

SECRET

September 1968

THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

General Kelly, General Davis,

Gentlemen:

Any child can tell you that if you talk about the wish you make when you blow out the candles, it won't come true. A bit later in life, we learn that any mention of the fact that a pitcher is working on a no-hit game is likely to ruin his chances.

Those are superstitions, but it happens to be a fact that an intelligence service tends to lose some of its security every time it is talked about. In public, an intelligence service simply does not crow about its successes, alibi its failures, respond to criticism, or discuss its business to satisfy public curiosity.

Senator Saltonstall, who knows a great deal about U.S. intelligence operations, once explained to his constituents that in an open society like ours, it is impossible to inform the public without informing our enemies, who make it a practice to read our newspapers very carefully.

SECRET

SECRET

That is why I welcome opportunities like this to speak in private, particularly on the relationship between intelligence and policy formulation.

Our critics are neither restricted by security regulations, nor restrained by the prospect that we will refute them with facts. As a result, they have put forth some weird and mischievous versions of the role and the nature of U.S. intelligence activities. As far as our public image is concerned, this is unfortunate, but it is not fatal and we just have to live with it. Within the government, however, it is vital that we all have a clear and comprehensive understanding of the exact relationship between intelligence and the rest of the governmental apparatus--specifically, how intelligence supports the policy-maker, and how the policy maker controls intelligence activities.

The fact that you are here, attending these courses, identifies you as men who are going to be doing a considerable amount of joint staff and joint committee work in your future career assignments. A substantial portion of that work is going to involve special task forces and inter-agency committees, where

SECRET

SECRET

you will be working with--possibly for--the intelligence community.

Accordingly, I think it will be helpful to you, to your services, and to the intelligence community itself, for you to be familiar with the concept, the organization, and the functions of the various elements in our government which work together to produce national intelligence.

First, I am going to discuss what we call the intelligence community. With all the attention that intelligence has been receiving from the information media, it is surprising that there is still a good deal of confusion about the precise meaning of the phrase, "intelligence community."

This is simply a handy way of referring to all elements of the Government which are concerned with obtaining, analyzing, and disseminating foreign intelligence. It is a framework within which they can work together.

The National Security Act of 1947 did not create the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. We had intelligence agents--and good ones, too--in the Revolutionary War. Before CIA was established, our Government was obtaining intelligence from the

SECRET

SECRET

Army and the Navy, the Department of State, and the FBI, and these same organizations are still providing it.

The National Security Act of 1947 was written against the backdrop of Pearl Harbor. All investigations of that black day showed that the intelligence was there. It had been gathered. But the failure was that all of the bits and pieces in the hands of various elements of the Government had not been brought together in one place--the significant sifted out from the insignificant--and a unified, coordinated warning provided ⁱⁿ time to the people who could act on it.

The obvious remedy was to insure that our intelligence agencies work together, exchange and compare information, and provide the decision-makers with the best combined, agreed intelligence that is available. In a nutshell, this is the concept of the Intelligence Community. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency for this purpose: to ensure that all of the intelligence in government hands would be assembled, evaluated, and disseminated as finished intelligence to those who need to have it.

There are at least two definitions of "national"

SECRET

SECRET

intelligence. You may be more familiar with the distinction between national intelligence--information of interest to the entire government--and departmental intelligence, which serves the needs or falls within the competence of one particular service, department, or agency. For the purposes of my discussion, however, national intelligence is "all intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy....and which transcends the exclusive competence of any one department or agency." Put more simply, it is the information which national leaders need to make strategic policy.

It follows that finished national intelligence, as we understand it, must provide the President and his advisors with the gist of all information available from any source and service, and an agreed evaluation of that intelligence and its significance. This is why it is so important to talk in terms of the intelligence community, and not the Central Intelligence Agency alone.

If the services, and the State Department, and CIA, and the FBI are all engaged in gathering information, any good bureaucrat can tell you that there are two great dangers:

SECRET

SECRET

The first and the greatest danger is that some vital assignment will fall between the stools--that each agency will think somebody else has the responsibility.

The other danger is duplication of effort--and this is not merely a question of extravagance. In intelligence, uncoordinated efforts in the same field can lead to disasters.

To cope with both these pitfalls--to ensure enough coordination so that there will be no important gaps and no undesirable duplication--the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent Presidential instructions gave the Director of Central Intelligence two responsibilities. He is by law the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has the statutory function of producing coordinated national intelligence. He is also, by Presidential directive, the principal or senior Intelligence Officer of the Government. He guides and coordinates all intelligence activities--anywhere in the Government--relating to the National Security interests of the United States, and he acts as principal intelligence advisor to the President.

Let's take a look at the composition of the intelligence community.

SECRET

SECRET

The first element most people think of in this context, of course, is the Central Intelligence Agency.

Second, there is the Defense Intelligence Agency, which reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Joint Chiefs, to the Secretary of Defense. The DIA is responsible for intelligence essential to the discharge of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Unified and Service commands, and the military departments.

The intelligence units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force continue to serve the particular missions of each one of the services. Within the DoD, the three services components are closely coordinated by the Director of DIA.

An intelligence component in the State Department serves the Secretary of State and the policy planners. All of our diplomatic personnel are intelligence gatherers in a sense. In addition, however, there is also a requirement for men who apply themselves professionally to the analysis of that information, and its bearing on present and future implications for U.S. foreign policy.

There is an intelligence component in the Atomic Energy Commission, with a specialized charter devoted

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

to the vital field of intelligence on nuclear energy developments.

The primary functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are concerned with internal security, but you can easily imagine the connections between foreign intelligence and internal security. So the FBI, too, is a member of the intelligence community. The FBI and the CIA work closely together, because they are both combatting an opponent whose operations and agents move back and forth between the U.S. and foreign countries.

Those, then, except for the NSA which is in a unique category, are the individual members of the intelligence community--CIA, State, DIA and the service components, AEC, and FBI.

Rounding out the picture of the community, there are a number of national intelligence assets--activities which do not serve any particular department or agency, but serve the entire Government. One agency may manage them, and even provide most of the personnel and equipment, but they actually operate directly for the entire intelligence community.

The largest of these is the National Security Agency, which is also a member of the intelligence

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


community. Its collection components, scattered all over the world, are provided by the armed services.



25X1

Another national intelligence asset is the National Photographic Interpretation Center, which deals with intelligence acquired by photographic means, examining the films in detail, and interpreting what is to be seen.

I need only mention the detection of the Soviet medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba in October 1962, to show how essential NPIC is to our intelligence effort.



A fourth such national intelligence asset is the Board of National Estimates, which I will discuss a bit later.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Now, these intelligence agencies and organizations I have just enumerated are tied together, for guidance purposes, by the United States Intelligence Board, which we often refer to as USIB.

The Director of Central Intelligence, by Presidential designation, is the Chairman of USIB-- and this, by the way, is one place where the Director's two jobs--or his "two hats"--are very carefully differentiated. When he chairs the U.S. Intelligence Board, he is there as the President's principal intelligence officer, not as the head of CIA. USIB acts on and approves the agreed, coordinated judgments of the entire intelligence community, and it would not be proper or effective for the Director simultaneously to chair the meeting and to present the views of the Central Intelligence Agency. For this reason, CIA has separate representation on the Board in the person of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

The other principals are:

The State Department Director of Intelligence and Research;

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;

The Director of the National Security Agency;

The Assistant General Manager of the AEC; and

The Assistant to the Director of the FBI

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Since the consolidation of intelligence under DIA in the Pentagon, the intelligence chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force attend and participate, but as observers rather than as official members of USIB. They retain the right, and in fact the duty, to express any dissent they may have on matters under discussion. If you have seen the National Intelligence Estimates, with their footnotes, you know that this is a right they do not hesitate to exercise.

USIB meets regularly once a week--sometimes more often. USIB is concerned with a wide variety of matters, but I think it is important to emphasize that USIB operates as an advisory body to the Director of Central Intelligence.

USIB has three principal functions.

First, the USIB establishes--and periodically reviews--the national priorities for the guidance of the intelligence community in choosing intelligence targets and in recommending assignment of assets to cover those targets.

Second, the USIB continuously reviews our foreign intelligence activities to determine whether they are in accord with those priorities, and to make sure that we are doing everything possible to

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

close important gaps, and to avoid unnecessary duplication. Please note that I have modified the word "duplication" each time I have used it. When we are trying to get hold of the other fellow's secrets in the interests of our national security, a certain amount of duplication is not only desirable, but even mandatory for the sake of confirmation.

Third, the USIB reviews in draft form and in great detail the National Intelligence Estimates which the Director of Central Intelligence submits to the President.

The actual work of drafting and re-working these papers is generally done in the Office of National Estimates, which is a part of CIA, but the final product is a National Intelligence Estimate, and must, therefore, reflect the considered judgment of the entire intelligence community. This is ensured through the participation of all appropriate elements of the community, through the contribution of facts and judgments, in the revising of the papers in draft, and by the USIB review of the final product. The objective of each estimate is a careful and thoughtful set of judgments which will be of the greatest possible assistance to the policy maker.

SECRET

SECRET

I want to stress that the men engaged in arriving at an estimate are not striving for unanimity per se. It would be possible to achieve unanimity by overriding the dissenting minority, or by watering down the estimate to the least common denominator-- a narrow area of complete agreement by the entire intelligence community. Such unanimity, however, would be a disservice to the policy maker and the planner.

What is asked is that the dissents shall be based on honest differences of opinion over how the available facts are to be evaluated and interpreted-- not on personal convictions, hunches, or parochial interests. Within this frame of reference, it is policy to encourage well-founded dissents.

The Board of National Estimates, which I referred to a bit earlier, deserves special mention. Until the British recently moved to set up a similar group, the Board of National Estimates was the only institution of its kind in any intelligence service in the world. As established by General Bedell Smith when he was Director of Central Intelligence in 1950, it is a body of senior, knowledgeable men of varied experience, who have no other duty than to study and seek

SECRET

SECRET

answers to the fundamental questions of national security. The Board is composed of about fifteen men with extensive backgrounds in the military, diplomatic, legal, academic, and intelligence professions. Their sole function is to hear and consider evidence and argument from the entire intelligence community. These judgments are then presented to the Director and to USIB, and normally have great weight in the estimates the Director submits to the President and his advisors on matters of critical importance to national security.

A word about the National Estimates themselves. More than 1,000 Estimates have been prepared in the last 18 years. They include the standard papers on such topics as, "The Outlook on Country A, or Area B," which look ahead two or three years, and deal with broad trends and expected lines of policy by the country or in the area in question.

There are the more specialized estimates on the Soviet military establishment. These papers are built on a solid base of hard evidence; they go into greater detail and look further ahead-- usually five years. They focus on such subjects as the Soviet strategic attack forces, or the general purpose forces. The production of these papers

SECRET

SECRET

is timed to assist planning of Defense force levels and budgets.

A third type, the Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE, includes ad hoc papers on important questions of the moment, such as the expected reaction to some proposed course of action by the U.S. Therefore, the SNIE's may get into some pretty sensitive areas.

There is a related series of papers, called National Intelligence Planning Projections, which are not very well known. These projections are written by CIA with the assistance of DIA for the use of the long-range planners in the Department of Defense. In these Projections, hard figures are set down on just how many Polaris-type submarines, or anti-ballistic missile sites, or a certain type of ballistic missile, the Soviet Union could have under certain conditions in, say, October 1976 or June 1978. Projections this far into the future leave the current base of evidence quite far behind and are, in effect, a setting forth of detailed plans for the Soviet Defense establishment several years before the responsible Russians have to formulate such plans. I might add that these Projections have been well received.

SECRET

SECRET

Other activities of the U.S. Intelligence Board are carried on by committees with specialized functions. Some of them are regular standing committees, such as the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, which follows nuclear developments in the Soviet Union, France, Communist China, and other countries with the potential of becoming nuclear powers. A similar committee, the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, concentrates on Soviet Space and Missile Activity.

Then there are a number of ad hoc committees to deal with specific crises or recurrent headaches--a Berlin committee, an Arab-Israeli committee, a Taiwan Strait committee, to give you some examples out of the past.

The Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board concentrates on the highly specialized field that we call indications intelligence. The National Indications Center, located in the Pentagon, is staffed jointly by the intelligence community. It keeps track of indicators which might give us early warning of hostile intentions against the United States or its allies. This Center and the intelligence agencies report to the Watch Committee on indications

SECRET

which may be significant--or on the absence of any significant indicators. The Watch Committee has a regular weekly meeting, timed so that the conclusions will be ready for the weekly USIB meeting, but in times of crisis the Watch Committee may meet one or more times a day.

Against this background, I would like to describe how the intelligence community makes its contribution to the decision-makers in our Government.

Let me say first of all that when it comes to decision-making, it is a firmly established rule that the only role of intelligence is to supply objective, substantive intelligence. It may be hard fact. It may be an intelligence appreciation--the best judgment of the situation; or it may be estimative--again, a considered judgment of how the situation is likely to develop. But the important quality this intelligence must possess is objectivity. It must not be warped by policy interests, budgetary concerns, or departmental parochialism.

The ancient Greek policy makers used to ^{GET} their estimative intelligence from the Delphic Oracle. Some of these estimates have been preserved for us by the historians and playwrights of the time, and

SECRET

they offer a tempting pattern. They were so worded that no matter what happened, the Oracle could later claim to have been right. The gimmick, of course, was that each prediction permitted at least two diametrically opposite interpretations.

The Oracle had, however, discovered the basic essential for an intelligence service: credibility. An intelligence service has no value, no purpose, and no future, if it is not believed by those it serves.

This is what dictates that an intelligence service shall only support, not participate in, policy making.

The President and his advisers face a choice between Course A and Course B. Intelligence will only provide the facts--and the whole range of known facts--relevant to the choice. Intelligence will not recommend one course or the other. The moment that intelligence begins to advocate Course A, the proponents of Course B are going to suspect--if not believe--that intelligence has rigged its reporting to support that advocacy. Credibility goes out the window.

The estimative function, of course, includes contingency papers. These are answers to questions,

SECRET

SECRET

posed by the policy makers, as to the probable consequences or reactions to specific proposed courses of action by the United States. This is indeed thin ice for the intelligence community, and I must admit that it comes close to policy recommendation to conclude that such-and-such a course of action would probably be considered a casus belli by Power X or Power Y. These papers are undertaken, however, at the specific request of the policy maker. The conclusions are based on a review and analysis of all the facts available. And if there are rival advocates among the policy makers, they can always check with their own intelligence representatives to determine whether the question has been given objective and impartial review in the estimative process.

My point is that if there is controversy over what the U.S. policy or course of action should be, the opposing advocates must have an impartial source of objective information which all can trust. The intelligence community can furnish that objective foundation, and command the necessary credibility only if it never engages in advocacy.

I have been talking mainly about estimative intelligence, but support for the policy maker is

SECRET

SECRET

not limited to telling him what is going to happen, or likely to happen, in the future.

The intelligence community also provides basic intelligence--the type of bread-and-butter facts you find in the National Intelligence Surveys. This is the best and most comprehensive information we can gather about a country: its sociological and demographic makeup, the railroad system, the ports, rivers, communications, laws, police, economy, military forces.

It is designed to tell the reader more than he may think he will ever want to know about a country, about countries with which he may feel he will never be concerned, from every source available to our intelligence services. It is in effect a giant world almanac, which already comprises more than 10 times the volume of information in the Encyclopedia Britannica, and is still growing.

In this day and age, the currency of intelligence is not a question of this week's information, or today's information--it comes down to a question of hours, and even minutes. A report which is current at the close of business is likely to be well out of date by daybreak. The first publication the President reads in the morning, the President's Daily Brief, is

SECRET

updated at CIA Headquarters little more than an hour before he receives it.

Accordingly, current intelligence has to be a responsibility 24 hours a day, seven days a week, drawing on every available and every conceivable source of information--what we call the all-source basis. It is handled by instantaneous but secure communications which link the operations centers or duty offices of all of the intelligence elements with the operations centers or situation rooms of all of the principal policy makers. And current intelligence must rely on the fastest possible passage of critical information, from the field, into Washington for the essential evaluation process, and then onward to alert government leaders to emergencies, crises, and other significant developments on a real-time basis. In essence, the ultimate deadline for currency in intelligence reporting today is the half-hour or so it takes an ICBM to arch half-way around the world.

Much of what I have said so far about our intelligence production was intended to dispel the idea that the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Intelligence Community, somehow "makes" U.S. policy. Now let me turn to the allegation that CIA operates without any

SECRET

controls, that it makes and implements its own policy, sometimes in contravention of the professed policy of the United States.

This is the other side of the relationship between intelligence and policy: the controls which the policy makers, the elected authorities of the U.S. government, have and exercise over even the most secret of our intelligence activities.

Essentially, we are now talking about functions which, within the intelligence community, are peculiar to CIA. I want to discuss briefly where we get our charter for these activities, and how they are generated, planned, organized, and controlled.

The National Security Act of 1947 gave CIA five functions:

One, To advise the National Security Council-- and of course the President--on intelligence matters relating to national security;

Two, To support and advise the National Security Council in the coordination of all foreign intelligence activities of our government;

Three, To produce and disseminate finished national intelligence within the government;

Four, To provide those services of common

SECRET

concern for intelligence which can best be undertaken centrally; and

Five, To perform such other services as the National Security Council may direct.

Four presidents and 21 years later, the language of the statute requires a couple of brief footnotes;

For one thing, it is often stated that the CIA was created to coordinate the intelligence activities of the government. Strictly speaking, this is not correct. The Act of 1947 directed the CIA to make recommendations to the National Security Council on coordination; the CIA recommended, and the NSC ordered, that this coordination would be effected by the Director of Central Intelligence as the President's principal intelligence officer. This the Director does, to a large extent through the USIB machinery. To deal with another aspect of coordination, I have recently established a three-man National Intelligence Resources Board, chaired by my Deputy and including the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. In a period when intelligence requirements appear to be growing and the resources to deal with them shrinking at about the same pace, this board has the unenviable task of matching

SECRET

responsibilities with assets. Their recommendations help me to determine, along with the proper authorities at Defense and State, the most desirable and economical methods of intelligence collection.

Finally, I have a senior intelligence officer with a small but experienced staff within CIA, assigned to continuing review and evaluation of the major programs encompassing the activities of the intelligence community. So much for the machinery of coordination.

The second footnote concerns statutory theory and practice. The National Security Act of 1947 ties the CIA in directly under the supervision of the National Security Council. The National Security Council was created by statute; it is listed in the government organization manuals; and a succession of statutes has specified its membership. The Director of Central Intelligence, by statute, attends as an advisor.

The fact of the matter is that successive presidents have differed in their use of the NSC--differed from each other, and even changed concepts within a presidential term.

Lest anyone should argue that the CIA is therefore controlled by a sometimes inactive or dormant

SECRET

SECRET

body, let me state that whether the statutory NSC was meeting hourly, daily, weekly, or infrequently, under any given administration, each President has had continuing machinery within his cabinet or his White House staff to deal with NSC questions, and these questions have included continuing control over the Central Intelligence Agency.

With those two footnotes, I think we can pass over the first four functions assigned to CIA, and concentrate on the crux of the problem, the fifth assignment: to perform such other services as the National Security Council may direct.

This is our charter for covert actions. I propose to tell you why they are necessary, and how they are controlled. I will leave it up to you, if you wish, to consider whether there is, or should be, or could be, some other agency of the government where these responsibilities might better be assigned.

In the "Cold War," which has existed longer than there has been a CIA, we face an enemy adept at conspiracy and subversion, with worldwide clandestine assets, skilled agents, and no compunction about undermining or overthrowing any Government which resists the spread of Communism.

SECRET

SECRET

There are apt to be occasions when it is important for the United States, in order to counter these Communist efforts, to have its own capability to respond by covert or clandestine operations. This is not necessarily because the United States would be ashamed of either the objectives or the methods. It is primarily because it sometimes takes clandestine methods to beat clandestine methods--just as a killer submarine is one of the best weapons to use against another submarine.


This is the shadowy, twilight zone of Government operations that Congress had in mind when it directed CIA to perform "such other services" as the National Security Council might direct.

Whenever the CIA carries out a covert operation overseas, it is with the prior approval of a special committee of the National Security Council. This committee is chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, representing the President. He meets once a week--or more often if necessary--with the Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense--normally the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

SECRET

Covert operations which the Agency proposes to conduct overseas, and which are of major importance or carry with them significant risk of exposure or embarrassment, are presented to this committee. These may be political, psychological, economic, or paramilitary operations. Whatever their nature, they either win the approval of the committee, or they do not take place.

When covert operations are approved in advance by representatives of the President, The Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, it is obvious that these operations are not going to be contrary to--or outside of--the guidelines established by United States Government policy.



25X1

Our undertakings must also have the approval of the Bureau of the Budget. Certain officials of that Bureau have been given full clearance to

SECRET

inquire into all of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in detail--and believe me, they make full use of that authority.

In addition to such prior approvals, there are other elements of the executive branch which have the same full clearance to monitor our continuing operations, and conduct post-mortems on those which have been completed.

Some of these have been ad hoc groups--such as the Clark Committee, the Doolittle Committee, and the Hoover Commission task forces.

On a permanent basis, all of the intelligence operations of the U.S. Government are under the continuing scrutiny of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This board was formed in January 1956, under Dr. James Killian of M.I.T. It is now headed by General Maxwell Taylor, who succeeded Clark Clifford when Mr. Clifford became Secretary of Defense. It is an assemblage of distinguished private citizens, appointed by and reporting to the President. It meets for a couple of days every two months to examine--in depth and in detail--the work, the progress, and the problems of the entire U.S. intelligence program. Between regular meetings,

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP76-00183R000500100001-9

subcommittees carry on continuing investigations of our successes and failures in intelligence.

The present Board includes--former high Government officials such as Ambassador Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army and Director of the Budget; and Mr. Gordon Gray, who was President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs;

--former military men, General Taylor and Admiral John Sides;

--men from the academic world like Professor William Langer of Harvard; and

--prominent leaders in business and technology, such as Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories, and Dr. Edwin Land, Head of Polaroid.

We are not only under effective control by the Executive Branch--whatever you may have read to the contrary--we are also under the continuing scrutiny of the Legislative Branch.

Ever since CIA was first established, the Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized by the President, and in fact instructed, to make complete disclosure of CIA activities to special subcommittees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP76-00183R000500100001-9

SECRET

The Congress has created subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate to hear these reports.

Also, as you may have surmised from my references to the Bureau of the Budget, our operations require money. Our headquarters are in Langley, Virginia, not at Fort Knox, and our appropriations requests are discussed in full with special subcommittees of Senate and House Appropriations.

Some of the confusion over CIA's relations with Congress arises from the fact that these four special subcommittees, and only these--about 30 legislators in all--have been cleared by the President to inquire in detail into our activities and operations.

We will, of course, brief any congressional committee having a jurisdictional interest in our substantive intelligence from all over the world. In the course of a year, there may be 20 or 30 such committee hearings--and some of them run as long as three full days. We also brief individual congressmen frequently at their request.

But discussion of CIA activities, methods, and sources is another matter. It involves the lives of people who work with us, and the efficacy of our methods. These matters are discussed only with the

SECRET

SECRET

special subcommittees designated for these purposes. This is not arbitrary or bureaucratic; it is simply recognition that the risk of inadvertent disclosure rises with the number of people who have access to sensitive information of this type.

Where disclosure is authorized, it is complete. With the special subcommittees, I discuss covert operational matters and other intelligence aspects which are so sensitive that even within CIA only a small percentage of our personnel are authorized to be informed.

I am happy to say that the members of these subcommittees, over the years, have established an enviable security record, and have repaid our candor with constructive and welcome support. Accordingly, I can perceive no cause for terror in the suggestion that I should report to what the press likes to call a "joint watchdog committee." I already do.

The Director of Central Intelligence is required by statute to safeguard the security of U.S. intelligence sources and methods, but the laws and Presidential directive have also provided that the Director shall report to authorized representatives of the Congress. The question of who shall hear that report is a matter for the leadership of Congress to decide.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP76-00183R000500100001-9

My only objection to the demands for a watchdog committee is the completely erroneous implication that there is no such machinery at present.

So much, then, for the charge that CIA is under no controls, and that nobody in Washington is told what CIA is doing.

Finally, if I may, I want to devote a few moments to the types of people who work for the CIA.

The fact of the matter is that James Bond and his colleagues of the spy movies and novels do not convey an accurate picture of intelligence work in this era.

A commentary in the London Economist makes my point pretty well with this summary: "Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking collection and analysis of fact, the exercise of judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is not simply what serious journalists would always produce if they had time; it is something more rigorous, continuous, and above all operational--that is to say, related to something that somebody wants to do or may be forced to do."

The CIA employee is a much more academic man than the public realizes. We may have a few men with the debonair aplomb of Napoleon Solo, but we have

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP76-00183R000500100001-9

SECRET

more than 800 senior professionals with 20 years or more of intelligence background. Three quarters of our officers speak at least one foreign language. About 15 percent have graduate degrees. Six out of every 10 of the analysts who have direct responsibility at Headquarters for analysis of a foreign area had lived, worked, or traveled abroad in that area even before they came to CIA.

When you combine all of the years required for graduate study, foreign experience, and then add 10 to 15 years of intelligence work, it amounts to an impressive depth of knowledge, competence, and expertise at the service of our Government.

We could easily and adequately staff the faculty of a small university with our experts. I have discussed with you how the Central Intelligence Agency serves the Government, how it is controlled, and briefly, what manner of man works there. I have left to the end one final question: "Why?"

For the answer, let me quote a couple of outside witnesses:

Secretary of State Rusk in December 1965, told a public meeting of the White House Conference on International Cooperation:

SECRET

SECRET

"I would emphasize to you that CIA is not engaged in activities not known to the senior policy officers of the Government. But you should also bear in mind that beneath the level of public discussion, there is a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world. It is a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side. And so, once in a while, some disagreeable things happen, and I can tell you that there is a good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence in those who have to help us deal with that part of the struggle for freedom."

In April 1965, President Johnson put it this way: "We have committed our lives, our property, our resources and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed, to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency."

To sum up, the intelligence community of the United States Government comprises all of the

SECRET

SECRET

intelligence components of the various agencies and departments, operating under the advice and guidance of the United States Intelligence Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence as the principal intelligence officer of the President.

Its principal function is to provide the intelligence appreciations which the decision-makers need in order to formulate policy, and to give them timely warning and expert analysis of developments bearing on the national security of the United States. Intelligence supports policy--it does not formulate it.

The authority for intelligence, covert and clandestine activities comes from the President and the National Security Council, and these activities are subject to approval and review by appropriate bodies of both the executive and legislative branches.

Authors writing about the Central Intelligence Agency have often been fascinated by the scriptural quotation in the lobby of the CIA Headquarters building: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

In the present day, maybe the outsiders would have more understanding for the role of intelligence in the free world if the quotation said:

"The truth shall keep you free."

SECRET