to kill him if he ever saw him again.

Most of the work was duller, however. A lot of time was spent reading mail between Ecuador or Uruguay and Cuba. Local postal officials were a priority target for C.I.A. recruitment.

Another target was local builders. When a Czechoslovak or Soviet delegation was due to take up residence, C.I.A. teams would arrange with the builders to install microhpones before they arrived. Managers of hotels and apartment houses were enlisted.

On Tape, a Tryst

Mr. Agee writes about bugging an apartment in Montevideo that was to be used by an Argentine woman arriving on behalf of a far-left group. It turned out that a main purpose of the visit was to meet her lover, and the tapes duly took it in.

He writes of making a regular visit to high Uruguayan police authorities, with whom the C.I.A. was cooperating to put down revolutionary groups. Mr. Agee and his colleagues had turned over names of suspects to Col. Ventura Rodriguez, the chief. Upon a second visit, he wrote:

"As Rodriguez read the report, I began to hear a strange low sound which, as it gradually became louder, I recognized as the moan of a human voice. I thought it might be a street vender trying to sell something, until Rodriguez told Ramirez"—another police officer—"to turn up the radio. The moaning grew in intensity, turning into screams."

Mr. Agee was horrified at what his work had led to. "I don't know what to do about these police anyway," he writes. "They're so crude and ineffectual. Hearing that voice, whoever it was, made me feel terrified and helpless. All I wanted to do was to get away."



Cover of book by former American spy, published by Penguin in London. A San Francisco publishing house may bring it out in the U.S. this spring.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 January 1975

The CIA panel

The naming of a public commission to investigate charges of domestic spying by the CIA is a welcome step. President Ford has swiftly served notice that he does not want to cover up any abuses of power or "dirty tricks" by an executive agency that by its nature has not always been subject to the closest scrutiny.

That said, however, some misgivings might be voiced about the composition of the panel, which has a wide professional but less varied ideological spectrum. Such members as Ronald Reagan, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer and Douglas Dillon, while men of proven ability and stature, nonetheless are of conservative bent and generally committed to past U.S. policies.

Some might be concerned, too, about Vice-President Rockefeller's close personal ties with Henry Kissinger, who heads the high-level intelligence panel, the 40 Committee. Nor will it go unnoticed that there are no women in the group.

This is not to suggest that the eight appointed individuals should not be on the panel. But a larger and politically more divergent make-up might have served the purpose better.

In any event, it is important that Congress also press forward with an investigation of the CIA.

The formation of a joint House-Senate committee, as proposed by Senators Baker and Weicker, makes sense. It would eliminate the duplication of effort that would result if a plethora of congressional committees pursued their own investigations.

Such a congressional committee should have a broader mandate than the President's panel, which regrettably is limited to looking into the domestic spying allegations. As we have stated before, it is time for a thorough study of the CIA with a view to an overall restatement of its mandate and functions. Congress should probe, for instance, whether the subversion of foreign governments is an acceptable CIA activity.

It would also be well for Congress to keep watch on the inquiry of the Ford commission. By performing a watchdog role, it can help assure that there will be the fullest accounting possible of the CIA's past domestic conduct.

Meanwhile, it is to be hoped that the newly created panel will perform its task with thoroughness and, as Mr. Rockefeller stated, with due regard for the "basic concepts of freedom and human dignity." The charges made are sweeping in nature but so far little substantive detail has emerged to support them.

One thing the current wave of enthusiasm for delving into the CIA must not do — and that is to unwittingly destroy the reputation of an institution that is greatly needed to protect the nation's security. Warning of such a possibility former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach comments, "I think the agency was and I assume still is the most objective analyzer of intelligence that there is on the Washington scene and it's important that it be preserved."

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 11, 1975

Secret agent

INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary
By Philip Agee.
Penguin. 640 pages. 95p.

Few people would raise an eyebrow if they read, in some anonymous revolutionary newspaper, that President Echeverría of Mexico, President López Michelson of Colombia and President Figueres of Costa Rica were CIA agents or collaborators. The allegation would have scarcely more effect if it appeared in one of those handy guides to "Who's Who in the CIA" that are printed from time to time in East Berlin. But, cropping up in a 600-page book by a man who served with the CIA stations in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico between 1960 and 1969, it is guaranteed to make everyone who suspected that agency's skulduggery is behind most things that happen in Latin America leap to his feet and cry, "I told you so."

Mr Agee may not make his fortune with a book well timed to cash in on the post-Watergate appetite for revelations on the CIA (now domestically under heavy fire in the United States, see page 43); but he has certainly made some prominent people's faces red, and not just in Langley, Virginia. His book comes as a godsend to the anti-American left throughout Latin America: it names names, it catalogues the wide range of infiltration and "destabilisation" techniques employed by the CIA, it concludes that inter-American security, as defined by successive governments in Washington, is merely "the security of the capitalist class in the US"—and the picture must be authentic because it is by a man once on the inside.

Or must it? There is little reason to doubt Mr Agee's account of the routine operations of the stations to which he was assigned. The basic modus operandi is confirmed by other people's revelations (and notably those of the former Bolivian minister of the interior, Antonio Arguedas). The priorities prescribed for the CIA in the 1960s were much the same throughout the continent: to neutralise (and, if possible, secure the expulsion of) the communist embassies; to support counter-insurgency; to penetrate all major political groupings; and to identify and undermine those in government suspected of anti-American leanings. In pursuit of these ends, the CIA colonised local intelligence services and frequently succeeded in creating a flow of information on left-wing groups, and much else, that was far superior to anything the local head of state could hope to gain from other sources. Mr Agee quotes many cases, for example, where, through agents in immigration departments, post offices and airports, the CIA had first crack at intercepting "interesting" foreign correspondence.

His picture of the daily grind of a CIA station in Latin America is often revealing, particularly on the scope of black propaganda operations designed to discredit or divide the left, on the emphasis placed on funding and manipulating trade unions, and on counter-intelligence operations against the Cubans—in which Mr Agee became a specialist. Mr Agee suggests that the CIA helped to topple the left-leaning President Arosemena in Ecuador in 1963, but then that president hardly needed anybody's help to fall over.

The first two-thirds of Mr Agee's book are so stuffed with pedestrian detail and so barren of personal comment or political analysis that one tends to swallow them whole—although the style is a constant reminder that this is not a diary at all, but a reconstructed chronicle. But in the last part of the book, the tone alters. Mr Agee starts forgetting names as he gets closer to the present day; he devotes only a brusque 10 pages to a 15-month posting in Mexico City, compared with 210 pages for a three-year posting in Quito; and he starts complaining about the morality of operations.

His conversion to his new (and now, confessedly marxist) position is not adequately explained. On page 408, he uses a stolen key to start dipping into the secret correspondence in his boss's safe. A dozen pages later, he is worried about the ethics of the invasion of the Dominican republic. He then starts quoting United Nations statistics on the distribution of wealth in Latin America (collected by the UN, it should be noted, in 1970, after Mr Agee left the CIA). But his final decision to leave the Agency seems to have been related more to marital problems than to a political awakening.

He admits to two visits to Cuba—in May 1971 and May 1972—where one is surprised to find a man who spent most of his career service spying on Cuban embassies being received warmly and helped with "research materials". His disenchantment with his former employers now seems to have turned into a crusade; at a press conference in London last October, Mr Agee was already updating his book, issuing a list of 37 alleged current agents of the Mexico City station.

Mr Agee's book is inescapable reading for those interested in recent Latin American history and the way intelligence services operate. But one must be careful to read between the lines as well. The author is remarkably good at unveiling CIA operations and contacts (including many that one might have thought that a junior officer would have been kept in the dark about) without giving much away about what the Cubans or the Russians were doing. As his book makes clear, he was in a position to know all about black propaganda.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

4 JAN 1975

Secret police?

Washington, DC

The fog of suspicion that swirled around the Central Intelligence Agency during the period of President Nixon's decline and fall has thickened to a point at which a formal investigation, conducted on a grand scale and independently of the administration in office, looks like the only way to dispel it. Put crudely, the suspicion is that the agency has assumed some of the character of an American secret police. This charge is more dangerous to the agency than any amount of exposure on the usual lines—bungling at the Bay of Pigs, provoking the Russians with U-2 flights, or meddling in the politics of Chile or Guatemala. Those were merely reproaches of bad judgment. A system of domestic espionage, which is what the CIA is now accused of having conducted, would be a flagrant breach of the act of Congress by virtue of which the CIA exists.

The National Security Act of 1947 provides that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions". Those functions belong to the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the powers of the CIA start at the water's edge. An ambiguous area does, however, exist in which foreign agents or foreign money may be fostering conspiracy, espionage and sabotage on American soil. President Nixon and his men were inclined to use external security as a pretext for harassing and spying on domestic "enemies", and the atmosphere of the late 1960s, when anti-war protest was vehement and radical, lent itself to such evasions of the spirit of the law. What has to be established is whether, and how systematically, the CIA joined in this constitutionally dangerous game.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 JAN 1975

Meanwhile— the KGB prowls in Far East

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

The Far Eastern Economic Review, in a cover story on Soviet secret agents in Asia, has concluded that Russian espionage activity in this area is "expanding steadily."

But the weekly magazine's correspondents throughout Asia also found that the Russians are more often than not crude and inefficient in their efforts to pry secrets from Asian sources.

This is partly because governments are alerted, it said, but also because the bureaucratic structure of the KGB, the Soviet equivalent of the American CIA, has proven "expensive and ineffectual."

The Soviet cloak-and-dagger men keep a "sharp watch" on American activities in Asia, the Hong Kong-based magazine said.

But some time ago the Russians' main target became the Chinese rather than the Americans.

7 January 1975

Moscow's press revels in U.S. probe of CIA

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Pravda's turgid prose is enlivened these days by a first-rate spy serial: the CIA scandal.

The contrast could not be greater with Soviet noncoverage of the unfolding Watergate scandal from 1972 through the resignation of President Nixon in 1974. The difference could arise from the welcome chance to cudgel the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, or to attempt to show readers that the Soviet Union is not the only country that hounds its dissidents.

Or the difference could stem from the degree of involvement in the scandal of the American President with whom the Kremlin wants to continue doing business.

When Mr. Nixon was implicated in Watergate, Moscow protected him and tacitly justified its own willingness to deal with him. With President Ford not implicated in the present affair, Moscow does not have to shield him.

Still, the subject is a ticklish one in Moscow because of the mirror image it casts on the Soviet secret police and intelligence agency, the KGB. Western specialists say the KGB maintains exhaustive surveillance files on Soviet citizens.

One of the leading Western experts on the U.S.S.R., poet and historian Robert Conquest, estimates that 20 million Soviet citizens died in Stalin's secret-police purges and forced collectivization.

And Soviet secret police interrogation, torture, and forced labor camps have been vividly described for Western readers in Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archipelago." (Soviet citizens must either read an illegal manuscript of the novel or listen to the Western radio broadcasts of the book beamed to the Soviet Union.)

Soviet commentators are aware of the comparison. Pravda's weekly international review of Jan. 5 made a point to ridicule the comparison.

Tomas Kolesnichenko wrote: "It is exactly the United States from which come accusations against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of 'absence of democracy,' 'persecution of dissidents,' etc. As for the U.S., the authors of such concoctions, of course, think that the American society is the summit of democracy.

"However, the revelations of the persecutions of dissidents in the U.S. are appearing one after another . . . it turns out that this organization [the CIA], whose task was only a 'noble activity' of foreign espionage, did not hesitate to undertake real surveillance and compiling folders on dozens of thousands of persons in the U.S.

"Now it turns out . . . that already since the middle of the 1950's a continuous program of espionage has been conducted with weapons of microphones, eavesdropping on telephone conversations, and other electronic devices.

"Thus the highly praised bourgeois democracy in practice turns out to be a system of total surveillance and spying."

Despite any possible backfire on its own system, however, the Soviet press has been carrying fairly full summaries of developments in the CIA scandal.

Initially, Pravda and Izvestia spoke of CIA spying on "progressive and democratic" elements — a term reserved for those supporting policies the Kremlin approves of.

More recently, these papers have pointed out that "the CIA filing system was started not only on representatives of democratic forces of the country." Senators, congressmen, and a Supreme Court justice were also spied on, the papers reported.

The resignation of four top CIA officials because of their excessive use of police power — an unheard of possibility here — has also been carried in the Soviet press.

And on Jan. 6 Pravda reported that President Ford has ordered an investigation of the "illegal actions of the CIA, which . . . practiced large-scale secret spying on thousands of Americans, thereby flouting their civil rights and freedoms.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

WASHINGTON POST
5 January 1975

To Quiet Criticism, CIA Must Now Come in From the Cold

By William Greider and Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writers

Inside the supersecret agency of government, it is known as the Bluebird, and, in some ways, the CIA is as obvious as that little blue bus which putts around Washington, dropping its bureaucrats at their unmarked office buildings.

One ex-official, who rode the bus and played the CIA's secret games, remarked dryly: "There is much less difference between the agency and the Department of Agriculture than people would have you believe."

On its way downtown, the Bluebird winds through the high-rise offices of Rosslyn, past the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which cranks out translated digests of overseas radio news. The same building houses the old Domestic Contact Service, which picks up tidbits from thousands of Americans who travel abroad. Only now it is called the "Foreign Resources" branch, because "domestic" has become a scare word within the CIA.

Around the corner on Lynn Street, the Bluebird stops at the unmarked home of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, the shop which turns our encyclopedic "national intelligence surveys," everything you ever wanted to know about the other guy. Another building houses the recruiting office for ordinary out-front employees. Farther out Wilson Boulevard is "Blue U.," a big blue office building owned by former congressman Joel Broyhill, where CIA technicians are trained.

In the city itself, the bus swings up 23d Street and lets off passengers at the training building tucked behind the Navy Medical Center, where they used to give new recruits the series of lie-detector tests to measure their mettle.

CIA posts are scattered all over the capital, though not on the Bluebird route — the so-called safe houses used for clandestine contacts and secure storage of enemy defectors, the field office on Pennsylvania Avenue a few blocks from the White House, the blank-faced yellow factory on M Street Southeast where agency analysts scrutinize high-altitude photos of Russia and China and the Middle East, counting up the rockets.

When the Bluebird rolls home to Langley, Va., and the seven-story marble fortress, shrouded by suburban forest, it is at the headquarters of the mystery. When the building was opened in 1961, agency officials put a sign out front, "Central Intelligence Agency," like any other government bureaucracy. One of the Kennedys told them to take it down — inappropriate for a bunch of spies.

The road signs are, back in place now, but the mystique lingers on. Nathan Hale, a bronzed Yalie who was America's first martyred spy, stands brooding in the courtyard, his statue erected by another Ivy League spy, the present director, William E. Colby, Princeton class of '41.

"Moses sent a man from each tribe to spy out the land of Canaan," Director Colby solemnly explains the tradition to interviewing reporters. "Nations have the right for their self-protection and self-interest to do things abroad in a different fashion from the way they want to run their country at home. Intelligence has been collected in that way for thousands of years."

It is the same speech the director makes to new recruits, the Career Trainees, who also get instruction in breaking and entering, telephone tapping, steaming open other people's mail, disrupting public meetings, fouling up automobiles and sabotaging printing presses.

Inside the gray and vacant lobby at headquarters, the CIA added a poignant touch several months ago—31 stars engraved on the marble wall for the anonymous agency officers killed in action over the past generation.

Their stories are still secret, where they died and how, even their names are officially unacknowledged.

Outside the agency, a social mystique surrounds it, too. From the start, it has been run by men of breeding, Ivy League alumni who live in the smart homes of Georgetown and McLean, men who mix the coolness of their class status with the bravery of buccaneers. A former FBI agent once explained: "We had the Fordham boys, they had the Yalies."

On the lobby wall, opposite the 31 stars, the agency has posted its creed of intelligence, taken from a non spy, St. John: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

Can the CIA be truthful about itself and still survive as a secret intelligence agency? That is its dilemma right now, as Congress and the public clamor for a fuller accounting of what this agency has done in the world and within the borders of the United States.

For 27 years, the CIA has prospered in secrecy, shrouded by tales of derring-do, protected by official evasions. Now it must come in from the cold, at least enough to quiet the criticism. The "truth," as it unfolds in congressional inquiries and other investigations, might de-mythologize the place for its own good. Or, if the staunchest critics prevail, it might leave the CIA a mere shadow of its former shadow.

Some men who served within, who are still loyal to the agency, believe this process may be good therapy for the CIA and for the republic. For instance, listen to the "magic wand" theory held by one man who served in key CIA posts in Europe and Asia:

"The problem faced by the agency ever since it was formed is the idea that covert activity strikes many Americans in high places as the answer to everything — like a magic wand — as the solution to problems which aren't solved by the methods we are used to using.

"Thus, if you have a country that doesn't like our economic system, that doesn't want our aid, that doesn't talk to our leaders, that thinks it can get more from the Soviet Union, then you turn to the CIA. Ahah, the magic wand. I think that attitude has accounted for much of what has happened. The problem is the magic-wand doesn't always work."

Others from the intelligence community are fearful that this period of probing may compromise the future effectiveness of the CIA, an arm of government which they consider vital, especially to an open democracy in a world of closed adversaries.

"The country has a lot to learn about how it wants to live with the CIA," said one ex-official. "And the CIA has a lot to learn about how it ought to serve the country."

The idea that something "magic" lurked behind the marble fortress has sustained Washington cocktail gossip for a generation, fed by incredible stories filled with danger and wit—and often success.

There was the caper in Monte Carlo, remember, when the CIA rigged up a urinal in the casino to collect a sample from King Farouk because somebody in Washington was interested in his health.

And then there was the Bhuddist demonstration in Saigon, when the political action branch sent South Vietnamese into the crowd with egg-size bombs of itching powder.

Or the time in Moscow, when a CIA operation named "Gamma Gupy" intercepted the radio-telephone chitchat from the limousines of top Soviet officials, picking up masculine gossip about a masseuse named Olga, plus valuable insights into the Russian leaders' temperament.

Some of the stories ended uphappily. During the Korean War, the agency trained Taiwanese and parachuted them into mainland China where they broadcast out information on troop movements. A lot of them disappeared without a signal. Some made their way to the Manchurian foothills, where they were scooped up in baskets by a low-flying C-47 with a hook. On one such flight in 1952, the Chinese were waiting. They shot down the plane, executed the spy, and two Americans, Jack Downey and Richard Fecteau, spent nearly two decades in a Chinese prison.

Back in 1963, when the CIA was helping to change governments in South Vietnam, things took their natural course and the agency's new clients murdered the agency's old client, Ngo Dinh Diem.

In Laos, the CIA ran a secret war for 10 years, fought by its own "Armee Clandestine," with as many as 35,000 recruits from the native populace. The agency congratulates itself for the cost-effectiveness of this operation and the small number of U.S. casualties—though the secret war virutally decimated a generation of Meo tribesmen.

To grasp the full range of CIA ac-

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tivity, however, consider this sample of countries where the agency has played an effective role in a change of government: Iran, Guatemala, Somalia, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, South Vietnam, Laos, the Congo, Indonesia, according to the testimony of ex-officers, scholarly studies and the acknowledged history of the agency.

Does the CIA kidnap people? Does it torture? Does it assassinate? No, no, no, the Old Hands insist. "Our world is full of assassins," one retired officer maintains, "who never killed anybody." Another high CIA official, however, was less reassuring on assassinations.

"I don't want to make a flat statement that we never did such a thing," he explained. "There were some things that were a little close to the edge."

Years ago, such artful disclaimers from the agency were swallowed without much question. Now, because of a combination of factors, a new skepticism has developed. The CIA's chummy connections with the Watergate burglars, its denials, followed by belated admissions, upset even the agency's defenders on Capitol Hill. Further, the fresh disclosure of CIA involvement in toppling a foreign government—this time in Chile—renewed old arguments over its "covert action" abroad.

Then, more recently, a report by The New York Times that some of the agency's overseas espionage techniques were being used at home against American citizens produced additional shock waves.

Now, dozens of resolutions are pending in Congress for a grand inquiry of some sort, or even a new oversight committee to exercise greater control. Some critics want to outlaw the agency's "dirty tricks" altogether and restrict it solely to intelligence-gathering, a task which is done more and more by electronic marvels in the sky rather than human spies.

One of the doubters is Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, which expects to draft legislation redefining the CIA's charter and perhaps narrowing the range of "covert operations."

"A larger number of purists will say, and perhaps rightly so, that we got no business getting involved in such activities, "Nedzi explained. "But my view of a Congress as a whole is that there is a lingering feeling that the world isn't so neat and tidy that we can afford to tie our hands in this way."

Nedzi describes himself leaning toward the "purist" camp. "I'm inclined to think we ought to stay out of covert operations," he said. "I want to emphasize I'm not persuaded 100 per cent. At this point, I have such serious doubts that you can maintain secrecy, so, if you going to be involved somewhere, do it openly and support it publicly."

The congressional debate gets a bit confused, however, because only a handful on Capitol Hill really know what they are talking about (and most of them won't talk at all). In 1949, Congress "freed" the agency from regular appropriations processes. Its activities and spending are reviewed in private by a few members from House and Senate committees on Armed Services, Appropriations and, more recently, Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs. The rest of Congress is kept in the dark. So are most people inside the CIA.

According to one reliable source, the CIA is now an agency with about 15,000 regular employees, a figure shrunk by inflation and budget holddowns, just like other federal agencies. About 4,800 of those people work in "clandestine services," the secret spies here and abroad, but the agency hires thousands of foreign "agents" to gather information too.

The CIA spends about $750 million a year (not counting the very expensive satellites and spy planes operated for it by the Pentagon), which makes it more costly than the National Science Foundation, but less expensive than the State Department.

The CIA won't verify that budget figure, but when former agency official Victor Marchetti published it in his book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," the agency tried unsuccessfully to censor it.

Langley operates or supports a bizarre collection of enterprises. It has bankrolled two radio stations—Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—plus several news services to distribute propaganda. It owned several airlines —Air America, Air Asia and Southern Air Transport. It whipped together its own air force of B-26s for war in the Congo. It has some 200 agents under "cover" overseas as executives of American businesses. It has, by the last estimate, several dozen journalists on its payroll abroad. Its West Point is "The Farm," codename ISOLATION, at Camp Peary, Va., but it has also trained foreign mercenaries in Saipan and Okinawa and at the International Policy Academy in Washington.

In the 1960s, the agency penetrated scores of domestic institutions, mainly with its money, by financing overseas activities by labor unions (Retail Clerks, Communication Workers, Newspaper Guild, to name a few), and private organizations like the National Student Association and the National Education Association and dozens of tax-exempt foundations. It now avows that those days are over—though for some, like international labor organizations, the government has replaced secret CIA funding with "overt" money.

The CIA was born with the National Security Act of 1947, the same year as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Quartered at first in old Tempo buildings along the Tidal Basin, it flourished with the Cold War, picking up the FBI's responsibility for overseas surveillance but foreswearing any involvement in domestic spying, a restriction on which the late J. Edgar Hoover reportedly insisted.

Six months ago, the Senate debated over whether to make the CIA present its budget figures in public, but decided against it. The agency's view is that if you divulge the budget one year you will have to do it again the following year — thus signaling too much information to the opposition.

"If you have a very important technical system which can be countered fairly easily," said Director Colby, "in Washington today, you're going to let as few people know about it as possible. Why? Because somebody will make a mention of it, just to show how important he is, sometimes. Or the reporter will pick it up and he'll run it and somebody will turn a switch and we will no longer get the benefit of it. That has happened. So you hold it as narrowly as you can."

But the penchant for secrecy even leaves people within the agency uncertain whether they are getting the full story. The CIA is organized so the left hand won't tell the right hand what it's doing, not to mention ordinary congressmen. When the "covert operations" people were organizing the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, they did not tell the agency's own deputy director of intelligence, Robert Amory, who might have figured out that the whole trip would be a bummer.

When the "covert" people wanted to check out a Chinese espionage prospect with the agency's established contact man in Hong Kong, they didn't send one name. They sent half a dozen —so that no one in between would know with whom they were doing business.

Even communications between CIA people is garbled in a heavy language of cryptonyms. Nobody ever uses the right name for anything or anybody. The U.S.A. is ODYOKE, according to ex-spy Philip Agee's account. ODACID is the State Department. ODEARL is Defense. KUBARK is CIA. They have a RED series to cover anti-Soviet operations—REDWOOD, REDSOX and REDSKIN (which means legal travelers into Russia).

The CIA is especially proud of its claim that its ranks have never been penetrated from the outside, an accomplishment of the agency's counterintelligence section, the one now under fire for its alleged domestic activities. "They are the real paranoids of the agency," said one former officer. "They don't trust anybody."

If the CIA does not tell the straight story inside, how can anyone outside be sure they are getting the truth? That question was given more substance late last year with the release of testimony by the late CIA Director Allen Dulles before the Warren Commission in 1964. Dulles assured the investigators that, as CIA chief, he might well lie to them or anyone else, except the President himself, to protect the identity of a CIA agent.

When former CIA Director James Schlesinger was trying to figure out the CIA's connection with Watergate, he assured the congressional oversight committees that the agency was not in contact with the burglary team's wireman, James McCord. Months later, McCord's periodic letters to the agency turned up.

"He said, 'I'm so damn mad. I just learned about this,'" recalled Rep. Nedzi. "After going into the matter, it became clear that someone way down the line had these letters tucked away."

The CIA is also effective in keeping secrets from its diplomatic counterpart —the State Department. Yet, the CIA uses diplomatic cover for most of its overseas officers. They show up on the regular embassy rosters, usually with bland titles which conceal their real influence. "Informers want to talk to diplomats," one agency veteran explained. "They don't want to talk to Coca-Cola salesmen."

The Russians, of course, use the same system. In a way, it protects both sides, because, as one CIA alumnus explained, governments don't arrest diplomats. The worst that will happen to any operative from KGB, the Soviet spy apparatus, or the CIA is exposure and expulsion.

In terms of quantity, the business of "running agents" in foreign countries is a minor part of the CIA's game, producing a small fraction of the total intelligence. In terms of quality, there

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

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are strong differences among CIA men themselves over whether it is worth much.

For the old hands, who grew up with the agency, it is the heart of the business. "It's the only part of the job that counts," one of them said nostalgically.

For others, especially among the younger officers, it is an elaborate game of "Mickey Mouse" that pumps out lots of reports, mostly worthless to American policy decisions.

"Meeting people in bars at midnight —that gets old fast," said one young ex-officer. "The first time it's fun, but it gets old. When you get done, you have to go back through the bureaucracy. Write a report, file an expense chit."

The traditionalists argue that spy satellites are good for counting missile silos, but they do not help with reading minds. "The people tell you about political dynamics," a high official explained. "It's terribly important to know what's going on within a closed society, comparative political forces, strengths of the military group, party apparatus, the government, the youth movement. You're not going to get that out of a machine."

The skeptics don't think the CIA is so hot at getting those kind of insights either, especially from China and the Soviet Union.

"The bulk of the overseas jobs are anachronistic game-playing," said one of the disillusioned. "Running agents — that's a crock. It's minutia. It's recruiting low-level and middle-level politicians and paying them for reports. A lot of times, the report turns out to be something the agent copied out of a newspaper."

It also can be expensive. One retired officer said a busy station like West Germany could spend as much as $3 million a year, taking care of defectors and supporting local politicians, even ones who are temporarily out of office. "So he won't go broke," the officer explained.

One CIA official, who prizes the system of agent information, explained why it can be costly:

"Sometimes to run a good case involves quite a few people on our side. Because if you're going to meet the fellow, you have to have somebody watching you to see who else may be watching you and then watching him because somebody else may be watching him, so somebody has to be watching him to see who may be watching him when we make the meeting."

If that sounds like dialogue from TV's Maxwell Smart, the business of CIA penetration is no joke to foreign governments. "Inside the Company," an ex-officer's book scheduled for publication in England this month, provides an exhaustive portrait of how it is done: the tedium and scope and risk of American spies trying to pry their way into another country's politics. Philip Agee, a CIA man for 12 years, has set down the most minute details of his service in Ecuador, Argentina and Mexico, naming names and causing a considerable reshuffle of CIA personnel in Latin America.

A lot of energy was expended in trying to tap into Communist bloc embassies or to compromise their employees. In Mexico City, he recounts, the agent LICOWL-1 ran a tiny grocery across from the Soviet embassy and reported that Silnikov, the embassy's administration officer, was ripe for entice-ment,

"The station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait," Agee reported. "An appropriate girl was obtained through BESABAR, an agent who is normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers . . . By loitering at LICOWL-1's store, the girl attracted Silnikov's attention and a hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby, obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is astonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and photographing the sessions with the knowledge of the girl . . . Eventually it will be decided whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disruption by sending tapes and photos to the embassy if the blackmail is refused."

In Ecuador, the CIA was plugged into the police, politicians, the post office, the airports, the government, labor and student groups.

Here, for example, is Agee's recital of the agents recruited there in the early 1960s:

ECSIGIL, two independent operatives within the Ecuadorean Communist Party, each with his own "cut out," another agent who served as go-between so they would not have to meet directly with CIA people. ECFONE, another Communist Party agent, sending five or six reports a week. ECOLIVE, an agent inside the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. ECCENTRIC, a doctor friendly with the president. ECAMOROUS, chief of intelligence in the National Police. ECJACK, an army intelligence officer who wanted to resign from his own country's ineffective service and join the CIA full-time.

ECSTASY, a postal worker in Quito who set aside mail pouches from Cuba, Russia and China for his brother, who delivered them to the U.S. embassy for inspection. ECOTTER, an airport employee who passed on passenger lists. ECTOSOME, an Oldsmobile dealer who reported on his Czech friends. ECOXBOW, a retired colonel and vice president of the Senate, getting $700 a month plus a luxury hotel room for fun and games because his access was so good.

AMBLOOD, an agent trained to penetrate Cuba where he was later caught and confessed to an assassination plot aimed at Fidel Castro.

The list goes on and on—a newspaper columnist, political candidates, a cabinet member, student leaders, even a socialist in the Chamber of Deputies.

But, as Agee laboriously recounts how the CIA used these people, it becomes clear that passive intelligence-gathering was only a small part of the game. There was constant agitation against the government's recognition of Cuba, against the leadership of domestic organizations, against any Ecuadorean forces which the CIA station chief perceived as hostile to American interests. In agency terms, the action succeeded. Two governments fell in quick succession, thanks partly to the clandestine agitation, and were succeeded finally by a military regime.

The controversy over foreign activities has been matched in the last two years by unanswered questions about what the CIA is doing inside the United States. The law limits it to gathering foreign intelligence abroad, but a loophole provision also directs it to protect national security sources interpreted to include some domestic operations.

The CIA has offices in at least 15 American cities, according to one former employee, where as many as 500 people interview scientists, businessmen and college professors either bound for Eastern Europe or just returning. The agency asks them to look out for mundane intelligence like the crop reports or esoteric technical gossip like the status of new technology.

Among ex-officers, it is widely believed that the agency's counter intelligence has on occasion "bugged" its own employees to check their security. The spectre of widespread electronic eavesdropping in the drawing rooms of Georgetown is not so widely believed.

The agency's pursuit of "foreign" intelligence has also led to some stateside burglaries, according to one former officer, who said the CIA had broken into embassies in New York and Washington, mainly to photograph foreign codebooks.

Director Colby insists that the agency does not have any "gray areas" in its charter which allow it to break U.S. laws. But then he muses aloud over the question of a burglary of the Japanese embassy, say, two days before Pearl Harbor. Would the CIA be justified in doing it?

"That's a close case," the director said, "a very close case."

One limitation to CIA activity within the United States has been its natural bureaucratic rivalry with the FBI. When Hoover was alive, he persistently protected his own turf and blew his stack in 1970 over a minor episode when an FBI man passed to the CIA the whereabouts of a college president on his way to Eastern Europe. Hoover demanded the name of his own agent and the CIA refused. The FBI director retaliated by cutting off "all liaison" with Langley.

"There were a lot of people is government," said an ex-CIA official, "who were asking God at the time to take Mr. Hoover from us."

The Watergate scandal suggested that, contrary to tradition, the CIA could be persuaded to help out with domestic spying aimed at American citizens. It began with a telephone call from White House aide John D. Ehrlichman to CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman, suggesting the agency give "carte blanche" to E. Howard Hunt Jr., the former agency officer working for the White House "plumbers." When Hunt called on him, Cushman taped the conversation and turned over exotic paraphernalia—a wig, a moustache, a fake identification card, a speech-altering device, a camera concealed in a tobacco pouch.

Hunt and his friends did a couple of burglaries for the White House before they were caught. Meanwhile, the CIA helped out again with a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg, the antiwar critic who surfaced the Pentagon Papers.

When the scandal broke, the agency successfully deflected White House suggestions that the CIA was somehow responsible. Still, the episode left troubling questions. It was learned, for instance, that McCord was reporting to a CIA "case officer," a relationship which implies that McCord was doing domestic work for the agency.

How much does anyone in Congress know about this sort of thing? Are senators briefed on embassy break-ins? Does anyone know that the U. S. gov-

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ernment according to one estimate was spending at least $11 million in the early 1960s to change governments in Ecuador? According to the CIA, it faithfully reports all of its "covert activities" to the select few entitled to know, but even the agency admits that it does not volunteer any grisly details — if nobody asks the right questions.

Director Colby explains: "If you look back over 25 years, you see degrees and variations of Congress's supervision, so that I think that some of the senators can properly say they didn't hear of some things. In some cases, their chairman heard about them. In others, the material was perhaps covered in our annual appropriations briefings in which the matter was covered in general terms and then described to the degree requested."

When Congress turns to its debate on CIA oversight, it will have to face one nettlesome reality: in a lot of situations, Congress did not want to know. If a spooky operation succeeded, fine. If it failed, then everyone could holler.

Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) who chairs the Senate's joint oversight committee, once expressed his own ambivalence: "You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such and shut your eyes some and take what is coming."

The Stennis committee rarely meets, though the senator has pledged more vigorous supervision in the wake of Watergate. The new foreign aid bill requires advance briefings for Foreign Relations members too. Marchetti tells in his book about the time in 1966 when the Senate appropriations subcommittee was prepared to ask tough questions about technological costs. The agency bedazzled them with a display of James Bond gadgets — a camera in a tobacco pouch, a transmitter concealed in false teeth and so forth — some of the same equipment which the CIA later provided to the White House burglary team.

On the House side, Rep. Nedzi said he has been briefed regularly about CIA activities ever since he became chairman of the oversight subcommittee two years ago, and that nothing on the scale of the Chile intervention has occurred in that time. How does he know for sure?

"The answer is that I don't," Nedzi said. "I'm not going to vouch for what they're telling me. But I want to emphasize that I have no reason to believe that they're lying to me, at least at the top levels."

On the other hand, Nedzi has known for more than a year about the CIA domestic spying which caused the current flap. He was briefed on it by Colby and kept it to himself. Nedzi was assured, he said, that the questionable had been discontinued. "It was historical," he said.

If congressional oversight has been weak, some experts think the same is true of the executive branch. One former official said the National Security Council, despite the popular mythology about it, exercizes very little control over the spooky operations. If anyone does, it is the President. The NSC issues lots of directives about the CIA's noncontroversial bureaucratic functions, he said, but the sticky, clandestine stuff never gets written down.

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, consisting of nine prominent citizens, many closely attached to the defense establishment, is likewise not regarded as a serious check. One highly regarded CIA alumnus said: "Those guys are almost without exception more hawkish than the guys in the agency. The tone of those guys is: 'If there's anything wrong, blow 'em up.'"

If Congress does opt for new oversight machinery, it will still face the dilemma of how to operate a secret agency in an open democracy. "All of the clamor," said Nedzi, "is based on the premise that somehow, if Congress had known about all these things, they wouldn't have happened. To me, that doesn't follow at all . . .

"There's a very difficult problem here that fortunately I haven't come to in its pure form yet. What is the moral obligation of a congressional overseer if some information comes to him which indicates a direction in which he doesn't feel the agency or the country should be going? Does he have the right to blow the cover off the project? Does he have a duty to blow the cover? If your answer is yes, is it reasonable to have a secret agency in the hands of so many masters?"

WASHINGTON STAR
10 January 1975

Colby Assures U.S. Envoys CIA Cooperative

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer

In an unprecedented appearance before all U.S. ambassadors to Latin American nations here this week, CIA Director William Colby gave assurances that he would instruct agency station chiefs around the Western Hemisphere to make the fullest disclosure to the envoys of information and appraisals generated by the CIA.

Colby attended the final session of a three-day closed-door meeting of the ambassadors at the State Department on Wednesday, it was learned. He assured William D. Rogers, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and the ambassadors that the CIA is "running no operations" in Latin America today.

Under questioning by several of the ambassadors, Colby acknowledged that not all CIA station chiefs — nominally under control of their ambassador — fully shared information acquired by the agency or the estimates and policy recommendations sent to CIA headquarters.

THE STATION chiefs, who are "light cover" on embassy staff lists, have separate and secure channels of communication with their Langley, Va., headquarters, and there has been no prior requirement for CIA officials abroad to fully inform the ambassadors about the information they send to Washington.

Colby said the wiser station chiefs do make it a practice to keep the ambassadors informed generally of what they learn and what they report.

Several ambassadors asked Colby if he would issue instructions to make this information-sharing mandatory and the CIA director said he would do so. However, Colby said that obviously the CIA stationiefs would not reveal the names of their secret sources in Latin America even to the ambassadors.

The Star-News was told that ambassador to Chile David Popper said that even after a year in Santiago he had not been able to discover exactly what role the CIA played in the September 1973 revolution or events preceding it. Several members of Congress have complained that Colby's secret testimony before the Senate Arms Services Committee on CIA's Chilean operations is still so closely held that other members of Congress have not been allowed to see it.

BUT COLBY assured the ambassadors that the CIA was not involved in the successful uprising of the Chilean armed forces which overthrew the Marxist-dominated regime of the late Salvador Allende. He also said the CIA did nothing to precipitate the truckers' strike that paralyzed Chile for two months shortly before the revolt.

There has been no public disclosure of exactly how the CIA spent an estimated $8 million that was approved by the White House "40 Committee," headed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for expenditure in Chile in the period before the Allende's overthrow.

There has been, however, public testimony of CIA collusion with the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. in an attempt to influence the political turn of events in Chile at the time of Allende's election in 1970.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 January 1975

Very Nature of CIA Frustrates Oversight

BY HARRY ROSITZKE

For 20 years the exposure of secret CIA operations has automatically elicited public outcries for "a thorough investigation" and "more congressional oversight." These exposures have, until recently, focused on CIA's covert operations abroad in such fields as technical intelligence collection (the U2 overflight program), paramilitary operations against Guatemala and Cuba, political action operations in Iran and Chile, and the use of private American organizations and dummy foundations to support a propaganda program against the Soviet Union abroad.

Retired after 23 years in Central Intelligence Agency operations, Harry Rositzke is the author of "U.S.S.R. Today."

Now the CIA joins three other elements of the executive branch accused of carrying out improper or illegal counter-intelligence activities inside the United States during the Nixon Administration. First, the White House itself with its plumbers' squad and the aborted Huston plan, in which a former White House aide suggested widespread intelligence-gathering, including breaking and entering. Second, the Pentagon with its compilation of dossiers on American civilians. Third, the Federal Bureau of Investigation with its counter-intelligence programs directed against radical groups involving not only investigations but the provocation and harassment of individuals and organizations.

The CIA case in this lineup is unique in two respects. First, its charter specifically prohibits the agency from carrying out internal security operations within the United States, a function falling within the exclusive province of the FBI. Second, the CIA has for some time, long before Watergate, been loosely and vaguely suspected of importing it's "dirty tricks" from abroad, of becoming a domestic "Gestapo."

The facts of CIA's "domestic operations" and on whose authority they were carried out, will be made clear by the President's blue-ribbon panel and by the investigations already promised by Congress. Together these should provide the public with the facts—but, as usual, after the fact.

The principal limitation of Congressional oversight, however earnest or competent, is simply this: it serves only to detect or expose what has already happened. For 20 years, Congress has been able only to hold postmortems: after Lt. Powers' U2 was shot down, after Castro wiped out the invaders at the Bay of Pigs, after the secret army in Laos had existed for years, after covert support of anti-Allende elements in Chile had stopped.

Placing historical facts on the record serves some worthy purpose, not the least of which is to warn the executive branch to observe greater caution in the future, but it cannot effectively control improper or illegal actions in the present.

The main issue is: how can illegal internal security activities by the CIA or other arm of the executive branch be detected or prevented in the future?

It can't be adequately done by Congress because of the very nature of intelligence-gathering organizations. Their files are highly classified and closely guarded, their employes are trained in secrecy and highly disciplined and they are in the habit of dealing only on a "need to know" basis. Congressional oversight committees, faced with this mixture of built-in secrecy and internal bureaucratic control, are simply inadequate to the job of controlling executive branch security organizations.

Another problem with Congressional oversight involves national security. In any public inquiry into a secret operation there is inevitably a fallout of information that is not essential to the inquiry and which should be kept secret in the national interest. To expose such secrets in the search for illegality or impropriety is to give comfort to those hostile to us and to feed anti-American propaganda around the world.

If oversight is not the solution to detecting violations of our civil rights at home, what is? One answer would be to employ against those who abuse or misuse their legal authority one of their own favorite counter-intelligence techniques—the encouragement of informants.

What might serve that purpose is to have a federal ombudsman in Washington, a man of impeccable credentials with a small staff of two or three investigators who would invite any federal employe to get in touch with him in complete confidence to register complaints about the improper investigations of American citizens. Such an ombudsman, or permanent commission, would properly come under the Senate Judiciary Committee and act with its authority in investigating the legitimacy of the complaints it received. Cases of questionable or clear illegality would be forwarded to the judiciary committee or to the attorney general and given publicity within the bounds of proper security.

One can only speculate on whether such an ombudsman would have served a useful purpose in the past.

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Might former CIA Director Richard Helms have referred the White House request for a profile on Daniel Ellsberg to an ombudsman? Might former FBI Director Patrick Gray have revealed to him his conviction that the President was being misled by his subordinates? Might White House Counsel John Dean have gone to an ombdusman weeks or months before he found good reason to talk to the grand jury?

More important, perhaps, are the citizens whose rights are violated. Whether from the right or the left, black or white, radical or militant, the targets of domestic counter-intelligence have the greatest right to be heard. When they discover that they are being tailed, bugged or denounced without legitimate cause they should have a place to lodge their complaints. Now they have nowhere to go but the courts, a slow and expensive process. Would they go to a man in Washington they could trust? I think many would.

America's investigative journalists have contributed a great deal to the exposure of official corruption, but they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to obtaining unvarnished facts on counter intelligence. What is needed in the present case is the whole story, factual and objective, as only an ombudsman or permanent commission could provide it.

An open society cannot be closed by a handful of plumbers, but it is healthier without them. There is no foolproof way in a democratic country to keep it free from executive excess unless citizens participate—be they federal employes or suspected "radicals." The least we can do is give them the telephone number of an honest and powerful watchman.

WASHINGTON POST
15 January 1975

Press Reports on CIA Hit

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger yesterday described as "overblown" press accounts alleging that the Central Intelligence Agency had files on 10,000 American citizens as a result of surveillance carried on in the United States.

Schlesinger, who served as CIA director for six months early in 1973 before taking over as head of the Defense Department, declined to provide any details on CIA domestic activities that may have been questionable over the years, but he commented, "I think that in relation to historical standards, that there were not activities in such number or so surprising as to be a source of national turmoil."

Speaking at a Pentagon press conference, Schlesinger sought to retract the term "misdemeanor" that he used Monday in describing some of the incidents that may have occurred during the CIA's more than 20-year history.

Schlesinger said misdemeanor is a legal term that should be avoided until it is determined by the President's blue ribbon investigative panel if any illegalities did in fact take place.

"All bureaucracies have a tendency to stray across the line," he said.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975

U.S. Furor Over C.I.A. Is a Puzzle to Europe

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Jan. 11—The controversy over charges of domestic spying in the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency has aroused considerable interest in West Germany, where similar activities came to light last October.

But in Bonn, as in Paris, Rome, and London, occasional disclosures of questionable activities of security agencies have few lasting effects, and the intensity of public reaction in the United States always surprises Europeans. "You don't have a country over there, you have a huge church," a diplomat here remarked.

Italians take it for granted that if they have any social or political standing at all, their telephones will be tapped by one secret agency or another. Thousands of prominent Italians were discovered listed in the files of Rome's military intelligence service in a scandal six years ago.

In Paris, the police were caught last year installing bugs in the office of a satirical weekly, Le Canard Enchaîné.

In Britain, which is in a wartime-like condition because of Irish Republican Army bombings in Northern Ireland and England, the public expects M.I.5, the security service, and M.I.6, the secret intelligence service, to be discreet in their handling of domestic and foreign spying.

The Spy in Brandt's Office

Cases of abuse seldom come to light in the British press because of the Officials Secrets Act, which makes disclosures like those made in The New York Times in recent weeks almost impossible.

The West Germany weekly journal of opinion, Die Zeit, pointed out a similarity between the Times reports that the C.I.A. had illegally investigated about 10,000 Americans from the nineteen-sixties until last year, and disclosures that were made last year about the West German Federal Intelligence Service.

These were made in October, during an investigation of the security services' botching of the case of Günter Guillaume, the East German agent who worked in Chancellor Willy Brandt's office until last April and contributed to Mr. Brandt's resignation the next month.

The former chief of the Brandt Chancellery, Horst Ehmke, said in parliamentary hearings that he had discovered in 1970 that the intelligence service had illegally kept files on 52 German politicians, ranging from the Opposition leader Franz Josef Strauss to the man behind the Brandt "Eastern Policies," Egon Bahr.

According to Die Zeit, "the causes of the violations are identical. Here, as there"—in the United States—"the secret service justified itself and created its own laws outside the laws of the commonwealth. Here, as there, existed the dangers Thomas Jefferson once said threatened every free state: That uncontrolled power can easily become all-embracing power."

Report Due Next Month

Mr. Ehmke's disclosures provoked a few newspaper articles, but whatever spying had gone on was four years in the past. He told the parliamentary commission that some of the files no longer existed—he had ordered them destroyed. Mr. Ehmke said he believed the files were kept by Christian Democrats in the secret service who hoped to use them to embarras the new Social Democratic Government, in power since 1969.

The parliamentary committee's continuing examination of the Guillaume case is expected to produce a report some time next month that may result in suggestions for a reform of the entire intelligence system.

It has been made clear in public testimony that Mr. Guillaume rose to his position as Chancellor Brandt's assistant for party affairs even though strongly incriminating evidence against him had been in the Government files for nearly 20 years. The various bits and pieces were never put together for the authorities, who approved a top-secret security clearance for him in 1970. The responsibility for the failure is still a matter of dispute.

The German Bundesnachrichtendienst, or Federal Intelligence Service, was built up after World War II by Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, the intelligence genius of Hitler's Wehrmacht. At first, he worked directly under American occupation authorities, and after West Germany became independent he cooperated closely with the American services.

Like the C.I.A., which was created in 1947, the German agency was limited to foreign intelligence. A second agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, was created for domestic security. Keeping of files on German politicians, therefore, was clearly a violation of the Federal Intelligence Service's charter, as C.I.A.'s monitoring of American civilians would be a charter violation in the United States.

There is, essentially, a more relaxed attitude toward such violation's here than there is in the United States Mr. Ehmke told Die Zeit in an interview last October that he thought the service would be justified in keeping files on a German politician if he was making contacts with foreigners here—just the thing that critics of the American service say is illegal in the United States.

Germany is perhaps a special case, because of the division into capitalist and Communist states, and as Günter Guillaume proved, it is comparatively easy for an East German agent to pass himself off as a loyal West German citizen. The lines between "domestic" and "foreign" intelligence in West Germany therefore are easily blurred.

The C.I.A. is known to consider the German intelligence services so riddled with East German agents that the Americans do not share real "top secrets" with it. Estimates of the number of Communist spies of various sorts in West Germany run as high as 10,000.

In Franc, a cool sense of "raison d'état" often justifies espionage activities, which most conservative Frenchmen assume are conducted as a matter of course. When the late Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, visited France in the early nineteen-sixties hundreds, perhaps thousands of people were either detained or shipped to Corsica for the duration of his stay, as security risks.

Last year it was learned that many different French authorities have the right to order wiretaps and that government ministers had taps put on their mistresses' phones as well as on those of their political rivals.

After President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was elected in May, he promised an end to such wiretapping and said the files would be destroyed. Some files were burned, but it is generally conceded in Paris that domestic spying still goes on.

The Italian Parliament passed legislation outlawing telephone tapping last year. But recently, an allegedly illegal monitoring center was discovered on the outskirts of Rome, indicating that the practice is probably continuing on a large scale.

WASHINGTON POST
17 January 1975

Belin Named Director of CIA Panel

United Press International

President Ford yesterday appointed David W. Belin, who was counsel to the Warren Commission, which investigated John F. Kennedy's assassination, to be executive director of the eight-member commission investigating charges of illegal domestic spying by the CIA.

Belin, 46, has been a senior partner with a law firm in Des Moines since 1966 and is said to be a long-time acquaintance of Mr. Ford.

In his work for the CIA investigating panel, which Mr. Ford created Jan. 4 under direction of Vice President Rockefeller, Belin will draw $36,000 a year. The commission is supposed to finish its mission within three months.

Rockefeller appointed Sol Neil Corbin as his special counsel serving as his liaison with the commission. Corbin also served as counsel to Rockefeller when he was governor of New York from 1962 until 1965.

Belin was counsel to the Warren Commission in 1964. The White House said he has concentrated in his private law practice on corporation work and court cases, including constitutional issues.

WASHINGTON POST
9 January 1975

N.Y. Times, Time Asked for CIA Data

From News Dispatches

Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of a CIA oversight subcommittee, yesterday asked the editors of The New York Times and Time magazine to suggest witnesses for a House inquiry into alleged CIA domestic spying.

Both publications in the last two weeks have carried extensive dispatches claiming the CIA had breached its charter by carrying out surveillance of American radicals and dissenters within the United States.

The New York Times turned down the request, on grounds that it was given information for its stories on a confidential basis.

A spokesman for Time magazine said in a statement: "This was obtained from confidential sources and for that reason we cannot comply with the request."

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

BALTIMORE SUN
12 January 1975

Avoiding the police state

By PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

Columbia, S.C.

It is a truism that "intelligence is the first line of national defense," since important foreign policy and military decisions affecting the national security are based, at least in theory, on the best information available. The collection, evaluation and dissemination to policymakers of such information is the primary function of the intelligence community.

Unfortunately, the Central Intelligence Agency has had a bad press for years as a result of such covert operations as the Bay of Pigs fiasco and past military interventions abroad which have little, if anything, to do with the primary function of intelligence. Recent revelations that the CIA has been engaged in political surveillance (domestic spying) on so-called subversive elements which it regarded as a threat to domestic or internal security have distracted public attention from the essential and proper functions of the agency and tend to give intelligence in general a bad name.

Back in 1970 Army intelligence also came under a cloud when the Senate subcommittee on constitutional rights under Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.) investigated military counterintelligence agencies which had expanded their normal function of protecting military installations to include political surveillance of suspected civilian "subversives." The Ervin investigation brought a halt to these extra-legal activities, but excellent as it was, its report left unanswered such fundamental questions as: What are the legitimate functions of counterintelligence and security police agencies in a democratic state and society? How do they differ from similar agencies in totalitarian or police states? What are the constitutional safeguards against their illegitimate expansion?

All national intelligence agencies have one or more subdivisions that recruit and manage networks of espionage agents who collect information abroad using clandestine techniques. The task of counterintelligence or counterespionage is to block such efforts. When police agencies, such as the FBI, take over these functions they are called security police. In the U.S.S.R. counterintelligence is carried out by the proper divisions of the GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) and the civilian KGB (Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers). The KGB is thus a combined national intelligence and security police organization. However, surveillance of political dissidents is widespread in the U.S.S.R., not only on military installations but throughout the entire state and society.

The amount or degree of such domestic spying is a basic criterion in distinguishing police states from open societies. Indeed, *any* such surveillance is rightly regarded as a threat to democratic freedoms. The authors of the Constitution and Bill of Rights cherished such freedoms so highly that they deliberately imposed restraints on the power of the President and the Congress even in matters affecting national security.

The Constitution and Bill of Rights were meant to protect the privacy of the individual in his personal life and to guarantee his freedom from political surveillance by government agencies. Under the Fourth Amendment, the sanctity of the home is guaranteed against illegal search or seizure by the police—and by police there is no question that the intent was to include all police agencies, including what later became our national security police, the FBI.

Senator Ervin's investigation revealed that at one time various military counterintelligence units kept political card index files on 25 million American citizens and extensive dossiers on many thousands of others. Similar charges have been made that the CIA has kept some 10,000 civilians under surveillance. Such situations would have been considered "unthinkable" by the authors of the Constitution.

The justification offered for this violation of constitutional rights by the Defense Department was that it needed files on "politically subversive elements" during the widespread civil disturbances and urban riots of 1967. Ghettos were burned and buildings bombed. Military forces were called upon to restore order in the emergency situations thus created, a perfectly legitimate function of the armed forces. After all, George Washington himself called upon the militia of several states to put down the Whisky Rebellion of 1794 and personally led the forces.

These were military operations and their commanders felt that they were simply doing what they regarded as an essential task at the time—collecting the information needed for emergency operations. The job was done with characteristic zeal amounting at times to military "overkill," since in an atmosphere charged with political and social tensions, one man's liberal became another man's subversive. The situation would have been ludicrous had it not been so menacing.

A basic principle is at stake here which cannot be too strongly emphasized: when even the legitimate security police agencies of a democratic state expand the definition of "subversive" to include anyone who opposes government policy, the intelligence base of these agencies becomes identical with that of police-state dictatorships. When this happens, the constitutional framework of the democratic state has in fact been eroded, regardless of whether or not such erosion is tacitly accepted by the public, as was the case in Nazi Germany.

The threat to the Constitutional order is far more serious when, under a mantle of secrecy, the counterintelligence components of a national intelligence agency assume internal security police functions, thus following the Soviet model. This is true whatever "presidential mandate" of legal pretext may be invoked either secretly at the time or later by way of attempted justification.

According to Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former Inspector General and Executive Director of CIA writing in *The U.S. Intelligence Community:* "By law, the CIA has no police or subpoena powers nor does it engage in any internal security activities—other than those affecting its own personnel or operations." In connection with the Watergate affair former CIA Director Richard Helms has repeatedly affirmed this principle, and has denied that under his directorship the CIA engaged in any extra-legal political surveillance of alleged subversives.

Serious charges have been made that counterintelligence or "special operations" divisions of the CIA carried out widespread domestic spying during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The substance of these charges has been publicly admitted by the former head of Counterintelligence of CIA. The full story of how the agency got mixed up in political surveillance in clear violation of its charter and the constitutional principles involved must await investigation, which should be immediate, thorough and free of whitewash.

Not only the vital, legitimate function of intelligence as the first line of national defense is at stake, but also the foundations of our democratic state and open society. As Watergate has demonstrated these may be undermined from within by political zealots who are capable of rationalizing almost any crime in terms of their own paranoid perceptions of "national security."

The congressional committees can demand action and usually get results if they want to be tough. But it should be remembered that these bodies are exactly what their chairmen want them to be. The constant refrain that nobody in Congress knows the amount of the CIA budget or where it is buried in the overall budget is simply not true (unless the subcommittees have not bothered to examine the budget). The congressional subcommittees on CIA (one each in Appropriations and Armed Services in the House and Senate) not only can know all of the details of the CIA (and the intelligence community) budget, but all of the activities and operations.

One question that must be answered is: How much time do the committees wish to devote to CIA and intelligence? The Armed Services Committees have the entire Defense Department to oversee, a subject with political appeal

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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

—bases, contracts, jobs, constituents. Appropriations must pass on the federal budget of which intelligence is less than 2 per cent.

There appears to be little merit to adding another committee just to oversee intelligence activities with each senator and congressman already sitting on one or two standing committees as well as special committees. Nor would there seem to be any use in establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence if the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees continued to exercise jurisdiction over the intelligence agencies. This would only add to the competition and rivalry between committees. A Joint Committee would be advisable only with exclusive jurisdiction and members and staff with time available to do the job.

Another question is: To what degree should the Committees examine the details of intelligence operations? It is not easy to persuade foreign nationals (and they are the only ones who are clandestine agents) to engage in highly dangerous work in which their lives may be at stake. If such people believed their names would be publicized they would never work for the United States.

In broad terms the committees must be told enough about the work of the intelligence community so they may responsibly assure the American people that the system is working properly. The Congressional Committees never should be misinformed or uninformed.

More specifically, in the areas of espionage, counterespionage and covert political operations the committees should know what is going on and where, but should not ask for details of operations or identity of agents. In counterespionage, the never-ending struggle to protect our own secrets, the overseers should be told in general which agency is carrying out the operations in the United States.

In the area of covert political operations, the suggestion made by President Ford that the "40 Committee", his body for reviewing in advance proposals for such activities, advise the congressional committees of contemplated action seems to make good sense. This would give the congressmen an opportunity —on a confidential basis to raise objections with the President before the mounting of an operation they deemed unwise. However, if such information were to become a vehicle for political opponents of the President's foreign policy to attack it, the partnership would end.

One thing should be obvious: The willingness of the President to allow frank discussion of intelligence operations with congressional committees in executive session will be in direct proportion to the responsible handling of that information by legislators. Neither branch of the government is in a good position to "cast stones" on the subject of leakage of classified information. Nor can we expect leaks to be eliminated by anything except responsible performance in both branches of government. But foreign intelligence assets are too perishable and irretrievable to be destroyed in the pursuit of partisan politics. Most important at this moment in our history is for the Congress to assure itself and the American people that the intelligence and security agencies are working properly.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 January 1975

THOSE IN THE KNOW ARE 'CONCERNED, NOT HYSTERICAL'

The CIA: Will Investigations Clear the Air?

BY J. F. terHORST

WASHINGTON—Advance communication between the White House and Capitol Hill indicates strongly that neither Congress nor the Administration intends to let investigations of alleged CIA domestic spying turn into a publicity-generating vendetta that could permanently cripple the agency's vital intelligence-gathering mission.

Several days before President Ford announced the Rockefeller commission to check into charges of CIA spying on American political dissidents, a key telephone conversation occurred between presidential counselor John O. Marsh, a former Virginia Democratic congressman, and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the armed services subcommittee.

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Marsh advised Nedzi of the President's intention to appoint a special inquiry board, and solicited Nedzi's opinion, because his subcommittee is the only regular congressional unit charged with monitoring the nation's intelligence apparatus.

Nedzi advised Marsh that it might be wiser for Mr. Ford to delay the naming of his special group until House and Senate investigations into the CIA had been completed.

Marsh replied that the public outcry and the nature of the charges made it impossible for Mr. Ford to abstain from ordering a probe of the agency. The President would have to take action or be open to accusations of ignoring the problem, Marsh said.

Nedzi advised Marsh that Congress could not delay, either—and for the same reasons. Indeed, the White House learned, Nedzi intends to begin his CIA hearings within two weeks, and hopes to conduct them with full press coverage. CIA chief William Colby already has been alerted to have himself and other agency witnesses ready to testify by then.

Marsh got essentially the same response from Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), who heads the Senate Armed Services Committee, and from other Democratic and Republican leaders of the two chambers who do not intend to delay their congressional inquiries until the Rockefeller commission completes its 90-day CIA investigation.

Those in the White House and on Capitol Hill who know the substance of the allegations against the CIA are, in the words of one of them, "concerned but not alarmed or hysterical."

Nedzi, for example, was apprised of some alleged CIA spying on domestic antiwar groups more than a year ago, during his closed-door probe into CIA involvement in the Watergate coverup. He did not make it public then because he was convinced that it was not directly related to the Watergate scandals. In fact, some of the alleged CIA spying activities dated back to the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, he was informed.

The gut issue in all of this is whether the CIA violated its charter against domestic surveillance or whether it merely extended it legitimate foreign intelligence gathering int the home front in an effort to see whethe there were links between American citizen and some hostile powers abroad.

There were widespread suspicions withi the top echelons of government back in th 1960s and early 1970s that foreign mone was bankrolling some of the antigovernmen activities within the United States.

If the presidential panel named by M Ford and the congressional hearing accom plish anything, they should at least answe the persistent implication that antipathy an rivalry between the late FBI Director J. Ed gar Hoover and the heads of CIA were th cause of the problem. The FBI supposedl conducts domestic surveillance, but report are that Hoover would not take on cases re ferred to the FBI by the CIA.

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Practically speaking, it probably wouldn matter to an individual if he were being se cretly investigated by the FBI or the CI but it makes a lot of difference nowaday when the CIA is rather widely suspected b young persons and older conspiratorial type of running a secret, sinister supergovernmen within the United States.

Responsible lawmakers and public official are confident that the CIA investigations wi disprove these suspicions to a majority o Americans, even though a fanatic fringe crie "whitewash."

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 January 1975

WATCHDOGS WENT TO SLEEP

If Officialdom Didn't Know, Why Didn't It?

BY DAVID WISE

Profound ironies underlie the current debate in Washington over charges that the Central Intelligence Agency violated the law and turned loose its spies, spooks, wire tappers and "entry" men on American citizens inside the United States.

Those who have urged greater control over the CIA and warned of the dangers of secret power in a democracy have been repeatedly assured that the CIA always operates under tight presidential supervision. The official claim is that no covert operations are undertaken abroad without the approval of a high-level White House committee and that Congress and an outside civilian review board serve as vigilant watchdogs, barking in the night at the slightest sound of an illicit clandestine footstep.

David Wise is the coauthor of "The Invisible Government," a critical study of the CIA.

Unless there were considerable substance to the allegations of CIA domestic spying, President Ford would hardly have found it necessary to appoint an eight-man commission, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, to conduct an inquiry. If the CIA indeed were under tight presidential control, Mr. Ford would not have needed a report from CIA Director William E. Colby and a commission to investigate CIA domestic spying—he would already have known all about it.

President Ford, however, is a relatively recent occupant of the White House, and perhaps he was unaware of CIA domestic spying. Reportedly these domestic activities were suspended around the time Watergate broke open in 1973. Perhaps Colby neglected to brief the new President on what had been going on. But in that case, what about Secretary of State Henry Kissinger?

For five years, Kissinger served as Richard Nixon's national security adviser and chief of the staff of the National Security Council, titles he has retained as secretary of state. Under the law, the CIA is directly supervised by the NSC. Yet 24 hours after the CIA story broke, a spokesman for Kissinger said, "The secretary has never seen any survey of American citizens by the CIA and he doesn't know if any such surveys exist."

If Kissinger, the man with direct responsibility over the CIA since 1969, really knew nothing of CIA domestic spying, there is yet another paradox in the case of Nelson Rockefeller. The man chosen by President Ford to investigate the CIA has been a member since 1968 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. For years, starting with the late Allen Dulles, CIA directors have claimed that this board of civilians has access to whatever it wants to know about the CIA. If so, Rockefeller would already possess full knowledge of any CIA domestic spooking—he would not need an eight-man commission to ascertain the facts.

As for Congress, if the four subcommittees responsible for watching over the CIA were being properly informed, there would be no need for the various new Congressional probes now under consideration.

On the face of it, then, the current controversy has raised grave new doubts about the familiar claim that the CIA operates under strict control by the executive branch and Congress.

But, as the Watergate scandal demonstrated, there is another side to the coin. While there are great dangers to a democracy when a secret intelligence agency operates out of control, there are equally great dangers when a President and his men exercise improper control and misuse power against political enemies or dissidents. The central importance of Watergate was this abuse of power and the misuse of government agencies—particularly law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the FBI—against individuals.

Richard Helms was director of the CIA from 1966 to 1973, a period when much of the alleged domestic spying took place. In a 1971 speech, he said: "We do not target on American citizens." Yet the Senate Watergate hearings and the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment evidence indicated that the CIA while Helms was director twice violated the law confining the agency to overseas operations.

Helms agreed to outfit Nixon's plumbers with a wig, a camera, a voice alteration device and other spy equipment, and Helms personally approved the preparation by the CIA of a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. On June 28, 1972, Helms obligingly wrote a memo asking the FBI to "confine themselves to the personalities already arrested" and avoid expanding the Watergate investigation into "other areas, which may well eventually run afoul of our operations."

The CIA cooperated for a time with Nixon's attempt to use the intelligence agency to block the FBI probe of the Watergate burglary despite the official denials. It is also very possible that the CIA followed presidential or White House orders in carrying out domestic spy operations.

The problem of controlling the CIA is, therefore, a dual one: To make certain that the agency operates under strict supervision of the executive branch and of Congress, but by the same token to be sure that it is not misused by a President or his advisers and turned into an illegal secret police.

It is possible that a much-needed general reform of the CIA will emerge from the current investigations. As a first step Congress should outlaw all covert operations by the CIA overseas and confine the agency to gathering and evaluating intelligence—the mission which Congress thought it had assigned to the CIA when it created the agency in 1947. Second, Congress should specifically prohibit any CIA domestic operations and precisely define that term. The legislation should include strict safeguards against presidential misuse of the agency.

Third, Congress should establish a joint committee to ride herd on the CIA, scrapping the existing informal, shadow subcommittees.

In the words of Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) a member of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on CIA: "There is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA."

WALL STREET JOURNAL
3 JAN 1975

CIA FERMENT grows—and not just because of domestic-spying charges.

The agency emphasizes scientific snooping by satellite or electronic eavesdropping; director Colby deemphasizes "dirty tricks." The trend to detente angers CIA veterans whose careers advanced when the Communists clearly were the enemy. Today's relative openness about CIA work contributes to a general sag in morale.

Chances are stronger than ever for congressional restraints on the agency. Coming Capitol Hill inquiries will surely find a partial basis for reports of illegal actions in the past. Some forbidden domestic spying evidently took place under former Director Helms, with Vietnam-war protesters the main targets.

Colby will survive as CIA chief for now. But a respected outsider may be brought in later on to restore the agency's reputation.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

17 January 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Baker Reports C.I.A. Compiled Dossiers on a Former Senate Aide and a Private New York Investigator

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16—Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. said today that his investigation into any Central Intelligence Agency involvement in Watergate had disclosed that the agency had compiled dossiers on a former Senate aide and a New York private investigator.

In a telephone interview at his home in Huntsville, Tenn., Senator Baker, a Republican, said that his investigation had found that the agency had dossiers on Bernard Fensterwald, a Washington, D.C., lawyer and former aide to the late Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat of Missouri, and on Arthur James Woolston-Smith, an officer of a New York City investigation and industrial security consulting concern.

"These were but two of the numerous indications our investigation turned up that the C.I.A. has engaged in widespread domestic activity," Mr. Baker said'

A spokesman for the C.I.A. declined to comment on the Senator's allegation.

A report on the agency's domestic activities released yesterday by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, acknowledged that the agency had kept files on several members of Congress and numerous dossiers on American citizens collected both by domestic spying operations and through agency employment checks.

Senator Baker said that his inquiry into C.I.A. activities, brought to an abrupt close by the demise last year of the Senate Watergate committee, of which he was vice chairman, had uncovered five areas that he believes require further investigation by a bipartisan select Congressional committee or some form of permanent intelligence oversight committee.

Mr. Baker said that he was "unabashed" in his desire to be part of a Congressional committee to investigate the agency. He added that though "I feel it may sound immodest, I think I'm one of the best qualified men in the Senate to delve into C.I.A. because I was one of the first to hear the 'animal crashing about in the forest.'"

Senator Long's Activities

The Senator was referring to his suspicion in 1972 that there might be illegal intelligence and espionage activity going on in this country.

Both Mr. Fensterwald and Mr. Woolston-Smith said that they had no knowledge that the C.I.A. had maintained dossiers on them. "I don't doubt it and I don't care," said Mr. Woolston-Smith, a New Zealander who said his coincern had done intelligence work for the United States Navy. Mr. Woolston-Smith, an officer of Science Security Associates, Inc., said he had warned the Democrats in April, 1972, that they might be the subjects of a sophisticated electronic surveillance plot.

Mr. Fensterwald said he had no "independent" knowledge that the C.I.A. had a dossier on him or that it had ever investigated him, but he speculated that he might have come under agency scrutiny when he was working for Senator Long's investigation of wiretapping and bugging in the mid-1960's.

"We were getting into C.I.A. wiretapping, pushing the Freedom of Information Act and investigating a U.S. Government plot to assassinate Fidel Castro and any one of these things could have attracted their attention, Mr. Fensterwald said. Last month, Time magazine reported that the C.I.A. had created a dossier on Senator Long during the same period.

The report on domestic activity released by Mr. Colby, current director of the C.I.A., acknowledged that the agency had voluminous files on American citizens as well as the 10,000 specialized dossiers on antiwar activists first revealed by The New York Times on Dec. 22.

Though a file on Mr. Woolston-Smith may have ended up in C.I.A. data vaults as a foreign national involved in intelligence work, the fact that there was a dossier on Mr. Fensterwald struck Senator Baker as demanding more information. "We had no indication from the C.I.A. that Mr. Fensterwald had been involved in any foreign intelligence," he said.

Mr. Baker, discussing the need for further investiation, said that one of the five proposed subjects was the destruction of tapes and documents.

On Jan. 24, 1973, Richard Helms, then director of the C.I.A., ordered the destruction of tapes of his personal office and telephone conversations dating back over several years. The tapes included conversations with President Nixon and other Administration leaders, according to Mr. Baker's Watergate report.

The destruction was carried out despite a request from the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, that the C.I.A. retain all evidence pertinent to the Watergate investigation. Mr. Helms later testified that the tapes had contained no Watergate material. "We ought to have further testimony on this from Helms's secretary and from the custodian of the tapes," Mr. Baker said.

Mr. Baker said that the volume of material destroyed was so great that "it took them several days to scissor the tapes and burn them.:

"I don't charge Mr. Helms with any wrongdoing," he said. "I'm only sorry the Congress has been deprived of the opportunity to review the material."

He said that his investigation had found indications that the C.I.A. might have tapes of telephone and room conversations throughout its headquarters in Langley, Va. He pointed out, for instance, that a tape of a conversation between Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., then deputy director of the C.I.A., and E. Howard Hunt Jr., who was convicted for his role in the Watergate burglary had not been destroyed. The agency, he said, also "appeared to have a taping capability from the main switchboard."

Mr. Baker said that, in addition to the tapes, the C.I.A. had reported that several documents had been destroyed.

A second area to investigate, Mr. Baker said, is the domestic role of Eugenio R. Martinez, a Watergate burglar. The C.I.A. acknowledged that at the time of the Watergate burglary, Mr. Martinez was receiving a $100-a-month retainer as an operative in Miami. Mr. Baker said that in addition to reporting on "maritime operations" Mr. Martinez was assigned to learn about possible demonstrations by Cuban-Americans at the Miami political conventions.

When the Senate Watergate investigators asked the C.I.A. about this apparently completely domestic assignment, presumably forbidden by the National Security Act of 1947, they were told that the agency was responding to a request from the Secret Service which had the responsibility for candidate safety. Mr. Baker said there was no clear reason why the Secret Service should have asked the C.I.A. for such domestic intelligence.

Support for Hunt

Moreover, Mr. Baker said, when he attempted to interview Mr. Martinez's case officer during the crucial period in 1971 and early 1972, he was first told the officer was "on African safari" and then was later told he was unavailable because he was serving in Indo-China. Mr. Baker said the agency had also withheld numerous documents concerning Mr' Martinez's activities.

The third area proposed for investigation is the support for Mr. Hunt. Mr. Baker's investigation disclosed that, in addition to providing Mr. Hunt with disguises, false documents and hidden cameras, the C.I.A. had referred Mr. Hunt to former agency personnel who might be willing to become involved in espionage operations.

Upon Mr. Hunt's request he was given the name and location of a "lock picker" and men to do electronic surveillance, Mr' Baker reported. The referrals were made by the chief of the agency's external employment assistance branch, which aids former employes.

"I think we must establish whether these referrals were authorized by the director and, if not, who decided this was an appropriate job referral for the agency to make," Mr. Baker said.

One former Senate investigator said that the external assistance operation was "virtually the switch plate of an old-boy network for former C.I.A. agents." The discovery of the Hunt referrals fed the suspicion that many C.I.A. men continue to work for the agency long after appearing to resign or retiring. Mr. Hunt testified that he "retired" once in the mid-1960's as a cover story for a spying assignment in Spain.

The Hiring of Agents

The fourth proposed study would involve covert domestic agents. Mr. Baker said that "far more must be learned? about the C.I.A.'s hiring of secret agents in the United States. It was his investigation that first brought to light the existence of a domestic agent operating in Washington on a $250-a-month retainer. Lee Pennington Jr. was the C.I.A. operative sent to the home of James W. McCord Jr., convicted Watergate burglar, two days after the break in and the man who assisted in the destruction of papers that might have linked Mr. McCord to the C.I.A.

Mr. Pennington died of a heart attack last year, but not before testifying that he had been retained by the agency to gather information in Washington. Mr. Baker said he had found indications that there were "other Lee Pennlngtons."

Finally Mr. Baker would investigate fronts and proprietary companies.

The Baker investigation uncovered indications that the C.I.A. had retained and possibly fully supported private investigation agencies in the United States that could conduct domestic surveillance operations under the guise of private investigations.

Mr. Baker said this evidence coupled with his findings on the operations of the now-defunct Robert Mullen Company required that Congress "learn a great deal more about the C.I.A.'s investment in private industry and its use of private firms for cover operations."

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

GENERAL

LONDON TIMES
16 December 1974

Muted voice

Is the Voice of America going soft on Communism? The thrust of a *Time* magazine article last week was that Henry Kissinger's détente policies have muted America's official overseas broadcasts, particularly those in 16 Soviet and East European languages.

Provocative stories are supposedly being avoided. Readings in Russian of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* were vetoed. VOA correspondents abroad complain they are being suppressed when they try reporting internal dissidence, according to the article.

It has had interesting repercussions at VOA headquarters, Fred Emery reports from Washington. Some staff on news and current affairs see nothing to complain about if the "Voice" is at last losing its ideological stigma.

They claim, perhaps extravagantly, that for plain news they have long been on a par with BBC overseas services. The propaganda tag of cold war vintage has long irked them, as being a deterrent to listeners.

If the United States Information Agency director, James Keogh, has put a stop to the aggressive anti-Soviet commentaries which his predecessor, Frank Shakespeare, urged on them, they are not grumbling. The grumbles which *Time* reported may come from émigrés in the East bloc services, who feel they are losing their anti-communist crusade.

While policy lines come from the State Department, through USIA, working news staff claim they are not excessively inhibiting to ingenuity. When Keogh, for example, gave a directive that unnamed source Watergate stories attacking the Nixon Administration were not to be used, the news reports simply quoted the White House spokesmen denying the offending stories, which were then told at length.

Officially, the VOA will not admit that the voice of ideology has been muted. Officials assert that it has not been there for some time. Yet Ruth Walter, VOA spokeswoman, said: "When our Government's foreign policy changes, we have to change, too."

Time had one damaging quote. It said that Pavel Litvinov, an exile speaking to Soviet Service VOA staff, declared: "The quality of your broadcasts to my country has declined 500 per cent in the last few years." And the staff applauded.

Miss Walter says he never said it. The tape of the talk has neither that quote nor the applause, she insists, although Litvinov did accuse VOA of having less to say about internal events in Eastern Europe. She points out that the CIA's Radio Liberty in Germany, now openly financed by Congress, is specifically there for a propaganda purpose. VOA people seem happy to be called soft if it makes them a harder news organization.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 January 1975

Soviet Trade Fiasco

From the Soviet Union's repudiation of the trade-emigration compromise negotiated by Secretary Kissinger with Moscow and Senate leaders, the country should learn some important lessons.

The first is that a superpower cannot be pushed around by a Senator, even a superpower's senator. Senator Jackson's amendment to the trade bill undoubtedly helped Mr. Kissinger obtain, by quiet diplomacy, a huge increase in Jewish emigration to about 35,000 in 1973. But by dragging out the issue for two years and insisting on public "assurances" from Moscow—against the State Department's strong advice—Mr. Jackson overplayed his hand and, as President Ford has noted helped to achieve results quite the opposite from those he intended.

The second lesson is that the Congressional role in overseeing the Administration's foreign policy is that of advice and consent, not taking negotiations into Senatorial hands or tieing the hands of the officially designated negotiators. The Stevenson amendment limiting Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviet Union to the insignificant sum of $300 million over four years undoubtedly grew out of the atmosphere of "victory over Moscow" that Senator Jackson created, but it carried the error a disastrous last step.

Instead of permitting the President to relax the restrictions when convinced that Soviet-American relations and the future of détente would benefit, the final version of the amendment adopted by the Senate required further Congressional approval for each credit increase over the ceiling. This clearly was the straw that broke the Soviet camel's back.

The third lesson is that détente is still too fragile a thing to carry the kind of load some Americans seek to put on it. It has been evident since 1971 that the basic transaction in the new Soviet-American relationship has been a Soviet offer of détente to obtain Western technology and credits and an American offer of trade and credits to obtain détente. All elements of détente, including strategic arms control, the Middle East, Vietnam, and progress in human rights, such as Jewish emigration, are unavoidably linked to trade and credits. One is not politically possible without the other.

But the linkage must be flexible, rather than rigid, and the quid pro quo in trade and credits must be there in sizable amount. The Senate repudiated the Kissinger compromise when it passed the Stevenson amendment. The tragedy is that Moscow could not wait for the Ford Administration, in the current session of Congress, to try to reverse it.

The fourth lesson is that the Stevenson amendment must be quickly reversed because it not only shackles the Administration's efforts on the emigration issue but on all negotiations to assure a peaceful world.

* * *

Trade can continue to expand despite the failure of the trade pact. The Soviet Union's hard currency earnings abroad have been increased by the rise in oil, gas and mineral prices and Moscow is in less need of credits for short- and even medium-term purposes. But some long-term projects, each of which would have to be weighed on its merits, will be unable to go forward until long-term credit facilities are created.

Emigration undoubtedly will continue to be linked to trade and détente, as from the beginning. The Soviet Union demonstrated a refusal to be pressured by reducing emigration to 20,000 last year and it continues to drop. A turn-around will depend on the whole state of Soviet-American relations.

A dangerous period has opened. Far more than trade and emigration is involved. In the Mideast peace negotiations, the Soviet view has never been identical with that of the United States, except on the determination to avoid a nuclear confrontation. If the prospects for détente continue to dwindle, the chances for a moderate Soviet policy in the Mideast may dwindle with it.

There is less danger of a breakdown in arms control negotiations. Here both countries have identical interests. But in other fields, such as mutual force reductions in Europe and efforts to resume peace negotiations in Vietnam, as well as the Middle East, hope for a more peaceful world will ride on the Administration's new efforts to revise Congressional trade and credit restrictions.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975

PARIS SPECULATES ON U. S. MARINES

Desert-Warfare Exercises and Kissinger's Remarks Stir Questions on Oil

By FLORA LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 11—"Has Kissinger the gunboat diplomat succeeded Kissinger the Nobel Peace Prize winner?" the announcer on a French television newscast asked this week.

He was commenting Tuesday night on a news film clip showing a landing exercise on a Mediterranean beach involving 1,000 marines attached to the United States Sixth Fleet. The implication appeared to be that the marines were practicing to land in Arab oil-producing countries.

However, the program's director, Michel Texier, said subsequently that it was simply intended to show "part of the contingency plans openly recognized by the Department of State so as to be prepared for all eventualities."

The newscast, which has provoked some renewed concern here about United States intentions in the Middle East, followed by several days the publication of Secretary of State Kissinger's remarks suggesting that force might be used to solve the oil problem in a case "where there is some actual strangulation of the industrial world."

Ready for the Desert

Until Mr. Kissinger's remarks about the possibility of intervention, the widespread speculation in Europe about possible American military action against Arab oil fields was based mainly on television films of American troops practicing for desert warfare in the western part of the United States.

The French film, made about two weeks ago, showed American marines from the Sixth Fleet landing on the Italian island of Sardinia. However, the speaker said that they planned further training exercises in France.

Military sources here said the exercises would be held at Canjuers, a French tank and artillery base near Toulon. While the exact dates were not officially made public, the ships bringing the contingent, about 200 marines were due at Saint-Raphaël yesterday and were to leave on Jan. 20, the officials said.

It was learned on inquiry from French and United States military sources that small units of marines have been training on French soil for some years, despite France's withdrawal from the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and her expulsion of all United States military units.

Criticism by Communist

Officials on both sides said that this represented no change in French policy toward NATO or military cooperation with the United States. Nonetheless, the exercises were not generally known and the disclosure brought a sharp attack on the Government from the Communist leader, Georges Marchais.

Mr. Marchais said that President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's failure to denounce Secretary of State Kissinger's public statement that United States military intervention in the Middle East was "not ruled out" meant that Paris had given tacit approval to American policy.

The Communist leader said more than tacit approval was involved in the French Government's willingness to permit United States exercises at Canjuers, "in geographical conditions like those to be found in the Middle East."

"It is veritable collusion, deliberate," he added.

Officials said there was a 10-day marine exercise at Canjuers, a relatively new base, in January, 1974. The marines operate there, by themselves, although facilities at the base and its firing ranges are manned by the French.

Other exercises have taken place at the Foreign Legion base at Lovo-Santo in Corsica, where United States marines and French legionnaires join in assault landing practice. The last such exercise was in October, 1974, and lasted four days.

"The marines show the legionnaires new tactics and techniques for amphibious operations, and the French show us the latest in commando tactics," according to Comdr. Gene Wentz, spokesman for the United States Naval Command in Europe at its London headquarters.

The French television clip on the Sardinia exercise was an extract from a 20-minute segment about the Sixth Fleet shown Thursday night as part of an hour-long current events review. It included an interview with the fleet's commander, Vice Adm. Frederick Turner, who described his mission as maintaining and safeguarding United States interests in the Mediterranean.

At one point, the French interviewer sought to learn from a marine officer whether he thought his men were "ready to die for oil wells" and elicited the reply "Yes," suggesting that the motivation for a military operation existed.

But when pressed, the officer, identified only as Captain Germain, said that in the present situation he did not "think an intervention would be necessary."

NEW YORK TIMES
23 December 1974

SUMMIT PARLEYS HAMPER ENVOYS

Are Said to Curb the Flow of Information to Diplomats

By FLORA LEWIS.
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Dec. 22—The growing trend for direct personal contacts among Western leaders has compounded the problem of communications, making it harder for many officials and diplomats as well as newsmen to obtain needed information.

A number of French and West German diplomats are complaining—as American diplomats have complained throughout the Kissinger years—that they are being kept in the dark by their own Governments.

The recent NATO meeting in Brussels and the European summit conference in Paris were cited by some officials as examples of the problem.

Secretary of State Kissinger said at a news conference at the end of the meeting of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on Dec. 12 and 13 that it was "the best NATO session I have attended."

"The new format of restricted sessions makes for a better dialogue and less formal statements," he said. "I recognize it also makes for more erratic briefings, since not all delegations interpret the restrictions in a similar manner, and we will have that straightened out by the next meeting."

An Angry Dispute

That was a diplomatic account of an angry dispute over information policy during the session.

Mr. Kissinger had proposed "restricted sessions" with all but one of the ministers' aides excluded and the usual press briefing sessions afterward limited to statements of "discretion." The ministers agreed to have only two aides present, though still excluding their press spokesmen.

Apparently, Mr. Kissinger understood "discretion" to mean a refusal to tell the press what was said. The delegation of the Netherlands, which has a policy of generally open information, interpreted it to mean giving a fair summary of the speeches since there had been nothing particularly sensitive or embarrassing that seemed to warrant concealment.

According to NATO sources, Mr. Kissinger was furious. The United States spokesman, Robert Anderson, held a briefing in which he said that reports of Mr. Kissinger's speech based on the Dutch briefing were "inaccurate." But he refused to say anything more or to give an American version of what had been said.

Information Tightened

The Secretary's anger led most delegations to tighten up on the information they disclosed for fear that full reports might endanger future allied exchanges, press officers said.

Thus, briefings were held by spokesmen who had to get their information second-hand because they had not been allowed into the restricted session, and many of the briefings were restricted to newsmen of the nation providing the report. Later, the reporters exchanged what they had learned, having to accept their information at one more remove from the source.

The difficulties at the European summit meeting in Paris two weeks ago had a similar effect of making information hard to obtain. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing had insisted that only Government heads and foreign ministers be admitted to the session so as to encourage easy exchanges.

The governmental press spokesmen were willing to provide information, but the tight schedule of the conference enabled them to see their top delegates only for two or three minutes after each session. They had to obtain what news they could get on the run and were unable to answer many questions from reporters.

WASHINGTON POST
12 January 1975

Russell Tribunal

BRUSSELS—The second session of the Bertrand Russell tribunal's "trial" of four Latin American countries for violations of human rights opened here.

Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia were found guilty of "crimes against humanity" at the first session of the "trial" last March in Rome. The second session is to analyze the countries' social and economic systems.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Western Europe

Tuesday, Jan. 7, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Bonn Nervous About U.S. Demands if Mideast Erupts

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Jan. 6—The threat of a new Arab-Israeli war—and its potential consequences for West Germany—is becoming one of the biggest foreign policy headaches confronting Chancellor Helmut Schmdt's government.

The possibility that fighting might break out again in the Middle East, bringing in its wake a new oil embargo, is a topic of considerable concern in all West European capitals. Even more than the others, Bonn has special reasons for anxiety about the situation.

Tremendous quantities of American arms and military equipment are stockpiled in West Germany. In the event of a new Middle East war, any U.S. attempt to resupply Israel would almost certainly involve drawing upon these stocks and transporting them from air bases and ports within Germany.

But such a move would run directly counter to West Germany's policy of "strict neutrality" in the Middle East. That was made quite clear during the 1973 October war, when U.S. shipments from Germany to Israel embroiled Washington and Bonn in one of the most acrimonious disputes of their long postwar alliance.

The Middle East cease-fire enabled the two governments to paper over their differences before they escalated to the crisis stage. But German officials are keenly aware that a new war would put their neutrality policy under agonizing strains.

Bonn probably would not be able to avoid getting caught in the cross-fire. Its dilemma would be a choice between equally unappealing options:

• Going along, at least passively, with the United States, the ultimate guarantor of West Germany's security, and with Israel, whose very existence is the direct result of Nazi Germany's attempt to exterminate the Jews, or,

• Defying the Americans and Israelis to appease the Arabs, who provide roughly 70 per cent of West Germany's oil.

The Germans are understandably reluctant to talk about which path they would choose in the event of war. Despite a growing surge of speculation in the German press, the Schmidt government has alternately refused to say anything, issuing terse restatements of its neutrality, or talked cryptically around the subject.

In an interview published in this week's edition of the newsmagazine, Der Spiegel, Schmidt said, "I know of no pressure" from the United States to make air bases and port facilities available for supplying Israel.

He added that Bonn would not react to such pressure. Beyond that, he said only, "Since I don't regard myself as chancellor of a world power, I will not philosophize publicly about [that] question. That would be fatally dangerous."

This last sentence was perhaps the most revealing, because it appeared to underscore the deep divisions that the matter is known to have caused within Schmidt's Cabinet. It is no secret here that the Cabinet is seriously split between those who feel that West Germany must stand beside the United States in a crunch and those who are fearful of antagonizing the Arab oil suppliers.

The split involves both Schmidt's Social Democratic Party, which has factions that are strongly pro- and anti-Israel, and the junior partner in his government coalition, the liberal Free Democratic Party. The most talked-about difference of opinion concerns the Free Democrats.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Free Democratic leader, is reportedly the Cabinet's strongest believer that Bonn's first consideration should be its security relationship with the United States and its moral obligation to Israel. There is a real question, however, about how much backing Genscher has for this position in his own party.

The Cabinet's foremost exponent of not offending the Arabs is Economics Minister Hans Friderichs, also a Free Democrat and a man who is believed to harbor ambitions about supplanting Genscher as party leader.

Starting under former Chancellor Willy Brandt and continuing with Schmidt, Bonn has moved in successive stages from a much talked-about "special relationship" with Israel, through "strict neutrality," to a current refinement of that position that many regard as weighted in favor of the Arabs.

As outlined in the recent U.N. debate, Bonn's policy advocates a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territoris occupied in 1967 and recognition of the Palestinian right to create its own state under PLO leadership on part of this territory. On the other side, Bonn says, this should be coupled with recognition by the Arab states and the PLO of Israel's right to exist.

German diplomatic sources defend this stance as the only "realistic basis" for a peaceful Middle East solution. They deny that it is weighted against Israel, pointing out that the Schmidt government has publicly agreed that there can be no constructive dialogue with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's right to a secure existence.

The Germans not only are fearful that Washington might be unable to head off a new Arab-Israeli conflict but also are clearly disturbed by recurring hints from U.S. sources that some action with the oil-producing states might eventually become necessary. For example, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's recent remarks on this point prompted expressions of disagreement in Bonn over the past weekend.

Commenting directly on Kissinger's statement in an interview with Business Week, a Schmidt spokesman, Armin Gruenewald, said that West Germany had no intention of participating in any plans to use force against oil-producing countries. Bonn's policy, Gruenewald said, "is cooperation with these countries, not confrontation." He reemphasized West Germany's commitment to the Europe-Arab dialogue being prepared by the European Economic Community.

Despite denials on both sides, there have been hints that Washington has put West Germany on notice that a refusal to help out in an emergency could create a serious breach in West German-American relations and engulf the NATO alliance in crisis.

Should the need for a new operation actually arise, the United States undoubtedly would attempt to be more discreet about it than in 1973 when Israeli ships openly docked in Bremerhaven to load American equipment. There is strong suspicion that there may be a Bonn-Washington understanding to allow the West Germans to protest publicly about violations of their neutrality, while pleading that they are powerless to do anything about it.

That might satisfy diplomatic forms, but it probably would not convince anyone—least of all the Arabs. The Germans are known to regard it as a thin reed on which to rely in case the Arab countries should impose a new oil embargo.

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Near East

Christian Science Monitor
9 January 1975

Politicking stirs up firestorm in India

Pro-Soviet party vies for more power

By Joe Gandelman
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

Growing ties between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's ruling Congress Party and the Communist Party of India (CPI) — the largest and most Russian-oriented of India's three major Communist parties — has set off a mini-firestorm here.

The controversy broke out when a CPI document indicating its long-term strategy came to light.

This document, which the CPI later regretted and hastily tried to explain, called for coalitions with the Congress Party in various states — similar to one in Kerala, on India's southernmost tips where the CPI is junior partner in an administration headed by a Communist chief minister.

Coalition advocated

But, most importantly, the CPI for the first time advocated a Kerala-like coalition at the national level with Congress Party "progressives" (pro-CPI members), a stance seen by many as an attempt to foster yet another Congress Party split.

The strategy is called "Unity and Struggle." While the CPI joins forces with the ruling party (unity), it will also continue to build up support for itself from tribal groups and other dissident elements (struggle) and will try to isolate the Congress Party from the political opposition, which represents some 50 percent of the Indian electorate's votes.

Frictions encouraged

Conflicts between Mrs. Gandhi's party's two wings will be helped along, and if a split takes place, the CPI will "assist" Congress progressives in a coalition at the center.

Much of the protest over the CPI-Congress relationship has come from within the Congress Party itself. More conservative members now warn that the CPI views Mrs. Gandhi as "an Indian Kerensky" (the moderate Russian socialist who preceded the Bolsheviks in Moscow in 1917).

They also accuse the Congress-CPI alliance of being carefully calculated to win Russian aid and goodwill, and point to the CPI's history of following the fashionable Moscow line.

Plan endorsed

These suspicions were not diminished by the Soviet news media's recent enthusiastic endorsement of the CPI's desire to unite with "left and democratic forces."

Mrs. Gandhi has depended on the CPI since 1969 when bitter disagreement split the Congress Party into two factions — the Old Congress and the Indira Congress. The CPI in effect filled the gap left by the exit of the old-line conservatives.

Though the pro-Moscow Communists have proved loyal and influential partners since then, only in recent months have they emerged as the Congress Party's single, consistent, steady ally.

For example, when a parliamentary uproar recently raged over a government import license scandal alleged to involve ministerial misconduct, the CPI alone continually backed Mrs. Gandhi's party.

Mrs Gandhi, meanwhile, defends "selective cooperation" with the CPI, and is wondering aloud why the opposition parties are making so much noise when they themselves are allied with the "Maoist" Communist Party Marxist (CPM) in J.P.'s movement.

Astute analysts note that Indira Gandhi is not exactly a political pushover and does benefit from Congress-CPI cooperation.

Still, many normally sober, nonalarmist observers warn that although the Congress Party is now the dominant part of the alliance, the "tail" could begin "wagging the dog" if a choice comes between relinquishing power or giving in to CPI demands to survive.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 JANUARY 1975

Kissinger Views Make Serious Speculation of Idle Talk

By CLIFTON DANIEL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6—Military action to solve the oil problem, once a matter for cocktail-party conversation in Washington, has become the subject of serious speculation here and abroad as a result of remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger.

Today Kenneth Rush, American Ambassador in Paris, called on the French Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues, to "clarify" Mr. Kissinger's statement refusing to rule out the possibility of intervention in the Middle East.

Mr. Rush was one of several envoys to major European countries who were instructed to offer explanations of the remarks, particularly those interpreted as critical of European governments.

Those comments appeared in an interview with Mr. Kissinger published last week by Business Week. Responding to questions about the oil problem, the Secretary said, "I'm not saying there's no circumstances where we would not use force.

"But it is one thing," he added, "to use it in the case of a dispute over price; it's another where there's some actual strangulation of the industrial world."

Later in the interview Mr. Kissinger, asked why Europeans were so hostile to the United States, especially in regard to its dealings with the Middle East, replied that "I think they suffer from an enormous feeling of insecurity that leads to a certain peevishness."

Mr. Rush told Mr. Sauvagnargues that the Secretary had been referring to the past, and not to governments but to individuals, according to a Paris dispatch to The New York Times. The same explanation had already been given here.

The French Minister's reaction was not indicated, but the dispatch said he raised no objection to Mr. Rush's explanation.

On Saturday the White House confirmed that Secretary Kissinger, in his remarks, was voicing President Ford's views as well as his own. It seemed clear that Mr. Kissinger had spoken deliberately; although he was responding to questions, he had a chance to review his responses before they were published.

One of Mr. Kissinger's aides, who said he was surprised by the reaction to Mr. Kissinger's remarks, said the Secretary considered his comments to be as mild and non-provocative as they could be and still be honest. He could not honestly have said, the aide observed, that the United States would in no circumstances countenance military action.

When asked why the entire series of questions and answers had not simply been cut out, th aide said that never occurred to anybody.

Avoidance and Warning

Until Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Ford addressed themselves to the question of military intervention official Washington tended to shy away from it and to warn against its consequences. It was said that America's allies would not cooperate, the Moslem world would rise as one man and the Russians would rush to the rescue of the Arabs, and that the American public would not tolerate a new war.

Those who talked about intervention did so privately or anonymously. Former Senator J. W. Fulbright, who retired last week as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

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mittee, said he had heard intervention discussed at dinner tables and in Capitol cloakrooms.

A major oil executive labeled the discussion 'loose talk.' Frank Ikard, president of the American Petroleum Institute, speaking before Mr. Kissinger's interview appeared, said: "You hear it more in the form of a question than anything else. I haven't heard it from anybody at the policy level, anybody who can make a decision on it."

Like many others Mr. Ikard termed intervention 'unthinkable.'

Representative John Brademas of Indiana, deputy chief whip of the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, described Secretary Kissinger's remarks as unwarranted and unwise. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Senate Republican leader, said, on the other hand, that the Secretary was entirely right.

If the United States was in dire economic straits, Mr. Scott said on ABC television's "Issues and Answers," "I can't imagine this country not doing whatever it needed to do, either economic or military, to permit itself to survive, and we wouldn't be worth a damn as a nation if we didn't."

Actually, the question of using force has been in the back of the minds of policy makers since the beginning of the Arab oil embargo against the West in 1973. President Ford mentioned it obliquely in his speech to the World Energy Conference in Detroit on Sept. 23.

"Throughout history," he said, "nations have gone to war over natural advantages such as water or food, or convenient passage on land or sea."

"But," he added in the very next sentence, "in the nuclear age, when any local conflict may escalate to a global catastrophe, war brings unacceptable risks for all mankind."

Weighed and Rejected

The President's energy advisers reportedly considered a military option in their discussions at Camp David, Md., last Dec. 14 and 15, but the White House said, their recommendations did not include it.

So far the most extensive and closely reasoned public examination of the military option has come from John Hopkins University professor of international relations, Robert W. Tucker, whose analysis was printed in the January issue of Commentary, published by the American Jewish Committee.

Remarking on the "astonishing" absence of any meaningful threat of force in the crisis, Professor Tucker examined the technical feasibility of military intervention. He concluded that it would depend on whether there was a relatively restricted area containing enough oil to provide reasonable assurance that, if war effectively controlled, it could break the cartel of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

"The one area that would appear to satisfy these requirements," Professor Tucker wrote, "extends from Kuwait down along the coastal region of Saudi Arabia to Qatar." It supplies 40 per cent of present OPEC production and contains 40 per cent of world reserves.

"Since it has no substantial centers of population and is without trees," the article added, "its effective control does not bear even remote comparison with the experience of Vietnam."

The Public and the Allies

The American public, Professor Tucker said, would assuredly oppose another Vietnam, but might support intervention if it promised success at a modest cost. The United States would have to act unilaterally, he suggested, but its allies could later be won over by "even-handed" distribution of the oil. As for the Russians, he said they "still lack the naval forces needed for effective interposition in the Persian Gulf."

Against Professor Tucker's sanguine view must be put other opinions. Secretary Kissinger himself told Business Week that military action on oil prices would be "a very dangerous course."

"We should have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war than to get out of it," he said, adding that it would be reckless to take military action without considering what the Soviet Union might do.

Conspicuously silent amid this speculation has been the Defense Department. While it may have contingency plans, the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, has pointedly avoided menttioning any possibility of military intervention.

Given the risks, why is the military option tempting? Mainly because political and economic measures offer no immediate promise of stopping the financial hemorrhage caused by the quadrupling of oil prices and the threat of another embargo in case Israel and the Arab states go to war again.

'The Low-Cost Option'

One of the experts at the Camp David conference is said to have passed around a note saying—facetiously or not, "Let's try the low-cost option—war." This alludes to Government analysts' calculation that at the present rate the oil-exporting countries will have accumulated monetary surpluses by 1985 totaling $1.2-trillion—about six times the present monetary reserves of the entire world.

Even among those who fear war there are some who have said privately that it does no harm to let the Arabs know that they are running risks too, for it may make them more amenable to persuasion.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975

ARABS QUESTION KISSINGER'S ROLE

By JUAN de ONIS
Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Jan. 11—Arabs are beginning to question Secretary of State Kissinger's role as a peacemaker in the Middle East, following his statement on the use of military force against oil-producing countries. They are wondering what heh really had in mind in his comments in a recent interview with Business Week.

Mr. Kissinger appeared to rule out military action just to bring down oil prices as "a very dangerous course," but he suggested that it was another matter if "there is some actual strangulation of the industralized world" through a new embargo or an outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states.

Al Ahram, a Cairo newspaper that often reflects official thinking, said editorially that his comments did not indicate that the United States was thinking clearly about the relationship between oil and a political settlement in the Middle East.

"The policy of recourse to force against the oil-producing countries ignores the fundamental fact that the use of oil as a weapon is a direct result of United States support of Israel," the newspaper said. "If the U.S. is concerned about the continued flow of Arab oil supplies, it need only deal with the cause of the problem without having to move its forces and occupy the oil fields in the Middle East."

A Kuwaiti Reaction

Abdel-Rahman al-Atiqi, Kuwait's Minister of Finance and Oil, said military action was "incomprehensible" from the standpoint of oil problems.

"What can be gained by force can also be had in a cheaper way, and at lower prices, in a peaceful way," he was quoted as having said recently.

The reaction has a bearing on the attitude of the Arab oil producers, which are actively preparing for discussions in Algeria this month on a producer-consumer conference.

The United States has sought prior coordination among the consuming countries before they meet with the producers.

In an evident reference to the West European countries and Japan, which depend heavily on imported oil, Mr. Kissinger said in his interview that the consumers had to achieve "financial solidarity so that individual countries are not so obsessed by their sense of importance that they are prepared to negotiate on the producers' terms."

To the arab oil experts who have studied the statement, this smells of a "confrontation policy," as one Kuwaiti adviser said.

hTe oil producers have also noted the United States refusal to support the proposal of the European Economic Community for an expanded borrowing and leanding facility under the International Monetary fund to channel surplus oil funds to industrial countries with payment difficulties.

This is regarded as another exampie of American bargaining tactics that set little store by cooperation on reaching agreement with oil producers on a system of long-term lending of surplus funds that would protect the value of petro dollars.

Without such an agreement, big producers, such as Saudi Arabia, that earn far more than they can currently spend domestically, have little incentive to maintain even present levels of output.

But if there is a production reduction, for lack of economic incentive, prices would tend to rise. The question being raised here is whether this would move the oil problem toward the status of "gravest emergency" that Mr. Kissinger has said would make military action a possibility.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 JANUARY 1975

Endearing Indira

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for years has been famous for biting the hands that feed India. But in her latest lecture to the world's advanced nations, she outdoes herself.

Mrs. Gandhi last week called it "a new form of arrogance" for countries that have provided India with millions of tons of grain in the past to be concerned in the present world food shortage with the soaring demands of governments that have not been able to reach necessary levels of food production or adequately to curb population growth, or both.

The irony is that much of India's present problem stems from the high prices of the oil cartel, which Mrs. Gandhi hypocritically refrains from attacking, knowing that her friends there would be likely to cut off such aid as they are granting. The West, in contrast, has suffered Mrs. Gandhi's own form of arrogance for years, but undoubtedly will continue to grant aid out of human sympathy for the Indian people and Asia's most important democratic experiment.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Africa

LONDON OBSERVER
5 January 1975

Why the US tilted towards Vorster

by ANDREW WILSON

THE OBSERVER has obtained the full text of the controversial secret document on United States foreign policy objectives in southern Africa, known as National Security Study Memorandum 39.

Parts of it have been quoted in the US Press, but the whole goes much further in explaining the Nixon Administration's 'tilt' towards the Vorster and Smith regimes, America's concern for continued British use of the Simonstown base, and its interest in Mr Callaghan's current efforts to secure a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia.

Evidence that the 'tilt' continues under President Ford came just before Christmas with the sacking by Dr Kissinger, the Secretary of State, of Mr Donald Easum, his chief adviser on African affairs and an advocate of a more active anti-apartheid policy. It was followed last week by a report that the US will provide South Africa with enriched uranium for its first big nuclear power plant.

'NSSM 39' was prepared by a group of experts from the State and Defence Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency. It was delivered to Mr Nixon in 1969 under the direction of Dr Kissinger, at that time the President's foreign policy adviser.

The memorandum begins by listing America's 'important, but not vital' interests in the region—about £400 million worth of investments, a highly profitable trade balance, and substantial political and military interests. In addition, it says, the US has an indirect interest in the key role which South Africa plays in the UK balance of payments. 'UK investment in South Africa is currently estimated at $3,000 million (£1,250 million), and the British have made it clear they will take no action which would jeopardise their economic interests.'

The memorandum says the US has an important interest in the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production which is important to the successful operation of the two-tier gold price system.

On defence it is even more emphatic; 'Southern Africa is geographically important for the US and its allies, particularly with the closing of the Suez Canal and the increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean.'

After mentioning overflight and landing facilities in South Africa it describes the country's naval facilities as having a level of technical competence which cannot be duplicated elsewhere in Africa. It also refers to a US missile tracking station (since closed) and to US finance of a British installation in Swaziland 'which helps us monitor nuclear atmospheric explosions.'

Another installation 'of major importance' is a NASA station for tracking unmanned spacecraft.

'We (also) have an atomic energy agreement with South Africa under the Atoms for Peace programme; this is important in influencing South Africa to continue its policy of doing nothing in the marketing of its large production of uranium oxide which would have the effect of increasing the number of nuclear weapons powers.'

NSSM 39 says there is a basic consensus in the US Government that US interests in Southern Africa are not *vital* security matters, and that most black nations would tend to judge *conspicuous* US co-operation with the white regimes as condoning their racial policies. But it also admits to a 'basic intellectual disagreement' within the Administration on such vital questions as the inevitability of violence.

On Rhodesia, the memorandum says that the sanctions devised by the British were 'a compromise between force, which they were unwilling to contemplate largely because of domestic reasons, and doing nothing, which would have jeopardised their relations with the black African States'—and that the US co-operated for the same reasons. It deplores an 'overestimate' of the effectiveness of the programme.

NSSM 39 lists the broad objectives of US policy towards Southern Africa as follows:

- To improve the US standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue.
- To minimise the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and the risk of US involvement.
- To minimise the opportunities for the USSR and China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black Governments and liberation movements.
- To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes.
- To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production.

But it admits that these objectives are to a degree contradictory, and that on the central question—America's posture towards the white regimes — the range of options is limited. On one hand, it says, the US cannot endorse the racial policies of the white regimes; on the other, 'our interests do not justify the consideration of US military intervention in the area,' including involvement in the enforcement of sanctions.

The document outlines a number of policy options.

Option One—'Closer association with the white regimes' is based on the premise that, whatever America does, it can have no significant effect on the region, and that it should simply try to protect its economic and strategic interests in the white States.

Option Two—described as 'broader association with both black and white States in an effort to encourage moderation and reduce tension'—is based on the premise that the blacks cannot gain political rights through violence.

Option Three — limited association with the white States and continuing association with the blacks—is based on the premise that a posture on the racial question acceptable to the blacks need not entail giving up all material interests in the white States.

Option Four — dissociation from the white regimes and closer relations with the blacks—is based on the premise that America cannot influence the whites for constructive change; that increasing violence is therefore likely; and that 'by cutting our ties with the white regimes we can protect our stand on the racial issue in black Africa and internationally.'

Option Five — dissociation from *both* sides—is based on the premise that confrontation will grow worse despite any outside efforts—and that the US should simply lower its profile in the area.

The crucial option turns out to have been the second one, for it was this that was recommended by Dr Kissinger and which, State Department sources now admit, was adopted by President Nixon.

In the relevant passage the memorandum states: 'The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists

'We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies, and through more substantial economic assistance to the black States help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change.'

NSSM 39 goes on: 'We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white States. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies. Without openly taking a position undermining the UK and the United Nations on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime.'

According to the memorandum, the US would have to expect rebuffs from both whites and blacks in attempting to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To encourage this change in white attitudes, the US would have to show willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, 'provided that they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population.'

In a move to forestall criticism arising from the possible leaking of NSSM 39, the State Department stated in a fact sheet last year that the US had adopted a policy of 'communication' in its dealings with South Africa. This, it said, meant the maintenance of formal, if not cordial, relations, with South Africa, while making clear America's abhorrence of South Africa's racial policies. It said America would continue to support fully the UN embargo on arms to South Africa, and would not encourage investment there.

But this has not allayed fears in the UN and in sections of the British Labour movement that the US, having modified its former strict policy on South Africa, is now pressing, in NATO, for an extension of the North Atlantic alliance's responsibilities to the Southern Hemisphere. This fear is given impetus by a passage in the memorandum which describes South African port facilities as being of 'long-term strategic importance to the US and its allies in view of increasing Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean.'

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 December 1974

Portugal's oil-rich separatist hotbed

Soviets accuse U.S. in Angola unrest

By Dev Murarka
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Soviet experts on Portuguese Africa are charging repeatedly that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Gulf Oil Corporation of America are active in backing separatist movements in Angola, particularly its oil-bearing part, Cabinda.

The Portuguese colony of Angola is rich in minerals and oil. But it also has a comparatively large population of white settlers, 600,000 out of a total of nearly 6 million. This makes the decolonization a complex one.

Fighting erupts

Last month Cabinda was shaken by fighting between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the leading political party there, and the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (FLEC). FLEC claimed it wanted to secede from Angola and form a separate state.

Cabinda is so rich in oil that this year the revenue from sales is estimated to be $400 million or more. The argument used by FLEC, with tribal overtones, is that if the oil wealth was used only by the local tribe and not shared with the rest of Angola, Cabinda would become another Kuwait.

One of the Soviet experts on Portuguese Africa who has often traveled behind the guerrilla lines there, S. Kulik, charges in No. 50 of the Soviet magazine New Times: "The U.S.-operated Gulf Oil Corporation, which exploits Cabinda's oil fields, suspiciously hastened to back this idea [of secession] and gave FLEC financial assistance."

Troops regain control

For the time being, it is reported, the MPLA and Portuguese troops operating jointly, have subdued the FLEC followers and regained control of Cabinda town. The dismissal of many local officials and several senior commanders of the Portuguese garrison in Cabinda followed, for condoning FLEC activities.

The problem in Angola, however, is not confined to the dispute between the MPLA and the FLEC alone. There are numerous splinter groups claiming a share in the succession to Portuguese rule. Some of them are tied to the white settlers. But the most important, the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA), is based mostly in the north, on Angola's borders with Zaire, and is supported by the Zaire government. It is led by Holden Roberto.

Soviet blame U.S.

But the Soviet version puts more of the blame for Angola's problems on the United States.

In an earlier New Times article (No. 46), Oleg Ignatyev claimed that "judging by numerous statements of its former leaders, [FLEC] had been generously subsidized by the United States, which also supplied weapons for Roberto's units.

"In response to this American concern for the national liberation movement, the FNLA played the part of a cordon hindering the MPLA's operations in the northern — the richest and most densely populated — parts of Angola."

Mr. Ignatyev's account goes on: "Of late the Maoists have joined in this dirty game. Holden Roberto was invited to Peking.

Instructors from Peking

"The fascist regime in Portugal had already been overthrown when 112 Chinese instructors arrived in one of Roberto's military camps.

"Whom are they going to instruct, and in what? After all, the democratic authorities of Portugal have proclaimed their firm intention to carry decolonization through to the end, and facts show that their words are not at variance with their deeds.

"It looks very much as if the plans of the CIA and its backers, the monopolies, which have enormous capital investments in Angola, coincide with the plans of Peking aimed at strengthening the FNLA as a counterweight to the MPLA."

From this account it seems obvious that the Soviets are fully backing the MPLA, with which they have had good relations and to which they have supplied arms in the past.



Moscow would be loath to see a pro-Western or pro-Chinese group come to power in Angola, and evidently it will exercise some pressure in Lisbon perhaps through the Portuguese Communist Party, to see to it that the MPLA is given due weight in whatever settlement is evolved.

But more than that, it would appear that a new concern is bothering Moscow — collusion between China and the United States to keep the Soviet influence out of Africa.

It is no secret to anyone familiar with developments in Portuguese Africa that Peking has been trying hard to undercut Soviet influence upon the guerrilla movements there.

And in the opinion of Soviet experts, Washington would prefer a Chinese presence there rather than Soviet influence because in addition to keeping Moscow out, the Chinese may not have any other interest which would clash with Washington's interests.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

WASHINGTON POST
9 January 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The New Vietnam Crisis

The Ford administration decided Tuesday to seek desperately needed arms from a hostile Congress for beleaguered South Vietnam based on this secret warning from Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon: If weapons continue to be rationed at the present parsimonious rate for another three months, the result will be catastrophic.

Thus, policymakers meeting at the State Department decided on an all-out effort for an immediate $300 million in arms. Most critically needed to stem the dangerous though still localized Communist offensive is ammunition, particularly for Saigon's ample supply of big guns. These guns are now starved for shells to fire. Also in critical short supply is aviation fuel, which has partially grounded Saigon's small air force.

These shortages of both ammunition and aviation fuel contributed to Hanoi's conquest of Phuoc Binh City, a provincial capital only 75 miles north of Saigon, in the Communists' most glittering military victory since the 1972 offensive. The latest triumph flowed directly from anti-Saigon animus in Congress; other military disasters could follow.

Seeking military aid for Saigon is a formidable first challenge for President Ford in facing the new Congress, overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic. The difficulty was apparent to the emergency session Tuesday of Mr. Ford's top officials, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, CIA Director William Colby and Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements. Their decision, concurred in by the President: Mr. Ford himself will take the leading role in persuading Congress.

They were left no choice by Martin's stringent warning that shortages of ammunition and fuel were trapping Saigon's forces in a series of predictable and ugly defeats against the enemy's lavishly-equipped tank brigades.

Martin's message was terse: High battlefield casualties to South Vietnamese troops defending strongpoints, including district capitals in the highlands, were causing severe morale problems. A large percentage of those casualties, he reported, are directly due to limitations imposed on the firing of weapons to conserve dwindling stocks of ammunition. The stocks have been dwindling because of the Pentagon's allocation of scarce supplies in compliance with restricted congressional funding.

The first crack at Congress will seek an immediate $300 million appropriation to finance conventional ammunition and fuel from the Pentagon's domestic stocks, both of which are in plentiful supply. The last Congress actually authorized $1 billion for military aid to Saigon but only appropriated $700 million; so, the $300 million sought needs clearance for floor action only by the House and Senate appropriations committees, traditionally more friendly toward South Vietnam than the dovish Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees.

Despite that slender advantage, Mr. Ford's aides have no illusions about the congressional quagmire they are entering with this week's decision to reopen the inflammatory congressional debate over Vietnam. Sen. John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has agreed to help. But other senior Democrats have not yet been contacted for help in an uphill battle in each house. To line up other leaders of both parties, President Ford is planning the usual high-level talks in the White House next week.

At first glance, the prospects for getting the 94th Congress to help South Vietnam help itself seem grim. The freshman liberal Democrats have emerged from an atmosphere of shame and anger over the American role in Vietnam. They have come to Washington to battle recession and inflation, not meddle in the blood feuds of Indochina.

But Ford administration officials by no means feel helpless. The case to be made for this first installment of emergency aid, on its face, is that Saigon has displayed surprising resilience and military skill. Government troops have been holding their own against North Vietnamese regulars supplied by Moscow and Peking with tanks, heavy artillery and other sophisticated arms moved south from Hanoi since the cease-fire—in contravention of the 1973 Paris agreement.

If Saigon is given the means to use its guns and planes, these officials insist, South Vietnam will not be overrun. In three months without help, a final countdown will start with its tragic climax quite predictable. That is the choice President Ford is putting before the 94th Congress.

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LONDON TIMES
2 January 1975

Richard Harris concludes his survey of East Asia

Vietnam: Divisions that go far deeper than politics

The first point to be made about Vietnam is to affirm that it is part of the civilization of East Asia and not part of South-east Asia, an area that lacks any real identity. Ruled by China for a thousand years, tributary to China for another thousand, Vietnam's Confucian society did not disappear under the pressure of French colonial encroachment. The period was too short; the resistance to French rule too strong. In Vietnam the French met with more violent hostility to their colonial rule than did any other colonial power in any other part of Asia.

But having accorded Vietnam a similar resistance to Western civilization and the enclosure within its own world common to other East Asian countries, it becomes necessary to enter qualifications. French rule cannot be disregarded: it left its deposit of outside culture and offered Vietnam an international foothold.

Then there is the difference between north and south, unlike Korea. The northern part of the country is the historical base of the Vietnamese people, the part that China ruled in the first millennium, the part that kept its ties with China most closely in the second. But Vietnamese expansion southwards led to partition in the 16th century. Not until the mid-18th century was the Mekong Delta peopled and brought under control, nor was Vietnam fully unified again until French aid helped the Emperor Gia Long into power in 1802.

Thus the north is the disciplined, hierarchical, authoritarian Confucian state in the full East Asian sense, where government is seen as the apex and fulfilment of society and where Vietnamese patriotism is most developed. French rule scarcely had time to make a dent in these traditions: it served only to create a new nationalism.

By contrast the south with its ethnic and religious divisions is anarchic, much less disciplined; its Confucian society diluted. Given to spurious religions and warlordism (and often the two combined) it was disrupted even more by 90 years of French rule, its upper class seduced into a subservience to the French from which they profited and into a French culture that absorbed many of them to the point of expatriation.

The strong solid north and the weak friable south offered a formidable contrast long before

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

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the Indochinese Communist Party was founded and Ho Chi Minh captured the leadership of Vietnamese nationalism in 1945 with the wartime league known as Vietminh. To the leaders of that political alliance the government they formed in Hanoi in August, 1945, remains the only true representative of Vietnamese nationalism whether it was making the claim against the French or, since, against the Americans. In its view in the forties, the fifties, the sixties, the seventies and in any foreseeable decade the unity of Vietnam depends on the recognition of the rights of the government in Hanoi as the starting point. They are the guardians of tradition, the exponents of a doctrine, the upholders of true independence.

For the only East Asian country once under western colonial rule the independence matters more than elsewhere, or rather it must be more demonstrable. By the same token, the obvious dependence on the Americans of every government in Saigon since Diem in 1954 is an unchallengeable justification for the task of unification to which North Vietnam has set itself.

Against this there is the case to be made for the south. The historical division of the country has left a southern consciousness. The southerners would prefer to be ruled by southerners (though even in the last 20 years of warfare the power in Saigon has been held more often by men of the north or the centre than of the south). Unlike Korea which was inopportunely divided by the postwar occupation, Vietnam's similar division after the Japanese surrender only translated into cold war terms a division that had existed long before. It is not easy to distinguish the anti-northernism of the south from the anti-communism which President Thieu drills into his cadres with the same fervour as the party line is injected among the cadres of the north.

Perhaps the distinction scarcely matters. In a world of new nation states, most of which were modernized and galvanized into nationalism by western rule, a united Vietnam regaining its full independence is as much a goal for the Vietnamese for reasons of East Asian particularism as it is for reasons of anti-colonial nationalism. And if one asks how the unification can come about there is only one possible answer; indeed, there could have been only one possible answer. That the unifying force happens to be communist means—as it did in China—that only the communists offered all those ingredients of nationalism, independence and doctrine that marks the East Asian renewal of the twentieth century. Only the north upholds all the East Asian values.

As with Korea one cannot forecast the immediate future in Vietnam. In both countries American policy is still important. The belief in American power rather than the appeal of any ruler holds the south together in both. On top of that comes the authoritarian discipline that President Park and President Thieu both hold to.

But because they are dependent on western power and because they regard the West as a hinterland against the communist north, both South Korea and South Vietnam will remain politically weak. Each country has a small vocal opposition to its repressive government and being open to inspection by western journalists such an opposition will be able to make itself heard. Moreover both countries have been the scene of bitterly fought wars ostensibly in support of "freedom" or "democracy" or some such western political concept.

Were the wars fought in vain? Of course the pleas of the opposition—however small, urban-based and ineffective—will win support; theirs is the voice of the liberal democrat against the police repression of the authoritarian ruler who goes on in the old East Asian way. From time to time there is an outburst of struggle and the deeds of the repressive government are seen to be animated by none of the ideals that the "free world" deems proper. Western sympathy builds up for the churchmen and journalists, the students and intellectuals in Seoul and in Saigon who suffer for their ideals of freedom. Since these are the slender shoots of a genuine discovery of political freedom through contact with the West, western sympathy for the governments in the two capitals will constantly be eroded and their negative anti-communism will seem more and more empty. They can industrialize and export successfully as in South Korea, but they will remain politically unstable.

There remain obstacles to any speedy unification of Vietnam by the political elision which the communists foresee in the Paris agreements—which President Thieu shows no signs of fulfilling—or by another offensive conducted by the troops the north has in the south. One is Hanoi's appreciation of the American temper and the likelihood of further air intervention. Another is the often acknowledged need in Hanoi for economic recovery as a priority to any action over the south. Nor will the Chinese be very generous in aid for a government whose military tactics in the Tet offensive of 1968 and the 1972 offensive will not have earned them praise in Peking.

But not least it should be said that the southern communist People's Revolutionary Government and its Vietcong force is not likely to recover the popular backing that it enjoyed in the early sixties. Its standards were never as high and have fallen far short of the qualities that enabled China's communist guerrillas to penetrate so deeply into the rural consciousness in China in the 1940s.

Ideally, of course, both Korea and Vietnam should be unified by mutual patience and forbearance, arriving at their own East Asian consensus over doctrine and discipline. But once launched as they have been in the cold war atmosphere neither side finds it easy to step clear of it.

Previous articles in this series were published on December 2, 13, 16, 17, 27.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 January 1975

Under the eye of Korean CIA

Kim Young Sam, leader of South Korea's main opposition political party, says he has gotten used to being under constant surveillance by government agents.

The opposition politician has been held for questioning by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency three times over the past 12 years. It's all part of South Korea's very rough brand of politics.

Mr. Kim was among those who engaged in demonstrations against Park Chung Hee after Mr. Park, then an Army general, took power in a military coup in 1961. As floor leader of the New Democratic Party, Mr. Kim later opposed Mr. Park's attempts to prolong his stay in power.

A handsome man whose modishly long hair is now graying, Mr. Kim took over as the opposition leader about four months ago. Since then, he has stressed one constant theme: There must be a revision of the existing Constitution to allow for the direct election of South Korea's president.

Some of Mr. Kim's own party members are critical of the opposition leader's tactics. They say he lacks subtlety and political realism. The New Democratic Party has long been badly hampered by factional splits and a lack of grass-roots support.

"We do have some differences among party members over procedural matters," said Mr. Kim, acknowledging that factionalism is a problem. "But we are all united on the issue of constitutional revision."

In an interview, Mr. Kim said he thought President Park was exaggerating the possibility of an attack from Communist North Korea in order to justify his continuing hold on power and suppression of the opposition.

"North Korea alone doesn't have the capacity to attack South Korea," he said. "North Korea must have either Russian or Chinese help to attack, and that is not something they are willing to give now because they want detente with the United States."

A few years ago, Mr. Kim discovered how dangerous South Korean politics can be when someone hurled a container of sulphuric acid into his car. Mr. Kim, who escaped harm, was never able to determine with absolute certainty who threw the acid. But he declared that he is "90 percent certain" that it was a government agent.

"The worst thing about being in my position is the constant surveillance by government agents," he said. "But after a while you get used to it — the telephone tapping and the people following your car — and you get so you don't agonize over it."

Daniel Southerland

WASHINGTON POST
7 January 1975

2 Rightists Offer to Join —Sihanouk

Agence France-Presse

STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6 — Prince Norodom Sihanouk has said that several officials of the Cambodian government, including ex-Premier Sirik Matak and Chief of Staff Sosthenes Fernandez, have offered to join his Cambodia United Front.

Matak and Fernandez are members of a four-man advisory group which advises President Lon Nol.

Sihanouk was interviewed for Swedish television in Peking where he heads a government in-exile which is trying to oust Lon Nol.

Matak and Fernandez have sent secret messages to him through friends, Sihanouk said, adding that they had "not yet received the permission of their masters, the Americans . . . who constitute an obstacle to a peaceful solution in Cambodia."

Sihanouk said he planned to expand his government to include "several representatives of the right but excluding [illegible] traitors."

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

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NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975

KISSINGER KEEPS LATIN AID OPTION

Goes Counter to Advisers in Extending Military Equipment Grants

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11—Secretary of State Kissinger has rejected the almost unanimous recommendation of his senior advisers to terminate next year the long-standing program of outright gifts of military equipment to Latin America, a number of Administration officials have disclosed.

According to these officials, the reason for the Kissinger decision was philosophical, not financial. It goes to root issues that divide the Secretary from his own experts on how to deal with Congress and the proper role of military aid in foreign policy.

The recommendation to terminate the military grants to Latin America was made to Mr. Kissinger last November by Carlyle E. Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. It was fully supported, the officials said, by the Latin American bureau of the State Department, all of the United States ambassadors in Latin America, the National Security Council staff, and the Office of Management and Budget.

It was opposed only by the Pentagon, which proposed cutting off the program in Central America by 1979 and in South America by 1981, the officials said.

Mr. Kissinger chose the Pentagon option without any explanation of his decision, it was confirmed.

The secretary's action, an associate explained in an interview, was based on his conviction that he needs to retain every possible carrot and stick in his diplomatic arsenal.

The amount of the grant military aid program to Latin America is trivial this year—about $10-million to be distributed among nine countries.

"But Henry never knows," another official said, "when a million here and there might come in handy." And, he continued, "it is a matter of principle with Henry not to give in to Congressional pressures to tie his hands."

In recent years, Congressional committees have stepped up pressures to end grant military aid worldwide and to Latin America in particular.

PU 2nd add AID

Mr. Maw and his supporters, another official explained, "wanted to get out in front of Congressional criticism for a change, dampen some of the Congressional hostility, and end the program without being forced to do so."

This group also argued, the official said, that the amount of aid is now so small that it does not provide Washington with any leverage anyway. Rather the group mentioned that ending the program would provide an opportunity to underline a new relationship with Latin America.

The group's position was that stopping the military handouts would help to undercut accusations about Latin Governments being simply Washington's clients.

Last month in the "Declaration of Ayacucho," a number of Latin American nations pledged themselves to limit arms expenditures and not to acquire offensive weapons.

The question of decisions about the aid program arose last October during the course of review of the new budget within the Ford Administration. The new budget is to be submitted in February.

The only dissent from the majority view came from the Pentagon, which argued that the aid program was important in maintaining close relations with the Latin American military.

The recommendations were cabled to Mr. Kissinger in November while he was traveling in the Middle East, and he cabled back adopting the Pentagon stance.

This was the third year in a row, the officials revealed, that Mr. Kissinger overruled similar recommendations on the program. Neither this new recommendation nor previous ones would eliminate cash or credit military sales or military training programs.

The nine Latin American nations that receive grant military aid are Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay.

WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1974

Diplomat's Chile Role Cited

U.S. Nominee Stirs Protests in Caracas

By Joseph Novitski
Special to The Washington Post

CARACAS, Dec. 28 — A storm of protest here has greeted the nomination of Harry W. Shlaudeman, a career diplomat, to be U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. He served in the Dominican Republic after American troops landed there in 1965 and later was in Chile just before the overthrow of the Allende government.

Despite the protests, the Venezuelan government has agreed to the nomination. Leaders of President Carlos Andres Perez's party told reporters yeaterday, in an attempt to moderate criticism, that the goodwill between two governments was more important than the personality or reputation of an ambassador.

Since President Salvador Allende's socialist-led government was deposed in Chile's military coup last year, the Latin American left in many countries has firmly identified Shlaudeman with reported American intervention against Allende.

Criticism of the Shlaudeman appointment began on the Venezuelan left three days ago, but has since spread to all of the country's important political parties, including the governing Democratic Action Party, at the rank and file level.

Shlaudeman, now serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in Washington, must still be confirmed by the Senate before replacing Ambassador Robert McClintock here. At one of his last appearances before a congressional committee in June, Shlaudeman denied any U.S. connections with the coup in Chile.

Five months later, President Ford said that the U. S. government had supported Chilean newspapers and political parties that opposed Allende's attempt to bring socialism to Chile.

[Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) complained that on the same date Shlaudeman testified that the United States had no role in the Chilean coup, Harrington was reviewing secret testimony by CIA director William Colby, who said the agency had set aside $11 million for anti-Allende activities in Chile.]

Shlaudeman was deputy chief of mission, the second-ranking office, in the U. S. embassy in Santiago from June 1969, 16 months before Allende's election, until a few months before the coup in September 1973.

Previously, Shlaudeman had served as political officer in the U. S. embassy in Santo Domingo from 1962 to 1963. He returned after Marines were landed in the Dominican Republic by the Johnson administration in 1965, and acted as part of the diplomatic team that negotiated the withdrawal of American troops under Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

Men who watched Shlaudeman at work in the Dominican Republic said he seemed to be a hard-headed professional diplomat. He was respected by Chilean diplomats under President Eduardo Frei, Allende's predecessor.

After Allende's election, some members of his coalition of Marxist parties said they preferred dealing with Shlaudeman rather than Ambassador Edward Korry, although they felt that Shlaudeman was not sympathetic to their political aims. Shlaudeman has since been accused of being an agent of the CIA by left-wing Latin American parties.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

BALTIMORE SUN
7 January 1975
James J. Kilpatrick

Pro-Arab Torrijos Must Not Get Panama Canal

Washington.

An ominous story appeared a couple of weeks ago in the Washington *Post* under a Panama City dateline. It was headed "U.S.-Panama Accord Seen in Early 1975." This was Marlese Simons's lead:

"A U.S. concession to surrender jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone at the end of five years has led to confident predictions by an authoritative source that a new U.S.-Panama canal treaty would be ready for signature next year."

Let us sound the alarm bells and summon such able warriors as Representative Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.) and Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.). For the past 20 years, Mr. Flood has been raising Catonian cries in the House. Mr. Helms has made himself Senate leader of the fight to prevent a giveaway of vital rights and property in the Canal Zone. This "concession to surrender" cannot possibly be approved.

We ought to understand what is at stake in these negotiations, both as to the canal past and as to the canal future.

Under the treaty of 1903 the United States acquired rights "in perpetuity" over a 10-mile-wide zone of Panamanian territory. The rights included all power and authority the United States would possess "if it were sovereign." By direct purchase from private owners, the United States also acquired title, in fee, to certain lands now involved.

In 1914, after a tremendous and costly feat of engineering, we opened the Panama Canal to the shipping of the world. For 60 years the canal was operated without an increase in tolls. About 70 per cent of the tonnage through the canal in recent years has originated in, or been destined for, the United States. Apart from its commercial value, the canal has had immeasurable strategic value also. Mr. Flood has aptly called it 'the jugular vein of this hemisphere."

Panama has benefited also. More than 40 per cent of Panama's foreign exchange earnings, according to a State Department paper last year, and nearly one-third of Panama's gross national product are directly or indirectly attributable to the canal.

What of the future? Panama is under the iron rule of Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, who seized power in October, 1968. He is pro-Arab and pro-Communist. Before any surrender of jurisdiction is approved, we should ask ourselves how in the name of common sense the United States could benefit from Panamanian control. The prospect is for nationalization; the prospect is for General Torrijos to do in Panama what the late Gamal Abdel Nasser did in Suez.

Now, it is understandable that Panama chafes under the continued U.S. presence. Senator Alan Cranston (D., Calif.), who favors a new treaty, has asked how Americans might feel if the British still held perpetual rights along the Erie Canal. Doubtless the present situation is indeed a "source of confict," and after 10 years of intermittent negotiations, Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker doubtless is correct in saying the Panamanians are "impatient."

But there comes a time when great powers must behave as great powers. Not evey source of conflict can be removed. Some conflicts must be endured; they must be lived with. Not every wounded sensitivity can be soothed. When every reasonable and prudent concession to Panama has been made, a line has to be drawn: No more. And sorry about that.

The treaty of 1903 is not engraved in stone. It has been twice amended—in 1936 and 1955. It is entirely possible that further amendments can be agreed to, relinquishing unneeded land for Panamanian development, further increasing payments to Panama, and providing for some Panamanian participation in administration of the canal.

But the rumors now afloat smack of abject surrender. They smack of appeasement. They smack of the same cockeyed judgment that gave us the wheat deal with the Soviet Union. That was called a victory for detente. One more such victory and we are done for.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 December 1974

Cuba: a mixed report

Cuba under Fidel Castro has yet to become the economic success claimed for it by some of the most ardent supporters of the island's Marxist government. But, at the same time, it is far from the failure seen by many Cuban exiles living in the United States and by others who vigorously oppose the Castro government.

This is the report that a Monitor correspondent brings from Havana following a recent visit to assess Cuban developments 16 years after Dr. Castro came to power. While Cuba's economy is still propped up by massive Soviet aid and now given a strong assist by high sugar prices, there is evidence that Cubans have solved some of the problems of inefficiency and mismanagement which nettled them in the early years of the Castro revolution.

Moreover, Dr. Castro and his close advisers appear more relaxed than at any time in recent years. With the economy working more smoothly, they are allowing a limited, although controlled, amount of democracy — provincial council elections aimed at decentralizing the bureaucracy now centered in Havana.

On a hemisphere level, Dr. Castro is winning new respectability. Diplomatic ties with Latin-American nations are growing. There is also evidence that the Cuban leader would not oppose some sort of relationship with Washington — but it would have to be based on an end to the decade-old economic blockade. That should not be too hard a step for Washington to take. After all, the blockade never brought Dr. Castro to his knees. Although it made his economic situation difficult, it also allowed him to whip up a sharp anti-United States campaign on the island. Today, the blockade appears to be an anachronism in U.S. foreign policy that does more harm to the U.S. than to Cuba.

This past week it brought a sharp denunciation from Canada. The issue involves a subsidiary of a U.S. company which has been forced to cancel the sale of desks and chairs to Cuba because Washington warned the parent company that the sale would violate U.S. law and the company could be penalized. It can be hoped that the new year brings not only a reversal of policy in the Canadian case, but also a broad change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 December 1974

U.S. and Canada duel over Cuba trade

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington and Ottawa are on a collision course over trade with Cuba.

The issue at stake — whether Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies may sell their wares to Cuba — goes to the heart of Canadian nationalism. It also raises the broad issue of whether Washington has any right to dictate policies in such cases.

For years, the United States has insisted that the foreign subsidiaries are merely an extension of their United States parent and therefore subject to U.S. law. Hence, because of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba, the subsidiaries cannot sell to Cuba.

Resistance started

Washington's stand has been a sore point not only with Canadians but also with Latin Americans and others.

But few foreign subsidiaries have tried to buck the order — until early this year.

Both Argentine subsidiaries of United States automakers and the Canadian locomotive subsidiary of a U.S. firm entered into big deals with the government of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro. For various reasons, Washington was forced to accept fait accomplis in these cases.

But now a new case is up for scrutiny and ruffling Canadian feathers.

It involves a relatively small sale of $500,000 worth of office furniture to Cuba by a Toronto-based subsidiary of Litton Industries of Beverly Hills, Calif.

Halt ordered

The U.S. parent company ordered the Canadian firm to halt the deal — after learning that the U.S. trading-with-the-enemy act might well be applied against the transaction, a step that would hold Litton executives responsible if the deal were consummated.

Canadian Trade Minister Alistair Gillespie called Washington's role in the affair "intolerable interference" and accused Litton of "corporate colonialism."

The exact nature of Washington's role in the affair is not clear. The State Department says that "no agency of the U.S. Government has blocked the sale," but it is understood that the Treasury Department was contacted on an informal basis by Litton people.

Mr. Gillespie said in a press conference in Ottawa that his government would formally protest the issue in a note to Washington before the year is out — and that he was hoping to clarify just how it happened that the deal was canceled by Cole Division of Litton Business Equipment, Ltd.

What could happen

The directors of Cole are all U.S. citizens and residents and therefore subject to fines and jail terms of up to 10 years if the Canadian firm went ahead with the sale and if Washington were to prosecute.

Earlier when a Montreal-based railway-equipment firm, a subsidiary of Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., of Harrison, N.J., signed a $15.2 million contract for locomotives, the deal went through because all of the subsidiary's directors were Canadian, and therefore outside U.S. law.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 January 1975

Chile rebuts torture charges

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Smarting from mounting accusations of prisoner torture, Chile's military leaders have gone on the offensive.

Denying many of the allegations, they have put in doubt some of the specifics of the charges by accusing organizations like Amnesty International of being loose with their facts.

Fernando Duran, Chile's ambassador to France, said this week in an interview in Paris that three of the places where the London-based Amnesty International claimed torture had taken place were unlikely locations for such activities.

One of the places where Amnesty International charged torture was committed is a public building open at all hours to anyone, Mr. Duran said. Another is a private office building. A third simply does not exist, he said.

Mr. Duran did not specifically deny all torture charges, but his interview in Le Monde was aimed, according to Chilean officials, at scotching the heavy flow of torture charges now being aired.

That flow was boosted in mid-December with the release of an Organization of American States (OAS) study charging the Chilean military with "extremely serious violations of human rights" including the extensive torture of political prisoners.

Many of those said to have been tortured were supporters of the government of Salvador Allende Gossens which the military deposed in a violent coup in September, 1973.

The OAS charges were contained in a 175-page document prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the basis of a 12-day tour of Chile last summer by a five-nation investigating team.

Attached to the OAS document was a lengthy rebuttal from the Chileans, contending that the report contains "important and grave deficiencies" and "manifest errors."

But this rebuttal did not specifically contest charges of individual torture.

Use of shocks alleged

The OAS investigators, headed by Robert F. Woodward, a former United States ambassador to Chile, did not identify alleged victims by name, using numbers instead, but they were specific on the charges — claiming the military had used electrical shocks, threats against close relatives, sexual violence, and beatings.

Amnesty International's charges are similar, covering some of the same ground, although the two reports spring from separate investigations.

For its part, the Chilean Government has manifestly denied the extensive use of torture, claiming that while there have been occasional lapses in Chile's traditional concern for rights, the basic thrust of Chile's policy remains one of protecting human rights.

But it is obvious that Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and his fellow military commanders in Santiago are worried about the charges which have led, at least in part, to Mexico's late November decision to break relations with Chile and to the numerous attacks on Chile in the United States Congress and the threat of military aid prohibitions in foreign-aid measures on Capitol Hill.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6