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DIRTY TRICKS—PART II

Forgive him, Mother, for Miles Copeland has undertaken to tell us what CIA is all about; why 'intelligence' and 'espionage' are different, what the term 'agent' really means, and why things may just be looking up

There's a CIA in Your Future

MILES COPELAND

BESIDES THE *Encyclopedia Britannica*, a complete set of the works of Dickens, and autographed copies of *The Jeweler's Eye*, *The Four Quartets*, and *On Being a Real Person*, Mother's floor-to-ceiling bookshelves contain every known book on spies and counterspies, with the latest ones especially in evidence—from Wise and Ross's *The Invisible Government* to a book by somebody named Fletcher Proutty propounding a theory that the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of CIA comprise a "secret team" which runs the affairs of the country. Why such a library? "We have to read all this stuff to understand what everybody says about us," explained Mother.

Until the top people at CIA started reading what the outside world thought about spies and spying they had to face their critics in bewildered silence, not having the faintest idea what they were talking about. "Is it true," some senator once asked Frank Wisner when he was head of the CIA's covert services, "that in every American embassy you have at least one agent?" Frank thought the senator was implying that the CIA spied on the State Department. "No, senator," he said, "We only put agents in embassies of Communist countries."

Image Problem

Then he realized that the senator was talking about regular employees, not agents, and he had to explain that he would promptly fire any of his employees who got themselves directly involved in "agent" work, i.e., spying. The senator, whose information came from popular books on spies, didn't believe him. "Okay," said Mother, "so

now when some congressman or newspaperman speaks of our employees as 'agents' we know what they mean, and we don't fight it. But it does inconvenience our image."

A "convenient" image, it appears, is all the Agency seeks. Angus Thuermer, the CIA's public relations officer, despite all his Shelley Berman chatter is a very tough hombre and is the only official in the Administration I have met who doesn't feel he has to apologize for the Agency.

He can defend the Agency's actions in Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere in such a way as to convince almost anyone whose mind is not totally closed. But, aside from the fact that none of the newsmen he sees feels inclined to report what he says ("It's bad taste these days to go around saying nice things about the CIA," a Washington columnist told me), the Agency itself holds him back. His job is not to give the CIA a happy public image such as is sought by Coca-Cola or General Motors, but to pass on to the general public an understanding which will silence those critics who play to the galleries, and to young people a picture of Agency work which will make them suspect that the CIA might not be such a bad place to be employed.

Recruiting Good Guys

So long as the Agency can hold onto its best personnel and recruit high quality replacements, say its top officers, it can ride out the post-Watergate storm and then put itself through the organizational overhaul it has long needed. Recruitment, they say, is the main problem. The campus disturbances of the past few years have helped enormously ("anything those creeps are against, I'm *for*," a Columbia law student told a CIA recruiter after having to karate chop his way through a jeering crowd to make the interview), but the constant harping on the CIA's alleged misdemeanors by supposedly responsible adults does plant doubts in the minds of young people of the sort the Agency needs. Senator Church may not be a great statesman, but he *is* a senator, and when he flailed out at the CIA because its officers had actually *talked* to ITT executives some of the Agency's recruits awaiting security clearances dropped out before the clearances were completed.

On the face of it, the Agency's concern over ITT's problems was clear enough. A Soviet-backed candidate was about to become President of Chile, to confiscate all American assets in the

Mr. Copeland's Spies and Counter-spies will be brought out in the spring by Simon and Schuster.

country, including those of ITT, and to make his capital a base for anti-American activity throughout Latin America. In asking the help of the U.S. Government ITT was doing exactly what any American victim of such developments would be expected to do. But with a democratically elected senator raising a fuss, the youngsters reasoned, there must have been more to the affair than met the eye. The insistence of other congressmen that the CIA's attempts to identify our country's enemies and learn about their activities somehow reflect a "Gestapo mentality" or result from the "pressures of Big Business" has scared off even more—all on the grounds that "the congressmen *must* know something we don't."

Intelligence v. *Espionage*

My Agency friends tell me that they are toying with the idea of coming into the open to explain, mainly to young people, just what the intelligence business is all about, and what role the Agency is supposed to play in it. While the era of Nixonmania lasts, however, I doubt that any program to educate the public on the CIA will get past the idea stage. Therefore, during this "sorting out period," as Mother and the others call it, if the story is to be told it can only be told by a knowledgeable outsider such as myself. Here (forgive me, Mother) goes.

First, the layman should be made to understand that "intelligence" and "espionage" are not synonymous. "Intelligence," a CIA training manual says, "is looking before you leap." A market survey is one form of intelligence; an ordinary map of New York City is another. So is looking out of the window to see what the weather is like before you decide what to wear to the office. Intelligence is anything you do, any information you take into consideration, in order to maximize your chances of doing the right thing—or, more important, to avoid the wrong. Only to the extent that you *spy* to get the information you need are you engaged in espionage. But most people—and most corporations and governments—learn most of what they need to know without having to spy.

The CIA is no exception. As an intelligence organization, it does for the United States Government what organizations of other names do for business concerns. It resorts to espionage to about the same extent that business organizations resort to it—or perhaps less, if we are to believe accounts of recent industrial espionage scandals. Specifically, the CIA's espionage unit contributes about 5 per cent of the material which goes into the U.S. Government's highest level intelligence summaries, and about one tenth of 1 per cent of the total quantity of material on which these summaries are based. One satellite in a single turn of the globe amasses more "intelligence information" (i.e., raw information which is processed into "finished intelligence") than the CIA's spies collect in a month. So what does the CIA employee do in the course of a day's work? "We read newspapers," was the truthful answer of an Agency staff member who was being interviewed by someone writing an article for a magazine.

It is CIA policy to use espionage only in quest of information which is indispensable to national security, and which cannot be adequately obtained by other means. The CIA's spies sometimes acquire information which does not meet these qualifications, but only as a byproduct of operations designed to get information which does meet them. More often, it gets non-essential—and often useless—information from sources developed in the course of its passive "political action" programs. A prime minister of some African or Asian country decides for some reason—just possibly for the reason that he thinks he is doing what is best for his country—that he wants to stand against the anti-American currents which surround him, but he feels he needs insurance. After some weeks of fencing with the American ambassador, he is turned over to the CIA "station chief"—for the reason that the CIA has facilities, and the State Department does not, for setting up Swiss bank accounts, arranging for hasty departures in case of emergency, and providing all the other elements of insurance needed to bolster the courage of a straight-thinking prime minister. In the course of arranging all this, the CIA officer who is in contact with him gets a continuing flow of political information, most of which is concerned with reasons why the man is behaving as he is. As time goes on, and as the prime minister gains confidence, the supply of information is put on a regular basis, and the prime minister is, from that time on, an "agent"—although not one reporting information which, strictly speaking, is indispensable to national security and which cannot be obtained by other means.

If the CIA's espionage service is larger than its officers would like it to be (apart from operations in Indochina, it has 15 per cent of the Agency's total personnel, and 25 per cent of the budget), it is not because of genuine, conventional espionage operations, but because of the political action activities with which it has been saddled.

In the Communist countries and throughout the Third World the CIA has hundreds of cabinet ministers, government officials, and leading politicians on its payroll, all seeking "insurance." Some of them are valuable as agents, many are not—especially those who do not gain in confidence, and who decide that they need *re*insurance from the other side. All the same, keeping the doors open to the government leaders and politicians of these countries is regarded as a necessary practice in a world where, whether or not it suits our democratic principles, tremendous pressures are exerted from the other side. Every CIA station chief complains about the deadwood on his payroll, but he is overridden—by his ambassador, not by his bosses at Langley. Our diplomats feel that we must maintain a pretense of obedience to the policy, "We do not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign nations," even in those places where it is obvious that we couldn't bring about fair elections if we tried.

Secret Army in Laos

This is by way of saying that the CIA comes to "political action," as those operations in aid of interfering without interfering are called, only with the greatest reluctance. All political action operations in which the Agency has been involved, including the small percentage of them which have been found out and reported in the press, have been planned and conducted on explicit instructions from the White House. There is no "invisible government"; the CIA does not generate its own political action operations. It *influences* the decisions of its superiors, in the way that market analysts influence the decisions of the soap manufacturers who employ them, but in

every case where one of its political action operations has failed it has used its influence, unsuccessfully, to persuade its superiors not to go ahead with it. The Bay of Pigs fiasco is an example: A review of the Agency's reporting prior to that occasion shows clearly that its officers had misgivings throughout, and on the eve of the launching stated unequivocally that it could not possibly succeed without the air cover

which President Kennedy had at the last minute withdrawn.

CIA officers are against *all* large scale operations, from the attempted invasion of Cuba to the army in Laos, simply because they are large scale and therefore, by definition, out of place in a secret organization. According to Mother and his staff, the unsecret secret army in Laos is probably the Agency's last anomaly. Although it was a success (a fact which its critics seem to regard as irrelevant), its cost, not only in mere funds but in operational manpower and administrative time, was such as to throw the whole Agency out of kilter. Now that it is all over, the CIA's "dirty tricks" specialists will get back to concentrating on what they know best, "precision penetration," directed against "targets" of the "people's war against imperialism and capitalism."

"Precision penetration," as the term is used by espionage specialists means: 1) identifying a "target"—i.e., the exact place (an office safe, a conference room, the brain of a person) where "the secret" is kept; 2) making a thorough "target study"—i.e., mapping the target's layout, examining the security defense around it, determining what persons have access to it, and getting whatever information is necessary to determine how best to go about recruiting someone in the organization or more persons who have been found to have access to the target and recruiting them as agents, receiving their reports, giving them instructions, and paying them. As the attention of the specialists shifts toward the conventicles of "the people's war against capitalism and imperialism" there will be modifications to the approach, but the essentials remain the same.

The CIA's agents, please note, are persons who are already inside their assigned targets, not persons who have been introduced from without. The suggestion that the CIA might pick out some clever young Westerner, teach him perfect Russian, drill him in continental mannerisms, and send him off to insinuate himself into a job in the Kremlin has always been a fiction. The CIA has rarely, if ever, employed American citizens as agents. (The U-2 pilot, Gary Powers, was no exception. A friend of mine in the KGB assures me that the word "spy" was flung at Powers only as part of the prosecution's rhetoric, and that he was found guilty not of espionage but of "acts against the security of the state," and was sentenced for what he was, an ordinary airplane pilot taking photographs in forbidden areas of the USSR.) In modern practice, the CIA does not even employ locals as agents unless they are already properly placed to gain information of value. In a Moslem country it would employ only Moslems, never a Jew or even a Christian. To penetrate a Palestinian terrorist organization, it would employ only Palestinian terrorists—Christians being permissible in this case, since Christian elements are fast gaining ground in Palestinian extremist circles.

There are various obstacles in the way of achieving "precision penetration" of Palestinian terrorist movements, and all other targets of the "people's war." One is that these targets are not only compartmented, but compartmented on an ever changing basis: A group bent on blowing up the American embassy or hijacking a TWA airliner might be formed at six o'clock one evening, exist only for the duration of the operation, then disperse—its members going in various directions to join other ad hoc groups. Another is that the targets are not offices, complete with safes containing TOP SECRET written materials and corruptible file clerks, but rooms in the apartments of the terrorists in Arab [illegible] in refugee camps. Another difficulty is that there are many targets to penetrate, and the relations between them are so loose and unsystematic that those who manage espionage operations against them keep finding themselves in blind alleys. The only answer to the problem seems to be to keep whole communities under surveillance. "This means we are subscribing to police state methods," says Mother, "but what else can we do?"

With intelligence on the "people's war" pouring in as it presently is, even the most liberal-minded CIA officers feel that they have no choice but to do *whatever* is necessary to deal with it. They believe that, sooner rather than later, the public will swing over to sharing the alarm, and will become suddenly unsqueamish about police state methods or whatever it takes to give them a good night's sleep. The CIA, the FBI, and other security agencies had better be prepared. They had better have in readiness methods of "community surveillance" which have in them only such invasions of privacy as are absolutely necessary, and which ensure that the invasions are handled with such discretion and delicacy that even the most ardent liberal can't conscientiously object to them.

The FBI has a comparatively simple problem. Provided it can be assured of freedom from political influences, it



can easily administer a system of community surveillance which will be pervasive enough to check terrorist influences in the U.S. yet not constitute more than a minor departure from our traditional ways of doing things. The CIA, however, must enable security services of other countries to apply effective community surveillance systems, lest avoid giving undue power to governments which are corrupt or other-

tipping its hand to those who back the [illegible] and that subscription to the CIA's [illegible] were spotted, close-ups were made and a young man was picked out who is almost certainly the guilty one. The police now have something better than an Identikit picture to go on.

terrorists or to provoke premature outcries from shortsighted liberals, the CIA must reorient its covert services so they can cope with this objective.

Togetherness Against Terror

To wind up this short unauthorized course on the CIA, may I predict that the following will be the principal features of its covert services' New Look:

1. There will be closer cooperation between the CIA's covert services and the FBI and other federal agencies responsible for the internal security of the United States. In earlier days, the CIA and the FBI were barely on speaking terms, but they have been drawn closer together by the Watergate affair, and they will move still closer as clear pictures of the foreign connections of extremist groups in America begin to emerge. Until now, there has been considerable conflict between intelligence and police in counterterrorist operations: Intelligence leans toward keeping discreet track of terrorist groups and neutralizing them quietly, while policemen lean toward arresting their members and bringing them to trial. Intelligence officers think in terms of information, policemen in terms of evidence that will stand up in court. In the future, these distinctions will become less and less important—and extra-legal (i.e., intelligence) actions against terrorists will be closely coordinated with legal (i.e., police) actions against them.

2. There will be less use of foreign security agencies by means of penetrating parts of them, and more emphasis on obtaining straightforward official cooperation. Instead of inducing section heads to spy for the United States, CIA station chiefs will convince their bosses at the top that the control of terrorism is even more in their interests than in ours. The CIA is already having marked success in this. Even the rabidly anti-American Palestinian Liberation Organization has admitted that "Black September" terrorism has harmed the Palestinians far more than it has harmed the Israelis, and all Arab governments but two have taken official positions consistent with this belief. Many of them have openly admitted to recognizing that purely local counterterrorism is ineffective in the face of "Octopus" arrangement is essential. The CIA's penetration of the agencies will continue, but mainly to keep track of the extent to which they are being misused for internal power purposes. One hundred per cent of them *are* being so misused (of course the fuss, during Watergate, over the impropriety of using government investigative agencies as "resources of the incumbency" is lost on all populaces but our own), but it is advisable that we keep tabs on the effects.

3. There will be more cooperation than ever before with private organizations—industrial, financial, labor unions, philanthropic, religious, and educational. The notion that it is somehow sinful for the U.S. Government to help American interests, or vice versa, will pass. These organizations will not allow themselves to be used to cover out-and-out clandestine operations, of course, but there are various quite proper ways in which they can join in a common effort, inside their own organizations and in collaboration with local governments, to combat international terrorism. Cooperation of the sort which existed during World War II and just after between the ITT and the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, may well become the model.

4. Already "community surveillance" facilities—miniature television cameras, microphones, metal detectors, "black lights," and X-rays—are being installed at strategic observation points throughout major cities, industrial areas, and military bases, with concentration on airports, railway stations, communications centers, and other places which are normally most tempting to terrorists. Through vast though simplified monitoring arrangements, a comparatively small number of technicians can keep watch over large crowds of persons, and photograph them so that they can be studied in detail after terrorist occurrences. Within days following the IRA outrages in London railway stations, the British security authorities had installed equipment to photograph in their entirety all the crowds entering and leaving the stations. Following the bomb explosion in the King's Cross station of September 12, Scotland Yard Special Branch officials were able to run over their films again and again in a search for persons

We are not allowed to know the specifics of the American equivalents which have been in effect since early in 1970, but friends of mine in the FBI tell me that they have thwarted perhaps hundreds of terrorist attacks. So have the systems which have been installed by the CIA in other countries of the world, from Morocco to Hong Kong. The press does not report thwarted acts of terrorism, but only those which elude the system. For some time to come, terrorists will elude the system to cause an increase in public indignation, causing, in turn, an escalation of community surveillance systems.

5. All the while, the CIA and the FBI will be on guard against being pushed *too* fast by all the public indignation, and against its being exploited by democratic politicians, including those in "the incumbency." These agencies must become "as antiseptic as the Supreme Court," as Mother puts it, adding that the Buckley proposal that there be "bonded buggers" is already a reality. The easy access to computerized information—which, incidentally, has never been as easy as some critics of the government have claimed—will be stopped. Only a select few persons who have been specially cleared, and who live under special controls, will have access to this information, and before passing it on to other officials who must make use of it they will "sterilize" it so that it contains only what is needed for the legitimate purposes at hand, and no more. Once Watergate has blown over, together with the lingering sympathies for the Ellsbergs and others who have made heroes out of themselves by leaking official secrets, congressmen who have a particular understanding of the problems will push for legislation to strengthen the position of the "bonded buggers" and to enable them to do their job more efficiently. But even without the legislation, I am told, there is every sign that the system will continue to work. Those of us with sinful pasts may relax: only those sins which might justly disqualify us from something we may dare to apply for will ever be found out. Even then, only the bonded buggers will know. □