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DIARY NOTES

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4 June 1965


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1. At the Executive Committee Meeting this morning:

a. The Director said that he talked about our fifteen-year plan during his briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee this morning. Chairman Mahon somewhat surprisingly implied that this sounded like "empire building." The Director admitted that he made a tactical error in the way he made his presentation. He requested that the preamble be rewritten to emphasize that the purpose of this plan is to avoid "empire building;" i.e., plan our intelligence program to meet the highest priority requirements by elimination of lowest priority requirements to the extent possible.

b. At the Counterinsurgency Committee meeting yesterday apparently Ambassador Kidder or someone else from the Department of State made a speech about the failure of agencies to fill their quotas at the National Interdepartmental Seminar. The Director issued very firm instructions that CIA would fill its quota in all cases. If we don't have enough senior people to fill our quota, it will be filled with junior people. I telephoned Matt Baird and told him that, if the quota is not yet filled, he should call the other Deputies promptly and ask them for their nominations since they all heard the Director's admonition.

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3. I read a memorandum which Larry Houston plans to submit to Dick Helms requesting legislation to permit us to pay consultants more than the \$50 a day which is now authorized and to adopt Department of State legislation on travel and medical care. I told Larry that this paper looked fine and that he could tell Dick I concurred in this approach.

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4. John Clarke advised me that we would receive a letter about a course in systems analysis which the Department of Defense is setting up at the

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University of Maryland. He thought that we could and should get an Agency slot for this course. I agreed.

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5. I asked both John Clarke and Mr. Kirkpatrick to expedite their decisions on our [redacted] paper.

* * * * *

6. I talked with Howard Osborn, [redacted], and Dick Helms about Drew Pearson's comments in the Washington Post this morning concerning CIA. Dick requested that we play this in low key and under no circumstances go outside the Agency to inquire how Pearson got this information.

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7. I talked with [redacted], Dr. Tietjen, and [redacted] about [redacted] problem. I decided to do nothing to change their current travel plans. I asked Dr. Tietjen to have someone, probably [redacted] get in touch with Earl on Monday, 7 June, to pursue this problem. I told Pat to get in touch with Dr. Tietjen and be guided by his advice regarding what action, if any, the Office of Finance should take at this particular time.

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JUN 4 1965

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

President Johnson's Personal War

By Drew Pearson

War, no matter what the circumstances, is tragic business. However, the war in Viet-Nam has also become a lonely war and to some extent a personal war for one man.

This is not because the President began it. It began 18 years ago under the French, was picked up ten years ago by President Eisenhower, and increased four years ago by President Kennedy.

It's become personal today because the President feels it so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the White House Security Room. Three in the morning is about the time the news is in from Viet-Nam on the casualties and the hits after each bombing raid.

The President worries over these, broods over them, wants to know, no matter what the hour of the night, just what has happened.

One reason for this personal direction is that the President is worried over the possibility of enlarging the war. He knows how easy it is for bomber pilots to make a mistake, or how dangerous it



Pearson

can be to jettison their bombs on their way home.

On the usual wartime bombing raid, a mission will fly over a target, attempt to knock it out; but if the clouds are low or an enemy plane gives trouble, the bombers may drop their pay load indiscriminately on the way back, regardless of military targets.

Targets of Concrete

Not, however, with the war in Viet-Nam. Mr. Johnson has given strict orders that only the targets he picks out are to be hit—and these are bridges, ammunition dumps, railroad centers and military installations.

"We're knocking out concrete, we're not hitting women and children," he has frequently told his aides.

In addition to his care to avoid civilian casualties he is concerned over any bombing mission that might stray over the line into China, or give the Communist Chinese the slightest provocation to enlarge the war.

This is why the war in and over Viet-Nam has been a lonely war, a personal war directed by a man who goes to bed well after midnight, but wakes up automatically at 3 a.m. to check on the military targets he has personally pinpointed.

Under the Constitution, he tells friends, he is charged

with the conduct of war. But regardless of the Constitution, he knows that if there are failures, or if the war spreads, he will get the blame. So he is taking the responsibility.

Insoluble Mess

When the President outlined his Baltimore peace proposals they were also personal, especially his plan for a giant series of dams on the Mekong River to benefit all the Indochinese countries, including North Viet-Nam.

Mr. Johnson had hoped that this, coupled with his offer of unconditional peace talks, plus joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. aid, might induce the other side to sit down at the conference table. It didn't, for three reasons:

The North Vietnamese have been winning. Our bombing raids have not stopped the supply of troops and supplies from going south or the guerrilla raids by the Viet Cong.

The Russians, who normally might have acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot by our bombing of the North. The Chinese have chided them with being too friendly to the United States in the past, and with forsaking their alleged former role as the champion of small nations. So it's difficult for them to side with the United States now.

The Chinese are delighted

at the predicament of both Moscow and Washington. They don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The longer it lasts, the more the United States and Russia become at swords' points, and the more the smaller nations of Southeast Asia pull away from the United States into the Red Chinese camp.

In brief, the military advisers who sold the President on the strategy of bombing North Viet-Nam failed to understand Oriental politics. Though he inherited the Vietnamese problem, they sold him on enlarging it into a mess that could either lead to world war or is almost insoluble without serious loss of face.

Behind the Scenes

The Central Intelligence Agency is using a mysterious airline that calls itself Air America to drop weapons and supplies to our guerrilla fighters in Communist-held areas of Laos and Viet-Nam. The CIA is trying to give the Reds a taste of their own guerrilla medicine . . . Senate investigators have discovered that the CIA not only watches suspicious mail, but actually opens the letters as part of its secret intelligence work. However, Senators will protect the CIA, will not reveal this in their probe of Government eavesdropping.

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