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COMIREX-M-70

25X1A	<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Document Number and Subject</u>
	[REDACTED]	23 Sept 63	31	USIB-D-41.11/1, subj: Relationships Between USIB and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

ARCHIVES  
COMIREX-M-71

25X1	<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Document Number and Subject</u>
	[REDACTED]	18 Dec 63	49	COMOR-D-71/1, subj: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance Involvement in Priority National Intelligence Objectives
	---	4 Nov 63	1	USIB-AM-63/45, subj: Priority National Intelligence Objectives
	---	28 Aug 63	--	USIB-D-25.1/9 (Attachment A and B) subj: DCID No. 1/3 <sup>1</sup>
	---	11 Dec 63	3	COMOR-D-71 (Draft), subj: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance Involvement in Priority National Intelligence Objectives

NRO review(s) completed.

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COMOR-D-1/1

18 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  
Involvement in Priority National  
Intelligence Objectives

REFERENCE: USIB-AM-63/45 of November 1963  
"Priority National Intelligence Objectives"

Attached is the COMOR response to the inquiry from the Executive Secretary of the United States Intelligence Board on the above subject. It was approved at the special meeting of COMOR on 17 December (see COMOR-M-218).

[Redacted]

Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachment  
Subject paper

- Copies 2, 3 State TCO
- 4 DIA [Redacted]
- 5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCO.
- 9 OACSI TCO
- 10, 11 ONI TCO
- 12, 13, 14, 15 AFNIN TCO
- 16, 17 NSA TCO
- 18, 19 NRO TCO

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COMOR-D-71/1

18 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary  
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  
Involvement in Priority National  
Intelligence Objectives

REFERENCE: USIB-AM-63/45 of November 1963  
"Priority National Intelligence Objectives"

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance is directly and indirectly responsive to the PNIOs. In view of the fact that departmental research is closely attuned to the support of the National Estimates, they in turn are derivative of the PNIOs. Therefore, the participating agencies in COMOR are submitting requirements related to, albeit once removed, from, the PNIOs themselves. Furthermore, in resolving issues before COMOR where priorities must be established, PNIOs frequently have a deciding influence. In the case of COMOR and because the principal collection mechanisms toward which its requirements are directed, involve political and physical risk and sensitivity, the work of the COMOR is constantly under review by the United States Intelligence Board which is most conscious of the PNIOs.

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2. COMOR has been responsive to the PNIOs in the scheduling of satellite reconnaissance, the long-range program for Far Eastern reconnaissance, the activation of the [Redacted] program and the varied use from time to time of the U-2 in other areas of the world, not to mention the Cuban reconnaissance. These recommendations are not only approved by the Board but are frequently in one way or another subject to approval by the Special Group. In the case of the satellite photography, a provision has been made for the use of a standby package which can be activated within seven days to provide information bearing upon indications of the imminence of hostilities, although it is recognized that such a contribution would not be in the literal meaning of early warning as outlined in PNIO No. 1. In the use of the KH-4 [Redacted] and the U-2 in Cuba and China the priority of targets within those programs is closely attuned to the PNIOs.

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3. Whereas the COMOR itself made no conscious change in its procedure or judgment as a result of the most recent revision of the PNIOs, the foregoing explanation reveals that COMOR is so intimately directed by the interests and concerns of the participating

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agencies and by the Board itself that any failure of recommendations to be responsive to a new orientation could hardly go unnoticed.

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Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

[Redacted Signature]

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
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

ACTION MEMORANDUM



*Need to know what to do from cables & what to do with them after get it*

USIB-AM-63/45  
4 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, EIC  
Chairman, GMAIC  
Chairman, JAEIC  
Chairman, SIC  
Chairman, COMOR  
Chairman, IPC  
Chairman, SIGINT Committee  
Chairman, CCPC

SUBJECT : Priority National Intelligence Objectives

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-25.1/8, 9 August 1963  
b. USIB-M-283, 14 August 1963, item 4  
c. USIB-D-25.1/9, 28 August 1963  
d. USIB-AM-63/37, 29 August 1963  
e. DCID No. 1/3, Revised 14 August 1963, and Quarterly Supplement thereto

1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB), as indicated in reference b. and transmitted to you by reference d. requested the Committees of which you are Chairmen to report major modifications in procedures adopted and significant changes in actions taken or planned by your respective Committees to discharge their responsibilities with respect to the implementation of DCID No. 1/3, following its approval on 14 August 1963.

2. The following instructions are provided herewith for the guidance of the Committees in preparing the requested reports to the USIB. These instructions have been developed by the USIB Secretariat at the request of the Chairman, USIB. Mr. John Bross, Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, is responsible for reviewing and evaluating for the DCI the actions reported upon by the USIB Committees. These reviews will be submitted to the USIB by the DCI for consideration in connection with the USIB Committee reports.

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3. In order to make your separate Committee reports generally comparable and compatible, it is requested that each Committee answer the questions set forth below regarding procedures adopted and actions taken or planned under its auspices with respect to each PNIO or Quarterly Supplement listing germane to the mission of the Committee concerned.

a. Which of the PNIOs and Quarterly Supplement listings are germane in whole or in part to your Committee's responsibilities?

b. What extra and unusual efforts, beyond normal coverage, have been made or are planned with respect to each of the PNIOs and Quarterly Supplement listings identified in a. above?

c. What problems or impediments are being encountered or anticipated in the process of implementing each of the above PNIOs and Quarterly Supplement listings?

4. In your responses, please indicate when pertinent to your terms of reference:

a. Revised priority collection or research requirements which have been derived from the above PNIOs or Quarterly Supplement listings.

b. How such requirements were identified, whether by the further analysis by research personnel described in paragraph 3 of the Foreword of DCID No. 1/3 or by other means.

c. Which revised priority collection requirements have been identified as appropriate for a particular collection system and levied upon it, with due regard to that system's operational capabilities and suitabilities.

d. Based upon revised priority collection or research requirements, any shift, augmentation, or reduction which has been taken or planned in the allocation of existing collection or research resources, or the development of new collection or processing resources.

5. In making the above request, it is recognized that the missions of the Committees vary widely in subject matter and focus and that many of the

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


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topics set forth in the PNIOs and the Quarterly Supplement are either outside the jurisdiction of a particular Committee or only partially applicable within a given Committee structure. For that reason, it is important in this first report that each Committee take care to include in its responses those items for which it has an assigned responsibility and those implementing actions which are clearly a part of its mission. In reporting actions taken or planned, Committees should report not only the activities actually conducted by the Committee or its subordinate interagency groups but also supporting actions by member agencies taken under the auspices of the Committee or its members.

6. The Committee reports should be submitted to the USIB Secretariat not later than 2 December 1963, for review and analysis by Mr. Bross and his Staff and for reporting to the USIB.

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Executive Secretary

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Attachment A  
USIB-D-25.1/9  
28 August 1963

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3<sup>1</sup>

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised 14 August 1963)

FOREWORD

1. Pursuant to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3, the following list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs) is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence production, and of supporting research and collection activities. This list replaces that contained in DCID No. 1/3, 9 January 1963, which is hereby rescinded.

2. This listing of priority objectives presupposes that the bulk of the intelligence required for the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research pursuant to DCID No. 1/2. The present Directive identifies, for priority treatment, certain specific critical substantive problems within the general body of the intelligence required for policy planning purposes. In this context, "priority" means preferment in the allocation of research and collection resources. Such preferment does not warrant neglect of the general and basic intelligence coverage required by DCID No. 1/2.

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This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/3 of 9 January 1963.

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Attachment A  
USIB-D-25.1/9  
28 August 1963

3. The identification of specific critical substantive problems in this Directive is but a first step toward determination of the priority, if any, to be accorded to particular collection requirements by particular systems of collection. Not every bit of information somehow related to a priority problem will be required with equal urgency; some may be procurable by routine means. The identification of priority requirements entails further analysis by research personnel to determine (a) the elements of information essential to the solution of the problem indicated, (b) the elements already available or readily obtainable through research, (c) the additional information obtainable through routine collection, and finally (d) the residual information of such critical importance as to warrant a priority collection effort.

4. Even when a priority collection requirement has been thus established, it does not follow that it should be treated as a matter of priority by every collection agency. A priority requirement appropriate for one system of collection may be of no priority whatever with respect to another, because unsuited to it. Determinations as to which requirements will be accorded priority by particular systems of collection must be made by responsible collection authorities, under the general guidance of the PNIOs, with the regard for operational capabilities and suitabilities.

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Attachment A  
USIB-D-25.1/9  
28 August 1963

5. The present Directive is intended to serve as a stable basis for long-term intelligence planning, with reference to the development of intelligence resources as well as to the allocation of existing resources. It seeks to identify the critical substantive problems likely to persist, or to develop, during the next five years. It will be reviewed and revised annually. It will also be supplemented by a quarterly listing of currently critical or potentially critical situations. This supplement, looking forward for six months or so, will seek to anticipate such emergent changes in the situation as might warrant some shift of emphasis in the employment of research and collection resources.

OBJECTIVES\*



\*While this list of objectives is not intended to have internal priority arrangement, primary emphasis must continue to be given to those objectives which are so critical as to pose an immediate and continuing military threat to the security of the United States.

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Attachment B  
USIB-D-25.1/9  
28 August 1963

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3

QUARTERLY SUPPLEMENT

14 August 1963

FOREWORD

1. DCID No. 1/3, revised annually, is intended to serve as a stable basis for long-term intelligence planning by identifying critical intelligence problems deemed likely to persist over a period of five years or so. Such guidance must necessarily be expressed in relatively broad terms.

2. The purpose of this Quarterly Supplement is to provide more current and specific guidance within the context of DCID No. 1/3, by calling attention to situations which, within the next six months or so, may require some adjustment of present intelligence attention and coverage. The Supplement is intended to guide short-term intelligence planning by anticipating changes in specific situations which may justify either some reduction or some augmentation of effort.

3. It is not the function of this Supplement to present a complete listing of all matters of intelligence interest. Like DCID No. 1/3 itself, the Supplement presupposes that the bulk of the intelligence required for

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
Attachment B  
USIB-D-25.1/9  
28 August 1963

the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal coverage pursuant to DCID No. 1/2.

4. This Supplement will be superseded by another in December 1963.

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11 December 1963 Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP75B00621R000200200001-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary  
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  
Involvement in Priority National  
Intelligence Objectives

REFERENCE: USIB-AM-63/45 of November 1963  
"Priority National Intelligence Objectives"

1. USIB-AM-63/45 requested a report on "major modifications in procedures adopted and significant changes in actions taken or planned by your respective Committees to discharge their responsibilities with respect to the implementation of DCIC No. 1/3."

2. COMOR involvement with the PNIO is secondary. The last sentence of the third paragraph of the 28 August PNIO, which is quoted below, is a good statement of what is accomplished by COMOR members before a requirement is brought to COMOR:

"The identification of priority requirements entails further analysis by research personnel to determine (a) The elements of information essential to the solution of the problem indicated, (b) The elements already available or readily obtainable through research, (c) The additional information obtainable through routine collection, and finally (d) The residual information of such critical

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importance as to warrant a priority collection

effort."

3. Answers to the reference memorandum are given

below:

Para 3a. --"Which of the PNIOs and Quarterly Supplement listings are germane in whole or in part to your Committee's responsibilities?"

The majority of the highest priority requirements reaching COMOR are in satisfaction of OBJECTIVE 2 of the PNIO. Additional requirements coming to COMOR contribute to 1a and 2 of the Quarterly Supplement. COMOR is also a contributor to 6 of the Supplement and makes contributions to 4 and 5. In the case of 4 and 5, COMOR has been particularly careful in its insistence that it be established that other sources are temporarily failing to meet an emergency situation, and that there therefore exists a justification for the use of overhead reconnaissance.

Para 3b. --"What extra and unusual efforts, beyond normal coverage, have been made or are planned with respect to each of the PNIOs and Quarterly Supplement listings identified in the above question?"

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As COMOR is not involved in implementing,

it cannot claim efforts or plans.

Para 3c. -- "What problems or impediments are being encountered or anticipated in the process of implementing each of the above PNIOs and Quarterly Supplement listings?"

COMOR has no problems as it has no responsibility for implementing the PNIOs.

4. With reference to para 5 of the action memorandum:

The admonition to report supporting actions by members leads back to our previous statements on how COMOR acts. It does not specifically charge any member with action to determine what other collection facilities are being used to satisfy a requirement but expects each member to have done this before submitting a requirement to COMOR for consideration.

Para 4a. -- "Revised priority collection or research requirements which have been derived from the above PNIOs or Quarterly Supplement listings."

The COMOR type of priority has been unaffected by PNIO revision.

Para 4b. -- "How such requirements were identified, whether by the further analysis by research personnel described in para 3

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Not applicable to COMOR.

Para 4c. --"Which revised priority collection requirements have been identified as appropriate for a particular collection system and levied upon it, with due regard to that system's operational capabilities and suitabilities. "

Virtually all of COMOR's priority collection requirements have been identified as appropriate for one of its collection systems and have been accepted with due regard to the operational capabilities and suitabilities of those systems. COMOR specifies "virtually all" because under some emergency conditions and because of pressure from higher authority COMOR sometimes shares the responsibility for a requirement on which it may feel its contribution would be minimal.

Para 4d. --"Based upon revised priority collection or research requirements, any shift, augmentation, or reduction which has been taken or planned in the allocation of existing collection or research resources, or the development of new collection or processing resources.

The collection resources known to COMOR and in general coming under its cognizance are sensitive

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and their development and use are only justifiable if deployed against highest priority targets. It is felt that there is little likelihood of there being a change in the PNIO itself likely to affect the major collection efforts. Changes in emphasis and importance of areas outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc may occur and have some affect on the use of existing collection devices.

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