

the procedure. Does that state it substantially?

Mr. MUSKIE. That states it precisely, may I say to the Senator. We have no interest in blocking the project. We are just concerned with the particular aspect of it that I have described.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If my distinguished colleague, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young), has no objection on his side of the aisle, I see no objection to the amendment, and I would be willing to accept it and take it to conference.

Mr. YOUNG. I have no objection. In fact, I think the Senator from Maine makes a good case.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I express my appreciation to both of my colleagues.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Maine.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on S. 3703 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated by title.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 3703) to authorize in the District of Columbia a plan providing for the representation of defendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the courts of the District of Columbia and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 15, 1974, at pp. H8448-H8450.)

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report on S. 3703.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Missouri.

The motion was agreed to.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message from the President of the United States was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Marks, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. NUNN) laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the nomination of William R. Crawford, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Cyprus, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

NOTE

In yesterday's RECORD, at page 15354, third column, a message from the President of the United States is shown as having been referred to the Committee on Appropriations. This reference is incorrect. The message has now been referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1975

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, what is the pending order of business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. H.R. 16243.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1836.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 50, between lines 20 and 21, insert a new section as follows:

SEC. 848. No funds in excess of \$81,000,000,000 may be appropriated pursuant to this Act.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished junior Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN) be added as a cosponsor to the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, the amendment I propose today to the defense appropriations bill is motivated by two important considerations: First, that waste and mismanagement due to several years of overspending have diminished rather than expanded the effectiveness of our conventional forces; second, that the severe inflation facing our economy today and in the foreseeable future necessitates a real reduction in budgetary outlays for fiscal year 1975 and beyond.

The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee knows that I greatly admire the work he has done on this bill. But despite the reductions that have been made, the defense budget continues to grow disproportionately while the American people have less to show for it.

Last year, General Brown, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned:

We are going to be out of business if we don't find ways to cut costs.

But the \$82.1 billion budget we consider today is permeated with wasteful programs which add nothing to the national security. And, as such, it is a disincentive in the search for managerial

innovation in the important areas of weapons procurement and manpower utilization.

Each year we hear the symptoms of mismanagement—cost overruns, weapons failures in combat, reductions in quantities of arms due to excessive costs, burgeoning headquarters personnel, and excessive numbers of support forces. It is no longer possible to argue that more money will give us a stronger national defense. And there is no time more appropriate than during this period of rampant inflation to establish a budget ceiling which will encourage change.

It is my firm belief that there is no more intelligent and creative group in these United States than the men and women of our military services. When you add the managers and employees of the largest corporations in America, you have a force which is indeed formidable. But in recent years that force has been misdirected by a budgetary process which encourages deceit and punishes innovation. And Congress must share the blame.

During the 5 years I have served in this body, I can think of only one defense debate—excluding Vietnam—which provided congressional and public exposure of the issues equal to their importance. That was the ABM debate. Senator McINTYRE's excellent efforts on Trident and counterforce notwithstanding, we have generally failed in providing an adequate forum for debate on some of the most crucial issues of our time. And the defense bill has grown heavy under the burden of unnecessary weapons and programs.

We have also failed to scrutinize the defense budget because too often such spending is considered worthwhile in "Grand Rapids" and a "wasteful boondoggle in Oklahoma," as it was so aptly put by President Ford in a slightly different context.

But I am optimistic. I do not believe that parochialism need doom Congress to a perpetual inability to reduce or eliminate specific items in the defense budget. Today, however, we must recognize the obvious political reality and act accordingly. We must seek ways to consider this budget on a national scale and reduce it to its proper level.

Though there is always a measurable limit to our economy's ability to support both defense needs and consumer demand, a strong defense and a healthy economy are not mutually exclusive goals. Both are vital to our national well-being and both should entail national sacrifice. It is our job to find the lines beyond which we cannot venture—at the upper extremity lest we stimulate more inflation—and at the lower extremity lest we weaken our defense posture.

It is my firm conviction that an \$81 billion ceiling on new budgetary authority is more than adequate to maintain the effectiveness of our military forces. My only concern is that it may still be too high to help in the battle against inflation.

In that regard, it is important to understand that, due to the peculiar nature of defense spending, any savings we can effect in this budget will be particularly helpful in countering inflation in the cur-

has been investigating possible sites in Maine for the radar system. However, it was not until June 25 of this year—after Senate passage of the military procurement authorization bill—that the Air Force announced the selection of a "preferred" transmitter site in western Maine and a receiver site in eastern Maine.

The receiver site, involving 1,000 acres of valuable farmland, has generated the most concern among Maine citizens. The land in question produces 5 percent of Maine's total blueberry crop with an estimated annual cash value of \$47,000.

As a result, Maine citizens and State officials seek adequate opportunity both to point out to the Air Force the adverse economic impact of the selected site and to solicit from the Air Force information as to the availability and cost of alternative sites which would still meet the technical requirements of the system.

Public hearings on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement have been scheduled for September and the Air Force has encouraged public comment. At the same time, however, there are indications that development of the proposed site is proceeding apace. Therefore, the hearings may not provide an adequate opportunity for Maine citizens to convince the Air Force of the importance of the land in question to our economy. The purchase of land options on some tracts involved in the system are scheduled to take place prior to the hearing. Also, potential contractors were requested on July 25 to submit detailed proposals and cost estimates on site development.

This amendment is intended simply to limit any further action on site acquisition and development of the prototype receiver until additional information on the matter of site selection is obtained. It is not our intent to prevent the Air Force from proceeding with development of the radar technology and other research activities associated with the OTH system.

I believe the delay I am urging is reasonable and will assure that Members of Congress and the citizens of Maine will have ample opportunity to resolve the questions which have been raised.

We are currently holding discussions with the Air Force, and I am hopeful today's vote—evidence of the sensitivity of the Senate to the problem concerning the proposed receiver site for the OTH system—will generate the kind of cooperative spirit which we need to have in order to resolve the problems.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point some recent correspondence I have had with the Air Force concerning this matter.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 13, 1974

Maj. Gen. M. J. BOSWELL,
Director, Legislative Liaison, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL BOSWELL: On August 9, Colonel Horace Wood briefed my staff on the Administration's plans to build a prototype Over-The-Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) radar system in the State of Maine. In the course of the briefing, several questions were

raised which Colonel Wood suggested would best be answered in writing for the record.

Specifically, the following questions were raised about which I would like to know the Air Force's thinking: How does the OTH-B improve the current DEW line? How likely is it that an operational OTH-B would be able to detect the kind of subsonic missiles that an adversary might employ? How does the planned development of an OTH-B system relate to the Executive's projected reductions in the Air National Guard? What consideration was given to the economic impact of constructing the OTH-B on the State of Maine and, specifically on Washington County? Finally, what criteria were used for choosing the receiver site in Township 19, as opposed to another nearby site with less adverse economic impact?

Since the Congress is currently considering the FY '75 Military Procurement Appropriations Bill, I would appreciate the favor of an early reply.

Sincerely,

EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
U.S. Senator

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington, D.C., August 21, 1974.

Hon. EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
U.S. Senator

DEAR SENATOR MUSKIE: This is in response to your letter of August 12, 1974, requesting the Air Force view on several questions concerning the Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar Program.

Specific answers to your questions are contained in the attachment. In addition, a copy of the Revised Draft Environmental Impact Statement filed with the Council on Environmental Quality on July 30, 1974, is forwarded for your information. It is important to note that the location of the transmitter and receiver stations was not become finalized until after Federal and State agencies and the public have had an opportunity to comment on the Draft Statement. They may submit their comments to the Special Assistant for Environmental Quality, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, or to one of the open hearings scheduled for September 11, 12, and 13. The deadline for comments is September 23.

After all comments are considered, we will prepare and issue a Final Environmental Impact Statement setting forth our decisions. No action can be taken to implement the decision until 30 days after release of the Final Statement.

If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us. Sincerely,

ROBERT B. TANGUY,
Brigadier General, USAF, Dep. Dir.
Legislative Liaison.

OVER-THE-HORIZON BACKSCATTER (OTH-B)
RADAR PROGRAM

1. Question: How does the OTH-B improve the current DEW Line?

Answer: The present Air Force program and long-range plans call for two OTH-B radars, one sited in the Northeast in the State of Maine and one sited in the Northwest portion of the Continental United States (CONUS). When operational these two sites will preclude an end run of the DEW Line in the north. The initial phase is to design and develop a limited coverage prototype and conduct a test and evaluation for one year for the purpose of validating system concepts and defining performance and costs before building the operational sites.

2. Question: How likely is it that an operational OTH-B would be able to detect the kind of subsonic missiles that an adversary might employ?

Answer: Although it is possible for an OTH-B radar to detect the missiles to which you refer, the primary mission of the

CONUS OTH-B system is aircraft detection. The distinguishing characteristics of an OTH-B radar is its ability to use the ionosphere to reflect the high frequency (HF) signals around the earth's curvature, typically on the order of 4,000 kilometers. This capability provides a potential to provide a quantum improvement in the range at which aircraft can be detected, and at all altitudes down to the earth's surface. It will be possible, therefore, with an operational OTH-B radar to detect and provide warning of an adversary aircraft before they penetrate to the range necessary to launch their subsonic missiles.

3. Question: How does the planned development of an OTH-B system relate to the Executive's projected reductions in the Air National Guard?

Answer: The long-range surveillance and tactical warning which is possible with the OTH-B system is more vital than ever in view of the projected reductions in the Air National Guard Interceptor Force and our ability to react and intercept potentially hostile aircraft entering our sovereign airspace. The OTH-B system will significantly increase the warning time available to alert National Command Authorities such that appropriate action can be taken to determine the identity and purpose of the intruder.

4. Question: What consideration was given to the economic impact of constructing the OTH-B on the State of Maine and, specifically, on Washington County?

Answer: Consideration of site locations during the concept formulation phase was based primarily on technical and operational criteria. Once the State of Maine was considered optimum under these criteria, extensive consideration of the economic impact in the local areas within the State was factored into the final site selection. Recommendations were solicited and received from the State of Maine Land Development officials on possible site locations, and the preferred site takes into consideration the availability of land and the economic conditions.

5. Question: What criteria were used for choosing the receiver site in Township 19, as opposed to another nearby site with less adverse economic impact?

Answer: The detailed criteria used for choosing the receiver site are contained in the Revised Draft Environmental Statement and include minimum Radio Frequency Interference (RFI distances), economic impact, population densities, existing soil and foliage densities, topography, and other associated impacts and costs. The selected site in Township 19 was considered optimum in this case. Surveys in the areas around the Township 19 site determined that the topography was less than technically desirable due to orientation and size. Construction in the possible surrounding areas would, therefore, necessitate extensive land relocation and grading with much higher costs and environmental impact.

Mr. MUSKIE, I appreciate the patience of the distinguished floor manager of the bill, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), in giving consideration to this amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, as I understand, we are not taking the money out of the bill, we are simply providing for no expenditure until some of these problems can be further considered and hopefully worked out.

Mr. MUSKIE, The Senator is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN, It is not killing the project, but it is trying to make an accommodation so that there can be a spirit of cooperation and good will as a part of

August 21, 1974

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rent fiscal year and beyond. In the jargon of the economist, defense spending is "inherently inflationary" due to its "non-productive demand generating nature." In plain English, defense expenditures translate into consumer demand, but for every dollar that goes into defense production, there is one less potential dollar for the production of consumer goods. The increase in consumer demand resulting from defense spending and the simultaneous reduction in supply create a classic inflationary environment.

Furthermore, other than increasing consumer demand, defense spending has a limited impact on economic growth. Private spending—or even nonmilitary public spending—can create capital goods which can add to the total productive capability of the economy and also create more jobs. Goods produced for military purposes have no such return.

It is not my intention to base my entire case today on economic theory. I recognize that any theory has a countertheory, especially in the field of economics. But I do believe it is necessary to characterize the nature of the Federal spending my amendment seeks to reduce.

President Ford has reaffirmed his predecessor's goal of reducing outlays in fiscal 1975 below the \$305 billion originally requested. Congress, for its part, has also resolved to cut the budget; \$5 billion is the goal most frequently cited, although the Senate has twice gone on record as favoring a \$10 billion cut. But according to the most recent budgetary scorekeeping report, appropriations bills and other legislative spending measures enacted as of August 2 place us \$1.1 billion over the administration's request.

Of the \$305 billion Federal budget, only \$84 billion are in the controllable category; that is, items not already designated for payment by other legislative measures. Of that \$84 billion, \$58 billion, or 70 percent, is attributable to defense spending. There, if we cannot establish an \$81 billion ceiling on this appropriations bill, I think it will make it more difficult for us to tell our constituents that Congress is going to cut the Federal budget.

I have heard no one proclaim that the fight against inflation is a 1-year battle. In this regard, a reduction in this budget will help in curbing budgetary outlays in later years as well, since much of the procurement and research money we will appropriate will not be spent in this fiscal year.

As I said earlier, we have overspent for defense in the recent past. There is no better illustration of that assertion than to examine the unexpended balances on hand at the end of the past 4 fiscal years. This amount has risen steadily from \$31 billion in fiscal 1972 to an estimated \$44.1 billion at the end of fiscal 1975.

This means that, increasingly, goods and services for which the Defense Department has contracted are being delivered at a slower pace than appropriated money is being poured into the system. We are appropriating more money than the delivery system can keep up with. While there will always be un-

expended balances, they should remain steady or decrease, except in wartime. The current trend is causing a serious distortion which my amendment would help rectify.

In his book, "The Politics of the Budgetary Process," Aaron Wildavsky said the most successful tactic in assuring the financial growth of a bureaucracy was the technique of "incrementalism." In other words, an agency should ask Congress for just a little more than it wants even while it wants a little more than it needs. In the past 2 years the Defense Department has probably caused Mr. Wildavsky to want to rewrite his book.

Soon after the fiscal 1974 budget was approved, DOD asked for a supplemental appropriation of \$6.2 billion. The very day they asked for the \$6.2 billion as a supplemental the Pentagon submitted its fiscal year 1975 request calling for an \$11.4 billion increase. But even that request did not stand. Budget amendments were received in the spring which raised the fiscal year 1975 request to \$87.1 billion. Thus, if the fiscal year 1974 supplemental is included, the total increase requested by the Defense Department since the fiscal year 1974 budget was enacted on December 20, 1973, is \$19 billion.

In action to date Congress has reduced those requests by only \$6.5 billion—this includes a \$1.5 billion reduction of the fiscal year 1974 supplemental and the reduction of \$5 billion approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee. It seems clear that the Defense Department's mastery over the politics of the budgetary process is unsurpassed.

Now, as we debate an amendment which would allow an increase in the defense budget of \$6.8 billion over the amount appropriated last year we hear calls of alarm from those who would rather ignore the total DOD request—the supplementals, the budget amendments, the special aid for the Middle East war—and the admission that at least \$1.5 billion in outlays was put into the budget for economic purposes rather than defense purposes.

This budget is a model for the technique of "incrementalism." It is still more than the Pentagon wants, to say nothing of what it really needs.

Mr. President, as I said at the outset, it is my hope that an \$81 billion budget would encourage positive managerial change within the Defense Department. This year I had the opportunity to examine one of the more current managerial innovations at Defense, the so-called "design-to-cost" program. It was adopted with great fanfare in 1969 at the insistence of then Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard.

On January 28, 1974, approximately 5 years after Mr. Packard made "design-to-cost" an official DOD policy, I asked about the current status of the program. I wanted to know the cost goals that had been set for each weapons system.

I was amazed to find that the vast majority of systems were not yet under the program 5 years after David Packard had put it into place. Indeed, my letter forced the military services to sit down

for the first time to determine how and whether weapons programs would come under a "design-to-cost" requirement.

"Design-to-cost" is a good program, but there is simply no incentive to care about cost goals when there are so many tax dollars to be spent.

David Packard posed a general cure for the problems which afflict our Defense Establishment when he said:

We are going to have to stop this problem of people playing games with each other. Games that will destroy us, if we do not bring them to a halt.

The "game playing" to which Mr. Packard referred is the most debilitating symptom of our failure to bring efficiency to defense. Unfortunately, the budgetary process itself may inspire the most destructive tendencies.

For example, military planners understand that the public seeks dramatic, not marginal, improvements in the performance of a particular weapon. Imaginations, therefore, work overtime in establishing performance goals that are frequently unattainable, often unnecessary and sometimes downright impractical.

Next, it is felt necessary to understate costs. In this the military services have ready allies. Contractors abound who are willing to bid low to buy in. And when the Pentagon comes before Congress to certify the low cost of a new system, it does so with the support of industry.

The military planner also understands that it is difficult to sell long-range projects. Consequently, a schedule is drawn up which shows quick progression from milestone to milestone. Scarce margin is left for error and the pressure to deliver often leaves little time for adequate preproduction testing.

The direct consequence of this excessive concurrency in weapons development is the cost overrun. We have, all heard the incredible toll these overruns take. In 1972, according to GAO, 77 major systems had accumulated overruns totaling \$28.7 billion. This year a GAO study of 55 major systems revealed overruns of \$26.3 billion.

There is simply no getting around it, from the contractor to the military project officer to the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the message is clear: cutting costs is not the way to get ahead. It is time that Congress sent a new message to the decisionmakers at the Defense Department.

Mr. President, I have said repeatedly today that the budget that we are considering contains waste—that \$81 billion is more than adequate to maintain the effectiveness of our forces. While I am sure the vast majority of American people would agree that the defense budget does contain waste, I would not expect any Member of this body to support a ceiling on military expenditures that could not be supported by specific suggestions of areas where reductions can be made. Congress has a constitutional responsibility to assure that our military forces are properly equipped to maintain our security.

I would also concede that in enumerating areas where further reductions could

be made, my judgment is not infallible. I will, therefore, discuss reductions totaling twice as much as are necessary to achieve the \$81 billion ceiling. Certainly, the defense experts on whose recommendations I will base my suggestions must be correct at least half the time.

Mr. President, we will begin discussing several different weapon systems and Defense Department programs, the sum aggregate of which will be close to double what I am recommending insofar as a cut in this year's budget is concerned.

In addition, I have attempted to steer away from programs and systems which I believe have been subjected to the debate and decision of this body. Systems such as the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, counterforce and programs such as MASF aid to South Vietnam most certainly require our continued surveillance, but they will not be part of my list of potential savings.

If I may, Mr. President, I will now go into an item-by-item analysis of where I think substantial cuts can be made in this budget.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Mr. President, I will begin my discussion of potential reductions in the manpower area.

The committee has made a noteworthy step in dealing with the problem of excess forces stationed overseas. A withdrawal of 25,000 troops is to be completed by March 31, 1975. This requirement combined with the reduction in total end strength of 24,211 could mean that the Department of Defense will make major dollar savings from the overseas withdrawals.

On the other hand, the Senate Armed Services Committee in their report on the authorization bill outlined many areas where additional personnel costs could be saved, primarily in the area of support functions. Altogether, they recommended a total reduction of 49,000, some 25,000 more than the reduction now before us. Since the Armed Services Committee emphasized cuts in support personnel and the Appropriations Committee dealt primarily with overseas forces, I believe the work of both committees could be combined to justify a larger savings to the taxpayer.

It is clear, for example that an additional 25,000 personnel could be deactivated with no perceivable effect on national security. If one-half of the direct costs—\$12,500 per person—can be saved this fiscal year, the net reduction would be at least \$156,250,000. With this additional reduction, the end strength level would approximate that recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I would add that the full potential of such a reduction would be \$300 million.

I will draw upon the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the authorization bill, S. 3000, which described cuts totaling 31,500, to delineate the 25,000 reduction I feel is feasible:

First. Reduce the active duty manpower request for the Air Force an additional 5,500. The Air Force has decided that any increases in strategic airlift manning—C-5A and C-141 aircraft—should be achieved through Reserve components. An earlier reduction of 2,810

for this purpose was mandated in the fiscal year 1975 authorizing legislation already enacted into law.

Second. Cut active duty levels by 10,850, to achieve a 7-percent reduction in military personnel assigned to training functions. Overall, the proportion of staffs, overhead and support personnel compared to student load in the Department of Defense is extremely high. For example, using both military and civilian staff and overhead personnel, the Senate Armed Services Committee found an unacceptable ratio of students per staff in each of the services. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Armed Services Committee study of this problem, taken from the committee report on S. 3000, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the study was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STUDENT PER STAFF RATIOS

Students per staff:	
Army	1.6 to 1
Navy	1.5 to 1
Marine Corps	1.8 to 1
Air Force	1.6 to 1
Total DOD	1.6 to 1

If training base support personnel were included in the above ratios, it would reduce the overall Defense Department ratio to almost one instructor or staff man for every student. That is much more than other school systems in the country. For comparison, student to staff ratios for several kinds of non-Defense schools are shown below:

Students per staff:	
Public high schools	18.9 to 1
Public post high school vocational schools	From 4.6 to 2 to 70.4 to 1
Private post high school vocational schools	From 28.6 to 8 to 123.7 to 1
Colleges	15.0 to 1
Local school system	15.0 to 1

The committee is aware of the fact that military training differs substantially from the training and education in the civilian sector. It is also aware of the accounting differences that make exact comparisons difficult. However, the difference in staffing is so wide, the committee believes that much more can be done to tighten down on staffs and overhead for training. As a minimum, the committee feels that the following avenues should be vigorously pursued to achieve reductions in training manpower and expects a report on actions taken in each area prior to the FY 1976 manpower request.

Reduction of the levels of staffing in training activities.

Consolidation of schools and courses to eliminate duplication within each service and between Defense components.

Use of educational technology to substitute equipment for training personnel.

Use of improved systems for on-the-job training instead of formal individual training.

Reduction in the scope of career development education as opposed to job related skill development.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I am pleased to yield to the distinguished acting majority leader, the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I merely wish to ask whether or not it would be agreeable to enter into a time limitation on this amendment.

Mr. EAGLETON. I would propose the

following. Mr. President: I do not think I will use the time I am going to propose, but I did talk to some other Senators who want to speak on this subject. In order to protect them, I would propose 4 hours to a side on this amendment. I realize that I probably will not use that much time and, knowing the Senator from Arkansas, I am almost positive he will not use that much.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, in my earlier discussions with the Senator from Missouri, I thought he meant 4 hours equally divided.

Mr. EAGLETON. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Four hours to each side?

Mr. EAGLETON. The problem is that other Senators who are cosponsors want to speak, and this would give me the widest latitude in protecting them. I do not think we will use that much time, and I will be eager to yield back time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I suggest, then, that we do not have an agreement on time, that we talk until we are through, and I will expedite it on this side. I would like to complete action on the bill today.

Mr. EAGLETON. I think we will, but I am trying to consider Senators who are not in the Chamber and who want to speak on the subject.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Eight hours from now will be about 9 o'clock tonight. I hope we can do a little better than that.

Mr. EAGLETON. I plan to move expeditiously, I say to the Senator.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I suggest that we wait a while, to see how the debate progresses. I would like to dispose of the bill late this afternoon.

I have no intention, I may say, of speaking anywhere near 4 hours. I probably will speak 15 or 20 minutes myself, and a few other Senators may wish to speak. I think we could take an hour on this side. I would be willing to accept a 3-hour limitation and give 2 hours to the Senator from Missouri and take 1 hour on our side. I am just trying to expedite the matter and shorten the proceeding, and not deny anyone the right to be heard.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. My question was for the purpose of hoping to expedite the matter. If we entered into an agreement that there would be 4 hours to a side, Senators would not be obliged to take that much time. They could yield back such time as they wish, and that would be an outside limitation. Without an agreement, the debate could go on throughout the day and into tomorrow.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I would like to vote on it today.

Mr. EAGLETON. I can assure the Senator that this amendment will be voted on today, well before sundown.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Will the Senators agree to this proposal: that the Senator from Missouri have not to exceed 4 hours and that the Senator from Arkansas have—

Mr. McCLELLAN. Not to exceed 2 hours.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. And the Senator from Arkansas have not to exceed 2 hours on the amendment?

Mr. EAGLETON. That is fine with me.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I will agree to that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senators.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. President, I had completed item 2 of my discussion, and I shall continue.

Third. Cut 12,750 or 5 percent of the 255,000 active duty personnel requested for base operating support. This support includes many varied functions involved in operating bases for active duty and reserve military and civilian personnel and their dependents. It includes such items as the operation of commissaries, laundries, and theaters, the providing of base transportation, supply and food services, building and road maintenance and construction, providing utilities, fire and public services and running the base headquarters and administrative activities.

Since fiscal year 1973, the Department of Defense has announced 463 base closures or realignment actions that have eliminated 69,400 military and civilian jobs. However, these reductions are not reflected in the DOD manpower request for base support personnel. In fact, the DOD request included an increase of 5,000 in military personnel above fiscal year 1974 levels for base support.

Fourth. Cut 2,460 or 3 percent of the 82,000 military personnel requested for medical support. According to the Armed Services Committee report—

These personnel are for "fixed site" medical facilities such as hospitals and include all the various kinds of people from doctors to administrative clerks who operate these facilities. This category does not include the medical personnel and units that directly support Army and Marine divisions. Navy ships or Air Force direct support clinics and dispensaries. Although the overall number of military personnel has declined and the Defense Department reported a decrease in medical workload (i.e. patients), the DoD request included an overall increase in the number of medical support personnel and in the ratio of medical support personnel to military manpower.

The committee went on to make the following recommendations:

The committee felt that the number and proportion of medical support personnel in the military services should not be increased. The committee has no intention of decreasing medical care, but there are compelling reasons to hold up increases in medical support personnel at this time.

First, a major study of Health Personnel is underway with participation of Defense, HEW and the Office of Management and Budget. This study, which is to be completed in late 1974, will examine the requirements for medical personnel and is seeking to find ways of making Defense health care delivery more efficient. The reduction would hold medical support at current levels until the study is completed.

Second, medical personnel are difficult to recruit and retain in an all-volunteer situation. The reduction would deny increases in medical support until the recruiting situation is clearer and there is more experience with the medical bonus.

Third, defense medical costs have been increasing rapidly. "Fixed site" medical support costs, including civilian salaries, totaled \$1.6 billion in FY 1960 compared with \$2.8 billion in FY 1975. These medical costs on a

per man basis have risen from \$470 per man in FY 1970 to \$1,280 per man in FY 1975—up 2.7 times.

Mr. President, it is clear that the Armed Services Committee has made responsible recommendations in this important area which, if adopted, will bring considerable savings to the taxpayer. Perhaps even more import the recommendations will go far in trimming the fat of excessive support personnel from our conventional forces.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Mr. President, another area of the Defense budget with excellent potential for substantial savings this year is in reductions of Department of Defense civilian personnel. I would propose reductions from the committee-approved level of civilian manpower which would result in a savings of approximately \$153 million.

The committee has approved funding for 995,000 direct hire civilians who are employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense. The Committee on Armed Services, under the distinguished leadership of Senator STENNIS, earlier proposed funding 982,727 civilian personnel. This would be a reduction of 12,273 below the Appropriations Committee level and 4 percent under the Pentagon request.

I endorse Senator STENNIS' proposal, the reduction proposed by the Armed Services Committee, and feel that this further trimming of civilian personnel levels is easily justified by the inflationary pressures on our economy. Furthermore, Mr. President, a reduction of an additional 12,273 civilian personnel can be accomplished without laying off a single employee of the Defense Department. In fact, the 4-percent cut in the Pentagon request for civilian manpower was, as the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the fiscal year 1975 authorization bill stated, "largely a denial of increases of civilians in the Defense Department request."

DOD employed 994,000 civilians on January 1, 1974, according to the Armed Services Committee report. That is equivalent, I might say, to the population of the two largest cities in my State, St. Louis and Kansas City. That is how many civilians the Department of Defense employed on January 1, 1974.

The Armed Services Committee, therefore, simply rejected the increase of 33,000 civilians and recommended a further 11,600 reduction from the January 1, 1974, level. This further reduction of 11,600 could be accomplished, the Armed Services Committee report went on, "by not filling new job vacancies and by normal attrition, rather than by any layoffs."

The report further stated:

The Defense Department reported that about 215,000 new civilians would have to be hired just to keep the number of civilians in FY 1975 about equal to the number in FY 1974. A reduction of less than 10 percent of the new hires would more than accomplish that part of the Committee reduction that would reduce strength below actual on-board levels.

Mr. President, civilian manpower is a significant portion of the Pentagon's

annual budget that has been largely overlooked. Yet 17.4 percent of total Defense Department outlays for fiscal year 1975 were slated for the civilian personnel payroll according to Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's fiscal year 1975 posture statement. That meant that \$14.9 billion in outlays was planned for civilian pay alone.

This figure is incredible when it is considered that we are not talking about paying for military personnel to fight in combat, but rather another part of the massive support elements needed, ostensibly to keep the troops prepared for fighting. Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations committees have commented at one time or another in the last few years about the large combat-to-support ratio which is such a costly burden in the military budget. Yet the support category referred to in this poor teeth-to-tail ratio does not even include almost one million civilians.

Indeed, while many point to the skyrocketing manpower costs in today's Defense Department budgets, which reach about 55 percent of the Pentagon's budget, it is frequently not realized that 17.4 percent of the 55.4 percent manpower costs go for civilians. The stark statistics are provided in Dr. Schlesinger's posture statement. I ask unanimous consent that the table used in that statement to show the pay costs for DOD manpower categories be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ESTIMATED PAY COSTS FOR DOD MANPOWER IN FISCAL YEAR 1975

Category	Fiscal year 1975 outlays	Percent of DOD outlays
Civilian personnel payroll.....	\$14,929,600,000	17.4
Military personnel payroll.....	19,030,000,000	22.2
Military special pay and allowances.....	6,655,000,000	7.8
Family housing.....	878,000,000	1.0
Military retired pay.....	6,011,000,000	7.0
Total manpower outlays.....	47,504,000,000	55.4

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it is clear that DOD employs a massive number of employees costing a large amount of money. In fact, while the Defense Department employs almost a million civilians, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, frequently cited as an example of an overgrown bureaucracy, employed 142,159 employees as of June 1974 or, I hasten to add, Mr. President, about one-eighth as many civilian employees as DOD.

The Monthly Report on Federal Personnel and Pay of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures' statistics as of June 1974, demonstrates that, excluding the quasi-Federal Postal Service, the Defense Department employs about as many civilians as do all other Federal agencies combined.

The Senate Armed Services Committee report also pointed to many categories of civilians which are not included in the number authorized by that committee. They include:

First, employees performing civil func-

tions administered by DOD, the largest of which is the Corps of Engineers civil works activities. This category includes about 29,000 employees in fiscal year 1975.

Second, indirect-hire employees who are hired by host nations in support of U.S. troops stationed abroad. There are about 103,000 persons included in this category.

Third, employees in special employment programs for students and disadvantaged youth, such as the stay-in-school campaign and the temporary summer aid program. The number in this program varies from about 22,000 at the end of fiscal year 1973 to a summer peak of 40,000 employees.

Fourth, employees of the National Security Agency who are excluded because their employment statistics are classified.

Fifth, schoolteachers in the Department of Defense Overseas School System who are not included because they serve on a 9-month basis and are not on the DOD payroll at the end of the fiscal year. There are approximately 8,000 schoolteachers in this category.

Sixth, employees paid from nonappropriated funds—including those working at base exchanges, commissaries, and clubs. There are an estimated 150,000 personnel in this category.

All these exceptions, some of which have to be paid for by the taxpayers and some of whom are paid for through internally generated funds, bring the total worldwide Defense Department force to well over 1.3 million people. A reduction of a mere 12,273 seems insignificant in comparison.

There are 1.3 million civilians working worldwide for the Defense Department. If memory serves me correctly, this is a number of people greater than about 20 of the States of the Union.

I just added the name of the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN) as a cosponsor to this amendment. I am not sure as to the precise population of Delaware, but I suspect that it is under a half million. I know Delaware has one House Member. The number of civilian personnel, worldwide, for DOD is then greater, I think, than the total of about 20 States in the Union. Thus, in terms of what Senators represent in terms of States, I should say that DOD's work is already so well represented here, they should have about 30 Members of Congress assigned to them, based on their population.

The distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator STENNIS, has more than once expressed his dissatisfaction with the number of civilians requested by the Pentagon. In his opening comments at the manpower authorization hearings for fiscal year 1975 on March 21, 1974, Senator STENNIS said:

I am concerned that the Defense requests before us today include a substantial increase in civilian personnel, some 30,000 and a nearly stand-pat situation in the military strengths requested. It looks as though the taxpayer is not getting much economic benefit from any improvements in Defense efficiency. It seems to me he ought to get some.

Last year the House Appropriations Committee expressed a similar unhappiness with Defense Department civilian manpower levels. In its report on the fiscal year 1974 Defense Department appropriations bill, the committee, chaired by Representative MAHON, stated:

For the past few years the Committee has been concerned about the high number of civilians being employed by the Defense Department. It has been unsatisfied with the extent of reductions.

The House Appropriations Committee report also gave several reasons why civilians jobs should be cut:

1. The ceasefire in Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Indochina.
2. The reduction in the number of military personnel and equipment.
3. The proposed closing of some military installations.
4. New production techniques and mechanization which should take over some of the civilian workload.

That committee, the Mahon committee, called for action to bring about decreases in its report on the fiscal year 1975 appropriations bill when it pointed out that for fiscal year 1974:

The Congress made a reduction of about 15,900 positions as an indication of its interest to encourage the Department to carefully monitor and control its civilian employment practices. The Department, however, did not make the reductions recommended but, in lieu thereof, submitted a supplemental budget request in civilian positions of about 19,000. Thus the Department requested about 35,000 more civilian positions than the Congress approved.

In short, Mr. President, it is clear that substantial reductions can be made in the civilian personnel area. I am recommending a cut of only 12,273 personnel to the level approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee with the attendant savings of about \$153 million. Yet it is clear from the evidence presented by various congressional committees and distinguished military experts, that we can make even further reductions from that which I propose. My proposal will, I repeat, lead to no layoffs nor will it harm U.S. security interests.

AWACS

In the weapons system area, I will begin with a program I have followed closely for almost 3 years—the airborne warning and control system—AWACS. The savings I believe can be derived in this area are typical of the subsequent recommendations I will make. They are savings designed to slow down the development of a weapons program to assure that it is properly tested before it is procured. As I will explain in detail, the risk we take in moving ahead too fast on the AWACS program is not simply that the system may end up not working well. It is that AWACS may not work at all in performing its primary mission.

AWACS, an overland look-down radar and tracking system housed in a modified Boeing 707, was originally assigned the primary task of strategic air defense.

In February 1970, a revision to a DOD development concept paper added a secondary role—tactical command and control. But that secondary role was not

given serious consideration until August 1973, when Secretary Schlesinger assigned the tactical NATO role as the new primary mission. At about the same time, he deemphasized the air defense mission stating in his March 1974 posture statement that:

A CONUS air defense system structure primarily for peacetime surveillance (the current air defense mission) would not require an AWACS force.

In November 1973 the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council met to decide the future course for the AWACS program. A main concern of the participants was the fact that the aircraft scheduled for procurement with fiscal year 1975 funds were to be built in the strategic, or core, configuration—the configuration suitable for the obsolete air defense role. They were, in short, stuck with a configuration that was to perform the function that no longer existed.

A letter from the Chairman of the Review Council, Deputy Secretary William Clements, to the Secretary of the Air Force pointed out the need for major changes to achieve a design capable of performing the much more complicated tactical job—the job recently created for AWACS.

It is evident that a more capable configuration than the core is essential to support general purpose tactical forces. The effective integration of command and control in joint operations requires additional (intelligence) equipment . . . identification (devices), communications, data transfer, command and control and a measure of self defense.

Secretary Clements then directed the Air Force to conduct extensive tests to determine what the tactical configuration should be. That configuration has yet to be defined, and could not possibly be validated until operational tests have been performed. This rather obvious point was made in a highly critical GAO report on AWACS sent to me in March 1974.

In testimony before the Armed Services Committee, GAO defense analysts even more explicitly described the problems of designing the new version of AWACS:

The change in the primary mission emphasis from strategic to tactical requires that more and better equipment of all types, computers, processors, displays, and particularly communications equipment, be on board the aircraft. Thus, the question exists as to whether all of the needed systems can be installed in the aircraft, can be integrated so as to function properly together, can interface with a large number of command and control systems now being operated in Europe by U.S. and NATO ally forces, and whether the system will have the needed tracking and communication capacity to accomplish its mission.

The GAO went on to recommend that Congress "defer funding for production models of the AWACS until the Air Force verifies and demonstrates through tests that a viable and useful tactical configuration can be developed." There is good reason for that recommendation, for caution, for there are grave doubts that AWACS will ever be viable in the tactical environment of Europe.

When a GAO technical consultant pre-

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pared mathematical calculations showing that AWACS could be completely blacked out by ground-based jammers from within 200 miles of the Iron Curtain, the Air Force protested that the calculations were based on a more limited capability than the AWACS radar actually possessed. But these calculations were based on the official specifications for the radar given to the contractors.

Now, we have a study performed by the Air Force itself which shows clearly that AWACS can be jammed with inexpensive and unsophisticated jammers which could virtually render the \$80 million plane useless.

In analyzing this Air Force study, the GAO took the Air Force's "bombs-over-target" effectiveness estimates for AWACS and concluded that because self-screening jamming could be used against the system, the unenhanced version—the version we will buy with fiscal year 1975 dollars—contributed "nothing to the air defense of Europe." The GAO did point out that the Air Force has suggested two techniques for at least minimizing the impact of the jamming threat, but also states that:

Neither of the two techniques for overcoming self-screening jamming has been demonstrated in tests nor evaluated as to effectiveness.

It is important to understand the difference between the mission originally conceived for AWACS and its present task. Whereas in the air defense role AWACS would have only to detect and track a wing of slow-moving turbo-prop bombers flying toward the United States over large expanses of ocean and wasteland, in the tactical role AWACS will confront literally thousands of tracks of fast-moving fighter aircraft. These aircraft will have to be detected and sorted out by AWACS' computers and then tracked as intercepts are attempted.

In the air defense role AWACS has no ground-based jamming threat to consider and there are no fighter aircraft to pose a threat to its survivability. AWACS would naturally be a high priority target for the numerous enemy aircraft we will confront in a European air battle and, according to GAO, if these aircraft were equipped with jamming devices, AWACS would have a "nearly zero probability of surviving."

The principal mission for AWACS is in the European theater, and yet our NATO allies have not decided whether they will purchase the system. NATO is currently studying the question of whether to buy AWACS and no decision will be made by our allies until the end of the calendar year 1975.

I will not speculate on the eventual decision NATO might make but I do not believe that we would be fulfilling our obligation to the taxpayer if we funded the procurement of AWACS before we know whether and how many systems NATO will buy.

Perhaps, the most compelling reason to delay procurement of AWACS in fiscal 1975 is the recommendation by the Senate Armed Services Committee that an independent group of radar experts study whether AWACS will ever be capable of performing its primary mission against

ground-based jamming. This group will provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a full report on this most vital question.

It seems obvious that no money should be appropriated for procurement of AWACS until we know whether NATO feels AWACS is worth the investment and whether the system will ever be capable of performing in Europe. It is clear that a reduction of procurement funds would help to avoid an excessive amount of concurrency—and the resultant overruns in later years—and, at the same time, save \$311.1 million approved by the committee for procurement of 4 aircraft and initial spares.

SITE DEFENSE

Now, Mr. President, I move on to the next system I will use as an illustration to prove wherein the budget can be prudently, and safely cut without sacrificing one iota of national security—site defense.

One might have assumed that the ABM issue died with the signing of the ABM treaty.

Mr. President, General MacArthur said "old soldiers never die, they just fade away." Well, weapons systems, Mr. President, never die and, believe me, they never fade away; no, sir. So we still have an ABM kicking around, and it is called site defense.

Site defense is being developed as an upgrade for the Safeguard system around our ICBM site at Grand Forks, N. Dak. While it cannot be deployed, it is said that it is needed as a "hedge" against a possible Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

But in July of this year that treaty looked stronger than ever as the United States and Russia agreed to protocol limiting each side to only one ABM site.

I have to digress there, Mr. President, and reminisce, if I may, about a former colleague of ours in the Senate who, I think, had as intriguing a way of putting things as anybody I have ever known. That was the former distinguished Senator from Minnesota, Gene McCarthy. He was in the Senate the first 2 years I was here. I was here in 1969 and 1970, and he was completing his term in the Senate at that time.

If the Members will recall, he took a trip to the Soviet Union. He was not only a Senator but had been a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, so he went to Moscow and he met with the Soviet leaders. I think he met with Brezhnev and Kosygin.

He told me of the conversation that he had with one of those Russian leaders, I think I can share that conversation with the Senate. I do not think he would mind.

He said that—let us assume it was Breshnev—Breshnev asked him, "Why are you people building the ABM?"

McCarthy, in that wonderful way of his, answered very quickly, "We are building it, Mr. Chairman, because it does not work."

Now, the Russian, not being used to the McCarthyesque, sense of humor, said, "We do not understand. Why are you building a system that you know does not work?"

"Ah, ha," said McCarthy, "if we build a system that does not work you will build a system that does not work because you want to be just as good as we are, and both of us could keep very, very busy building systems that do not work in the public interest."

I just add that as an irrelevant footnote. But since it is so irrelevant, it is a true testimonial to ABM, which is a living irrelevancy; and it is a true testimonial to site defense which is an irrelevancy superimposed on top of an initial irrelevancy.

Even without that tangible reflection of support for the strategic doctrine of limiting defensive missiles, it is generally conceded that neither we nor the Russians want to throw money down the drain on defensive systems that are generally obsolete when deployed due to advances made in offensive weaponry—the Gene McCarthy theory of planning notwithstanding.

For the purpose of this discussion, however, I will assume a worst case—that we do need a "hedge" against the rather remote possibility that the ABM Treaty will one day be no more. What should that "hedge" be comprised of? Should we build a system which could be made obsolete by the latest Soviet technology? Or should we continue to research in the area of defensive strategies . . . to perfect the difficult task of "hitting a bullet with a bullet?"

Until recently, the site defense program called for the development of a prototype demonstration model which would have been ready for deployment under original plans, in 1977, when the 5-year ABM Treaty expires. According to the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the authorization bill, site defense is composed of "a state-of-the-art phased array radar, a third generation commercial data processor and related software, and a modified Safeguard Spring Interceptor missile, called Sprint II."

As is clear from that description, the components of site defense are not unique. But the program did have one unique quality which distinguished it from the other ABM programs in which we are engaged. It was to have been a prototype program. Site defense would tie the various ABM components together for testing. General Leber, the head of all the Army's ABM programs, described the principal need for site defense this way:

It is system technology. It is not component technology. The component technology is done over in the advanced technology program.

But the conference report on the military procurement bill completely transformed the site defense program. That report states that "the primary objective of the site defense program should be development of subsystems and components to advance the technology in such elements as sensors, missiles, and software." The report goes on to state that site defense should no longer be "directed toward a prototype demonstration. . . ." Site defense, in short, is now the same component technology "done

over in the advanced technology program."

It is also now a totally redundant program for which there is no further use. The work on ABM component technology is being done under the advanced ballistic missile defense research program, for which \$91 million has been approved in this budget. That is more than enough to spend for a "hedge" against an unlikely occurrence.

The Armed Services Committee have, therefore, answered our question—it is not worthwhile to build a system which could be obsolete when it is deployed. As General Leber said in discussing the rapid technological progress being made in the ABM field:

Site Defense isn't the end of this thing. Five years from now they will look back on it and say that it is ancient.

Although I have attempted to avoid recommending the elimination of programs, I believe site defense is an obvious waste of title V R. & D. funds. We do not need a redundant program and we do not need a system which, if built, would be "ancient" when deployed. The demise of site defense would represent a savings to the taxpayer of approximately \$103 million, leaving \$20 million for termination costs.

Moving on to yet another system, which I have discussed a bit already, Safeguard.

SAFEGUARD

If site defense would have been ancient 5 years hence, its intended predecessor, the Safeguard system is already in that category. Safeguard sits, uncompleted, around our ICBM site at Grand Forks, N. Dak.

It is limited, under the ABM Treaty, to 100 missiles which are intended to protect our ICBM's.

But recent studies, including a classified GAO analysis, show that our ICBM's do not need protection. Soviet missile accuracy is not sufficient now, nor will it be in the future, to threaten our land-based missiles. These missiles are, of course, deployed in hardened silos.

If, in the future, the Soviets develop their MIRV system, an ABM system comprised of only 100 missiles would be easily overwhelmed. When the Soviet MIRV becomes a reality—assuming that, in the meantime, we do not reach a warhead-limitation agreement—then we should consider what measures we should take to protect our land-based deterrent. If we decide at that time that an ABM is needed—and I personally would oppose such a choice—then we will be able to design a system to meet the current threat.

But the most compelling reason of all to eliminate funds for Safeguard in this year's budget, is the decision by the Pentagon itself to mothball the system soon after it becomes fully operational later this year. That such a decision has been made was recently confirmed by a Defense Department spokesman.

Now, think of it, Mr. President, in the Pentagon they want more money, a little over \$135 million, to complete a system that they have already decided to mothball.

Instead of allowing funds to complete Safeguard and maintain it for a full

year, I would give the Army exactly what it needs to put the system in mothballs. The savings here, therefore, would be \$80 million, leaving \$55.8 million to phase out the program.

I repeat for emphasis, Mr. President, what I am doing with these systems is trying to show by adding the dollar amounts, that would be able to safely cut the budget in excess of over \$2 billion. But I am not even, as I said earlier, asking for \$2 billion. I might be half wrong, so I cut it in half to about \$1 billion.

SAM-D

The SAM-D program has received the careful attention of Senator Bayh and the General Accounting Office. Senator BAYH has made a very responsible recommendation to slow down this program to keep it out of the engineering development phase before it is tested. But the token \$11 million cut made in this bill will not accomplish that purpose.

SAM-D, which is a medium altitude surface-to-air missile system designed to replace the Nike-Hercules and improved Hawk for air defense purposes, has experienced a unit cost growth of almost 400 percent.

Mr. President, I emphasize, a unit cost growth of almost 400 percent.

The program is at least 76 months behind schedule and the unit cost is almost eight times as much as that of the improved Hawk, the system it is designed to replace.

Prior to January 1974, the SAM-D was a full-scale engineering development program. The Defense Department had overlooked its own fly-before-buy guidelines in allowing the program to proceed to this stage even though crucial elements of the technology, most notably the TVM—target via missile—guidance system and the warhead fuse, had never been adequately tested. Secretary Schlesinger recognized this serious concurrency problem and on January 10, 1974, he ordered that the program be reoriented so that the testing would be completed at an earlier stage. Although the Secretary's decision was intended to reduce the concurrency problem, the program experienced no fundamental change except in its scheduling. Fully half of the fiscal year 1975 funds—\$58.5 million—are to be spent for engineering development of tactical versions of the system. Thus, while a decision was made to reduce concurrency, that decision has not been fully implemented.

The sole justification for the SAM-D as articulated by the Army and OSD has been its requirement to defend the 7th Army forces stationed in Europe against conventional attack by high-performance Soviet-built aircraft. Perhaps the most telling comment on the cost-effectiveness of SAM-D has been the flat refusal of every NATO country—with the exception of Germany—to even indicate an interest in purchasing the system.

Although Germany has indicated a potential interest in acquiring the system once it is fully developed, there has been no attempt to gain financial participation on the part of that country in the developmental stages. Just as in the case of AWACS, our NATO allies are apparently willing to allow the United

States to bear the expense of developing a system designed to defend Europe.

A full-scale cost-effectiveness analysis of SAM-D was undertaken this past year by OSD in conjunction with the General Accounting Office. This study was delivered to Congress on April 15, 1974. Its major conclusion is that we are unnecessarily duplicating air defense weapons systems at high cost. In its comments on the study April 29, 1974, the GAO noted.

Cost effectiveness of the SAM-D or its variants apparently cannot be proven based on realistic assumption. . . . It would appear that even if the SAM-D technology works and even if the threat materializes, the SAM-D will probably not be necessary if F-15's are available.

It is important to note that although the OSD study assumed that the technology testing program would be successful and would not increase costs—an unlikely assumption—it also concluded that two wings of F-15's could reduce the successful penetration by the enemy in the NATO area to close to zero.

In recent developments, the Army has programed \$10 million out of fiscal year 1975 funds for research on a backup guidance system. This most certainly cannot be read as reflecting confidence in the proposed TVM guidance system. Furthermore, the \$10 million will be spent on exploring the feasibility of one of the two types of guidance techniques now employed in current—state-of-the-art—systems. This would indicate that the case for SAM-D superiority over present systems—based on its TVM technology—is on most uncertain ground.

It would appear that little more than the Army's prestige in having a new missile in development is keeping SAM-D alive.

It is the same sad story, Mr. President, of not letting a system die which should have had a laudable death years ago. Why cannot a weapon system go to the grave with decency? Why must it linger on and on, eternally, long after it has outlived even an imagined useful role? But SAM-D goes on and on.

While I suspect this program will be terminated or completely revised in the near future, I will not make such a recommendation at this time. Instead, I would propose to save \$60 million above the reduction recommended by the committee. This \$60 million is earmarked for continued engineering development. This action would return the program to the advanced development stage until the TVM guidance system is tested, as Senator BAYH has so many times and so wisely suggested.

SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS

Mr. President, as I have pointed out, in each of the past 4 fiscal years the Defense Department's unexpended balance at the end of the year has increased, indicating that the funds being appropriated for the Defense Department are beginning to exceed the Department's ability to spend them. This is especially true in the shipbuilding business where orders for new ships have overwhelmed the delivery system. In addition, the inflationary impact of these programs on the economy is substantial. Both of these conditions make it essential that we

examine with great care several ship construction programs.

The three major private shipyards are Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Miss., Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock in Newport News, Va., and the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics in Groton, Conn. These 3 yards are presently building 63 of the 66 ships which the Navy has under construction and they have all the work that they can handle. Several factors contribute to this situation. Private yards have experienced a large increase in commercial ship construction and are presently working at a higher percentage of capacity than they have experienced in several years. Many yards also find commercial contracts more attractive than Navy contracts because the commercial specifications and quality standards are somewhat lower than the Navy's. Commercial ships are easier to build, are being ordered in large batches, leading to long profitable production runs while Navy ships—especially auxiliaries such as the destroyer tender and fleet oiler requested in the present budget—are built a few at a time. As a result, they are less profitable and less desirable from the point of view of the contractors. And as we all know, dealing with the Government bureaucracy is somewhat more difficult than dealing with private buyers, except when you get to that thing called "ball out." But we are not to that point yet with ships.

Many ships now under construction are experiencing substantial delays. The DD-963 is one of those and appropriating funds for seven more ships this year will simply add to those delays.

It would be less inflationary if we appropriated for three instead of seven of these ships. By doing so some \$264 million could be saved this year. The appropriation for the four additional destroyers could be deferred until next year.

Litton's Pascagoula yards have had serious labor problems. Due to inadequate labor supply as well as technical problems with a new yard and new methods, Litton's programs have experienced delays and cost increases. At present, according to the most recent figures available, the last of the DD-63's will be delayed some 18 months. The cost of each ship has increased from \$86 million per unit to \$108 million. By slowing the rate of procurement we can ease the pressures on Litton and give them time to get the bugs out of their construction techniques so that the remaining ships built will be of higher quality.

The impact of this proposal on the capabilities of the fleet would be minimal. The U.S. Navy is already ahead of the Soviet Navy in numbers of ocean escorts—destroyers, frigates, and other escorts—and will continue to be in 1980 even if we stretch out the procurement of these destroyers. The Navy has some 191 destroyers, frigates, and escorts, compared to 188 for the Soviets. In addition, our destroyer-type ships are generally larger than the Soviet's and some of ours are nuclear powered while the Soviets have no nuclear powered surface ships.

The current budget also calls for appropriating \$502.5 million to build three

in a series of 36 SSN-688 Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarines. However, it would be more prudent to appropriate funds for two instead of three this year at a savings of some \$167.5 million. Again, the shipyard situation has a direct bearing on this program. Five of these submarines are being built at Newport News and the other 18 at Groton, Conn. Both of these yards are backed up with considerable work. Newport News, in addition to building the five SSN-688 submarines is also building two other submarines of a different class, four nuclear frigates, and two CVAN's—nuclear powered attack carriers. The first of these two carriers will be delivered more than 3 years late. This is partly the result of a severe manpower shortage which will surely be made worse by making further demands for additional ships.

This problem can be eased by slowing the pace of procurement somewhat. As Admiral Frank Price of the Chief of Naval Operations Office recently pointed out, reducing the SSN construction rate allows industry to "catch up on their present contracts and to be able to proceed with nuclear attack submarines and Trident at the same time." If funds for only two of these submarines are appropriated this year the United States will have 90 attack submarines in 1981 rather than 91. The difference in one submarine will not have a significant impact on the fleet's capabilities.

In considering this proposal, we should take a close look at comparative United States and Soviet capabilities in this area. The United States at present has 61 nuclear attack submarines in commission plus 27 under construction and funded for a total of 88. The Soviets have approximately 35 nuclear attack submarines and 40 nuclear powered submarines with cruise missiles. The Soviet's overall submarine force has been declining in recent years and will continue to do so, despite the growth of its nuclear submarine force toward the maximum allowable under SALT.

A large part of the existing Soviet submarine force consists of approximately 153 obsolescent diesel attack subs which will very likely be retired in coming years. In addition, experts such as Admiral Rickover and Admiral Moorer have repeatedly told us that U.S. submarines are qualitatively superior to their Soviet counterparts. Admiral Moorer has pointed out that the 688 class is both quieter and has better sonar than the best of the Soviet Union's attack submarines.

It should be pointed out that the SSN-688 is very large and displaces almost 7,000 tons. This is larger than many World War II type cruisers presently in the Soviet Navy. The Navy has said it would be desirable to develop and build a new class of smaller and less expensive nuclear attack submarines than the 688 class, which presently costs about \$200 million per ship. It might be wise, in light of current national economic problems, to build fewer 688-class submarines and urge the Navy to move ahead more quickly in developing a smaller and less expensive submarine.

The Navy has requested some \$81 mil-

lion to build a fleet oiler—AO. This would be the first of a class of 10 ships which together with other support ships are projected to cost a total of approximately \$2 billion. The purpose of these ships is to deliver fuel to operating ships at sea. Currently, the Navy has 27 fleet oilers, or 1 for every 8 major surface combatants. It is my view that these funds should be deleted from this year's appropriation and deferred for at least 1 year.

There are several considerations which I think justify this position. First, it should be kept in mind that the oiler is an auxiliary—not a combat ship. Thus, while some of the existing oilers are old, retaining them in service for 1 or 2 more years will not reduce significantly the combat efficiency of the fleet. At the same time, many of the existing 27 oilers are among the newest, largest, and most modern replenishment ships in the world. Furthermore, the new class that the Navy wants to build will have about the same capacity as present AO's. Thus, they will not add significantly to the Navy's capabilities. The Navy also has nine oilers under construction in the "build for charter" program.

We should also keep in mind that the role of the oiler in providing fuel for Navy ships is declining as more and more ships become nuclear powered. For example, the Navy will soon have 3 nuclear powered aircraft carriers in operation and a total of 14 nuclear ships by 1980. This, of course, reduces the need for oilers.

Finally, the shipyard crunch is important here. Ships such as the oilers seem to be the least popular to build by private shipyards. The Navy has two submarine tenders and one destroyer tender for which funds were appropriated in prior years—fiscal year 1972, 1973—that are not yet under contract because of lack of interest by the shipbuilding industry.

The House Appropriations Committee report should be paid special attention in this regard. The committee concluded that the request for funding an oiler was premature by a year and urged that the amount be denied without prejudice until the Navy has determined the extent of interest by the shipbuilding industry in building this ship and at what cost.

We should keep in mind that if past experience is any indication, even if we appropriate funds for this ship for fiscal year 1975, it may be 1 or 2 years before a contractor is found to build it.

As was suggested by the House Appropriations Committee, the Navy should first determine the interest in the shipbuilding industry and then return for funding.

Mr. President, the appropriations bill calls for the funding of a new destroyer tender—AD—at a cost of \$116.7 million. The initial Senate authorization bill excluded all funds for the AD. The Senate Armed Services Committee report justified this action, stating that:

The Committee recommends denial of \$116.7 million for one destroyer tender. Three tenders approved by Congress in FY 1972 and 1973 are not yet under contract, and until such time as these ships are under con-

tract and the costs and schedules are known, authorization of additional tenders will not be authorized.

The House prevailed, however, and the tender was put back in by the conference committee.

The purpose of a destroyer tender is to provide minor repairs and services for destroyer-type ships at forward bases. The U.S. Navy has and plans to maintain about 200 destroyers and related types of ships which are serviced by destroyer tenders.

The Navy currently has 12 tenders, or 1 tender for every 16 destroyer-type ships. The existing 12 tenders are more than enough to provide for those regularly stationed overseas with the 6th and 7th Fleets. The majority of tenders are stationed at naval bases here in the United States.

A 1-year deferment in the construction of a new tender would not affect the readiness of the destroyer force. Minor repairs or services required can be supplied by the existing 12 tenders, augmented if necessary by naval shipyards and shore-based facilities.

Thus, Mr. President, the total savings in the shipbuilding area—the area most responsible for the rise in unexpended military balances—would total \$629.2 million. Again the slowdowns and the delays I have recommended would enhance rather than hinder our military effectiveness.

M60A1 TANK

Another reduction which is budgetarily feasible and which will not undermine national security, concerns the rate of production of the M60A1 tank to the original rate of production planned by the Department of Defense. In hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services this year, Secretary Schlesinger said that the Defense Department originally planned to increase the rate of production of the M60A1 to 515 per year through fiscal 1976, but that "the lessons learned from the recent Middle East war" have made the Defense Department increase the production of M60A1's to 667 per year over the next few years.

Using the Middle East war for justification of increased tank production is very misleading. Tanks sent to Israel are sold through MAP, which does not affect the bill we are currently considering. Also, Israel pays us back for the tanks it purchases. In the fiscal 1974 supplemental, the Defense Department was given the funds required for enabling attainment of the planned buildup in production rate. Thus, the fiscal year 1975 request will not affect in any way our aid to Israel.

The Pentagon is using the Middle East war as the reason for accelerating the modernization of M60A1's for the Army and the Marine Corps. In fact, the Marine Corps plans to end their modernization program in fiscal 1976. The Defense Department has given Congress no real reason why these modernization programs have been accelerated, and why the original rate of production is no longer feasible.

According to the House report on the authorization bill "fiscal year 1975 M60A1 procurement requests have been based on the maximum rates of produc-

tion that the assembly lines can deliver, particularly since there is only one remaining willing supplier-subcontractor of the traversing turret." I do not believe it makes sense to approve a maximum rate of production that only one supplier-subcontractor is willing to produce, and might have trouble meeting.

I propose that we restore the original rate of production—a cutback of 150 tanks for fiscal 1975. We would not be halting the production line; we would not be cutting off new production lines; and we would not be violating contracts. We would simply be slowing down the rate of production, which in turn would guarantee that the rate of production is met. The savings to the American taxpayer would be \$50 million in fiscal 1975. This is a prudent reduction which does not go beyond the original request of the Department of Defense.

CH-47C CARGO TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended restoration of \$41.4 million for the procurement of 19 CH-47C cargo transport helicopters. This seems to be questionable funding item in light of the fact that the House Appropriations Committee recommended denial of these funds. This is what the House committee said about the CH-47C request:

The Army requested \$14,400,000 for 19 CH-47C Chinook cargo helicopters. This would represent a last buy of this helicopter. The Army has initiated a three-year research and development program to improve the maintainability, reliability, survivability and safety of the CH-47A/B models of this helicopter, while reducing operating costs. In some respects, they will be an improvement over the CH-47C model. The asset position of these helicopters is such that these 19 CH-47C helicopters need not be bought. The Committee recommends the funds be denied and the Army wait until the CH-47A/B helicopters are improved before buying additional ones, if this becomes necessary.

I very much agree with Chairman MAHON's statement. The need for the CH-47C seems minimal, especially in light of ongoing research to build a better version. This purchase could easily be eliminated without endangering national security and with substantial savings for the Nation.

WAR RESERVE STOCKS

On to yet another subject, Mr. President. I shall not dwell too long on this, because I believe that at a later point in this debate, Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts may offer a specific amendment on this point. But I should like to speak very briefly to what are called war reserve stocks.

In 1973 the Department of Defense initiated a new program which was called war reserve stocks for Allies; \$23 million was budgeted for these stocks in fiscal year 1973—which is not so terribly much in 1973, and for the Pentagon, \$23 million is just about their daily paper clip account. But that amount has grown to the request we have before us today, which is approximately \$529.6 million.

It should be noted that this program is not for our NATO allies, but was created to help support certain Asian allies—

and Cambodia. These stocks are in addition to our own inventory needs, but because they remain in U.S. inventories unless and until they are needed by our allies, the program was not considered a military assistance program or a military assistance service funded program. But by whatever name is contrived by the Pentagon, it is clear that this is a backdoor military aid program.

The Senate passed an amendment offered by Senator KENNEDY on June 6, 1974, to the military procurement bill, to bar the supply of stockpiled war materials or equipments to any Asian country unless specifically authorized by Congress. Sadly, the amendment was dropped in conference, but the Senate is on record as disapproving the war reserve stock concept.

It is not easy to find the appropriation for the war reserve stock program in the budget since the \$529.6 million that has been approved by the committee is hidden among various accounts in the procurement section of the bill. In fact, the committee has been able to ascertain the exact amounts in each account only after great effort. I think that the reason for this is obvious: such a program would not survive an up or down vote in the Congress. I hope we shall have a chance to prove that with Senator KENNEDY's amendment.

Although I will personally vote to completely abolish this program, I will not assign a savings of \$529.6 million—the total for War Reserve Stocks in the budget—because a more conservative approach has been taken by certain members of the House Committee on Appropriations. These members have suggested deleting the ammunition portion of the stocks which, because they have a limited shelf life, would require continued replenishment. Such a requirement would involve an endless commitment of money. I would therefore suggest leaving \$180 million in this program so that certain obsolete tanks and aircraft could be maintained. Thus, the potential savings to the taxpayer would be at least \$350 million.

The most conservative saving that I can point out to you would be \$350 million. If it were up to me, I would vote to do away with the whole \$529, but I am trying to come up with a very conservative estimate.

It should be obvious after this lengthy discussion—may I digress, Mr. President. It has not been my purpose, it is not my purpose to debate this amendment at undue length. We have already agreed to a time limit. I am not a filibusterer, either by talent or persuasion. But I felt it was necessary to discuss at some not inordinate length certain facets of this budget.

As I said at the outset, we purposely omitted those matters that have been discussed previously, whether it be the Trident or the B-1. We tried to get down to some programs that first, the Committee on Armed Services itself had already frowned upon, or that the House Committee on Armed Services or the House Committee on Appropriations disapproved of, even programs that the military itself was not too satisfied with.

But I have only recommended two programs for elimination, the two that are so patently redundant and unnecessary that they should be eliminated; to wit, site defense and Safeguard—and I have left money in the budget for termination costs. In the personnel category, wherein I am supported very strongly by Senator STENNIS and his committee, I have simply taken the recommendations of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, a committee which I believe is eminently qualified to discuss such matters. Likewise, the slowdown in SSN-688 procurement and the delay of one year in purchasing a tanker and a tender, are programs designated by the Senate Committee on Armed Services for the reductions I have suggested.

So I am really in accord with Senator STENNIS again on all of those.

The elimination of the last buy of CH-47C helicopters was strongly recommended by Chairman MAHON of the House Committee on Appropriations due to the on-going development of a more modern version. I feel that my suggestions to slow down the AWACS and SAM-D programs will help in eliminating excessive concurrency and assist in avoiding cost overruns in later years. The reserve stocks program is a form of backdoor foreign aid which the Senate has previously gone on record as opposing.

Therefore, we get to the bottom line, Mr. President. The total savings to the taxpayer in the areas I have discussed up to now would come to just over \$2 billion. This, of course, is twice as much as is necessary to bring the committee bill down to the \$81 billion level. If my colleagues cannot accept all of my suggestions, I would hope that they could accept half.

The cut I am recommending in my amendment, joined by many distinguished cosponsors, is \$1.1 billion. I feel we have been able to demonstrate a \$2.1 billion cut.

Well, perhaps they can say I am half wrong. If I am half wrong in every item that I have saved, then it still comes down to just about my amendment, \$1.1 billion. If I am half right, if you want to approach it from the viewpoint of the positive, then it still comes down to \$1.1 billion. So, half right or half wrong, the figure that we recommend in this budget is minimal.

Obviously, the list of suggested savings that I have put forth is not exhaustive. Such programs as Phalanx, the surface effect ship, the sea control ship, the heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53E helicopter and the patrol frigate have all been severely criticized by the General Accounting Office in reports sent to Congress. I am sure that a careful examination of these programs would find areas where immediate savings could be made that would help us to avoid cost overruns in the future.

As I stated at the outset, I have not included programs such as the B-1, Trident and counterforce, which have been focused upon extensively by Congress.

Finally, it is important to note that the Secretary of Defense need not accept my suggestions if my amendment

is enacted. He would have the discretion to reduce programs which he felt were of low priority. I would venture a guess, however, that many of the programs the Secretary of Defense would choose would be among those which have been discussed in my speech today.

Mr. President, for years Congress provided little or no check on the military budget. But we have seen an important reversal of that attitude of unquestioning submissiveness. Much of the credit for that important turnaround goes to the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee (Mr. McCLELLAN). He has made the tough decisions concerning this bill and he has made them with courage and determination. While I obviously feel strongly that further reductions can be made, my suggestions are based on the firm foundation of Senator McCLELLAN's work.

Today we have more reason than ever before to assure that there is no fat . . . that there is no waste in this budget. Indeed, we must assure that there is no waste in the entire Federal budget, and I have voted consistently to reduce that budget to assure that it does not feed the fires of inflation—to be sure that, if belt-tightening is required within the American economy, that the Federal budget will be an example to all sectors. The Defense Department cannot be excluded from the general effort to reduce the Federal budget—and it need not be excluded. Reductions on the level I have recommended today would not endanger the security of the United States one iota.

Mr. President, I am hopeful that my discussion today will not be interpreted as "just another gratuitous slap at the military." For it is not intended as such. I have great admiration for the men and women who are assigned the awesome task of defending our Nation. Those Defense Department officials who have urged Congress to reject my amendment are doing so because they sincerely believe that it is in the best interests of the Nation.

But the Nation cannot continue down the path toward internal economic destruction as it strives to defend itself against external forces. Whether my amendment is successful or not today, I call upon the military and civilian employees of the Defense Department to use their exceptional talent to effect managerial change to cut costs. I urge those individuals to respect the American tax dollar and to spend it only when a tangible benefit to our national defense can be derived.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. EAGLETON. I am pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise for two purposes: First of all, to commend the distinguished Senator from Missouri for an exemplary statement, an outstanding service in the area of defense expenditures. I think it is possibly one of the most thorough and well-documented statements that has ever been presented in the Senate.

The Senator from Missouri was kind

enough to make his statement available to Senators earlier so we had a chance to see what he is going to say. I, for one, am grateful for the monumental work he has undertaken, and I would like him to know that I should like to be associated directly with his endeavors.

I think this is one of the more important developments in the area of defense expenditures during my long experience in the Senate. I thank the Senator, and commend him on behalf of the American people, who know that we have to make some defense expenditure cuts that will enable us to bring the budget under control, and at the same time not imperil our security.

The Senator's statement was made without malice, without being derogatory, and without any effort to abuse the military; and I think we are all indebted to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, we are rapidly approaching the hour of 2:30. May I ask the distinguished majority leader what his wishes are? I yield to the majority leader on my time.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO ESCORT THE PRESIDENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair be authorized to appoint a committee to escort the President of the United States into the Chamber.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair appoints the following Members of the Senate to escort the President of the United States into the Chamber: Senators MANSFIELD, ROBERT C. BYRD, MOSS, BIBLE, FULBRIGHT, ERVIN, METZENBAUM, HUGHES, HUGH SCOTT, GRIF-FIN, COTTON, BENNETT, TOWER, BROCK, AIKEN, and GURNEY.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR CURTIS, AND FOR THE SENATE TO TAKE A RECESS AT 2:35 P.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) be permitted to proceed not beyond the hour of 2:35 p.m., at which time the Senate will stand in recess.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON INFLATION

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, on August 19 I addressed the following letters to the President of the United States:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The vast majority of Americans approve of the plan to have a Summit Conference on Inflation. It is believed that the placing of facts concerning the various segments of our economy out on the table will assist in arriving at sound solutions.

No segment of our economy has a greater stake in retarding and ultimately stopping inflation than does agriculture. We urge that those in charge of this summit meeting develop fully the case in reference to the increased costs imposed upon the farmers. These relate to everything the farmer must have in order to carry on the production of food and fiber for our economy. We would mention such things as tractors, trucks, other machinery, repair parts, tractor and truck fuel, fertilizer, pesticides, land taxes, payroll taxes, seed, the requirements relating to safety, health, sanitation and pollution, freight, labor, fencing, and the countless other items of cost which our farmers face.

We are aware that all of our citizens are experiencing the harsh treatment that inflation brings. We are aware of the public sentiment against rising prices including the protest that is voiced against the cost of food in the marketplace. It is important and necessary that the full facts be adequately demonstrated to the public and that misinformation be avoided and corrected. If this is not done, many well-intentioned citizens will arrive at an erroneous decision in reference to food costs. It is an open opportunity for the demagogue. It is the costs added after the food leaves the farm which make food expensive.

We call attention to the disastrous, unwise and unfair policies of the government some months back in placing a ceiling on beef without across-the-board ceilings and control on everything. This did not lead to a mere loss of profits. It spelled disaster to many people. It drove some out of business. It wiped out the assets of some. It dislocated the orderly production, feeding and marketing of cattle resulting in surpluses, shortages, scarcity, disastrously low prices and, later, higher prices to the consumer. This action was taken without any justifiable economic reason. It was opposed by all who are knowledgeable in agriculture. It was stubbornly kept on too long. We submit that unwise and unfair actions which cannot be justified economically should not be taken for political purposes.

We suggest that those who select the participants and plan the agenda for the Summit Conference on Inflation see to it that all the facts are presented; that the full story is given to the American consumers concerning the non-farm cost that contributes to the cost of food in the marketplace; that the whole story in reference to the increase in

the costs that farmers must pay be vividly placed before the American public; that the facts in reference to the percentage of the income of the American consumer which is spent for food both historically and currently be presented, and that these figures be compared to the other nations of the world; and that the facts in relation to the price increases of non-food cost-of-living items be fully developed and compared.

We believe that American farmers have a greater stake in the fight against inflation than any other segment of our economy because of agriculture's inability to pass on added costs. American agriculture wants knowledgeable people to chart a course for fighting inflation—people who have the capacity and the will to examine all facts and the courage to apply real solutions.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate.

Mr. CURTIS (continuing).

We commend you for the steps that you are taking and we are sure that there are many individuals in the field of agriculture who can make a distinct contribution for the good of our entire economy.

With kindest personal regards, I am
Respectfully yours,

And it is signed by the junior Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

RECESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess awaiting the call of the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Thereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the Senate took a recess.

The Senate reconvened at 2:38 p.m. when called to order by the President pro tempore.

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

At 2:39 p.m., the President of the United States entered the Chamber accompanied by Senators MANSFIELD, ROBERT C. BYRD, MOSS, BIBLE, FULBRIGHT, ERVIN, METZENBAUM, HUGHES, HUGH SCOTT, GRIFFIN, COTTON, BENNETT, TOWER, BROCK, AIKEN, and GURNEY.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It is my distinct pleasure and privilege, on behalf of the Senate, to welcome the President of the United States to the Senate. The President will now address the Senate.

[Applause.]

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT FORD

The PRESIDENT. Mr. President, Senator MANSFIELD, Senator SCOTT, Members of the United States Senate, I wanted to stop by today just to say hello to those with whom I had an opportunity to get better acquainted and to officially inaugurate Pennsylvania Avenue as a two-way street. [Applause.]

It is wonderful to be back in a Chamber where so much of America's history for almost 200 years has been written and, I say without any hesitation, one of the greatest experiences of my life was the privilege of presiding here, though for

a relatively short period of time. [Applause.]

Although my tenure was quite short, I think it was long enough to convince me that the U.S. Senate is one of the greatest legislative bodies in the history of mankind. [Applause.]

I think in the days and months ahead all of us must draw upon the great traditions of the Senate. Our job, both in the legislative as well as in the executive branch, is to restore the people's faith in the history and tradition of our American Government. No single man and no single woman can possibly do this all alone. It is a job for all of us working together to achieve.

As Governor Rockefeller said yesterday, we must deal with some very hard and somewhat harsh realities. We are not always going to be on the same side. It would not be America if we were. I do not think that really matters. It only matters if we end up by being on the best side for America from one State to another. [Applause.]

I would be very, very remiss if I did not express my appreciation for the Senate and the House going more than halfway on several measures of major importance in the last week or so.

I speak here specifically of the Cost of Living Council proposal, some actions taken on appropriation matters, the action on housing, the action on pension legislation, and the legislation affecting education.

I think what has taken place and transpired in these various proposals is indicative that we can march toward the center in achieving some good results for our country as a whole.

Now, I do not intend to talk specifically about any prospective legislation. I think I would probably be out of order, and I certainly shall respect the rules or traditions of the Senate in that regard.

As we go ahead, we must look not only at our problems at home, but also at our problems abroad.

I believe we have a good team in the executive branch of the Government, and I can assure you that that team will be working with this team, the House and the Senate, in the months ahead.

Thank you very much.
[Applause, Senators rising.]

The PRESIDENT pro tempore announced that Senators would assemble to greet the President.

Thereupon, the President was greeted by Senators in the well of the Senate Chamber.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1975

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate will come to order. Let us have order.

The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. EAGLETON. While Senators are still on the floor, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I will momentarily yield the floor to Senators JACKSON and BROOKE for a colloquy on a related subject.

Before yielding, Mr. President, I must confess my senatorial naivete. As I was concluding my remarks and saw—

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order?

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate will come to order. Senators will take their seats.

Mr. EAGLETON. As I was concluding my prepared remarks, I noticed that the visitor galleries started to fill up and the press galleries started to fill up. I thought that the "word of wisdom" had gone forth in this citadel of deliberative intelligence and that the press and thousands of people were coming to hear "the word." [Laughter.]

My aide quickly corrected my erroneous judgment and whispered to me, "President Ford is coming to speak to the Senate."

In further explanation of my naivete, I then thought that President Ford had perhaps heard "the word" and was coming to make a public endorsement of my amendment. But, sadly, he did not.

As I marched down to shake hands with our fine, new President, accompanied by Senator HATHAWAY—and not too far away was Senator NELSON—I mumbled to Senator HATHAWAY and said:

Is it too late to ask unanimous consent to change the vote that three of us made last year?

But, since Senator LONG is on the floor and he objects to all such unanimous-consent requests, I shall make no such request.

Yes, there were three who voted "No" on the nomination of Gerald Ford to be Vice President. We did so for such reasons as each of us felt appropriate at that time. I, as one of the three, pray to God that my judgment passed at that time was wrong. History will determine the future course of this country. History will determine the wisdom, or lack thereof, of my vote.

I have been mightily impressed by what I have seen of and heard from our 38th President.

If my judgment was wrong last year, then so be it.

I think I speak the sentiments of all Senators who are here today when I say that we have been deeply touched not only by what the President said to us, but by the fact that he came to this Chamber to say it to us, face to face.

I am an honored individual, indeed, to have been here today.

I now yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield first to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE).

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, it is not my intention to take a great deal of the Senate's time in discussing the "strategic initiatives" advocated by Secretary

Schlesinger. At the initiative of the distinguished junior Senator from New Hampshire the Senate, in closed session, discussed this issue in some depth during debate on the fiscal year 1975 defense authorization bill.

Nor is it my intention to propose the deletion of funding in this appropriation bill for several strategic programs—the terminally guided MARV, guidance improvements for Minuteman III and the MARK 12A warhead and reentry vehicle—which I believe to be premature reactions to admittedly disturbing developments in Soviet strategic programs. Given the evident belief by large majorities in both Houses that the United States should proceed with research and development in these areas, such an amendment would be futile.

I term these funding proposals premature because I have yet to find convincing reasons, either in deterrence theory or by examination of the linkages between technological possibilities and our strategic policies, to believe that the initiatives proposed by Secretary Schlesinger will result either now or in the future in an enhancement of our national security through increased stabilization of the deterrent relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union. This objective must be the criterion by which we judge any proposed alterations in our strategic posture.

The most disturbing aspect of the proposed "strategic initiatives" is the possibility that they foreshadow deployment programs that will eventually undermine the stability of the superpower deterrent relationship. Such stability is predicated, to a great extent, on the assumption that neither side will have an incentive to strike first in a crisis situation. However, a marriage of significant accuracy improvements with increased yield that results in one or both sides achieving a significant silo-busting capability will inevitably increase the incentives to strike first in extreme crisis situations. As a noted British strategist has written:

Especially at a moment of acute political anxiety, the existence of that capability, whatever the intention behind it, is bound to force a nervous adversary to consider whether he can afford not to strike first, lest he allow himself to be at least partially disarmed.

This would be especially true if one of the adversaries maintained the major portion of his strategic inventory in fixed land-based missiles as is the case with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the pressures on a power emphasizing the sea-based deterrent, such as the United States, will be less intense because less of its strategic inventory will be threatened by an effective silo-busting capability. Nevertheless, it too would likely experience increased pressures to consider a first strike under certain conditions.

I am also troubled by the implicit assumption in the Secretary's proposals that nuclear war can be waged at various levels of intensity and that escalation from one level to another can be controlled. Fortunately, we have no practical experience by which to judge whether or not this is the case.

More importantly, I fear that deter-

rence may be weakened by emphasis on planning for war scenarios having escalatory nuclear exchanges as a prime focus. This creates the impression that sooner or later the nuclear threshold will be breached and it is only prudent to plan for that eventuality. Such fatalism, unfortunately, may prove self-fulfilling to the degree that it inspires alterations in our strategic posture that decrease the inhibitions regarding use of nuclear weapons. The "strategic initiatives" suggested by Secretary Schlesinger threaten to be such alterations.

The assumption that proposals to exploit technical possibilities in the accuracy-yield combination will influence the Soviet Union to adopt policies more conducive to the U.S. position on a permanent limitation on offensive strategic systems is also open to question. Many respected analysts of Soviet military policy seriously question whether Soviet planners will give much heed to such a blunt signal. The more likely reaction in the Kremlin will be to continue development of MIRVed delivery vehicles while stepping up efforts to achieve a Soviet form of efficient accuracy-yield combination. I seriously doubt that we can substantially affect the tempo of Soviet strategic developments through initiatives that appear to be a direct challenge to the survivability of their own strategic forces.

It is also disturbing that many readily accept the view that research and development on these "strategic programs" is only a first step in a process that can easily be arrested at any time. In theory this may be the case. However, past practice leads me to believe that the temptation to deploy such capabilities once they are fully developed will likely prove irresistible regardless of whether or not world conditions or our own self-interests justify such deployment.

MIRV deployment is a case in point. Had a moratorium on MIRV testing been achieved and had the United States shown some unilateral restraint in MIRV deployment, concern over the possible evolving Soviet MIRV threat to our land-based ICBM's would have been much less today and there would be far less reason to give serious attention to the initiatives advocated by Secretary Schlesinger.

The perceptual affect of these research and development decisions may be far more pervasive than is commonly thought. Once the U.S. research and development phase has been completed on these programs, a prudent security planner in the Kremlin may feel compelled to assume deployment will take place regardless of congressional actions. One can count missiles and staging platforms but it is impossible to verify, short of on-site inspection, whether or not yield and accuracy improvements have been deployed. Hence, the Soviet Union will likely feel pressured to fashion its strategic policies and weapons to take account of assumed deployment of U.S. silo-busting capabilities regardless of whether or not such deployment actually takes place. This, in turn, may stimulate many of the destabilizing tendencies I have already mentioned.

In pointing out the real or potential

negative implications of these "strategic initiatives." I do not mean to imply that I am unconcerned about the threat posed to our security by the dynamic nature of ongoing Soviet strategic programs. It would be dangerous and injurious to U.S. security and world stability if we allowed ourselves to become strategically inferior in any significant respect to the Soviet Union.

I share Secretary Schlesinger's view that we must take the steps necessary to insure that this does not happen. However, I do not believe that the course of action proposed by the Secretary is the only or necessarily the best alternative open to us.

Other strategic alternatives do exist. Indeed, the United States has an active strategic program, disregarding the counterforce initiatives, that will deny the Soviet Union any military advantage should it continue its strategic missile buildup to a point where it threatens to achieve a significant disarming capability against our fixed land-based strategic forces. One needs only point to the Trident or B-1 programs as well as the active investigation of various modes for mobile ICBM's to substantiate this assertion.

It is my belief that in the next few years, as the debate over the U.S. strategic posture continues, the Congress and the Executive should thoroughly explore alternative strategic approaches emphasizing the ability to deny the Soviet Union any benefits it might attempt to achieve through seeking a disarming capability vis-a-vis any of our strategic forces. At the same time we should eschew any similar attempt to deploy a disarming capability against fixed land-based missiles or other strategic systems of the U.S.S.R.

Through continued efforts to achieve success in the SALT negotiations and through a strategic policy that seeks to avoid offensive first-strike threats to any of the components of the Soviet Union's deterrent forces while denying a similar disarming capability to the Kremlin vis-a-vis any segments of our strategic Triad, we can best hope for the establishment of greater security for ourselves and others and for a lessening of the dangers of the nuclear age. This should be our overriding goal and should guide decisions involving the modification or development of U.S. strategic nuclear weaponry.

Mr. President, the committee report quotes Secretary Schlesinger to the effect that a principal feature of U.S. strategic policy should be,

The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR.

Hopefully, we all support that view. However, to talk of a "first-strike disarming attack" in such general terms ignores the possibility that one could seek a disarming capability against a certain portion of an adversary's nuclear arsenal, such as fixed land-based missiles, and still maintain that the "combination of forces" sought for deployment would not give one the ability to

execute a first-strike disarming attack against the U.S.S.R.

In order to forestall any misconceptions in this regard, the report also states that the committee construes the Secretary's statement to mean that the United States will not seek to deploy a first-strike disarming capability against fixed land-based or other strategic systems of the U.S.S.R. I interpret this to mean that it should continue to be U.S. policy to eschew any attempts to achieve an accuracy-yield combination on our missiles that would provide us with an efficient silo-busting capability that could be construed by a reasonable opponent as an effort to achieve a disarming capability vis-a-vis his fixed land-based missiles. Does the Senator from Washington agree with my interpretation?

Mr. JACKSON. The question, as I understand the matter posed by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, essentially refers to the statement in the report of the Committee on Armed Services quoting Secretary Schlesinger as follows:

A principal feature of United States strategic policy should be the avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the U.S.S.R.

The Appropriations Committee goes on to construe this to refer to "such a deployed capability against fixed land-based or other strategic systems of the U.S.S.R."

I take it that the Senator's question essentially is, Do I agree with this construction of Secretary Schlesinger's remarks?

The answer is, "yes." It is not the strategic policy of the United States to deploy systems that could execute a first strike attack against land-based or other strategic forces of the U.S.S.R. It should be pointed out, however, that the strategic policy of the United States should not be limited to the single option of attacking the civilian population of the Soviet Union. The report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, with which the Appropriation Committee associated itself, is clear on that point.

Taking both the growth of Soviet forces and future developments at SALT into account, we should be working to design a strategic policy that will provide for enhanced flexibility in our strategic forces.

Continuing research and development along the lines of the strategic initiatives advocated by Secretaries Schlesinger and Kissinger is an essential part of that effort, and I am glad that the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations have recognized that fact and supported those programs.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, in my conversations with the Senator from Washington he stated that the "strategic initiatives" proposed by Secretary Schlesinger were research and development initiatives only. He stressed that a clear distinction must be made between research and development efforts and production-deployment decisions. I fully agree with this view. However, at some

point in the future pressures are likely to occur for deployment of the accuracy-yield capabilities that are likely to be developed through the proposed "strategic initiatives" programs. In contemplation of these pressures, I wonder if the Senator from Washington has any views regarding what, if any, conditions would justify deployment of an accuracy-yield capability that would provide the United States with an efficient silo-busting capability, "efficient" referring to a 2-to-1 or 1-to-1 ratio of warhead to silo destruction.

Mr. JACKSON. To state it another way, as I understand the Senator's question, under what circumstances would I favor moving from the research and development of a missile with a significant silo-killing capability to the actual deployment of such a weapon?

First, let me say that there can be no hard and fast answer to that question. But I think it is useful to discuss the factors that would go into any decision to deploy missile systems capable of destroying Soviet silos on a one-to-one basis. These factors are, first, the future growth of Soviet forces. If the Soviets exploit their throw-weight advantage by deploying a significant number of accurate MIRVs or additional missiles, they could acquire the capability to destroy a large fraction of our land-based forces utilizing only a small fraction of theirs.

This would place the United States at an unacceptable disadvantage, and in my judgment we would require a capability to destroy their reserve forces as an essential part of any American retaliatory attack.

The second factor relates to future developments at SALT.

We need to achieve a SALT II agreement based on essential equivalence. Such an agreement is unlikely to include limitations on accuracy, since there is no way to verify accuracy. I do not believe that we could have a stable SALT II agreement over the long run if the technological quality of our forces were allowed to deteriorate in comparison with Soviet forces.

We must assume that the Soviets will continue to improve their technology and that we will, therefore, have to continue to improve ours. With a SALT II agreement that provides for reductions to a level of equality, we might be able to defer indefinitely the deployment of extremely high accuracy-high yield missiles. Without such a SALT agreement, we might not. It is simply too soon, I think, at this point in history to come to a final conclusion.

Mr. BROOKE. Then, as I understand it, we are in agreement on the distinction between research and development efforts and production and deployment decisions? There seems to be no question of that point.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right. We have made a clearcut distinction in this appropriation bill, together with the authorization bill, Mr. President, between research and development on the one side and actual deployment and production.

Mr. BROOKE. What we are doing in this appropriations bill is merely re-

search and development, is that not correct?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct. Mr. BROOKE. And prior to any time we move to production and deployment decisions, we will again have to assess the posture of the U.S.S.R. as far as its strategic posture is concerned and determine what the proper course of action should be to maintain our own security.

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD that section of the report of the Committee on Armed Services dealing with the authorization bill, pertaining to aspects of the bill concerning the strategic initiatives, research and development. I do that, Mr. President, because we have, of course, the language of the report of the appropriations bill before us, but we do not have this item.

There being no objection, the section of the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ASPECTS OF BILL OF SPECIAL INTEREST
STRATEGIC INITIATIVES—RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT

Defense Department proposal

Both in his testimony before the committee and his posture statement, Secretary Schlesinger presented a thoughtful, comprehensive analysis of U.S. strategic policy. One of Secretary Schlesinger's major themes was the importance of strategic flexibility. While pointing out the importance of the assured destruction mission, Secretary Schlesinger highlighted its limitations, stressing, in particular, that the President must have a full range of strategic options to cover a variety of contingencies. The Secretary argued strongly that the United States must not limit its strategic objectives to the threat to destroy millions of innocent civilians as the sole—or even the principal—response to potential Soviet actions.

To provide for a necessary range of options, Secretary Schlesinger announced a new emphasis in targeting policy. As outlined to the committee, this emphasis in targeting doctrine does not represent a major departure from past U.S. policy. Indeed it is consistent with the committee's longstanding conviction that the United States must have the capability to destroy a variety of selected targets, military and civilian, if and when necessary.

In addition, several new R&D programs have been proposed in an effort to develop a broader range of strategic options. The following programs have been proposed:

- Navy:
 - Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
 - Terminally Guided Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle
- Air Force:
 - Air Launched Cruise Missile
 - Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
 - Improved Yield for Minuteman
 - Improved Accuracy for Minuteman
 - Increased Number of Minuteman Reentry Vehicles

According to Secretary Schlesinger, these specific R&D programs in large measure represent hedges against the potential growth and development of Soviet strategic forces as well as the outcome of SALT II.

Finally, Secretary Schlesinger reported to the committee on the relentless momentum of Soviet strategic weapons development. As Secretary Schlesinger declared in his posture statement, "In summary, the new Soviet ICBM program represents a truly massive effort—four new missiles, new bus-type dispensing systems, new MIRVed payloads, new guidance, new-type silos, new launch

techniques, and probably new warheads." The breadth and depth of the new Soviet missile development is both surprising and disturbing.

Committee action

In assessing the strategic initiatives proposed by the Defense Department, the committee shares a fundamental commitment to the principles of deterrence and to the maintenance of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance based upon parity. Although making some minor dollar reductions, the committee felt that the new strategic initiatives were necessary to maintain and implement these principles and should be supported.

By its action the committee seeks to insure that the necessary resources are available to the United States in order to maintain its technological margin in the face of Soviet strategic advancements. Under the provisions of the interim agreement on strategic weapons, Soviet strategic missile forces are numerically superior to our own. Moreover, they deploy three times the missile throw weight of the comparable U.S. forces. A vigorous program of research and development on the part of the United States is essential to our effort to maintain the stability of the strategic balance.

The committee believes that the strategic programs recommended to be authorized for fiscal year 1975 are a particularly appropriate means of maintaining the technological margin of our strategic missile forces in a period of rapid Soviet technological development. The programs are not primarily designed to make numerical additions to our existing strategic forces. On the contrary, the major thrust of these research and development programs is to upgrade our existing forces so as to enable them to be used with greater discrimination and with less unintended damage over a broader range of selected options.

Finally, the committee wishes to reaffirm, as it has in the past, its hope for a successful and stabilizing follow-on agreement at the SALT negotiations.

The nature and extent of the deployments that these strategic initiatives will enable us to make will inevitably reflect the outcome of present and future negotiations at SALT as well as the evolution of Soviet strategic forces. It is worth pointing out that the new strategic programs now underway in the Soviet Union, which have given rise to great concern within the committee, have all come to light since the conclusion of the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons. In authorizing these programs, the committee intends to demonstrate, with unmistakable force and clarity, its resolve never to allow the Soviets to obtain strategic superiority. These new R&D programs create the most compelling incentive for Soviet restraint in the technological exploitation of its numerically superior strategic forces and for a genuine effort to conclude a stabilizing SALT II agreement.

The improved accuracy-yield issue

The primary focus in the deliberations on strategic initiatives was on the issue of whether it was in the best interests of the United States to improve the accuracy and yield of U.S. missiles. The \$77 million request was as follows: Improved Guidance to increase the accuracy of the Minuteman force, Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) with terminal guidance for increased accuracy of the Trident missile, and Mark 12A to increase the yield of the Minuteman force.

The committee voted to support the proposed accuracy-yield program for a variety of reasons. There were, however, as discussed below, four principal points upon which a broad consensus was achieved.

First, the committee has long been concerned to sustain the technological excel-

lence of our strategic forces and, wherever possible, to improve the efficiency of those forces. Improving the accuracy of our strategic forces enables us to broaden the range of options available to the President and to minimize the collateral damage associated with a retaliatory strike in the event that deterrence fails. Moreover, improved accuracy enhances the values of our existing strategic forces by permitting one strategic launch vehicle to accomplish a strategic mission that might, with less accurate weapons, require several such weapons.

Given the growth and development of Soviet strategic forces, a deterrent posture based principally on the threat to retaliate against Soviet civilians, knowing that such a strike would almost certainly lead to the destruction of millions of American civilians, is less and less credible. Development of the technology required for a range of more discriminating—and more credible—responses is, in the judgment of the committee, simple prudence.

Second, a purposeful failure to improve the accuracy and yield of our strategic warheads would be a gratuitous self-constraint. Since the growth of Soviet strategic forces, especially that reported to the committee by Secretary Schlesinger, appears to be accelerating such a unilateral constraint on our part would give the Soviets the strategic initiative.

Third, several members emphasized that the development of these yield and accuracy improvements would not be a commitment to deployment. At a relatively modest cost, these developments provide an important hedge against future as well as developing Soviet programs in addition to preserving flexibility.

Fourth, the committee was extremely sensitive to the importance of negotiating from a position of strength in the complex SALT deliberations. In reviewing SALT I it was noted that favorable Congressional action on the ABM program enabled us to do precisely that. The Secretary of Defense will advise the committee of any developments affecting Soviet strategic capabilities, including the conclusion of further agreements at SALT, that may bear on the committee's assessment of the strategic initiatives authorized in this bill.

The committee would also like to stress that these improvements are not intended to provide the United States with a first-strike capability. The committee agrees with Secretary Schlesinger that a principal feature of United States policy should be, "The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR."

Conclusion

In summary, the committee considers that maintaining technological superiority in strategic weapons, even more so than in other areas of weaponry, is critical to the future deterrent posture of the United States. The line of demarcation between research and development and production is clearly defined. The Soviets have thus far made it clear that research and development is in no way constrained by the agreements reached at SALT I. In fact, their own rate of development nearly underlines this point. Thus, the committee recommends supporting the strategic initiatives proposed by the Defense Department.

Mr. EAGLETON. I ask the distinguished Senator from Washington how long his colloquy with the junior Senator from Massachusetts will go on?

Mr. BROOKE. We have concluded our colloquy. I wanted the opportunity to discuss with the Senator from Washington his views as far as the question of a first-strike capability is concerned.

Presidential statements and those of the Secretary of Defense confirm that it is U.S. policy not to seek a first-strike capability. I want to be sure that it is understood that in appropriating this money for R. & D. on increased accuracy and yield, we are not changing our strategic doctrine. I think the Senator from Washington has agreed that this does not represent a change in the strategic doctrine of the United States.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct. I want to compliment the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts for his able assistance in our joint effort to agree on report language in the bill which is before the Senate. That language does have the informal concurrence, as I understand it, of the Secretary of Defense, speaking for the administration.

Likewise, the language in the report in connection with the Defense authorization bill for the current fiscal year, which I previously referred to, represents, to my knowledge, a view that is concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, speaking for the administration.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I had the intent, first, of offering in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and then, falling there, in the Committee on Appropriations and, falling there, on the floor of the Senate, an amendment which would have deleted the approximately \$77 million for R. & D. on accuracy and field improvements. I feel strongly that these programs may be interpreted as a sign that we might be moving in a direction of seeking a first-strike capability at least against fixed land-based strategic systems.

After discussion with the distinguished chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and subsequently with the distinguished junior Senator from Washington, report language was worked out which clearly indicates that such is not the intent of the Committee on Appropriations in recommending these funds. Moreover, from the quoted remarks of the Secretary of Defense, I assume it is the intent of the administration not to seek a first-strike capability against either fixed land-based or other strategic systems of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, I assume there is no change between the intent of former President Richard Nixon, and President Gerald Ford in this regard.

I am very grateful to the distinguished Senator from Washington for joining in this colloquy and for working together with me on the report language which is provided in the report of their Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator. Let me just conclude by repeating the report language, quoting Secretary Schlesinger:

A principal feature of United States strategic policy should be, "The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR."

I think that speaks for itself, and I believe that my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts agrees that the combination of the statement of the Secretary of Defense, the statement of the

Committee on Appropriations, and the statement of the Committee on Armed Services, in the reports of those bills, conforms to his understanding and my understanding.

I thank the Senator for his very helpful dialog here.

Mr. BROOKE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. The dialog has been one that I hope will dissipate the confusion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record four articles pertaining to this subject matter.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Scientific American, May 1974]

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(By Barry Carter)

"Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?"

The questions asked in the preceding quotation, taken from President Nixon's first foreign-policy report in 1970, have been cited repeatedly in the past few months by Administration spokesmen in an effort to explain and justify some significant changes that are being made in U.S. policy regarding its strategic military forces. The new strategy, spelled out most clearly in Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger's annual report for the fiscal year 1975, released in March seeks "to provide the President with a wider set of much more selective targeting options," and hence greater "flexibility," in choosing an appropriate response to "any kind of nuclear attack."

As the opening quotation illustrates, much of the official rhetoric concerning this new development in U.S. strategic policy has been more misleading than illuminating. To criticize the "assured destruction" doctrine of the past decade or so as planning only for massive retaliation against Russian cities ignores the fact (belatedly acknowledged by Schlesinger) that U.S. strategic forces have for years had the capability, both in weapons and in planning, for a "flexible response." More important, the broad hypothetical issues invoked by such public statements have tended to obscure the more immediate real issues presented by this Administration's recent actions.

The real issues are serious ones. The primary operational question at present is whether or not the U.S. should develop missiles with an improved capability for attacking "hardened" targets in the U.S.S.R. The main rationale offered for developing such an improved "counterforce" capability (so called because it is aimed at an opponent's military forces) is that it is "impermissible" for the U.S. not to "match" certain Russian counterforce developments. There is also the suggestion that these missiles would minimize "unintended collateral damage."

The preceding question in turn raises the subtler issue of how the active promotion of such programs for improved counterforce capabilities affects the stability of the strategic nuclear deterrent and hence the likelihood that there will be a nuclear war. Before one can address these two issues one must understand why public debate should properly focus on such questions and not (at this time anyway) on the kind of questions posed in President Nixon's 1970 remarks.

In the late 1950's and early 1960's U.S.

strategic policy went through a series of transformations. By 1962 American military planners recognized that the U.S. would have many more missiles than the U.S.S.R. could have for several years and in fact many more missiles than were required to devastate every major city in the U.S.S.R. A counterforce strategy therefore held out the attractive option of limiting damage to U.S. cities by destroying a substantial part of the Russian strategic forces. In language that sounds remarkably familiar today, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said in a speech in Ann Arbor, Mich.: "The United States has come to the conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

The Russians, however, continued to deploy land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). As a result, even if the U.S. sought to limit damage to itself by the partial destruction of the Russian strategic forces, there would still be more than enough Russian forces left to kill tens of millions of Americans. Recognizing this fact, McNamara increasingly emphasized by the mid-1960's the concept of "assured destruction," which he said in 1968 meant the "ability, even after absorbing a well-coordinated surprise first strike, to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker." This criterion he defined explicitly: "In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent."

Few concepts have been as maligned or misunderstood as that of assured destruction. Critics label it genocide or use the acronym of "mutual assured destruction" to call it MAD. In fact, the concept seems well designed to serve two purposes. First, by planning the size of U.S. forces on the basis of the "worst case" scenario of an all-out Russian surprise attack, it ensures that the U.S. possesses the ultimate threat: to be able to wipe out the U.S.S.R. or any attacker in retaliation. Second, since the destruction criterion is reasonably precise, the concept provides a useful basis for limiting strategic-weapons procurement and for evaluating arms-control proposals.

While retaining the assured destruction concept, McNamara and his successor, Clark Clifford, supervised the development of the wide array of weapons that constitutes today's U.S. strategic arsenal. Both the numbers and the characteristics of many of these weapons were consistent with the assured destruction concept, partly because the U.S. possesses a "triad" of strategic offensive forces and partly because of the hedge against the "highest expected threat." The triad approach seeks to maintain a major retaliatory capability in each component of our strategic offensive forces: ICBM's, SLBM's and long-range bombers. Justified on the grounds that each component presents a different problem for an attacker, difficult and costly problems for his defense and a hedge against unexpected failures in one or both of the other components, the net result of the triad approach is to provide in the aggregate a high degree of confidence that the assured destruction mission could be carried out.

The hedge against the highest expected threat, as projected in the National Intelligence Estimates, meant that weapons would be developed and sometimes procured as a

cushion against Russian developments that, although not considered likely, were possible. The predictable result was that the U.S. came to possess much more powerful forces than were shown by subsequent events to be required for assured destruction. For example, one of the main justifications offered for developing multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) was to hedge against a greater-than-expected Russian deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system on the theory that increasing the number of incoming warheads would enable the U.S. offense to penetrate the Russian defense more easily.

Of course, some of the development and procurement decisions also reflected inevitable political and bureaucratic pressures. For example, faced with pressures from the military and from Congress, McNamara apparently thought he could not ask for fewer than 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's.

Finally, the proponents of the assured-destruction concept in the latter half of the 1960's quietly subscribed to secondary strategic objectives, in particular the desire to retain some ability to respond flexibly in the case of an actual attack. If the U.S. were subjected to a "limited" nuclear attack—possibly with a small number of missiles or because of an accident launch—most thought the President should have a range of options from which to choose. This factor helps to explain why, for example, the Minuteman II warhead, which was first deployed in 1968, could be programed for up to eight alternative targets, and why there was flexibility in the actual targeting plans.

As a result the U.S. ended up with strategic-war capabilities considerably greater than the assured-destruction concept required. That this situation was rarely acknowledged publicly was a serious mistake, the results of which we are now reaping in public misunderstanding of the policies of the past and, more important, in the sometimes surprising ignorance about the present capabilities of the U.S. strategic forces. The simple fact, which cannot be stressed too strongly, is that the U.S. strategic forces are now capable of carrying out a large array of alternative missions, far in excess of assured destruction.

To begin with, assured destruction does not require many forces. Assuming zero or low Russian ABM levels (a reasonable assumption given the 1972 Moscow Treaty limiting ABM systems), the delivered warheads of 220 Minuteman III ICBM's could kill about 21 percent of the Russian population from immediate effects alone and destroy about 72 percent of the Russian industrial capacity. The delivered warheads from 170 Poseidon missiles (which is fewer than the total carried by 12 submarines) could cause a similar level of damage [see illustration on page 24]. Projections of bomber survivability vary greatly, but most experts would estimate that enough B-52's could reach their targets to satisfy easily the traditional assured-destruction criterion.

The total of U.S. strategic forces is, of course, much larger. There are at present 1,054 ICBM's, of which 1,000 are Minuteman missiles and 54 are the older, larger Titans. Of the Minuteman missiles 550 have been or are in the process of being converted to the Minuteman III, which can carry up to three warheads. These MIRV's are estimated to have an accuracy of 1,500 feet or less (expressed in terms of "circular error probable," which means that 50 percent of the warheads are expected to fall within a radius of 1,500 feet of the target). The explosive power, or yield, of each warhead is equivalent to between 170 and 200 kilotons of TNT, or at least 11 times the size of the 15-kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Rapid retargeting of the Minuteman III will be possible soon with the advent of new computer-software sys-

tems, such as the Command Data Buffer system. (All estimates of the numbers and characteristics of U.S. forces used in this article are taken from the statements of U.S. officials, from publications of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and from other reliable publications.)

In addition the U.S. arsenal includes 656 SLEBM's, 496 of which are scheduled to become Poseidon missiles. The Poseidon can carry up to 14 MIRV's, but it is usually deployed with 10. Although accuracy might be reduced by uncertainties about the submarine's location, it still is probably less than 3,000 feet. Moreover, even though each warhead is smaller than Minuteman's, there are many more of them and each is still about three times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. Like the Minuteman III warheads, the Poseidon warheads can be retargeted quickly.

Bombers are often viewed as the stepchild of the U.S. strategic triad. The approximately 400 B-52's and 65 FB 111's are unaccountably ignored in many comparative tables of American and Russian strategic forces, notably in President Nixon's first three foreign-policy reports. This is surprising given the fact that an estimated 40 percent of the U.S. budget for strategic offensive forces is spent on bombers. Moreover, from the standpoint of nuclear strikes the per-sortie attrition rate of about 3 percent suffered by the B-52's in their attacks on heavily defended Hanoi demonstrated high survivability. Indeed, most places in the U.S.S.R. would not be as heavily defended as Hanoi, the B-52's would not be making the more vulnerable high-altitude attacks they made there and the bombers would use nuclear warheads to silence air-defense batteries. Each B-52 carries between four and 24 nuclear weapons, the load being a variable mix of gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles. The bombs can be in the megaton range (that is, equal to 1,000 kilotons) and can be delivered with very high accuracy.

(This accounting of the U.S. strategic forces does not include the extensive U.S. "tactical" nuclear forces, many of which could attack targets in the U.S.S.R. In addition to the more than 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, many such weapons are deployed in Asia and on forward-deployed ships in the Atlantic and the Pacific.)

In short, the U.S. already has a considerable potential for "limited" strategic strikes. Exactly how much capability depends on the critical assumption of who strikes first and how, as well as on one's assumptions about the nature of the Russian threat. In any case three important factors should be remembered about potential targets in the U.S.S.R.:

1. There are many nonmilitary, industrial targets outside urban centers that would require only one or two nuclear warheads each; such targets include manufacturing plants, power plants and the two construction yards for missile submarines.

2. Except for "hardened" targets, most military targets could be destroyed by only one or two warheads each; such targets include air-defense sites, military airfields, major army bases and submarine bases.

3. Even for hard targets such as missile silos, nuclear-weapons storage facilities and command posts, the use of small numbers of warheads will create a high probability of destruction. For instance, three Minuteman III warheads delivered against three Russian missile silos with a "hardness" about the same as that of the U.S. silos when they were first built would have approximately an 80 percent chance of destroying one silo, whereas seven Minuteman III warheads would have a similar 80 percent probability of knocking out one silo three times as hard. Presumably many Russian missile silos have a hardness in this range.

As a result, even with existing missiles a

limited strike by the U.S. that employed 100 missiles or fewer could do substantial damage to the U.S.S.R. and could knock out some Russian ICBM's.

In calculating the sufficiency of our strategic forces, one should not forget the Chinese. For any conceivable "crisis scenario" the total expenditure of U.S. warheads against China could easily come from the present surplus exceeding the weapons needed for the assured-destruction mission against the U.S.S.R. Not only could the U.S. destroy most of the nascent Chinese nuclear forces, but also it has been estimated that a few warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people), more than half of the industrial capacity and most of the key governmental, technical and managerial personnel. Indeed, against fixed targets such as cities the U.S. could use its B-52's, which could return to their bases for other missions.

Not only does the U.S. have this multifaceted capability but also its nuclear strategy has always included plans for attacks other than massive ones on Russian cities. This conclusion is logically inescapable when one realizes that the U.S. has had thousands of strategic warheads since the mid-1960's, has about 7,500 now and is expected to have almost 10,000 by 1977. There are only about 200 major cities in the U.S.S.R. Either the U.S. has aimed a superfluously large number of warheads at each major city or it has planned for other targets all along. Any doubts on this score were resolved by Secretary Schlesinger's statement in March that "our war plans have always included military targets."

President Nixon has made it very clear from the early days of his Administration that he wanted changes in U.S. strategic policy. Neither he nor any other high official, including Secretary Schlesinger, has ever rejected the assured-destruction concept. Rather they have defined assured destruction narrowly to mean only massive retaliation against cities and have said that more options are needed. To date the Nixon Administration has really presented two different sets of what "more" is needed. First there were the "sufficiency criteria," which were publicized in the period from 1970 to 1972. This past year has seen the emergence of a new set of criteria.

The sufficiency criteria, which President Nixon first hinted at in 1970, were spelled out by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in 1971. They are:

1. Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces."

2. "Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis."

3. "Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war."

4. "Defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches."

These four criteria have been explained further, including the fact that the deterrence is for the benefit of U.S. allies as well as the U.S.

The publication of the sufficiency criteria at least moved the public debate off the misleading view that U.S. policies and forces only envisioned massive retaliation against cities, but beyond that there is little new in the criteria. This is partly because they were never clearly explained; accordingly they remained more Delphic than definitive.

The first criterion is simply a basic statement of the assured-destruction concept. The third is a result of the assured-destruction assumption at meaningful levels of destruction; beyond the ability of either side to inflict 75 million fatalities and between

50 and 75 percent industrial damage—levels that would finish either country as a viable society—relative differences in the ability to inflict urban or industrial damage seem insignificant. Besides, much higher levels of destruction can only be achieved with considerable difficulty, since either country soon reaches a point of rapidly diminishing returns in terms of urban or industrial destruction per additional warhead.

The fourth criterion was clearly justification for the Safeguard ABM system. Without getting into the debate over such issues as whether or not the advantages of damage limitation against small attacks or accidental launches outweighs the disadvantage of the Russians' misinterpreting the purposes of any ABM deployment, suffice it to say that the Administration as early as May, 1971, was committed to insignificant ABM levels in the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The fourth criterion thus became "inoperative."

That leaves the second criterion. It clearly enunciates a desirable objective in strategic policy: to avoid strategic forces or actions that would be destabilizing in a crisis. Although this objective was not explicit before, it was inherent in the assured-destruction objective of providing highly survivable forces that would thereby reduce the incentive for a first strike. The second sufficiency criterion fails to delineate what more, if anything, was needed.

The criteria are silent about the kinds of option other than assured destruction that the President was so concerned about. Moreover, should the U.S. react to protect its allies (still undefined) in the same way that it would to protect its own territory? And what are U.S. strategic objectives with regard to China? In short, except for the flirtation with the ABM possibility, the sufficiency criteria only hinted at new strategic policies rather than establishing them.

Instead of trying to amend the sufficiency criteria, the Administration decided about a year ago simply to scrap them and to start anew in redefining strategic policies. This time Secretary Schlesinger has been the principal spokesman. After some of his press conferences late in 1973 and early in 1974 led to confusion among journalists and other observers as to what the new policies encompassed, the appearance of Schlesinger's annual report in March clarified the issues considerably. At one place in that report the "Principal Features of the Proposed Posture" (a posture Schlesinger clearly likes to refer to as "essential equivalence") are listed:

1. "a capability sufficiently large, diversified, and survivable so that it will provide us at all times with high confidence of riding out even a massive surprise attack and of penetrating enemy defenses, and with the ability to withhold an assured destruction reserve for an extended period of time."

2. "sufficient warning to ensure the survival of our heavy bombers together with the bomb alarm systems and command-control capabilities required by our National Command Authorities to direct the employment of the strategic forces in a controlled, selective, and restrained fashion."

3. "the forces to execute a wide range of options in response to potential actions by an enemy, including a capability for precise attacks on both soft and hard targets, while at the same time minimizing unintended collateral damage."

4. "the avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR."

5. "an offensive capability of such size and composition that all will perceive it as in overall balance with the strategic forces of any potential opponent."

6. "offensive and defensive capabilities and programs that conform with the provisions of current arms control agreements and at the same time facilitate the conclusion of more permanent treaties to control and, if possible, reduce the main nuclear arsenals."

These factors plus the accompanying text in the report provide the best available insight into the proposed new policies. The first factor, combined with the second's requirement of bomber survivability, constitutes essentially a restatement of the assured-destruction concept. It needs no further elaboration here except to note that assured destruction does not require immediate response; indeed, the emphasis on a "second strike" capability and on the survivability of U.S. forces reflects the goal of having time in which to consider what the appropriate response should be.

Skipping briefly to the fourth, fifth and sixth factors, they raise a host of diverse issues—touching on all offensive and defensive strategic programs. There is not sufficient space to treat them comprehensively here; instead the focus will be on their impact on the Administration's concepts of strategic flexibility and limited nuclear war.

The third factor and the balance of the second address the questions of flexibility and limited strategic war directly. The underlying questions can best be summarized as follows: (1) Should the U.S. have a number of response options? (2) Should the U.S. develop missiles with improved counterforce capabilities? (3) Should the U.S. actively promote the idea of improving counterforce capabilities for fighting, if necessary, a limited nuclear war? Since the first question is essentially noncontroversial, the remaining two define the immediate issues.

Schlesinger reports that most of the targeting options in the past have involved "relatively massive responses." He wants to provide the President with a "wider set of much more selective targeting options." There is general agreement among strategic analysts that the U.S. should have a variety of response options other than massive retaliation against cities. These options could be useful, for example, in deterring a limited strategic attack. As Paul C. Warnke, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has put it: "There can . . . be little objection to the concept that our targeting plans should be sufficiently flexible to provide the President with a variety of options in the event of a nuclear attack." Warnke believes "we might be better positioned to deter a less than all-out Soviet attack if we have the refinement of command and control to push only one or a few buttons rather than the entire console . . . to respond with less than our Sunday punch."

This broad consensus includes those options that draw on the capabilities of present forces and those already well along in development. As we have seen, our present forces already have the accuracy-yield combinations to be used effectively to destroy almost anything except hard targets. Even against such hard targets as ICBM silos these forces could destroy large numbers of targets, but they would not do it "efficiently."

Schlesinger makes it clear, however, that he wants more than flexibility, that he wants counterforce options that require new or improved weapons. The incremental options are ones "minimizing unintended collateral damage" and providing a hard-target kill capability that "matches" that of the Russians. To be able to achieve these options Schlesinger seeks programs to develop missiles with improved counterforce capabilities.

The proposed defense budget for the fiscal year 1975 includes a number of such programs. The programs appear to fall into two categories.

First, there are the short-term programs, the ones that involve relatively minor changes and for which initial deployment might easily begin by the late 1970's. The major programs in this category include procurement of more Minuteman III missiles; refinement of the existing guidance system of the Minuteman III to increase accuracy (probably from 1,500 feet down to 700 feet or less); a higher-yield warhead for the Minuteman III identical in configuration with the existing warhead, and a general program to improve and measure the accuracy of SLBMs. The proposed budget also includes funds to flight-test a Minuteman III with a larger number of smaller reentry vehicles. Whether this program will increase counterforce capabilities or not depends on the accuracy and yield of the new warheads.

Second, there are two major long-term programs. Both will require considerable development time, and initial deployment would seem unlikely before 1980. Advanced development will be initiated for a terminally guided "maneuverable reentry vehicle" (MARV) for possible "retrofit" into both ICBM's and SLBM's. Although a MARV warhead has been programmed for some time for the advanced Trident I SLBM, it is not to be terminally guided, being designed for evasion of ABM interceptors rather than for improved accuracy. A new terminally guided MARV, however, will presumably have an accuracy of a few hundred feet. This would give even warheads the size of the Poseidon's a very effective hard-target kill capability.

Further research and development is needed to decide exactly how the new MARV will work. By definition, after the MARV has separated from the "bus," or postboost vehicle, that holds all a missile's warheads, it can maneuver almost up to impact in order to correct its flight path. The corrections could be accomplished in two ways. The most likely development is the homing MARV, what some call the true MARV. A sensor in the warhead would acquire an image or images of the target or of prominent terrain features nearby (or perhaps would simply acquire an "altitude profile" of the terrain along its flight path). An on-board matching device would match this information with a map stored in its memory. The warhead's flight path would then be corrected either by gas jets or by aerodynamic vanes.

An alternative approach is to use an inertial guidance system in the warhead as well as in the bus. Since the reentry vehicle often separates from the bus early in its flight, an on-board guidance system would allow much later changes in trajectory. The information on position would come, however, from the system's gyroscopes, from stars or even from satellites and not from the target area itself. As a result this approach in theory would probably not be as accurate as the homing approach.

The second long-term program is the development of an entirely new ICBM for the 1980's. This missile, which may even be an air-mobile missile, would include a new guidance system (presumably a terminally guided MARV), which Schlesinger says would give it "a very good capability against hard targets."

How reasonable or necessary is it to develop missiles with improved counterforce capabilities in order to minimize collateral damage or to match the Russians' hard-target kill capability?

It is particularly difficult to understand how these missiles will minimize collateral damage. The warheads Secretary Schlesinger is proposing will probably have at least the yield of the present Minuteman III and Poseidon warheads. Such warheads would cause extensive damage over a wide area. For example, a "small" 100-kiloton bomb exploding in the air over a target would cause substantial fatalities and damage from

immediate effects alone over a circle with a radius of 2.5 miles. Since the possible improvement in accuracy for the Minuteman, for example, is at most about 1,000 feet even in the long run, the number of civilian fatalities will hardly be reduced significantly if a warhead at least three to 11 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb lands a few hundred feet closer to the intended target.

A substantially smaller warhead that still provides an improved hard-target kill capability is unlikely to be ready for deployment until the 1980's, since a very accurate terminally guided MARV is needed to allow a significant "trade-off" between lower yield and higher accuracy. Furthermore, the value of much smaller warheads in saving lives must be put in perspective.

First, the way to minimize fatalities, if nuclear weapons must be used, is careful target selection, in other words aiming at targets distant from urban centers. Air-defense sites or air bases in the Arctic and isolated army posts or industrial sites are good examples. For a very limited exchange the differences in fatality levels from an attack on such targets with warheads of, say, 50 kilotons as against five kilotons would not be significant.

Second, if there is a large-scale nuclear exchange, then there simply is no way of keeping civilian damage at a low level. The effects not only of immediate blast but also of radioactivity would kill millions.

Third, in an actual nuclear exchange the successful continuation of a U.S. policy aimed at minimizing civilian casualties depends in large part on what the Russians do, and the Russians have never seemed much attracted to this objective. Their strategic warheads have always been large. Even though they necessarily reduced the size of individual warheads on their ICBM's in order to deploy MIRV's on them, some if not all of the warheads are still in the megaton range.

Schlesinger's main justification for the new counterforce programs is that the U.S. to match that of the U.S.S.R. This seems a questionable refinement of the broader theme of "essential equivalence." Schlesinger has on occasion defined essential equivalence to suggest overall balance. For example, he recently testified: "We do not have to have a match for everything in their arsenal. They do not have to have a match for everything in our arsenal."

Whether or not such an overall balance exists today and for the foreseeable future is a question that deserves public debate; a good case can be made for the affirmative. Most important, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a high-confidence ability to carry out a wide variety of retaliatory options. In terms of static indicators the Russians do have more missiles and greater missile "throw weight." The U.S., however, has more bombers, more warheads (now and for the rest of the decade) and about equal throw weight (if bombers are included in the calculations). In terms of qualitative factors U.S. missile submarines are much quieter and hence harder to find than the Russian ones, and U.S. bombers are more modern. Finally, to maintain or even enhance some of its capabilities, the U.S. already has a number of strategic programs well along: the conversion of older missiles to larger Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles, the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine with its advanced missiles.

Schlesinger, however, avoids the complex question of whether the general U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic picture is one of overall balance—of essential equivalence. Rather, he selectively focuses on relative counterforce capabilities against ICBM silos (Selective vision is not exactly a new tactic in military analysis. The "missile gap" of 1960 is a classic case; the heated debate over the num-

ber of U.S. ICBM's compared with the number of Russian ICBM's ignored the massive U.S. bomber force. Schlesinger's selective vision is even blurred within its own field. Although the Russians are clearly developing new missiles and MIRV's, they apparently have not pursued the accuracy aspect of a counterforce strategy with much zeal. As General George S. Brown, the chief of staff of the Air Force, recently remarked about the new Russian programs, "MIRVing alone won't [take out the Minuteman force]. Accuracy is the other key element and we haven't seen evidence of accuracy improvement in their work which we would expect to see."

Is there some reason why the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should have essential equivalence in the capability to destroy missile silos? The arguments against this course of action seem persuasive. There is no benefit in terms of traditional strategic analysis in being able to kill efficiently very large numbers of the other side's silos. As we have established, the U.S. can already destroy some silos, although at a cost of a few U.S. missiles each. Inefficient, limited destruction of silos should suffice for the war scenarios that some envision, in which the U.S. feels it necessary to destroy silos as a way of showing its "resolve." Killing many more silos would not minimize damage to the U.S.; everyone agrees that the U.S. cannot expect to destroy a large enough fraction of the silos or other strategic offensive forces of the U.S.S.R. to limit damage to this country in any meaningful way.

Finally a critical assumption underlying the preceding discussion is that the silos will have missiles in them when they are destroyed. In fact, the flight time of a Minuteman missile to the Russian missile fields is about 30 minutes. If the Russians were to deploy early-warning satellites, they could detect almost instantaneously the launch of U.S. missiles, which means that the U.S.S.R. could probably have the option of launching many, if not all, of its missiles before the U.S. warheads arrived. Using U.S. warheads against empty silos in empty fields seems a particularly questionable policy.

The full cost of these new programs is unclear. Much depends on the size of the deployments and the extensiveness of the modifications. A useful benchmark is the Minuteman III program; the conversion of 550 older Minuteman missiles into Minuteman III's will cost between \$5 billion and \$6 billion. Although the costs of some of the new counterforce programs might be comparatively small, the total cost of all the new programs would greatly exceed the Minuteman III costs.

Added to the questions about the analytical reason for the new counterforce programs and the inevitable costs must be the distinct possibility that these programs will be destabilizing and will make arms limitations more difficult to negotiate.

Assuming a crisis situation, a substantial U.S. counterforce capability against Russian ICBM's is more likely to create an incentive for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a hair-trigger, launch-on-warning posture; the Russian leadership would fear that the U.S. might attack first in an attempt to limit damage to itself. These fears would make it even more likely for the U.S.S.R. to attack first in a crisis in order to destroy some of the U.S. ICBM's that had become more tempting targets as a result of the new U.S. counterforce programs.

Schlesinger deplores this instability (as in his fourth feature, cited above, of the new posture), but he and other high officials say that the new U.S. programs are not extensive enough to create such Russian fears. The conceivable accuracy and yield improvements on 1,000 Minuteman missiles, however, even without the terminally guided MARV, could give the U.S. the capability, on

paper at least, of destroying between 80 and 90 percent of the Russian ICBM force. The deployment of the MARV or the use of improved SLBM's against the Russian missiles would push that percentage even higher.

The Russian leadership, moreover, might be more conservative than the U.S. leadership in assessing Russian strengths and weaknesses. This conservatism would be based at least partly on the fact that, unlike the balanced reliance in the U.S. on all three elements of the strategic triad, in the U.S.S.R. ICBM's are the primary component of the strategic offensive forces. The U.S.S.R. is allowed up to 1,618 ICBM's under the SALT I Interim Agreement (compared with 1,054 for the U.S.), and the Russians are actively developing four new ICBM's. Moreover, these missiles are under the command of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which since it was created in about 1960 has been one of the most important branches, if not the most important one, of the Russian military. Unlike the U.S. Air Force, which has responsibility not only for ICBM's but also for bombers and many tactical forces, the primary responsibility of the Strategic Rocket Forces is the Russian ICBM force; consequently this organization has every incentive to enhance its role in strategic planning. The Long Range Aviation command, which has responsibility for the Russian bombers, has never had the bureaucratic strength of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Russian navy has responsibility for a number of other forces besides missile submarines.

The strategic-planning emphases of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. differ particularly on the subject of bombers. At present the U.S. has more than 450 intercontinental bombers, about a fourth of which are kept on "ready alert" at a large number of air bases (so that they can avoid being destroyed even in case of surprise attack). The Russians have about 140 long-range bombers. These are qualitatively inferior even to the B-36 bombers deployed by the U.S. in the 1950's, are not kept at as high readiness and are located at just a few air bases. Although a new Russian bomber (named the Backfire by the Pentagon) is just beginning production, it seems primarily intended for targets on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. In any case it is not certain how many Backfires will be built, and the plane appears to lack the critical range and low-altitude capabilities of the B-52's.

As for SLBM's, the U.S.S.R. is building new missile submarines and is allowed more boats and SLBM's than the U.S. under the terms of the SALT agreements. In contrast to the active U.S. MIRV programs for both ICBM's and SLBM's and the new Russian MIRV programs for ICBM's, however, the Russians have not begun testing multiple warheads on their new SLBM. The U.S.S.R., moreover, usually keeps only five or six missile submarines on patrol at any one time, compared with 40 percent of the 41 U.S. boats. In sum, the U.S.S.R. does not seem to give missile submarines the same priority in strategic planning as the U.S.

Schlesinger essentially hinges his denial that first-strike fears by the U.S.S.R. would be enhanced by the planned U.S. improvement in its capabilities against ICBM's on the relative invulnerability of the Russian missile submarines. Compared with the U.S. missile submarines, however, the Russian boats are noisier—an important qualitative disadvantage—and must operate in ocean areas where it is easier for the U.S. to locate and detect them. In addition the U.S. has under way a large, aggressive antisubmarine-warfare program for tactical and strategic uses. It has been reliably estimated that U.S. expenditures in the fiscal year 1972 for anti-submarine warfare were \$2.5 billion and that by 1974 they would rise to more than \$4 billion. The Russian leaders might well fear, at

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some future crisis point, that the U.S. had developed a significant antisubmarine-warfare capability, making Schlesinger's suggested ultimate reliance on their missile submarines less than completely reassuring.

One "crisis scenario" that is often concocted to show the danger of the growing Russian counterforce capability against Minuteman and to justify developing improved U.S. counterforce capabilities is an attack or threat of attack by the U.S.S.R. against U.S. ICBM's. The scenario envisions the following chain of events: (1) a real or threatened Russian attack against Minuteman; (2) a realization by the U.S. leadership that it is left or will be left with no more than a capacity to attack Russian cities; (3) major concessions or even surrender by the U.S.

This scenario has an obviously fantastic quality. Even if the internal logic of the scenario were accepted, it still does not justify improving U.S. counterforce capabilities. It does not matter whether the U.S. missiles destroyed are highly accurate or not. What matters is what other U.S. forces can do if these missiles are destroyed. Indeed, as we have seen, by presenting an increased threat to the U.S.S.R., U.S. development of highly accurate missiles might actually make the Russians more likely to attack, thus making the scenario less implausible.

More important, the underlying logic of the scenario is simply wrong, as should be evident to both the U.S. and the Russian leadership. First, the Russians would have to consider that Minuteman might be launched against Russian targets in the 30-minute warning time between the launch of the Russian ICBM's and their arrival at the Minuteman silos. Second, even if a surprised or reasonably cautious U.S. leadership did not launch on warning, a few Minutemen would survive even the most careful attack. Also surviving would be at least the bombers on alert and most if not all of the U.S. missile submarines in the water. (If the attack occurred after an initial crisis period, more bombers than usual would be on alert and more submarines would be in the water.) These combined forces would provide the U.S. with the capacity to carry out a number of limited strikes while still retaining an assured-destruction hedge.

Finally, some U.S. retaliation would seem very likely to the Russian leadership since tens of millions of Americans would be killed in any "Minuteman only" attack. In attacks against silos the bombs are set to explode as close to the ground as possible, thereby picking up much dirt and debris. The fallout from the explosion of thousands of megatons of nuclear weapons over the Minuteman fields would be tremendous, and winds would carry the lethal contamination over many major U.S. cities. Such calculations of fallout do not even include the possibility of a few Russian warheads going off course and directly hitting populated areas, nor the collateral damage by Russian attacks against other targets, such as bomber bases, many of which are near cities.

Even not assuming a crisis, the consequence of these new U.S. counterforce developments might be to push the U.S.S.R. toward accelerating or expanding programs, or starting new ones. The arms race is not as mechanically "action-reaction" as some have suggested, but a substantial new U.S. capability against the primary strategic offensive force of the U.S.S.R. will surely fuel justifications within the Russian bureaucracy for some kind of reaction. This should be particularly true when U.S. antisubmarine-warfare programs, noted above, are also considered.

If the U.S. counterforce programs are allowed to continue beyond the rhetoric of announcing them, these programs would operate to undercut any progress at SALT. Of course, if announcing these programs is just a short-term ploy designed to strengthen the U.S. bargaining position for the impending

SALT II agreements, then little real harm will result. There is no evidence, however, that top Administration officials intend to turn these programs off quickly. And even if there are such intentions, new weapons programs tend to gain a momentum of their own once they are announced. High-level officials become publicly committed to rationales for them, rationales that include more than the systems' just being "bargaining chips." Bureaucracies are created with a vested interest in the continuation and expansion of these programs. Moreover, improvements in accuracy and yield would be particularly difficult to limit explicitly in SALT, making it harder to rationalize publicly any subsequent termination of the program.

Accuracy improvements are generally accepted as being among the most difficult weapons characteristics to limit in an arms-control agreement, because of problems of both definition and verification. Drafting a workable, direct limit on accuracy seems impossible, since the counterforce potential of a warhead depends on the accuracy-yield combination. Moreover, a simple numerical limit on accuracy would not be verifiable. A photograph of a silo or even the missile gives little clue to the kind of small but important differences in accuracy that are being considered here. Closer examination through on-site inspection, even if such inspection could be negotiated, would be insufficient. On-site inspection could indicate whether the warhead was a terminally guided MARV, but this would not establish any particular accuracy. Moreover, on-site inspection includes a heroic assumption that the latest warheads are on the missile and not stored nearby in an area excluded from the on-site inspection provisions.

Surveillance of Russian missile-testing may give some indication of accuracy. The indication, however, is indirect and not conclusive. Test data tell one about the ballistic coefficient (or pointedness) of the warhead, its reentry speed and similar information, all of which helps in estimating accuracy. An outside observer, however, can never be sure what the actual target is. Similarly, course corrections by the warhead would indicate a maneuvering capability but not necessarily terminal guidance or particularly high accuracies.

An indirect way to limit or impede accuracy improvements through SALT would be by placing a strict limit on the number of missile tests. This would make it more difficult to develop advanced guidance techniques and to test them often enough so that the military would have confidence in them. The low limits necessary seem non-negotiable, however, since they represent a direct challenge to all new strategic programs. Even without accuracy improvements the Pentagon will want to do extensive research and development and operational testing of the new Trident missile and further operational testing of the Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. Similarly, the Russians will want to flight-test extensively their four new ICBM's and their new SLBM as well as their existing arsenal of missiles.

Limits in SALT on the yield of warheads might be more possible, but they would be of uncertain significance. The two sides could limit yield by an agreement that warheads not be larger than a given yield or a given weight. The effect of any such limitation could be circumvented, however, by increasing the number of warheads and by increasing their accuracy. Moreover, it would be difficult to verify the exact yield of a warhead. Even elaborate on-site inspection would not ensure that "advanced" warheads were not hidden nearby. Surveillance of flight tests only gives an estimate of the size of the warhead, and yield per pound of warhead can be varied by warhead design and the richness of the nuclear "fuel" used.

In short, the practical difficulties of fashioning limitations in SALT on the type of counterforce improvements now planned by the U.S. make such limitations unlikely and will instead presumably create strong pressures in the U.S.S.R. to expand old programs or to start new ones that either match or compensate for the U.S. programs. This in turn, can only work against other limitations on strategic arms.

Allied concerns about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent are another reason offered for developing missiles with improved counterforce capabilities. Occasionally a specific scenario—a Russian attack in central Europe—is given as a justification for such improvements. Neither the scenario nor the more general invocation of allied claims is persuasive.

The European scenario supposedly demonstrates that the U.S. needs the ability to respond with nuclear weapons in order to show its resolve and to destroy some of the attacking Russian forces. There are, however, already sizable U.S. forces in Europe that could accomplish both of those objectives. Even if the U.S. decided to employ strategic weapons, existing U.S. forces could carry out a wide variety of selective attacks.

As for the broader claims of allied concerns, Morton Halperin, an authority on nuclear strategy, has remarked: "The credibility of the U.S. deterrent to an Ally is primarily a result of the overall U.S.-Ally relationship, which includes economic and political considerations as well as military. To the extent that Allied leaders evaluate U.S. military capabilities, they look especially to the U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in that particular theater of operations. Fine distinctions in the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance or in U.S. strategic policy are unimportant to Allied leaders. Among those Allied analysts who care, opinion is probably split between those who favor the U.S. possessing an efficient silo-kill capability and those who do not."

Among the European strategic analysts who oppose such deployments is Ian Smart, formerly assistant director of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies. Smart writes: "Producing and deploying much more accurate strategic missiles . . . is to be regretted and even feared since . . . it can only reduce the stability of the strategic balance in any period of acute tension." At least part of this European concern can be attributed to the fact that, in a strategic exchange, the industrialized European countries are very likely targets—if only because of the U.S. forces deployed in or near those countries.

Finally, even assuming that the allies (or even the American people) accord considerable political significance to fine distinctions in the "strategic balance," Schlesinger's proposed counterforce improvements are not very helpful politics. The supposedly important distinctions are usually visible ones such as the number of delivery vehicles, the number of warheads or the throw weight. Schlesinger's accuracy and yield improvements do not affect these indicators, except possibly in the counterproductive way of reducing the number of warheads in order to allow larger ones.

On balance, then, there seem to be strong arguments against developing missiles with improved counterforce capabilities. Collateral damage can best be minimized by shifting targets, not improving accuracies by a few hundred feet. The ability to destroy efficiently large numbers of missile silos in order to "match the Russians" seems not only unnecessary and expensive but also destabilizing. SALT might well be undercut, and the supposed concerns of our allies about the U.S. deterrent are not answered by such programs.

As one gets caught up in considering nuclear-war scenarios and nuclear-weapons capabilities there is a dangerous tendency to

forget that the primary objective of nuclear strategy is to avoid nuclear wars, not to fight them.

Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the world's lack of experience in using them, crossing the "nuclear threshold" would be a profoundly destabilizing event. It is a delusion to believe one country could employ nuclear weapons, even on a limited scale, and have a high degree of confidence that the response by another nuclear power would be predictable and proportionate. The particular first use might be estimated by the opposing country's observers to be greater than it actually was, or the use might have created more damage than expected (for example through greater-than-expected fallout). The opposing country might not have readily available weapons of the same yield or similar targeting options and decide to escalate. The political reaction in the opposing country might lead to escalation. In short, the possible causes for matters getting out of hand are endless.

To make deterrence work, a country must carefully consider its public attitude toward nuclear war and cautiously select its retaliatory options. This does not mean that the U.S. should have only the single strategic option of massive retaliation against cities. This country already has ample capabilities for lesser options, and it seems appropriate to have the flexibility, at a minimum, for possible responses to accidental or limited launches.

The Nixon Administration, however, is going beyond this. It is seeking the additional capability to attack efficiently large numbers of Russian missile silos. Not only might this counterforce option be destabilizing in itself but also the Administration's promotion of the option and its general public advocacy of a counterforce strategy might have a pervasive, if subtle, tendency to reduce the inhibitions against the use of nuclear weapons—in effect, to lower the "nuclear threshold." New bureaucracies, with vested interests in the hardware and rationales of a counterforce strategy, are created. In trying to gain public approval of new policies and programs, leaders find themselves taking more simplistic positions than the uncertainty of nuclear warfare warrants. In this climate some of the risks of nuclear war are downplayed. Unrealistically precise calculations suggest that limited nuclear war can be kept limited and even result in positive gains.

There are some disturbing parallels here to the vogue of limited conventional war in the early 1960's. In pushing for changes in conventional strategy and new procurement, advocates of limited conventional war ignored some of the pitfalls and costs of such a strategy. The searing national experience of the war in Vietnam was needed to demonstrate these oversights.

Exactly where the line should be drawn on "selective targeting options" is not at all clear. It seems most inadvisable, however, to take the gamble of developing missiles with improved counterforce capabilities, whether this is to match a specific Russian capability or for any other reason.

Opponents of U.S. counterforce improvements, nonetheless, must recognize certain practical limits to their arguments. Even if Congress declines to fund the new and accelerated development programs Schlesinger is proposing, continued U.S. testing of strategic missiles and various research-and-development efforts already under way inevitably will lead to some improvements in missile accuracy. (As Schlesinger has pointed out, some refinements in existing guidance systems will occur almost as a matter of course—through better software programs, greater purity in rocket fuel, better measurement of the earth's gravitational field and numerous other factors. The development of a terminally

guided MARV, something further beyond the state of the art, requires more of a conscious bureaucratic decision to proceed.) Besides U.S. advances, moreover, Russian counterforce improvements are likely to continue, raising serious questions about Russian intentions.

Faced with these likely developments, the solution is still not to follow the Schlesinger approach. Rather, the solution should be to seek actively to negotiate for limits on MIRV's and for the reduction of vulnerable strategic forces.

Limits on MIRV's would be designed to slow the perceived threat to U.S. ICBM's, a Russian threat that many consider destabilizing. In return for the U.S. slowing certain of its strategic programs, for example, the U.S.S.R. might agree to limits on the deployment of the SSX-18, the "follow on" missile to the large SS-9. This would push at least a few years further into the future the time when analysts would estimate that only a particular level of Minuteman could survive a Russian counterforce attack.

Negotiating missile reductions represents another approach: to limit not only the threatening forces but also the threatened ones. This approach would essentially mean bilateral reductions in ICBM's, presumably in a way that would retire the more threatening ICBM's, so that the remaining ICBM's would be less vulnerable. Some asymmetrical reductions might also be considered. For instance, the U.S. could reduce its ICBM's, whereas the U.S.S.R. (having less to fear in the short run about the vulnerability of its ICBM's) could reduce some ICBM's plus other forces.

Reductions in the land-based missiles of both sides would reduce the importance of this strategic strike force. It would thereby undercut the rationale for an expensive contest of matching counterforce improvements. More important, it would reduce the greatest potential source of instability in a crisis. Both countries would have less incentive to adopt an unstable, launch-on-warning posture or to launch an attack out of fear of a preemptive strike.

The reductions approach has received support recently from such diverse sources as the Federation of American Scientists and Fred C. Iklé, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It was even accorded the status of a possibility in Schlesinger's recent annual report.

Rather than focusing on how to match the U.S.S.R. in a particular capability when such matching does not bode well for either country, the strategic debate in the U.S. in the coming months should focus on MIRV limits, force reductions and other measures designed to minimize the chances of nuclear war and to decelerate the arms race.

[From the F.A.S. Public Interest Report, February 1974]

COUNTERFORCE 10 YEARS LATER: PLUS CA CHANGE

On January 10, 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger revealed a quiet change in U.S. central war strategy. (See box, page 3). He announced that, several months before, he had begun the process of improving the accuracy of U.S. missiles, that we were now targeting Soviet military targets, and that we were preparing to fight less than all-out nuclear wars. This was a fundamental and far-reaching decision reversing a position which had previously been debated for more than a decade under the heading of "deterrence" versus "counterforce".

Several questions arise. First, why was the decision taken in secret when it is of such importance, and when it seems to contradict policy statements made by President Nixon, Senator John Stennis and others, only a few years ago.

Second, the decision is partly justified on grounds involving the SALT Agreements limiting missile numbers, but the decision is clearly *not* to be negotiable at SALT.

Third, will the decision encourage limited nuclear war both by acknowledging that we are prepared to fight a controlled nuclear war if initiated by the other side, and by making our own preparations for initiating one? Thus, will the decision enhance or undermine U.S. safety?

Fourth, will the decision make future SALT agreements more or less difficult? In what direction is the arms race now heading?

COUNTERFORCE VERSUS DETERRENCE

In the early fifties, the United States thought of nuclear war as a prolonged (sixty day) campaign of exhaustion. Both cities and military targets were to be devastated. Later, the United States gradually realized that its preponderance of strategic weapons should be aimed initially at the time-urgent targets that could retaliate against us—a counterforce strategy evolved. Still later, during the missile gap period, the United States was preoccupied with defending itself against counterforce threat-possibilities to its bombers, threats that never materialized.

But by 1962, it was evident that the United States would have far more missiles than the Soviet Union for several years—and more missiles than were necessary to strike Soviet cities. The excess of missiles had been purchased for essentially political reasons—Secretary McNamara did not feel that he could come into Congress with a request for fewer than 1,000 although it was conceded, inside the Administration, that 400 would do for military reasons. (By 1965, the United States had a four-to-one lead over the Russians at about 1,000 to 250, in land-based missiles). In 1962, Secretary McNamara said, in a famous speech at Ann Arbor:

"The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population".

The rationale for this decision was not particularly strong. If we were not going to strike first, it was asked, would we not be aiming at only empty holes? DOD said the Soviets might have a "reload capacity". In fact, DOD was assuming, as usual, that the war would begin in Europe with a Soviet aggressive act and that the United States might well strike first on the nuclear level. Underlying the arguments and the rhetoric was an excess of missiles for which there simply were not enough civilian targets. Supply produced its own demand.

As the Soviet Union built submarines, Secretary McNamara moved away from this pronouncement. His rhetoric became that of "deterrence" rather than "counterforce". Undoubtedly, U.S. missiles remained targeted upon Soviet missiles. But the Soviet missile force was growing beyond the ability of the U.S. force to keep up—at least on a missile for missile basis. In the sixties, counterforce became a generally discredited term.

In the research institutes, however, there was a solution: MIRV. It could make each missile count for several. Thus it could make possible a continued economical effort to target many Soviet missiles. Secretary McNamara would not purchase MIRV for this (counterforce) purpose. But he would, and did, buy it to overwhelm any possible Soviet ABM. In this regard, it was the perfect penetration aid, requiring that each "decoy" be destroyed because each was a warhead.

This kept MIRV alive. And much was said about it being defensive only. It was argued that the small (2-10 times Hiroshima) size precluded use against enemy missile silos only. For President Nixon's assertions in this regard, see box above.

In fact, however, it was considered inevitable among the more sophisticated observers that the Defense Department could not be prevented from putting high accuracy on these small warheads. There were too many temptations. At that point, DOD would have a really potent counterforce threat.

We had the potential for 3,000 200-kiloton warheads on our 1,000 Minuteman missiles (three such warheads on each). And we had programmed 5,000 warheads on 31 Polaris submarines (16 missiles with 10 warheads each on each submarine of 50 kilotons each.)

The warheads were relatively small but, in such calculations, accuracy is much more useful than yield. An eightfold diminution in yield (megatonnage, payload capability) can be compensated for by a doubling of accuracy. Thus a giant Soviet missile with 25 megatons and 1/2 mile accuracy is only as effective as a U.S. one-megaton missile with 1/6th mile accuracy. The United States did indeed lead the Soviet Union in accuracy by a factor of two to three. And these accuracies were getting to the point where even with the smallest programmed Hiroshima-type bombs, hardened missile silos could be threatened.

Furthermore, as with Secretary McNamara, when there are too many warheads to target on civilian targets, what can one do or say to prevent the Defense Department from targeting military targets? And once this is conceded, what can one do to prevent the missile targeting from being done with high accuracy? Thus did cynics argue.

People did try. Senator Edward W. Brooke wrote a long series of letters to President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird. The responses were favorable in tone but equivocal read literally. The heart of the often repeated response was:

"We have not developed, and are not developing a weapon system having, or which could reasonably be construed as having, a first strike potential."

In addition, the President denied that he was funding a specific program for improving accuracy to which Air Force General Ryan had referred with pleasure and anticipation as providing "hard-target" killers. But this was all. The evident loophole ("reasonably be construed") is now being exploited.

Our own MIRV was first tested in August, 1968. By 1970, it was being deployed. It was evident to the same experienced observers that this deployment meant the beginning of the vulnerability of our own land-based force. The Soviet Union would never be stopped from catching up. On August 17, 1978 when the Soviet Union had finally and belatedly tested a MIRV, five years late, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger responded to a question about the chances for MIRV controls by saying:

"I think that the minimal point that one can make is that the Soviets are unwilling not to demonstrate a technology that the Americans have demonstrated. The imagery is something that presumably is not particularly appealing in the Kremlin."

If only we had argued this way in 1968 we might have tried harder to negotiate.

Now that our own MIRV is deployed, and the ABM danger has evaporated in a SALT Agreement precluding ABM, the question naturally and predictably arises in the Defense Department of completing the process—putting on the high accuracy.

The rationale being used is partly fore-shadowed and partly new. In the fore-shadowed part, Secretary Schlesinger argues that the strategic situation is now so stable

that a counterforce strategy cannot be considered a "first-strike" potential. After all, the Russians have submarines.

Presumably he does not argue that the Soviet Union will like it. When Secretary McNamara made his speech, Marshall Sokolovskii said "McNamara's statement shows concrete and practical evidence of preparation of a preventive war" (Red Star, July 19, 1962). And when the Defense Department, in 1969, projected similar Soviet capabilities against our land-based force, Secretary Laird said there was no question they were preparing a "first-strike" threat.

Secretary Schlesinger's new argument is based on asserting that the Soviet Union might, in 1980, have a counterforce capability itself if it learns what we know now.

"If the Soviets were able to develop these improved technologies presently available to the United States in the forms of guidance, MIRVs, warhead technology, at some point around 1980 or beyond they would be in a position in which they had a major counterforce option against the United States and we would lack a similar option" (January 10, 1973).

He goes on to say that this capability might be used in a novel way. The counterforce option he has in mind is selective, or reasonably all-out, attacks on U.S. land military targets notwithstanding the existence of a secure sea-based force. In effect, he fears that the increasingly stable nuclear balance might permit limited strategic attacks that avoided cities. The U.S. might then be faced with an ultimatum to avoid retaliation lest the Soviet attacks further escalate to cities. Presumably, the Soviet purpose would be a show of force.

These limited attack possibilities are not only feared by Secretary Schlesinger. They are also welcomed, as a way of solving a strategic dilemma in Europe. In arguing for flexibility before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 18, 1973, Secretary Schlesinger said, in support of the plausibility of such attacks,

"... or to take another example, the United States' pledge to come to the aid of the NATO alliance, which would mean that we would be forced if we had to rely exclusively on the assured destruction options, to destroy Soviet cities and in consequence of this have destruction of American cities". He would prefer limited strategic attacks instead. Indeed, such demonstration attacks on a very limited basis—are said to be programmed already in the event of war in Europe.

It seems evident that these apocalyptic considerations are sufficiently important and interesting to the body politic that they should have had much greater airing. As late as two years ago, Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, was arguing in support of the Defense Department against putting high accuracy on our MIRVed warheads:

"DOD AND SENATOR STENNIS OPPOSED COUNTERFORCE IN 1971

"On October 5, 1971, Senator James L. Buckley (Conservative—Republican, N.Y.) proposed amendment No. 448 to the Military Procurement Authorization and asked that "not less than \$12,000,000 shall be available only for the purpose of carrying out work in connection with providing counterforce capability for the Minuteman III system."

"Scattered excerpts from the debate follow: "Senator Buckley: The amendments I have offered will not provide us with a first-strike capability for two reasons.

"First of all, these are designed only to modify the warheads within existing missiles. We simply do not have enough missiles to mount enough warheads. For a first-strike effort, with the improved accuracy, we should need in excess of 12,000 warheads if we were ever to try a first strike against the Soviet

Union . . . [Editor's note: 8,000 are now programmed on missiles alone].

"Second, it should be kept in mind that there are innumerable situations where flexibility is urgently desired. Let us assume that either from the Soviet Union or from some other country there are indications that they acquired the capability for a first strike capacity. Let us assume that their first strike knocks most or all of our strategic weapons. We would then have our submarine and additional weapons. We would then face the choice of aiming those at the civilian population of the enemy, thereby destroying tens of millions of human beings in the Soviet Union or trying to defend ourselves by directing our missiles at a second strike against the remaining weapons held by the enemy.

"Senator Stennis: The explanation of this amendment includes the word "counterforce". Those familiar with these terms know that essentially means a first-strike capability. We have stayed within the terms of deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. That is what we are talking about at the SALT talks.

"Here is what [the Defense Department says] in their position paper on proposed Amendments No. 448 and 449.

"The Defense Department cannot support the proposed amendments. It is the position of the United States to not develop a weapon system whose deployment could reasonably be construed by the Soviets as having a first-strike capability. Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first."

"I stand squarely on that ground. It is not often that the Department of Defense comes out against an amendment that would put more money in a bill.

"... we do not need this type of improvements in payload and guidance now, the type of improvements that are proposed, in order to have the option of attacking military targets other than cities. Our accuracy is already sufficiently good to enable us to attack any kind of target we want, and to avoid collateral damage to cities. The only reason to undertake the type of program the amendment suggests is to be able to destroy enemy missiles in their silos before they are launched. This means a U.S. strike first, unless the adversary should be so stupid as to partially attack us, and leave many of his ICBMs in their silos for us to attack in a second strike." (See pages S15868, 15891, 15893 of Congressional Record, Senate, October 5, 1971).

COUNTERFORCE AND SALT

The counterforce decision is put forward by the Secretary as if it had much to do with SALT—in fact, however, it is non-negotiable. He does emphasize that we cannot permit the other side to have a relatively credible counterforce capability if we lack the same" (January 10). And he emphasizes that the other side might have the capability by 1980 in the form of 7,000 one-megaton warheads. (The U.S. will soon have more than that number of warheads, and, as noted, with the accuracies anticipated these will be quite adequate for target-killing. Indeed, for limited strikes one wants less collateral damage; a force of smaller warheads would be better.)

But he notes that the targeting strategy change "has taken place" and that it is "quite distinct" from our SALT position (January 10, 1974 backgrounder). In this sense, the current furor about SALT and the Interim Agreement is an irrelevant smokescreen. Even if the SALT Agreement had provided for forces of quite equal size, the Secretary would presumably have wanted this same targeting doctrine and the same accuracy. Why?

It is true that the Secretary puts great emphasis, as do military men, on the politi-

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cal consequences of letting the other side get more than our side possesses in some dimension of armament. It is assumed in such statements that the side with the most megatonnage might be able to frighten the other. (Why the side with the most warheads or accuracy—our side—might not be able to gain the upper hand is never clear.)

Indeed, no measure is sufficient to make much difference. The fact is, and the literature of "limited strategic attacks" reveals it, that shows of force or resolve in a contest where neither side can disarm the other have to do with psychology rather than with weaponry. If one is "chicken" no amount of additional megatonnage will help. If one is bold, and willing to take risks to coerce the other side, no weapon inferiority need matter as long as a secure retaliatory force is maintained.

These facts are much blurred in the declarations of the Secretary of Defense, which are further tied to SALT negotiating strategy. He notes with repeated emphasis:

"We must maintain essential equivalence between the forces available to the Soviet Union and the forces available to the United States. There should be no question in the minds of the Soviets as we negotiate with them of our willingness to achieve that essential equivalence" (January 10).

Even as SALT strategy, this can be questioned. Why should there be "no doubt"? Might we not, just as well, argue that there should be "no doubt" in Soviet minds that the U.S. was not going to try to keep up with the nuclear Jones mindlessly? Obviously, much turns on the felt political relevance of militarily irrelevant force imbalances. Unfortunately, on-going SALT negotiations tend to exacerbate concern about imbalances that would otherwise be seen to be politically irrelevant as well.

EVOLUTION OF NIXON ADMINISTRATION DOCTRINE

The link between strategic weapons and resolve has long preoccupied this Administration. The link began to be emphasized in the 1970 State of the World Message where the Administration began to take pot-shots at the existing strategic posture. It criticized the theory of "assured destruction" as one which belated:

"Deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure we could destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces".

It suggested that the previous Administration believed that, if this criterion were satisfied, "restraint in the build-up of strategic weapons was indicated regardless of Soviet actions."

The Administration called for "strategic sufficiency" which, despite its name, was designed to require more weapons than "assured destruction" under a somewhat cooler label than the discredited "strategic superiority".

There was not—as there had been in the late fifties—concern that the Soviet Union might be able to disarm us. Significantly, the 1970 State of the World expressed concern about the "Soviet threat to the sufficiency of our deterrent"; the 1971 statement talked of the possibility that the Soviet Union might seek forces that could destroy "vital elements of our retaliatory capability" (italics added).

Indeed, the 1970 statement indicated that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture was political: "to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority".

In both the 1970 and 1971 statements, the Administration emphasized that it must not be "limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenge" (1971). (It also mentioned, without much conviction, that "sufficiency also means numbers, character-

istics and deployments of our forces which the Soviet Union cannot reasonably interpret as being intended to threaten a disarming attack".)

In 1972, the President re-emphasized what he had said in 1971:

"In its broadest political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated" (italics added).

In short, the Administration had shifted the standard for strategic forces from a measurable strategic goal to a goal that was open-ended, depending ultimately on its own sense of psychological vulnerability. It was concerned that its sense of "resolve not be underestimated". But in a balance of terror, as noted, no amount of additional weapons can be certain of satisfying that criterion. Thus, sufficiency, defined this way, was an open ended invitation to weapons procurement.

In short, the decision to change our central war strategy was really quite independent of SALT. It grew out of the Administration's unwillingness to fall behind by any measure, no matter how militarily irrelevant the measure. It grew out of the double standard with which the Administration strategists cannot help but measure what constitutes "essential equivalence". And it grew out of the excessive number of warheads which we have programmed—an excessive number that forces the Administration to target and accuracy decisions for Parkinsonian reasons. The problem is simple: *weapons in search of a target.*

COUNTERFORCE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

The United States is now legitimizing the notion of limited strategic attacks. In preparing for the possibility ourselves, and in talking of the fear that the Soviet Union might engage in this possibility, we are improving the prospects for limited nuclear war. This assertion can hardly be doubted. It takes "two to play" controlled war and if the other side is clearly not prepared, one would be foolish to try. By advertising our consciousness of the possibility, we are moving a giant step closer to having the Russians try out the ultimatums that we previously shrugged off as an impossible joke. This is not good.

Furthermore, if we plan limited nuclear attacks and talk about it enough, to this extent, we might try such a strategy. This is a dangerous course. The Russians are less likely than we to have invested in, and to be able to rely upon, the command and control that is necessary to play limited nuclear war. They, more likely than we, would just salvo their weapons or not fire at all. If counterforce targeting means kidding ourselves about these facts, then the security of the United States will be undermined by it.

Finally, the Secretary does not plan to purchase just the forces necessary to strike a few Soviet targets as a show of force: this ability we have already had for many years. He plans to purchase high accuracy and install it on the Minuteman and Poseidon MIRVs. The result will be an enormous boost in the capability of our forces to attack all of Soviet land-based missiles.

DOD thinks that by not specifying exactly what military targets they are planning to aim at, they can confuse the issue. But once higher accuracy is purchased, it will provide enough capability to attack all of the Soviet retaliatory weapons—obviously these will then be the ones aimed at. And high accuracy is needed for nothing else.

SALT AND COUNTERFORCE

The Interim Agreement limits the number of silos in which the two sides can place their missiles. Thus it pins down the targets at

which counterforce weapons would be aimed. How long will the two sides be willing to abide by the agreements limiting missile force numbers if these forces become vulnerable?

Growth in missile forces is probably not the answer to their dilemma, of course. New forms of missile deployment would have to be arranged. With each side gaining several thousand target-killing warheads, multiplying the existing forces in number will not seem cost-effective. After all, it is cheaper to buy an attacking new warhead than an entirely new defensive missile.

One answer, of course, is the one FAS provides. Throw away the land-based missiles and they will cease to be aimed at each other, with the benefits described on pages 1 and 2.

It should be noted, however, that this solution will not prevent the targeting of other less important military targets. Nor will it prevent shows of force, limited nuclear war (or limited strategic attacks) or whatever. These could still be carried out by submarine based missiles.

What our solution will provide, however, is a very small difference between the results of striking first and of striking second—in this sense it will increase the stability of the nuclear balance by providing the smallest possible incentive to strike first in a major way.

In the absence of such a solution, there will presumably be land-based missiles in other modes: mobile-based or based in silos under mountains and so on. Nothing could be more ridiculous at this stage of the arms race. But in light of the history summarized in this Report, no arms race procurement possibility can be ruled out as too bizarre.

RISE AND FALL OF NUCLEAR SURPRISE ATTACK

Consider the decline of the nuclear surprise-attack scenario. It began in the late fifties when exaggerated estimates of Soviet missile production suggested the USSR would have missiles while the U.S. still had only bombers.

Scenario (1958-61): The USSR launches large numbers of missiles at U.S. bombers on their bomber bases, destroying the deterrent.

Problems: The attack is hard to effect because the bomber bases in question were all over the world; to hit them at the same instant meant launching the attacking missiles at different times, thereby providing some warning. Also, U.S. had nuclear weapons in Europe and on carriers. (Especially important, the Soviets did not in fact ever have the missiles on which the attack is premised.)

But, at least, the USSR attack made sense on paper and in concept.

By the mid-sixties the situation was much different. The United States had 1,000 land-based (Minuteman) intercontinental missiles and a fleet of 41 ballistic-missile-firing (Polaris) submarines, with 16 missiles each, more than half on station at any one time. The Soviet attack scenario became at least ten times less plausible. Here it is.

Scenario (mid to late sixties): The USSR launches missiles attacking not only U.S. bombers but 1,000 U.S. missiles as well. In order to cope with the retaliatory strike from our Polaris submarines, the USSR plans to shoot down hundreds of such missiles with an antiballistic missile system.

Problems: No sane military or civilian planner in any country would rely upon a ballistic missile defense to shoot down hundreds of missiles. For this reason, this attack did not make sense, even on paper. (Further, the Soviet Union did not have a ballistic missile defense. Still further, the Soviet Union did not have the capacity to destroy even the U.S. land-based targets.)

Notice especially, how much harder this is to believe than the earlier scenario. This plan may make conceptual sense but it does not make practical sense.

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In recent years the scenario further declined:

Surprise Attack Scenario: (1969-71): The Soviets launch large numbers of missiles against our land-based missiles and bombers.

Problem: No solution whatsoever is provided for neutralizing our sea-based deterrent. The scenario is badly incomplete.

Notice that, by this time, the Soviet Union can not even be assumed to have a ballistic missile defense. By 1972, there is even a SALT agreement precluding all but two (strategically irrelevant) missile defense sites. As a result, the surprise attack scenario for this period is simply incomplete—on paper or in concept. In short, by 1970, there was no surprise attack scenario based on current Soviet forces or any proclaimed extrapolation of them!

The result was a new political addition to the scenario:

Surprise Attack Scenario (1973-): The Soviet Union launches large numbers of missiles against U.S. land-based missiles and then issues an ultimatum against U.S. responses with sea-based ballistic missiles.

Problem: The attack on our land-based forces does not significantly change the deterrent situation. Why then would the Soviets risk it?

Our sea-based forces could respond against any Soviet targets they wish, issuing a counter ultimatum—that full scale attacks on U.S. cities would result in a full scale attack on Soviet cities.

Soviet attacks on our land-based forces would inevitably cause widespread fallout and many millions of casualties. No Soviet planner could assume that we would carefully and restrainedly calculate after that. Nor could he be sure that we would distinguish this attack from an all-out attack. Nor could he be sure that we could restrain our sea-based forces with suitable communications once the crisis began or our airborne bombers.

The entire scenario is bizarre—enormous risks for no point. The enemy disarms his land-based missiles in order to disarm our land-based missiles (with the sole advantage that they are disarmed over our territory rather than over his). Each side retains a deterrent as before, based on sea-based missiles.

One can only imagine that the Joint Chiefs have been smoking pot. The most incisive way to see the flaw in this scenario is to imagine that, some months before the attack, the United States had unilaterally dismantled all of its land-based forces. What would be the significance then of this scenario? We would have removed the targets for the attack but would have retained a totally adequate strategic deterrent.

STATUS OF THE FAMOUS FOUR CRITERIA

In 1971, the Administration allowed as it had four secret criteria for determining what strategic forces it needed and how to negotiate. For those who are insufficiently cynical about such things, it is revealing to see how little attention is paid to them.

By 1972 and 1973, these criteria were public. By now they seem to have been all but abandoned. Of course, the first criterion is still with us: "Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces."

But the fourth criterion "Defending against damage from small attack or accidental launches" was given up when the SALT agreement prohibiting a thin ABM over the entire country was reached.

The third criterion was:

"Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war".

Without doubt the destructive capabilities of each side have reached the point where any differences are irrelevant. But the Administration itself signed an Interim agreement at SALT which did provide the Soviet Union with much greater payload capability.

Finally, the last criterion is very much at issue today:

"Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis".

The only method for doing this today is to get rid of land-based missiles. Indeed, destruction of U.S. Minuteman missiles—whether done unilaterally or as part of a bilateral reduction—would dramatically reduce the difference between a U.S. retaliatory blow before or after a Soviet attack. Thus it would precisely fulfill the criterion above by providing no Soviet incentive to strike first.

[From Arms Control Today, January 1974]

FLEXIBILITY: THE IMMINENT DEBATE

In his 1970 "State of the World" message President Nixon asked, "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?" While it was obvious that the President believed that he needed greater flexibility in the employment of nuclear weapons, the specific implications of this remark for American nuclear strategy and strategic weapon programs were unclear at the time, and remained so for the next four years. Now, it is expected that the missing details at last will be spelled out in the President's 1974 "State of the World" message and in Defense Secretary Schlesinger's defense budget report.

Congress and the American people would do well to scrutinize these documents closely because it is very likely they will raise fundamental questions for the nation concerning what type of nuclear doctrine it should adopt. Furthermore, the choice of nuclear doctrines will have obvious consequences for American political relations, arms control efforts, and weapon procurement policies. Most importantly, the issue will not be whether the U.S. should or should not adopt greater strategic flexibility in the employment of its nuclear weapons, as some would imply, but rather what kinds of actions in the name of strategic flexibility would most contribute to American security—and what kinds would most detract from it.

While "strategic flexibility" is a concept which does not lend itself readily to definition, former Defense Secretary Richardson explained it last year in congressional testimony as "having the plans, procedures, forces, and command and control capabilities necessary to enable the United States to select and carry out the response appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation." Even more recently, Defense Secretary Schlesinger stated that a change in the "targeting strategy" of the American strategic forces had taken place and therefore the U.S. now has "targeting options which are more selective and which do not necessarily involve major mass destruction on the other side."

These statements imply—erroneously—that the previous American doctrine of "assured destruction" lacked the capacity for flexible options. The implication that new types and numbers of strategic weapons are required is similarly groundless. In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky pointed out that there is no inherent technical reason that prevents existing American retaliatory forces from being employed in a limited manner. Similarly, as Schlesinger himself recently reaffirmed, the U.S. does have strategic weapons which could

be used in a "limited counter-force role." Furthermore, the U.S. has maintained such a capability for some time: Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith in their 1971 work, *How Much Is Enough?* noted that even with the "assured destruction" doctrine, American strategic weapons could be used to perform "limited and controlled retaliation."

What neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union has today is an efficient counterforce capability against hard targets or hardened missile silos. This type of counterforce capability would be comprised of a substantial number of nuclear weapons, each with a high probability of destroying a hardened missile silo. For example, the U.S. could presently destroy some of the Soviet missile silos with a high degree of confidence, but only "inefficiently"—by means of targeting 3 or 4 Minuteman missiles on each Soviet silo. With an "efficient" counterforce capability the number of missiles required to be targeted at each silo might be reduced to the more favorable ratio of one or two Minuteman missiles per Soviet missile silo.

In sum, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) characterized as inflexible by President Nixon and other critics is not inflexible at all.

Several events during the first term of the Nixon Administration have fundamentally increased the degree of strategic flexibility available to the U.S. and should not be overlooked. For one thing, the ABM Treaty has significantly enhanced the ability to respond at a low level since every small attack does not have to overwhelm the adversary's defenses. In addition, noteworthy advances in command and control capabilities can now make available to the President an unlimited number of strategic targeting options for the American missile forces. One example of this is the current deployment of a computerized retargeting system which vastly reduces the amount of time required to change the target selections of each missile. Therefore, it is clear that not only did the previous American forces contain a substantial degree of flexibility, but present American forces have acquired even more in recent years. If the present nuclear force structure is already inherently flexible, then what further capabilities could the President and Defense Department desire? Although it is likely that certain improvements could be made in U.S. command and control capabilities to increase flexibility, the only step which remains to be taken in the area of counterforce capabilities is the development of an efficient "silo-killing" counterforce capability. While at the present time the Nixon Administration has not explicitly stated that the development of such a capability is an American strategic objective, Secretary Schlesinger in recent weeks has implied that the capability to destroy Soviet military targets, including missile silos, would be one way of enhancing American "strategic flexibility." The forthcoming foreign policy message and defense report are expected to provide the details.

In our view the development of such a capability would be not only unwarranted but also dangerous. Moving to a counterforce doctrine would also represent a major policy shift since in the past President Nixon and other top officials have frequently assured the Congress and American public that the U.S. would neither develop a counterforce capability nor any weapons "which the Soviets could construe as having a first-strike potential." While it is possible to argue that "technically" a hard-target counterforce capability does not constitute a *determing* first-strike potential since both sides will maintain relatively invulnerable sea-based missiles and bombers, the fact remains that both nations will perceive such a capability as an attempt to achieve such a capability and therefore highly provocative, regardless of what is "technically" correct. It is difficult

to believe that those Americans who for years have been most concerned about the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force to a Soviet MIRV attack will not be able to comprehend that even a "limited" U.S. counterforce potential can generate uncertainties in Soviet eyes about our intentions, create instabilities in the strategic balance, and foster suspicions between the two nations. What are Soviets doing right now?

The acquisition of such counterforce capabilities would increase the likelihood of nuclear war and the potential for crisis instability. The likelihood of nuclear war will be increased since a counterforce doctrine and related capabilities will make nuclear weapons seem more "useable" in addition to making their attractiveness as a viable policy option superficially greater. Crisis stability will be decreased since with hard-target counterforce capabilities and vulnerable land-based forces each side will perceive in a crisis situation the incentive of even a limited first-strike upon its adversary's missile force. The attractiveness of counterforce targets in a second-strike attack could never equal those of a first-strike attack. Consequently, an incentive will exist for the side which seizes the initiative to strike first. Yet, any benefits gained from such a first-strike attack would be only short-sighted and illusory since each nation will still retain more than enough nuclear weapons to ultimately destroy the cities of the other. In addition, the development of a hard-target counterforce capability will only promote further strategic arms competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union, while impeding progress in arms control efforts such as the SALT II negotiations and the Comprehensive Test Ban.

In light of the disadvantages of such a capability, the United States should make the basic choice to increase strategic flexibility through further improvements in command and control capabilities rather than by the development of a provocative hard-target counterforce capability.

Finally, the ultimate solution to the problem of an increasingly vulnerable land-based missile force will be found, not in the development of more efficient "silo-killing" weapons but rather in the negotiation of mutual limitations on MIRV flight-testing and deployment as a preface to the eventual reduction of the land-based missiles on both sides.—*John C. Baker.*

[From the Economist, Mar. 2, 1974]

THE SCHLESINGER GAMBLE

After the energy conference, Nato: Mr. Kissinger has scored another point in America's relations with Europe. He has been arguing that the United States and its European allies need a better method of regular consultation. Now, from next month, the political heads of 14 foreign ministries—everybody in Nato, including France, except Iceland—will meet frequently with the Nato permanent council. This provides a new level of consultation, between the twice-yearly meetings of ministers and the stodgy gatherings of the permanent council meeting alone. The change is needed: the recent publication of the American defence budget is a vivid reminder not only of the preeminence of the United States in matters of defence but also of the two-way dependence with its allies.

The new items in the American defence budget, plus some major changes in emphasis, have set the United States off in a fresh direction. This budget is very much the creature of the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger. The hallmark is flexibility. He wants to have several possibilities for response in any situation. Not only does he want the power to fight a conventional war, he wants a rich variety of nuclear options as well, so that even nuclear action can be tailored to the shape of any particular crisis.

There are three distinct results of this budget; all are, or ought to be, highly controversial, and not looked upon simply as this year's ration for the American military establishment. First, the bad news for America's European allies is that Mr. Schlesinger's nuclear flexibility is apparently to be achieved at the expense of some kinds of conventional forces. Although widely billed as America's biggest defence budget since the second world war, it is actually smaller in real money terms than any since 1951. It does not directly reduce the American forces in Europe, but it does cut about 20,000 men out of the armed services as a whole. If this kind of budget becomes routine over the next few years it will certainly generate pressures of its own for reductions in Europe; a sizeable part of the Defence Department could find itself allied with the isolationists in Congress.

The second result of this budget will be to make the current round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt) much more difficult. The negotiators are confronted with America's proposal to produce lots of different new weapons. There are now not only bombers and land-based and submarine-carried missiles (and numbers of warheads) to be considered. There is a new quiet missile submarine, smaller than the 24-missile Trident; there are missiles with maneuverable warheads; there are also, in one of the sharpest budget increases, new cruise missiles which can be launched from submarines or aircraft. None of these new weapons is here yet; most are years away. But the American defence budget, with its tradition of revealing nearly everything about American plans, is itself a major instrument in arms politics. And this one, with its bewildering array of strategic possibilities, cannot fail to make Salt-2 a very complex operation indeed.

The third result of this budget may be a sharp acceleration of the arms race. The Americans' nuclear strategy has passed through several distinct stages. There was President Eisenhower's "more bang for the buck", which was massive nuclear retaliation for any attack by the Soviet army. This was followed by flexible response, which has never seemed entirely convincing because Nato has never been willing to provide enough troops to hold off a Soviet attack for more than a few days. Then the advent of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) threatened to break the nuclear balance. The Salt-1 agreement tried to put the lid back on this box by limiting the numbers of ABMs. But in retrospect Salt-1 may have been a hollow triumph; certainly the tacit agreement by both sides to deploy only one of their two allowed ABM systems was due in large part to the realisation that offensive technology is moving faster than defence. The new American budget pushes this technology a stage further with all its hints of new attacking weapons to come. The nuclear arena is, once again, the centre of the American-Russian competition.

SEE WHAT WE CAN DO

Of course, the American budget is not the only factor which threatens to destabilise things. The Russians have built a lot more missiles over the past few years than the Americans have, and have lately tested several new long-range missiles; they have also developed multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles before western intelligence predicted they would. Mr. Schlesinger's announcement that some American warheads are being re-targeted on to Russian missile sites is part of the response to that. (It is also the result of the increased number of Poseidon missiles in America's inventory. With Poseidon's multiple warheads, there are so many warheads available that they are literally running out of city targets.) The budget is another part.

So this year's American defense proposal—

which is all the budget is at this point—may simply be a historical milestone in a process that began several years ago. There is a strong argument that the nuclear flexibility this budget represents can be used to make war less likely. And if the budget brings home to the Russians the breathtaking range of possibilities available to the technological power of the United States, Mr. Brezhnev may decide to make Salt-2 the great breakthrough to cooling off the cold war which most of the world hopes it will be. But if Salt-2 fails, 1974 will have introduced the idea of a flexible nuclear response and could be the beginning of an extremely expensive round in the arms race.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts. I believe there is a strong case against developing an increased capacity to destroy Soviet land-based missiles.

First, it is an illusion to believe that the United States can develop a capability for limited nuclear war that will significantly reduce casualties in a war with the Soviet Union. Even if both sides directed highly accurate weapons against exclusively military targets, the associated civilian damage would be immense, both from direct blast effects and from fallout. Casualties would still be in the millions on both sides.

To be sure, it is important for the United States to have many options in its nuclear strategy. Yet we have had these options for many years, including the targeting of many of our weapons against Soviet military sites. Having options might, indeed, increase the chances of stopping a nuclear war—especially one that started by accident. But we would only fool ourselves if we believed that these options—or the new programs we are considering—would in a nuclear war prevent death and destruction the like of which has never been seen on this planet.

Second, we must consider the risks of destabilizing the balance of mutual assured destruction between the two superpowers. It may be that hard analysis would indicate that even a U.S. ability to destroy the Soviet Union's land-based missiles would not provoke them to launch a preemptive attack against us, and that we would not be provoked to launch a preemptive attack if the Soviet Union could destroy our Minuteman and Titan missiles. There are simply too many nuclear weapons on both sides that would still get through—bombers, weapons based at sea, and land-based missiles not effectively destroyed—for either power to escape massive destruction in any nuclear war. Such a war would remain an act of insanity, and would most likely end civilized life in our two countries and elsewhere.

Yet even if the possibility of a successful attack against land-based missiles alone would be unlikely to provoke a nuclear war based on cold logic, we must still consider the imponderables—the psychological factors that so often govern men's actions. Any country whose land-based missiles were vulnerable to destruction in a first strike would be likely to consider adopting a strategy of "launch on warning," thus returning us to the hair-trigger days of the 1950's. This strategy might be adopted out of fear—

wrongly in my judgment—even though other weapons systems remained invulnerable. Yet no national leader—either here or in the Soviet Union—should once again be faced with the awful responsibility of potentially deciding on nuclear war in the few precious minutes between the word of an impending attack and its occurrence. No leader should be placed at the mercy of fallible machines to tell him whether or not an attack has actually been launched.

Each superpower has gained from the sure knowledge that a devastating nuclear response is possible, what ever the other side does first. In no way should we undermine that strategic and psychological assurance—which underpins the current relaxation of tensions between the superpowers. And we should demand that the Soviet Union take no action that would do likewise.

Third, I concur with Senator BROOKE that it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to distinguish between developments we make in the yield, accuracy, and maneuverability of U.S. warheads, in order to destroy Soviet land-based missiles; and the actual deployment of these weapons. Unlike deployed missiles, themselves, these new warheads cannot easily be counted—if at all. Hence, once development is completed, the Russians will never be entirely sure that we have not deployed them. They will very likely act as though we had done so, just as our military planners believe that later in the 1970's they will have to count on a full deployment of Soviet MIRV's, whether or not Moscow actually decides to follow this course.

The time for restraint, therefore, is now, before new doubts are raised in the minds of Soviet planners about our intentions, and before they use these doubts to argue for the building of yet more Soviet nuclear weapons.

Finally and most important, I believe we must assess very carefully the effect of these new developments on the prospects for reaching a firm agreement at the SALT II talks—an agreement in the interests of both sides. To be sure, we must be prepared to meet any Soviet challenge to our ability to respond effectively to any Soviet nuclear attack. To be sure, we must be mindful of the relative balance of nuclear forces on both sides for psychological reasons. We must seek a substantial overall equality, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, between the nuclear forces of both sides. We must seek by every means to gain Soviet restraint in the arms race—restraint particularly in the possible deployment of new, large missiles which the Soviet Union has been testing.

Yet it is important at this critical stage of arms negotiations for the United States to take no action that is likely to stimulate further Soviet nuclear weapons deployments. For if we do so, we will only play into the hands of the Soviet marshals, against those officials of the Soviet government who may genuinely seek an end to the nuclear arms race.

Following my trip to the Soviet Union last April, I am firmly convinced that it is possible to reach an effective SALT II

agreement, provided that both sides are prepared to exercise restraint. And I am even more convinced that the time to do so is now. Secretary Kissinger himself has stressed the problem of coping with a rapidly-approaching nuclear environment in which there are thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides, of every conceivable type and characteristic. It will not be easy to cope with the growth of nuclear technology in any event; but it will be immensely more difficult if either side goes forward with new deployments or develops new capabilities that are read by the other side as implying new deployments.

These new U.S. hard-targeting programs would take several years to develop, and would not improve our ability to survive a Soviet first strike and respond effectively. But if that is true, then we have nothing to lose and everything to gain by waiting—waiting to see whether a small measure of U.S. restraint will lead to the Soviet restraint that we earnestly seek in deployment of new, large missiles.

In light of the limited accomplishments in arms control at the last summit—a failure to make any substantial progress—and in light of the imperative need to move forward at SALT II, I believe that we should not muddy the diplomatic waters. We should hold off on these programs, and challenge the Soviet Union to hold off on its new deployments.

Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I join with Senator BROOKE in opposing these new research and development programs.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment, No. 1836, be temporarily laid aside and that I be permitted to yield the floor to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) so that he may call up his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield briefly?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the final vote on the pending business occur at 4:45 this afternoon.

Mr. EAGLETON. Is that on the pending amendment?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The pending business, the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HELMS). Does the Senator also ask that rule XII be waived?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. GRIFFIN. What about the vote on the Eagleton amendment?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is on controlled time. I do not anticipate that the opponents will consume anywhere near the 2 hours that have been allotted.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I have an amendment I would like to be able to offer. I have discussed it briefly with the Senator from Arkansas. He has indicated a willingness to take it to conference.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. KENNEDY. I want to make sure that we will have an opportunity to consider the amendment and discuss it briefly. I am not interested in an extended period of debate.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President I was not in the Chamber a moment ago. What is the request?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That the vote on passage occur at 4:45.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I have no objection, I am perfectly willing.

What is the question of the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. KENNEDY. It is with respect to my amendment, which we discussed. I understood that we were going to have a brief exchange.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I indicated to the Senator that I would be willing to take the amendment to conference, so that we would not unnecessarily take up a lot of time arguing it and discussing it. If the Senator is willing to do that, I think we can proceed.

Mr. KENNEDY. The distinguished senior Senator from Missouri has been extremely interested in this matter, and I am wondering whether I could have an opportunity to talk with him briefly, and then if the majority leader would propound such an agreement, I am sure there would be no objection.

Mr. EAGLETON. I can say, on behalf of my colleague, that he would be amenable to the unanimous-consent request.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator want a quorum call?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to repeat my earlier unanimous-consent request that the vote on final passage occur at the hour of 4:45 p.m. and that rule XII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW, AND FOR SCHEDULE OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if this bill is disposed of tonight, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate convene at 9 a.m. tomorrow; that there be an appropriate period for the recognition of special orders and the joint leadership, with a brief morning hour; and that the vote on passage of the State, Justice, and Commerce appropriation bill, which will be the pending business, occur not later than 3 p.m. tomorrow, with rule XII waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1975

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 1835

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1835.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY's amendment (No. 1835) is as follows:

On page 50, line 21, insert a new section as follows:

SEC. (a) No funds appropriated for the use of the Department of Defense by this or any other Act in fiscal year 1975 may be used for the purpose of stockpiling war materials or equipment for use by any Asian country except to the extent authorized by title VII of this Act or by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Foreign Military Sales Act.

(b) Any materials or equipment stockpiled by the Department of Defense on the date of enactment of this Act for future use by any Asian country may not be transferred to any such country except to the extent such transfer is specifically authorized by law.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this is an amendment that deals with the war reserve stocks for allies. The amendment was initially accepted by the Senate last June, as part of the Defense Authorization bill, but it was dropped in conference because of the opposition of the House conferees. Hopefully, they will have a different attitude this time in conference.

Specifically, Mr. President, this amendment will prohibit \$529 million from being used for war reserve stocks for allies. This ambiguous account is reportedly used to obtain weapons and ammunition on a contingent basis for the support of forces in the event of a future war involving South Vietnam, South Korea, or Thailand.

This new funding account, quietly built up in the last 2 fiscal years, has not gone through the authorizing committees of the Congress. It is a back-door means of bolstering increased procurements by the Defense Department.

When the disguised account was discovered by Senator FULBRIGHT last spring, the Defense Department explained it as being used for supporting these three allies—South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand. At the same time, the Defense Department stated that the equipment remained in stockpiles controlled by the United States. However, the Department would not state that, in the event of hostilities, congressional authorization was required be-

fore these weapons could be turned over to other countries.

In fact, when the General Accounting Office reported its findings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month, the Defense Department objected to the GAO's use of the word "authorization" as being required prior to the transfer of stockpiled items to these Asian allies. The Department argued instead that only "consultation" with the Congress was required.

I find this appropriation objectionable on two counts. First, it could mean that congressionally established ceilings—on aid to Vietnam, for example—could become meaningless if the Defense Department can circumvent those ceilings by comingling U.S. and allied reserve stockpiles, and thereby escape congressional control over their distribution. Second, it means that we are being asked—at a time of difficult economic circumstances—to boost our own Defense budget for the purpose of meeting the future military needs of South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand. Clearly, this major item should be considered as part of the foreign aid request, not as a disguised account in the DOD appropriations bill.

The Defense Department now argues that much of the new equipment purchased by this account goes directly to the U.S. active military forces and the U.S. Reserves. If that is the purpose of these funds, then they should not be categorized as "war reserve stocks for allies."

Moreover, the GAO has informed me that there is a circle at work: Even if some of these weapons go to U.S. troops in the field, the weapons that are replaced go to the Reserves and/or to the stockpile. Then, once in the stockpile, there is a clear tendency for the supplies to be declared excess and turned over to South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand. Thus, the will of Congress can be thwarted by the backdoor.

The process is misleading in another way. For example, in fiscal year 1973, the Defense Department listed \$24.3 million in excess stocks as going to South Vietnam, \$6.4 million as going to Thailand, and \$8.3 million as going to South Korea. But those figures are what the DOD calls actual value, not the acquisition cost of the supplies. The GAO found that the Department of Defense was listing those weapons at 8.9 percent of their acquisition cost. Thus, the acquisition of weapons declared excess and turned over to those countries in fiscal year 1973 was approximately \$390 million. In fiscal year 1974, the acquisition cost of equipment declared excess and turned over to those three countries was approximately \$620 million. And in fiscal year 1975, the Defense Department plans, according to the GAO, to turn over to those three countries weapons and equipment whose acquisition cost is approximately \$738 million.

I see no reason for the U.S. Congress to approve \$529 million in an account listed as war reserves for allies and designated for South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand, at the same time that the Department of Defense contemplates turning over excess items costing an estimated \$738 million to those countries.

If there are stockpile needs that are not being met for U.S. active duty forces, let the Defense Department ask specifically for that equipment as it usually does in its normal procurement requests. If this is a legitimate foreign military aid request, then let it be properly considered under the foreign aid bill.

Mr. President, it is also important to note what this amendment does not do:

First, it does not affect in any way the Department's service-funded program of aid to South Vietnam. The committee has recommended \$700 million for that fund.

Second, it does not affect in any way the level of assistance which may eventually be approved by the Congress under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act—\$300 million has been requested for South Korea and Thailand under those programs. This amendment is unrelated to congressional approval or rejection of those requests.

Finally this amendment does not affect the approximately half-billion dollars worth of stocks which have already been set aside for these Asian allies in the past 2 fiscal years. But it does put a halt to adding another half-billion dollars worth of weapons to that stockpile this year, until the purposes of the stockpile are more clearly explained to Congress, and the implications of such foreign aid have been properly deliberated.

Mr. President, I have grave doubts whether such foreign aid should be authorized at all. Certainly, it should not be done without the consent of Congress. But primarily, I wish to stress that such foreign aid does not belong in this bill. This is a budget bill to provide funds for the operation and maintenance of the Department of Defense. Foreign assistance appropriations should not be mixed with appropriations for the U.S. armed services.

The only foreign assistance fund appropriated along with funds for the services in this bill is the assistance for South Vietnam. All other foreign assistance is authorized in the Foreign Aid bill, under the military assistance program. This is true even of the \$2.2 billion in military assistance authorized for Israel last year.

The Armed Services Committee report on the Defense authorization bill strongly emphasizes the same point:

As it did last year, the Committee is again recommending reductions of the items included for war reserves for allies. The Committee does not agree that these items should be procured for storage for allies in a title that is intended for the procurement of items for U.S. forces.

In this year of the war powers bill and economic belt-tightening, Congress cannot avoid its responsibility to guarantee that such programs are fully justified in terms of foreign assistance, and that there are proper controls over transfer of these weapons. We have had enough of Presidential wars.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the recent study prepared on this subject by the General Accounting Office may be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the study

August 21, 1974

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STOCKPILING OF WAR RESERVE MATERIALS FOR USE BY UNITED STATES ALLIES

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D.C.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This report is in response to a May 6, 1974, letter requesting information on the stockpiling of war reserve materials by the Department of Defense (DOD) for possible future use by Asian allies.

Our study concentrated on the scope of the program, the statutory authority being relied on by DOD for stockpiling these materials, and the authority under which they could be turned over to any of the allied forces. Our work was performed at DOD in Washington, D.C.

Because of the short time allowed to meet the Committee's needs, we have been unable to verify the information provided by DOD or to obtain a legal analysis of the propriety of the program. However, we have included our views and interpretations and believe this report will be helpful during the upcoming foreign assistance authorization hearings.

We have not submitted the report to DOD for its official position; however, we have discussed the observations with DOD officials and have considered their views.

SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM

According to a DOD directive, the total quantity of a defense item authorized for peacetime acquisition includes the quantity estimated (1) to equip and sustain U.S.-approved force levels in peacetime and in wartime for periods specified in planning documents, (2) to equip and sustain allied forces by satisfying approved requirements of the Military Assistance Program, the approved requirements of the Foreign Military Sales Program, and approved wartime requirements for those allies specified in current program planning documents, and (3) to provide support for other U.S. Government departments and agencies. The term used to describe the above procurement requirement is approved force acquisition objective.

This objective includes a quantity to be stockpiled abroad and in the United States for future national emergencies—war reserves. These reserves are intended to sustain operations until production can be expanded to match combat consumption.

DOD believes that the war reserves are essential to rapidly deployable combat forces so that the United States has the future capability to respond and be supported in combat for whatever period the national interest requires.

We determined from DOD planning and programing documents that the approved force levels used to plan future requirements included the estimated number of allied forces that might need logistics support in future Asian hostilities. Estimated allied requirements add to but do not replace U.S. requirements.

DOD stocks of munitions and equipment have traditionally been available for transfer to allies pursuant to appropriate military assistance legislation, as well as for use by U.S. Forces. Specific identification of war reserve stocks for possible future transfer to allies in DOD budget documentation planning began with the development of the fiscal year 1972 Defense program. Some available assets were allocated for this purpose in fiscal year 1973. However, funds were not requested in budget submissions to the Congress until fiscal year 1974.

Items held in reserve that are planned for potential allied use are not segregated from

other reserve stocks, and almost all the same kinds of items are also required as war reserves for U.S. Forces. If necessary, the war reserves for allied forces could be used to support U.S. Forces.

DOD considers that war reserve stocks for allies are not yet committed or authorized for transfer to any nation. They are for "allies" in theory only and, according to DOD officials, will remain U.S. property until the President, with appropriate congressional consultation determines that such stocks should be released to a specific ally. DOD officials said that the portion of the total war reserve stocks designated for future allied use is based on an arbitrary decision and it is the total (United States and allied) war reserve requirement that has validity.

DOD planners for fiscal year 1973 allocated \$23 million of its reserve assets toward the total allied requirement; for fiscal year 1974, \$494 million was allocated. For fiscal year 1975, \$529 million of the total procurement request has been proposed for application toward allied requirements. Some of each of the following types of items are proposed to be procured from the fiscal year 1975 funds.

Army

Small arms ammunition.
Artillery ammunition.
Tank recovery vehicles.¹
Portable radar sets.¹
Minor miscellaneous items.
Spares and repair parts.
Mortar ammunition.
Tanks.¹
Machine guns.
Rocket launchers.¹
Landing boats.¹

Air Force

Air-to-ground munitions.
Tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons.

LEGAL AUTHORITY CITED BY DOD FOR STOCKPILING AND TRANSFERRING STOCKS

We were told by officials of the Office of General Counsel, DOD, that DOD's legal authority to both stockpile war reserve assets and transfer these assets to allies is contained in:

The annual DOD authorization and appropriation acts;

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and

The Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended.

No specific sections of these acts were cited.

AUTHORITY FOR STOCKPILING AND TRANSFERRING STOCKS—GAO VIEWS

Time did not permit us to perform a search for all possible means available to stockpile war reserves and to transfer these stocks. However, our brief look at the legislation mentioned by DOD disclosed that the general authority to procure U.S. defense material is contained in the annual DOD authorization and appropriation acts. This authority does not provide for the procurement of war reserves but rather for specific defense items (for example, Procurement of Ammunition, Army). Nevertheless, through backup data submitted with appropriation requests and the testimony of witnesses, the congressional committees responsible for DOD authorizations and appropriations were aware of DOD's program of stockpiling for

¹All new procurement of these items will go directly to U.S. Army active and reserve units. The older pieces of equipment displaced by the new procurement will go into the war reserve stockpile that could be used to replace U.S. or (with proper authorization) allied combat losses in some future conflict. Therefore, this procurement, although labeled as allied reserve, modernizes the U.S. Army Force structure while increasing the total assets available as war reserves.

possible future allied use. Thus, the legislative history of the annual DOD authorization and appropriation acts suggests that the committees intended to authorize this stockpiling.

However, the congressional committees responsible for authorizing military grant and sales assistance to foreign allies apparently were not aware of the stockpiling program.

We were informed that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was unaware of the planned stockpiling, even though transfers to allies (as well as the transfer of any defense articles to foreign governments, except Vietnam) would go through programs under the jurisdiction of the Committee.

Authority to transfer procured defense stocks is separate from the authority to stockpile war reserves. Authorizations relating to transfers are contained in various sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments, 1971, as amended; and the annual DOD authorization and appropriation acts (Military Assistance Service Funded). Some of the pertinent sections of these acts are discussed below. (See app. I through III.)

Foreign Assistance Act—Military assistance

Section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, gives the President the authority to provide military assistance to friendly countries and international organizations. In fiscal year 1974, the Congress authorized the President to spend either through loans or grants up to \$512.5 million for this assistance, although actual appropriations amounted to \$450 million.

Section 503(c) provided that, when defense articles are loaned to foreign countries or international organizations, under section 503(a), the military assistance appropriation will be charged only for out-of-pocket expenses and depreciation. In our report, to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, in March 1973,¹ we indicated that previously DOD had leased defense articles on the basis of different law (10 U.S.C. 2667).

This law authorizes leasing of nonexcess defense articles when it is in the public interest or will promote national defense. However, the law has no relation to foreign assistance and was enacted to authorize the leasing of defense plants and production equipment to private commercial interests. In our report, we specified that articles were leased under law (10 U.S.C. 2667) at no cost to foreign governments or international organizations and that it appeared the use of this provision circumvented the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Our view was that such loans or leases constituted military assistance and should be subject to restraints imposed by the act.

Additionally, under section 506(a), if the President determines it is in the security interests of the United States, he may order up to \$250 million in defense articles from stocks—in addition to the \$450 million appropriated—and reimbursement will be provided in subsequent appropriations available for military assistance. He exercised this authority during fiscal year 1974 by authorizing the transfer of up to \$200 million in defense articles to provide additional military assistance to Cambodia.

Under section 614(a), the President also may authorize assistance, in an amount not to exceed \$250 million, without regard to any provisions of the act. However, the President may only use funds already appropriated under other sections of the act. During fiscal year 1974, the President exercised his authority under section 614(a) five times for purposes of military assistance. The total amount

¹"Use of Excess Defense Articles and Other Resources to Supplement the Military Assistance Program." B-163742, Mar. 21, 1973.

authorized by the President was \$133.4 million.

These and other related sections of the act are shown in appendix I.

Foreign Military Sales Act

Although the Congress placed a ceiling on the total credit sales and guarantees under sections 23 and 24 of the Foreign Military Sales Act (see app. II), no similar restrictions are placed on cash sales under sections 21 and 22 of the act. Thus, an unlimited quantity of defense stocks could be sold under sections 21 and 22. During fiscal year 1974, DOD estimates that credit sales will amount to \$730 million, the authorized ceiling, and cash sales will amount to approximately \$7.2 billion.

Military assistance service funded authority

The provisions in annual DOD authorization and appropriation acts (see app. III) give DOD authority to use its appropriated funds to transfer any defense articles, including war reserve material, to support South Vietnamese forces, subject to the \$1.126 billion ceiling.

Foreign Military Sales Act amendments—Excess Defense articles

Excess defense articles are items in excess of DOD-approved force requirement level. The authority to transfer excess defense articles is contained in section 8 of the Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments, 1971, as amended. (See app. II.)

In our report to your Committee in March 1973, we indicated that excess defense articles were generated through modernizations of forces and changes in authorizations of articles to equip and sustain the approved forces. The decision as to what portion of the DOD inventory will constitute the approved force requirement level and what assets may be transferred as excess defense articles rests entirely with DOD. Excess articles are continuously available in vast quantities and have been used in military assistance programs since the inception of foreign aid. Use of excess articles to supplement the regularly funded military assistance program has increased since 1968 because of reduced military assistance appropriations.

At the time of our earlier review, "value" was defined as not less than one-third of the amount the United States paid when the articles were acquired (acquisition cost). Since then, the law has been changed and value is now defined only as actual value plus the cost of repairing, rehabilitating, or modifying the article, which could range from as low as salvage value to as high as acquisition cost. A recent sampling by DOD showed the actual value of excess articles averaged only 8.9 percent of acquisition cost, considerably less than the one-third minimum required under previous legislation.

Orders for excess defense articles are to be considered expenditures of military assistance funds. However, those articles generated abroad are charged to the appropriation only if the aggregate actual value during any fiscal year exceeds \$150 million. Under the old definition of value this would equal about \$450 million (3 x \$150 million) in excess articles, based on acquisition cost. Now, however, if DOD decides to use the 8.9 percent (1/11) figure as actual value, approximately \$1.65 billion (11 x \$150 million) in excess articles, based on acquisition cost, could be granted to foreign countries without charge to the military assistance appropriation. This is over three times more than the value of excess defense articles granted through the military assistance program during any single previous year.

The proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 would further liberalize the use of excess items. Our analysis of the proposed act showed that the theoretical ceiling of \$1.65 billion could be increased to \$4.4 billion. We believe that consideration should be given to providing more congressional control over excess defense articles.

The stockpiling of defense assets for potential use by allies adds another level to the DOD procurement base. We previously mentioned that new Army procurement will modernize U.S. active and reserve units and the older articles being replaced will make up the war reserve stockpile. It is conceivable that once these U.S. Forces have been modernized, DOD will modernize the war reserve, and thus make large quantities of defense assets excess and available for transfer to foreign governments, including those for which the stockpile was originally intended.

More importantly, however, is the fact that DOD has the authority to decide what portion of the DOD inventory will make up the approved force requirement level. Since the war reserve for allies represents a portion of the total war reserve in excess of U.S. approved force requirements, DOD can now stockpile older items that would immediately become excess upon replacement. If a future emergency arises over seas, DOD could reduce the approved force requirement level and immediately make the war reserve for allies available as excess for transfer to whichever country may need them. All this could be accomplished without adversely affecting the total U.S. approved force requirements.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we feel that the President and DOD at the present time have considerable statutory authority to transfer reserve materials to allies if they are needed. It should be pointed out that the authority to transfer U.S. defense stocks under these provisions applies to any defense item in the inventory, whether planned for future use by allies or U.S. Forces.

The broad authority is especially prevalent in the area of excess defense articles. Under present authority DOD is permitted to transfer vast quantities of excess items to foreign governments with little or no charge to any future increase in available excess items (1) because of the modernization of forces and/or the reduction in the approved force requirement level and (2) because of the proposed liberalization of the no-cost transfer ceiling, the Committee may wish to consider tighter controls over the quantity of excess articles that can be transferred to foreign governments. This may include retaining section 8 of the Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments of 1971, but modifying it (1) to establish actual value at not less than 33 1/3 percent of acquisition value and (2) to require that excess programs be stated in congressional presentation documents in terms of acquisition cost.

We recognize that there is legislation pending on the DOD procurement authorization bill that would forbid the stockpiling of defense assets for possible future use by allied forces. Although passage would eliminate the war reserve for allies, it would not strengthen control over excess defense articles.

We plan no further distribution of this report unless you agree or publicly announce its contents.

Sincerely yours,

ELMER B. STAATS,

Comptroller General of the United States.

EXCERPTS FROM FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Section 503—General Authority—(a) The President is authorized to furnish military assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance, by—

(1) acquiring from any source and providing (by loan or grant) any defense article or defense service; or

(2) assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a noncombatant nature.

(b) In addition to such other terms and conditions as the President may determine pursuant to subsection (a), defense articles may be loaned thereunder only if—

(1) there is a bona fide reason, other than the shortage of funds, for providing such articles on a loan basis rather than on a grant basis;

(2) there is a reasonable expectation that such articles will be returned to the agency making the loan at the end of the loan period, unless the loan is then renewed;

(3) the loan period is of fixed duration not exceeding five years, during which such article may be recalled for any reason by the United States;

(4) the agency making the loan is reimbursed for the loan based on the amount charged to the appropriation for military assistance under subsection (c); and

(5) arrangements are made with the agency making the loan to be reimbursed in the event such article is lost or destroyed while on loan, such reimbursement being made first out of any funds available to carry out this chapter and based on the depreciated value of the article at the time of loss or destruction.

(c) (1) In the case of any loan of a defense article or defense service made under this section there shall be a charge to the appropriation for military assistance for any fiscal year while the article or service is on loan in an amount based on—

(A) the out-of-pocket expenses authorized to be incurred in connection with such loan during such fiscal year; and

(B) the depreciation which occurs during such year while such article is on loan.

(2) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply—

(A) to any particular defense article or defense service which the United States Government agreed prior to the date of enactment of this subsection to lend; and

(B) to any defense article or defense service, or portion thereof acquired with funds appropriated for military assistance under this Act.

Section 504—Authorization—(a) There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the purpose of this part not to exceed \$512,500,000 for the fiscal year 1974: *Provided*, That funds made available for assistance under this chapter (other than training in the United States) shall not be used to furnish assistance to more than thirty-one countries in any fiscal year; *Provided further*, That none of the funds appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall be used to furnish sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, to any underdeveloped country, unless the President determines that the furnishing of such weapons systems is important to the national security of the United States and reports within thirty days each such determination to the Congress. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended. Amounts appropriated under this subsection shall be available for cost-sharing expenses of United States participation in the military headquarters and related agencies program.

Section 506—Special Authority—(a) During the fiscal year 1974, the President may, if he determines it to be in the security interests of the United States, order defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense and defense services for the purposes of part II [military assistance], subject to subsequent reimbursement therefor from subsequent appropriations available for military assistance. The value of such orders under this subsection in the fiscal year 1974 shall not exceed \$250,000,000. (b) The

Department of Defense is authorized to incur, in applicable appropriations, obligations in anticipation of reimbursements in amounts equivalent to the value of such orders under subsection (a) of this section. Appropriations to the President of such sums may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for such orders are hereby authorized.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 610. Transfer Between Accounts.—(a) Whenever the President determines it to be necessary for the purposes of this Act, not to exceed 10 per centum of the funds made available for any provision of this Act (except funds made available pursuant to title IV of chapter 2 of part I [Overseas Private Investment Corporation]) may be transferred to, and consolidated with, the funds made available for any other provision of this Act, and may be used for any of the purposes for which such funds may be used, except that the total in the provision for the benefit of which the transfer is made shall not be increased by more than 20 per centum of the amount of funds made available for such provision. * * *

Section 614. Special Authorities.—(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this Act and the furnishing of assistance under section 506 in a total amount not to exceed \$250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this Act or any other law without regard to the requirements of the Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this Act, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more than \$50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year. The limitation contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression.

(c) The President is authorized to use amounts not to exceed \$50,000,000 of the funds made available under this Act pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of the use of such funds, which certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts. The President shall promptly and fully inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of each use of funds under this subsection.

Section 652. Limitation Upon Exercise of Special Authority.—The President shall not exercise any special authority granted to him under section 506(a), 610(a), or 614(a) of this Act unless the President, prior to the date he intends to exercise any such authority, notifies the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in writing of each such intended exercise, the section of this Act under which such authority is to be exercised, and the justification for, and the extent of, the exercise of such authority.

Section 653. Change in Allocation of Foreign Assistance.—(a) Not later than thirty days after the enactment of any law appropriating funds to carry out any provision of this Act (other than section 451 [Continuity Fund] or 637 [Administrative Expenses]), the President shall notify the Congress of each foreign country and international organization to which the United States Government intends to provide any portion of the funds under such law and of the amount of funds under the law, by cate-

gory of assistance, that the United States Government intends to provide to each. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States Government shall not provide to any foreign country or international organization any funds under that law which exceed by 10 per centum the amount of military grant assistance or security supporting assistance, as the case may be, which the President notified the Congress that the United States Government intended to provide that country or organization under that law, unless the President (1) determines that it is in the security interests of the United States that such country or organization receive funds in excess of the amount included in such notification for that country or organization, and (2) reports to Congress, at least ten days prior to the date on which such excess funds are to be provided to that country or organization, each such determination, including the name of the country or organization to receive funds in excess of such per centum, the amount of funds in excess of the per centum which are to be provided, and the justification for providing the additional assistance.

(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply in the case of any law making continuing appropriations and may not be waived under the provisions of section 614(a) of this Act.

APPENDIX II—EXCERPTS FROM FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT AMENDMENTS, 1971 AS AMENDED

EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES

Section 8. (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), the value of any excess defense article granted to a foreign country or international organization by any department, agency, or independent establishment of the United States Government (other than the Agency for International Development) shall be considered to be an expenditure made from funds appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for military assistance. Unless such department, agency, or establishment certified to the Comptroller General of the United States that the excess defense article it is ordering is not to be transferred by any means to a foreign country or international organization, when an order is placed for a defense article whose stock status is excess at the time ordered, a sum equal to the value thereof shall (less amounts to be transferred under section 632(d) [Reimbursement Among Agencies] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) (1) be reserved and transferred to a suspense account, (2) remain in the suspense account until the excess defense article is either delivered to a foreign country or international organization or the order therefor is canceled, and (3) be transferred from the suspense account to (A) the general fund of the Treasury upon delivery of such article, or (B) to the military assistance appropriation for the current fiscal year upon cancellation of the order. Such sum shall be transferred to the military assistance appropriation for the current fiscal year upon delivery of such article if at the time of delivery the stock status of the article is determined, in accordance with section 644 (g) and (m) [definitions of "excess defense articles" and "value"] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to be nonexcess.

(b) In the case of excess defense articles which are generated abroad, the provisions of subsection (a) shall apply during any fiscal year only to the extent that the aggregate value of excess defense articles ordered during that year exceeds \$150,000,000.

(c) For purposes of this section, the term "value" has the same meaning as given it in section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(d) The President shall promptly and

fully inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of each decision to furnish on a grant basis to any country excess defense articles which are major weapons systems to the extent such major weapons system was not included in the presentation material previously submitted to the Congress. Additionally, the President shall also submit a quarterly report to the Congress listing by country the total value of all deliveries of excess defense articles, disclosing both the aggregate original acquisition cost and the aggregate value at the time of delivery.

(e) Except for excess defense articles granted under part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the provisions of this section shall not apply to any excess defense article granted to South Vietnam prior to July 1, 1972.

CASH AND CREDIT SALES

Section 21. Cash Sales From Stock.—The President may sell defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense and defense services of the Department of Defense to any friendly country or international organization if such country or international organization agrees to pay not less than the value thereof in United States dollars. Payment shall be made in advance or, as determined by the President to be in the best interests of the United States, within a reasonable period not to exceed one hundred and twenty days after the delivery of the defense articles or the rendering of the defense services.

Section 22. Procurement for Cash Sales.—(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the President may, without requirement for charge to any appropriation or contract authorization otherwise provided, enter into contracts for the procurement of defense articles or defense services for sale for United States dollars to any foreign country or international organization if such country or international organization provides the United States Government with a dependable undertaking (1) to pay the full amount of such contract which will assure the United States Government against any loss on the contract, and (2) to make funds available in such amounts and at such times as may be required to meet the payments required by the contract and any damages and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of such contract, in advance of the time such payments, damages, or costs are due.

(b) The President may, when he determines it to be in the national interest, accept a dependable undertaking of a foreign country or international organization with respect to any such sale, to make full payment within 120 days after delivery of the defense articles or the rendering of the defense services. Appropriations available to the Department of Defense may be used to meet the payments required by the contracts for the procurement of defense articles and defense services and shall be reimbursed by the amounts subsequently received from the country or international organization to whom articles or services are sold.

Section 23. Credit Sales.—The President is hereby authorized to finance procurements of defense articles and defense services by friendly countries and international organizations on terms of repayment to the United States Government of not less than the value thereof in United States dollars within a period not to exceed ten years after the delivery of the defense articles or the rendering of the defense services.

Section 24. Guaranties.—(a) The President may guarantee any individual, corporation, partnership, or other juridical entity doing business in the United States (excluding United States Government agencies) against

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political and credit risks of nonpayment arising out of their financing of credit sales of defense articles and defense services to friendly countries and international organizations. Fees shall be charged for such guaranties.

(b) The President may sell to any individual, corporation, partnership, or other juridical entity (excluding United States Government agencies) promissory notes issued by friendly countries and international organizations as evidence of their obligations to make repayments to the United States on account of credit sales financed under section 23, and may guarantee payment thereof.

(c) Funds made available to carry out this Act shall be obligated in an amount equal to 25 per centum of the principal amount of contractual liability related to any guaranty issued under this section, and all the funds so obligated shall constitute a single reserve for the payment of claims under such guaranties. Any funds so obligated which are deobligated from time to time during any current fiscal year as being in excess of the amount necessary to maintain a fractional reserve of 25 per centum of the principal amount of contractual liability under outstanding guaranties shall be transferred to the general fund of the Treasury. Any guaranties issued hereunder shall be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.

Section 31. Authorization and Aggregate Ceiling of Foreign Military Sales Credits.— (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this Act not to exceed \$325,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974. Unobligated balances of funds made available pursuant to this section are hereby authorized to be continued available by appropriations legislation to carry out this Act.

(b) The aggregate total of credits, or participations in credits, extended pursuant to this Act and of the principal amount of loans guaranteed pursuant to section 24(a) shall not exceed \$730,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974, of which amount not less than \$800,000,000 shall be available to Israel only.

APPENDIX III.—EXCERPTS FROM DOD AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION ACTS

DOD APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1974

Section 801. Subsection (a) (1) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(a) (1) Not to exceed \$1,126,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (A) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces, (B) local forces in Laos; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1974 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine. None of the funds appropriated to or for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such payment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970. Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military sup-

port and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos: *Provided*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

DOD APPROPRIATION ACT, 1974

Section 737. (a) Not to exceed \$1,126,000,000 of the appropriations available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year shall be available for their stated purposes to support (1) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces; (2) local forces in Laos; and for related costs on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine: *Provided*, That none of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such payment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States under section 310 of title 37, United States Code, serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970; *Provided further*, that nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos. *Provided further*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

(b) Within thirty days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to Congress a report with respect to the estimated value by purpose, by country, of support furnished from such appropriations.

Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate the consideration of this amendment by my colleague and friend from Arkansas, and I hope that he will be willing to take the amendment to conference and fight for it there.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have discussed this amendment with its distinguished author, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY). I have considered it first in the light of the fact that apparently it is legislation on an appropriation bill; that was my first reaction to it, and I think that is true, and it might be subject to a point of order.

However, this same language, as I understand it, has been considered by the authorization committee and was reported out and passed here in the Senate—no, it was a floor amendment agreed to in the Senate earlier this year, to the authorization bill; am I correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Therefore, the Senate having acted upon it legislatively, I feel inclined, as I have said—and I do not find any objection to it from those with whom I have conferred—to go ahead and accept the amendment and let it go to conference and see what we can do with it there.

I have no objection to the objectives and purposes of the amendment, if it can be accepted. It is an attempt to get control and keep control of expenditures and of materials and supplies that we may be appropriating for and trying to give away as assistance, and we have not made a provision in this bill with respect to even the sale of weapons, and so forth, to other countries, to try to get better control of that so we will know what is going on, and requiring reports.

So I have no objection, unless there is objection on the part of some other member of the committee—and I hear none—to accepting the amendment and doing the best we can with it.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts.

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 1836

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate revert once again to the consideration of amendment No. 1836.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HELMS). The Chair will advise the Senator that that is automatic.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Illinois.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I want, first of all, to commend the junior Senator from Missouri for the extraordinary effort with which he has invested this amendment, and for bringing it to the floor of the Senate, and I also commend the chairman of the Appropriations Committee for his work and the work of that committee. It has done a good job of cutting excessive spending from the defense budget, though it has not, Mr. President, in my judgment, gone far enough.

When it comes to national survival, we all agree that such sums as are necessary for national security must be raised and spent. The tragedy is that we stumble through our debates about national defense with no reliable definition of national security and no reliable standard for determining what is necessary.

An adequate definition of national security includes not just military hardware and personnel, but the confidence of the American people in their Government; the confidence of the world in our country for enlightened leadership; a healthy domestic and world economy, and the conditions of a good life at home.

In order to rationally determine military policy, we need a coherent foreign policy. It is asking too much of the Congress and the military to forge a rational defense and military strategy if they do not have a clearly defined and articulated foreign policy.

We do not have such a foreign policy. What we have had, instead in recent years, are promises, slogans, contradictory gestures, and personal diplomacy.

An opening by the U.S. Government to the People's Republic of China, was appropriate and long overdue. But President Nixon's Peking visit was handled in

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a way—by secret arrangements and shock announcements—that demoralized our Allies in Asia and undermined our position in the United Nations with respect to Taiwan. And when the U.N. accepted the logic of his action, President Nixon chastised the U.N.

President Nixon's visit this year to the Soviet Union was at best unnecessary. None of the heralded arms limitation agreements materialized. And in order to make some gesture of success for global television, President Nixon signed a limited nuclear test-ban treaty which implies that the United States and the Soviet Union are not very serious about stopping nuclear proliferation. This comes at a time when worldwide interest in obtaining nuclear reactors is rapidly accelerating. The visit—and the administration's continuing conduct—suggest American indifference to the repression of personal freedom in the U.S.S.R.

What the United States has gained from these exercises in Presidential diplomacy remains to be seen and, whatever it is, it could have been achieved without President participation and without the shocks we suffered in East Asia, South Asia, and Europe, as a result of our bilateral maneuverings. Presidential posturing is no substitute for a prudent and thoughtful worldwide foreign policy which recognizes the world's pluralism and the Nation's multitude of interests in all its parts.

Drift and weakness in foreign relations and economic policy have direct and dangerous results in defense policy.

The notion persists that world power and influence and national security are directly related to the size of the defense budget. As mistakes of foreign policy, or more accurately the absence of a principled foreign policy, produce from Southeast Asia to Eurasia U.S. weakness, the pressure increases to spend more money on the military—and so the wheel takes another turn.

Military spending by itself does not bring us added security in the world. Each increased expenditure usually brings a response from the other side, leaving us by and large in the same relative position, but always poorer and a little closer to the flash point.

The notion also persists that increased defense spending can stimulate a troubled economy. The idea that domestic problems might be solved simply and quickly by throwing dollars at them finds no advocates. Yet, the same notion drives us to compulsive expenditures for weapons, military personnel, and power.

* Military spending does not stimulate the economy. It is an unhappy fact that excessive military spending contributes heavily to inflation. It diverts resources from productive uses—housing, health, energy, transportation, education—to nonproductive uses. Unlike most forms of Government spending, defense spending increases demand, without increasing supply.

Other nations, notably West Germany and Japan, rose from the ashes of World War II to become our principal competitors in the world marketplace by spend-

ing little on the military—much on their economies. Now, our heavily weighted economy is crumbling. It is experiencing inflation and recession. Consumer prices are increasing at a rate of 12.6 percent, while wholesale prices increased in July at an incredible annual rate of 44 percent. Unemployment in July was 5.3 percent and rising. And productivity increased only 1 percent last quarter.

The economic consequences of runaway military spending—inflation, the diversion of funds from demonstrable needs, declining productivity, unemployment—are as destructive to the national security as an inadequate defense budget.

It is wrong to argue, as President Ford does, that inflation can be halted by cutting in the domestic sector but not in the defense sector of the budget. Some Government spending in time is deflationary. Initiatives in health, housing, energy, and transportation could increase productivity and supply demand. Agricultural production can be increased in part at Government expense—to meet growing demands for food at home and abroad with deflationary consequences. President Ford, like his predecessor, appears to have his priorities mixed up. If he offers more of the same, the Nation will suffer more of the same.

The defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1974 as reported by the Appropriations Committee provides funds for the Department of Defense over and above those necessary for an adequate military posture. Reductions can be made without impairing the ability of the military forces of the United States to carry out those missions essential to our national security.

The bill would provide \$82,079,358,000 in new appropriations and transfers. On December 20, 1973, the House and Senate agreed to the conference report on the fiscal year 1974 Department of Defense appropriations bill providing a total of \$74,218,230,000. It was signed into law by the President on January 2, 1974.

On February 4, 1974, about 1 month later, the President transmitted to Congress a fiscal year 1975 defense budget totaling \$85,582,297,000. This represented an increase of \$11,364,067,000, a 15-percent increase over the amount provided by Congress 1 month before. At the same time, the President transmitted a fiscal year 1974 defense supplemental request of \$6,200,421,000, made up of \$3,412,741,000 for a so-called readiness requirement due to the Middle East crisis and \$2,787,680,000 for pay increases. On May 30 and June 24, 1974, the President transmitted budget amendments totaling \$1,475,200,000 for fuel price increases and certain personnel benefits, increasing the fiscal year 1975 Defense budget to a new total of \$87,057,497,000. Thus, between February and June 1974, Congress was requested to consider a total increase of \$19,039,688,000 for the Defense Department.

To date, the Congress has by law reduced this increase by a mere \$4,873,032,000. The House recently passed a military appropriations bill of \$83.4 billion for a further reduction of \$3.7 billion. And the Senate Appropriations

Committee has reported out a military appropriations bill with an additional reduction of \$1.4 billion. Yet, we still have left an increase of \$11 billion.

This increase in defense appropriations comes when the United States is militarily powerful and not at war. The involvement in Southeast Asia has been wound down—yet the spending winds up.

When President Nixon signed the military procurement authorization bill into law on August 5, he said that he was not completely satisfied with the bill because "A number of provisions authorize spending for unneeded equipment and could thus inflate defense spending unnecessarily in a time when we all should recognize the need to avoid waste."

This amendment to the defense appropriations bill will establish a ceiling on new budgetary authority of \$81 billion, and help eliminate some of the wastes to which the President referred.

Next year the new Budget Committee will establish ceilings such as the one we are recommending. This method is also used by the Office of Management and Budget within the executive branch to establish priorities for the Federal budget. It is an approach which has been used extensively in the past to control and delimit the categories of the Federal budget, and now has been adopted by the Congress for the future.

The Nixon administration asked that the Federal budget be reduced by \$5 billion in outlays to help control inflation. President Ford has indicated that he would seek reductions in Federal spending, and some predict that he will ask for greater cuts. A reduction in outlays of \$5 billion would require a reduction in budgetary authority of \$11 to \$12 billion. If this goal is to be reached, the proportionate reduction in the defense budget would be in the \$6 to \$7 billion range. The \$81 billion ceiling we propose is on the high side of such a formulation.

If Congress is serious about reducing the Federal budget as a means of controlling inflation, it cannot overlook the fact that 70 percent of the controllable portion of that budget is attributable to the military and due to the nonproductive, demand-generating nature of defense spending, reductions made in the defense appropriations bill, dollar for dollar, will be more effective in countering inflation than any other cuts.

Congress has appropriated more money over the past 4 years than the delivery system—the defense industry—can keep up with. This is illustrated by the steady increase in unexpended balances—money obligated but not spent—over the past 4 fiscal years. In effect, the delivery of goods and services cannot keep up with the orders placed for them. An \$81 billion ceiling on this year's budget can help rectify this unhealthy distortion of the appropriations process.

Mr. President, the Senate Appropriations Committee should be commended for the diligent job it has done in examining the defense budget. It has, after months of work, reported out a bill which cuts over \$5 billion from the administration request.

However, the committee has not pared away all the waste and fat in the defense budget, nor will this amendment. But it would encourage the Defense Department to give the highest priority to real defense needs and to curtail those programs not essential for the defense of the Nation.

An \$81 billion ceiling on expenditures will encourage managerial innovations in weapons procurement and manpower utilization—a more efficient use of the defense dollar.

The United States is today the strongest military power in the world. Despite the tendency of the military to poor-mouth U.S. defense capability at budget time, the United States retains important advantages over the Soviet Union militarily—as well it should. The United States is about 5 years ahead of the Soviet Union in the development of MIRV's, multiple warheads which can be aimed at separate targets. The United States has more than twice as many nuclear warheads as the Russians and will have this superiority well into the 1980's no matter what the Russians do. The naval balance of power still favors the United States, a status which the Soviet Union is not likely to be able to change in the near future.

For all my misgivings about Soviet Union intensions, the United States is militarily strong enough to cut an additional \$1 billion from the defense budget without adversely affecting our real military strength.

This amendment will encourage the Defense Department to give the Nation what it needs—a lean, highly disciplined, well-equipped professional military force.

Mr. President, an \$81 billion ceiling is not an arbitrary figure. A few examples of possible budget cuts suffice to demonstrate how the Defense Department could comply—comfortably.

First. Military assistance to Vietnam: Our policy in Indochina, with all its contradictions, has already cost the United States dearly in blood, dollars economic vitality, self-confidence, and world influence. We should phase out our military assistance to South Vietnam's autocratic regime as quickly as possible. By providing large sums of money to the Thieu government, we are prolonging an Americanized war.

The administration asked for \$1.45 billion in new appropriations for military aid to South Vietnam; the Appropriations Committee has recommended \$700 million. An additional \$150 million can reasonably be cut from military assistance to Vietnam in order to accelerate the phaseout of military aid. Without aid, the Vietnamese will fight it out on the ground where the war will be won or lost—or they will make peace.

Second. Airborne warning and control system—AWACS: The Air Force asked for \$550 million to initiate production of 12 aircraft and \$220 million to continue development of AWACS technology. The Appropriations Committee has recommended \$311.2 million for procurement of four aircraft and advance procurement of parts and the \$220 million for research.

AWACS was originally being developed to provide air defense in the United States against a Soviet bomber attack. The military belatedly recognized that a bomber threat to the United States no longer existed. But instead of giving up AWACS, it shifted it from a strategic to a tactical mission.

The General Accounting Office—GAO—has reported that the change in primary mission should have caused a slowdown in the AWACS production schedule.

The main radar component of AWACS must be redesigned. And it is possible that AWACS can be jammed by enemy ground-based units. Further studies are necessary. They could show that AWACS will not be capable of performing its new primary mission. Under these circumstances, research should proceed, but the \$311.2 million in procurement funds could be cut this year.

Third. Site defense: The site defense system cannot be deployed under the ABM treaty and the conference report on the military procurement bill instructs the Army to forgo development of a prototype demonstration model and instead use the money authorized for research and development.

ABM technological research is already being done under the advanced ballistic missile defense system program. A total of \$91.4 million is being spent on this ABM hedge in addition to the \$5 billion already spent.

Since site defense is a totally redundant program, it could be cut by \$103 million leaving \$20 million to phase out.

Fourth. Safeguard: This is our operational ABM.

The Defense Department intends to use \$120 million to complete the Safeguard base at Grand Forks, N. Dak., which will be put in mothballs 6 months after it becomes operative. The United States cannot afford to build bases and then close them 6 months later. We cannot recoup the \$5 billion spent on the ABM system, but we can safely save this \$120 million for the U.S. taxpayer.

Fifth. War reserve stocks for allies:

This program is not for our NATO allies, but for certain Asian allies. These war reserve stocks are in addition to our own inventories. But because they remain in U.S. inventories until shipped to our Asian allies in the event of war, the program is not considered a military assistance program.

This program increases U.S. war stock inventories beyond their authorized level and circumvents congressional scrutiny over foreign military assistance programs; \$350 million could be cut from the \$529.6 million 1975 budget and an investigation made by the GAO to determine whether the entire program should be deleted from the Defense budget.

Sixth. Cruise missile: The Navy has asked for \$45 million to continue its development of a strategic cruise missile—a sea-launched, low-flying, jet propelled missile.

The United States has currently deployed 41 submarines with 656 Poseidon and Polaris missiles. It is spending billions of dollars to develop the Trident

submarine missile system. The U.S. Navy does not need another missile system. Redundancy in weapon systems is pure waste.

The committee has recommended an appropriation of \$30.9 million for the Navy's cruise missile program. This research and development program can be terminated to save the U.S. taxpayer \$30.9 million.

Seventh. SSN-688 attack submarine: The Navy has requested \$502.5 million for procurement of three SSN-688 attack submarines and the committee has recommended this appropriation.

Twenty-three of these submarines have already been funded and now the Navy is designing a smaller and less costly attack submarine. The SSN-688 program could be slowed down to allow the procurement of a more cost-effective submarine. As recommended by the Armed Services Committee, only two boats instead of three should be built in fiscal year 1975 for a savings of \$100 million.

Eighth. The Armed Services Committee also recommended a delay in purchasing a fourth AD-destroyer tender. This would save \$116.7 million. The three tenders approved in fiscal years 1972 and 1973 are not yet even under contract. Where the Pentagon has not yet even begun to consider additional funds for the same program until such time as the cost and schedules are known and the funds needed.

Ninth. The House Appropriations Committee recommended the elimination of \$41.4 million for 19 more CH-47C helicopters.

The Army has initiated a 3-year program to improve the maintainability, reliability, survivability, and safety of a similar cargo helicopter, the CH-47A/B model; it can do without these 19 helicopters this year. An approved and more cost-effective model may soon be available.

Tenth. DD-963 Spruance class destroyer: The committee has accepted the Navy's request of \$655.4 million for the procurement of the last seven ships of the 30-ship program.

This program could be stretched out by slowing down procurement to three instead of seven ships for a savings of \$264 million.

The unit cost of this oversized and rapidly obsolescing destroyer is nearing \$100 million. At the very least, the program should be decelerated until the overrun and technical problems are resolved.

Eleventh. Tanks: The Middle East war raises serious questions about the role of the tank in modern warfare where effective antitank missiles are used. The Pentagon response has been to accelerate procurement of M60 tanks—\$237 million—and to revive the main battle tank—XM-1—killed by Congress in 1971. The committee has cut the Army's request and recommends \$172.6 million for procurement of the M60 combat tank and \$65 million for development of a new main battle tank. Additional tanks are needed, but not so many.

Development of super tanks is hardly

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justified. The appropriation for tanks could be reduced \$50 million in fiscal year 1975.

These 11 items represent a possible additional savings in the defense budget of more than \$1.5 billion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Let us have order in the Senate.

Mr. STEVENSON. They do not include overdue manpower reductions or cuts in strategic programs such as the B-1 bomber, Trident submarine and counterforce programs which have been the focus of considerable controversy.

From \$300 million to \$1 billion could be saved in the defense budget if manpower levels are designed to produce a lean and professional Military Establishment. As recommended by the Appropriations Committee, the Department of Defense manpower levels as of June 30, 1975, will be 2,128,000 active duty military personnel and 985,000 civilians.

As of March 1974, the United States maintained approximately 465,000 land-based troops overseas—300,000 in Western Europe and related areas and about 165,000 in Asia. These overseas troops are the costliest component of our general purpose forces.

I am cautious about unilaterally withdrawing substantial U.S. combat forces from Western Europe with negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions underway. On the other hand, I am skeptical about the need to maintain 165,000 troops in Asia.

Even after the end of direct U.S. military involvement in the fighting in Southeast Asia and 22 years after the Korean conflict ended, we maintain 35,000 in Thailand, 57,000 in Japan, 38,000 in Korea, and 5,000 in Taiwan. Many of these forces can be reduced without adversely affecting our defense posture and the remaining troops and our 7th Fleet could continue to provide stabilizing evidence of continued American interest in Asia. Withdrawal and demobilization of 100,000 U.S. military personnel in Asia would yield savings of approximately \$300 million.

There are now more commissioned and noncommissioned officers than seamen and privates in the Armed Forces. We have more colonels, captains, generals, and admirals than we had in 1945 when the military had 12.1 million men under arms.

If the abundance of officers reflected the requirements of sophisticated 20th century warfare, no one could complain. But the Pentagon ranks now also include over 7,000 civilian employees who earn between \$27,000 and \$39,000. The military is plainly topheavy. And about 66 percent of the defense budget goes into paying and supporting defense personnel.

Another way to save money is to cut personnel levels substantially. A cut of about 66,000 personnel as proposed by the Appropriations Committee is too modest. The deadwood must be dropped out, overall levels reduced, the number of high ranking officers and civilian personnel cut, and the wage and fringe benefits of the military—such as uniformed servants, helicopters serving as limosines

and unearned flight pay—must be cut to levels comparable to those in civilian life.

Nowhere are the twin dangers of economic folly and military explosion more forbidding and dangerous than in the field of strategic weapons policy.

To the extent that the United States now has any strategic policy, the policy is—quite rightly—to sustain an adequate nuclear deterrent.

Currently, the United States has 1,054 deployed Minutemen and Titan missiles, 41 submarines with 656 Poseidon and Polaris missiles and a force of B-52 bombers capable of delivering twice as many nuclear bombs as the Russians. These survivable strategic systems can destroy the Soviet Union several times over. Once would be enough.

Unfortunately, the debate is too often muddled by bargaining chip theories, and by strategic arms limitation agreements which, by limiting numbers only, accelerate the qualitative arms race. The policy is also clouded at times by rank nationalism, carefully timed leaks about real or contrived Soviet buildups and interservice rivalry.

For all my misgivings about Soviet intentions, I find it difficult to accept the notion that the United States can decelerate the arms race by accelerating it.

Even though we currently have a massive and modern strategic system, this year's defense appropriation contains hundreds of millions of dollars for new strategic systems and improvements in the deployed systems many of which are redundant. For example, there is about \$300 million for counterforce programs. Advanced counterforce weapons would introduce a dangerous element into the strategic equation. If construed by the Soviets to threaten their entire land-based missile deterrent, the counterforce program could provide a strong impetus to the arms race.

President Ford has called upon the Soviet Union to join the United States "in an intensified effort to negotiate an equitable limitation of strategic arms." Certainly some, if not all of the counterforce money, could be cut from this year's defense budget. If we start a counterforce program now, as in the case of many weapons systems, once they are started, it will be virtually impossible to stop. Ultimately, such programs can cost the U.S. taxpayer billions of dollars and then, as with the ABM which cost \$5 billion, never be deployed.

Other considerations aside, which makes more military sense? To invest \$1 billion each in a few large new submarines, their missiles, and the enormous new bases they would require, only to gain marginally greater range and silence? Or to spend less money on more smaller submarines which would increase the number of target points a potential enemy would have to find? To invest \$61.5 million on a deep penetration bomber when bombers are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated air-defense systems? Or to build a less expensive plane which could stand off the coast of a potential enemy and shoot a cruise missile into the target?

This year's defense appropriation includes \$400 million for the B-1 bomber and \$1,363.8 billion for the Trident submarine program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I yield 3 more minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Illinois.

Mr. STEVENSON. Both of these programs could be pruned. The B-1 bomber program research could at least be slowed for a savings of about \$40 million, and about \$800 million could be cut from the Trident program by procuring one boat instead of two per year, and then by developing the less expensive, more cost-effective Narwhal.

The President wants to give SALT II a chance. We ought to give our negotiators a chance before lurching ahead once again. We ought also to give other nations less of an incentive to catch up in the deadly race to join the nuclear club.

As the Senator from Missouri has shown, this billion dollar cut can be made with the knowledge that our military forces will still have the ability to deter aggression and, if necessary, to protect our national interests. What is more, the Defense Department has a fund of over \$10 billion of unobligated and unexpended funds which it can reprogram with congressional approval for high priority programs without increasing the budget we finally approve.

Mr. President, we dare not sacrifice national security by appropriating funds for excessive and wasteful military weapons and personnel. Our national security is neither measured nor insured alone by tanks, planes, missiles, warships, and armed men, but by the fundamental strength, unity, and confidence of our people in our institutions, economy, and society. We do not protect, but instead endanger, that security with excessive military spending. As President Eisenhower said:

Every addition to defense expenditures does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it.

The United States has passed that point. We, indeed the world, simply cannot afford this madness any longer.

To reestablish American priorities and American principles, I join with the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) in urging the adoption of this amendment to establish a \$81 billion ceiling on the Defense budget.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois. I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the Eagleton amendment, and I am extremely hopeful that it will be acted upon favorably in the Senate this afternoon.

I think that all of us who have reviewed the very commendable work of the Appropriations Committee in cutting back some of these requests are heartened by its actions. But I think that the proposal of the Senator from Missouri is sound, first of all, from a security point of view, and that is our overriding concern and our overriding interest. It is also sound from a fiscal responsibility point of view.

In effect, with the passage of the Eagleton amendment, we will have increased the Defense appropriation more than 10 percent from what it was last year, which is basically the increase in the cost of living, plus approximately \$1 billion.

We are talking about an increase of this nature, Mr. President, in spite of the fact that we have seen the end of the war in Southeast Asia, in spite of a very important and commendable step toward normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, and in spite of the commendable efforts of the administration in trying to reduce tensions in East-West relations and in signing agreements on strategic weapons.

These are three extremely important and significant developments that have taken place in recent years. Yet in spite of these three important developments, we find that the defense spending has continued up and up and up.

I think all Americans listened to the President of the United States the other evening when he urged Congress to cut back approximately \$5 billion in Federal spending.

As the Members of this body know, the areas where we can cut back primarily center on military budget. The military budget contains approximately 70 percent of the controllable items, while the remaining 30 percent lies in the areas of health, education, housing, and other people's programs.

If we are talking about trying to tighten our belts, then I believe that it is only appropriate for us to find ways in which there can be some cuts in Defense appropriations. The Senator from Missouri has outlined a variety of different ways in which the figure of \$81 billion can be reached. He is reflecting the good sense and the aims of many entrepreneurs and leaders of corporations in this country: when they are given a budget they live within it, and make choices between various alternatives. In like manner, the administration should choose among competing weapons systems and make decisions based upon the national interest.

Leaders in the Defense Department are the experts and can make the judgments, rather than our debating the merits of weapons system after weapons system, as we have done in the past.

The eminent good sense of this approach will leave it up to the professionals in the Defense Department in judging how cuts best can be made.

I think that through a review of bidding practices, contract practices, and special arrangements made by Pentagon officials with major companies and corporations, the Defense Department can

easily find ways in which this appropriations figure can be reduced to the \$81 billion provided for in the amendment of the Senator from Missouri.

We can reduce manpower, centering on the support manpower built up in recent years.

All we have to do is look at the ratio of support to combat manpower, to see the possibility for reduction in the former. We can look at the number of supergrades in the military. Often we hear complaints about the number of high-salaried people working in education, health, and other areas. But as the Senator from Missouri knows, we have more supergrades—generals, admirals, and colonels—leading Armed Forces of 3 million people today than we had leading the world's greatest military force, 12 million people, at the conclusion of the Second World War.

These cuts can be made, and certainly not in the combat arms and in the essential areas of national defense. But they can be made in a variety of areas: procurement, research, and manpower.

So I commend the Senator from Missouri. I think he has put forward a responsible position for the Senate this afternoon. It is in the interest of the security of this country, and in the interest of those concerned about fiscal responsibility.

I commend him, and I hope the Senate will support his efforts this afternoon.

I see a number of appropriate areas where significant reductions can be made:

First, in the area of manpower, we can achieve significant reductions in appropriations by a modest lowering of the levels of manpower.

By merely adding an additional 75,000 end-year cut in Active Military Forces, by adding an 18,000 end-year cut in civilian forces, and by cutting the end-year level of reserves by 44,000, we can achieve a savings of appropriations of \$650 million in actual pay and in reduced operations and maintenance. In future years, this would represent a \$1.2 billion cut.

It should be noted that the Senate Armed Services Committee itself recently reported a bill with a 49,000-man reduction in Active Military Forces and recommendations for additional cuts of 11,000 in noncombat forces abroad.

The appropriations bill merely provides for a 24,000-man reduction. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has testified that there is a slow draw-down of our forces planned in Thailand and South Korea.

The Armed Services Committee has also questioned the 225,000 level of military base support personnel.

In these areas as well as in other non-combat support areas, reductions could be made by the Secretary.

The suggested civilian manpower reduction of 18,000 includes a recognition that the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed a 44,600 cut in civilian manpower, compared to the Appropriations Committee recommendation of 32,000.

The proposed reduction of reserves re-

fects the actual request of the Secretary of Defense, which was increased by the authorizing committees.

An additional \$529 million also could be cut by the Secretary by terminating the "war reserve stocks for allies" account in which weapons and ammunition are obtained on a contingent basis for the support of foreign forces in South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand.

This reserve stock funding account has not gone through the foreign relations and armed services authorizing committees.

It is a back-door means of bolstering the actual procurement by the Defense Department.

When it was discovered by Senator FULBRIGHT, the Defense Department explained it as being used for supporting these three allies—South Vietnam, South Korea and Thailand.

At the same time, the Defense Department stated that the equipment remained in stockpiles controlled by the United States.

However, the Department would not state that congressional authorization would be required before these weapons could be turned over to allies.

In fact, when the GAO responded to the requests of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a report, the Defense Department objected to the GAO's use of the word "authorization" as being required prior to the transfer of stockpiled items to these Asian allies, arguing instead that only "consultation" with the Congress was required.

I find this position objectionable on two counts.

First, it could mean that congressionally established ceilings—on aid to Vietnam for example—could be meaningless if the Defense Department believes that it can turn this equipment over to Vietnam without further congressional authorization.

Second, it means that we are being asked—at a time of difficult economic circumstances—to boost the defense budget for the purpose of planning for South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand's future military aid needs. I say, this subject should be considered as part of the overall foreign aid request.

Subsequently, the Defense Department has argued that much of this new equipment goes directly to the U.S. Active Military Forces and the U.S. Reserves.

If that is the purpose of this reserve, then it should not be funded under this category.

But, the GAO has informed me that there is a circle at work, in which even if some of these weapons go to U.S. troops in the field, the weapons they are replacing go to the Reserve Forces or to the stockpile.

In recent years, there have been substantial increases in the item, "war reserves for allies."

In fiscal year 1973, the Defense Department set aside \$25 million.

In fiscal year 1974, the figure jumped to \$494 million.

And in fiscal year 1975, the current figure is \$529 million.

These figures are based on the acquisi-

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tion cost of supplies placed in the stockpile.

Once in the stockpile, there is a strong tendency for these supplies to be declared excess and turned over to South Vietnam, South Korea and Thailand.

Thus, in fiscal year 1973, the Defense Department listed \$24.3 million in excess materials going to South Vietnam, \$8.4 million going to Thailand, and \$8.3 million going to South Korea.

But those figures are what the DOD calls actual value, not their acquisition cost.

The GAO found that the Department of Defense was listing those weapons at only 8.9 percent of their acquisition cost.

Thus, the acquisition cost of the weapons declared excess and turned over to those countries in fiscal year 1973 was in fact approximately \$390 million.

In fiscal year 1974, the acquisition cost of the equipment declared excess and turned over to those three countries was approximately \$620 million.

And in fiscal year 1975, the Department plans, according to GAO, to turn over to those three countries weapons and equipment whose acquisition cost is approximately \$738 million.

I see no reason for the U.S. Congress to approve \$529 million for the current fiscal year, in an account listed as war reserve stocks for allies and designated for South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand, at the same time that the Department of Defense plans to turn over items costing an estimated \$738 million to those countries.

In addition, there are other areas where cuts are desirable in the overall Defense appropriations. I would note that the Senate Armed Services Committee has recommended that only two nuclear attack submarines be authorized this year, rather than three. The committee felt that there would be no negative impact on our security, since 23 of these vessels have been funded but have not yet been delivered; and for a substantial portion of them, the construction stage has not yet begun. A reduction of one attack submarine would mean a reduction of \$334 million.

Similarly, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a deletion of the request for a destroyer tender, noting that three other tenders have been funded in prior years, yet contracts have not yet been awarded. In the committee's view, prudence suggests deleting the \$116.7 million request from the appropriations bill now before us.

Another area of procurement where reductions can be made is in the F-14, where current appropriations of over \$600 million are planned, for the purchase of 50 F-14's. This plane has been a subject of considerable controversy and questionable utility; and work is now underway on lighter weight replacements. Cutting in half the order of 50 planes to 25 would permit a savings of \$300 million from this year's appropriations bill. It also should be noted that purchase of 80 F-14's by Iran will insure that the production line for these planes will not be measurably affected by a decision to reduce the U.S. level of procurement this year to 25 planes.

The Appropriations Committee also added, in the area of the ABM, an additional \$38.8 million over the House funding for continued research and development on the new site defense system and the older "Safeguard" system. With the United States-Soviet agreement to limit each country to one ABM, I see no need for funding two ABM's, and surely not for adding money beyond what was voted by the House.

Finally, I would suggest that the Secretary could effectively reduce the \$700 million level of assistance for Vietnam by an additional \$150 million, to reduce the so-called MASF program for South Vietnam to a level well below the Senate's fiscal year 1974 funding.

In sum, these are specific areas, totaling nearly \$2 billion, from which I believe reductions could be selected by the Secretary in order to reduce the level of Defense appropriations by \$1.1 billion, thereby meeting the \$81 billion ceiling, without affecting our national security in the slightest.

I would also emphasize to my colleagues that additional reductions are also possible in other areas—for instance, by slowing slightly a number of major ongoing programs: The Trident, which has appropriations this year of \$1.6 billion; the B-1 bomber, with appropriations of \$449 million; the Minuteman III conversions, with appropriations of \$597 million; and the 7 DD-963 destroyers, with appropriations of \$457 million.

In examining the Department of Defense appropriations bill, I believe that the items I have listed are susceptible to reduction without affecting our security. They would easily permit a reduction to meet an \$81 billion ceiling, and they would help to ease the current economic situation by reducing the excessive inflationary pressure of Government spending. We have not mandated specific reductions as part of our amendment, because we believe the Secretary should have the authority to make the final determinations within the ceiling.

Nevertheless, this list of potential reductions is persuasive evidence that an \$81 billion ceiling is not only well within the reach of Congress, but also within our basic national interest.

Suggested cuts totaling \$1.9 billion
[In millions]

Total reductions:	
Manpower and operations and maintenance -----	\$650.0
MASF—Vietnam -----	150.0
F-14—reduce buy from 50 to 25--	300.0
SSN 688 Nuclear attack submarines—reduce buy from 3 to 2--	167.0
Site Defense—reduce to level of House appropriation -----	23.0
Safeguard—reduce R. & D. funds to level of House appropriation--	15.8
War reserve stocks for Allies-----	529.0
Destroyer Tender—delay buy, as recommended by Armed Services Committee -----	116.7
Total -----	1,951.5

Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield to the distinguished Senator from North Dakota such time as he desires.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, this defense budget has already been cut \$5.5

billion, the deepest cut that has ever been made on a regular defense appropriation bill in my time in the Senate, and that is nearly 30 years.

If we had cut it \$10 billion, there would have been the same amendments offered to decrease it, with much the same arguments.

I would like to take exception to one of the many proposals, and they are all based on inaccuracy or misinformation, on the long statement of the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) under Safeguard.

I wish to quote, and this is in respect to the Safeguard:

But recent studies, including a classified GAO analysis, show that our ICBM's do not need protection. Soviet missile accuracy is not sufficient now, nor will it be in the future, to threaten our land-based missiles. These missiles are, of course, deployed in hardened silos.

Mr. President, we have six Minutemen missile wings and not one of them has hardened silos. They are in the process now of hardening the Minutemen silos in one wing in Wyoming and one wing in North Dakota.

I read further:

But the most compelling reason of all to eliminate funds for Safeguard in this year's budget, is the decision by the Pentagon itself to mothball the system soon after it becomes fully operational later this year. That such a decision has been made was recently confirmed by a Defense Department spokesman.

I do not know who that spokesman was. He is not identified.

Before I go further, Mr. President, let me read from a letter from the Department of Defense.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be placed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

Washington, D.C., August 9, 1974.

Hon. MILTON R. YOUNG,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR YOUNG: Secretary Schlesinger has advised me of your conversation with him and your interest in the information that appeared in the Congressional Record and in the Press concerning DoD plans for the Safeguard site.

There are no DoD plans to close down the site. The Safeguard site is an important element of our strategic defensive posture at which we do not now plan to assure any status characterized by the word "mothballing." We are, as you know, giving continuing attention to taking every possible measure to reduce costs within the Department of Defense. One of the options being preserved would be to reduce somewhat—many months hence—the level of operation of portions of the Safeguard site. Final decision to execute this option could only be made if the future international situation and the status of the arms control negotiations warranted such a change in status. In any case, there are no plans—tentative or otherwise—to make such a change prior to fiscal year 1977.

The FY 75 Defense Program includes funds for R&D and operation of the Safeguard site. This program will permit us to acquire the essential operational experience necessary to support future R&D. The program also will assure that this Safeguard site can be operated to provide the protection it uniquely affords. Our planning of strategic forces necessarily includes assumptions on the degree

of strategic warning that we might receive prior to a severe crisis. When it is possible to make the appropriate assumptions about strategic warning and when we have acquired the necessary operational experience it will then be possible to consider whether this site could be safely maintained at a reduced level of operational readiness.

I hope that this information will clarify some of the misconceptions that could easily have arisen from material recently available on this subject.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. MAURY.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., August 7, 1974.

Memorandum for:

Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Major General Raymond B. Furlong, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (LA).
Colonel Robert L. Burke, Director for Defense Information.

Mr. Charles Hinkle, Director for Security Review.

I have responded as follows to this question from Les Gelb of the New York Times:

Q: Has there been a decision to mothball the Safeguard site?

A: There is a decision to protect an option to phase down portions of the Safeguard site in an orderly way in the outyears beyond FY 1976 resulting in a reduced readiness status. Obviously this option might not be exercised and the planning could change depending on the international situation and the status of arms control negotiations. Full operation of the site in the period before FY 1977 will provide us with essential R&D information and operational experience and will insure the capability to restore the site to full readiness in a timely manner if it should in fact be placed in a reduced status. The decision to protect this option to reduce readiness in the out-years has been fully discussed with the Congress throughout the year including the Secretary's classified Defense Report of last March.

JERRY W. FRIEDHELM.

Mr. YOUNG. This letter is dated August 9, addressed to me:

DEAR SENATOR YOUNG: Secretary Schlesinger has advised me of your conversation with him and your interest in the information that appeared in the Congressional Record and in the Press concerning DoD plans for the Safeguard site.

There are no DoD plans to close down the site. The Safeguard site is an important element of our strategic defensive posture at which we do not now plan to assume any status characterized by the word "mothballing".

That story also appeared in the New York Times, that we are going to mothball the ABM site. That statement is utterly false.

Mr. President, I now read the last paragraph of the Eagleton statement:

Instead of allowing funds to complete Safeguard and maintain it for a full year, I would give the Army exactly what it needs to put the system in mothballs. The savings here, therefore, would be \$80 million, leaving \$40 million to phase out the program.

Mr. President, since the Safeguard program was first started by President Johnson, we spent approximately \$6 billion in research and development, and testing, and about \$300 million on the site in Montana, which we abandoned, and about \$805 to \$810 million on the site in North Dakota.

It would take \$60 million to complete the ABM site in North Dakota.

Would it not make sense, Mr. President, to complete the site after over \$300 million has been spent on it when it only requires \$60 million more to complete it?

One thing they have been able to develop through this ABM project is a radar that is five times as strong as any other radar we have deployed any place in the world. That is one of the results.

Mr. President, this is only one of what I believe to be many errors and inaccuracies contained in the Senator Eagleton statement.

May I say again, what a horrible mistake it would be after spending \$6 billion on this Safeguard system to abandon the one site we have about completed, where it would only take \$60 million more to complete it. The Russians have one site and they are going on improving theirs day by day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. EAGLETON. Very briefly, Mr. President, the Defense Department spokesman I failed to mention by name is Jerry Friedheim.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point an article from the New York Times of August 8, 1974, by Leslie H. Gelb, which deals with mothballing the Safeguard and contains the quote from Mr. Friedheim.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOUSE VOTES MISSILE SITE PLANNED FOR
6 MONTHS' USE

(By Leslie H. Gelb)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 7.—The House of Representatives voted \$135-million yesterday for the completion of a missile defense site that the Pentagon plans to place in mothballs six months after it becomes operative, according to a number of Congressmen and Administration officials.

The impending mothballing could not be stated in the floor debate on the defense appropriations bill because the Pentagon has kept the information classified.

Most members of the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee who were aware of the mothball plans, nevertheless, recommended passage of the measure. Their arguments were that some research lessons might be learned and that \$5 billion had already been spent on the project.

Representative Robert N. Giaimo, Democrat of Connecticut, offered an amendment to reduce funds for the project by about \$85 million.

URGINGS IGNORED

He and a number of his colleagues urged their fellow Congressmen during the debate on the amendment to go over to the floor managers' tables and read the page in the classified record that described the mothballing plans. Only a handful went over to look at the text. The amendment was defeated, 182 to 219.

"Assistant Secretary of Defense Jerry W. Friedheim acknowledged in a telephone interview that "the decision has been made to protect the option to phase down some parts of the defense missile site" after 1975.

He added that the decision would "save money" and "give us the option to come back with the site" in an emergency.

Other Pentagon officials, however, main-

tained that it would take about three months to get the site working again once it had been phased down as planned.

Mr. Friedheim did not explain why the mothballing plans needed to be classified.

The House passed yesterday a Defense Department appropriations bill of nearly \$84 billion, some \$3.6-billion less than the Administration had requested. This figure does not include an additional \$6-billion for other military programs such as foreign military aid, civil defense and development of nuclear warheads done by the Atomic Energy Commission.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS PROTECTED

The bill will allow the Pentagon to proceed with almost all of its planned new weapons programs.

At the same time, however, Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas and chairman of the Appropriations Committee, warned the Pentagon not to ask Congress for more money because of inflated costs. In recent years, the Pentagon has sought supplements after its budget had been approved and was expected to do so again this year.

The House also passed two key amendments contrary to the positions of its own Appropriations Committee and to the Administration.

MISSILE SITES LIMITED

By 233 to 157, the House voted to cut military aid to South Vietnam to \$700-million, or \$300-million below the committee recommendation and \$900-million under the Admin-

By a vote of 214 to 186, the House also killed Administration plans to begin the production of a binary system for the delivery of nerve gas. Binary nerve gas production had been proposed by the Pentagon to match Soviet developments in gas warfare and opposed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an obstacle to negotiations under way in Geneva to ban chemical weapons.

The background to the vote on the missile defense site was frequently cited by Mr. Giaimo and others to justify their opposition to the measure.

In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty limiting each side to two antiballistic missile sites. During the Moscow summit several weeks ago, both sides further agreed to a one site limit for each.

In between these two agreements, the Pentagon decided to begin research and development on a new type of missile defense system known as "site defense." The technology of the systems limited by Soviet American treaties. The House yesterday approved \$100-million for the new site defense program.

On April 25, 1974, Gen. Walter P. Leber, the chief of the Safeguard defensive missile system that is limited by the Soviet-American accords, informed the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in classified testimony of the following Pentagon plans:

1975 COMPLETION

If Washington and Moscow agreed to limit the Safeguard system to one site, Washington would choose Grand Forks, N.D., the site nearest completion.

With the \$135-million requested in the new budget, the Grand Forks site would be completed some time in 1975.

Since this one site would be without strategic significance, the Pentagon would keep it in operation for about six months for research, then phase it down to a low state of readiness.

Pentagon plans remain as stated then by General Leber. His testimony is what Mr. Giaimo and others were referring to in the House debate yesterday.

Mr. Giaimo's amendment would have budgeted only enough funds to close out the

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Grand Forks site. He and others argued the following: The research benefits to be gained by completing the Grand Forks site could not be used elsewhere since by treaty the United States is limited to one site and could not be transferred to the new site defense system since the two technologies are so different.

Speaking in favor of completing the program, Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida, said: "If we stop now, we will have nothing to show. For \$5-billion we have nothing to show—nothing."

In a telephone interview, Mr. Mahon stressed that it was important for the United States to possess the technology "used by our troops in our country," since the Soviet retain an operational site near Moscow."

The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet taken action on this matter or on the Defense Department appropriations bill.

Mr. EAGLETON. May I say to my friend from North Dakota, it seems like 5 years ago or so when we were debating ABM and Safeguard. We need not repeat 5 years of history, nor the enormity of debate, which consumed many, many days. We take diametrically opposite viewpoints as to the advantages of Safeguard.

I predict to my good friend from North Dakota that the biggest thing North Dakota will get out of Safeguard will be a State park. In terms of its utilitarian qualities, its defense utilization, it is worthless.

I presume I might view it in a somewhat different context were it in my home State, although I fought like the devil to keep it out of my State of Missouri when they threatened to propose it for Sedalia, Mo. They wanted to Safeguard us to death with a nonoperable, useless, wasteful system.

The Pentagon did me a perverse favor when they said it would no longer go to Missouri, as a threat of punishment. I accepted their decision and I have obtained more political mileage out of it than if they had put it there.

Nevertheless, it is in North Dakota, and I presume it will stay there.

I can assure the distinguished Senator from North Dakota it is going to be mothballed and will not be used. It does not make any difference. It could not have been used anyway.

Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. Yes.

Mr. YOUNG. It was not a request of mine nor the people of North Dakota that the ABM site be placed in North Dakota. There are two big air bases in our State, about 300 Minutemen, and the ABM. If North Dakota seceded from the Union, we would be the third biggest nuclear power in the world. We did not ask for these installations. It was a Defense decision that placed them there. We did not object to it. Our people thought if the country needed them for national security they would accept them.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi such time as he may desire.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. President, I think everyone should really follow the route this bill has taken: the authorization part, to start with, by a committee of the Senate and by a committee of the House, and then a conference committee meeting between each on the authorization bill which went over the entire matter for weeks—I think 5 weeks over a period of time. Then come back for a moment to the history of this matter.

The original budget was considered most exhaustively by our committee. As pointed out this morning by the Senator from New Hampshire, research and development was carefully considered, and considerable reductions were made.

The same thing happened with reference to procurement.

Reference has been made to ships. There was one group where the chief control ship was finally eliminated altogether. They are going to take a new start somewhere in that field. That was a legislative act.

We brought a bill to the floor of the Senate for authorization.

Consider the manpower, aid to South Vietnam, the civilian manpower, plus the military procurement, plus the R. & D. We took out, in round numbers, between \$2.5 billion and \$3 billion. That is including the manpower and the foreign aid.

We went to conference. We did not have that much of a saving, but we had well over \$1.5 billion.

This went to the House of Representatives where they have a staff that works year in and year out. They came back with a lot of very valuable information that led to reductions in this bill.

The Senate Committee, under the guidance and leadership of these two Senators, the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from North Dakota, worked further on the bill.

Do not think this is trivial work. I know the Senator from Missouri does not think so because he did some good work once on a tank, and I commend him publicly and privately. So he is a worker, too.

Do not think that these men are not workers. They and their staff—and the rest of us helped them some—really put a fine-tooth comb all the way through this matter. Let us not say to the people of America that we are just throwing away money, putting it in for this and putting it in for that.

There has been more time taken up and lost on these bills, arguing about beagle hounds and items of that kind, than there has been of these real weapons. The members of the committee have been through it from bottom to top. They have come up with some recommendations that are really down to the bone. I do not think they have cut any muscle, but they have got down pretty close to it.

This amendment, with all deference to our friend from Missouri, would lock this committee in by this vote, putting a ceiling on this of \$81 billion. That means that we go through the formality of appointing conferees and they will go to represent the Senate at the conference. That means they will have to go into the conference and say to the House conferees, "We cannot go above \$81 bil-

lion because of the Eagleton amendment, and that means the House will have to yield to us on everything."

Their bill calls for about \$83 billion. So we would be \$2 billion under them to start with. We could not go above \$81 billion. Then we have to bring back a bill that is not below the lowest figure of the two nor above the highest figure of the two.

It just means we would be locked in and that is all we could do or say. We would very quickly get an answer.

Mr. President, I shall discuss in some detail the extent to which the Defense budget has already been reduced under our congressional process—that is what happened during the authorizing process to which a large portion of the budget is subject, and what has happened in the appropriation process, which has overall jurisdiction over the entire Defense budget. The Senate will see that this request, as it now stands, which has been reduced from \$87 billion to \$81.5 billion, has undergone a most intensive review by four committees.

RESULTS OF AUTHORIZATION REVIEW

As the Senate knows, appropriations cannot be made for substantial portions of the Defense budget until the appropriation has been authorized. This requirement covers the procurement of all major military hardware, all research and development, the fiscal year end-strengths for military and civilian personnel in the Department of Defense, and military assistance for South Vietnam.

Those portions of the Defense budget not subject to authorization include the entire O. & M. account, portions of the personnel account, parts of the procurement account, and various other sundry items.

Mr. President, the Senate version of the authorization bill reduced the Defense budget by \$3 billion, 244.7 million. These cuts were as follows: Procurement, \$1 billion, 110.1 million—8 percent—R. & D. \$372.6 million—4 percent—the 49,000 military cut and the 44,600 civilian personnel cut would have resulted in savings of approximately \$1.2 billion annually; military assistance for South Vietnam cut \$550 million—33 percent—from the request of \$1 billion, 450 million. The Senate committee cuts, Mr. President, were not increased or decreased on the Senate floor.

RESULTS OF CONFERENCE ON THE AUTHORIZATION BILL

In conference, Mr. President, a portion of these cuts were restored. However, the record should reflect that the final authorization act reduced the Defense budget by a total of \$2 billion, 135.2 million from the request. The major reductions were as follows: Procurement cut \$810.9 million—5.9 percent—R. & D. \$388.1 million—4.2 percent—personnel \$488 million; Vietnam assistance cut \$450 million—31 percent.

FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN TWO APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES

The overall cut, Mr. President, made by the House Appropriations Committee in the defense budget was slightly over \$4 billion.

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS ACTIONS

Mr. President, proceeding with the same comparisons the Senate made further reduction in the overall budget which totaled \$5.5 billion. This includes further reductions in the procurement, R. & D. and personnel accounts. The Vietnam assistance, which as the Senate may recall, was reduced an additional \$300 million in the House, remains at that figure in the Senate, which, as we know, is now \$700 million from a total request of \$1 billion, 450 million.

FINAL COMMENT

Mr. President, these figures speak for themselves. This is one of the tightest Defense budgets we have had in years. It still permits a strong national defense, but, at the same time, there have been far greater cuts in this budget than any I have known in the Congress so far this session.

Mr. EAGLETON. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. EAGLETON. This cut is to be made in the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, if you came back to the floor of the Senate with an \$81.5 billion bill, hypothetically. He could so do, in my opinion, with the discretion lying with the Secretary of Defense, were he to cut off that extra \$0.5 million figure.

Mr. STENNIS. You did not let me finish my story. I was going to say what would happen in the conference.

You would not get any kind of an offer back on any kind of negotiation or anything else. Their own self-respect would make them say, "We are not going to yield to the Senate on that figure, and we are not going to lose our time in arguing about it. We are not going to have a conference, if you are going to stand on that amendment."

So, of course, the Senate would have to yield on that amendment before you could get down to any kind of negotiations. Do not say it would not happen that way, please, unless you have been through the thing I am talking about.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. As this amendment is worded, I think it means whatever we appropriate, the appropriation, the overall total, must be that. It does not cut any item in the bill.

It does not increase any item in the bill as it is now. It simply puts on a ceiling. If I interpret it correctly—and I think that is the interpretation placed on it by the author—it means that we would abrogate our power and authority and responsibility to appropriate, but we would delegate that power to the Secretary of Defense. I do not believe that is the best way to do it.

Mr. STENNIS. I do not think so.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I do not know where he would cut. He might not cut in the places that the distinguished Senator from Missouri has suggested that cuts would be made.

Mr. STENNIS. The House is not going to agree to anything like that. We might just as well recognize that now. The con-

ferencees would have to yield or come back for further action of some kind, under the parliamentary procedure.

We have to be practical and realistic. We are prepared to defend this bill. It is not a product of any one person's arbitrary idea. It is a product of the judgment of those of us who have been working on it, particularly led by the two Senators to whom I have referred.

We are not going to get anywhere with the House conferees by going in there with a mandate. With respect to any particular item that has to be voted on, it may be too late now to offer an amendment. But any particular weapon or any particular amount was subject to attack, or any particular item could have been left out.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. EAGLETON. I do not have a particular amendment in mind, but I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, what he thinks about the wisdom of cutting additional civilian personnel from the Defense Department payroll? I quoted at great length an excellent report by the Senator's committee about the lavish civilian personnel quotas of the Defense Department. I ask the Senator what his current attitude is with respect to that?

Mr. STENNIS. My attitude is rather well reflected in the bill as it exists.

I do not recall the figures at this time, but 30,000 additional places were requested, and the Senate Armed Services Committee turned down virtually all of them, plus some more. I cannot recall the exact figure, but it was about 39,000 which could have been taken care of by attrition. That was compromised somewhat in the conference with the House on authorizations. The House Appropriations Committee then took that authorization as the top figure and reduced it somewhat. The McClellan subcommittee reduced it more, and it now stands at about 32,000, as I recall. That is not only the best judgment I have; it is the composite judgment of many of us who have worked on this subject.

We held extensive hearings on this matter, and we are already holding some hearings on manpower for next year. The military manpower has been gone over in the same fashion. We recommended a reduction to which the House did not agree.

Mr. President, that is about the only contribution I can make. There has never been a bill that has been considered and reconsidered and evaluated and measured and weighed and examined and analyzed, with a composite made, any more than this one. In fact, I believe that this bill has had more treatment along that line than at any time since I have been on the Armed Services Committee.

As I have said, we have already started working on next year's bill, because I believe the membership is pretty well satisfied with this one, the way it is now.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, we are awaiting the senior Senator from Missouri, and I am ready to close on my amendment.

I yield the floor.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the Eagleton amendment.

I remind Senators that the President of the United States, in the 1975 budget estimate, sent a request asking for \$87 billion. Congress has considered this request in the pending bill. The House Armed Services Committee went into it in detail and fine-combed it. The Senate Armed Services Committee went into it in detail and gave it thorough consideration. The House Appropriations Committee has given it thorough consideration, and they have come up with a bill of \$83 billion. The Senate cut that. The decrease recommended by the Senate is \$1.5 billion. In other words, they cut it to \$81.5 billion, a reduction of \$5.2 billion from the original administration request.

Mr. President, how much more can we cut it? The idea of just saying that we want to cut off a billion dollars sounds good. It is nice to go back home and say that we voted for an amendment to save a billion. But where is it being saved? It is being saved from the only thing that can keep America free.

In this time in history, when Communist dictators are trying to devour the world, when they have 36 percent of the world's population and want to take the rest of it, how are we going to keep this country free? How are we going to defend the free world, unless we keep strong militarily?

The only language the Communists know is power. In order to have power, we must have a strong defense program. We cannot have a strong defense program if we are going to cut into the very sinew of a defense bill that has been considered by 4 committees, which they have reduced and reduced, and it cannot be reduced any more without peril to this country. I hope the Senate will think over this matter well and realize that it is important to keep this country strong.

Under the amendment that the distinguished Senator from Missouri is advocating, key decisions would be transferred from Congress to the Department of Defense. That is the very thing we are trying to get away from. We have said that the executive branch has too much power, that we have to bring it back to Congress. But under this type of amendment the Defense Department is going to make the decisions that we should make, and the members of these committees have tried to make these decisions in a sound manner. If the committee has made some errors—and no doubt we have made some; nobody is perfect—it can be corrected in conference. But just to take a meat ax and cut a billion dollars from the defense of this country does not make sense to me.

I repeat that the survival of this Nation, the survival of this Government,

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the survival of freedom in this country, depends on the military strength of this country.

I remind the distinguished Senator from Missouri and my colleagues that we read in this morning's newspapers about our President trying to negotiate a multi-lateral reduction. If we reduce unilaterally, we are taking away from the President the strength he needs. We are depriving him of the sinews he needs to say to the Communists, "We want to reduce, but we want you to reduce, too." But if only we are going to reduce, we cannot expect negotiations to be successful.

We cannot expect to go into conferences and to reach agreements that are beneficial to this country and for the welfare of this Nation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to say in closing that I hope the Senate will defeat this amendment.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, to conclude the presentation of the proponents of amendment No. 1836, I am very pleased to yield to my distinguished colleague from Missouri.

No one in the Senate, Mr. President, with all due respect to the fine Senators on the floor and those who have been on the floor today, no other Member of this body has had the awareness of and the knowledge of matters relating to military affairs—to the armed services—to the national security of this country, than my senior colleague. His experience in the executive and legislative branches of the Government—in the Defense Department and on the Armed Services Committee—makes his advice and counsel most valuable.

Thus, although normally, the sponsor of the amendment would close on it, I am eager to adopt such thoughts as my distinguished colleague will say in support at this time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, first, I deeply appreciate the very kind remarks by my able and distinguished colleague from my own State. I know he knows how grateful I am for what he has just said.

Mr. President, yesterday, on the floor of the House, in answer to President Ford's request on Monday night for the cooperation of the Congress in reducing the Federal budget in effort to combat inflation, by a vote of 257 to 155 the mass transportation bill was slashed from \$20 billion to \$11 billion.

The categories in this bill were cut on the basis of a certain percentage and not, to the best of my understanding of the debate, justified on a program-by-program basis. In other words, this was an across-the-board cut of almost 50 percent.

Why cannot the same criteria be applied to the Defense Appropriation bill? Why not an across-the-board cut of some 8 percent for the sake of efficiency and the state of our national economy?

I support the amendment proposed by my colleague from Missouri and commend him for his thoroughness in researching the various items in the Defense bill which he believes should be

reduced below the level recommended by the committee.

I congratulate him on the detail with which he went into it in his effort. But, in this time of rampant inflation, is it really necessary for us to go into such detail in recommending a less than 2-percent reduction in an \$87 billion Defense budget—less than 10 percent if you include the \$5 billion reduction recommended by the committee.

Why is an 8-percent reduction in our defense bill so much more unacceptable when it comes to fighting inflation than an almost 50-percent reduction in the mass transportation program?

Anybody who has large cities in his State knows only too well the growing problem of the strangling of our cities because of the lack of such transportation. It is for those reasons that I believe that mass transportation is desperately needed to move forward as rapidly as possible.

Time after time I have heard many of my colleagues say that we should not interfere in this or that program in the Defense budget because the Congress does not really understand these programs as well as the civilians and military in the Pentagon and they are the ones who should make the decisions about our defense posture.

Well, if they are the experts, then let them decide where to spend the money; but let the Congress assume its responsibility to the American taxpayer to try to stem the rising tide of inflation by telling the Pentagon that they have only so much to spend. This would be the business-like approach to the problem.

This is the way the problem was approached by the President who probably knew more about the Pentagon than any President, General Eisenhower.

As I have said before, a sound economy with a sound dollar is as important to national security as weapons systems, especially in that some of the latter are clearly questionable.

I find incredible the argument that a modest reduction in the Defense budget, in this year of double-digit inflation, would make the United States a "second-rate power."

For these reasons, I plan to vote for the amendment presented by my distinguished colleague now before the Senate, and would hope that all my colleagues who are truly interested in reducing inflation will do likewise.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have listened to much of the discussion this afternoon on this amendment. At times, I was otherwise occupied and did not, therefore, hear all of the argument that has been made. But, Mr. President, there is no need for a lot of argument. The issue here is pretty simple. The question is, do you want to have appropriations by line item, duly examined and approved by the regularly constituted committee of this body, which has a mandate to do just that, and then to report its findings and recommendations to this body? That is our system. That is the way we should proceed.

The opportunity to have proceeded in

that way was available to the distinguished author of this amendment, who is a member of the Committee on Appropriations. As I examine his remarks this afternoon, I find he has suggested 12 specific large areas, where he thinks reductions could be made and should have been made, and within those suggestions, there are smaller items, I am sure. I have not examined it in all detail.

I suggest to you, Mr. President, and to my colleagues that if these areas are susceptible of cuts, they should be cut as proposed in his remarks, but not as in the amendment before us. The logical thing, the proper thing, and the best thing that could have been done would have been to present to the Committee on Appropriations the specific amendments to make the cuts as the places where the remarks of the Senator today now suggest.

Some of them may be good and some of them may have been accepted or may have been modified and accepted. I do not know. But I do know, Mr. President, that when we delegate to the Defense Department the authority to spend \$81 billion any way it wants to, or delegate the authority and mandate it to cut a billion dollars from whatever we appropriate here, we are abrogating our responsibility.

I do not think it is very becoming of us to do that, and I do not want us to do that. I want us to keep this system whereby we hear evidence on these appropriations, on the budget, and on the proposed appropriations, and weigh them. And then, after discussion and judicious consideration, make a decision and submit a recommendation. That recommendation will not always be wise, will not always be the best. But I submit, Mr. President, that it is a far better system, and that far fewer errors in judgment and actions will occur by coming through that process than by simply submitting on the floor of the Senate a provision which states:

No funds in excess of \$81 billion may be appropriated pursuant to this act.

Well, there is more than that in the bill. What does this cut? What does it affect, if it simply places a ceiling without approving any specific item in the bill?

Mr. President, it is a blank check, a delegation of power to the Defense Department to spend \$81 billion any way they want it. I do not agree that they should have the final say. Often we defer to their judgment. I have before, and will in the future continue to defer where I am sure they are better informed and better advised than I. But I want to reserve the right, and I want the Senate to reserve the right, to examine the budget, pinpoint items, and say, "For this item, for this plane, for this submarine, for that much ammunition, for that much provisions, for that much fuel, you can spend so much and no more."

That is the way it should be done. That is the only way, Mr. President, that Congress can keep control of the purse strings of this Nation. If we are going to delegate to department heads the power to dispense and dispose of a total appropriation without specific directions as to

how it can be spent, we are moving in a dangerous direction.

I do not know; perhaps some of these cuts could be made. But I say this amendment does not make a single cut where our distinguished friend says they perhaps could be made and should be made. Not a single cut such as he proposes is made by this amendment. He says they could be made there, but they are not made. It would be doing the thing in an irresponsible way. In my judgement, if the Senate thought that we had appropriated too much money, and that the committee's recommendations were unsound, the proper procedure would be to recommit this bill with instructions to the Appropriations Committee to bring in a bill not to exceed \$81 billion in appropriations.

That is the right way to do it. That is the right way, Mr. President; then we could weigh these things. But I submit that the \$5 billion cut that we have already made is not modest and it is not insignificant unless, Mr. President, we are entering into a process of disarmament, of reducing our military strength to where we will be a second-rate power.

I know no Member of this body wants that. Not a Member of this body, on a vote that clearly presented that issue, would vote to make America a second-rate power.

But let me point out something to my colleagues. We have in the past, on two occasions immediately preceding World Wars, been unprepared. Those wars may have occurred because we were not adequately prepared. Under existing conditions, with the technology and the stage of scientific advance at that time, we had the opportunity to get ready and to meet the enemy.

Mr. President, we do not have time on our side any more. There is enough power harnessed today, in the hands of one potential enemy, that if unleashed could destroy this Nation, unless we stay prepared to immediately inflict comparable damage to our adversary. And when the day comes that that adversary feels that by a first strike they could destroy this Nation, I do not want us to be unprepared.

I do not know what it will take. No one knows today. But I do know if we are not careful—and I have been concerned about this question, Mr. President; as I recommended this \$5 billion cut I have been concerned about it. Are we sending a signal that may be interpreted as an indication of our retreat from meeting the challenge that is posed?

I hope not. I do not know what next year will bring forth. I will tell you what I think it could mean. I think that as we go out with this bill of \$5 billion less than requested, we could make it a signal, and determine from the response whether there is any genuine, true purpose on the part of our potential adversaries to negotiate in good faith for disarmament. This could be a suggestion that, "Yes, we are ready to start negotiating disarmaments with you."

We will know pretty soon whether there is any reaction of that kind to this action we are taking voluntarily. If that reaction in response to this cut does not

come, it may later be well to look more carefully into the extent to which we are crippling our defense potential.

I do not want to talk any longer. Senators have their minds made up. Either they are going to vote to handle the appropriation as in the amendment, or vote to stand by the rules and the system that guarantees the opportunity to inspect, to examine, to inquire about, and then to make judgments. But if we do it by this amendment, we lose that power and that prerogative, and I think it is irresponsible.

Yes, Mr. President, I would like to reduce this bill. I would like to wipe it off the books. I wish the condition of civilization today would permit us to do that.

But, Mr. President, we are living in a world of reality, not fantasy. The dangers are real. They are not imaginary. And I would like to leave this thought with my colleagues as I conclude, Mr. President; I am not sure that we have not already cut too much. I could find many places we can still cut. I could put a list of them into the Record. Here are a dozen places where we could cut, but it would mean starting down the road to disarmament, and I do not think we can afford that. Let me say this, Mr. President, in conclusion:

The turbulence and instability of international affairs, the capability of potential aggressors to wage wars of conquest instantaneously with unprecedented weapons of catastrophic destructive force and power, and the ever-present and calamitous danger these tragic and realistic conditions present, clearly and irrefutably preempt us from disarming and from reducing our military arsenal to a level that will relegate our Nation to a second-rate power.

It is imperative that we support and maintain a defense posture of deterrent proportions. To do less is to incur unacceptable risk—it is to invite provocations and impositions, and possibly an assault—a challenge to war.

The price of keeping a deterrent strength—of preparedness—comes high I know. But it prevents war and insures peace; it is more than worth the cost and the sacrifices it entails.

We hear a lot today about priorities in Federal spending. We are compelled to measure and compare the relative importance and need of proposed appropriations, and that is what we have undertaken to do, Mr. President.

But I would remind my colleagues that as the highest priority for any of us as individuals is the preservation of life itself, so is it with our Nation. We must be ever ready, able, and willing to provide adequate defense for its security and survival.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I do not know how much time I have left, but I yield myself 1 more minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator have more time remaining?

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I yield the Senator such time as he may desire.

Mr. McCLELLAN. No.

Mr. EAGLETON. I am prepared to

yield back the remainder of my time. I am prepared to yield to any Senator on either side or one who is neutral.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. STEVENS. I understand the vote on the final passage of the bill must occur at 4:45, is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the previous order; that is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to raise a question concerning one of the comments in the reports on this defense appropriations bill. When the matter was before our full Appropriations Committee, I briefly discussed the subject with our distinguished chairman, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), and with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

There is a reference in the report to propose reductions in headquarters staff. In the past few months, I have discussed with my good friend, Senator STENNIS the problem regarding the Alaska Command. I have also written to him to convey my views concerning the future of the Alaska Command.

We have had seven Unified Commands and the Alaska Command has represented less than 5 percent of the personnel involved in the headquarters of these commands. In 1970, the Blue Ribbon-Defense Panel recommended to the Department of Defense that the Alaska Command be disestablished. At that time, I protested this action to the Department of Defense, and after review of the problem the Under Secretary of Defense, David Packard, disagreed with the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and determined that the Alaska Command would remain intact, although there was a substantial reduction in the number of personnel at the Alaska Command headquarters.

Now we have been informed of a similar recommendation that is designed to disestablish the Alaska Command.

In my recent letter to Senator STENNIS, I pointed out that the situation in Alaska is not the same as exists in the other 49 States. We are not only separated from the continental United States, we have an extremely close proximity to the U.S.S.R. In Alaska there is a mixture of forces and commands that have vital roles in our national defense. We have the Air Force, the Army, the Coast Guard and the Strategic Air Command. In addition, there are separate functions such as the Navy Research Laboratory, the Test Command and a large National Guard. The Alaska Command has mobilized the facilities for joint training for all of these components and for the joint utilization of facilities and equipment, not only of the military but of other functions of the Federal Government which are directly related to defense, such as the Alaska Railroad.

We are not only the last frontier, our Alaska terrain represents one-fifth of the land mass of the United States. When our State became a part of the Union, President Eisenhower was so convinced of the strategic defense implications of

northwestern Alaska that he requested, and Congress approved, section 10 of the Alaska Statehood Act, which provides special powers to the President of the United States quite similar to those involved in martial law to be exercised in the event the President determines it is necessary in the interest of national security.

Additionally, the Alaska Command has served the Nation extremely well in times of national disasters in Alaska such as the great Good Friday earthquake of 1964 and the disastrous Fairbanks flood in 1967, at which times it was the Alaska Command that provided the nucleus for coordination of all Federal activities.

I feel very strongly that the Alaska Command is necessary to maintain the unity and the responsiveness necessary for defense forces in times of peace and in times of crisis in the event of war. We know that Alaska would probably be isolated in the event of a major war, and in any event we feel the planning for the defense of Alaska that is not done in Alaska cannot recognize the unique and developing problems in our great State.

Above all, Alaskans feel that if the Alaska Command is disestablished, our military forces will be supervised by what amounts to middle management—and in the event of a crisis requiring augmentation of our forces, there would not only be the necessity to augment the troop strength but there would also be the necessity of imposing on our defense structure a top management team that would be unfamiliar with the circumstances.

Working with the Alaska Command and its Advisory Council, I have explained to the Department of Defense an Alaskan proposal for the consolidation of the component headquarters while at the same time maintaining the Alaska Command. The advantages of this proposal are many: first, it would meet the request of our congressional committees for manpower savings in headquarters personnel; second, it would provide for the best possible coordination of the military effort in Alaska under the circumstances; third, by maintaining a unified command the responsibility for defense activities is in clear focus and would thus permit a closer relationship with our State and local communities; fourth, by preserving the Unified Command the true function of a command headquarters would be maintained along with the direct responsibility to the national level for activities in our State which, as I said, is one-fifth of the size of the rest of the United States.

The coordination plan set forth by Alaskans, including the military in Alaska, could effect a savings in excess of the manpower savings that would be realized if the Alaska Command was disestablished.

This is not an idle problem so far as I am concerned. Since I have come to the Senate I have attempted to support those bills—both authorization and appropriations—which I felt would maintain an effective defense establishment within our financial capability. And I have done this while watching the Alas-

ka Command reduced 21 percent since 1970. I believe it could be shown that there are fewer military personnel in Alaska today than there were before Pearl Harbor—and while I completely support the concept of détente, it is to me a concept that will succeed only if our Nation maintains its strength.

I have, as I have informed our two distinguished chairmen, been in contact with the Department of Defense again concerning the proposal to disestablish the Alaska Command. I have the distinct impression that the Department of Defense feels that it must respond to indications from the Congress, and particularly from the Senate, which the Department of Defense believes require the disestablishment of the unified commands. And in doing so it is ignoring the advice that has come from the individual services and the unified command structure in Alaska concerning the necessity for the maintenance of this unified command in Alaska.

In effect, I have the distinct impression that there are portions of the Department of Defense which believe that the proposed action to disestablish our Alaska Command shows a responsiveness to the Senate. I have conferred with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, regarding my feelings concerning this matter, and he has agreed to visit Alaska and meet with the Alaska Command and Alaskans concerning this problem prior to acting on the recommendation to disestablish Alcom.

What I now fear is that the references in the report on this appropriations bill could be interpreted to add to the "pressures" that some people in the Department of Defense feel they have already received from the Senate—they could be interpreted as an approval, or at least a request, for additional action to disestablish headquarters. I sought the support and guidance of my good friend, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) in the past and now I seek not only his advice and counsel, but also that of the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee (Mr. McCLELLAN). And with this recitation of the background and my feelings on the problem, I would like to inquire: Is there anything in this report which could be interpreted by the Department of Defense as a request or direction to proceed with the disestablishment of the Alaska Command?

Second, would the two distinguished chairmen comment for the record we are making here on the proposal to consolidate the headquarters of the individual components of the Alaska Command, while at the same time maintaining the Unified Command. As I previously stated, I am informed that the personnel reduction involved in that consolidation could be equal to or greater than the personnel savings involved in the disestablishment of the Alaska Command. And I would seek the assistance of my two colleagues and great friends in attempting to convince the Department of Defense that the previous requests from the Senate pertain to the elimination of unnecessary command structures—with the goal

of achieving manpower savings, but that the Senate has not and does not seek the disestablishment of command structures which are necessary to carry out the plans for the defense of our Nation.

Alaskans are most proud of their unique relationship in the Nation today—we soon will be providing a substantial portion of our Nation's energy resources and our potential for producing strategic metals and minerals is even greater. But we are not unaware of the fact that Alaska with its remoteness from the South 48 and its proximity to Asia is in a unique geographical location. Our location offers strategic advantages to our Nation, but at the same time it presents an apparent weak spot in our defense—and we believe that the defense posture for our military forces in Alaska must maintain defense and readiness that was not present in Alaska at the beginning of World War II. To Alaskans the Alaska Command is the symbol of preparedness—take it away and I think our State will lose confidence in the commitment of the Nation as a whole to maintain our ability to defend Alaska.

I would be happy to have the comments of my good friends on these questions at this point if they would care to respond to my remarks.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have been advised that the Department of Defense is currently reviewing the unified command plan and in all likelihood will recommend that changes and realignments be made. The review is expected to be completed in about 6 months and is a part of the Defense Department's program to reduce headquarters staffs and increase combat manpower in the Armed Forces.

I believe that revisions to the unified command plan that will reduce headquarters staffs are feasible, however, the actions described on page 34 of the committee report, under the title "Achieving Savings in Support and Headquarters Personnel" are not intended to approve any specific changes that may be proposed by the Department upon completion of its review. The committee will carefully examine the proposed changes to the unified command plan. I can assure the Senator that the committee does not seek, and will oppose the disestablishment of command structures which are necessary to carry out our national defense.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my response to the Senator from Alaska is as follows:

I am inserting in the Record a copy of a letter from me to the Secretary of Defense dated October 24, 1973. In that letter I urged reductions in the manpower levels at headquarters.

In that letter, nor in any other letter, nor orally or otherwise, have I ever recommended the disestablishment of a military command. That is a judgment for the military and the Department of Defense to make.

I ask unanimous consent that the letters may be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

August 21, 1974

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15569

OCTOBER 24, 1973.

HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, one of the amendments recently considered on the Senate Floor in connection with the FY 1974 Military Procurement Authorization Bill was a proposal by Senator Proxmire which would have required as a matter of law certain reductions in the headquarters and headquarters staff. These reductions were suggested in the Committee Report as illustrative of reductions which could be made in support and headquarters activities. The Committee Report indicated that over 10,000 positions might possibly be saved in this area.

The amendment was defeated and I opposed the adoption of the amendment. I would not want my vote as well as that of many Senators to be misinterpreted as meaning that no reductions in headquarters personnel are desirable or possible. The reason for opposing this amendment was based on the Committee position that while substantial cuts should be made, the Secretary of Defense should apportion the cuts and have the latitude to make the cuts wherever he deemed best, as part of his management responsibilities. The Committee Report cited the headquarters activities among a number of others as being illustrative of areas where reductions might well be made in noncombat activities.

I realize that many times the Congress makes what might be termed as "gestures" in support of manpower reductions but these are never made mandatory as a matter of hard law. The Services understandably do not take these actions too seriously if they are not specifically required by law.

The point I can not too strongly emphasize in this letter is that if the Department of Defense does not make rather substantial reduction in the one million men in headquarters and support activities in the coming months, you can be sure that the Armed Services Committee will be compelled to take more stringent action next year in order to achieve some results. I recognize that over the years headquarters and support activities, especially NATO, have become institutionalized and there is great resistance in reducing un-needed or marginal functions. This results in a tendency on the part of the Services to make any mandated reductions in combat activities.

I am sympathetic to the severe problems you face in achieving meaningful reductions in this area. I write this letter to put the Services on notice of the Committee's intention next year, so far as I am concerned, if demonstrable results are not otherwise achieved.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. STENNIS.

DECEMBER 3, 1973.

HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my letter of October 24 I strongly emphasized the fact that if the Department of Defense does not make substantial reductions of manpower in headquarters and support activities in the coming months, the Armed Services Committee will be compelled to take more stringent action next year to achieve some results.

I understand that you have a study underway on the impact of 10, 20 or 30 per cent reductions in the headquarters staffs of the Services and Defense Agencies. However, I am very concerned, based on my understanding, that this study will not be completed in time to reduce the FY 75 budget and manpower request. Studies are needed but are not enough. As I said in my earlier letter, demonstrable results must be achieved.

I intend to closely watch progress on this matter. I would like you to provide me a monthly report of actual, on-board manpower for each Service and Agency broken down by the mission and support categories of this statutory Manpower Requirements Report. That strength would be compared with previous months and years, as well as the planned end-year strength. Differences from the previous months actual strength should be explained in terms of the specific headquarters, organizations and units that are affected. I would appreciate receiving the report on the 15th of each month for the prior month beginning on December 15 for the month of November.

Thanking you for your attention on what I know is a problem to you—the field of personnel, I am

Most Cordially yours,

JOHN C. STENNIS.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., December 24, 1973.

HON. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I agree with the view expressed in your letter of December 3 that demonstrable results must be achieved soon in terms of headquarters manpower reductions. The headquarters review I have directed will achieve such results. Moreover, our emphasis on the elimination and consolidation of functions and headquarters will permit significant manpower savings without damage to essential command and management functions. While this approach requires more thoughtful study, it is preferable to arbitrary across-the-board reductions. I plan to use the resources released by reductions in command structures to improve combat capability.

As we reach key decisions on the various parts of the headquarters structure, I have asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to keep you personally informed. Although the full study will not be completed in time for inclusion in the President's FY 1975 budget and manpower request, our testimony before your Committee next spring will cover the results achieved by that time. These results can therefore be reflected in the FY 1975 manpower program.

I would appreciate it if we might consider reporting format alternatives to that specified in your letter. The Services do not routinely report strength information in the Annual Report manpower categories. Thus while an occasional special report can be prepared, regular reports do pose greater difficulty which I would like to explain more fully. Therefore, I have asked Mr. Brehm to discuss the problem with your staff and suggest alternatives which will meet your needs and are within our current reporting capability.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

J. R. SCHLESINGER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Missouri yield back the remainder of his time?

Mr. EAGLETON. I am happy to yield such time to the Senator from Virginia as he may desire.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I wish to ask the chairman of the Appropriations Committee this question. As I understand it, the Appropriations Committee started out with a budget request from the administration of, in round figures, \$87 billion.

Mr. McCLELLAN. It was \$85 billion—something to begin with, but we got an

amended request that brought it up to \$87 billion-plus.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. So with the amended request the Department of Defense sought a total appropriation of \$87 billion-plus.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. And after the Appropriations Committee went over the matter carefully it now recommends to the Senate a reduction of some \$5½ billion from that request.

Mr. McCLELLAN. \$5½ billion in new obligational authority; that is what they asked to spend, that is what they asked, \$87.57 billion in obligational authority requested, and we have reduced it to \$82.7 billion, I believe.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. So the committee brings in a proposal which represents a reduction from the request by the Department of Defense and the administration of some \$5.5 billion.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Between \$5 billion and \$5.5 billion in round numbers in total authority.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Yes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. And over \$5 billion in actual reduction in funds.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The Senator from Virginia has developed figures on defense appropriations.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Sir?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The Senator from Virginia has developed some figures on defense appropriations going back to 1960 which, at the appropriate time, I will ask to be inserted in the RECORD.

For the moment, however, I want to just point out several figures. In 1960, the Department of Defense appropriation was \$39 billion, in round numbers. In fiscal 1975, if the Appropriations Committee's proposal is approved, it will be \$82 billion, so that is an increase of a little more than double during that time.

But now, if one compares that—and that is a substantial increase—with the appropriations for HEW, we find that in 1960 the total HEW appropriations were \$4 billion. They are now \$36 billion—last year, 1974, they were \$36 billion, a nine-fold increase during that period.

If we take another date, if we take fiscal 1969, we find that the Department of Defense appropriations were \$77 billion. That compares with \$82 billion which the Appropriations Committee recommends to the Senate, or an increase of about 6 percent during that period of time.

Now, if we take the HEW appropriations we find that in 1969 the figure was \$16 billion, and it is now \$36 billion for 1974, more than double.

Under the able leadership of the senior Senator from Arkansas, the Appropriations Committee has done an outstanding job in attempting to get defense expenditures under control and to eliminate many questionable items from the request made by the Department of Defense.

I doubt if any other piece of legislation has been brought before the Senate which carried a reduction as high as \$5.5 billion.

I support the reductions in military

August 21, 1974

appropriations recommended by the committee.

I commend the able Senator from Arkansas.

I ask unanimous consent that a table showing appropriations for Defense and HEW be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HEW and Defense appropriations, fiscal years 1960 through 1975 (figures rounded).

Year	[In billions]	
	DOD	HEW
1960	\$39	\$4
1961	40	4
1962	47	5
1963	48	5
1964	48	6
1965	48	7
1966	59	10
1967	70	13
1968	74	15
1969	77	16
1970	74	17
1971	71	22
1972	75	27
1973	78	32
1974	78	36
1975	82	35

Source: Office of Management and Budget except 1974 and 1975 are Senate Appropriation Committee.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for just a moment?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I would like to state, as I did in my initial and opening remarks on this bill, I pointed out that in 1950 outlays for national defense were about 50 percent of the Federal budget. In 1960 they were 40 percent. In 1970 they dropped to 30 percent, and this year they will be 29 percent. So we are constantly going down. That is true with respect to the gross national product, and so forth.

We are constantly going down; whereas the Senator mentioned some of the other things, social security has gone up 283 percent during that time; health services, including medicare and Medicaid, increased from \$496 million to \$22.4 billion. So the great increase in the cost of Government is not attributable to the rise in military spending. We are doing everything we can to hold it down.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I thank the Senator.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 1836 be temporarily set aside for not to exceed 3 minutes so that I may yield to the Senator from Maryland and so that he may bring up a related subject and dispose of the same within the hour of 4:45.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Maryland.

Mr. MATHIAS. I wish to call up an amendment which I have sent to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 22, line 20, strike the period after "1977" and insert in lieu thereof a colon and the following: "Provided, That not more than \$90,100,000 of the funds provided herein may be expended for the procurement of the A-7D aircraft, and \$128,000,000 of the funds provided herein shall be available only for the procurement of the A-10 aircraft."

Mr. MATHIAS. I am offering this amendment on behalf of my distinguished colleague from Maryland (Mr. BEALL) and both of the distinguished Senators from New York (Mr. JAVITS and Mr. BUCKLEY).

It is an amendment which seeks to bring some equity into the appropriations provided for the procurement of military aircraft and, particularly, to bring about some equity between a new aircraft, the A-10 which has been specifically requested by the Defense Department, and what is proposed to spend on a much older and less useful aircraft, the A-7 that has not been requested by the Defense Department.

I offer the RECORD, and ask unanimous consent to have printed, a comparison of the amounts which are provided in the bill for the different airplanes and a table showing the amounts if cuts are distributed proportionately.

There being no objection, the comparison was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Dollar amounts in millions]			
	Authoriza- tion and house levels	Senate committee level	Cut (percentage)
A-10	\$159.2	\$118.0	25.9
B-1	455.0	399.9	12.1
F-15	757.0	681.0	8.7
A-7D	100.1	100.1	0
Total	1,471.3	1,309.0	11

If all the above aircraft systems shared equally (by percentage i.e., 11% cuts each) the burden of procurement cuts, the following appropriation levels would result:

[In millions]	
A-10 (up 20.1% from committee recommendation)	\$141.7
B-1 (up 1.25% from committee recommendation)	404.9
F-15 (down 2.5% from committee recommendation)	378.7
A-7D (down 11% from committee recommendation)	89.1
Total	+1,309

From the above comparisons, it is clear that both the B-1 and F-15 come reasonably close to suffering an appropriate proportional share of the procurement cuts for aircraft systems. On the other hand, the A-10 would have to be increased substantially (20% higher than the Committee recommended) and the A-7D reduced substantially (11% below the Committee's recommendation) if true parity is to be achieved.

Mr. MATHIAS. I yield to my colleague from Maryland.

Mr. BEALL. I thank my colleague from Maryland for yielding.

I rise in support of his amendment. I think he has made an excellent point that we should pay some attention in this debate to the requests from the Department of Defense.

I would suggest as this bill goes to conference, the conferees will recognize that

if there are going to be cuts they should be shared equitably among all the procurers of airplanes.

Mr. President, I would like to join my distinguished colleague, Mr. MATHIAS, in expressing my strong disapproval of the recommended reductions in the A-10 program. I understand and fully support the committee's desire to cut the fiscal year 1975 budget. I believe, however, that all segments of the Federal budget must share an equal burden in our effort to overcome the serious double digit inflation which continues to threaten the economic health of our Nation.

But, Mr. President, I do not believe that the A-10 program should be slashed 25.9 percent while other programs of dubious value and effectiveness, such as the A-7D, continue to receive full funding. The A-7 was a good aircraft, in its day, but I believe the time has come for us to move forward to the newer, more versatile A-10. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has stated that the A-10 will help form the core of the force structure for the Tactical Air Command in the next decade.

There are two additional points I would like to make in this debate:

First. Now that the A-10 has been extensively flight-tested, it is far more economical to produce the aircraft in large numbers. The committee cutback would reduce the number of aircraft produced in fiscal year 1975 from 30 to 20, thus increasing the per unit cost.

Second. During his testimony before the House Appropriation Committee, Defense Secretary Schlesinger strongly objected to Congress "thrusting" money on the Pentagon for projects it has not requested such as the A-7. In fact, the administration has not requested funding for the A-7 program for the last several years.

Mr. President, I support a strong national defense because I believe that it contributes to our national security as well as world peace. If we expect to get efficient use out of our defense dollar we must stop wasting them on outdated equipment and purchase instead modern-effective weapons that will make the free world more secure.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I would ask if the managers will give us some light on this subject.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I understand what the Senator really wants to do is not to increase appropriation, but transfer some item, the item on the A-10, take how many million out of that?

Mr. MATHIAS. Ten million.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Ten million out of that and place it on another plane, the A-7?

Mr. MATHIAS. From the A-7 to the A-10.

Mr. McCLELLAN. From the A-7 to the A-10.

Well, I do not know, Mr. President, this is a matter that should be considered, of course, by the full committee.

I would say this, as the Senator knows, frequently the Department of Defense asks for reprogramming, and if it finds that it needs more on the plane the Senator is interested in and submits a reprogramming request to the Appropria-

tions Committee, all I can say for this one is that it will be given most careful consideration.

We do not always approve every request they make, but if there is justification for it and they feel this plane ought to have more impetus, needs more appropriation, and it could take it from the other without injustice, I would not have any objection.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, since that is exactly the situation, since there was a large budget request for the A-10, I would assume our chairman is telling us that in conference he would take a similar view of that situation.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Certainly, I have an open mind on it. The Senator will understand we will try.

You see what has happened here today, we tried to find places to reduce this budget.

I have said many times, I do not see that where we made the cuts necessarily was always the best, but we did our best. If the Department of Defense would come and show us that within the appropriations made, it needed or would be wiser to spend some of the money here than there where we appropriated, within bounds, I would consider it.

Mr. MATHIAS. I have already discussed this question with the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, the ranking minority member, and I know how he would feel in conference.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, the A-10 is an excellent plane, it competes with the A-9, in the flyout test it won.

I think this will be in conference and I am sure I will give it sympathetic consideration.

I do not think we made a perfect job saying how much money should be spent for each plane, but this will be in conference.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I believe the decision to reduce funding for the A-10 program is a serious mistake, for the following reasons:

First. The importance for effective close air support was demonstrated by the experience of the October war in the Middle East. Only a truly survivable aircraft—one of high performance at low altitudes will suit modern requirements.

Second. The A-10 was explicitly designed to suit this need. Its excellence has been demonstrated in an exhaustive series of tests.

Third. The Air Force has a well-documented, urgent need to replace the World War II vintage, propeller-driven aircraft such as the A-1, with modern aircraft needed to provide infantrymen with adequate protection under modern battlefield conditions. This means we must speed the production of the A-10.

The proposed reduction in outlays for the A-10 this year would result in an improvident delay in the deployment of this plane in the quantities necessary to maintain a high level of effectiveness.

I join the Senator from Maryland in urging restoration of adequate funding.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, in Senator MATHIAS' comments, he has noted the importance of the A-10 program.

In the Armed Services Committee, we

gave the A-10 a thorough and complete evaluation. We asked for the results of the A-10/A-7D fly-off. These were presented, with the A-10 clearly winning the fly-off for the close air support mission.

Gentlemen, I will not attempt to address the need for the A-7D in the Air National Guard, but I would like to assure you that in the A-10 this country is developing an outstanding aircraft to meet an important mission.

In this country, few systems have been developed that so closely met all their requirements within the prescribed costs. All the contracts are in place to keep these costs and schedules under control on both the aircraft system and the supporting ammunition. Let us not disrupt that by starting, stopping, and delaying a well-run program that fills an important need in our Nation.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I fully subscribe to the comments of Senators MATHIAS and BEALL. I fully support the action of the Appropriations Committee to reduce by an overall 5.1 percent this year's appropriation for the Defense budget; however, I believe where reductions are made for solely budgetary reasons and where a specific weapons system has amply demonstrated its ability to perform the assigned mission in a cost effective manner, such weapons systems should not be unduly reduced.

The specific case here is the A-10 program, the prime contract for which is being carried out by Fairchild Industries. The A-10 has won, hands down, two fly offs, has experienced no cost overruns and is a weapons system that, as amply proved from the lessons learned in the most recent war in the Middle East, will be an essential element of the tactical air force when it enters the Air Force's active inventory. In addition, the introduction of this aircraft into the active inventory will enable the release of modern aircraft that are much needed into the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.

The Appropriations Committee reduced this program's procurement by 10 aircraft or \$41.2 million, which is a percentage of roughly 25 percent. This percentage is considerably above any reduction in certain other Air Force aircraft programs, and in my judgment, in a case such as the A-10 program which is not experiencing development problems or cost overruns, it would be a far more even-handed approach to reduce the program on a percentage similar to other programs. I hope that the conferees appointed for this bill will take this into consideration and make the reductions equitable. Such action, of course, would not involve the adding of more money to the total bill before us.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, in view of the sentiments expressed by the distinguished managers of the bill, I would withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.

Mr. EAGLETON. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask that the pending business be laid aside for an amendment which I have at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report it.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 14, line 16, strike out "\$285,700,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$309,300,000".

Mr. TOWER. Very briefly, Mr. President, this amendment—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will observe that there is no time remaining.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be extended for 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TOWER. By way of explanation, Mr. President, this simply does two things. It replaces the helicopter given to the South Vietnamese, places them in the Army inventory, and keeps the production line open, because there is no other existing line, and it enables us to continue sales and competition.

Mr. McCLELLAN. It was not our intention to close down any assembly line, but we did this year. Last year we put in money for the airplane to keep that line going. This year we did not put it in.

I just cannot go along with that this year because there is no budget for it and we have cut and cut.

But out of deference to the situation here, I am advised that it will require, and that the Department of Defense wants, \$18.5 million in order to keep this production line open and keep it going.

On that understanding, I am willing to accept the amendment and take it to conference.

Mr. TOWER. I accept that assurance.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If the amendment is modified to \$18.5 million.

Mr. TOWER. I accept the modification suggested by the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I am happy to join my colleagues in supporting this amendment by the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON).

Clearly, Government spending has to be reduced if we are to combat inflation with actions and not merely words. And this battle cannot be won unless the good soldiers in the Pentagon do their part.

The people of Iowa and, I believe,

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across the Nation, overwhelmingly favor cuts in military spending.

Economic good sense requires it.

And careful attention to the facts of America's military strength makes it possible.

As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am well aware of numerous examples of waste, inefficiency, and overkill in this Defense budget. Important cuts have already been made during the authorization and appropriation process. Regrettably, other reductions which I favored were put to a vote and failed to receive majority support.

Those matters are not at issue now. Whether or not we can agree on specific line item reductions, we can certainly agree that there is still a billion dollars worth of flexibility or padding in this budget.

Under this amendment, the Secretary of Defense would have to make the hard choices, avoided until now, on which additional activities are only marginal, which programs can be slowed down or deferred until later.

Even with an \$81 billion ceiling, we could still have sufficient capability to deter any attack. Our arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons remains three times that of the Soviet Union. Our nuclear submarines remain invulnerable. We will continue to build and buy the most modern weapons—although we have a disturbing tendency to sacrifice quantity for only marginally better quality.

None of this muscle would be cut if we had an \$81 billion ceiling. Instead, the Pentagon would have to do what every other agency of Government is doing, and what every hard-pressed American family is doing.

The American economy is caught in the vise-grip of inflation and recession. The remedy for inflation is reduced spending; to overcome the recession, we need job creation.

Defense spending makes both of these problems worse, for it produces goods which consumers cannot buy and it adds less than other Government spending to increased employment and productive capacity. Most economists agree that more jobs would be created, and our economy put on a sounder base in the future, by directing spending away from the military and into more socially useful programs such as education, housing, and health.

As Yale Prof. Bruce Russett concluded after studying the relation of Defense spending to the economy over the past 30 years:

An extra dollar for defense in any one year has, on the average, reduced investment by 29 cents and the level of output in the economy has been permanently diminished by the order of six or seven cents per year for each defense dollar.

If invested, he points out, that dollar would have produced 25 percent more in additional production, in perpetuity.

After all, the strength of America does not rest in its weapons alone. Our national security also depends upon the health and well-being of our people, the vitality of our economy, the preservation of our freedoms, and the removal of the

vast inequities which deny quality living to large segments of our population.

We have been so obsessed by the threat of external attack that we have ignored or neglected the clear signs of our internal stagnation and decay. Families which are struggling to pay skyrocketing bills for food, clothing, housing, and education are nevertheless taxed hundreds of dollars each year to prepare for hypothetical contingencies in dozens of countries around the globe.

We have become prisoners of fear, rather than hopeful workers for a truly peaceful world.

Our defense planners have gone largely unchallenged, and the end result has been a military-technological-budgetary spiral that takes more from our pocketbooks and gives us less real security in the long run.

We can take up this challenge. We can demand a more prudent Defense budget which preserves our military strength without weakening the society to be defended.

The amendment before us now gives us another opportunity to move toward this goal.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the problem of rising Federal expenditures is no where more dramatically presented than in the budget for national defense. A strong American Defense Establishment has proved necessary to the safety of our people, and the preservation of world peace. But principles of fiscal prudence demand that in defense, as in all other areas of Federal spending, unnecessary Federal expenditures be cut from the budget.

My distinguished colleague from Missouri, Senator EAGLETON, has proposed that the level of defense funding in the appropriations bill pending before us today be restricted to \$81 billion. His proposal would set the level of defense spending \$1.2 billion below the \$82.1 billion recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. It would still allow an increase of \$3.1 billion from the level of appropriations in the last fiscal year.

Whether or not a defense spending level of \$81 billion is sound depends on two kinds of considerations—whether or not that gross figure reflects an appropriate allocation of national resources compared with other Federal programs, and whether or not the specific reductions in defense activities which would have resulted from the funding level are justified. I believe that the case has been made for the \$81 billion funding level on both these grounds.

From the standpoint of total national priorities, the prudent reduction proposed by Senator EAGLETON makes sense.

Of the \$140 billion of this year's fiscal budget which is controllable by the regular appropriations process, well over half will go to national defense. National security is certainly a high-priority need, but there are others. Just as we must be prepared to pare down spending for social programs to an appropriate level within the total budget amount, we must be prepared to make tough budgetary choices in the area of defense. A reduction of defense funding to \$81 billion

would still allocate 27 percent of the entire Federal budget, and 57 percent of controllable funding, to this purpose.

And with respect to specific cuts, I believe that the careful analysis of the defense budget reveals that additional saving from the level recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee can be justified.

The underlying case for a substantial defense spending reduction has already been made by the Appropriations Committee in its current recommendations to the Senate. That committee, and its Subcommittee on Defense, both chaired by the able Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) have made a compelling argument for the \$5 billion reduction it proposes from the level of the budget request.

In presenting this amendment calling for the \$81 billion level, however, Senator EAGLETON has argued that additional, specific cuts are justified. He points out, for instance, that the \$1.2 billion reduction in defense spending could be accomplished by cuts that can be attributed to 10 specific defense programs. This analysis concludes, in fact, that over \$2 billion in additional savings can be achieved—more than enough to meet the \$81 billion ceiling. I do not agree with Senator EAGLETON on all these proposals.

But, earlier this year, on May 30, 1974, I had occasion to prepare my own analysis of the Defense budget in preparation for a debate sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute on defense spending. At that time, I concluded that significant additional reductions amounting to at least \$5 billion would not be unreasonable, and would certainly not be unsafe to our national interests. Among the examples I cited at that time were cuts in manpower costs; cuts in spending for conventional weapons for general purpose forces; through elimination of "gold plating" weapons with expensive and unnecessary "extras," and increased emphasis on less expensive weapons systems; cuts in strategic weapons spending, including costly programs for development of the B-1 bomber and counterforce capability of our long-range missiles; and cuts in wasteful foreign military assistance. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the statement I made to the American Enterprise Institute on May 30, containing this analysis, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MUSKIE. Our consideration of appropriations bills this year, and my endorsement of an \$81 billion defense spending level proposed in this amendment, must of necessity be made without the benefit of the budget review process. That newly established process will be based on detailed analysis of the individual components of the budget, and comprehensive study of the effects of specific ceiling levels on the ability of the Government to meet its responsibilities to the American people. The budget review process now being implemented, which will be fully effective for the fiscal year 1977 budget, will be based on a year-

long, and continuing analysis that will provide us with the information to allow us to make judgments about whether specific budget cuts are appropriate and effective.

A "ceiling" approach to budget cuts, without the background of that analysis, must be based on a careful balance of the information we do have available now. The most important component of our existing budget decisionmaking process is the work of the Appropriations Committee. But the report of the Appropriations Committee, of course, should not be the last word in the Senate on the spending level we approve. It is perfectly appropriate that the committee's proposals should be open to review, and subject to revision or approval by the Senate as a whole. In the debate on this defense appropriations bill, and the amendment proposed by Senator EAGLETON, I believe a case has been made for a deeper defense budget cut than that committee recommends.

EXHIBIT 1

MAY 30, 1974.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE

Earlier this year, I spoke at the U.S. Naval Academy on the subject of our foreign policy. My thesis was that the United States is on the verge of a new coherence in its foreign policy, a new sense of direction and common purpose, and a restoration of the bipartisan tradition in America's foreign relations.

This restored bipartisanship, I argued, is based on a broad popular consensus on four fundamental principles of American foreign policy: first, that an isolationist policy is not a viable option for America; second, that the general direction of détente with the Soviet Union and China is an important American interest; third, that our alliances with Europe and Japan are still vital, notwithstanding progress toward détente, and should be emphasized; and fourth, that our policies must reflect the growing interdependence between the developed and underdeveloped world.

A foreign policy based on these principles requires that America be strong militarily. I believe in a strong national defense. The issue in this debate is not whether America should be strong or weak—rather, it is whether the Congress can make any significant cuts in the Administration's defense spending request for fiscal year 1975 without undermining our security interests or our foreign policy objectives. I am prepared to argue that it can.

The President's total budget request for FY 1975 is \$304.4 billion. Of that, \$141.8 billion is controllable by Congress through the regular appropriations process. Of this portion of the budget which Congress can control, well over half goes to national defense. That is a sizeable amount. Fiscal conservatives who have spoken eloquently on the tendency of government to overspend—and of modern bureaucracies to develop their own entrenched interests—should surely look with some skepticism at a defense budget of this magnitude.

Economists may disagree among themselves on how large the federal budget should be in a particular year—whether we should have a budgetary surplus or deficit, and how large the balance or shortfall should be. But within any given budget ceiling, we politicians cannot look to economists to tell us how to order our budgetary priorities. That is an obligation we have as representatives of the people, and how we make decisions on budgetary priorities affects not only our own political futures but, far more impor-

tant, the future well-being of the entire nation.

It is the job of the President to propose a distribution of federal priorities, and it is the responsibility of the Congress actually to make the hard choices. The Congress, through the appropriations process, must decide how much to spend on defense; how much federal assistance to give to state and local governments; how much assistance should go to health, transportation, education, or environmental improvement.

Congress has the responsibility to make spending decisions which reflect the needs of the people. The nation's security is certainly a high-priority need, but there are others: federal funding for education is now only \$7.5 billion; funding for drug abuse enforcement and prevention is only \$750 million; for community development and housing, only \$6.4 billion; for pollution control, only \$700 million; for energy research, only \$2.1 billion. Compare these figures to the Administration's defense budget of \$92.6 billion.

In ordering our budget priorities, the Congress must be prepared to trim back in one category in order to increase spending in another. My own view is that significant cuts can be made in the President's proposed defense budget for FY 1975 which would free up several billion dollars of additional resources for helping to reduce the present tax burden, for reallocating to other areas of the federal budget, or possibly for both.

There is a pernicious view among those who habitually oppose cuts in defense spending reflected in the oft-heard slogan "Where national security is concerned, money is no object." This is a fine-sounding platitude, but the fact is that our total resources are always limited and must be allocated among many competing needs in our society. The nation has always compromised on national defense—even in wartime.

So tough budgetary choices must inevitably be made in defense, as in all areas of federal expenditure. While no President or Congress wishes to shortchange the defense effort, the unavoidable fact is that our society has other needs besides military power. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara expressed it well when he said some years ago: "I do not mean to suggest that we can measure national security in terms of dollars—you cannot price what is inherently priceless.

But if we are to avoid talking in generalities, we must talk about dollars. For policy decisions must sooner or later be expressed in the form of budget decisions on where to spend and how much."

THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

The Nixon Administration has proposed to Congress the largest peacetime military budget in our history. The total request for the Department of Defense is \$92.6 billion. To this figure, one can legitimately add the military budget within the AEC—for nuclear weapons programs and the like—which amounts to over \$3 billion, and some additional funds used by other agencies for defense-related purposes. For purposes of this debate, however, I will use the Defense Department's own figure of \$92.6 billion as the total request for FY 1975.

This spending request is an increase of about \$10 billion over last year's request: a \$10 billion increase notwithstanding the fact that we have withdrawn from Vietnam—the costliest war in our history; notwithstanding the fact that we have an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union and that we have entered into a new era of negotiation; and notwithstanding the fact that the Nixon Doctrine calls for a much less interventionist foreign policy than we have had in the past.

Only recently President Nixon sent to the

Congress a message, accompanying the Report of his Council of Economic Advisers, in which he said: "Too much government spending is the spark that most often sets off inflationary explosions. . . . We must work together to cut where we safely can. We must so discipline our present decisions that they do not commit us to excessive spending in the future." What I propose is that we apply the President's tests to the defense budget.

Secretary Schlesinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February that this year's defense budget request in real terms "means doing no more than holding our own as compared to 1974." The basis for this remark is that the difference between the FY 1975 request of \$92.6 billion and the FY 1974 budget of \$87.1 billion—an increase of \$5.5 billion—is barely enough to cover pay and price increases. Technically, the Defense Department's figures are correct—except that there has been some dubious manipulations of the statistical data.

The figure used by the Defense Department as representing the 1974 defense budget includes two items which really do not make sense for comparative purposes with respect to the FY 1975 request. The first of these is last year's \$2.2 billion emergency aid to Israel. This figure is not a direct part of U.S. defense costs, and the Defense Department has already announced that Israel will be expected to pay back \$1.2 billion of this arms aid. As a one-shot aid effort, these funds should be subtracted from the FY 1974 defense figure so as to provide a fairer comparison to the FY 1975 request which includes no such amount for Israel.

The second statistical manipulation which serves to inflate the FY 1974 budget is the retroactive inclusion of \$2.1 billion contained in the Supplemental Appropriations request for purposes of buying new capability. Normally, Supplementals are reserved for such things as emergencies or cost overruns. Out of the total Supplemental request of \$6.2 billion for defense, several billion dollars can legitimately be considered part of the FY 1974 budget—including, for example, a \$3.4 billion figure for pay increases. But \$2.1 billion of the Supplemental request is intended to increase inventory items such as ammunition and other supplies, increase airlift capability, accelerate production of the Trident submarine and, in Secretary Schlesinger's words, to "buy certain high-value weapons and equipment which are now in short supply in our Services." These funds clearly represent an increase in real defense resources and should require a new authorization. This kind of request is normally submitted in the regular budget as a new proposal, rather than in a Supplemental.

Despite the attempted distortion, the FY 1975 request is still higher in absolute terms than any peacetime military budget in our history. The Administration has attempted to create the impression that this increase results largely from military pay and the cost of the volunteer force. But compared to FY 1974, other areas of the budget have been increased even more: procurement is up 23.4 percent; research, development, test and evaluation is up 15.9 percent; and operation and maintenance is up 13.7 percent. By contrast, the costs for active duty military personnel have increased only 6.5 percent. If the volunteer force were terminated, no more than \$750 million would be saved.

Finally, I should point out that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated last February before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that outlays for defense "might have been a billion or a billion-and-a-half dollars less in 1975" were it not for the fact that additional spending was deemed necessary to stimulate the economy. I do not believe that increased defense spending—which is not essential to our security—is the wisest fiscal tool for stimulating our economy. This is so for several reasons: First,

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military spending is generally slower in impact than increasing other programs because of built-in lags necessary for cost-effective contracting. Second, countercyclical spending is less desirable through the Defense Department than through other agencies, because it cannot be targeted to particular geographic depressed areas as effectively. Third, military spending goes largely to industries employing skilled, well-paid workers, whereas unemployment is most severe among unskilled, low-income people. Fourth, military spending as a stimulus to the economy is particularly wasteful, because instead of creating social capital and providing services vitally needed in our states, cities and rural communities, it creates only superfluous military hardware.

When economic circumstances require a stimulus, a more effective and fairer way to pump demand into the economy would be to put extra spending power directly into the hands of working people who are hardest hit by both recession and inflation. This could be done through expanded and extended unemployment compensation benefits, public employment programs in hard-hit localities, a temporary reduction of the social security withholding rate or a reduction in income taxes in the lowest brackets.

WHERE CUTS CAN BE MADE

The format of this debate will not permit a detailed analysis of the defense budget or a systematic presentation of budget alternatives. There are a number of public policy organizations which have done excellent work in this field—and their proposed cuts range as high as \$15 billion. I believe that reductions amounting to at least five billion dollars are not unreasonable—and certainly not unsafe.

Let me give some specific examples. First, in the area of manpower costs, which amount to over 55% of the total defense budget: The number of men in uniform has been dropping in recent years, in line with our withdrawal from Vietnam, the growing strength of our allies, and our new determination to avoid military involvement in regions which are not vital to American interests.

Still, far too many military personnel are involved in performing direct or indirect support tasks such as administration, logistics, training, or maintenance. Some of these support troops should be reduced.

Moreover, the U.S. should make significant reductions in the number of troops stationed abroad—bringing these men home and demobilizing them. The United States at present has 480,000 men in foreign countries—300,000 in Europe and 180,000 in the Western Pacific and Asia. We have 35,000 men in Thailand, for no apparent purpose other than possible reinvolvement in Indochina. We have a full division in South Korea, 24 years after the outbreak of the Korean War, even though the South Korean Army already outnumbered the North Korean Army by two-to-one. Our troops in Europe can be pared down as well as our allies assume a greater share of the burden for their own conventional defense. A 25% reduction in U.S. forces overseas would hardly signal an isolationist policy.

This year, the Administration is asking for a further increase in the number of civilian positions in the Defense Department even though there are already over 1.1 million such employees—nearly one civilian for every two in uniform. Excluding the Postal Service, the Department of Defense has roughly as many civilians as all other federal agencies combined.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has already recommended a two percent cut in military manpower and a four percent cut in the civilian bureaucracy this year. I would recommend additional manpower cuts beyond this, emphasizing reductions in support

troops and civilian bureaucrats, saving our taxpayers well over two billion dollars in payroll and attendant operation and maintenance costs.

Moreover, it is time that something be done about "grade creep" in the military. Surely it is not essential to our nation's security to have more field grade and flag officers to command a force of 2.2 million men today than we had in 1945 to command a force of 12.1 million. Nor is our security enhanced by having 400,000 more sergeants than there are privates in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps doesn't have this problem—it has twice as many second lieutenants as lieutenant colonels and 23,000 more privates than sergeants. If our Armed Services had the same grade structure today as they did in 1964, we would save about \$700 million annually.

Second, in the area of conventional weapons systems for our General Purpose Forces: Here, defense planners have gradually moved toward what is called a high-low mix—certain very expensive, maximum-capability weapons systems complemented by less expensive and less-capable alternatives. I welcome the trend toward less expensive alternatives at the lower end of the mix. Past procurement trends have been too spend-thrift, favoring new weapons systems equipped with all the most advanced technologies regardless of expense, even when gains in performance were marginal.

For example, new fighters like the F-14 cost 15-25 times what the jets of the Korean War cost. Even taking into account inflation, a Korean War sabrejet would cost about \$690,000 today—which happens to be about the same price as the average total cost of the new Phoenix air-to-air missile being placed on the F-14 fighter. This tendency to goldplate new weapons systems out of proportion to real military necessity must be controlled.

Substantial savings—ranging from one to four billion dollars—could be realized by stretching out procurement of more expensive weapons systems at the higher end of the mix and by emphasizing the lower end of the mix where possible. Examples of expensive weapons systems for which procurement should be stretched out include the SSN-688 nuclear attack submarine and the DD-963 destroyer. Systems which might be cancelled altogether include AWACS, the Navy's F-14 aircraft program and the Phoenix missile being developed for it, and the Army's renewed proposal for the Main Battle Tank (XM-1)—which the Congress wisely killed in 1971. Examples of weapons systems at the lower end of the mix which should be emphasized are the patrol frigate, the sea control ship and the VFX "austere" carrier aircraft proposal.

While the Pentagon has made much of the alleged decline of our conventional forces since the mid-sixties the truth is that our "peacetime" force for the seventies though quantitatively somewhat smaller is qualitatively far more powerful than in the mid-sixties. We maintain essentially the same number of tactical air wings. The Navy has the same number of attack carriers and three times as many attack submarines.

The small decrease in the number of ground divisions from 19½ to 16 during the last ten years has reflected deactivation of forces remaining from the earlier Berlin buildup and abandonment of plans to fight 2½ land wars simultaneously in Asia and Europe. Given this perspective, the cries of alarm about the alleged decline of our conventional power should be viewed with skepticism.

Third, I believe that cuts can be made in the budget for strategic weapons systems. I recognize that strategic forces account for only about 20 percent of the U.S. defense budget. But we are engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union designed to stabilize

and hopefully to achieve reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems. We need not accelerate our own weapons development at this time on the theory that this would strengthen our position at the negotiating table.

I am not suggesting unilateral reductions in the strategic defense budget which might undermine an overall equality between ourselves and the Soviet Union. I support a limited Trident submarine program—although the pace of its development should not be geared to producing bargaining chips in the SALT negotiations. I also support the Navy's request for funds to develop a smaller submarine to succeed our present Polaris/Poseidon force. Our undersea deterrent is the backbone of our strategic nuclear forces.

But I have serious doubts about the directions being taken in our strategic bomber programs. The B-1 bomber is a typical example of a goldplated weapon system in financial difficulty. The unit cost of these planes has been rising steadily—now amounting to over \$60 million per plane. I am concerned as to whether its ability to penetrate enemy airspace might be outpaced by advances in air defense technology before the aircraft is ready for development. My own preference would be for the Air Force to develop a less expensive stand-off bomber capable of firing its missiles from a position outside of enemy territory. Cancellation of the B-1 bomber program would save \$500 million this year.

I also have serious questions about the Administration's relatively modest request for development funds to improve the counterforce capabilities of our strategic missile forces. These funds are to implement Secretary Schlesinger's new strategy, involving improvements or changes in the targeting, the command and control, the accuracy, and the yield of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.

The military reason for this change is the assumed need to fill a perceived "gap" at the lower end of the spectrum of strategic nuclear deterrence. Along with this, there is the requirement, often mentioned by President Nixon, to multiply the options available to national leaders in the event deterrence fails. Both of these requirements can be satisfied, we are told, by the institution of greater flexibility in our targeting capability and in our hardware. With more rapid retargeting, with greater terminal accuracy, and with greater warhead yield, national leaders will obtain the ability to fight controlled or limited nuclear war by concentrating, if deterrence fails, on so-called military targets in a tit-for-tat fashion. This capacity, it is said, will also enhance the psychology or credibility of deterrence.

On the political side, a paradigmatic function is claimed for the recommended changes in U.S. strategic forces. Their advent is expected to sabote Soviet leaders of any notions that they may have that their new missile programs (the SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18, and SS-X-19) will gain them a commanding lead in strategic weapons, assuming that this is their perception or motivation in this matter. If the Soviets see our willingness to commit our long lead in technology to the arms race, so the scenario runs, they will give up their own programs and negotiate more productively in the strategic arms limitation talks. Further, it is anticipated, this U.S. posture will reassure our friends and allies, convincing them that they can continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella despite Soviet buildups.

I feel certain that there are few, if any, members of Congress who doubt the desirability of improving our command and control systems and our retargeting capacity. What causes concern are improvements in accuracy and yield, especially simultaneous improvements in these areas. Here I would like to recall the previous and emphatic statements of this Administration, both

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President Nixon and former Secretary Laird, that the U.S. would resist any initiative that gave even "the appearance" of going for a first-strike or "silo-smashing" nuclear force, because it would be destabilizing and provocative. Accuracy and yield improvements, of course, give precisely this appearance. Thus, it is crucial that we know what now prompts this dramatic reversal in national policy.

A question also arises as to what price the U.S. will have to pay to get the increments of security which yield and terminal accuracy improvements are said to give us.

What are the system-life costs of these programs? Can we be sure that we are really getting a greater degree of safety and security for our money? Or are we in fact buying programs which will increase the risk of nuclear war rather than diminish it?

The initial cost of following Secretary Schlesinger's recommendations for providing such options—new warheads, new guidance systems, and advanced work on a new ICBM—is not large in relation to other defense costs. The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved \$77 million for research and development in three programs: \$32 million for accuracy improvements of the Minuteman; \$25 million to increase the yield of Minuteman warheads; and \$20 million for MARV (maneuverable reentry vehicles). But these relatively modest funds could be the opening wedge for programs which in time could cost billions. I believe we should scrutinize this proposal carefully before appropriating these funds this year.

Finally, there is the Administration's request for military assistance funds for foreign countries—amounting to nearly \$3 billion. I believe that at least \$1 billion can be cut from that figure, with more than half coming out of the Administration's \$1.45 billion request for Vietnam. The American people have been led to believe that our involvement in Southeast Asia is at an end, and yet our continued assistance to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is extraordinary. It is time that we ask tough questions concerning the relationship between all military assistance and our real foreign policy objectives.

To summarize, I believe that some cuts can be safely made in these four areas of the Administration's defense spending request for FY 1975: manpower, conventional weapons, strategic weapons, and military assistance. Such reductions can be made, in my view, without jeopardizing our national security or our overall foreign policy objectives.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON).

The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 37, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 375 Leg.]

YEAS—37

Abourezk
Bayh
Biden
Burdick
Church
Clark
Cranston
Eagleton
Fulbright
Hart
Haskell
Hatfield
Hathaway

Hughes
Humphrey
Javits
Kennedy
Mansfield
Mathias
Metcalf
Metzenbaum
Mondale
Moss
Muskie
Nelson
Packwood

Pell
Eroxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Roth
Schweiker
Stafford
Stevenson
Symington
Tunney
Williams

NAYS—55

Aiken
Allen
Baker
Bartlett
Beall
Bellmon
Bentsen
Bible
Brock
Brooke
Buckley
Byrd,
Harry F., Jr.
Byrd, Robert C.
Cannon
Chiles
Coke
Cotton
Curtis

Dole
Domenici
Dominick
Eastland
Ervin
Fannin
Fong
Goldwater
Griffin
Gurney
Hansen
Helms
Hollings
Hruska
Huddleston
Inouye
Jackson
Johnston
Long

Magnuson
McClellan
McClure
McIntyre
Montoya
Nunn
Pastore
Pearson
Scott, Hugh
Scott,
William L.
Stennis
Stevens
Taft
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Weicker
Young

NOT VOTING—8

Bennett
Case
Gravel

Hartke
McGee
McGovern

Percy
Sparkman

So Mr. EAGLETON's amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. MCCLELLAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, it is certainly no secret that the U.S. economy is the major problem facing our Nation. Furthermore, it is certainly no secret that the U.S. economy is a complex mechanism, with many parts, some of which are currently sending out contradictory signals.

We appear trapped in an economic morass, unable to find our way out of an Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere which provides only more mazes and more confusion.

I believe, along with others, that no one policy, no single action can resolve our problems and alone restore our economy to stability and prosperity. For that reason, I recently joined with four of my colleagues in proposing a domestic summit conference on the economy—a conference which would design a set of recommendations, a policy package, to deal with the various needs in our economy. Such a conference—and such an integral approach to our problems—is, I believe, imperative, and I am pleased that President Ford has decided to hold such a summit and that preparations, some of which were announced yesterday, are underway.

That conference is however, some weeks off, and during those weeks the Senate will have not only the opportunity, but also the responsibility to examine closely one aspect of our economy—Federal spending. During those

weeks the Senate will be considering a number of appropriations bills for fiscal 1975—including the two largest bills—the defense appropriation before us now and the Labor-Health, Education, and Welfare bill to come after the impending recess.

While the Senate has indicated support for a \$295 billion ceiling on fiscal 1975 appropriations—which represents a reduction of some \$10 billion in the budget request—recent tabulations suggest we are approximately \$1 billion over the budget as a result of actions already taken and yet to come are the two major funding bills—the two bills which must be considered the principal potential obstacles to spending reductions. This is where a true test comes. This is where Congress can either demonstrate its ability to come to grips with budgetary matters or reveal its inability to make hard choices, to determine priorities among the proposals before us.

I believe we have a good chance of proving our ability. The budget request for defense was over \$87 billion—more than one-fourth of the entire budget request. The House reduced this to \$82.9 billion and the Senate Appropriations Committee to \$81.5 billion—some \$5.5 billion below the budget request.

I believe the entire Appropriations Committee and especially its distinguished chairman, the Senator from Arkansas, who also heads the Defense subcommittee, are to be highly commended. Not only have they tackled the difficult job of reducing Federal spending but they also tackled it in one of the two most difficult budget-cutting areas.

Furthermore, they have cut in a responsible and reasonable manner. In recent weeks, a number of efforts to reduce spending on an across-the-board basis have been made. I have been associated with these efforts. Some have characterized this as a meat-ax approach, and that characterization is, to some extent, true. When applied to a single bill, it fails to differentiate among those programs which can withstand reductions and those that will be severely damaged by them. When applied to a number of bills it fails to differentiate among those that have been subjected to close scrutiny and frugal considerations and those which have not. Yet, in many cases, when reductions must be made, such an approach is the only tool available, the only means of achieving one's desired ends.

We can, however, I believe, be pleased that we do not have to apply such an approach to the defense appropriations bill. This bill deals with the security of our country—the responsibility which rests at the heart of this and every other government in the world. It involves programs and strategies which must be examined and evaluated one by one. Fortunately, that is what has been done in this case.

The subcommittee and the committee took some significant actions which are likely to affect not only this appropriations bill but a number of defense appropriations bills in years to come.

It went straight to the core of a major cost item—U.S. troops stationed overseas. I, for one, do not believe we can bring every American troop home from

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abroad and I recognize the very serious consequences of undermining the European troop reduction talks or the status quo in Europe. At the same time, I am cognizant of the very high financial cost imposed by the maintenance of forces abroad and the apparent lack of a comprehensive plan for determining the number of troops which are needed there. I share the committee's conclusion that reductions can take place and I believe the proposed 25,000 reduction by March 31, 1975, is a good initial step.

I also share the committee's concern over the proliferation and seeming duplication of missiles. The committee request for detailed information on the various missiles before the next budget is presented and before the next fiscal year begins should provide a fruitful area for examination and should lead to efficiency and economy in the development and procurement of weapons.

Elimination of the duplication of test facilities also bears further investigation.

Finally, the departments of government—and not only Defense—will have to learn—as the American consumer is doing—to consider the impact of inflation. Inflation has far-reaching consequences and we must seek to evaluate it in a consistent way, as the committee report mandates.

For these reasons—the substantial reductions made in committee, the concerns expressed in the committee report, and the indication that additional, more detailed examination of costly defense items will be forthcoming—I have decided to support the committee recommendation. This is not to suggest that it would be impossible to squeeze out another dollar here and there or that the committee should relax its future efforts to curtail spending. But, this position is taken in recognition of the outstanding work which has been done and in the hope of more of the same to come.

The defense appropriations bill involves many programs, many policies. It involves our concepts of parity and nuclear strategy and our efforts to save the world, including ourselves, from a horrendous destruction. It involves our conventional forces who must protect us from any who might seek to intimidate or influence us with nonnuclear military power. It involves our efforts to insure open seas both for our protection and our economic well-being.

We cannot afford to misunderstand or underestimate these needs. But neither can we afford idle and inefficient expenditures. The secret is finding the proper balance. I believe the pending bill moves in the right direction and offers even greater hope for the years to come.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Mr. McCLELLAN, a question concerning the report language dealing with military sales to foreign countries, which appears on pages 15 and 16 of the defense appropriations bill report.

The report language emphasizes the "political and economic impact of foreign military sales of the United States and recipient foreign countries." The committee expressed particular concern

"that long-term security interests of the United States might be jeopardized by large cash sales of sophisticated weapons systems in areas of potential conflict." The report continued:

Recent arms sales to the Middle East, Greece, and Turkey have created severe political, military, and economic repercussions on both the United States and the international community. These conflicts, weakened detente, threaten superpower confrontation, and have profound economic consequences.

Most importantly, the Defense Appropriations Committee concluded that—

At present, Congress has little meaningful statutory control over cash sales which are the largest category of foreign military sales.

The committee henceforth will require:

Prior notification of future cash sales of military equipment to foreign governments which exceed \$25 million; provide for the introduction of new weapon systems to the inventory of foreign armed forces; or when cumulative military cash sales to any foreign government exceed \$50 million in any fiscal year.

Mr. President, as you know significant portions of this reporting procedure parallels language of my amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act which passed the Senate last year, but which was removed in conference along with the majority of the Senate provisions.

While I commend the distinguished chairman for recognizing the potential consequences of these massive sales of arms and for establishing this mechanism whereby the Department of Defense will report to the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee, I still believe that significant features of the Nelson amendment still should be put into law. I intend to reoffer my amendment, but I believe that the appropriate legislation to amend is the Foreign Assistance Act, which will be debated after the Labor Day recess, and not the defense appropriations bill.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I want to thank the distinguished Senator from the State of Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) for his kind words.

The language in the report requiring the Defense Department to give prior notice of certain future cash sales of military equipment to foreign governments merely evidences our concern over the impact of these transactions. The committee felt that it would be desirable to have this information on hand as another factor in making determinations about production and procurement of military weapons. It is certainly not our intention to preempt this field.

I commend the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for his efforts in this area and want to assure him that the committee does not in any way mean to preclude his amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the Department of Defense appropriation bill we are considering today has been cut by \$5½ billion, or 6.3 percent, from the budget request. The level of spending reported in the Senate bill of \$82 billion reflects a "bare bones" expenditure for defense and should be effective in combating inflation. Since inflation is one of the greatest problems in our country to-

day, I feel this appropriation bill is a great step forward in resolving that problem.

EARLY EFFORT

Several weeks ago, the junior Senator from Kansas initiated, led, and participated in several efforts to reduce appropriation bills to hold down Federal spending. Since those efforts began, the Senate has passed the conference reports or Senate versions of five appropriation bills reflecting a reduction of more than \$1 billion from the budget request. During that time, the Senate Appropriation Committee has made an effort to determine our essential priorities and make even greater cuts in Federal spending.

The Senate Appropriation Committee is to be highly commended for their determined efforts to hold down Federal spending and inflation. Their reduction of the defense appropriation bill by \$5½ billion is exemplary. The efforts of the committee will go a long way toward holding down inflation. Because of the committee's efforts in holding defense expenditures to the bare minimum, we are now faced with a whole new picture.

The cut made on the DOD appropriation bill is nearly five times as much as made on all the other appropriation bills put together. It is more than half of the total reduction being sought in the Federal budget this year. At the same time, I would not vote for further increases in the spending under this defense budget.

DEFENSE IS VITAL

Since the Senate Appropriation Committee has reduced spending to the bare minimum level, we should at the same time resist further reductions in the level of spending. As the President recently stated before both Houses of Congress, nothing is more important in this Nation than our national defense. As the President pointed out, we must not recede from our position of parity with the Soviet Union in military strength to a position of No. 2. A recent survey showed that the vast majority of the people in Kansas and across the country are directly opposed to a No. 2 position in military strength.

The \$5½ billion cut by the Senate Appropriation Committee reduces defense spending to the bare minimum. Because of this, I must oppose the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) to cut the defense budget by another \$1 billion. Such a further reduction would weaken our defense posture dangerously and, in all likelihood, would put us in a No. 2 position of military strength in the world. Another \$1 billion cut from the defense budget would threaten our national defense posture. It would also increase the probability of the outbreak of conflicts all around the world. The interest of peace in the world is very great for the United States. We must avoid reducing our defense posture to the point where our own peace and the peace of the world is in danger.

SPECIAL EXPENSES FOR DEFENSE

The inflation factor for defense expenditures is especially high. Fuel costs for the Department of Defense have been especially acute in driving up de-

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fense expenditures. Yet it is obvious that our military vehicles and aircraft cannot function without fuel.

There have been numerous pay increases in the military which have also driven up defense expenditures. Military pay has been made comparable with civilian pay. This measure was passed by Congress and has contributed greatly to rising defense expenditures.

The Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) has indicated that he is disturbed that we are getting much less defense for much more money. While I share the Senator's concern in this matter, I maintain that the way to get more defense for our money is not to take away the money. The way to improve the cost efficiency in our Defense Establishment is for the Congress to take a greater role in the oversight of our defense programs. We must take greater care in establishing priorities for spending to insure that wasteful programs are stopped.

But, Mr. President, we cannot achieve a better and more cost efficient defense by taking away too much money. We are already at a bare minimum spending level and to cut the budget further is inviting disaster.

REDUCTIONS ALREADY MADE

In recent years, numerous cutbacks in our Defense Establishment have already been made. It is my position that we should not maintain an excessively large Defense Establishment. However, it is my position and the position of the people of Kansas and the Nation that we must maintain an adequate defense posture.

From 1968 to 1974, the number of personnel was reduced from 3.6 million to 2.1 million in the Department of Defense. In the same period, the Soviet Union has increased its military strength from 3 million to 3.8 million men. This year, we are planning a 32,000 man reduction in the number of civilian personnel.

In the budget reported to the Senate by the Appropriation Committee, our research and development program in defense has already been reduced to "bare bones." The R. & D. program in defense has been the key to maintaining our military superiority. The \$1 billion reduction proposed by the Senator from Missouri would further reduce our military R. & D. program. Considering the reductions already made, such a cut could be disastrous.

Mr. President, again I support the Senate Appropriation Committee in their efforts in reducing defense expenditures to a bare minimum. I support their efforts and feel that they have been adequate. The Senator would hope that further reductions can be avoided and that an increase from the Senate defense appropriation can be avoided as well in the conference committee.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a 10-minute limitation on the vote on passage of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The bill is open to further amend-

ment. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and the third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, shall it pass?

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 86, nays 5, as follows:

[No. 376 Leg.]
 YEAS—86

Aiken	Ervin	Muskie
Allen	Fannin	Nelson
Baker	Fong	Nunn
Bartlett	Goldwater	Packwood
Bayh	Griffin	Pastore
Beall	Gurney	Pearson
Bellmon	Hansen	Pell
Bentsen	Haskell	Proxmire
Bible	Hathaway	Randolph
Biden	Helms	Ribicoff
Brock	Hollings	Roth
Brooke	Hruska	Schweiker
Buckley	Huddleston	Scott, Hugh
Burdick	Humphrey	Scott,
Byrd,	Inouye	William L.
Harry F. Jr.	Jackson	Stafford
Byrd, Robert C.	Javits	Stennis
Cannon	Johnston	Stevens
Chiles	Kennedy	Stevenson
Church	Long	Symington
Clark	Magnuson	Taft
Cook	Mathias	Talmadge
Cotton	McClellan	Thurmond
Cranston	McClure	Tower
Curtis	McIntyre	Tunney
Dole	Metcalf	Weicker
Domenici	Metzenbaum	Williams
Dominick	Mondale	Young
Eagleton	Montoya	
Eastland	Moss	

NAYS—5

Abourezk	Hatfield	Mansfield
Fulbright	Hughes	

NOT VOTING—9

Bennett	Hart	McGovern
Case	Hartke	Percy
Gravel	McGee	Sparkman

So the bill (H.R. 16243) was passed.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I move that the Senate further insist on its amendments and request a further conference with the House of Representatives on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon; and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the presiding officer appointed Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. COTTON, and Mr. CASE conferees on the part of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on August 20, 1974, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 2510) to establish an Office of Federal Procurement Policy within the Office of Management and Budget, and for other purposes; and today, August 21, 1974, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled joint resolutions:

S.J. Res. 66. A joint resolution to authorize the erection of a monument to the dead of the First Infantry Division, U.S. forces in Vietnam;

S.J. Res. 220. A joint resolution to provide for the reappointment of Dr. William A. M. Burden as citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution;

S.J. Res. 221. A joint resolution to provide for the reappointment of Dr. Caryl P. Haskins as citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution; and

S.J. Res. 222. A joint resolution to provide for the appointment of Dr. Murray Gell-Mann as citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

THE 1980 WINTER OLYMPICS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on Senate Concurrent Resolution 72.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON) laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 72) extending an invitation to the International Olympic Committee to hold the 1980 winter Olympic games at Lake Placid, N.Y., in the United States, and pledging the cooperation and support of the Congress of the United States, which was on page 2, line 1, after "tradition" insert:

: Provided, That Olympic activities and plans in all respects fit within the present laws and adopted State plans, rules, and regulations respecting the entirety of the Adirondack Park; and be it further

Resolved, That Congress shall not support, financially or otherwise, any activities or plans which are in conflict with the letter or spirit of those laws, plans, rules, and regulations, or which would require any modification of them.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House of Representatives.

The motion was agreed to.

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AMTRAK IMPROVEMENT ACT
OF 1974

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 15427.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15427) to amend the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to provide financial assistance to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. TUNNEY, Mr. PEARSON, and Mr. BEALL conferees on the part of the Senate.

YOUTH CONSERVATION CORPS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in behalf of the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 1871.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON) laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 1871) to amend the Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-597, 86 Stat. 1319) to expand and make permanent the Youth Conservation Corps, and for other purposes, as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert: That the Act of August 13, 1970 (84 Stat. 794) is amended to read as follows:

"POLICY AND PURPOSE

SECTION 1. The Congress finds that the Youth Conservation Corps has demonstrated a high degree of success as a pilot program wherein American youth, representing all segments of society, have benefited by gainful employment in the healthy outdoor atmosphere of the national park system, the national forest system, other public land and water areas of the United States and by their employment have developed, enhanced, and maintained the natural resources of the United States, and wherein in so doing the youth have gained an understanding and appreciation of the Nation's environment and heritage equal to one full academic year of study, it is accordingly the purpose of this Act to expand and make permanent the Youth Conservation Corps and thereby further the development and maintenance of the natural resources by America's youth, and in so doing to prepare them for the ultimate responsibility of maintaining and managing these resources for the American people.

"YOUTH CONSERVATION CORPS

"SEC. 2. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there is established in the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture a Youth Conservation Corps (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corps'). The Corps shall consist of young men and women

who are permanent residents of the United States, its territories, possessions, trust territories, or Commonwealth of Puerto Rico who have attained age fifteen but have not attained age nineteen, and whom the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture may employ without regard to the civil service or classification laws, rules, or regulations, for the purpose of developing, preserving, or maintaining the lands and waters of the United States.

"(b) The Corps shall be open to youth from all parts of the country of both sexes and youth of all social, economic, and racial classifications with all Corps members receiving compensation consistent with work accomplished, and with no person being employed as a member of the Corps for a term in excess of ninety days during any single year.

"SECRETARIAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS

"SEC. 3. (a) In carrying out this Act, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall—

"(1) determine the areas under their administrative jurisdictions which are appropriate for carrying out the programs of employees of the Corps;

"(2) determine with other Federal agencies the areas under the administrative jurisdiction of these agencies which are appropriate for carrying out programs involving members of the Corps, and determine and select appropriate work and education programs and projects for participation by members of the Corps;

"(3) determine the rates of pay, hours, and other conditions of employment in the Corps, except that all members of the Corps shall not be deemed to be Federal employees other than for the purpose of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, and chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code;

"(4) provide for such transportation, lodging, subsistence, and other services and equipment as they may deem necessary or appropriate for the needs of members of the Corps in their duties;

"(5) promulgate regulation to insure the safety, health, and welfare of the Corps members; and

"(6) provide to the extent possible, that permanent or semi-permanent facilities used in Corps camps be made available to local schools, school districts, State junior colleges and universities, and other education institutions for use as environmental/ecological education camps during periods of nonuse by the Corps program.

Costs for operations maintenance, and staffing of Corps camp facilities during periods of use by non-Corps programs as well as any liability for personal injury or property damage stemming from such use shall be the responsibility of the entity or organization using the facility and shall not be a responsibility of the Secretaries or the Corps.

"(b) Existing but unoccupied Federal facilities and surplus or unused equipment (or both), of all types including military facilities and equipment, shall be utilized for the purposes of the Corps, where appropriate and with the approval of the Federal agency involved. To minimize transportation costs, Corps members shall be employed on conservation projects as near to their places of residence as is feasible.

"(c) The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture may contract with any public agency or organization or any private nonprofit agency or organization which has been in existence for at least five years for the operation of any Youth Conservation Corps project.

"GRANT PROGRAM FOR STATE PROJECTS

"SEC. 4. (a) The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall jointly establish a program under which grants shall be made to States to assist them in

meeting the cost of projects for the employment of young men and women to develop, preserve, and maintain non-Federal public lands and waters within the States. For purposes of this section, the term 'States' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and American Samoa.

"(b) (1) No grant may be made under this section unless an application therefor has been submitted to and approved by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture. Such application shall be in such form, and submitted in such manner, as the Secretaries shall jointly by regulation prescribe and shall contain—

"(A) references satisfactory to the Secretaries of individuals employed under the project for which the application is submitted, all (i) have attained the age of fifteen but not attained the age of nineteen, (ii) permanent residents of the United States, its territories, possessions, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, (iii) be employed without regard to the personnel laws, rules, and regulations applicable to fulltime employees of the applicant, (iv) be employed for a period of not more than ninety days in any calendar year, and (v) be employed without regard to their sex or social, economic, or racial classification; and

"(B) such other information as the Secretaries may jointly by regulation prescribe.

"(2) The Secretaries may approve applications which they determine (A) to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) and (B) are for projects which will further the development, preservation, or maintenance of non-Federal public lands or waters within the jurisdiction of the applicant.

"(c) (1) The amount of any grant under this section shall be determined jointly by the Secretaries, except that no grant for any project may exceed 80 per centum of the cost (as determined by the Secretaries) of such project.

"(2) Payments under grants under this section may be made in advance or by way of reimbursement and at such intervals and on such conditions as the Secretaries find necessary.

"(d) Thirty per centum of the sums appropriated under section 6 for any fiscal year shall be made available for grants under this section for such fiscal year.

"SECRETARIAL REPORTS

"SEC. 5. The Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Agriculture shall annually prepare a joint report detailing the activities carried out under this Act and providing recommendations. Each report for a program year shall be submitted concurrently to the President and the Congress not later than April 1 following the close of that program year.

"AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

"SEC. 6. There are authorized to be appropriated amounts not to exceed \$60,000,000 for each fiscal year, which amounts shall be made available to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out the purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated for any fiscal year to carry out this Act shall remain available for obligation and expenditure until the end of the fiscal year following the fiscal year for which appropriated."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the House has amended S. 1871 by decreasing the amount authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year for the funding of the Youth Conservation Corps from \$100 million, as contained in the Senate bill, to \$60 million. This is the only substantive difference between the House and Senate versions of this legislation.

Daily Digest

HIGHLIGHTS

Senate received address from President Ford, and passed Defense appropriations bill.

House cleared solar heating, geothermal energy, and juvenile justice bills for the President.

Senate

Chamber Action

Routine Proceedings, pages S15407-S15494

Bills Introduced: Eight bills and one resolution were introduced, as follows: S. 3935-3942, S. Res. 389.

Pages S 15411, S 15426

Bills Reported: Reports were made as follows:

S. 1939, to prohibit so-called "pyramid sales transactions," with an amendment (S. Rept. 93-1114).

S. Res. 389, requesting an additional \$85,000 for expenses of Committee on Government Operations (S. Rept. 93-1115) (referred to Committee on Rules and Administration).

S. 1134, to promote the conservation and orderly development of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed, with an amendment (S. Rept. 93-1116);

H.R. 6395, designating as wilderness certain lands in the Okefenokee National Wildlife Refuge, Ga., with an amendment (S. Rept. 93-1117); and

S. 2888 conveying certain federally owned lands to the Inter-Tribal Council, Inc., Miami, Okla., with an amendment (S. Rept. 93-1118).

S. Res. 360, requesting supplemental funds for Special Committee on Aging, with amendments (S. Rept. 93-1119);

S. 3838, authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to regulate notes issued by bank holding companies, with amendments (S. Rept. 93-1120);

S. 3942, authorizing funds for fiscal years 1975-77 for the Department of Commerce to promote tourism in the United States through the U.S. Travel Service (S. Rept. 93-1121);

S. Res. 358, requesting additional funds for Judiciary Subcommittee on Representation of Citizen Interests for inquiries and investigations (S. Rept. 93-1122); and

S. Res. 365, to print and distribute memorial tributes to former Senator Wayne L. Morse (S. Rept. 93-1123).

Page S 15411

Bill Referred: H.R. 16102, Emergency Daylight Saving Time, was referred to Committee on Commerce.

Page S 15410

Bills Passed:

Nevada land: Senate took from calendar, passed with committee amendment, and sent to the House S. 3518, to remove the cloud on title with respect to certain lands in Nevada.

Page S 15407

Arapaho National Forest: Senate took from calendar, passed with committee amendments, and sent to the House S. 3615, authorizing transfer of certain Colorado lands to the Secretary of Agriculture for purpose of their inclusion in the Arapaho National Forest.

Page S 15407

Tobacco: Senate took from calendar, passed without amendment, and cleared for the White House H.R. 6485, to make nonquota types of tobacco subject to quotas when grown in areas where quota tobacco is grown and the two are indistinguishable.

Page S 15409

J. Allen Frear Building: Senate took from calendar, passed with committee amendment, and sent to the House S. 3815, designating the Federal Office Building in Dover, Del., as the "J. Allen Frear Building".

Pages S 15501-S 15502

Defense appropriations: By 86 yeas to 5 nays, Senate passed H.R. 16243, making appropriations for the Defense Establishment for fiscal year 1975, after taking further actions on amendments proposed thereto, as follows:

Adopted:

(1) Proxmire amendment No. 1811, limiting to 218 the number of enlisted personnel which may be assigned to high-ranking military officers to meet their official responsibilities.

Page S 15518

(2) Hathaway amendment to strike section barring the use of funds to pay price differential on contracts hereafter made for the purpose of relieving economic dislocations.

Page S 15520

(3) Muskie amendment No. 1834, to bar use of funds to develop Conus Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radar system for period beginning with date of enactment and ending May 31, 1975.

Page S 15526

D 1037

(4) Kennedy amendment No. 1835, to bar the use of any funds to stockpile war materials for use by any Asian country except to the extent authorized by title VII of this act, or by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Page S 15553

(5) Modified Tower amendment adding \$18.5 million to maintain production line on the Bell UH-1H type Army helicopter.

Page S 15571

Rejected:

(1) By 21 yeas to 71 nays, Goldwater amendment (to Proxmire amendment No. 1810) to delete all funds for military assistance for South Vietnamese forces.

Page S 15500

(2) By 44 yeas to 47 nays, Proxmire amendment No. 1810, reducing from \$700 million to \$550 million funds for military assistance for South Vietnamese forces.

Page S 15494

(3) By 37 yeas to 55 nays, Eagleton amendment No. 1836, to reduce by approximately \$1 billion, to a ceiling of \$81 billion, total appropriations in the bill.

Page S 15528

Senate insisted on its amendments, requested conference with the House, and appointed as conferees Senators McClellan, Stennis, Pastore, Magnuson, Mansfield, Symington, Young, Hruska, Cotton, and Case.

Page S 15577

Pages S 15494-S 15501, S 15518-S 15577

Feathers and downs: Senate passed H.R. 11452, providing for the temporary suspension of duty on certain feathers and downs after agreeing to committee amendments, and to two other amendments proposed thereto, as follows:

(1) Curtis amendment to extend for 1 year the present law requiring that the Federal employee health program be coordinated with the medicare program; and

Page S 15579

(2) Bayh amendment to exclude from estate tax the first \$200,000 (now \$60,000) of the value of family farms.

Page S 15579

Pages S 15579-S 15581

Gas Pipeline Safety: Senate took from desk, passed without amendment and cleared for the White House H.R. 15205, authorizing funds to extend provisions of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.

Page S 15581

Address by President Ford: Senate received an address from President Gerald R. Ford. The President was escorted to and from the Chamber by Senators Mansfield, Robert C. Byrd, Moss, Bible, Fulbright, Ervin, Metzenbaum, Hughes, Scott of Pennsylvania, Griffin, Cotton, Bennett, Tower, Brock, Aiken, and Gurney.

Page S 15538

Vietnam Veterans: Senate agreed to the conference report on H.R. 12628, to increase training benefits and

to improve educational programs for Vietnam era veterans, thus clearing the measure for further action of the House.

Pages S 15502-S 15518

D.C. Indigent Defense: Senate agreed to the conference report on S. 3703, authorizing a plan for the District of Columbia to provide defense counsel for indigent defenders in criminal cases, thus clearing the measure for the White House.

Page S 15528

Economic Development Administration: Senate further insisted on its amendment to H.R. 14883, to extend authorization for the Economic Development Administration, and returned the measure to the House.

Page S 15500

1980 Winter Olympics: Senate agreed to the House amendment to S. Con. Res. 72, extending an invitation to the International Olympic Committee to hold the 1980 winter games at Lake Placid, N.Y., and pledging the cooperation and support of the Congress of the United States, thus completing action on the measure.

Page S 15577

Amtrak: Senate insisted on its amendment to H.R. 15427, authorizing funds for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation for fiscal year 1975, agreed to conference with the House, and appointed as conferees Senators Magnuson, Hartke, Tunney, Pearson, and Beall.

Page S 15578

Youth Conservation Corps: Senate agreed to the House amendments to S. 1871, to expand and make permanent the Youth Conservation Corps, thus clearing the measure for the White House.

Pages S 15578-S 15579

Appropriations—State, Justice, and Commerce: Senate laid down for further consideration tomorrow H.R. 15404, making appropriations for fiscal year 1975 for the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary, and by unanimous consent, it was agreed that there will be a 1-hour time limitation on an amendment (to be offered by Senators Ervin and Nelson) to bar use of funds for national security wiretaps without warrants.

Page S 15581

Presidential Communication: Senate received a communication from the President transmitting request for an amendment to the fiscal year 1975 budget in the amount of \$537,355,000 for certain activities of the Office of Education, Department of HEW, referred to Committee on Appropriations and ordered printed as S. Doc. 93-103.

Page S 15410

Confirmations: Senate confirmed the following nominations:

Roger W. Sant, of California, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration;

Jack B. Kubisch, of Michigan, to be Ambassador to Greece;

Richard L. Sneider, of New York, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea; and

file NR 16243

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for morning business has now expired.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1975

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 10 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 16243, which the clerk will report.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 16243) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), No. 1810. The time on this amendment is divided equally between and controlled by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) and the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN). The vote on the amendment is to occur at 11 a.m. today.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield myself such time as I may require.

MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. President, I want to make clear what this amendment does and does not do.

First, it would establish a ceiling on expenditures for U.S. military assistance to Vietnam at the level accepted by the Senate Appropriations Committee last year—that is, 1973, for the 1974 budget.

During consideration of the fiscal year 1974 defense appropriations bill, the full Appropriations Committee reduced military assistance funding to \$650 million. About \$100 million of this was for Laos.

Since money for Laos is no longer contained in this bill—its in the foreign aid bill—the equivalent figure for Vietnam military assistance as reported out by the Appropriations Committee last year was \$550 million.

That is the same level as my amendment would establish. It is not a drastic amendment or a radical amendment or an amendment that would leave Vietnam high and dry. It would give them the same amount the Senate recommended last year.

There is another set of figures we will hear about during this debate. The administration asked for \$1.6 billion last year. We ended up giving them a ceiling of \$1.126 billion. This happened when the lower figure of \$650 million on the Senate side was compromised with a larger House figure.

I do not want to mislead anyone. That was the final figure approved after the conference last year.

But the fact remains that the only time that the Senate voted on the individual item of military assistance to Vietnam last year during the appropriations debate, the Senate accepted \$100 million for Laos and \$550 million for Vietnam. That was the Senate position. That is what we took into conference. That is what my amendment would re-

store for the fiscal year 1975 bill—the same amount of \$550 million.

Yes, this amendment would be a reduction from what the Pentagon ended up with last year. No, this amendment would not be a reduction from what the Appropriations Committee recommended and the full Senate accepted last year. It would be holding the line at the same level.

UNITED STATES GIVES MORE AID

Last night, Senator KENNEDY perceptively pointed out what U.S. diplomats have been saying about the purpose of U.S. military aid to Vietnam. The purpose, it was stated by U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin, was to keep support for each side in balance. That means that the support the United States would give South Vietnam and the support the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would give North Vietnam would be kept in balance.

Has this been the case? We have the definitive figures from the Defense Intelligence Agency to put that into perspective. The estimates by the reputable DIA indicate that except for an increase in aid in 1972, military assistance by the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. to North Vietnam has been declining yearly.

In 1973, the U.S.S.R. gave \$175 million in military aid to North Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China gave \$115 million, for a total of \$290 million. If those figures are not correct, I think we should know the source before impugning them. They come from the Defense Intelligence Agency. They may be wrong. If there are better figures, let us have them, and let us find out why the Defense Intelligence Agency is not telling us the truth.

That same year, the United States spent a total of \$5.3 billion in Southeast Asia.

Over the longer period of 1966 to 1973, the Defense Intelligence Agency statistics show that the United States spent 29 times as much in Indochina as the Soviets and PRC combined. This amounts to \$2.57 billion from the U.S.S.R. and \$1.08 billion from the PRC.

The United States, on the other hand, spent \$107 billion in the same period including \$10.4 billion in direct military aid. And that figure for U.S. expenditures probably is far on the conservative side. It may be closer to \$140 or \$150 billion when everything is included related to those expenditures.

Mr. President, who are we kidding? That is not balancing military aid by any stretch of the imagination. If it is, the U.S.S.R. and PRC are getting the better end of the deal. Ask any taxpayer if a military standoff with expenditures 29 times as large on one side as the other is an economic or military victory.

Every year we hear the same cries of doom. If the bill does not contain \$700 million, Vietnam will go down the drain. If the bill does not contain \$1 billion, Vietnam will go down the drain. If the bill does not contain \$1.5 billion, Vietnam will go down the drain.

The latest to issue such an alarmist appeal was the State Department. They

said that if we do not appropriate \$1 billion, it will weaken the South Vietnamese to the point that they cannot defend themselves, and Hanoi might be tempted to launch another 1972 type offensive.

Well, the Senate and House Appropriations Committee have already violated that rule. According to the State Department, South Vietnam should now be going down the drain.

I cite this letter from the State Department as evidence that the point of doom is whatever the current budget request is. Does anyone find that unusual? To ask for less than the administration requests for anything is to invite disaster. Whatever they ask for is bare bones. Whatever we try to cut is endangering security and inviting disaster. Such is the state of rhetoric and the art of jawboning the Congress.

We heard yesterday that to approve the Proxmire amendment is to predetermine that South Vietnam will have to abandon large segments of the country.

And yet both the Frelinghuysen report from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the testimony of Gen. William B. Caldwell before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year indicates that the Saigon regime has increased its population control by 6 percent since the ceasefire and its control over hamlets by 770.

At one time I thought that the ceasefire established in 1973 meant that both sides were to occupy only the territory where they were at the time.

That is what article 3, section B, of the Paris agreement says:

The Armed Forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in place.

But that is not what has happened. Both sides have continually violated the ceasefire agreements. Until this time, the government forces seem to have gotten the upper hand in terms of hamlets controlled.

We will also hear that once Vietnam goes Communist, because we cut \$150 million from their budget, then Thailand will go Communist, and Burma, and Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia.

That is the old domino theory. But I would like to add a new twist to the old theory. It goes like this:

If the Senate does not reduce unnecessary military spending—the largest controllable item in the Federal budget, then inflation will continue to rage, Americans will be able to purchase less, confidence in Government will continue to fall, industry will reduce production, the money market will fail, and we will have economic chaos beyond our wildest dreams. That is a real domino theory to ponder and it is a lot closer to home.

Mr. President, it would be one thing if we knew that the U.S. dollar given to Vietnam went for an efficient and effective purpose. Some support for Vietnam is necessary, we all recognize.

But what happens to our dollars now?

Any man here who has talked with those who have been in Vietnam can give a ready answer to that question. The U.S. dollars go into the pockets of the corrupt bureaucracy in Vietnam. Black market operations abound. Here are some

disease, several questionable policy decisions were made, causing much adverse reaction from the medical professional community.

As the new organizational lines for agencies within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health became more clearly defined, the Bureau of Quality Assurance was created within the Health Services Administration—all of which were under the Assistant Secretary—to implement the Professional Standards Review Organizations which have also been created by other provisions of the Social Security Amendments of 1972. Because several elements of the kidney program were similar to PSRO functions, the Bureau of Quality Assurance actively sought to put that program under its umbrella. When assigned that program, the Bureau of Quality Assurance also had no staff experienced with kidney disease. But then obtained three staff members with experience in the kidney disease field who were detailed from other agencies. These personnel were assigned 10 months after the passage of Public Law 92-603. They came into an atmosphere clouded with bureaucratic infighting involving the Bureau of Health Insurance, the Bureau of Quality Assurance, and the Office of Policy Development and Planning, coupled with the preoccupation within the Bureau of Quality Assurance with PSRO's.

The most immediate result of this bureaucratic and alphabetical jungle was delay. Simple policy decisions often took more than 8 weeks for low level approval, with higher level approval often taking twice as long. In fact, HEW's policy statement which outlined its criteria for operation of the program was first drafted in November of 1973, but did not get approved until April of 1974.

Since July 1, 1973, the ESRD program has functioned under interim guidelines which were drafted in the days immediately preceding the beginning operating date of the program. There is general agreement that the interim program had several flaws which created confusion and aroused opposition among patients, doctors, hospital, and intermediaries. There was no effort made to publish the guidelines in the Federal Register or to make them available for public comment prior to putting them into effect. This procedure leaves significant questions as to the legal basis for the interim program. This is further complicated by the fact that the assignment of the ESRD program to the Bureau of Quality Assurance was never made part of a formal delegation of authority from the Secretary of HEW. This may have had the effect of nullifying BQA's authority to draft and implement the program since the statutory authority for ESRD appeared to be with the Bureau of Health Insurance under its general medicare responsibilities.

While all the wrangling was taking place within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Health, the Bureau of Health Insurance, within the Social Security Administration, was beginning to realize the importance of the ESRD program as a prototype for any kind of

catastrophic or national health insurance program. This realized, coupled with the growing interest within Congress to remove the Social Security Administration from HEW caused BHI to reassert its role in ESRD.

In April of this year, the Bureau of Quality Assurance belatedly announced the broad policy issues on which the ESRD program will be based. It is administering the program under the interim guidelines established by the Office of Policy Development and Planning and has set a timetable for the publication of final regulations in early 1975. So far, minimum utilization rates have not been established, nor have medical review boards been established. Both are required by law. Considering all of the hurdles which the program still has to overcome, it is unlikely that it will be in full swing until late 1975—3 years after Congress passed the legislation.

As national attention focuses on health care, the kidney program underscores the need for Congress to deal effectively with the HEW bureaucracy in order to assure that the law is faithfully executed. Such diverse topics as national health insurance, health planning agencies, and medical manpower are under active consideration by Congress at this time, but these subjects fall within different committee jurisdictions. If we allow the narrow strictures of committee jurisdiction to cloud our view of this subject, there can be no coherent approach to national health insurance debate.

We can avoid this pitfall by creating an ad hoc Committee on National Health Insurance to consist of members of the Finance, Labor and Public Welfare, Veterans, and Appropriations Committees, or of the appropriate subcommittees of those committees; to begin joint consideration of national health insurance and provide the Senate with a coherent report on the need for it and the administrative problems which may arise. That is the only way we can take a coherent approach to one of the most important subjects to come before Congress in this half of the 20th century.

The ad hoc committee would make it possible for the various committees with an interest in national health insurance to share information and evaluations of proposed legislation. In the long run, it will also help Congress to oversee the Federal health bureaucracy more effectively.

Mr. President, the end-stage renal disease program is but one example of the failure of the executive branch to implement the law in a proper and timely fashion and of the difficulties which Congress has in performing its oversight function. I intend to do all that I can to make the ESRD program work, but I hope that we all can learn from its mistakes before they are repeated on a massive scale in any national health insurance program we adopt.

ILLINOIS FINDS ERTS VALUABLE

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, while no line agency in Illinois yet uses ERTS

imagery, the Center for Advanced Computation—CAC—at the University of Illinois is finding ERTS data to be a valuable input to an experimental land use mapping computer system being developed at the center.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter I have received from the Honorable Hal Hovey, director, bureau of the budget, State of Illinois, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., July 24, 1974.

Mr. FRANK MOSS,
Chairman, Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MOSS: In response to your letter of June 24 to Governor Walker regarding the merits of establishing an operational ERTS system, please be advised that at present no line agency within the state uses ERTS imagery. However, the Center for Advanced Computation (CAC) at the University of Illinois is finding ERTS data to be a valuable input to an experimental land use mapping computer system being developed at the Center.

Sincerely,

HAL HOVEY,
Director, Bureau of the Budget.

SENATOR MANSFIELD

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, during the past week, the Senate has noted with pleasure and with pride the historic record of service established by the distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD.

The Senator from Montana has reacted with characteristic modesty, but it is clear to all who know him that the many tributes have been richly deserved and the many honors have been rightly earned. In setting a new record of tenure, he has carried out his responsibilities with competence and with civility. Each Member of the Senate has personally benefited from his counsel, his consideration, and his cooperation. The people of Montana and, indeed, all the citizens of our land, have been well represented by MIKE MANSFIELD.

It is, I believe, no coincidence that this former professor has become a textbook model of an effective Senate leader. His approach to leadership and life has been hallmarked by rationality and respect for others. His fairness has been especially appreciated by those of us on the Republican side of the aisle. As a result of conversations with my father-in-law, the late Senator Everett Dirksen, I became intimately aware of this quality even before I came to the Senate.

Senator MANSFIELD and Senator Dirksen worked quietly and effectively in moving and scheduling the business of the Senate, just as Senator MANSFIELD and Senator PORT do today. This gave a special meaning to the term "joint leadership." In a very subtle manner that is close to the essence of good leadership, they molded and framed the results of what we recognize as the landmark legislative achievement of the past decade.

Senator MANSFIELD's continued leadership, his guidance and good judgment, will be just as important as we face the challenges of the years ahead.

pictures of black market goods taken from U.S. depots and PX's. You can recognize goods from Sears, Lipton tea, fans, coolers, radios, hi-fi's, electric saws, grinders, scales, thermos, blankets, tennis rackets. Anything you can buy or steal from a PX, a U.S. Government warehouse, or a U.S. supply depot can be found on this black market.

And the person who pays for it is Uncle Sam and the taxpayers of this Nation.

We know about the thousands of "ghost" soldiers added to military payrolls—that is, nonexistent soldiers, soldiers that do not exist, but added to military payrolls—for which the United States pays about 40 percent of the salaries and the corrupt officers and officials reap enormous profits and benefits from it. That has been documented.

South Vietnam's 92 generals have only recently been ordered to cut their personal staffs of chauffeurs, bodyguards, and servants from 36 to 11 each. They have also been told that they must make do with two rather than four motor vehicles. That is where U.S. tax dollars have gone. Think of it. Only 11 chauffeurs and servants each.

Why should the American taxpayer be required to provide that kind of fat and waste and extravagance to South Vietnam in a time of inflation, when we are all being hit as hard as we are?

Evidence has also been uncovered recently that a number of new American A-37's worth \$500,000 each—are being dismantled and sold for scrap on the black market in Saigon. A police raid on an illegal scrap operation yielded the wings of 15 planes as well as substantial amounts of other U.S. made military equipment which were being readied for foreign export.

We ship it to them. They tear it down and export it out of the country for a profit. That is where U.S. dollars go.

Obviously, Mr. President, in wartime, we know there is waste. In wartime, we know there is extravagance and, often, corruption. But what we can do about it is to cut the amount available. This is the one action we can take. We cannot administer this program. But we can make the amount available so limited that it will be used for the purposes they have to use it for and should use it for, to defend their country.

Mr. President, there is \$150 million that will be used for graft and corruption in this bill if there is a penny. The only thing worse than a dollar spent abroad when we need it here at home is a dollar spent abroad and utterly wasted in corruption.

Mr. President, we are supposed to be keeping South Vietnam strong and free. Unfortunately somewhere along the line the American concept of "free" has been dropped from that phrase.

The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE), spoke on this yesterday and pointed out the fact that President Kennedy, in that great address he made to the country when he was inaugurated, said that we would meet any burden, no matter how heavy it might be, in the cause of freedom. We believe in freedom. We will help freedom. The question is whether we are helping freedom

when we provide this kind of assistance to the South Vietnamese military government that has the track record it has.

I admit it is better than a Communist regime by far, and I admit that we should do everything we can to prevent a Communist regime. But I say we do not do that when we provide such abundant funds that they can have this kind of luxurious, wasteful, expensive, extravagant operation.

I trust that no one here will say that South Vietnam is a democracy where freedom of speech flourishes and dissent is the building block of compromise and moderation.

We are not building democracy in Vietnam. That may well be impossible. The roots of that society are not easily grafted with the American model of democracy and freedom.

So why do we hide under the charade that in some way we are preserving peace and freedom for the people of South Vietnam?

We are supporting South Vietnam for geopolitical purposes. That support should continue for geopolitical purposes. But there is a limit to everything and the American people have met the limit with huge sums of money for the regime in South Vietnam.

The \$550 million is enough. It would have built hundreds of hospitals in the United States, provided mass transit for tens of thousands, begun research on new medical cures for the diseases of our people, provided a maintenance income for our poor or even built five new Senate office buildings if you will pardon the reference to our own boondoggle.

Mr. President, it would also provide tens of thousands of houses at a time when housing is so urgently needed and when unemployment in the construction trades is so high.

Enough is enough. Let us draw the line at \$550 million and tell the South Vietnamese that their defense rests first on the will of their own people; that they will stand or fall in the long run not by the amount of U.S. aid but in the competition between efficiency and lassitude, good government and corruption, freedom and repression, land reform and oligarchy.

Such has it always been in that region of the world.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from Arizona 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we have heard the figure 8 to 1 on this floor quite often in the last few days, and I think this RECORD should be made clear. This is a report I put in the RECORD on July 10 of this year:

Evidence presented in these reports also put the lie to the preposterous new myth that the United States is providing eight to twenty nine times the amount of military aid to South Vietnam as the Soviet Union and China are providing to North Vietnam.

Comparing apples with apples, that is hardware with hardware, Communist military aid to North Vietnam is only slightly less, if that, than the comparable level of United States military aid to South Vietnam.

Congressional critics of United States support for South Vietnam would compare estimates of hardware aid alone, such as weapons and ammunitions, by the Communists, with the total program of our aid to the South which includes not just the cost of hardware, but the cost of rations, clothing, transportation from the United States, training, and so forth. These same critics would calculate our program over the period prior to the conclusion of the Cease-Fire Agreement, a period when the war was still in full progress, while ignoring Communist shipments since the Cease-Fire which, as these reports have revealed, enabled North Vietnam to send illegally over 50,000 soldiers, 1,000 artillery and anti-aircraft pieces, 400 tanks and enormous stockpiles of ammunition to its invading forces in South Vietnam.

Looking again at this ratio of 8 to 1, the latest figures that I have, made available to me by the Department of State on August 2 of this year, however, and using our best estimate based on hardware costs alone, indicate that in 1973, we outspent the Russians and the Chinese at most by a ratio of just over 4 to 3—about \$400 million for us as compared to about \$290 million for them.

I think, in all due respect to my friend from Wisconsin, he should have this clear, that we not only supply hardware, munitions, and so forth, used for war, but we are building hospitals, we are supplying medical aid, we are supplying food, we are paying for transportation, we are paying for the training of Vietnamese troops, pilots, and so forth, in this country. So let us get this straight in the RECORD: We are doing for South Vietnam far, far more than just shipping them aircraft, tanks, and the hardware of war, and it is not accurate to compare the total costs of all these programs with the cost of Communist hardware aid alone.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this report from the State Department be made a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPARISON OF U.S. MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM WITH COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

Recently released intelligence estimates of Chinese and Soviet military aid to North Viet-Nam have been compared to the cost of our military aid to South Viet-Nam under the MASF (Military Assistance, Service Funded) program, to indicate that we are vastly outspending the Chinese and Soviets in Viet-Nam. Such comparisons are grossly misleading. This is because the estimates of aid to the North include only military hardware costs, while the MASF figures cover the total costs of the program, i.e., not just the cost of the hardware but also the costs of rations, clothing, spare parts, gasoline, maintenance, transportation from the U.S., transmitting, procurement, etc.

It is impossible to be precise in comparing Sino-Soviet aid to the North with our aid to the South because of the necessarily incompletely and fragmentary nature of our intelligence information as well as various costing and accounting difficulties. However, our best estimate, based on hardware costs only, indicate that in 1973 we outspent the Russians and Chinese by a ratio of just over four

to there (about \$400 million for us as compared to \$290 million for them).

There are several reasons why we have to spend somewhat more money to help the South Vietnamese defend their country than the Chinese and Russians spend to help North Viet-Nam invade it, but the most fundamental reason is that it is more expensive to guard a bank than to rob it. Thus the South Vietnamese defense forces are necessarily larger and more costly to maintain than the Communist forces, because they must defend virtually all of their country—the cities and towns, the roads and railroads, the rice fields and factories—and they must defend it all of the time; while the Communist main forces are free to mass and attack at times and places of their choosing. With a considerably smaller and less expensive force structure, therefore, the Communists can often bring superior arms to bear on any given battlefield in South Viet-Nam.

It has been suggested that regardless of the relative value of U.S. military aid to the South and Sino-Soviet aid to the North, U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that in 1973 the North received slightly less than half what it received in 1972, and consequently our aid to the South should be cut correspondingly. In fact, it already has been—in FY 1973 it amounted to \$2.3 billion, and dropped to \$1.0 billion in FY 1974. This latter level has not been sufficient for us to replace South Vietnamese losses at the one-for-one rate permitted by the Paris Agreement.

Moreover, Sino-Soviet military aid over the years has allowed the North to build up massive stockpiles of equipment and munitions in the South and adjacent base areas in Laos and Cambodia. We estimate these stockpiles could support an expanded North Vietnamese military campaign in the South for about 18 months, even without further replenishment. On the other hand, we have never built up such stockpiles for the South Vietnamese, maintaining only about a two-month inventory of most categories of ammunition and other expendables. Consequently, reductions in our aid to the South have a much more immediate impact than Sino-Soviet reductions in aid to the North.

Finally, basic to U.S. combat doctrine, which we successfully imparted to the South Vietnamese, is the concept of achieving maximum effect with minimal loss of personnel. This requires high equipment utilization and expenditure of ordnance, as compared to the North Vietnamese concept of relatively higher expenditure of manpower. The South Vietnamese (and American) way of waging war costs more money, but it saves lives. Cuts in U.S. assistance and consequent shortages in some military items have already resulted in a relatively higher South Vietnamese casualty rate, and further cuts in our aid would produce an even greater casualty rate.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I have only a few minutes. The Senator will have to yield on his time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. If the Senator will yield on my time, I ask that I have some time so that I may discuss it briefly with the Senator from Arizona.

I think that the Senator from Arizona makes an excellent point. The fact is that a great deal of what we give is not used for hardware for tough, military purposes. It should be. We have an economic aid program, too. The Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended half a billion dollars, \$500 million, of economic aid. This \$550 million should be confined to the sinews of war—

the ammunition, the tanks, the planes, and so forth.

Mr. GOLDWATER. But it is not.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Well, if the Pentagon is not doing that, all we can do is provide the funds.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I just gave the Senator some figures, and it runs about \$400 million, not \$550 million.

I suggest to the Senator from Wisconsin that he amend his amendment to knock out all aid to South Vietnam if we are going to chop a little bit off of it and do the damage I think it will do. And I am not one who is generally interested in giving money away. I have never voted for foreign aid on this floor in my life, and I never will.

But I do not want to see Southeast Asia go down the drain, and I think it will unless we continue to give them aid. If the Senator wants to knock the whole thing out, I think it would be interesting to see how this body feels about that. I think the Senator might as well knock the whole thing out as remove \$150 million. It has already been cut.

Mr. PROXMIRE. May I just say to the Senator from Arizona that we are proposing that we provide the same amount we provided last year. Under the circumstances, it seems to this Senator that that should be enough, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have, on the basis of documentation, sharply reduced the amount which they provided last year.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I have said all I wanted to say on this subject. I just do not want to hear the figure 8 to 1 banded around on this floor any more, because that is not exactly correct. We are talking about apples, oranges, bananas, hospital supplies, schools, and everything else, not just the hardware of war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from North Dakota 5 minutes.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, as one who was opposed to getting into the Vietnam war in the first place—it never made sense to me—it is unusual for me to be defending military assistance to South Vietnam. I know that many of the sponsors of big cuts now though: this war was a great adventure about 10 years ago; but after we lost more than 50,000 lives, the thousands who are missing, over 300,000 casualties, and over \$150 billion in expenditures, I think it wise that we give some money to salvage something out of this great loss to this Nation.

The President's budget estimate for this purpose submitted by the Bureau of the Budget was \$1.4 billion. The Armed Services Committee—and their authorization bill passed both Houses of Congress—called for \$1 billion. We have now cut it down to \$700 million. I agree with the Senator from Arizona that if we are going to cut it further, we might just as well cut it all out.

We have a new dimension in our foreign policy now, in Secretary Kissinger.

I think he has done more for peace in the world than any other man in the history of the United States. He believes that our foreign assistance is a part of his bipartisan foreign policy, and to that extent I am willing to change some of my thoughts of the past and give some foreign assistance, if he believes it necessary, as he does.

Mr. President, I would like to read a letter addressed to Chairman McCLELLAN of the Senate Appropriations Committee, received this morning, signed, in behalf of Secretary Kissinger, by Robert S. Ingersoll, Assistant Secretary. It reads as follows:

AUGUST 20, 1974.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Kissinger, who is out of town, has authorized me to send you the following statement concerning the Defense Assistance for Viet-Nam (DAV) funding appropriation that may be discussed in the Senate August 21:

"I understand there may be moves to reduce further the amount to be appropriated for Defense Assistance for Viet-Nam.

"As I stated in my letter to you of August 12, cuts already made in our military assistance, combined with the rapid inflation which has eroded the value of that assistance, have brought the South Vietnamese armed forces to a level of austerity which, if reduced further, might affect their ability to defend their country against continuing Communist military pressure. Even the full \$1.0 billion which the Congress has authorized for Viet-Nam military aid would be dangerously austere, particularly in view of the increased North Vietnamese military pressure in recent months. At the \$700 million level currently under discussion, I fear that the North Vietnamese will be strongly tempted to increase their pressure still more, and the South Vietnamese will be in danger of running out of military necessities for defending themselves well before the end of the fiscal year. Still further cuts would clearly vitiate our policy of supporting the conditions which made the Paris Agreement possible and would call into question the reassurances President Ford and I have been giving of the continuity and constancy of American foreign policy.

"As I also stated in my August 12 letter, the best hope for a genuine negotiated settlement and eventual reconciliation in Viet-Nam is to maintain the balance of forces which has permitted the progress made thus far. I continue to believe that it is extremely important in furthering progress toward the goals of American foreign policy of the past five years that no further cuts be made in our assistance to South Viet-Nam.

Best Regards,

ROBERT S. INGERSOLL.

Mr. President, I have great confidence in Secretary Kissinger. I think he is one of the most popular men in America today. I believe he is using good judgment; and, as I stated before, he has done more for peace in the world than any other man in the history of this Nation. If he so strongly advocates this \$700 million, I am willing to go along.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HATHAWAY). Who yields time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for yielding to me.

I have not been able to attend the debate this morning, except to hear the

statement made by the Senator from North Dakota, and I wish to emphasize that I endorse every word of what the Senator from North Dakota has said about the beginning of this war and the continuing of it, and it being part of the foreign policy. That is certainly something we cannot just turn away from, throw down and go off and leave.

I have no complaints as to anyone's position on this bill, of wanting a reduction and wanting to save money. We all do. But those of us who have carried a good part of the load here concerning this year, and legislating on it, have been some of the ones who warned against going in there in the first place; but we stood firmer not to be run out of there, not to be chased out or leave, either, with our POW's left behind.

What the Senator has said about Mr. Kissinger is every bit true. But I want to say that no man has served, under the circumstances, in a finer way than did former President Nixon, when he had the courage and he took all the beating over the head politically and otherwise about withdrawing from this war under conditions where we were not going to be defeated, and under conditions where we were not going to leave until our POW's came with us. So I commend him for that again.

Now, on this matter: In this bill—may we have order, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. STENNIS. Our committee has been dealing with this matter for several years, military aid to South Vietnam, as an exception to the general rule that the Foreign Relations Committee deals with it. We were the ones, in our committee, who first put a ceiling on this amount of \$2.5 billion.

Then we brought that down as much as circumstances would allow. This year, now, there is written into the authorization bill a requirement, in hard law, requiring that this money be used under circumstances that require standard accounting methods, whereby the General Accounting Office can go in and chase down every single dollar that may be used in this way. That is an innovation. It is something new, and I think that we are going to have a far better chance to make a real test out of this matter, as to how much they may need, barring one extraordinary thing that no one can foretell, and that one thing is, How hard is North Vietnam going to press this matter for a decision?

In extremity, I judge almost everyone here would be willing to appropriate more money if needed to keep these people, the South Vietnamese, from being exterminated or virtually enslaved.

So I have said this in conference, that no one can actually say how much we will need, but just to get the ordinary things, artillery shells, ammunition, rifles, small arms, and items of that kind, is going to require about just as much as we have in the bill anyway.

It will not buy a lot of planes and tanks and a whole lot of things of that kind. If it has to be had, we have to consider this

in a supplemental bill. We had an understanding in the Appropriations Committee that we would make these reductions, and if there was an emergency arose and the administration asked for it, we would consider the facts as they developed then, just to furnish the elementals.

I hear all these stories about the artillery shells being stolen and sold for scrap. We have not had any of that that could be traced down with any authenticity. I do not know, I suppose we have a little stealing going on, thefts here and there, we usually do have, but that is certainly incidental.

The main matter here is—and I am not happy about it, I have never been enthusiastic about a whole lot of foreign aid—are we going to let this ally of ours, which is what we were calling them 2 or 3 years ago, die on the vine and be annihilated as a government and taken over by the Vietnamese Communists with us just standing by? Are we going to give them the minimum—now that is all it is in this bill, a minimum—that will keep them alive militarily, militarily under the ordinary, and they are having heavy lines of battle now, the enemy is closer to Saigon, the capital, than they have ever been.

Coming back to this question, are we going to keep them alive militarily?

I believe an old cliché like I am, to a degree, on military aid to every country in the world, and particularly with the background I have outlined, does not want to see that happen, not repudiate those 54,000 men killed over there and these thousands of others that were wounded, maimed, and their lives partly ruined. We do not want to repudiate them.

Just on that basis alone, I would stand strongly for the minimum.

Now, next year this matter is going to be handled by the—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McINTYRE). The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. One more minute.

Next year this matter is going to be handled by the Foreign Relations Committee along with all the other foreign aid matters and they will have an excellent chance to take a look and straighten out anything that is the matter with this program.

I think we have cleaned it up very much ourselves, but if we just let them sink into the mire and be defeated or exterminated, it will be too late.

I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my staff member, Mr. John Napier, may be on the floor during the debate on this bill and on H.R. 12628, including the voting on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bill Kennedy, of the appropriations staff, may have the privilege of the floor during future debate on this bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 13 minutes remaining.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, it certainly is not with any great enthusiasm or with any real pleasure that I undertake to defend the action of the Appropriations Committee in this instance in placing the amount of this appropriation at \$700 million, the same as that by the House.

I say, it is not any pleasure, because I am placed in a different role from any I have experienced in the past. Some who are very enthusiastic about this amendment have possibly over the years supported large sums of foreign aid spending. I have opposed these measures. I have not voted for foreign spending for a foreign aid bill since 1954, and it is not with any degree of satisfaction at all that I support any amount, not one nickel, for Vietnam or for Southeast Asia.

But it is not what I would personally like to do or would not like to do. We have a question here on what is the duty and the responsibility of our country to do under the present circumstances.

When we made the settlement in Vietnam that enabled us to bring our boys home, we called it peace with honor. I do not know, in my judgment—it was not a complete peace nor was it with complete honor, but it did result in the saving of thousands and thousands in American boys' lives. Recognizing that fact I am confident that we made some obligation, I do not think this will be denied, that we made some obligation to help Vietnam militarily, and economically, in the hope and expectation that possibly she could defend herself.

That was the whole theory, let us get out and we will give them help, so that they can defend themselves.

We got out and our boys are home, we are not fighting, we are not dying over there any more. I want to say that at \$700 million a year it is a small amount to get our boys home if that is all it is going to cost us.

For that reason, I am going along and supporting this provision again this year.

Now, if we are going to absolutely stop it, let us say so. Let the authorization committee say so. Do not bring out any more authorization for it and let us give them notice a year in advance that we are not going to do it.

We have cut them this year just over 50 percent—51 percent of what amount the administration requested. We are giving them about the same amount they received last year.

I want to add, we are not giving them as much assistance in goods, material, ammunition, and supplies as we gave them last year, because \$700 million this year will not buy the same amount of ammunition, it will not buy the same amount of gasoline, it will not buy the same amount of clothing, it will not buy the same amount of food, it will not buy the same amount of hospitalization, the same medical care, so we are cutting them down.

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We are not advancing them more than last year. We are gradually cutting them down.

We ought to do one of two things, make up our mind as national policy we are going to stop it altogether, or we ought to do a little to help them sustain themselves. Particularly, that is true, as it has been pointed out here this morning, with the enemy now within 16 miles of the capital city.

I do not doubt that there is corruption. I do not doubt there are many things wrong. There were many things wrong with a whole lot of other countries and governments, and we kept financing them. We have financed dictatorships.

Where we have already invested 50,000 American lives, plus 300,000 other casualties, that is our treasure.

I do not know whether we ever belonged there in the first place. My belief was when we went in there we should have gone in to win, and we did not.

I think our policy has been wrong from the beginning, but now we want out. Our boys are not dying, and after we induced them to agree to the terms of the peace with the understanding that we would give them some military aid, I think, Mr. President, we have some obligation to do it.

Now, let me point out, and I say I do not relish this, but here is a letter I received this morning from the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AUGUST 21, 1974.

HON. JOHN L. McCLELLAN,
Chairman, Department of Defense Subcommittee,
Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am concerned about a further reduction in the FY 1975 level of support to South Vietnam below the \$700 million recommended by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. A reduction below the \$700 million level would lead to a serious crippling of the South Vietnamese capability to defend themselves, would have a demoralizing effect on them, and could be taken by the enemy as an invitation to increase hostilities. There is no assurance, for example, that we will be able to provide adequate levels of ammunition stocks since the stated requirement for ammunition and essential operating costs alone exceed the \$700 million.

As you know, the Department of Defense originally requested funds in the amount of \$1.450 billion. As a result of recommendations of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Congress previously provided an authorization of \$1.000 billion for this purpose. Notwithstanding the level authorized, both the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have recommended a funding level of \$700 million. Congress also denied the use of about \$300 million in unobligated balances from FY 1974 and prior programs. This further compounds the impact of cuts in the FY 1975 request. To avoid the loss of all prospects for a negotiated settlement, I urge your support against further reductions in the program of military assistance for South Vietnam.

Sincerely,

J. R. SCHLESINGER.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I will read a sentence from it:

A reduction below the \$700 million level would lead to a serious crippling of the South Vietnamese capability to defend themselves, would have a demoralizing effect on them, and could be taken by the enemy as an invitation to increase hostilities.

I do not know that that this allegation is true, but I know it is quite probable. I do know they mean to control that country some day, if they can.

It is perfectly obvious to me, and I do not think anybody can deny it. It is just a question of how much more obligation we feel to try to help these people defend themselves.

Another portion of the letter reads:

Congress also denied the use of about \$300 million in unobligated balances from FY 1974 and prior programs. This further compounds the impact of cuts in the FY 1975 request. To avoid the loss of all prospects for a negotiated settlement, I urge your support against further reductions in the program of military assistance for South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I am going to support it this year, the amount that is in the bill, the amount that the House has approved. But I am making reservations, and I do not hesitate to say so. I think the appropriate committees, the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, ought to look into it very closely. We ought to make a policy that we are going to stand by and live by, and not have this problem every time an appropriations bill comes up. Let us determine what we are going to do, and then do it. We ought to give them notice that within a year's time, or some such time, we are not going to provide any further assistance. If we are going to provide help this year, we should give them notice that within a year's time, or some such time, we are not going to provide any further assistance. If we are going to provide help this year, we should give them enough funds to try to make certain that it will sustain them until we reach that point next year for a final decision.

Mr. President, I do not relish supporting this matter at all. I do not like it. I do not like it a bit. I have not liked it, any of it, in the last 20 years. But we do have a problem here, and we have an obligation, as I see it, at this moment to try to help these people to protect themselves; try to prevent their being overrun and conquered, and their government and their freedom destroyed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

I am practically through. I do not think we need to spend further time on this.

Mr. President, I think we ought to recognize some of the facts.

Fact No. 1 is what this amendment does is propose that we provide in military assistance for South Vietnam exactly the same as the Senate voted last year, \$550 million, not a reduction from what we recommended last year. Last year we did settle for a higher figure.

We went to conference. This year we will go to conference and we would presumably settle for some kind of a compromise figure. I am simply recommending that we provide the same amount as last year.

No. 2, in spite of all the argument and all the rhetoric, the fact is that the best evidence we have from the Defense Intelligence Agency is that the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union have sharply reduced the amount that they have been giving to North Vietnam.

The statistics are very clear. They cut the amount they gave in 1972 by more than one-half what it was. Their figures show that we are providing 8 times as much money to South Vietnam as the major Communist countries are providing North Vietnam.

The Senator from Arizona disputes that, and argues that we include in our military figures not only hard goods but many other things.

I say that is the discretion of the Defense Department. If they want to confine it to planes, tanks, ammunition, rifles, and so forth, good. That is what they should do.

Mr. President, in addition to these points, I would like to discuss the argument that has been made that there has been exaggeration of the corruption in South Vietnam. General Thieu's own paper, the most conservative paper in Saigon, and the paper that supports the administration, was responsible for the evidence that uncovered the fact that a number of new American A-37's worth \$500,000 each were being dismantled and sold for scrap on the black market in Saigon.

Furthermore, there is the fact the police raid on an illegal scrap operation yielded the wings of 15 planes as well as substantial amounts of other U.S.-made equipment which was being readied for foreign export.

I realize that corruption does take place under these circumstances. But the one action—the one action—Congress can take to reduce that is to limit the amount of funds available. This is the only way we can put real pressure on the Thieu administration to make sure that this kind of corruption does not take place in the future. As long as they have an abundance of hundreds of millions of dollars, it is predictable that this type of corruption is going to recur.

One further point, Mr. President: It has been said that if we do not provide the full amount the Appropriations Committee has recommended and the Secretary of Defense says he has to have, South Vietnam is going to go down the drain.

This is very hard to accept in view of the findings of congressional committees and the testimony of Gen. William Caldwell. The Frelinghuysen report, for example, and the testimony of General Caldwell before the Senate Armed Services Committee this year, showed that the Saigon regime has increased its population control by 6 percent since the ceasefire and its control over hamlets by 770. This is not what happens when a regime is in dire straits. It is improving its position.

So on every score, from the standpoint of the balancing of the amount of aid on the other side, which has been set by our officials as the principal purpose of our military aid, we are giving more. No matter whether you accept my statistics or the statistics of the Senator from Arizona, that is the case. We are giving more, substantially more. If my amendment is accepted we would still give more than the Communist countries are giving.

There is not any question that we can help put pressure on reducing corruption if we reduce the amount of money available.

There also seems to be little question that, when you look at the facts, the South Vietnamese are not about to go under if we provide a limited reduction in the amount of military assistance. They have been doing well and they will continue to do all right.

Mr. President, I do not know if the Senator from Arkansas has any request for any further time.

Does the Senator from Arkansas wish to yield back his time or have a quorum call with the time taken from both sides?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I will yield 1 minute to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from yielding.

Mr. President, just for the record, back when we had this matter up for consideration in the Armed Services Committee on Thursday, May 23, 1974, as chairman I issued a press statement calling upon the Department of Defense for a closer surveillance, and so forth, with reference to this program. My recollection is I wrote the Secretary of Defense a letter to that effect, but I have been unable to locate the letter. As a substitute, I will use the press release to describe it.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this press release to improve surveillance over the matter be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the press release was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEWS RELEASE OF SENATOR JOHN C. STENNIS

Senator John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, requested today that "a highly competent individual of top reputation" be assigned to take full charge of the billion-dollar program of military aid to South Vietnam.

Senator Stennis made the request in a statement directed to the Defense Department and the White House. He stressed that a top administrator should have full-time responsibility for the program under the general direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The text of the Senator's statement:

"In recent weeks the Senate Committee on Armed Services has devoted much time to the program of military aid for South Vietnam. That program was originally designed to finance a shooting war in which U.S. troops, South Vietnamese, and others were engaged.

"The after-the-fact accounting procedures which may have been necessary for full-scale fighting with allies are wholly inappropriate for providing aid to a single nation—South Vietnam. I think this program must be tightened up and put on a sound basis, and I am asking the Defense Department and the White House to do that.

"In the pending Military Procurement Authorization Bill, the Senate Armed Serv-

ices Committee has provided a new accounting format for military aid to South Vietnam. In place of the merged accounting arrangement known as Military Assistance Service Funded, MASF, our Committee has set up for this assistance a separate appropriations account which, in contrast to the present arrangement, would be subject to the same auditing and review procedures as any other appropriations account. Among other things, it would be subject to audit by the General Accounting Office. Obligations would require approval by the Secretary and would be charged immediately against the ceiling set by Congress.

"To administer this new program, I think a highly competent individual of top reputation should be assigned to take full charge and supervise operations here and in South Vietnam.

"I understand that the program will be the general responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, but I want a top-man assigned full-time to this job.

"I favor a reasonable amount of military aid for South Vietnam in the wake of our withdrawal. I am sure, however, that the Program must be put on a new basis which reflects the present situation."

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If both sides yield back their time—

Mr. McCLELLAN. Has the Senator from Wisconsin yielded back his time?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield back, unless the Senator from Arizona wishes to ask a question.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If both sides yield back their time, does the vote occur at 11 o'clock or now?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous-consent agreement was for the vote to occur at 11 o'clock. That is the time the vote will occur.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I had a request from the Senator from Missouri to speak briefly. I will yield to the Senator from Missouri for 2 minutes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yesterday, I gave reasons why I was going to support the Proxmire amendment. This morning I found that due to a rather intricate formula in the Corps of Engineers, a very important and essential dam for my State, slightly north of Kansas City, has been rejected. I also found that an important dam in Southwest Missouri, where the amount of money being asked was \$75,000—\$75,000—was rejected. The total project to go to completion would be \$18 million.

I have respect for those who believe that we have an obligation to the South Vietnamese. But the longer I am in this body the more I believe that our basic obligation is to the people of the United States, many of whom are poor, many of whom need their water developed, many of whom wonder why it is so necessary for us to spend all these billions upon billions of dollars in foreign countries when they cannot get the opportunity to have the Congress approve a few thousand dollars or in some cases a few million

dollars to improve their own quality of life.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. PROXMIRE. May I say to the Senator from Missouri I think he raises one of the most important points of all, one that has been neglected this morning in the debate.

The Senator from Rhode Island discussed it yesterday very eloquently. It is a fact that this inflationary year, when we have to do everything to hold down every nickel of spending we possibly can, when we are denying assistance for health, for education, for well being, for housing, for transportation, for so many purposes that we need—and the House just yesterday made an extremely sharp reduction in the mass transit bill—here is one area of assistance to South Vietnam where a modest reduction back to the level we recommended last year, it seems to me, is in order.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his remarks.

May I say that I have been in South Vietnam many times—in 1961, in 1965, in 1966, in 1967, and in 1972—and every time I went there I became more and more convinced that the sooner we got out of South Vietnam, and stopped pouring these billions of dollars down the rathole of that country, the better off it would be for the people of this country.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I am pleased to join in supporting the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), for I believe that military assistance to South Vietnam can and should be reduced further.

As a result of a compromise in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I supported that committee's recommendation of a \$900 million ceiling for this MASF program. As I said at the time, however, I hoped and expected that the Appropriations Committee would examine these requests on the basis of later evidence in order to consider further sensible reductions.

That committee has already seen fit to reduce the funding to \$700 million. I believe that recent evidence also justifies a further cut—to the \$550 million figure proposed in this amendment.

One of the most significant recent studies of this program was conducted by staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose report was published just 3 weeks ago.

That report makes these major findings:

U.S. officials who study North Vietnam most closely agree that a major Communist attack is unlikely this year and perhaps even next year.

While overall North Vietnamese and PRG military strength has increased about 30,000 men since the Paris Agreements were signed, Saigon has added over 50,000 men.

Both sides have continued military operations to consolidate their respective positions, but Saigon has expanded its control by 6 to 15 percent.

U.S. officials acknowledge that the mass of military equipment poured into

South Vietnam just before the cease-fire has not been well utilized.

And although officials in Washington continue to worry about alleged ammunition shortages in view of congressional cutbacks in MASF, the Foreign Relations Committee staff members report that "no mention of such shortages was made to us in briefings or discussions in Vietnam."

In fact, U.S. officials have no reliable means of verifying expenditures of ammunition by the South Vietnamese.

In view of these facts, I do not see why we should continue to fund this program at nearly last year's level. A \$550 million program would be much more in keeping with our desire to phaseout of this huge monetary commitment to Saigon and also to encourage the transition from a military to a political struggle.

After all, the South Vietnamese are far from defenseless. They have the fifth largest armed force in the world, and one of the largest and best equipped air forces. Even this \$550 million in military aid will be more than double what North Vietnam received last year from its allies.

The military machine we have built in South Vietnam is also an instrument for repression and the locus of waste and corruption. By continuing massive aid to the Thieu regime, we are in fact undermining the chances for peace or democratic government in South Vietnam.

Cutting military aid to \$550 million now is a responsible and a moral action.

Every time one of these requests is debated in the Congress, there seems to be a flood of scare stories from Saigon. We heard dire predictions last winter, when we denied the request for \$266 million in the supplemental. We heard more in June, when we cut the request to \$900 million. Now we hear them again.

What we do not hear is that plaintive cry for peace, for an end to the violence, which comes from the innocent people caught in the crossfire of the contending armies.

These farmers and orphans and urban squatters do not care who sits in the presidential palace, or who collects the taxes. Or if they do care, they have never been given a free choice or a free vote to express their preference.

The United States, by its own actions, cannot impose peace where there is no will for peace. But we can reduce our own involvement in perpetuating this long and tragic conflict.

This amendment contributes to that worthy goal, and I shall gladly support it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, we do have many pressing domestic problems here, and there are many important Government programs that need to be funded and funded adequately. But this does not obviate the fact that we have a world responsibility. We have to think in terms of the role of the United States in trying to promote a climate in this world in which we can achieve peace and security, a climate in which people can aspire to self-determination and have some reasonable hope of realizing that

aspiration. If we do not promote that climate in this world, I think we are going to inflict damage on the security of the United States.

Domestic problems are important. But it is also important that we create the kind of climate in this world in which we can preoccupy ourselves with domestic problems and not with international problems. To walk away from Vietnam and turn Vietnam over to Hanoi—and that is precisely what we would do if the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin were adopted—would be a dereliction of our responsibility. It would mean that we are saying that 50,000 American have died in vain. It would mean that the Paris agreement, which was so painfully put together, would be treated as a scrap of paper, because we would leave the South Vietnamese without the capacity to defend themselves. Already, in violation of the Paris agreement, the North Vietnamese have built up their forces to the greatest strength ever in South Vietnam.

I do not see how we can, in good conscience, abandon these people to what will be a major offensive and a certain blood bath should we fail to supply them with the military equipment they need.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Texas that I am not proposing that we get out of Vietnam. Perhaps I should, but I am not. I am proposing that we allow \$550 million, an enormous amount, for military assistance to Vietnam, in addition to the extra \$500 million that the Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended we provide in economic aid for South Vietnam. This is more aid than we provide to any other country in the world, more than we provide to all of South America. This is not abandoning our world responsibilities at all.

Further, in terms of the Paris agreement, the fact is that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have reduced their assistance far more than we have—as a matter of fact, far more than we would even if we adopted my amendment.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I appreciate the cooperation of the able Senator from Wisconsin in permitting me to present a matter to the Senate

PUBLIC WORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIZATIONS EXTENSION

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 14883.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14883) to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to extend the authorizations for a 2-year period, and for other purposes,

and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. RANDOLPH. I move that the Senate further insist upon its amendment.

The motion was agreed to.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1975

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would just remind the Senate that the President of the United States feels very strongly about this appropriation. The Secretary of Defense has written a letter, a copy of which is on the desk of each Senator, showing the importance of this appropriation. The Secretary of State has made a statement strongly favoring this appropriation.

I remind Senators, too, that this amount of \$700 million is only four-fifths of 1 percent of the defense budget. Originally, the Defense Department requested \$1.45 billion. That was cut to \$1 billion in conference with the Senate and the House. The Senate Appropriations Committee has now cut it to \$700 million.

Mr. President, if we go below that amount, we are jeopardizing the freedom of the people of South Vietnam. Furthermore, we will not be keeping our commitment there, which was the promise to those people of a tank for a tank, a gun for a gun, so that they can fight their own war and retain their freedom.

I hope that this amendment will be defeated.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, would it be in order at this time for me to call up my amendment to the Proxmire amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment would be in order.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I call up my amendment, Mr. President, and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 1, line 2, of amendment No. 1810, in lieu of "\$550,000,000" insert "0".

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I did not hear the last word in the proposed amendment.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The word is "zero." The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment again.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 1, line 2 of amendment No. 1810, in lieu of "\$550,000,000" insert "0".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE). On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) and the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 21, nays 71, as follows:

[No. 373 Leg.]		
YEAS—21		
Abourezk	Hartke	Schweiker
Biden	Haskell	Scott
Burdick	Hatfield	William L.
Church	Hughes	Symington
Cranston	Mansfield	Tunney
Eagleton	Muskie	Welcker
Fulbright	Pell	
Hart	Ribicoff	
NAYS—71		
Aiken	Dominick	Metcalf
Allen	Eastland	Metzenbaum
Baker	Ervin	Mondale
Bartlett	Fannin	Montoya
Bayh	Fong	Moss
Beall	Goldwater	Nelson
Bellmon	Griffin	Nunn
Bennett	Gurney	Packwood
Bentsen	Hansen	Pastore
Bible	Hathaway	Pearson
Brock	Helms	Proxmire
Brooke	Hollings	Randolph
Buckley	Hruska	Roth
Byrd,	Huddleston	Scott, Hugh
Harry F., Jr.	Humphrey	Stafford
Byrd, Robert C.	Inouye	Stennis
Cannon	Jackson	Stevens
Chiles	Johnston	Stevenson
Clark	Long	Taft
Cook	Magnuson	Talmadge
Cotton	Mathias	Thurmond
Curtis	McClellan	Tower
Dole	McClure	Williams
Domenici	McIntyre	Young
NOT VOTING—8		
Case	Kennedy	Percy
Gravel	McGee	Sparkman
Javits	McGovern	

So the amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONTAYA). The question now recurs on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE). On this question, the yeas and nays have

been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSTON (after having voted in the negative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY). If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withdraw my vote.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) and the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 47, as follows:

[No. 374 Leg.]		
YEAS—44		
Abourezk	Haskell	Nelson
Bayh	Hatfield	Packwood
Bible	Hathaway	Pastore
Biden	Huddleston	Pell
Brooke	Hughes	Proxmire
Burdick	Inouye	Randolph
Cannon	Magnuson	Ribicoff
Church	Mansfield	Schweiker
Clark	Mathias	Scott,
Cook	Metcalf	William L.
Cranston	Metzenbaum	Stevenson
Eagleton	Mondale	Symington
Fulbright	Montoya	Tunney
Hart	Moss	Welcker
Hartke	Muskie	Williams
NAYS—47		
Aiken	Dole	Long
Allen	Domenici	McClellan
Baker	Dominick	McClure
Bartlett	Eastland	McIntyre
Beall	Ervin	Nunn
Bellmon	Fannin	Pearson
Bennett	Fong	Roth
Bentsen	Goldwater	Scott, Hugh
Brock	Griffin	Stafford
Buckley	Gurney	Stennis
Byrd,	Hansen	Stevens
Harry F., Jr.	Helms	Taft
Byrd, Robert C.	Hollings	Talmadge
Chiles	Hruska	Thurmond
Cotton	Humphrey	Tower
Curtis	Jackson	Young
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1		
Johnston, against.		
NOT VOTING—8		
Case	Kennedy	Percy
Gravel	McGee	Sparkman
Javits	McGovern	

So Mr. PROXMIRE's amendment was rejected.

Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE, AND JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS—TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT ON NELSON-ERVIN AMENDMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at this time to ask for a 1-hour limitation on the Nelson-Ervin amendment which will be offered to the State Department appropriation bill. This has been cleared with the manager of the bill.

I wish to ask if the distinguished ranking Republican would agree, as has the distinguished ranking Republican of the subcommittee.

Mr. YOUNG. I have no objection. Mr. MANSFIELD. And the chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. PASTORE. I have no objection.

Mr. HRUSKA. I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no objection, it is so ordered.

J. ALLEN FREAR BUILDING

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1064, S. 3815.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 3815) to designate the Federal office building located in Dover, Del., as the "J. Allen Frear Building" which had been reported from the Committee on Public Works with an amendment on page 1, in line 5, strike out the words "the late" so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Federal office building located in Dover, Delaware, is designated as the "J. Allen Frear Building", in honor of Senator J. Allen Frear.
 Sec. 2. Any reference to such building in any law, rule, document, map, or other record of the United States is deemed to be a reference to such building by the name designated for such building by the first section of this Act.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Delaware for his support of this bill to name the new Federal office building in Dover, Del., the J. Allen Frear Building. I have spoken on this matter on two previous occasions, so my remarks shall be brief.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that Federal buildings should be more than concrete and steel—they should embody and complement the community in which they stand. Federal buildings can do this by bearing as their name the name of a distinguished member of the local community. In Dover, Del., such a man is former U.S. Senator J. Allen Frear.

J. Allen Frear's entry in the Biographical Directory of the American Congress reads as follows:

Frear, Joseph Allen, Jr., a Senator from Delaware; born on a farm near Rising Sun, Kent County, Del., March 7, 1903; attended the Rising Sun rural school and Caesar Rodney High School; graduated from the University of Delaware in 1924; president and

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owner of a retail business in Dover, Del.; Commissioner of Delaware State College 1936-1941 and Delaware Old Age Welfare Commission 1938-1948; director, Federal Land Bank Board, Baltimore, Maryland 1938-1947, being chairman of the board the last two years; director of the Farmer's Bank of Dover and the Baltimore Trust Co., of Camden, Del.; president of Kent General Hospital, Dover, Del., 1947-1951; during World War II served in the United States Army as a major, with overseas service in the European Theater of Operations with the Military Government, 1944-1946; delegate to Democratic National Conventions in 1948, 1952, and 1953; elected as a Democrat to the United States Senate in 1948 for the term commencing January 3, 1949; reelected in 1954 for the term ending January 3, 1961; unsuccessful candidate for reelection in 1960; appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 15, 1961, resigned in October 1963; elected a vice president of the Wilmington Trust Co., in Delaware, 1963; is a resident of Dover, Delaware.

This entry is enough to tell us that former Senator Frear has led a worthwhile life of community service, that he has done much for the people of Delaware. But it does little to point out the essential humanity of this man—his perception, his warmth, and his good sense; the qualities that have earned him friendship as well as respect, and deserve note.

Mr. President, in a time when suspicion is widespread that many in public office are not worthy of trust, it is important that we honor those who have lived a public life that is worthy of trust. For that reason I sponsor and urge my colleagues to support S. 3185, to designate the Federal office building located in Dover, Del., as the J. Allen Frear Building.

Mr. President, shortly after I first suggested that the Federal office building in Dover be named for former Senator Frear, an article appeared in the Delaware State News supporting that idea. I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From The Delaware State News, July 9, 1974]
NAMING OF FED BUILDING FOR FREAR IS GOOD IDEA

(By Harry C. McSherry)

A proposed action that was met with pleasure by all persons learning about it was the one to name the new Dover federal office building in honor of former U.S. Sen. Allen J. Frear of Dover.

The fact that the former Senator is a prominent Democrat apparently did not deter U.S. Sen. William V. Roth, a Republican, from suggesting it and, further, indicating he planned to confer with the proper Senate Committee concerning the matter.

As a supporter of civic matters, either in public, or privately, the former Senator has been acknowledged in the front ranks of affairs locally for a long term of years.

His pleasant manner has brought him an untold number of friends and has likewise aided his efforts in many activities.

It is needless to say the local public will be greatly pleased should the proposal of Senator Roth be successful.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have co-sponsored S. 3815, a bill to designate the new Federal Office Building in Dover, Del., as the "J. Allen Frear Building."

At the request of Senator Roth, I have had the bill reported out of the Public Works Committee of which I am a member. The Public Works Committee in its report stated that,

The committee believes that it would be most appropriate to name the New Federal Office Building in Dover the "J. Allen Frear Building."

J. Allen Frear served as the U.S. Senator from Delaware for two terms from 1949 to 1961. Senator Frear has dedicated his entire life to public service. A person of the highest moral integrity, Senator Frear has conducted himself in both elected office and his many public service activities, in a fair, impartial, nonpartisan manner. He has always placed the interests of the Nation and the people of the State of Delaware before self or party.

The best indication of this is demonstrated by the fact that my Republican colleague from Delaware first came up with the idea to name this building after Senator Frear, a Democrat.

I, therefore, in recognition of his outstanding record of public service, urge your support of S. 3815 when it comes before the Senate for consideration.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

VETERANS EDUCATION AND REHABILITATION AMENDMENTS OF 1974—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 12628, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated by title.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12628) to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the rates of vocational rehabilitation, educational assistance, and special training allowances paid to eligible veterans and other persons; to make improvements in the educational assistance programs; and for other purposes, having met after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 19, 1974, at pp. H8649-H8674.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation of not to exceed 5 minutes on the consideration of the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I rise to urge the Senate to adopt the conference report to H.R. 12628, the Vietnam Era Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974. The conference report before you has

reconciled the differences between the Senate and the House versions and has been agreed to unanimously by the Senate and House conferees. Mr. President, this bill is not all that we had hoped for but by and large it does contain the vast majority of the provisions passed by the Senate on June 19 of this year.

The one item which occasioned the greatest opposition from both the Administration and from the House conferees was the partial tuition assistance provision which would have provided up to \$720 a school year in additional educational allowances. While the tuition provision was dropped from this compromise bill, the conferees have agreed to a provision directing the Veterans' Administration to carry out a thorough study and to report to Congress and the President within 12 months on the opportunities for abuse and administrative difficulties arising from a tuition assistance program if one were to be enacted. Various interested organizations and agencies are to be consulted and their views solicited as part of the study process. The study would draw its context from the findings of abuses in connection with the World War II GI bill program and from an investigation of these problems as presently being experienced under the GI bill tuition assistance programs such as chapter 31, vocational rehabilitation, correspondence courses, flight training and PRP, and would include recommendations by the Veterans' Administration as to legislative or administrative ways in which any such abuses and difficulties could be prevented and mitigated under present or future programs.

Mr. President, I believe such a study would be valuable and may put to rest some of the persistent fears that exist with respect to any tuition assistance program. I must be candid and admit that I am disappointed that this provision was not agreed to, because it remains my contention that the concern over possible abuses in the GI bill program does not rest so much in the level or manner of payment as it does either with the quality of services offered by some institutions presently eligible to participate in the VA program or with deceptive, erroneous, or misleading advertising sales or enrollment practices by them. I am thus gratified that new and important controls added by the Senate which should mitigate against those abuses have been retained in the compromise version. Perhaps with the prospective study by the Veterans' Administration and the operation of these new controls added by the Senate, we will be able to approach the issue of tuition with increased knowledge, decreased concern and reduced emotion.

Mr. President, there have been some suggestions that this bill is inflationary and that more "compromise" is needed. I believe this suggestion is not in accord with the facts and ignores the extensive amount of compromise which has occurred already. The Senate by receding on the partial tuition assistance allowance has agreed in effect to a net reduction in the original Senate bill approved by a vote of 91 to 0 of almost \$500 million. I believe any objective observer will