

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

—————
JULY 7, 8, 9, AND 30, 1971
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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:30 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in session.

The Subcommittee on Europe meets today to begin a series of hearings on the international aspects of the world narcotics problem.

The purpose of these hearings is to analyze in detail the problem and to consider various legislative proposals which have been referred to the subcommittee. This legislation—in various designs—seeks to prohibit the illegal production of, and international trafficking in, narcotics.

Drug abuse is increasing at home and around the world. Of particular concern is the rapid rise in the use of opium-based drugs, particularly heroin, in the United States. Adding to this problem is the alarming increase in heroin addiction within the U.S. military forces in South Vietnam where the best estimates show that as many as 25,000 to 40,000 U.S. servicemen are addicted to heroin.

The worst part of the problem is that the United States is a victim country. It produces no opium or heroin, yet it is the principal market for the illegal producer.

To solve this problem, the United States must have the cooperation of the opium-producing countries. We cannot correct this situation ourselves. And the international aspects themselves are but one part of this exceedingly complex question of drug addiction.

We must be willing to devote more resources, human and material, to fight the illegal international traffic in heroin. Some argue that to do this we must be willing to exercise economic and political pressure, including the imposition of economic sanctions, where necessary to stop these countries from growing poppies.

Others argue that success can best be achieved through the extension of economic assistance which would help opium-producing countries to find suitable alternate crops which will pay the farmer to stop growing poppies.

Unfortunately, opium is often produced in remote areas that are beyond the effective political and administrative control of the governments concerned. It may be that a cutoff of economic and military

assistance to these countries would be counterproductive. The subcommittee hopes to be able to find some answers to this perplexing problem.

Last week we were all heartened to hear that Turkey had agreed not to produce opium after 1972. This is a significant step in the overall battle to stop the illegal international traffic in heroin. Prime Minister Nikat Erim and the Government of Turkey are to be commended for making this decision. Although this decision was a long time in coming, we welcome it, nonetheless.

But Turkey is not the only source of heroin. An increasing amount of heroin is being smuggled into the United States from the Far East—principally from poppies grown in Laos, Thailand, and Burma. We therefore must look also to those countries for help in solving this problem.

Our first witness today is my distinguished colleague from New Jersey, the Honorable Peter W. Rodino. Mr. Rodino ought to be publicly commended, and is by this Member of Congress, for his distinguished record and attention to this problem. He has been the leading Member in the House of Representatives in directing our attention and our energies to finding an answer, both legislative and otherwise, to this vexing and growing problem in the United States.

Mr. Rodino, we are pleased to have you with us.

We know you have a statement, and we would be pleased to hear it.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY**

Mr. RODINO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I appear before you today to urge immediate consideration of my bill, H.R. 1539, to suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs from illegally entering the United States.

I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and members of your committee, for holding long overdue hearings on this bill and various other proposals designed to attack the problem of hard drug addiction at its source—the poppy fields of the Near and Far East.

Before proceeding further, I wish to applaud the recent action of the Turkish Government in banning all opium production after 1972. This development is extremely gratifying, and in the President's words, I hope sincerely that "this step will provide an example which will soon be followed by other nations."

Since Turkey has been a prime producer of illegal opium and the major supplier of heroin which is imported into the United States, the ban, which was announced just one week ago, will undoubtedly alleviate to some extent the heroin crisis in this country. Despite this significant achievement, however, I appear today with feelings of frustration and impatience with the efforts of this country to eradicate the scourge of heroin. After 10 years of high-level negotiations

Turkey has finally agreed to ban opium production—but only upon the condition that they will be allowed to harvest their opium crops in 1971 and 1972.

While I am encouraged by the imposition of this ban, I can feel no sense of elation or relief. Any feeling of optimism is tempered by the fact that Turkey has merely reduced to four the number of opium-producing provinces for the next growing season instead of eliminating them altogether.

To the people of America, this will mean that for two additional years we will sacrifice five individuals a day, three from New York City alone, to the heroin plague. In addition, untold thousands of individuals will become addicted to heroin during this 2-year period. It is entirely conceivable that, unless Turkey restricts illegal opium production in 1971 and 1972, the number of addicts in this country in 1972 may approach one-half million. Therefore, it is necessary for the United States to insure that the Turkish poppy farmers will not be permitted to stockpile their opium during this grace period and, once this ban is completely effectuated, our Government should take every possible measure to guarantee that opium is not thereafter produced in Turkey; and that those other countries which produce illegal opium do not continue to receive U.S. assistance.

While it has been generally estimated that 80 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States originated in Turkey, recent reports indicate an increase in the production, processing, and exportation of heroin from the Far East. For example, in announcing Turkey's ban last week, President Nixon stated that presently 60 percent of the heroin in this country was originally produced in Turkey. In fact, John E. Ingersoll, the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, stated before a House Appropriations Subcommittee that "an estimated 1,300 tons of illegal narcotics is now illegally produced in the Far East each year."

Consequently, although Turkey's ban will decrease the supply of heroin in the United States, it will not entirely eliminate the illegal exportation of hard drugs to this country.

We cannot afford to allow other opium-producing countries to fill the vacuum created by Turkey in 1972. We must not allow illicit traffickers to find new opium fields, to set up new routes to the United States and to continue the exploitation of our young people.

A story which appeared in the New York Times last Friday, July 2, seriously questioned the impact of Turkey's ban on the U.S. drug problem. It was stated in this article that Turkey's action does not constitute a "resolution to the problem, but only one attack." The reporter reached these conclusions after observing that:

Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, and Laos produce opium poppies, that their policing techniques are less than adequate, and that the United States has little reason to believe it will be able to work out arrangements in the near future with these nations as it has with Turkey.

For this reason, I urge enactment of H.R. 1539, which will serve as an inducement to other countries to follow Turkey's lead in banning

opium production. It was a long time in coming, but now that Turkey's ban has been adopted, we cannot relax. We must strive to give notice to all opium-producing countries of the world that the United States will not tolerate the vicious devastation and destruction of American youths.

None of us, I am sure, need to be reminded of the severity of the drug epidemic that has engulfed this country. Nor do I feel it is necessary to recite an endless litany of drug abuse statistics to illustrate the magnitude and scope of this problem. For example, we are all aware that there are 250,000 heroin addicts in this country; that these addicts must steal between \$8 and \$10 billion worth of property to support their habit; and that drug overdose is the primary cause of death for individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 in New York City alone. These figures have filled the editorial pages of our newspapers and have saturated the Congressional Record for many months.

Since I feel that insistent repetition of additional facts will serve no useful purpose at this time, I would ask that a narcotics factsheet which I have prepared be included in the hearing record.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The factsheet referred to follows:)

NARCOTICS FACTSHEET

1. Number of heroin addicts.

Total, United States----- 250,000

Selected areas:

New York City----- 103,000
 Washington, D.C.----- 16,880
 Chicago, Ill----- 9,000
 State of Connecticut----- 2,000

2. Deaths due to heroin overdoses (1970).

Daily rate (per day) :

Total----- 5
 New York City----- 3

By area:

New York----- 1,050
 Washington, D.C.----- 84
 Vietnam (per month)----- 18

3. Opium production (1970) (in tons) :

Country	Legal	Illegal
Total-----	1,050-1,200	1,200-1,650
Turkey-----	130	100
India-----	750	175-200
Far East (Burma, Laos, Thailand, etc.)-----		1,000-1,300

4. Opium (heroin) imported and consumed in United States.

Total amount imported (tons) :

Legal (opium)----- 150
 Illegal (heroin)----- 3-4

Amount of heroin intercepted by Customs' officials (percent)----- 10-15

Source of illegal heroin in United States :

Percent by country or area :

Turkey----- 80
 Mexico----- 15
 Far East Triangle (Laos, Thailand, Burma)----- 5

5. Comparative costs in distributive chain for Turkish raw opium needed to produce 1 kilo (2.2 pounds) of heroin.

Wholesale price to Turkish Government.....	\$165
Wholesale price for same amount on Turkish black market.....	350
Wholesale price to smugglers after morphine base derived from equivalent amount of opium has been converted into 1 kilo of heroin.....	3,500
Wholesale price of 1 kilo of heroin in the United States.....	10,000
Street price of 1 kilo of heroin in United States (purity of 2.5 percent).....	400,000

6. Development of retail price of heroin in the United States, 1969 (from the World Heroin Report—Special Study Mission—House Foreign Affairs Committee).

United States	U.S. dollars per kilogram	U.S. dollars per kilogram of raw opium equivalent
Price to farmer for opium (in Turkey).....	\$25	-----
Wholesale price for heroin (Marseilles).....	5,000	\$500
Border price for heroin (New York).....	10,000	1,000
Wholesale price for heroin (New York).....	22,000	2,200
Retail price for heroin (New York).....	220,000	22,000

Note: When raw opium is converted to morphine and heroin, the volume is reduced by a ratio of 10 to 1.

7. Opium production in Turkey.

Opium producing provinces in Turkey:	
1967-68	21
1970-71	7
1971-72	4
1972-73	(1)
Farmers engaged in opium production.....	70,000

¹ To be announced on June 30, 1971.

8. Heroin addiction in South Vietnam.

Number of addicted U.S. servicemen in Vietnam.....	30,000-40,000
Vietnam veterans--addicts who have returned to United States.....	50,000
Daily cost to support average habit:	
In Vietnam.....	\$8
In United States.....	80
Source of heroin (percent):	
Laos	50
Burma, Thailand, and Hong Kong.....	50

9. Cost impact of drug abuse (including cost of property stolen to support drug habit) \$8-\$10 billion.

10. Allocation of funds for drug abuse control programs.

FEDERAL FUNDS (ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS DURING FISCAL YEARS 1969-72)

[In millions of dollars]

Category	1969	1970	1971	1972
Law enforcement.....	22.3	39.3	48.7	71.9
Treatment and rehabilitation.....	28.5	38.5	78.5	84.5
Education and training.....	2.0	10.0	17.3	19.2
Research and other support.....	15.1	17.3	21.9	22.6
Total.....	67.9	105.1	166.4	198.2

New York State annual expenditures:

Rehabilitation programs.....	Million
Treatment programs.....	\$100
Public welfare assistance to drug addicts.....	80
	50

11. Law enforcement statistics.

Federal:	
Drug-related arrests (1965)-----	50,000
Drug-related arrests (1969)-----	233,690
Percentage increase for all drug violations (1965-70)-----	500
New York City:	
Narcotics arrests (1960)-----	1,841
Narcotics arrests (1969)-----	18,489
Narcotics arrests (1970)-----	26,799
Percentage increase for felony narcotic arrests (1960-70)-----	1,355

12. Recent efforts to alleviate heroin problem.

U.S. Bureau of Customs instituted inspection of incoming parcels sent from South Vietnam. Inspections resulted in 248 narcotic seizures from March 1, 1971 through April 24, 1971. In addition, procedures calling for thorough inspection of returning servicemen have been established.

South Vietnamese Government, on April 15, 1971, launched a national campaign to prevent the importation of illegal narcotics from Laos, Thailand Burma and Hong Kong.

13. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs--seizure statistics¹ (1970).

United States:	
Drug--amount:	<i>Percentage increase over 1969</i>
Heroin--427 pounds-----	205
Cocaine--197 pounds-----	197
Marihuana--17,402 pounds-----	97
Europe and Middle East:	
Drug--amount:	
Heroin--156 pounds-----	
Opium--850 pounds-----	
Morphine base--858 pounds-----	

Mr. RODINO. Certainly, most of us are cognizant of the urgency of the drug crisis. Therefore, it is now imperative that we recognize the need for immediate and meaningful action by the Congress.

Because I recognized this need early last year, I introduced H.R. 17883, to authorize the President to suspend foreign assistance to any country which failed to cooperate with the United States in limiting the exportation of illegal narcotic drugs to this country. Because of the severity of this situation and in an effort to obtain immediate consideration of this proposal, I introduced it as a floor amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations bill on June 4, 1970, approximately a year ago today.

However, this amendment was subject to a point of order and after advising my colleagues that I would not cease my efforts in this area until strong and effective action was taken by the Congress, I withdrew it.

Because of my deep concern, I then wrote to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on June 29, 1970, urging hearings on my proposal. In that letter I stated that:

Narcotic addiction and the crime it produces are among our most serious domestic problems (and) it is imperative that we have the full cooperation of foreign governments in curbing the illegal production and processing of heroin, cocaine and morphine. I believe that my proposal would be a significant step in obtaining that cooperation.

Despite this request and the urgency of the situation, hearings were not held.

On July 9, 1970, I introduced another bill, H.R. 18397, which superseded H.R. 17883 and added a provision authorizing affirmative as-

¹ In addition, BNDD, in cooperation with French authorities, seized 893 pounds of heroin in 1970.

sistance to those countries which cooperate with the United States' efforts to stem the illegal flow of hard drugs.

In addition to these legislative efforts, I have continuously endeavored to arouse the interest of the President and the State Department in this matter. I have made numerous personal contacts and have written many letters to administration officials respecting the magnitude of the drug abuse problem in this country. The replies were generally disinterested and unresponsive.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Who was disinterested and who was unresponsive?

Mr. RODINO. Officials of the State and Justice Departments and the Executive Office of the President. In their responses—both in written replies and oral conversations—they did not directly address themselves to the action I proposed, which was to utilize continuing efforts by the State Department and other diplomatic channels. The attention and support of individuals in the administration generally was not forthcoming.

Mr. Chairman, it is only today that this hearing is being held under your direction by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I am pleased with this, but I feel that this kind of action might have been taken a year ago and many more lives might have been saved and less people might have been addicted.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I read one newspaper story quoting Police Commissioner Murphy of New York City, who said that "negative diplomatic repercussions would not have been an intolerable price to pay for doing something in this field."

Do you agree with that? In other words, what Mr. Murphy was saying is that indeed there might have been diplomatic waves and we might have paid a diplomatic penalty. But the penalties we paid at home for sitting on the sidelines for the last 5 years were far more severe.

Mr. RODINO. Absolutely, I agree with him, Mr. Chairman, because every day, as I stated, there are five deaths from heroin. Every day we have more addicts. Every day there is a greater supply of heroin coming into the country and the problem mounts and mounts and the longer we delay the more difficult the problem is to cope with.

I don't believe that any bill is going to solve the total problem or eliminate the problem completely. But if we are able to get at the source, if we were able to get the cooperation of all of the agencies of Government, and if we were able to get our leading administration officials and the President to speak out, then I believe, Mr. Chairman, we would have been far ahead of the game.

May I continue?

In November 1970, as the U.S. delegate to the North Atlantic Assembly and as vice-chairman of its Scientific and Technical Committee, I emphasized the need for the effective international control of narcotic drugs in a report which I presented to the Assembly.

As a result of my initiative, a working group was established to study and prepare a report on the international control of narcotics. On May 24 of this year, I submitted the U.S. contribution to this joint report. I intend to present this report, along with specific recommendations, to the Assembly at their meeting in Ottawa, Canada, in September. At this meeting the Scientific and Technical Committee expects to develop a multi-nation proposal which will be submitted to the full Assembly for its consideration and approval.

During the entire time that I have earnestly pursued domestic and international solutions to the heroin problem, I was repeatedly urged by the State Department not to make waves—that effective measures were being taken through diplomatic channels. And, of course, Mr. Chairman, I know there were others who were doing so assiduously themselves.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In your judgment, were effective measures taken?

Mr. RODINO. I believe measures were being taken, but the only kind of measure I believe effective was to cut off the supply completely.

Turkey has now agreed to ban the production of opium but not until they have harvested their crop in 1972. Even this I don't understand.

The bill, H.R. 1539, which is being considered by this subcommittee, represents the third thrust of my three-pronged plan, which I recommended to the President on October 22 of last year. Unfortunately, 8 months ago, the only response to this letter was a perfunctory acknowledgment by a White House assistant.

With the permission of the subcommittee, I would like to briefly review the present status of this plan. First of all, on January 22, 1971, I introduced H.R. 1540, which is entitled "the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1971." This proposal, which provides that any person known to be an addict would be placed under the medical supervision and control of public health officials, has been the subject of hearings held by the Judiciary Committee during the 91st and 92d Congress. It was 2 weeks ago today that I appeared before a Judiciary Subcommittee with respect to H.R. 1540 and, at that time, I emphasized the need for immediate and effective legislative action to abate the drug pandemic.

The second aspect of my plan advocates the strict enforcement of our drug control laws against the pusher. By using public health officials to supervise the addicts, law enforcement officials, armed with the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and the Organized Crime Control Act, would be able to conduct vigorous crackdowns on the drug pusher.

Lastly, as I have indicated, the third thrust of my three-pronged attack on hard drugs is contained in H.R. 1539, which is the subject of these hearings.

Although I have strenuously supported a domestic program of treatment and rehabilitation, the primary responsibility and concern of this Government should be the elimination of the illegal supply of hard drugs at the source.

In fulfilling this responsibility, it will be necessary for our Government to reassess our relationships with those countries which persistently refuse to curtail the illegal production of opium.

As Representatives Murphy and Steele stated in their recent report:

We must be willing to devote more resources, human and material, to fight the illegal international traffic in heroin, including the exercise of economic and political pressures where necessary. If that means the imposition of economic sanctions or the exercise of political initiatives, we must be willing to follow that course of action. We are fighting to save generations of young Americans from the scourge of heroin. As in any war, we must bring all of the weapons available to the point of decision.

Certainly, if Turkey, whose agricultural economy has been somewhat dependent on poppy farming for centuries can stop production, then

we have a right to expect the full cooperation of all opium-producing countries which are receiving America's assistance.

Since the number of heroin addicts and drug-related deaths are increasing at an exponential rate, we cannot be concerned with the potential adverse reactions of foreign governments to proposals such as mine or others. Similarly, we should not be concerned with placating foreign governments or modifying our proposals to suit them.

Instead, we should be concerned only with those measures which are acceptable to the American people—to the parents whose sons and daughters are dying each day of drug overdoses.

We need only recall the words of Mr. John E. Ingersoll, the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, last September 28. He said :

... I speak for over 200 million human beings who are alarmed, distressed, and even outraged about a calamitous problem they did not create and which they cannot solve alone. They do not understand why the nations of the world cannot bring to an end the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly opiate addiction, is causing our people. There is growing unity of opinion among the various and diverse segments of our population : illicit narcotics must go !

Indeed, it is now time for Congress to speak for these distressed Americans. With this in mind, I have devised a proposal which I feel would be satisfactory to the American people and at the same time would not jeopardize our foreign relations with opium-producing countries.

I originally introduced this proposal as H.R. 18397 on July 9, 1970, H.R. 1539, which is presently before the subcommittee, is identical to last year's proposal.

Briefly, the bill would impose economic sanctions on foreign governments upon a determination by the President that the government of such a country has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States. The sanction may involve the suspension of all or part of the economic and military assistance provided to such a country.

In addition, my bill would authorize the President to utilize such agencies and facilities as he may deem appropriate to assist foreign countries in their efforts to prevent the unlawful entry of narcotic drugs into the United States. This will enable the President to take personal charge of his national offensive to eliminate the illegal international traffic in heroin.

As I stated before a judiciary subcommittee 2 weeks ago: "It is indeed distressing and dismaying that our Government has not realistically responded to the drug crisis." It is my belief that the President, under this bill, will be empowered to commit the necessary resources to "the national war on drug abuse." This would be in accordance with his recent statement that he intends to "concentrate the resources of the Nation in a crusade against drug abuse."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think the President would act, assuming the bill were passed or became an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act?

Mr. RODINO. I believe it would become incumbent upon the President to take action.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Since 1946 to the present time, we have granted about \$5.7 billion to Turkey. Why is it during all of this period of time

that we didn't have sufficient influence or leverage, considering the amount of those grants, to do something about it? Why couldn't we convince the Turkish Government all during this period of time of the severity of the problem and need for action?

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, that is a question I have been asking myself. And I am sure that many, many Americans who are concerned, many Americans whose children have become addicted, many Americans whose children have died; and many parents who have deep concern about whether or not their children will become addicted, have asked this very question as to why we continue assistance to countries which presumably and outwardly cooperate with us, but yet produce this terrible supply of narcotic drugs.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What kind of solution is best, Mr. Rodino? I share your concern, but I wonder what good it would have done—if the only realistic solution, as you say, is to cut off the production, eliminate the sources of supply—for us to have cut ourselves off from Turkey? That would not have eliminated the source of supply. Turkey is still there and she is still producing poppies. What has occurred over a period of time is that we have, without cutting ourselves off from Turkey, persuaded her that there are serious international repercussions from the illegal transportation of drugs.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, while we were trying to persuade Turkey, we were building up numbers of addicts.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, and that is still going on. But you are not stopping that process by eliminating a single source. There are sources in other parts of the world.

Mr. RODINO. My bill would eliminate the sources in any country that is getting foreign assistance and I think the United States—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It would eliminate foreign assistance to those countries; it doesn't eliminate the sources. You would forbid any aid going to Southeast Asia under your amendment, but is that solving the problem? I doubt it very much.

The source of supply would still be there.

Mr. RODINO. We would assume the countries would cooperate with us and not grow the poppies.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think you are kidding yourself. This isn't a problem for their young people. The fact that it may be a problem for our young people isn't going to influence them. In other words, I think you are, perhaps, naive in suggesting that withholding of foreign aid is going to be the key to stopping the production of poppies.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me see if I can interject something.

It would seem to me if I were a recipient country of \$5.7 billion, I might be willing to forego a \$3 million a year crop.

Mr. RODINO. I am sure if we were to cut off that flow of foreign aid to these countries, Mr. Frelinghuysen, we would certainly get immediate results in better cooperation and in getting at the source if they are actually interested. And I am sure, as the chairman has pointed out, when you consider the amount of money that has been received by these countries, then, Mr. Frelinghuysen, I am sure that these countries are not going to spite themselves and continue to supply.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How can you be so confident? Why would this bring a country around? There are serious implications. We would be

writing off any responsibility to Southeast Asia because that is a source of supply of drugs.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, the big concern is our youth. And I think when you consider the fact that we now have thousands and thousands of addicts and when we have had so many deaths, I think that should be our primary concern.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Don't emotionalize it, Mr. Rodino. Of course it is our primary concern, but this isn't resolving the problem.

My son is just back from Vietnam. I realize the nature of the problem. But it isn't resolving the problem to say we are not going to give any aid to Southeast Asia because they grow poppies. They don't realize what it is doing to our young people. I would guess that your suggestion would not do anything except slam the door in our own face. It would not reduce the basic source of supply, which you say is your aim.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why don't you go ahead with your statement? Some people have different views. My own view is if we had done it 5 or 6 years ago, we would have been better off on all counts.

Mr. RODINO. It was my intent in drafting this proposal to avoid interference with Presidential prerogatives in foreign policy matters, and to provide affirmative economic assistance in order to prevent an adverse impact on the economy of opium-producing countries.

Since this bill did not receive active consideration by this subcommittee in the last Congress, and in view of the overall negative approach taken by the State Department in their report on this proposal and all other legislative proposals relating to the international illegal drug traffic, I introduced this bill as a floor amendment to the supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization Act on December 9, 1970.

As you know, after detailed debate indicating widespread support for this proposal, the floor amendment was adopted. Unfortunately, the Senate deleted this amendment on the ground that they did not have sufficient time to consider and debate the amendment.

I should mention that the State Department report categorically rejected all similar proposals designed to eliminate the illegal heroin traffic as being ineffective and possibly creating "international political pressures which would make it difficult for the foreign governments to take the action we desire." Instead, they suggested a sense-of-the-Congress resolution "to demonstrate the concern of Congress * * * and the desire of the American people to find a solution to the problem of illegal narcotics."

What could be more ineffective and futile? And how would parents suffering the agony of their children's drug affliction find this discouraging and negative response from officials of their government? Recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee illustrated that the State Department is certainly out of touch with present conditions in American cities and as a result is completely unqualified to pass judgment on the drug crisis.

Surely, their approach could in no way be construed as a realistic solution to the problem or a constructive alternative to my proposal.

Likewise, it is no coincidence that the administration's recently announced "national offensive" against drug abuse comes in the wake of revelations concerning the scope of heroin addiction among servicemen

in Southeast Asia. Because I was gravely concerned about this drug problem in South Vietnam almost a year ago, I wrote the Department of State requesting information regarding the use of opiated marijuana and the efforts of certain Southeast Asian governments to eliminate the sale of dangerous drugs to American servicemen.

The State Department, however, as well as the Armed Forces, was not willing at that time to concede the existence of a serious drug problem in Southeast Asia—now the problem has exploded.

It was not until the recent "World Heroin Report," issued by Representatives Murphy, of Illinois, and Steele, of Connecticut, of this committee, that the public was completely and accurately informed as to the extent of drug abuse among GI's in Southeast Asia. Indeed, it is my feeling that the public clamor and outrage which resulted from estimates that there may be as many as 40,000 addicted GI's in South Vietnam, together with the House action on my proposal last year, triggered the administration's recent action on the drug problem. I applaud these gentlemen for their informative report, and I fully support many of their recommendations.

However, I was especially interested in two of the conclusions that were reached by these distinguished gentlemen. Namely, that most countries view heroin addiction as "essentially an American problem." And, second, that "there is no sense of urgency on the part of most governments that action must be taken immediately to stop the illegal production of and traffic in heroin."

I concur wholeheartedly in both of these statements and it is for this very reason that the initiative must be taken now by the United States.

Similarly, the administration has now departed from its earlier position that "since addicts create the illicit demand for narcotics," heroin addiction should be considered primarily as a law enforcement problem. This transition is exemplified by President Nixon's recent statement that "the only really effective way to end heroin addiction is to end opium production and the growing of poppies. I will propose that as an international goal."

I fully support this goal. But the real question is—what tactics are to be employed to achieve this goal?

Since I believe that neither persuasion nor coercion alone is the proper solution, I have drafted legislation which embodies both of these approaches.

As I have already mentioned, this proposal received the approval of the full House of Representatives last year. I feel that this congressional action assisted our officials in persuading the Turkish Government to ban opium production. Likewise, passage of this legislation would induce other countries to cooperate with us in curtailing the production of opium.

If one is bothered by the foreign policy considerations in the event of a Presidential determination that funds to a particular country should be cut off, he need only ask himself whether we should sustain our relationship with these so-called "allies" if it means sacrificing our youth to the heroin plague.

We must inform the countries of the world, which readily accept our assistance, that we cannot tolerate their inaction and indifference concerning the international problem of heroin addiction.

I do not believe in being a prophet of doom, but unless we take strong action of this kind thousands of our young people will be doomed to a life of crime and desperation and many thousands to a tragic and untimely death.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome my colleague from New Jersey. He is one of the experts in Congress on the subject of drugs and control of drugs.

My earlier question, Mr. Rodino, was how effective your so-called solution would be. You have suggested that a combination of coercion and persuasion is needed. The persuasion would be to encourage them to prevent illegal entry into this country of drugs from their country. That might be some sort of a carrot, but nothing very remarkable. I wouldn't think there would be much of an inducement for them to do anything.

The coercion is, presumably, the weapon that you think is going to be effective. Much as I would like to see these sources of supply eliminated, I doubt very much whether the threat of suspension of foreign aid is going to be very effective a weapon to prevent the growing of poppies.

Granted, if a country is desperately in need of our assistance, it may be reluctant to give up that assistance. However, it may feel unable or unwilling or unprepared to eliminate the livelihood of a great many of its people. How will it reduce the threat to our young people if we cut ourselves off from certain countries that grow poppies? In other words, aren't you overrating the value of foreign aid as a weapon? Aren't you politicizing foreign aid in an unfortunate way?

Again, aren't you emotionalizing about the nature of the problem at home? The problem, of course, cannot be exaggerated, but in offering this as a solution, aren't you deluding us? For instance, how do you think this would have operated against Turkey? How would it operate against the countries that presumably will be continuing production of poppies?

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, I have got to assume that Turkey intends to remain our ally and intends to continue receiving assistance from us. And I feel that so long as she would want to remain our ally and would want to continue to receive assistance, that knowing that the President would have this power, Turkey would then cooperate and ban completely the production of opium poppies.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Suppose they didn't? Suppose she said, "To hell with you. Your aid isn't that important to us."

Mr. RODINO. I am saying let's first give the President this power. Let's pass this law. I think Mr. Murphy and Mr. Steele pointed to a situation that I think we lose sight of, and that is that others don't seem to realize the way we actually feel about this and they think that it is our problem, and that is it. It is not our problem alone. It is our problem and their problem, and if they are supposedly our allies, if they want to remain our friends, if they want to continue to receive our assistance, then I think they ought to show that they are willing to cooperate to that degree; and, if they felt that the President had this power, that the Congress gave him this power, that people of the

United States shout out in this way, I am sure that the reaction would be the same.

I recall that last year when my bill was first being considered and when it was making some kind of waves, that the then Prime Minister of Turkey—when a question was addressed to a member of another committee of the House as to whether or not some action might be taken on our bill—tremors, I understand, went through Turkey. Immediately they sought me out and asked me whether or not we couldn't defer, and whether or not we wouldn't hold off and whether or not we wouldn't wait until we might be able to work out the problem in some way.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You may create more tremors in Turkey than in New Jersey, Mr. Rodino, but I wonder whether the passage of legislation and the cutoff of all assistance to a country as important as Turkey would be in our best interest? If your proposal didn't perform the function of browbeating them into absolute suspension of all growing of poppies, where would we be?

We would have lost our ally and we would still have the source of supply. This is what worries me.

Suppose we now turn our backs on Southeast Asia after all of the problems we have caused despite our good intentions. We have caused a lot of problems there, and they are going to need both economic aid and military aid. Foreign aid could be a very powerful weapon with very small and poor countries, but it is a hard process to educate them quickly to what we consider their responsibilities. It is conceivable we might not see things as they do. As a result we might end up with a source of supply and be unable to help them in their adjustment to what we hope will be more peaceful conditions.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, I must respectfully disagree with the conclusion you reached in presuming that we are going to wind up with nothing, that they are not going to cooperate, that they are not going to be concerned with our assistance.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am concerned about the fact that there are two sides to the coin, and you see one. Suppose they say the growing of poppies is of sufficient importance to them that they are not going to accept our aid. There may be countries that would feel this way, so the source of supply would remain, and we would have failed in our efforts to coerce these countries in seeing things our way.

We would not solve the problem that way.

Mr. RODINO. If that were to occur, we haven't solved the problem but I would urge that we take the kind of action that shows the world we mean business.

When the President says that it is an international goal of his to end opium production and growing of poppies, then I can't see any other way of doing it than to have the President of the United States armed with this weapon to say, "Look, this is a problem that is afflicting us and we are not going to tolerate it if you people don't cooperate with us."

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But the President says international control is the only answer. You seem to be saying unilateral efforts on the part of the United States are the only way. I would think, with all of your experience in the international arena, that you would recognize that other countries do have a responsibility.

France has responsibility. For us to try to go it alone and act as if we had found the key to solving the problem of eliminating the source of supply, strikes me as naive.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, all I would like to add there is this, if we could cutoff some of the supply, we have less addicts.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are not stating anything very startling when you say that.

Mr. RODINO. Turkey was supposed to be the principal source of heroin, 80 percent of it. We would be cutting off a great source of that supply and we would be able to then reduce the problem to a size where we might be able to cope with it. I recognize it is an international problem but I recognize the problem is greatest in these areas, and unless we take this kind of affirmative action, I think we are deluding ourselves.

We have been talking with Turkey for many years. We have tried to impress upon her the need to actually eliminate the growth of poppies there. But only now, after this kind of clamor on the part of the American public—I am not deceiving myself or deluding myself that it was my voice—I think the fact that the American public has been speaking out, that mothers have been outraged, that Members of Congress have been speaking out, I think all of this finally has exploded into a situation that the people outside recognize that they have to do something too.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It was persuasion and not coercion that brought Turkey around. I am suggesting persuasion is a more useful tool than attempted coercion, especially since the proposed coercion probably isn't of sufficient weight to produce the desired results.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, all of my formula is merely to give the President the opportunity to assess whether those countries are actually cooperating.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are putting the monkey on his back. If he doesn't act, you can blame him for not taking action.

Mr. RODINO. The President took part of it. The President says it is something he feels responsible for, and, as a matter of fact, this is why he created only last week the Special Office of Drug Abuse.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I appreciate your testimony, Mr. Rodino.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. Mr. Buchanan is ahead of me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Burke.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend the gentleman for his leadership in this matter. As one member of the committee, I do see wisdom in his approach to the problem and, as you know, Mr. Rodino, would support some such action on our part.

President Theodore Roosevelt said, "Speak softly, and carry a big stick."

If the State Department wants to speak softly, that is all right with me, but we should give this stick to the President to use.

It seems to me you are giving him the weapon to use if he decides this is the effective means to obtain the end you desire, is that correct?

Mr. RODINO. That is correct. I am not particularly wed to this and it is not with pride of authorship that I am concerned about this bill. I hope that we get some proposals which will bring about the results that I am seeking and I think that this is the only way.

When the President says this is a problem that engages his attention in this way, I think then the people of the world who are supposedly our allies are going to take note, and this is the one way that I think they will.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I can understand your being a little hard on the State Department in your written statement. Sometimes I think the State Department would rather see the ship of state sunk than making waves to save it, but I think you are a little bit tough on this administration in that Attorney General Mitchell has declared a very real war on organized crime. And distribution is also a very vicious part of this problem, the systematic hooking of young people and the distribution system within this country of these illegal drugs.

It does seem to me a good deal of action is being taken in that direction which is very much in order in addition to the President's initiative to which you have referred several times.

Mr. RODINO. I applauded the action that was taken in that area especially, for, as you know, this is a profitable area for organized crime. I am happy that I was one of those who, in the Judiciary Committee, initiated the organized crime bill so that it would come to the floor and I am sure that this, again, is another area where we could attack, too, the role of organized crime in narcotics addiction.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I commend the gentleman for his leadership in this area, and I hope that he will be successful in his efforts toward passage of the legislation.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. I have no questions at this time.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rodino, I am interested in the purpose of your bill. In fact, I remember when it was introduced originally you sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to all of us, and my first impression was that I wanted to join as a sponsor. I want to say now that I join in the idea of what you are talking about, but it seems to me that your bill would operate somewhat as a camouflage for the real problem we have in the country: First, drugs getting into this country.

Second, your bill talks about poppy fields, but there is a bit more to solving the problem than growing the poppies. There is the processing, and where it goes, and how it gets into this country from there.

It seems to me that the bill itself can be construed to be somewhat political because everybody in this Congress, I am quite sure, is aware of the dope problem and the problem of narcotics in this country as well as its effect upon the younger people.

What concerns me is that in your statement you keep talking about illegal opium production.

First of all, the production itself is not illegal in all of the countries of origin. What makes it illegal is how it gets into this country. It gets into this country because we have people in this country that import

it, that push it, and who are responsible for the problem itself, not necessarily where the poppy grows.

We try to do away with the supplies. We tried the Volstead Act one time and we had bootlegging and we didn't do away with the illegal supply that the bootlegger peddled.

I would think that we have to attack this not on the basis of just blaming one of our allies but we must attack the problem in its entire sphere. We have to somehow or other bolster the protection of our borders to prevent its coming in here.

We stop a few cars, pick up some of them, we must go beyond that. Certainly there should be sufficient investigations in this Congress and elsewhere to warrant somebody from the top gang echelon going to jail, one of the higher-ups that are involved in this dope racket, and that is exactly what it is.

So. Mr. Rodino, I think your idea, although I agree with the concept, operates in a way of changing the look at the problem on the basis that Turkey is the only culprit involved in the dope racket and this I think alone doesn't help us in stopping the dope problem.

Mr. RODINO. Well, Mr. Burke, first of all, Turkey isn't the only culprit. I don't point to Turkey alone. I point to those countries that produce opium.

Mr. BURKE. Turkey is a NATO ally of ours, and the rest of them you haven't mentioned.

Mr. RODINO. There are countries also receiving assistance. I am talking about all of those countries that receive our assistance. You have got Laos and Thailand, and other countries that continue to receive assistance.

Now, let's make a distinction. There is the illegally grown supply of opium and there is a legal supply of opium poppy. I know that it is going to be physically impossible to completely stop the traffic of this opium poppy in here but, nonetheless, this is why I am directing my attention toward getting at the source so when you get at the source you don't have to wait for it to be processed.

Mr. BURKE. How, Mr. Rodino?

Mr. RODINO. Only 10 percent of it is stopped by customs officials.

Mr. BURKE. But there are other sources of poppy growth besides Turkey and the others are big sources of poppy growth.

Mr. RODINO. Yes, Southeast Asia.

Mr. BURKE. I mean of our nonallied countries who certainly are in a position to get it over borders if they can get it into this country.

Mr. RODINO. But, Mr. Burke, the biggest supply comes from Turkey; 80 percent of it has been a figure that has been accepted as such. If we were to cut off 80 percent of it, you are cutting off a big part of this problem. You are resolving a big part of the problem.

Mr. BURKE. But we haven't resolved the big problem.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Burke, I would like to say that if we cut off a big supply of this opium poppy then our law enforcement officials could more effectively deal with the rest of it which would not be as big a problem.

Mr. BURKE. Forgive me for arguing, but you are putting it in the first person. I tried to preface this with the statement that I think everybody in the Congress has the same feeling as you do in this re-

gard. I think all of us would like to knock off 80 percent any time we get a chance.

But I am not so sure that 80 percent of the supply coming into this country comes from Turkey. I think it comes from other areas and most of all it comes from the processing countries.

I think we ought to start——

Mr. RODINO. The best statistics would lead us to conclude that it is 80 percent.

Mr. BURKE. The processing is what makes the heroin. The poppies are grown. I am talking about processing countries such as Marseilles, France, where most of our smuggled dope originates.

As I stated, poppies alone aren't the answer. Marseilles and other areas that process the poppies into heroin cannot be overlooked.

Mr. RODINO. That is only after they get the base supply.

Mr. BURKE. I agree but what I am trying to say is that they may still very well get that basic supply.

Mr. RODINO. They won't be getting 80 percent of it.

Mr. BURKE. I don't mean to argue the point because I agree with you in concept, but what bothers me is the fact you pick one country, which is a NATO country, and somehow or other it seems to be the proper political thing now to attack our NATO allies.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Burke, may I say, and interject here, that I certainly don't want to attack our NATO ally, Turkey. I have addressed myself to the representatives at the NATO Assembly. I am a delegate to the NATO Assembly. We have discussed this. I know there is the kind of cooperation that we would like to get, but I think that really it is not the total kind, and I think we have got to consider all angles. I am sure that you are not being political and I am not being political.

Mr. BURKE. We are both political animals.

Mr. RODINO. If we felt we could get to the solution of the problem by cutting off the supply, I am sure the gentleman would want to join me in that solution. But I am not going to be concerned, frankly, and I don't make the statement idly. I am not going to be concerned with the waves I create in Turkey if I know I can save thousands of young people from being addicted.

Mr. BURKE. That is an unfair statement. Do you think I would be concerned about Turkey if I could save one or two young people?

So, we agree on the principle, but that was a nice political speech, and we should not get political. Truthfully, Mr. Rodino, we have to get to two things: Not only the poppy growers, but to the processors and suppliers, and I am afraid a bill such as yours puts too much emphasis on one thing and, therefore, it tends to throw the smokescreen around the real problems.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Burke, may I point out my bill specifically states, "to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed in whole or in part."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The gentleman's time has expired.

We will have to move along.

Mr. BURKE. May I say, thank you, Mr. Rodino, I appreciate what you are trying to accomplish.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Rodino, for bringing significant light on a very important subject and one that concerns all of us.

Mr. RODINO. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The next witness is Congressman Murphy, of Illinois, and then Congressman Robert Steele, of Connecticut.

STATEMENT OF HON. MORGAN F. MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Go right ahead, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I want to thank the committee for this opportunity.

As you know, Congressman Steele and I released a report on the "World Heroin Problem" which was based upon a round-the-world study mission conducted during the month of April. That report dealt with the heroin problem, both in the United States and abroad.

Of particular concern to us was the rapid increase in heroin addiction within the United States military forces in South Vietnam where the problem of heroin addiction has reached epidemic proportions.

In Vietnam, we discovered young American soldiers whose day-to-day existence depends on a \$3 vial of "skag." We found men whose minds and bodies have been shattered by the effects of habit-forming drugs as well as marihuana and other nonaddictive, but, nevertheless, dangerous drugs.

At the time of our visit, the military authorities told us they estimated 10 to 15 percent of our soldiers were heroin addicts. That figure has since been lowered to a firm 10 percent labeled as users, and 5 percent as hard-core addicts.

I must admit my skepticism, gentlemen, about these revised figures as past experience shows the Department of Defense (DOD) has a tendency to deemphasize any problem which places the military in a bad light before the American taxpaying public. This time last year, for example, DOD claimed a mere 100 heroin addicts were wearing the uniform of U.S. soldiers. It appears DOD was either deceiving itself or totally out of touch with reality.

But let's assume their numbers are correct. This means we still have 25,000 men who have tried heroin and 12,500 whom they believe are hard-core addicts. I emphasize that these are the ones the military knows about. Unofficial sources place the number at a more realistic figure of between 30,000 to 40,000 men who became addicted to drugs while in Vietnam.

This epidemic of drug abuse is not something which arose overnight. It has been coming for a long time—we have known about it, we urged the President to take action long ago, but nothing was done. And, now, we are faced with an overwhelming task—that of rehabilitating thousands of young men, not only from the strain and horrors of combat, but from the hideous specter of drug addiction as well.

In Vietnam, heroin addiction became an epidemic before action was taken. It is my hope that action will be taken now to prevent the same disastrous results in Europe and the Near East.

Following the publication of our report, Congressman Steele and I introduced on the House floor a comprehensive bill which we feel puts the drug abuse problem in proper perspective and offers some hope for finding a solution. This bill, I might add, was introduced before the administration offered its so-called solution to the drug menace among our soldiers.

Our bill called for a two-stage rehabilitation approach including the identification of heroin addicts through urinalysis and providing de-

toxification and rehabilitation for all addicts during their regular military enlistments. Step two provides that where military rehabilitation efforts fail, the addict could be admitted to a veterans hospital for up to 3 years of treatment.

Other recommendations included the authority for the Administrator of the Veterans Administration (VA) to assign an addict to any one of the existing civilian rehabilitation programs including the Public Health Service and National Institute of Mental Health.

State and community hospitals and drug centers would also be made available for veteran addicts.

Another important aspect of our measure would give the addict a medical discharge rather than a punitive or for-the-good-of-the-service type discharge, which normally deprives him of treatment at VA hospitals.

Up until 2 weeks ago, by the way, the VA had only five drug treatment centers with beds for less than 250 persons. These centers were opened this year under mounting pressure from political and civic organizations.

The VA has since announced plans for expanding their services to 27 additional treatment centers capable of caring for 6,000 addicts each year. Needless to say, gentlemen, I feel they are being more than optimistic. As a matter of fact, it is sheer fantasy to think the drug problem in the proportions of which we are speaking, can be attacked successfully by this token gesture.

However, I think it is a tribute to the administration and VA that they have increased it, and I know this is a tremendous increase, but I think that we are going to find that once the realization on the part of our veterans that they can come forth and admit their drug addiction problem without the punitive measures which usually follow, I think we are going to find how many we have and we are going to need more beds than that.

The Nixon administration meanwhile has made its proposal to the Congress and the American people, outlining what it called a "comprehensive program for drug rehabilitation." The program called for an additional \$155 million to be added to already approved funds bringing the total the President desires for the fight against drug addiction to a mere \$371 million.

This amount is for all drug rehabilitation programs in this country, not just for the military, I might add. The President's proposal is hardly a drop in the bucket when you consider that heroin addicts spend more than \$2.2 billion a year to support their habits.

I would like to interpose that after careful study of the President's program and attending hearings of the Select Committee on Crime, of which I am also a member, under the leadership of Chairman Pepper of Florida, what I thought was just \$12 million for pure research on part of the problem, I have found to be \$34 million, and I applaud the President for that. I think we should devote more money to pure research on this problem. I think therein lies the answer, and I will get to that after my testimony.

I feel that the bill introduced by Congressman Steele and myself defines a better starting point for hitting the problem head on—by first curing our military men who will soon be returning to society.

This is not to underrate the drug addiction problem in our civilian communities, but if we can't meet and defeat drug abuse in the confines of military service, how can we expect to accomplish it on a nationwide basis?

The first step to combat the heroin problem in Vietnam is being taken. All homeward-bound GI's must submit to urinalysis. If the test indicates drug use, the GI undergoes 5 days of preliminary treatment at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam before being shipped to the States for more extensive treatment.

First-hand reports from GI's in Long Binh, however, attest to the fact that the machine which performs the urinalysis can produce inaccurate results. In addition, GI's are scheming to devise foolproof ways to beat the system. In the words of a high-ranking Army medical officer, "If there's a way to beat this thing, the GI's will think of it."

Above all, gentlemen, I think it is clear that a quick solution is not coming—abroad or at home. We need long-range improvements in drug control and rehabilitation. We cannot allow drug abuse to be the victim of a 3-month spurt of activity because it is politically expedient on both sides of the aisle.

I was much heartened by the Turkish Government's opium decree announced last week. Their pledge to discontinue the planting of the opium poppy within the year is the result of increased efforts on the part of the Nixon administration to cut the heroin off at its source. It would be gross negligence on my part if I failed to acknowledge the roles played by Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim and U.S. Ambassador William Handley in reaching this decision.

In his prepared statement, the President announced that this administration was committed to aid nations and peoples prepared to help eliminate the narcotics menace. In April of this year, Congressman Steele and I cautioned that the United States must be prepared to undertake a multimillion-dollar program to assist these countries to develop substitute economic activities for their opium farmers. I reiterate my earlier point—we cannot solve the heroin problem we now face in this country by setting monetary limits on spending.

I feel we must make important decisions in the near future as to what international efforts we should take to prevent drugs from coming into this country or from reaching our servicemen around the world. Economic leverages can and must be utilized.

As one young man who wrote me put it: "Tough decisions must not be avoided in order to maintain the most cordial of diplomatic relations with our so-called allies." While we concern ourselves with cordiality, we risk the loss of a generation.

Gentlemen, I am sure I don't have to detail for you the ramifications of the international drug problem on American society. Think of it in terms of the crime committed on our streets, crime committed by drug addicts who are driven to any lengths, including violence, to obtain money for their next fix.

Think of it in terms of stolen property, of muggings and prostitution, of youths who sell drugs to other youths to obtain money. High school and college students, disenchanted with our country because of this nightmarish war in Indochina, think they have found comfort at the end of a needle. This is what we are now facing and will con-

tinue to face unless we do something positive to stop this terrible drug infection on our society.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think you said you wanted to comment.

I would also be interested in your views about the dialogue between Mr. Rodino and members of the subcommittee.

Mr. MURPHY. When I came to Congress, I read the Rodino amendment and at first blush I agreed with it. After my trip, I agree with it in part and in part I do not agree with it. I do not think the Nixon administration would have been able to bring Turkey to the position it now takes of banning opium growing in the country completely by just saying we are going to cut off foreign aid. I think they would have rebelled.

I think, as Mr. Burke and Mr. Frelinghuysen pointed out, we would have lost a valuable ally. We would have lost a valuable ally in the NATO setup, the anchor of the Near East, protection of the Dardanelles, down to the Mediterranean.

Ambassador William Handley has been working on the Turkish people to see the effect on the United States of their growing opium.

Interestingly enough, one Turkish senator, whom I have gotten to know quite well, told me that one of the biggest problems in Turkey is deaths resulting from automobiles, the misuse of the automobile. He said, "Morgan, what if we came to the United States and went to Detroit and said, 'Please ban the making of the automobile because we Turks don't know how to use it.'"

That is really what we are saying because they have no drug addiction problem in Turkey. The Turks know how to handle opium. It is a cash crop. The seeds from poppies are used. The oil is used for cooking. The seeds are used on bread and the stem of the flower is used for fuel. These people are completely oblivious to the ramifications of growing of poppies and the production of opium.

What we are concerned with is illegal trafficking in opium where Corsican syndicates, four families, insulate themselves. They have a buyer who goes into Turkey after it is harvested and takes the raw opium and smuggles it into other areas of the Middle East such as Syria and Lebanon where it is processed into morphine which is in turn smuggled into the Marseilles area of France where chemists refine it into heroin. These same families, through additional contacts, route this heroin through Italy and Corsica into the United States. Some of it is also smuggled through Mexico and Canada.

But, gentlemen, one statement which impressed me was made by a Bureau of Narcotics man. He said once the poppy was cut allowing the opium gum to seep out overnight, the war to stop heroin from getting into the United States was lost. A kilogram of opium which costs \$25 in Turkey goes for \$250,000 on the streets of New York. So you have got a tremendous profit picture there that you have to be concerned with.

In the Select Committee on Crime, we had testimony from a young girl who took two trips from New York to Chicago with \$3,000 in cold cash.

This is what you are dealing with. There is no one simple solution to the problem. I think the Turkey declaration is to be applauded. I think the Nixon administration is to be commended, especially Ambassador William Handley. It was of no small note that they would voluntarily ban the future growing of opium.

But we have to, as Mr. Burke pointed out, bring these same economic leverages, whatever they would be, to bear. I don't support a complete cutting off of economic assistance. I would like to say we will give you assistance. Where is it you are weak? If it is farmers, we will teach them crop rotation. If it is some loss of revenue, we will see what we can do about making that up.

In Southeast Asia the poppy is grown in the tri-border areas of Burma, Laos, and Thailand by nomad tribes. Whatever you could do to these governments, they have no control over the area in which the opium is grown. You could cut off all of the aid until the cows come home and it won't affect Burma because the poppy is grown by ex-Nationalist people driven out of China in 1948. These people, 15,000 or 20,000 of them, wives, families, and soldiers, guard these nomad tribes that grow the poppy in this tri-border area.

I think we could get a little tougher with the Thais who, I think, are very lax. We could get tougher with Laos. The leaders of Laos, who are supporting our mission in Southeast Asia, are actively involved in trade and trafficking of heroin. High officials in South Vietnam are involved in it, and they are supporting our mission in Indochina.

So this is not an easy problem, gentlemen. My recommendation for your consideration, to deal with this problem, is not only to cut off aid to some country not cooperating with us but also to help countries that have undertaken a burden such as Turkey, to clear up this problem.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murphy, I have been very impressed with your testimony and I think you and Mr. Steele are both to be commended for your report.

I don't know how much either of you gentlemen knew about the drug problem before you took the trip, but it surely proved invaluable to us.

I think it is a very clear articulation of what is a very serious national problem and I think your words of wisdom here today are very helpful to us.

My question, really, is what the solution is. You say there is no easy solution and, in effect, in your testimony you indicated that identification of addicts and rehabilitation and treatment of addicts is certainly an important part of the process, but that is quite late in the process and, of course, the fact that so many of our men in Vietnam have been exposed to the temptation of drugs is a real crisis. I notice you say that the returning GI's are tested.

My son just got back last week and I am glad to say he was not detained either in Vietnam or in this country, so I guess he must have cleared the new hurdles that have been erected to detect addicts, but he certainly substantiates the very widespread use of drugs in the Armed Forces.

He also mentioned that there are apparently defects in the urinalysis. He said there were hundreds of enlisted men who failed to pass the test, and two officers.

I said, "Only two officers?"

He said, "Yes," and it was found out that it was because they had been drinking tonic water. in gin and tonic, and the tonic water shows up in the same way as the use of drugs.

So if you don't want to be classified as an addict, you better be careful what you drink as well as what you have used.

What worries me is, is there nothing more that we can do to prevent the problem from being as big as it is?

You pointed with some pride, and I think justifiable pride, to the fact that Turkey has taken significant steps to control its production of poppies, but I would suppose, and certainly the articles in the newspapers indicate, that other sources of supply will develop to meet the continuing demand and because of the very tremendous rewards, we are not necessarily solving the problem by having identified and eliminated a major source of present supply.

Mr. MURPHY. May I answer that, Mr. Frelinghuysen? Turkey's banning the growing of opium makes these syndicates involved in the purchase and the smuggling from Turkey into Marseilles, France, make new contacts in different countries. There are other Middle East countries that will take up the slack that Turkey is going to give because of the money involved in it.

But you make these syndicates go out and make new contacts and in making those new contacts they become very vulnerable to detection and arrest because they are set in their ways now. They know the farmers in Turkey will say to the government, "I am only going to grow a couple of acres of poppy this year," but in fact may grow 10 times that much and sell the illegal amount to the smugglers.

You make them go to a different country and, by doing this, they are exposing themselves.

We have a better chance of detecting and arresting these people then.

It is not a cure. I would say it is a very significant step because anybody can argue about figures, but there is no argument that at least 60 to 80 percent of all of the opium received in the United States is coming from the fields of Turkey.

Now, to make up that supply, these families are going to have to look some place else. After arrests have been made in Italy and Marseilles, France, you will find six or eight bodies floating in the harbor. Whether they had any information that led to the arrest is unknown. If they suspect anything, they will kill people.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Steele, why don't you make your presentation now? We are very grateful for the opportunity to hear from you now, and then we will continue with the questions.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. STEELE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT**

Mr. STEELE. Mr. Chairman, I am very appreciative of the chance to testify. I know of the excellent work on drugs that your subcommittee has been doing, and I appreciate this opportunity. I have a brief statement. It will take me 4½ minutes, and then I will conclude.

In the last 2 months, there has been more constructive action by the Federal Government to fight narcotics addiction in America than there was in the last 20 years.

Among the recent developments, Turkey's announcement that it will ban the production of opium after August 1972 stands out as the

single most important development that could occur in our Nation's battle against heroin addiction.

The increasing flow of heroin into the United States in recent years has literally drowned out our efforts to fight narcotics addiction in this country. For every addict rehabilitated or incarcerated, several new addicts have taken his place because of the ever growing flow of heroin into America.

Approximately 75 percent of the heroin reaching the United States originates in Turkish poppy fields, and the elimination of this source will give us an unprecedented opportunity to mount a successful, all-out attack on narcotics addiction in America using all the weapons of education, rehabilitation, research, and law enforcement at our command. Furthermore, it will allow us to concentrate on finding ways to reduce the flow of heroin to the United States from other parts of the world, such as Mexico and the Far East, which will quickly step in to take Turkey's place unless we move now to forestall this threat.

I heartily congratulate and applaud President Nixon for launching the vigorous diplomatic offensive which has resulted in this critical breakthrough. I also congratulate Turkey's new Prime Minister, Nihat Erim, for his political courage in requiring tens of thousands of Turkish farmers to stop growing the opium poppy, which has been their most important cash crop.

On our recent visit to Turkey on behalf of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman Morgan Murphy and I devoted a major portion of our time to urging Turkish officials to abolish opium production, and our subsequent report to Congress recommended a new U.S. diplomatic offensive to further encourage the Turkish Government to take this critical step. Mr. Murphy and I are, therefore, particularly gratified by the recent Turkish announcement, which marks the first concrete step toward saving a generation of young Americans from the scourge of heroin.

Yet, the Turkish action alone is no panacea for ending heroin addiction in the United States. We must now move to reduce the market for heroin in the United States through new programs of education, rehabilitation and research and we must simultaneously press our diplomatic offensive to forestall other opium-producing countries from taking up the slack which will be created by Turkey's withdrawal from the opium trade.

Chief attention must be given to Thailand, Laos, Burma, Vietnam, and Mexico.

Mexico is currently estimated to be the source of 15 percent of the heroin entering the United States. According to one U.S. narcotics expert, "We have found opium fields in Mexico that make Turkey look sick."

The Burma, Laos, Thailand border area, also known as the "fertile triangle," is the world's largest illicit opium producing region. This area accounts for close to 1,000 tons of opium annually or over one-half of the world's total illegal output. An estimated 10 percent of the heroin reaching the United States and all of the heroin being sold to U.S. troops in South Vietnam originates in the fertile triangle.

An increase in the flow of heroin from Southeast Asia to the United States already appears to be underway. U.S. narcotics agents report that they have seized more heroin being smuggled into the United

States from Asia in the last 6 months than they seized in the last 6 years.

The heroin traffic in Southeast Asia is permitted and encouraged by a combination of deep-seated political corruption and the military realities in the area.

In Laos, the chief of the Laotian General Staff, Gen. Ouane Rathi-koune, is reportedly deeply involved in the heroin traffic. According to reliable sources, General Ouane's troops both protect the opium and heroin refineries along the Mekong River and transport heroin via Royal Lao military aircraft.

In Thailand, the Thai border control police, who are responsible for controlling the opium traffic in the Thai border areas, are totally ineffective due to widespread corruption in their ranks.

In the Burmese border area, the local militia which is loyal to the Burmese Government is allowed to carry on the opium traffic in their areas, and they provide military protection to Burmese opium and heroin laboratories.

The Thai and Burmese situations, moreover, are vastly complicated by the presence of two remnant Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) army divisions which fled China in 1949 and which provide most of the logistical support for transporting the opium down from the mountains to lowland pick-up points. The two Chinese armed groups—remnants of the 3rd and 5th KMT divisions—number approximately 3,000 men, and most or all carry automatic weapons ranging up to .50 caliber machineguns. The two KMT divisions constitute a controlling influence on opium trafficking activities in Burma and Thailand and have played a major role in stimulating local opium production.

I might add it had been the policy until recently for the U.S. Government to support the KMT.

The Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan continues to maintain contact with these two remnant divisions.

In Vietnam, despite a recent crackdown on corruption in the South Vietnamese customs department, I have learned this week that South Vietnamese military officers continue to deal in large quantities of heroin and to transport it around South Vietnam in military aircraft and vehicles, all of which were supplied by the United States. U.S. military authorities have provided Ambassador Bunker with hard intelligence that one of the chief traffickers is Gen. Ngo Dzu, the commander of II Corps. Dzu is one of the staunchest military backers of President Thieu and is one of the leading strongmen in the current Saigon government.

From the foregoing brief synopsis, it is clear that the U.S. Government must be prepared to skillfully and forcefully exercise every diplomatic, political, and economic leverage available to us in Southeast Asia if we are to break through the web of corruption and self interest that perpetuates and promotes the opium trade in Southeast Asia.

Failure to break through that web and gain the cooperation of the Southeast Asia governments will seriously jeopardize the important but tenuous gains made in Turkey last week.

Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. I would like to compliment both of you gentlemen for your report and certainly the efforts you have made to get statistics following your return here. I am glad you mentioned the fact that it is a two-pronged problem, not looking at Turkey alone but looking at the subsequent source of supply that would come into this country and the necessity, then, of making it not only an international problem but one that we must make within this country with regard to the importation and certainly the rehabilitation of those that have returned.

I have no questions.

I want to compliment you both for your work.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Vander Jagt?

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, would like to commend both Congressman Steele and Congressman Murphy for their very outstanding contributions in this area and for their helpful testimony.

In your bill, the bill that you testified about and have proposed, there is rehabilitation provided for the serviceman while he remains in the service, and then he can be referred to a VA hospital after his discharge. Is there any kind of requirement or incentive that he undergo rehabilitation even after the discharge, or could there be?

Mr. MURPHY. That would depend on the type of treatment that he would receive. This is a personal thing with these fellows. You must remember there are two types of addiction. There is the physical and the psychological. Of course the psychological would vary with each individual fellow who has become addicted. The depth of their psychological need will determine how long it will take to treat them.

The returning veteran from Vietnam was probably introduced to heroin while he was in Vietnam. Some medical people in their testimony state that they feel that there can be success in curing these men in a short period of time.

I think we have an opportunity here within the military to really work out a program.

In the Select Committee on Crime we have had medical personality after personality testify concerning many modalities of treatment, such as methadone. Methadone is an addictive synthetic drug that has been successful in many instances. What methadone does is take the fellow off heroin, and he gets methadone at some treatment center. He does not have to go out and support his habit by committing crime. But methadone in and of itself is not the complete answer, as Congressman Rangel will testify in a short while.

I would like the administration to spend more money on pure research. We have had testimony on naloxone and cyclazocine, drugs that offer hope with much more research. We may come up with a drug or medicine that we could use to inoculate our children in grammar school and immunize them from future heroin addiction.

This is what I think the Federal Government must pursue and the path it must take. We know we have at least 250,000 addicts right now. The modalities we have used to correct them have not been working for the most part. This is not to say that we must give them up, but we must pursue them.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. But under the terms of your bill, it does not address itself to the problem, I don't believe, of the guy who is physically

addicted, psychologically addicted, and when his discharge time has arrived, he says "I like being addicted. I don't want to be rehabilitated."

Mr. MURPHY. Then he can be committed to a VA hospital. The Secretary of the particular service will have the boy returned to the VA.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. VA via the district court?

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Then one last question. You state, on page 4, we must make important decisions in the near future as to what international efforts we should take to prevent drugs from coming in, and Congressman Steele mentioned we have to mount an all-out attack politically, culturally, and economically. I think everybody would agree with that, but do you have any recommendations as to what specific steps could be taken?

Mr. MURPHY. In Turkey's particular instance, I think it was by persuasion. Had we cut off foreign aid as suggested by some Members of Congress to the Turks, we would have gotten no place with them.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Congressman Steele, would you recommend cutting off aid to a country that did not cooperate?

Mr. STEELE. I am a little at a loss to understand all of the discussion about Turkey. We just had an enormous breakthrough in Turkey. It isn't going to happen immediately, to be sure, but it gives us a chance to go in and buy up some of the crop. I don't think you buy up the crop until the last year, otherwise the crop will be enormous, of course.

I am very much in sympathy with the approach that Congressman Rodino has taken. I think Mr. Rodino's approach has played a significant role in getting the Congress and country excited about this and has had an effect on Turkey. There is no question about it.

Yet had we taken that step with Turkey, I think you would have had exactly the opposite effect. I think they would have gotten their backs up and we would not have gotten anywhere with them. Now that we talk about Southeast Asia, it is an entirely different situation.

In Turkey we had an ally which essentially was a Western ally, although, to be sure, a Middle Eastern one, but, nonetheless, one we could talk to. The Turks have control of their country to an extent none of the Southeast Asian countries' governments do, and I think we are dealing with a different thing now in Southeast Asia.

I think it is going to take a more forceful approach in Southeast Asia than it would have in Turkey.

What would have been counterproductive in Turkey, I think may well be productive in Southeast Asia.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you advocate passage of a bill that has the potential of cutting off aid to one of the Southeast Asian countries?

Mr. STEELE. I advocate a bill that would give the President the power to do that, but would not necessarily contain language such as "the President shall suspend." I think there has to be some flexibility here.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. He has the power not to provide assistance now. Except for the psychological value of Congress doing something additional, if the President decided it was in the national interest not to give economic assistance to any country, he could now simply decide with or without publicity not to provide assistance.

Mr. STEELE. I think one of the things that has moved this Government to action in the last two and a half months has been the enormous

outpouring of pressure from the Congress and from the people of this country to move.

How does it happen? How does it come about that suddenly we get a breakthrough in Turkey? Why wasn't it last year or 2 years ago?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You fellows are being modest. The fact of the matter is we owe it to you.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What we have said is already going to their heads. You better be careful.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think in my 10 years I have never seen a case where two Congressmen took an initiative and brought it so to the public attention, causing the President to act.

If you fellows had not made the trip you did, and had not brought back the results and reports you did, factually supported, a great deal less would have occurred.

I don't know if Turkey's breakthrough would have occurred. I don't know if the President's appointment of Dr. Jaffe would have occurred.

This is sheer speculation. But my assessment, based on 10 years in Congress, is that this is one of the occasions where congressional initiatives brought executive action. And so it does prove the point that if Congress occasionally does enact certain legislative proposals, although the President already has the authority to act, this becomes a mandate, and it puts a little extra pressure on him to cause him to act.

Mr. STEELE. I think that is very well put and that is why my basic sympathy with the bill. I don't mean the compliments. I appreciate those that were directed at the chairman of our study commission, particularly. But I think congressional pressure could only have a beneficial result.

But, why the breakthrough in Turkey, for example? The difference is the kind of instructions I believe that were going out from the White House and State Department in the last 2 months that never went out before.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They called back all of the ambassadors here and the pressure was on.

Mr. STEELE. We have been talking indirectly to the Turks. Finally we told them what we had to have and it was done. I believe we can get a lot of the same results, not exactly the same, and I think the Congress will go on record and push the administration, that is desirable, but I don't want to see a situation where the President is forced in making a counter-productive decision, being rushed into a decision because I think the point was brought up quite well, here, what happens if we cut off aid to Thailand, and we haven't got their cooperation.

I think we have to use our leverages. For example, in Laos, if we stopped supporting Laotian Government for 1 day, it would fall. We support the Laotian currency. Every week we go in and buy up currency in Laos. We help pay the army. We buy up war material. Americans organized the Royal Laotian Armed Forces. The Laotian Government would collapse in 24 hours if it were not for us.

What about telling the general that he doesn't get this or that because of what he did last week with a certain heroin consignment? Why don't we use these enormous leverages we have?

I don't mean to take too long here but I would like to make one other comment on this military situation that is developing that concerns me greatly, and I think should concern the Congress and this entire Nation, and particularly this committee. That is, it has leaked out, these are not official statements, that 2 percent of the urinalysis tests in the military in Vietnam have proved positive. This is totally misleading.

Mr. MURPHY. His boy came back from Vietnam.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The percentage of enlisted men may be higher than that.

Mr. STEELE. I would be interested in talking to him about it.

The first 2 days, the Army will not acknowledge this, the first 2 days the urinalysis test was showing some 7 to 9 percent of morphine in the urine. Then it got out to all of the troops that everybody was going to be tested. You abstain from narcotics and nothing shows up.

The New York Times had a great article the other day about how G.I.'s beat the test.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, June 24, 1971]

GI'S IN VIETNAM SAY TEST FOR HEROIN ADDICTION CAN BE BEATEN

(By Iver Peterson)

LONGBINH, South Vietnam, June 23.—The homeward-bound G.I.'s taking the Army's new urinalysis test for heroin use here believe the test is not accurate, that even if it were, it can be beaten, and that even if it can't be beaten, it doesn't make any difference.

Last Sunday, American servicemen leaving Vietnam for home began taking the compulsory urine test, which uses an advanced and specially designed machine to determine whether they are addicted to heroin.

"It doesn't work anyway," said Specialist 4 Mike Lombardi as he waited at the 90th Replacement Battalion processing center for the bus to the airport, where he would board the "Freedom Bird" for the flight home. He took the test yesterday.

"There was one guy smoked three caps [capsules of heroin] when he took the test, he was so nervous, and he checked right on through," Specialist Lombardi said.

"And another guy came down off skag [heroin] three weeks ago and they pulled him out of line," he added.

ALL TAKE THE TEST

"It just varies," another G.I. said. "Some guys just luck out and some don't."

The 90th Replacement Battalion handles all newly arrived homeward-bound Army servicemen in Vietnam's southern half. There is another processing system at Camranh Bay, on the central coast, where the command has its only other heroin urinalysis machine. The Air Force, Navy and Marines use the same two machines but handle their personnel separately. All servicemen and women from general on down, must take the test.

As they wait for the test, which now is the first step in being processed out of country, the soldiers idle around the camp area reading comic books, fingering the bargain-priced suits and bell-bottom pants at the Last Chance Unclaimed Tailor and talking about the drug test.

Guy Walton, a sergeant who had yet to take the test, said that many of his friends were worried when they learned of the urinalysis.

"I'm worried about it and I'm a full-fledged juicer" [liquor drinker], he said. "Never touched dope."

PLAYED A HUNCH

The high-ranking Army medical officer who first announced the urinalysis program—he refused to be identified—said last week: "If there's a way to beat this thing the G.I.'s will think of it." They're busy thinking now.

One soldier, who decided not to give his name, said he played a hunch in trying to beat the test despite his heroin habit. He spent the morning of the test drinking beer, he said, and what he gave the Army technicians "was damn near pure water." He passed.

Some soldiers say they can't urinate when the times comes for the test. "That's why we have the coffee and fruit juice here," said one of the male nurses.

Another way of beating the test, the G.I.'s said, was simply to stay off heroin for a few days before reporting for processing. The Army nurses at the testing center say they have seen men visibly suffering withdrawal symptoms while taking the test.

MOST MEN APPROVED

Most of the men interviewed today agreed that the urine test was a good thing because it may provide help for addicts. If the test indicated that a serviceman is a drug user, he undergoes five days of preliminary treatment at a special center at Camranh Bay. If he is a hard addict, he may receive up to 60 days of treatment at an Army or Veterans' Administration hospital in the States.

These facts are explained to the men before they take the test.

"I believe the majority is for it," said Sgt. James Miller, who shepherds the men through the "out processing" routine. "Everybody's in such a hurry to get out of here they don't care anyway."

In fact, today there was more griping about the second step in the outprocessing routine—the barbershop—than about the urine test.

"Sideburns cannot be down below the ear opening," Sergeant Miller intoned.

The men, who don't want to face their girl friends with an Army haircut, groaned.

Mr. STEELE. What the military doesn't tell you is that 8,200 heroin addicts turned themselves in to rehabilitation programs between January and June of this year—8,200. Let's take this statistic: Let's assume that one out of four, or one out of five, people turn themselves in. Surely it is not any more than that. Multiply 8,000 by four or five and you come up with 35,000 that is the rough ball park estimate that we were working with.

I think it would be a great disservice to this country if the military at this point tries to sweep this thing under the rug just because the urinalysis program, easily beaten, is showing up 2 percent. They haven't come out with an official statement yet, but I think it is important that Congress—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Steele, do you know if there is any truth in the story that a man can fail urinalysis tests if he has been drinking tonic water?

Mr. STEELE. I heard it was beer.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. On page 4 of your statement, Mr. Steele, you mention General Dzu: What shall we do about a situation like that?

Mr. STEELE. It seems to me we are getting down to the nitty-gritty now.

We have gone to the South Vietnamese and said, "We have to have action." They say they are going to give us action, and they crack down on street peddlers. It is harder for the G.I. today to buy heroin on a base than it was before. The national police are cracking down. This was an easy step.

Second, they cracked down on the customs department. This was harder because it involved relatives of the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, they did it.

Now, who do we come to? We come to a top strong man, a general in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, one of the staunchest military and political backers of President Thieu.

Now is the question, how serious are you about cracking down? This is the point we come to.

I think we have gotten fairly far so far with diplomatic representations, Secretary Laird and Ambassador Bunker, and we have to lay it on the line again, our commitment to South Vietnam is on the line, either you are serious about this or you are not serious about it. I don't think you should put the man against the firing squad but he has to stop.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Supposing Dzu says, "I don't know anything about it" and that is that?

Mr. STEELE. I have said, and Congressman Murphy has said, and we said in our report very specifically, in less than 2 to 3 months unless there is substantial progress, the only solution is to withdraw from Vietnam. I hold to that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. We had, before the Foreign Affairs Committee, people from the Laos desk at the State Department. I asked how much economic and military assistance we were giving to Laos annually. The answer was \$200 million in direct economic and military assistance. This does not include other assistance growing out of the Indochina war, which is substantial. Not a word in the testimony had to deal with the problem of narcotics production or transportation or narcotics suppression in Laos. I asked the various witnesses how much of that money was going to go into suppression or police work regarding narcotics in Laos and he came up with a figure of two policemen, out of almost \$200 million. I think this is what Mr. Steele and I have in mind.

Here is a way that we can say to these people, "You are going to devote so much of this to the policing of narcotic traffic in your country. We know a certain general in your high command is involved in it." This is where the President could take this aid package and use it as a leverage to get rid of this fellow. What disturbs me is the State Department. It takes two freshmen Congressmen—of 5 months—to come up with this idea and it doesn't reflect brilliance. I think it is just common sense.

Here was 30 pages of testimony and not one word in there about heroin addiction in Southeast Asia or Laos. It defies me how a problem of this magnitude can be overlooked by responsible officials of the U.S. Government.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you both very much again. Our indebtedness and gratitude goes to you both for the magnificent job you have done.

The next witness is my distinguished colleague from New York, Hon. Charles B. Rangel. Mr. Rangel, we know you, too, are a member, together with our colleague, Mr. Murphy, of the Select Committee on Crime. We know you have had considerable understanding of this problem for many, many years, both in your district and during your service in the legislature in New York. We are very pleased to hear from you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK**

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee. Many of the remarks that you have heard earlier are incor-

porated in my statement, so with the chair's permission, I would like to have my entire written statement entered into the record.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

I am pleased to have the opportunity to share with you my views on bills seeking to curb the illicit flow of international narcotics to our shores.

I have introduced two bills, H.R. 4608 to provide for increased international control of the production and trafficking of opium and H.R. 6709 to prohibit foreign aid from being provided to foreign countries which do not act to prevent drugs from unlawfully entering the United States.

I live in Harlem. I would like you to put yourself in my shoes for a moment and see what heroin imported from abroad is doing to my community. Harlem reflects on an exaggerated scale what is in store for the rest of our cities if we do not do an about-face in our foreign policy toward countries growing, converting and exporting this international poison.

If you were walking down a Harlem street, it is not unlikely that you would encounter one of our 40,000 heroin addicts. Although addicts normally inject heroin into their veins while in bathrooms, basements, alleys, or other places out of the public view, nevertheless it is still possible to spot an addict under the influence of heroin. You can spot him "on the nod," drifting into somnolence, waking up, and drifting off again.

You can also spot him because of the crimes he is forced to commit to finance his habit. Property crimes by addicts are about as common as parking tickets. In fact, the Small Business Chamber of Commerce of New York in a study this year reports that theft by addicts living in or operating in Central Harlem amounted to \$2.3 billion in 1970. About \$1.8 billion of this theft is estimated to have been committed in the Harlem Community and the remaining half billion is estimated to have been committed by Harlem addicts in neighborhoods outside Harlem. You can actually see them ripping metal fixtures out of vacant tenement buildings and selling them to local junkyards. Among addicts, this practice known as "stealing copper," is considered a middle status occupation.

Last year there were over 11,750 narcotics arrests in Harlem. This arrest statistic, as large as it is, does not begin to tell the law enforcement problem. The vast number of criminal acts remain hidden, that is, they are simply not observed or reported. Some of those which are observed are not reported to the police. Some of those which are, are not recorded. The New York Narcotic Addiction Control Commission did research on the addicts it handles and found that only 79 percent of the addicts had arrest records. Interviews with the addicts themselves, however, revealed that virtually all committed crime to support their habit. One of the most startling findings of the Commission is that the addict may commit up to 120 crimes on average for each crime for which he is arrested and charged.

New York Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy testified with me before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 1st concerning the fruitlessness of domestic law enforcement against the traffickers who receive tons and tons of heroin from abroad. He described how he and his 800 man narcotics force in cooperation with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and customs officials conducted an intensive two-year campaign against heroin trafficking and how they arrested, in 1970 alone, at least 33 major distributors and international traffickers as well as thousands of junkies and addicts. But none of these efforts, he conceded, have reduced the availability of heroin on the streets of New York. What we have been doing, he said, is spending huge fortunes in largely unsuccessful and virtually impossible efforts to plug up what may be likened to thousands of tiny streams from a perforated garden hose instead of taking the more efficient course of shutting off the narcotics flow at the faucet. What is critically necessary now, he concluded, is to turn off the flow out of the poppy fields until all illicit and unregulated growth can be dried up forever.

I could describe to you how heroin has broken down our corrections system in New York City. Fully, 50 percent of the people in New York City jails are addicts. The City is crippled with a \$50,000,000 bill just on prison, court, and police costs for these criminal addicts.

I could describe to you how narcotics-related court cases are a revolving door operation. Those defendants whose cases are not dismissed outright, get off

with light sentences because of the lack of space in jails and the enormous backlog of criminal cases awaiting disposition.

I could describe to you how drugs including heroin have invaded our public schools. Heroin use is now the leading cause of death among teenagers in New York City. Off certain schools grounds a nickel bag of heroin can be as easily obtained as a pack of chewing gum.

Instead I want to tell you about how heroin kills. Last year it killed over 1,150 people in the City. That amounts to three a day. About half of those who died were under the age of 23, while about one-fifth were 19 or less. Of all narcotic-related deaths in 1970, 75 percent were due to acute reactions to a dose of heroin; 10 percent were due to heroin-related diseases such as hepatitis, tetanus, and bacterial endocarditis; and 15 percent were due to violent incidents involving narcotics.

These narcotics statistics do not include our returning GIs. Last year more people in New York City were killed by heroin than were killed in the war. Although initial results of President Nixon's new tests designed to weed out and rehabilitate the heroin addicts among homeward-bound GIs indicate an addiction rate of only 2 percent, I am certain that some addicts have slipped through by temporarily breaking their drug habit and "drying out." The fact remains when the GI comes home, his mother no longer gets a hero, but an addict.

Heroin, to my way of thinking, is just as dangerous a foreign threat to us as was the threat of Soviet missiles pointed at us from Cuba. When the Cuban missile crisis occurred, the nation united behind the President in his determination to make the Soviets back down.

Yet our efforts to deal with the foreign threat of heroin have been less than dramatic. On June 30, the State Department announced that after years of negotiating, it has finally gotten Turkey to promise to quit planting and harvesting opium by Fall, 1972. As you know, in the past the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated that as much as 80 percent of the heroin entering the American mainstream had its origin in the fields of Turkey.

Despite this breakthrough, BNDD officials admit that there is a distinct possibility that the illicit traffic that flourished in Turkey may be re-established elsewhere such as India, West Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

How do I explain to my people the federal government's inactivity and their apparent lack of results? How do I explain to them such things as the recent State Department announcement concerning the Turkish breakthrough which said in part:

"It is a difficult thing to explain to the Turkish farmers who use the seeds for seasoning, the oil for cooking, the stalk for fodder and fuel—that they can no longer grow opium."

It should not be too difficult a thing to explain to these opium farmers since the United States has promised to subsidize them in return.

My constituents tell me they just wish the State Department would give them half the consideration that it apparently gives Turkish opium farmers.

Harvey Wellman, the State Department's Special Assistant for Narcotics Matters, testified on July 1st before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the federal government was in fact doing all sorts of things. The State Department has made bilateral arrangements for mutual assistance in drug control with Mexico, Turkey and France. It has paid \$1 million of its \$2 million pledge to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and it has sent to the Senate for confirmation the United Nations convention to extend international controls to psychotropic substances.

These steps are commendable but so far they simply have not made the slightest impact on the availability of heroin on our streets. And as long as the heroin supply is so abundant, there will remain the likelihood that the number of persons introduced and addicted to heroin will continue to spiral upward.

The reason the federal government has placed more emphasis on its rhetoric than on its actions in international drug control is not so much that it has purposely ignored this national emergency but rather that things like narcotics control had to be balanced against the diplomatic considerations. How, after all, could the heroin problem be possibly as serious as the risk of offending a NATO ally? How could heroin which has devastated Harlem with pandemic virulence be more important than our relations with Iran or Laos?

I believe it is time that we re-examine our diplomatic priorities. Since the Executive Branch in the last three or four years has been unable to do so, it

becomes the task of Congress. For this reason, I have introduced H.R. 6709 which is cosponsored by 74 of my colleagues.

The bill would empower the Comptroller General, as an agent of Congress, to make an annual determination by March 31st of each year of the effectiveness of measures taken by each foreign government to prevent narcotics from unlawfully coming to our country. Should the Comptroller General determine that a government has not undertaken appropriate steps, he would notify Congress, and after 90 days foreign assistance would be terminated. Following the determination of the Comptroller General, however, should the President find that a government has subsequently taken sufficient measures or should the President feel that the over-riding national interest requires that economic aid be continued, he would request that Congress waive the provisions of the Act. Additionally, the President is authorized to utilize the various federal agencies he may deem appropriate to help foreign governments to curb the flow of illicit narcotics.

Special Assistant Wellman, in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, outlined the State Department's position on my bill. He stated that an explicit threat to terminate assistance would not promote our objective of curbing the illicit flow of narcotics from abroad. Such action might well create internal pressures which would make it difficult for those governments to take the actions we desire. This may be true to a limited degree but this is the assumption that we have been operating for years, and foreign governments still consider heroin an internal United States problem, not their problem. All our current diplomatic efforts have had little effect on these governments. The leverage is there and the heroin epidemic is so dangerous that we can no longer afford the luxury of waiting to see if foreign governments are going to take appropriate steps.

The State Department also said that such a bill would have no effect on those countries which are involved but do not receive foreign aid. What they are referring to is countries like Burma. In the first place while Burma is one of the biggest producers, it is also one of the biggest consumers. Very little trickles to the United States. In the second place, no one has yet come up with a solution to this problem. International cooperation has been suggested, but as BNDD Director John Ingersoll recently testified, Burma has not even agreed to meet with United Nations Secretary General U Thant to work on a solution. Finally, it is ridiculous to say that just because termination of foreign aid will not be a useful tool in one or two countries, we should not apply it to countries like Thailand or Laos where it would be highly effective.

The State Department also opposes the bill because it claims some areas of illicit opium production are outside the control, political and administrative, of the government and it would not be fair to cut off its aid. This misinterprets the bill. The bill would only require foreign governments to do what is reasonably possible. It would not require governments who are in the midst of war to dry up entirely all production and trafficking of opium. Thus, in Thailand where there is considerable uncontrolled local production, we would only expect the government to tackle the corruption in the Royal Laotian armed forces which is a major trafficker.

Finally, the State Department opposes the bill because it claims that we should be helping these governments not threatening them. The problem apparently is that there is no reliable substitute crop that will pay as much and that many countries have poorly trained and administered narcotics enforcement agencies. This also misinterprets my bill. Section 4 of my bill would allow foreign governments who wish to really do something about the problem to secure the assistance of the appropriate United States departments and agencies with their particular problem. For example, West Pakistan could request the assistance of the Department of Agriculture in setting up high yield Mexican wheat production instead of opium poppy. India could request the assistance of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and customs officials to tighten up the leak of illicit opium which it currently denies exists.

Attached to my testimony is a table of the economic assistance programs and the countries that would possibly be affected by my bill. (See p. 37.) I have re-drafted the bill to make certain that for practical reasons the Food-for-Peace Program administered by AID in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture would not be affected. (A copy of the re-drafted bill referred to appears on p. 36.) Also for political reasons, the Military Assistance Program and the Military Sales Program would not be affected under my bill as re-drafted.

The second bill I introduced, H.R. 4608, to provide for increased international control of the production and trafficking of opium, represents a pioneer effort.

It requires the United States representative to the International Criminal Police Organization to propose to the Organization that a special opium control staff be established within the Organization in order to investigate and propose appropriate action to eliminate the production, processing, and transportation of opium (other than for medical or research purposes).

It establishes a committee composed of those under secretaries of Executive departments, as designated by the President, who are engaged in the enforcement of laws with respect to the production, processing, transportation, selling, or use of opium, which shall coordinate the efforts of the United States in such Organization.

It authorizes the President to furnish assistance to any friendly foreign country, on such terms and conditions as he determines necessary, in order to encourage and enable that country to eliminate the production and processing of opium within its boundaries (except such minimal production and processing as that country may require, or any other foreign country may require, for medical or research purposes).

It requires such assistance to be used: (1) to aid opium producers in developing alternative crops and commodities and markets for such crops and commodities; (2) to provide new employment opportunities in the recipient country for those persons in that country who become unemployed as the result of the policy of that country to eliminate opium production and processing; and (3) to strengthen the capability of the recipient country to enforce its laws with respect to opium production and processing.

It provides that, if the President determines that a foreign country is continuing to permit the production and processing of opium which illegally enters the United States (other than for medical or research purposes), he shall immediately discontinue all military, economic, and other assistance to such country authorized under this or other law. Allows the President to seek, through the United Nations or any other international organization, the imposition of international economic sanctions against such country.

Finally, it establishes an Executive Committee on International Opium Control to advise the President and Congress on the administration of this Act.

In short, the bill would do all the things that I think are necessary to do in order to curb the international illicit flow of heroin to our country. Currently the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) continues as a skeleton communications organization with a small budget and a staff of 108 persons only 12 of whom are assigned to narcotics. INTERPOL does not actually investigate crimes itself. Its function is to coordinate the detective work of the various nations involved in a given case. Without this, of course, thousands of criminals around the world could find safety the minute they step over their nations' borders. INTERPOL maintains 1.3 million file cards on criminals and suspect individuals around the world. It also operates its own radio network in its headquarters in St. Cloud, France. Our government's representative to INTERPOL is Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Eugene Rossides. Since INTERPOL represents the only international police organization with any potential for fighting international narcotics traffickers, I believe its authority should be expanded and broadened and its current role re-defined.

REDRAFTED VERSION OF H.R. 6709

A BILL To amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit foreign assistance from being provided to foreign countries which do not act to prevent narcotic drugs from unlawfully entering the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

“(v) (1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall review and determine annually (A) the effectiveness of measures being taken by each foreign country to prevent narcotic drugs, partially, or completely produced or processed in such country, from unlawfully entering the United States, and (B) whether that country has undertaken appropriate measures to prevent any such narcotic drug from unlawfully entering the United States. Not later than March 31 of each year, the Comptroller General shall make a report to the Congress of his review and determinations for the preceding calendar year.

“(2) Except as otherwise provided under paragraph (3) of this subsection, ninety days after the making of any such report to the Congress, any foreign country with respect to which the Comptroller General has reported a determination under paragraph (1) (B) of this subsection, that such country has not

undertaken appropriate measures to prevent any such narcotic drugs from unlawfully entering the United States, shall thereafter receive no further economic assistance under part I of this Act.

"(3) If the President finds that a foreign country referred to under paragraph (2) of this subsection has undertaken, after the determination of the Comptroller General, appropriate measures to prevent such narcotic drugs from unlawfully entering the United States, or finds that the overriding national interest requires that economic assistance under part I of this Act be continued, he may ask Congress to waive the provisions of such paragraph, and if the Congress concurs, the provisions of such paragraph shall not apply to that country unless the provisions of such paragraph would apply further to that country as a result of a subsequent report and determination.

"(4) The President is authorized to utilize such agencies and facilities of the Federal Government as he may deem appropriate to assist foreign countries in their efforts to prevent the unlawful entry of narcotic drugs into the United States. The President shall keep the Congress fully and currently informed with respect to any action taken by him under this paragraph.

"(5) No provisions of this or any other law shall be construed to authorize the President to waive the provisions of this subsection.

"(6) For purposes of this subsection, 'narcotic drugs' has the same meaning as given that term under section 4731 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."

Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall be effective on the first July 1 occurring on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

(Following are the tables referred to in Mr. Rangel's statement.)

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, FISCAL YEAR 1971 (ESTIMATES)

(In thousands of dollars)

Country	AID	Development loans	Technical cooperation	Supporting assistance
Afghanistan	8,700	1,700	7,000	
India	184,530	175,530	9,000	
Iran				
Lebanon				
Nepal	2,631	706	1,925	
Pakistan	88,840	82,840	6,000	
Turkey	68,385	65,000	3,385	
United Arab Republic				
Bolivia	3,585	335	3,250	
Mexico				
Peru	7,010	3,360	3,650	
Burma				
Hong Kong				
Japan				
Laos	45,925	925	6,600	38,400
Malaysia				
Thailand	23,095	1,395	6,100	15,600
France				

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, FISCAL YEAR 1972 (PROPOSED)

(In thousands of dollars)

Country	AID	Development loans	Technical cooperation	Supporting assistance
Afghanistan	7,018		7,018	
India	230,050	220,000	10,050	
Iran				
Lebanon				
Nepal	2,695		2,695	
Pakistan	118,580	110,000	8,330	250
Turkey	43,948	40,000	3,948	
United Arab Republic				
Bolivia	13,400	10,000	3,285	115
Mexico				
Peru	14,100	10,000	4,100	
Burma				
Hong Kong				
Japan				
Laos	50,550			50,550
Malaysia				
Thailand	40,000			40,000
France				

Mr. RANGEL. I would like to share with the Chair its commendation of Congressmen Murphy and Steele. I think it is significant to note they are both freshmen and have done an outstanding job in making the narcotics problem a national issue.

In the consideration of any amendment to the foreign aid bill, there is a great deal of concern about protecting the sensitivity of our relationships with host countries. Because I am new in the U.S. Congress and am more used to thinking about heroin on the streets than diplomacy considerations, I will not comment on that.

I do hope that you will take time out to read the legislation that I have introduced and that of my colleague, Mr. Rodino.

I am not concerned with whether the amendment you adopt is my bill, or a combination with another Congressman's bill, but I think it is important to develop a mechanism to apply leverage against foreign governments involved in narcotics. My bill gives this leverage to the Comptroller General as an agent of Congress.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You are the only one who mentions the Comptroller General. What would you have him do?

Mr. RANGEL. The Comptroller General will have annual responsibility to investigate the conduct of any nation to see what its involvement is in cultivation or manufacturing of drugs which are being exported and imported into these United States. He will report back to the Congress on those nations which aren't taking adequate steps to curb the flow of narcotics and economic aid to these countries would be terminated.

It also provides for the President to waive provisions of the bill where in his opinion it would affect our national security. Congress would then authorize aid to continue if it concurred with the President's opinion.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What can you tell us about the depth of the problem as you have seen it from the community point of view? What is the broad general nature of this problem? How serious is it?

Mr. RANGEL. First of all, I would like to say as Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, I dealt extensively with prosecution of those people who had been charged with violating the Harrison Act, which is basically section 18 of the U.S. Code.

At that time, we were working closely with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. It became abundantly clear to me that 70 to 80 percent of the persons convicted were blacks and Puerto Ricans.

One of the elements of the crime under this Federal statute was that the person had to have knowledge that the drugs were imported into these United States illegally. I think it is safe to say that while black may be beautiful, it is not perfection and many blacks simply did not know anything about importation of heroin let alone how to import it.

Our failure to get the importers brings me to wonder whether our law enforcement efforts are a realistic method of dealing with the problem. The fact of the matter is that in my community we have screamed out about the trafficking of drugs for years but our voices have not been heard and tons of heroin continue to be imported unabated.

We have received absolutely no results from the efforts of the Congress of the United States, much less results from the efforts of the

State of New York. Police Commissioner Murphy has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also before the Knapp Commission as well as the State Investigating Commission and he has pointed out that the corruption that exists in a substantial part of the 32,000-man New York City Police Department stems mostly from narcotics trafficking.

Now, what this has done in a large segment of our community is to have the minority members review what has happened to their families, to their court system and to school systems to find out who would be responsible for such acts.

Black mothers are no longer praying that their children complete high school but only hoping and praying that they will not succumb to drugs.

It has almost corrupted the United Federation of Teachers because for professional reasons they have refused to cooperate with the New York City Police Department in reporting specific addiction information in our primary schools and secondary schools for inclusion in the Narcotics Register.

Our court system is overloaded with narcotics cases. Over 75 percent of those incarcerated are incarcerated for crimes closely associated with drug addiction. Those that cannot make bail are incarcerated for 2 to 3 years while awaiting trial. Needless to say, 70 or 80 percent of those people waiting for trial happen to be black or Puerto Rican.

One of the ways we try to have due process is called the bail system, but bail is set in New York City courts not on the basis of whether or not the defendant is expected to return to the court when his case appears on the calendar but whether there is enough space in the house of detention. The department of correction commissioner advises the court and the court advises legal aid. Legal aid then decides whether or not the defendants will have any bail at all or whether or not the initial charges would be held.

One of the methods which is used to eliminate calendar congestion is to allow drug pushers, whether addict or not, to plead guilty to misdemeanor and receive a reduced sentence if, in fact, any sentence at all. This is what imported narcotics has done to our justice system.

In our hospitals, drug addiction has almost corrupted the professional standards expected of hospital administrators as they attempt to politically react to the need for having beds for drug addicts at the expense of the aged, poor, and sick.

In the area of rehabilitation and job training, of course, we cannot expect rehabilitation to have any effect on our addicts since most of our rehabilitation centers are merely used by experienced addicts to reduce habits in such a way they can get by with \$3 and \$5 bags as opposed to \$60 and \$70 habits.

I mention all of this outside of the testimony which I submitted into the record because it is clear to those of us that come from communities such as Harlem that no one in middle America seems to be concerned about how the addicts have taken over our streets, closed churches, and prevented any type of community activity in the evening. Political clubs that used to be open one or two nights a week have closed. The Catholic church has closed. Protestant churches and synagogues have long been gone.

But when it became known that our returning GI's were addicted, when it became known there were whites getting addicted to the same drugs, when mothers began seeing not heroes returning from the war but drug addicts, then we observed a flurry of activity in the consciences of Americans who claim to be deeply concerned about all Americans.

I submit we must be concerned with disruptions from within as well as protecting our security from without, because while we find an overwhelming number of minority group members escaping the economic purges of not being able to survive in this Nation by enlisting into the service, we also find a growing feeling among minority group members that this is a plot of genocide which is meant to extinguish a segment of community members who may not be considered useful by the larger white majority.

Of course, there is very little credence that should be given to this type of thinking because this epidemic has spread outside of the inner cities into suburbia and throughout these United States. But I am saying that many of our people in the Harlem community who once felt America could protect them against foreign foes, if not against some of the domestic problems which we have historically faced, are now questioning whether America itself might not be unintentionally involved in the trafficking of narcotics.

It has been said over and over by distinguished members of both Houses that, in fact, we are giving subsidies to nations, we are giving military aid to nations, nations whose governments are involved in the growing and trafficking of narcotics. Details on this have been reported back by Congressmen and testimony that has been received from Congressman Steele and from Congressman Murphy but has not been rebutted by any responsible agency of Government.

We can know that planes that we have purchased, trucks that we have purchased, governments that we are supporting are actively engaged in trafficking drugs which affect our youngsters abroad as well as the people in this country.

I would suspect that there will come a time when legislators such as myself, who have attempted to be diplomatically responsible with the legislation that I have introduced, will have to concern myself with whether my primary responsibility will be survival of my community rather than the sensitive relationships that this country enjoys with our so-called allies.

So for these reasons, I welcome the opportunity to come here, but we know in Harlem, as many other communities throughout these United States know, when America has a foe, we know how to deal with it. Unless we can review our relationships with the nations which we can pinpoint are directly responsible for cultivation and manufacture of heroin, then we may lose a large segment of America from within.

It is commonplace for our department of hospitals to receive children that have received heroin overdoses. I just ask you to try to walk in my shoes and try to think of my children as being your children and I am convinced you will change your ideas about which is more important—the survival of American youth or the relations we have with nations with whom we have attempted over the years to negotiate.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity and I think that you and this committee should take a great deal of credit for the recent agreement that was made with the Turkish Government because I, for one, know the pressures that have been put not only on this House Foreign Affairs Committee but on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well to make certain that people did not say things that were offensive.

I think the value of life is far more important than many of the things we have concerned ourselves with in the past. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to congratulate Mr. Rangel. The freshmen are making a very impressive case today. I have been interested in your eloquent and profound testimony. I haven't read your prepared statement but if it reads as well as your spoken statement, it is going to be a valuable contribution.

In comment, I would only say that it is not a question of your children as against ours. All children are subjected to the same problem today. It has, as you pointed out, spread so far that our youth, no matter how they are brought up, no matter where they live, no matter what kind of education they are getting, are subjected to what we used to call temptation in a very real form. We are all very sensitive to the fact that something needs to be done.

The best way to protect our children isn't necessarily to throw the book at our friends or neighbors or other countries. That isn't going to solve the problem of the source of supply. I would suppose we face a much more tedious job of educating countries to the fact that this does constitute an international problem, with which they need to concern themselves more directly than they have.

If we are simply to cut ourselves off in an attempt to express disapproval of a policy which doesn't seem, to the Southeast Asians, for instance, to be evil because they have been accustomed to drugs for a long time, or in Turkey, we may not be solving the problem. We may be simply complicating it.

In other words, if we should have used what I understand is your approach with respect to Turkey 5 years ago, we almost surely would not have been able to secure the success which has occurred with respect to Turkey. The source of supply would not have dried up or be in the process of drying up had we simply said, "You are not our friend if you continue to grow opium because opium is being transported to our country from Turkey."

Mr. RANGEL. I have not the expertise to speculate as to what would have happened if we had taken a harder line in Turkey. Certainly, I suppose we could have negotiated with Cuba when we suspected they had missiles over there but I did somehow believe this Nation felt it was a national threat.

Your children are not subjected to what the children in my district are. Legislators like Senator Hughes and Senator Javits walked the streets witnessing narcotics sales with policemen on the scene.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am saying we should not pass judgment on the conditions that other children grow up in. I live in a town of 20,000 people and pushing takes place on the green in the center of town. It happens in a lot of different communities.

I am not downgrading your concern with your district. Admittedly the inner cities have a peculiar problem, in an exaggerated form, but the drug problem is prevalent and very widespread.

Mr. RANGEL. My whole point, and I didn't intend to belabor it, is that we have to find out what is the difference between communities such as mine and communities such as yours because this is going to have a direct effect in determining how we deal with nations that are affecting the very lives of our children.

Perhaps the freshmen Congressmen have not been here long enough to be responsible enough to fully understand the Government's international involvement with other nations that are supposed to be our friends but, as you well know, there has been a tremendous increase in addiction and I am certain that we must reevaluate whether in fact, we are dealing with allies.

I seriously doubt whether America is going to be standing alone as we see this drug epidemic sweep not only our Armed Forces but those who potentially will be called upon to serve this country.

I am merely suggesting that without fully disagreeing with the fine work done by my colleagues Murphy and Steele, that the Congress has the control over the purse-strings of foreign aid and the Executive should decide what is in the national interest.

It is difficult for me to understand why Congress has given foreign aid to those nations which we have already through our agencies found to be engaged in cultivation and manufacture of drugs, notwithstanding the fact that their cultures do not allow them to understand that they are killing our kids.

Someone said that once we dry up the fields in Turkey that it is going to move to some other areas and I suspect that it will as long as you have this inflated profit involved in this trafficking.

The only question I ask of my country, and certainly those that are sworn to uphold what it stands for, is how much courage will we have to deal with any nation that is involved in activities which affect our national security. I submit that until we really and fully believe that this is affecting our national security, then we will just continue to engage in our 10-year negotiations with friendly countries.

But for me, it makes no difference whether the killing comes from a so-called Communist nation or whether it comes from a nation which, historically, has enjoyed a friendly relationship. I am seeing deaths on my streets. Therefore, I am prepared to go beyond the responsible position which I have taken in my statement.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But is the issue having the courage to deal with other nations, or having the wisdom to know how to get the results? By simply closing the door to a country like Turkey, you don't solve the problem. The drugs continue to come in.

What is needed is a process of persuasion and education. Perhaps that is tedious and perhaps you get impatient and perhaps you feel there must be a quicker solution to protect children. Yet in the long run, I don't think there is any other way except to continue, on an international basis, the process which has already made some progress, in Turkey especially.

Mr. RANGEL. But have we tried another way?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't think there is any other way.

Mr. RANGEL. The strongest talk I have heard has come from this Congress in the last year and it has only been in the last year that we have successfully concluded a 10-year negotiation.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This was not done through coercion.

Mr. RANGEL. I don't know how we did it, but it seems to me the State Department and Turkey were very concerned about what your committee was taking up and your committee was taking up coercion.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am sure coercion was not a factor. The only coercion was that the President could withhold aid if he felt it advisable.

Mr. RANGEL. If he felt like it, but as long as the bills come through Congress and not the White House we will have to decide how much foreign aid we are going to give and what conditions we are going to place on it. I also believe, since I have over 70 sponsors of my bill, that many Congressmen and legislators who are not concerned specifically about the drug problems in their community are concerned about foreign aid.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wish more were concerned in a constructive way about foreign aid, to tell you the truth.

Mr. RANGEL. When you are talking about survival, it makes no difference what their concerns are. I think that we have to really look at how long is living going to live in the cities. I have to be concerned about your children and hope this tragedy doesn't overflow into your community. But every Congressman that ever sees what happens in my community on a daily basis will come back and review very closely the relationships we enjoy with friendly nations and perhaps it will not take coercion and may not work, but life is only one life and you can only try it one time.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Rangel, both you and I serve on the committee known as the Select Committee on Crime under Claude Pepper's leadership. I think that many members here have not had the opportunity of sitting in on those hearings and would like to know the approaches of treating heroin addicts that has taken place in New York.

New York State and New York City have spent more in the last 10 years than the Federal Government has spent in this entire century on the drug problem. I think the members here and my colleague on this committee would be interested in exploring methadone. Dr. Revichies, although he is suspect in a lot of quarters especially in the medical profession, does have a drug that bears taking a good look into and I think this is where the Federal Government has failed.

Mr. RANGEL. Congressman Murphy is referring to a method of rehabilitation. We were shocked to find out that the drug methadone has been before the Food and Drug Administration 7 years. Historically, no drug has been before the committee that long and has yet to be determined whether the drug is safe or whether the drug is dangerous.

Of course, it was just being used in Harlem then and communities like Harlem and I suspect now they will be moving much faster. But as you have heard earlier, heroin and methadone are both addictive. All doctors agree that it is more difficult to rehabilitate a methadone

addict than it is a heroin addict. It takes a longer time to detoxify him.

It is a dangerous drug if injected intravenously. It is also dangerous because it is dispensed without adequate supervision and a methadone black market has been created. The Food and Drug Administration just recently had to close up two clinics that were operating illegally.

There has been, up until the appointment of Dr. Jaffe, no coordination of any of the efforts made to rehabilitate addicts in any community in the United States, the results being that many communities that receive State and Federal funds merely hire ex-addicts or doctors to dispense methadone rather than attempt to rehabilitate.

I was able to bring before the Select House Committee on Crime a doctor that allegedly had treated 1,800 drug addicts with very, very high degrees of success with a nonaddictive drug. That drug was pending before the Food and Drug Administration. The doctor used this for over a year. We were able to hear testimony from three doctors that had used this drug and report overwhelming success with it.

The Food and Drug Administration, as well as National Institute of Mental Health, said the doctor did not fulfill his testing requirements as related to toxicity and so, therefore, they could not give him what is commonly referred to as an IND number.

Because of efforts of the chairman, as well as other members of the Crime Committee, we were able to bring the doctor here to Washington with representatives of the Food and Drug Administration as well as the state department of the State of New York and the health department.

We were happy to report that all of the toxicity tests will be conducted by the Federal Government and, if it proves that the drug is safe for injection, then it will be used in Lexington, Ky., for a more controlled study.

We are very excited about the potential that this drug has but we certainly believe that more work should be done.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all of the questions I have.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rangel, I would like to compliment you very highly on your statement. I think you have made your statement from the point of view of what you really know. I think many of us, including myself, and perhaps most of the American people, take the attitude that they are not going to fix the roof until it starts to leak and, when it is not raining, they won't fix it.

I think you have been in a position to see the dope problem where the average American has not had that opportunity, and I say this thankfully. As a result, it didn't seem as acute a problem at first until it has now been brought home to all of us. Not only because of the inner cities but particularly the amount of GI's that have come home from Vietnam and now it hits almost every area, plus school areas, apparently because of the ease in which drugs can be found by younger people.

I want to compliment you and say I can certainly understand your feelings and the feelings of the people in Harlem. I remember seeing drug addicts years ago when I was going to college but they were few. They weren't very many and most of the time you passed them off as an isolated fool.

But I think one of the things that has bothered Mr. Frelinghuysen and certainly it bothers me, is that we didn't know and never would suspect that it would hit us all so close or that we would be subject to its hitting all of our homes. We somewhat blinded ourselves to the fact that it was our problem, but felt it was the problem of somebody who went astray and there was not much one could do.

Let me ask you with regard to methadone, for instance, it is used in Miami now and in other areas in my district. Isn't it a cheaper drug actually than heroin? Isn't that the reason that it is used so readily, not to cure really, but because it is a cheaper way to help ease the problem?

Mr. RANGEL. You would find, Mr. Burke, that so many people that have their own modality become so expert in it that they close their eyes to some other way to rehabilitate addicts. There are many who don't believe that any addictive drug should be used and they have their drug-free programs.

It is true that it is so easy to manufacture methadone that it is relatively cheap. However, some people believe that you should use methadone only for the purposes of detoxifying. We use it in the houses of detention in the city of New York, not for maintenance, but merely to detoxify so that the pains and vomiting and eye burns will not occur. The person is able to still have the psychological craving but at least he has gone through that crash program of the body demanding the drug.

So in connection with detoxification, certainly I have heard very little opposition to the drug being used. Where you are running a maintenance program and tell a person that he will be a methadone addict all of his life, then you encounter strong reservations from professional people.

Mr. BURKE. I agree, but isn't methadone a manmade drug and, like LSD, it would not be impossible to still have the problem in this country with manmade drugs. So the problem is to try and find the cure.

Mr. RANGEL. We are beginning to have it today. Many of the people who testified before the Crime Committee—and certainly I know it from being in central Harlem—have found ways to reduce solid state of methadone into a liquid state and inject it into the vein.

We do now have a black market and a new methadone addict. Many of them use it in conjunction with heroin and other drugs.

Mr. BURKE. Isn't that a problem we also ought to look to in advance especially since there are so many younger people now that are well enough educated, let's say, in chemistry and other facets of manufacture, that the problem may still remain no matter what drugs we cut off from Turkey or elsewhere is concerned?

Mr. RANGEL. I don't think there is any question about it, and I was happy to see that the President included this aspect in his program. I was a little disappointed to see that there wasn't much money requested for it, but I do believe that we have to find out if we were able to eliminate all of the poppy fields and all of the cultivation, what we are going to do now with Food and Drug Administration which is licensing methadone clinics.

Mr. BURKE. I can agree, but one problem adds to another and we have to figure out how to solve it. I think there will be more money

now, since people are becoming more and more aware of the great problem in this country. You made one mistake though, I think, if I could correct it, as far as Turkey is concerned. In 1960 they did have about five times as many provinces growing poppies than today.

I think they had 20 or more provinces that produced poppies and it is now down, because of mutual governmental cooperation, down to about four provinces.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. But those 16 produced a very minimal amount.

Mr. BURKE. But they produced it and it has at least given the Turkish Government the opportunity to get into areas themselves now where they can perhaps ultimately decide just exactly what they need for medicinal purposes. But I think there has been effort, and with due respect to you freshmen, I know many of the people who have been in Congress a long time—and I have only been here 5 years—have been aware of the problem, but I do think something is now being done. I want once again to compliment you on your efforts in this field because you have had a great opportunity of observing more than most of us because of your area. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Vander Jagt?

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two brief questions. In your very eloquent statement, there was one thing I hope I misunderstood. You said that heroin addiction in your schools was prevalent in primary schools?

Mr. RANGEL. Yes; it is.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. What grades?

Mr. RANGEL. I shouldn't say prevalent, but transactions are taking place and deaths are reported from 8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds. The problem that we have is not so much that we haven't learned to live with this, but the fact that the largest union in the country, the United Federation of Teachers, are so concerned with their professional image that they are failing to report even what is happening in the schools.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. That was going to be my next question. In spite of the fact that 8- or 9-year-old grade school students are having a problem with heroin addiction, the teachers refuse to cooperate with the law-enforcement officers? Is that true?

Mr. RANGEL. And despite the fact that medical examiners report large numbers of children who are dying with overdoses, despite all of this, our police commissioner cannot get any cooperation from teachers in obtaining the names of student addicts and this is one of the professional hangups they have in cooperating with police. But it exists.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. I had hoped I misunderstood it. I am sorry. I understood it correctly the first time. You were here when Congressmen Murphy and Steele testified and I don't want to put words in their mouths, but it seemed to me that what they were telling us was that, in their opinion, having talked with the Prime Minister of Turkey and our Ambassador there, that if we had had an absolute automatic ban on aid to Turkey if they didn't stop growing opium, that we never would have made the breakthrough that we did make.

Is it not possible that someone would want just as desperately as you to cut off the source, to turn off the faucet instead of having all of that stuff flying out of the hose, and yet in his judgment, it could be that the most effective way to do so would be to give the President or some-

one else the authority to cancel the aid but not make it mandatory? Isn't it possible that would be a more effective way to achieve the ends that you want to achieve?

Mr. RANGEL. No one has more pride in being a part of the freshman class of Congressmen Murphy and Steele in connection with their study of the heroin epidemic in Southeast Asia than I, but they joined with me in lack of expertise as to what would happen to Turkey if we had taken a stronger position.

I suggest that if this cancer spreads, there will be no question in anybody's mind as to what we have to do. It is unfortunate that I have to find out what problems you have in your community by reading or listening to TV and listening to you on the floor, and perhaps I would have a more compassionate understanding of the problems you were facing if this was human nature.

It is not. I say that, notwithstanding what you read and what you hear, for unless you have to live with it, there is no way that you would really be able to evaluate the necessity of doing something drastic immediately.

I know that America is strong enough and concerned enough about its own that if the situation were reversed and it was not the inner cities, but in fact, the rural areas of this country that were hit with this epidemic, then perhaps I would be trying to find out what the farmers are complaining about.

I will be assisted tragically enough by the return of many of the southern GI addicts from Vietnam and when they get finished mugging the farmers in the South, then perhaps they will understand what we have been talking about in Harlem. It is tragic.

I don't think we can expect representatives to fully understand the problems, except by getting together and sharing information. But if senior Members of Congress were in my place, there wouldn't be any question that we would have gone into a more forceful plan with Turkey and not waited 10 years.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Rangel, I, too, want to compliment you for a very eloquent and very moving and very important statement.

What do you think of a situation like this? I read in the New York Times of July 2, 1971, that Washington is quietly concerned about the potential illicit drug traffic that exists in Iran which 2 years ago resumed growing poppies. After a lapse of 13 years Iran now starts again to grow poppies.

I look in one of these unclassified presentation books and it says in the past years, from 1946 to 1970, we sold or gave Iran \$1.334 billion dollars worth of military assistance. About half of it was in grants and half in military sales. If you were President of the United States, what would you do under those circumstances? Iran is still getting about \$100 million a year in credit assistance for the purchase of defense articles and services and is continuing to grow poppies.

Mr. RANGEL. I would suppose that we would not interfere with the internal operation of a government that was merely growing poppies where we had no way of knowing whether or not it was actually coming into the United States.

On the other hand, I think that the President of the United States should deal with any nation in such a strong fashion that each nation

that is thinking about filling the gap that will be left by Turkey would know that America is concerned about its survival and so there would be no question that it should take all appropriate steps necessary to stop its narcotics production and trafficking.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it your view that Turkey, a nation that over the past 20 years has received from the United States over \$5 billion in grant military aid and other assistance, would have been more willing to cooperate if we had shown a little harder line?

Mr. RANGEL. There is no question in my mind, and I say that as a freshman. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that the more we talk about negotiating and giving more funds that we have financed countries to stay in the opium trade rather than provide deterrents for them to get out of it.

I only hope that the people in Harlem can look forward to receiving the same type of consideration from our country that we have given to the Turkish farmers because, if we did, perhaps there would be no need for the vast amount of welfare assistance.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. At this point we will take the statement of Hon. Joseph G. Minish.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH G. MINISH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY**

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for asking me to testify concerning H.R. 3831, which would provide for a program to control the illegal international traffic in narcotics.

Part A of this measure provides that 10 percent of the U.S. contribution to the United Nations be utilized for the special fund supporting narcotics control activities. Already, Congress has approved an initial \$2 million for the fund created by the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs. However, if we are to make a successful effort to control drug and narcotic abuse, we must finance it fully. Addiction, and the resultant crime and human tragedy, are too expensive for us to underfund their eradication. The burgeoning drug problem must be swiftly and decisively controlled. I propose, therefore, that Congress agree to provide a full 10 percent of our U.N. contribution to this fund. At the level of fiscal 1971 appropriations, that sum would total \$4.6 million.

Part B of H.R. 3831 is a significant section, providing for the President to direct our representatives at the United Nations to effectively and multilaterally undertake to eradicate illegal production and international trafficking in narcotics. This section would work hand-in-glove with section C.

At the time section C was introduced, it was assumed that there was a legitimate medical need for opium production, to produce morphine, codeine, and semisynthetic analgesics and antitussives.

However, since section C was introduced, we are no longer sure that opium is necessary for medical purposes. Dr. Nathan B. Eddy, in recent testimony before another congressional committee stated that "all medical indications of morphine and/or codeine, as well as for

substances semi-synthetically derived from them, can be met by substances of wholly synthetic origin." Moreover, Dr. Eddy also testified that the Committee on Drug Addiction of the National Academy of Science-National Research Council has maintained that both medical practice and patients would suffer no loss if the alkaloids of opium, and substances derived from them, were unavailable.

The President, in his recent drug message to the Congress said that acceptable substances for morphine were available, and I have had evidence shown to me that there are acceptable codeine substitutes as well.

This committee has said that most of the illegal narcotics entering the United States are the products of crops grown legally for medical purposes and then diverted into illicit channels. Moreover, as the special study mission concerning the world heroin problem pointed out, there is only one effective way to control the narcotics problem. That is at the source, which is to be found in the poppy fields.

Of course, we were all extremely gratified at the statesmanlike announcement last week by the Turkish Government. Turkey, which is the source for approximately 70 percent of the illegal heroin reaching the United States, has agreed to eliminate within a year all production of opium poppies.

However, there is a great danger that opium growth may now be accelerated in other nations in order to take advantage of the Turkish decision.

It is my recommendation, therefore, that our Government seek to eliminate the legal international quota on opium poppy growth set by the United Nations. The committee could start this proposal in action by amending section C of H.R. 3831 to provide that the protocol to the 1961 Opium Convention call for an immediate end to the growth of opium for medical purposes. That would preclude the diversion of opium crops grown legally for medical purposes and then sold through the black market to drug traffickers. While certain synthetic analgesics could be abused, their distribution is far easier to control and regulate than that of opium.

Surely member states of the U.N. will not hesitate to join in such a new agreement, knowing that the drug addiction problem is widespread and growing. Moreover, such an agreement is appropriate through the international body set up for international cooperation. I hope the committee will consider these recommended amendments to section C.

While section D of the legislation is not as important as revision and enactment of section C, I might point out that since introduction of this bill, the United States has signed the treaty on psychotropic drugs and the President has stated that he will submit it to the Senate for ratification.

Last, section 2 of this legislation concerns the sense of Congress that the President take into account the contribution nations make towards suppressing the illegal international narcotics traffic.

Mr. Chairman, an addict will pay any price for narcotics, no matter what he has to do to get them. Only a total cutoff of the drug supply coupled with effective and humane rehabilitation programs will

result in a significant reduction in the problems of addiction. I am hopeful that this committee will agree with the position I have outlined, and thank you for permitting me to present my viewpoint.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until 1:30 tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., Thursday, July 8, 1971.)

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

THURSDAY, JULY 8, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:30 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in session.

Our first witness this afternoon is our distinguished colleague from New York, Congressman James Scheuer.

Mr. Scheuer, we are very pleased to hear you. I know you have done a great deal of work in this very important and significant field.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES H. SCHEUER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. SCHEUER. Congressman, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear here. I am grateful for your courtesy.

I have a prepared statement, but in view of the time pressure on all of us, I ask unanimous consent to have the statement appear in the record, and then I will just chat briefly.

Along with the statement, I would also like to insert a USIS report of a press conference held by Ambassador Carl Schurmann on June 18 in Geneva. Ambassador Schurmann was formerly The Netherlands Ambassador to Washington, and he is now the personal representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. to the recently established U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control. His very brief statement, I think, is interesting and informative.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The statements referred to follow:)

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES H. SCHEUER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and I am grateful for your invitation.

The subject of the need for international efforts to control narcotic drugs is not new. As long ago as 1909, at the suggestion of President Theodore Roosevelt, thirteen nations met in Shanghai to discuss methods of controlling the international traffic in opium and, in 1924, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives issued a report on the subject which reads as if it were written yesterday.

However, as this Committee well knows, narcotics addiction today poses a real threat to the health of our nation. Drug abuse is literally killing our youth and our cities. It is imperative, therefore, that we re-examine the problem and develop new and imaginative solutions.

Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of attending the recently concluded United Nations Conference on Psychotropic Substances in Vienna as a Congressional advisor to the United States delegation. Twice during the last year I traveled abroad, at my own expense, to confer with police officials, ranking Foreign Office officials, and elected representatives in London, Paris, Rome, the Hague, and Turkey. I have conferred with the President, the Secretary of State, top White House officials, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, United Nations officials in New York, Geneva, Rome, and many experts both within the government and in the private sector.

These consultations have convinced me that the problem of drug abuse will not be solved without a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary effort involving programs to reduce both supply and demand. This effort should involve law enforcement, education, research, treatment and rehabilitation coordinated by an office in the White House as I proposed last March, Senators Muskie and Harris proposed in May, and the President proposed on June 17th.

The need for coordination which was proposed as early as 1963 is especially acute in the field of foreign relations. We simply do not have a coordinated, integrated program in this area.

As a result, opium is being produced in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Laos, and Thailand at ever-increasing rates.

As a result, the French in Marseilles have made only a token effort to close down the refineries which transform opium into the heroin which enters the veins of children in the South Bronx—the French have not even gone so far as to provide their police in Marseilles with enough secretarial assistance, enough translators for translating American police training manuals into French, enough two-way radio cars, enough trained men to do the job.

Mr. Chairman, the President noted in his June 17 message, "America has the largest number of heroin addicts of any nation in the world. And yet, America does not grow opium—of which heroin is a derivative—nor does it manufacture heroin, which is a laboratory process carried out abroad. This deadly poison in the American life stream is, in other words, a foreign import."

We will not end heroin addiction in this country until we stop this "foreign import." Heroin addiction appears to bear a special relationship to heroin availability. The greater the availability, the greater the number of addicts. The reverse also appears to be true. Thus, the President is correct when he said: "It is clear that the only really effective way to end heroin production is to end opium production and the growing of poppies." A solution to the problem, if there is one, must begin with efforts to control the production of opium at its source—in the poppy fields of the Near and Far East.

Due to soil and climatic requirements and the labor-intensive character of poppy culture, most of the world's supply of opium, legal and illegal, is produced within a zone extending from the Turkish Anatolian Plain to Yunnan Province in China.

This opium is used for medicinal purposes—primarily in the form of the pain-killer morphine and the antitussive codeine—and in one form or another is smoked, eaten, sniffed or injected, in virtually every country in the world.

The production of opium for medicinal purposes is not much of a problem. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which is the successor of 10 previous treaties, has been successful in preventing the opium produced for medicinal purposes in India, the USSR and Turkey from being diverted to the illicit market.

The problem then is not with opium that is legitimately produced to meet the world's medicinal requirements. Rather the problem lies in opium which is produced illegally or which never finds its way into legal channels. This is the opium which, in various forms, comes into the possession of addicts and users throughout the world.

At least one expert, John Kusak, of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, has estimated that as much as 80% of the illegal heroin which reaches this country originates as opium produced in Turkey. This opium is produced by Turkish farmers in the same manner as the opium which they produce to supply some 20% of the opium utilized to satisfy the world's medicinal

requirements. However, unlike the opium which is collected by the Turkish government for this export trade and which thus enters legal channels, this opium is presently illegally diverted into the hands of the men who supply the illicit demand in the United States, Iran, and some other countries.

There are at least two methods of controlling this illegal production. The first method, which is only an interim measure until opium production can be halted entirely, involves guaranteeing, by some means, that all of the opium produced in Turkey enters legal channels. This involves, initially, a reduction in the number of provinces in which poppy culture is to be permitted. The Turkish government has in fact reduced the number of provinces from 21 in 1967 to 7 in 1971 and the number of provinces is to be further reduced to 4. By reducing the number of provinces and by limiting these provinces which are permitted to grow poppy to those which are located away from the Turkish border, surveillance of poppy culture is facilitated and production is more easily controlled.

In addition, the Turkish government must develop an efficient collection procedure and, in this regard, the Turks have recently taken a number of steps to strengthen and improve their efforts to guarantee that all opium which is grown in Turkey enters legal channels.

Allow me to take just a moment to outline these recent steps:

1. The Turks have established a coordinating committee at the central government and province level to coordinate all efforts to collect opium grown within the country.

2. The Turks have increased the government purchase price for opium by 60-70% to make the government's price more competitive with the illegal market.

3. The government has agreed to advance 50% of the purchase price to the farmers prior to harvest. Prior to this agreement, only illegal marketeers would agree to pay in advance of harvest.

4. The government has increased the number of its inspection teams to check yields in the field against growers' declarations of expected yields.

5. The government has trained and assigned new purchasing agents and has gathered enough vehicles so that the government can purchase the opium in the field while it is still wet. This serves two purposes.

First, in the past, the illegal market would pay for opium by weight when it was still wet and thus heavier than when it was dry. Since the government would purchase opium, in most cases, only when it was dry, the farmer would obtain more for his opium from the black market.

Second, by purchasing opium in the field, the government prevents the farmer from dropping off 4 to 5 kilos to illegal marketeers on his way to the government purchasing office.

6. The government has increased its enforcement activities so that in the first four months of this year, seizures of illegal opium exceed the amount seized during all of 1970. The amount seized is the equivalent of 500 pounds of heroin—a not insignificant amount.

7. Finally, and most importantly, the lower house of the Turkish legislature, just this week, passed a strict licensing law. This bill is now pending before the Turkish Senate and is expected to be enacted into law soon.

Thus far, I have outlined a procedure which merely provides a means for strengthening and enforcing Turkish law. Theoretically, all opium which is produced in Turkey is to be sold to the government monopoly for legitimate sale to pharmaceutical manufacturers. If theory were to become reality, if all Turkish opium were to enter legal channels, then, as I have noted, much of the problem represented by Turkish poppy culture would be solved.

In the final analysis, though, the total elimination of Turkish production is the only method of preventing Turkish opium from entering illegal channels. As long as opium is produced in Turkey, the lucrative illegal market, through corruption and the willingness to take risks, will guarantee that illegal opium will be produced and smuggled out of Turkey. Thus, the solution to the problem lies in the complete abolition of poppy culture.

I am pleased that the Turks have announced their intention to abolish production in 1972. This is certainly a significant step and should do much to help stem the tide of addiction in this country.

This prohibition will require an energetic law enforcement effort if it is to be successful, and American technical aid and assistance will be essential in this regard. It has been estimated that the entire American addict population utilizes only 50 to 60 thousand pounds of opium equivalent annually and that this demand

could be met by the cultivation of no more than 5-10 square miles. This fact indicates the magnitude of the law enforcement effort that will be required if illicit opium production is to be eliminated.

The elimination of illegal Turkish production, while a major and necessary first step, will not guarantee an end to the availability of illegal drugs.

Most of the world's supply of illegal opium is produced in the Far East, with other areas tending to rank in descending order of importance as one moves westward. Thus, Burma, Laos, and Thailand account for more than half of the estimated world illicit production of 1,250 to 1,400 tons, with Burma alone accounting for nearly 30%. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region is in second place and India in third.

Dealers in illicit drugs have demonstrated a remarkable facility in developing new sources of supply as older sources are eliminated. Thus, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Afghanistan-Pakistan greatly increased production in 1955 when Iran ceased production and supplies from the Yunnan Province in China were eliminated. In fact, there are already indications that production in these areas is increasing in anticipation of a decrease in supply from Turkey.

Thus, even the total elimination of poppy culture in Turkey will not solve the problem. The cessation of illicit production in that country would only result in a shift to new sources of supply. Elimination of Turkey as a source would, of course, be beneficial; indeed, such an accomplishment would diminish the number of supply routes to be discovered and disrupted and would force illegal suppliers to spend time and money to make new contacts and to develop new methods of distribution. However, we must also begin major efforts now to control the supply available from other regions as well.

Control of illicit opium production in the Far East may prove even more difficult than control of Turkish production. In this area, opium production, although illegal, occurs in regions over which the central government lacks sufficient administrative control to enforce the law.

Moreover, in many of these same areas, opium is the only crop which can be grown and profitably transported to market. One expert has informed me, for example, that if one village in the Far East were to substitute potatoes for opium, it would require all of the village's 52 horses for four months to get the crop to market—less than 25 kilometers away.

Under these conditions, control of illicit production will require the provision of substantial resources. When the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs—an organ of the Economic and Social Council—considered the problem, it noted that "in virtually every case, the countries where (illicit opium) production took place were developing countries, and the areas within their territory where there was such narcotics cultivation were usually the more underdeveloped and poorer parts of the whole national territory. It must be recognized that the governments concerned, with their limited financial resources and many imperative claims of high national priority in their budget, required substantial outside assistance in order to create the conditions under which the population involved could adopt other means of livelihood than the cultivation of narcotic crops."

This "substantial outside assistance" should be utilized in the development and implementation of a comprehensive international program involving crop substitution and diversification, law enforcement, drug abuse prevention, education, and treatment and rehabilitation. This is the only method of eliminating illicit opium production which has any real chance of success.

Crop diversification programs, involving the distribution of seeds, fertilizer, and technical expertise will be the most important element of an international effort to eliminate illegal opium production. Obviously, if farmers are to be prevented from growing poppy as a cash crop, a more profitable substitute crop will be necessary. Some countries, such as Yugoslavia, have already successfully substituted melons, and other fruits and vegetables for opium. Others can do the same. For example, in West Pakistan, much of the area where poppy is grown could be planted in high-yield Mexican wheat. The same might be done in Turkey. Since poppy culture is so labor intensive, this might be accomplished with relative ease.

The major obstacle to programs of crop substitution lies in the fact that, while there are many substitute crops that would earn more income *per unit of labor*, there are relatively few crops that would earn more than illicit opium *per unit of land*. For example, given current yields in the area, a Pakistani farmer would

earn approximately \$50 per acre from Mexican wheat as compared to the \$90 per acre he receives from opium. Therefore, a crop substitution program will necessarily involve some form of farm subsidy program.

In some areas, crop substitution will not be sufficient. Opium is grown in some regions because it is easily transported on the human back or by pack animals, the only modes of transportation available. Thus, it will be necessary in some areas to build railroads, roads, and distribution facilities, including small processing plants, in order to permit the farmers to get their new products to market.

In some areas crop substitution will not be feasible. In these areas it will be necessary to stimulate economic development in order to provide alternative sources of employment. This will mean the development of manpower training programs, and in some instances, a careful change in the life-styles of semi-nomadic tribes to enable them to adapt to a more sedentary life.

Law enforcement technology will also play an extremely important role in an effort to eliminate illegal poppy culture. In some countries, as I have noted, the government lacks effective administrative control of its opium-producing areas. This is particularly true of the mountainous districts of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where the mountain tribesmen are reported to sleep—not with their wives but with their long rifles—and don't hesitate to draw a bead on any unwelcome central government agent when he appears on the horizon, much as our Kentucky mountaineers welcomed the "revenooers." These countries will need assistance in their necessary attempt to gain control of these remote rural areas.

Once a country has gained complete control over its producing areas, law enforcement officers will require training and equipment for surveillance and control of illicit poppy culture. It has been estimated that the demand of the entire American addict population could be met by the cultivation of no more than five to ten square miles. This fact indicates the magnitude of the law enforcement effort that will be required if illicit opium production is to be eliminated.

American technology and aid would be of extreme utility in this effort. The high-altitude photographic and satellite surveillance techniques which we have developed would be invaluable in an attempt to locate illicit poppy fields, as would our developments in the area of electronic sensors and the use of chemical and low-grade radioactive tracer elements. Similarly, our development of different types of helicopters and our skills in utilizing them could be easily transferred and, in fact, we have already done so in aiding the Mexican government in its attempt to control the production of narcotic raw materials. Our Justice Department is in the process of developing mechanical detection devices which can literally sniff the air of airplanes and ships to locate illegal heroin and our Defense Department has developed defoliation techniques which could, perhaps, be utilized in eliminating illegal poppy fields. In short, the United States has tremendous technical resources at its command which could make a significant contribution to the effort to stamp out opium production.

The program I have outlined thus far has concentrated for the most part upon diminution of the *supply* of opium and its derivatives coming across our borders and into our neighborhoods. The effectiveness of this program would be greatly enhanced by efforts designed to reduce *demand* both here and abroad. Thus, an international program to end poppy culture must be accompanied by local programs for credible drug abuse prevention education in schools as well as addict treatment and rehabilitation centers in each of the countries involved.

Development of drug abuse education programs will not be easy. Addiction to heroin is a relatively new urban phenomenon restricted mostly to people under 25 years of age who live in societies, such as the United States, which are undergoing rapid social change attended by conflicts between old and new values. Opium, in contrast, is generally eaten or smoked by users, rather than addicts, in societies with large numbers of poor people, low standards of public health, and, in many cases, a long tradition of opium use. Obviously, different and indigenous programs will be required appropriate to each form of drug abuse in each of these different types of societies.

But even with the same society a number of different programs may be required. Here, at home, for example, we are only just beginning to devise programs which will reach the sophisticated college student as well as the knowledgeable ghetto youth who has lived in a drug culture for his entire life.

Construction of a variety of models for the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts throughout the world will also be difficult. A thoroughly effective method of treatment has not been developed, as the debate in this country between

advocates of drug-free therapy treatment centers for heroin addicts and the proponents of methadone clinics demonstrates. Moreover, assuming that an effective method is developed, it will not be easy to induce addicts to accept treatment. According to John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "the relatively high proportion of the local population (in some of the producing countries) who use opium or its derivatives regularly see no compelling reasons for reform, and on the contrary tend to resist any change in their way of life." Obviously, research must be accelerated and different types of programs developed for different societies and different drugs of abuse.

Intensive research by the international medical community will be required to develop new programs and new drugs to treat addiction. We must, for example, develop an improved, long lasting drug to block the effect of heroin, and a new and better drug to ease the withdrawal symptoms of those addicts who desire to break their habits. This type of research is already being conducted here and abroad and it must be intensified.

This brief review of the types of programs which must be involved in an international effort to eliminate illegal opium production indicates the magnitude of the effort which will be required.

The United Nations has already recognized the need for a world-wide effort of the type which I have outlined. In October 1970, at the urging of our State Department, the United Nations established a Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control. This Fund, run by international civil servants and financed by voluntary contributions from governmental and private sources, is designed to finance the development of a comprehensive program for the control of the international traffic in illegal opium and its derivatives.

The United States must make a substantial contribution to this effort—certainly far more than the \$2 million we have pledged for the Fund's operation this year and the \$2 million requested by the Administration for fiscal 1973. Other nations will estimate the size of their contributions by the size of that made by the United States. As a result, a small American contribution indicates a faint-hearted and indifferent United States commitment to international control over drug trafficking and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Fund to raise the resources it will require to accomplish effectively its task.

We must utilize leadership, resources, and example to make the Fund an effective and significant ally in an international effort to end drug abuse. Moreover, the United States must be in a position to make substantial bilateral commitments. While the Special Fund offers a means whereby the United States can contribute to a solution to the problem of drug abuse here and abroad without charges of "American imperialism," the Special Fund is subject to all of the disadvantages of an international organization. In many cases, it may move too slowly. In others it may fail to take action because of a political controversy in which the United States is not involved. The problem is too important in the United States to permit these factors to hinder our effort.

Mr. Chairman, the problem of narcotic drug abuse in the United States is inextricably intertwined with the world-wide problem of drug abuse. In all probability, the situation in the United States will not be brought under control without a substantial international effort involving law enforcement, crop substitution, economic development, education and prevention, research, and treatment and rehabilitation.

I have introduced legislation, in the form of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to establish a special program of American assistance for nations and international organizations which are in the process of designing or implementing programs to control narcotics abuse.

This legislation, even if successfully enacted and implemented, will not produce a simple and prompt end to the problem of drug abuse. Drug abuse is essentially a symptom of underlying alienation, bitterness and despair which produces a desire to escape to a world of unreality. Until we eliminate these root causes, drug abuse in some form will be with us.

The type of program I have outlined will, however, disrupt the criminal elements which are supplying the demand for narcotics, help get the addict out of a life of full-time crime, and most importantly, buy time. Time we can use to deal with the causes of drug abuse; time to develop new and effective methods of addict treatment and rehabilitation; time to develop effective means of prevention, including a long-lasting blocking drug and preventive inoculation—in short, time in which to save our youth—indeed—save the next generation of leaders around the world.

USIS REPORT OF PRESS CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADOR CARL W. A. SCHURMANN ON
JUNE 18 AT GENEVA

U.N. FUND AGAINST DRUG ABUSE PLANS GLOBAL ACTION TO MEET MENACE

Geneva, June 18—The recently-established United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) is seeking to draw up a global plan for a three-fold attack on drug abuse, the head of the fund told newsmen here June 18.

Ambassador Carl Schurmann, former Netherlands envoy to Washington, said he will meet next month with representatives of U.N. specialized agencies having responsibilities in the anti-abuse field, to discuss the plan.

Various agencies have specific parts to play in the U.N. anti-drug planning operation, he said—the World Health Organization (WHO) in the field of medical treatment, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in crop-substitution methods, the International Labor Organization (ILO) in reintegrating former addicts into society and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in educational programs.

Although each agency has special responsibilities, Ambassador Schurmann said, their plans and efforts must be melded into a coherent whole, to attack the drug problem at its three main points—production of drugs not needed for legitimate medicine, illicit traffic in them and abusive consumption of them.

The fund itself will not carry out anti-drug programs, Ambassador Schurmann said, but will rather seek to stimulate and coordinate programs and projects and where possible furnish the means to carry them out.

Listing some of the many problems which the world faces in overcoming the drug menace, the fund chief spoke of the difficulties of persuading farmers who traditionally live by production of opium poppies, coca leaves and the like to substitute other crops. This process may take five or ten years, he said. Governments must be helped in providing inspections and controls, often in remote areas.

In combating drug traffickers, governments must be helped to make police and customs controls more stringent and to achieve even closer international cooperation.

In attacking illicit consumption, there is need for treatment centers and rehabilitation programs—where again many governments will need help—as well as education programs to prevent people from becoming addicts.

All this work will be costly, he emphasized. He told a questioner that “ideally” the fund may have need of about five million dollars a year within a few years, and eventually perhaps twenty million dollars a year.

Ambassador Schurmann said the fund—which consists solely of voluntary contributions—now stands at “a little over two million dollars.” This is almost entirely made up of the initial U.S. contribution of two million dollars, announced when the fund was set up late last year.

The Holy See has given a token contribution of a thousand dollars, Ambassador Schurmann said, Turkey five thousand dollars and the Federal Republic of Germany a promise of a million deutschemarks (about 275,000 dollars) for next year.

In addition, he said, he has received several small private donations which give “heartening indication” of public support for the U.N. campaign against drug abuse.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to say that I think we can all take heart from the recent negotiations concluded by the State Department with Turkey which will lead to a cessation of opium poppy culture there by the end of next year. I think this validates the basic philosophy of the State Department. None of us are happy that their negotiations took as long as they did, but I think it validates their point of view that if we work positively, offering creative assistance, we are likely in the long run to make more progress than by adopting a more negative approach.

There is ample historical proof that the negative approach, while it may produce headlines, infrequently, if ever, produces results.

Now that the Turks have made this announcement, we have the chance to make a very positive impact on the progress which they make.

First of all, I think they must be given substantial assistance beyond the \$3 million loan we gave them some time ago, about half of which is being spent on law enforcement and about half of which is being spent on aid in crop diversification.

It seems to me that we have a great deal of technology to make available to the Turks in terms of both helping their law enforcement effort and in helping them find alternative sources of employment and alternative cash crops for their farmers. We can help them, for example, with high-flying aircraft photographic surveillance of poppy fields. We can help them with satellite and infrared photographic surveillance. We can help them with electronic sensors and chemical and low-grade radioactive tracer elements, not only to detect fields where poppies are being grown, but also to detect the exact fields of poppy from which the heroin which we intercept in this country was derived.

We ought to have an intensive effort to help the Turks with the technology that is already available, and to help them with pure, plain cash, Uncle Sam's calling cards, in placing their farmers into other lines of production and other kinds of work.

As has been emphasized by others, now that the problem of Turkey seems to be approaching some kind of intelligent solution, I think we have to look immediately to the other producing countries. The neighboring countries of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and, of course, the countries of Southeast Asia—Laos, Burma, and Thailand—are also important suppliers of the opium poppy, opium-morphine base and heroin in the world today.

It is interesting to note two things. Of these countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Turkey, have all signed and ratified the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. They are all under an obligation under that convention to end opium poppy culture if this is the best way to end illicit trade in opium, morphine base, and heroin.

I have been advocating that a country that has signed this convention but does not cooperate in closing down opium and poppy production, which contributes to illicit traffic should, under the provisions of this convention, be taken by the United States to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

Fortunately, that doesn't seem to be necessary in the case of Turkey.

But in our planning of a long-term, comprehensive strategy to help these countries out of the business of supplying this poisonous, mind-altering substance that ends up in our slums, our college campuses, if we don't get that cooperation we should be building a case to take to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Would the International Court of Justice assume jurisdiction?

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes, they would.

I cite you Articles 24 and 28 of the Convention that provide that, where there is illicit traffic, if closing down poppy culture is the best and most appropriate means of preventing that illicit traffic, then the parties are under obligation to do it.

The Convention does provide that if, in their opinion, closing down poppy culture is the most expeditious way of closing down the illicit trafficking in narcotics drugs, they must do it.

But, under the rules of international law, their opinion cannot be a capricious one. Their opinion cannot be merely in their discretion. It must be their honest judgment, and the judgment cannot be an arbitrary one, it cannot be a capricious one. It must be made with bona fides.

If, after years of experience, these countries grow opium poppies and process them into opium wax or morphine base, while the international trafficking continues, then they must make that bona fide judgment. If they don't, and if there is a difference of opinion on what a bona fide judgment would be, section 42 of the 1961 Convention clearly specifies the proper international judicial agency to make the determination of whether they have failed to make this decision properly.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What I really meant was that the International Court of Justice has not shown great inclination to assume jurisdiction of potentially difficult cases.

Mr. SCHEUER. It is my understanding that it is the foreign policy of the United States to give proper cases to the Court of Justice. We are trying to build up their jurisdiction and to build up their authority.

I had the experience of chatting about this subject in some detail with Professor Phillip Jessup, of Columbia Law School, my former professor of international law, who recently retired from the International Court of Justice at The Hague. He felt that where there was a reasonable case under the 1961 Convention we should take it to the International Court of Justice. If we are to build up their functions, their responsibilities, their authority, then this would be a proper exercise.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is France a signatory to that Convention?

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I read in the next to the last paragraph of your statement where you suggest that the French have rendered "only a token effort to close down the refineries."

When I visited with the French police some 7 or 8 weeks ago, they indicated that they are now much more aggressive in their surveillance. They said that these laboratories can be in a kitchen or a garage or in a basement. All you really need is a Bunsen burner and some simple laboratory equipment to transform the opium gum into morphine and then into heroin.

What leverage do we have with France? What can we do to stimulate their activities?

Mr. SCHEUER. Leading officials of this administration could cease and desist from making statements about the wonderful cooperation that we are getting from the French. The fact is that we haven't made even a bare bones beginning in getting cooperation from the French. Perhaps in a euphemistic moment, I may have said we are getting lipservice, but we are getting minimum lipservice.

We had a distinguished Speaker of the House who used to say he holds all of his colleagues in high regard, but he holds some of them in minimum high regard.

If we are getting lipservice from the French, it is minimum lipservice.

They have 40,000 police in Paris and yet when it comes to assigning 25 or 50 police to the Marseilles area to crack down on these laboratories, they can't seem to find them. They don't seem to find cars with two-way radios, they don't seem to be able to equip their agents in the field with two-way radios so they can communicate when they are out on clandestine missions. They don't seem to have secretaries and stenographers and office people who can work around the weekend. It is a comfortable 5-day week. They haven't yet agreed to use paid informers.

I suggest that it is quite well known that the entire traffic, distribution and processing in Marseilles is carried on by not more than 50 or 75 people.

It is controlled by an organized criminal syndicate that is dominated by Corsicans. It is going to be impossible to break this tightly knit Corsican criminal syndicate without the use of paid informers, and without looking upon this as a clandestine operation.

In effect, this is a war during peacetime, and the French haven't looked upon it in that light. They haven't used paid informers, they haven't even accepted proffers of American aid to use in a program of utilizing paid informants.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What can we do about it?

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, of course, we don't have a foreign aid program with France, so if you consider that a hook, we don't have that. But it seems to me that France is an ally, France is a leading member of the Western world. France is a leader of the civilized community, and I think that rather than look for any hook in the sense of foreign aid we simply have to make strong appeals to the French administration.

I think it is an outrage, for example, that the French have contributed not a sou, not a centime, to the Special U.N. Fund for Narcotic Control that was set up last year, primarily at the leadership and the instigation of our State Department. I think it is an outrage that the French, that the British, that the Italians, that the Canadians haven't yet contributed the first dime, and that the only significant contribution has been the U.S. contribution of \$2 million. I think it indicates clearly that drug addiction isn't a problem to the French.

They had a couple of heroin deaths on the French Riviera last summer, and for a few hours the French Parliament was concerned about the problem. But, basically, hard drugs, or at least hard narcotics, are not a problem with the French and we have yet to see even lip-service.

I think this should be a priority item with the administration, and we should stop making soothing announcements about the cooperation that we are getting from the French until they start producing results. They haven't had a bust of a single major processing facility in the last 2 years.

When you hear that they picked up an airplane here or there with a million or two or three million dollars worth of heroin, it is interesting, and it makes a good newspaper headline, but it doesn't amount to a hill of beans in terms of sheer results in the south Bronx, in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Harlem, and Washington, D.C. The flow of narcotics, of processed heroin that comes out of Marseilles, into this country goes

on daily, without surcease, without interruption, and if we occasionally pick up a few ounces or a few pounds of heroin it may mean that the organized criminal syndicates at the other end of the pipeline in Marseilles, can simply load another 5 or 10 or 15 percent of the stuff into the pipeline. It is just a cost of doing business.

Remember, they don't have public relations counsel, they don't have tax counsel, they don't have merchandising counsel, they don't have all of the costs of doing business in this country.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They have an enforcement council, though.

Mr. SCHEUER. But that comes very cheap, too. If their only cost of doing business is a 15-percent load at the other end for an occasional pickup that they know is going to take place, they have it made.

The French have yet to make a singleminded, intensive effort to wipe out this scourge of producing facilities at Marseilles.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have any view as to the situation in Southeast Asia?

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes, I do.

It is quite apparent that the organized criminal syndicates have already started the shift of producing and international trafficking in heroin from Turkey to Southeast Asia. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has traditionally said over the last few years that 5 percent of the heroin in this country came from Southeast Asia and about 80 percent of it came from Turkey. In recent months they have been talking about 10 or 15 percent of it coming from Southeast Asia.

I know that the President, when he announced the new arrangement with Turkey, mentioned that two-thirds of our heroin was coming from Turkey. That meant the difference between 66 percent and 80 percent was coming from somewhere. It was the first time that the President or the BNDD used that figure of 66 percent rather than 80 percent.

So I have excellent reason to believe that now we are getting 10, 15 or perhaps even 20 percent of the heroin in this country from Southeast Asia. There is excellent reason to believe that the organized criminal syndicates who control the international trafficking are in the process of shifting their routes, their distribution system, their processing systems to the countries of Southeast Asia.

There the problem is very much more difficult. In many cases, the writ of the central governments does not extend to their remote areas. In Afghanistan, for example, the central government in Kabul may send out an agent to the Khyber Pass area, to the nomadic tribe folks in the Khyber Pass area who grow opium as their only cash crop. In those areas, the mountain tribesmen sleep with their long rifles, not with their wives. They take out the long rifle with the eight, nine or 10 power scope and they draw a bead on the agent across the valley and there is one agent less in the central government.

This is true in Laos, Burma, and Thailand to a greater or lesser extent. They don't have the authority over their remote areas that the Turks have.

When the Turks started closing down the provinces in which opium poppy could be grown, they started in the most remote border areas, and they have now concentrated in the central provinces. They didn't have any significant difficulty in closing down poppy culture entirely

in their remote areas. Their writ did extend throughout their borders.

But this is not true of the countries of Southeast Asia. It is not true of Afghanistan. It may or may not be true to a lesser extent in Iran and Pakistan.

What it means is that we are going to have to rely less on law enforcement and more on positive aids to the farmers in those countries. We are going to have to give these governments moneys to help their farmers get into a better cash crop, to get into other kinds of work. At the same time we are going to have to give them far more law enforcement aid to enable their writ to extend to their borders than we have thought about up to now.

Above all, it is going to mean that we will have to create a comprehensive, integrated master plan of aid to these countries. It is a far more difficult, far more sophisticated, far more involved situation that we had with Turkey, that was a comparatively developed country, that was a traditional ally, and whose writ did extend to its own borders.

In many of the most serious problem countries, we have no foreign aid, so there is no stick to use in that sense, and we are going to have to rely on the carrot.

I believe what we need in the State Department are two things. First, we need dollars. It is going to cost in the neighborhood of \$25 million to \$50 million a year for this kind of a program.

The announcement of Carl Schurmann a few weeks ago indicates an ultimate budget of about \$20 million that he thinks they will need in a year or two, and I think he is underestimating the need.

So, No. 1, we need dollars.

Above and beyond the dollars, what we need is leadership. We have some very sensitive and well-meaning people in the State Department now who are advisers and consultants and so forth, but we don't have anybody in the State Department now who is in charge of creating a comprehensive, multidisciplinary program of drug abuse control in the producing countries of Europe and Asia. What we need is a man of the quality of Elliot Richardson or of George Ball, a man with great administrative experience, with a national, and preferably an international, reputation, to take charge and honcho these programs. We don't need any more consultants or advisers. We need a tough, competent, highly experienced, very sophisticated individual with great standing in the international community to take charge and to develop the kind of comprehensive, integrated program that is indispensable to success.

Last, what we must do is work far more effectively than we have with all of the international agencies. In many of these countries the U.S. presence is not a welcome presence, and the only presence that can be effective will be international.

Burma has informally told the authorities in the U.N. Commission on Narcotics Abuse that she would like to get out of poppy culture, to rid her country of addiction, and would like a U.N. mission to come. She specifically mentioned that she would like U.S. members not to be members of the mission. We do not have effective relations with Burma. We have not had them since 1959.

Burma is symbolic of the problem that we have in Southeast Asia. So we must do more to build up the competence and capability of the

U.N. fund. We must do more to involve the Food and Agriculture Organization that has several thousand agents in the field in underdeveloped countries who have been working in helping the farmers use better seed, more fertilizer, more irrigation. They are keen to get into the work of narcotics control.

I have spoken on several occasions with the head of the Food and Plant Nutritive Section of the Food and Agricultural Organization in Rome. He is desperate to get into the field of narcotics control, but he bewails and bemoans the fact that he has neither the funds nor the authority. We must see that he does.

The World Health Organization in terms of rehabilitation and medical treatment has a real role to play. Yet the New York State Narcotics Control Board has spent more in the last year than the entire World Health Organization budget for all medical services. This is ridiculous.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We don't have unilateral control over the budgets of international organizations.

Mr. SCHEUER. We don't have unilateral control, but we pay approximately 35 to 40 percent of the cost of these committees.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We still have only one vote.

Mr. SCHEUER. That is right, but we do pay by far the largest share, and I believe it is a problem of exerting leadership. I believe this is a cause which no one could object to. If we did exert leadership, we could involve the World Health Organization, the World Food Organization, the World Bank, in funding some small commercial projects, some roadbuilding that would be necessary in some of these countries to provide an alternative cash crop to opium poppy.

In many of these remote mountainous areas, they grow opium poppy because opium is the only thing that is worth enough for them to carry out because they don't have roads.

In a country like Afghanistan, for example, or the Shan Provinces, if we are going to get them out of growing the opium poppy we must build some roads so they can truck something out, and if we want them to shift from poppy production to sunflower production for the oil, we have to make available long term, low-interest loans to build processing facilities to convert the sunflower seed into oil and then give them long-term financing for the trucks and long-term financing for the roads.

This isn't a very elaborate system of transportation. I am talking about an inexpensive dirt road and a small fleet of trucks. But it is this kind of integrated approach that is necessary and it is this kind of comprehensive planning that hasn't come forward from the State Department yet and of which we are in urgent need.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. I want to commend our colleague on a very fine presentation.

You mentioned in your presentation the figure of \$3 million, I believe, in payment to Turkey if opium production were ceased. It is my understanding that Turkey has already received approximately \$100 million in some form of aid from the United States annually over the last 5 years.

Naturally, it would seem to be in their interest to stop growing opium at those figures: from \$3 million to \$100 million per year.

You also mentioned that under the 1961 convention some opium producing nations have agreed to curtail this type of farming. However, do you think this would encourage other countries who are not now growing opium to start raising the poppy seeds?

Mr. SCHEUER. I think most of the countries—I would say most of the regions of the world that have the climate and the topography, the soil conditions, to grow opium poppies, and the economic conditions, are probably already growing opium poppy. It is a perfectly miserable cash crop. No developed country grows opium poppy.

When the national per family income of Yugoslavia reached about \$250 a year, Yugoslavia in the course of a year or two phased completely out of opium poppy culture simply because her farmers made more money growing tomatoes, potatoes, winter wheat, and corn, and particularly melons for the breakfast tables of Europe. Opium poppy production is an extremely labor-intensive operation. It means that the farmer has to get his wife and kids up in the middle of the night to go out and lance each poppy flower individually. It is an extremely labor-intensive occupation that in the most developed countries do not yield farmers today more than \$50 or \$60 a year. So I would say that as a generality where the basic conditions exist for opium poppy culture it probably is going on now.

I would also say that as we begin intensive programs to help farmers in these producing countries that I have mentioned, which are well-known, the U.N. Commission on Narcotics Control should make it very clear to the international community that they would expect all member governments to make sure that no regions where opium poppy is not cultivated now permit opium poppy culture, and that national governments all over the world do not permit any additional acreage to go into opium poppy culture.

It is very interesting, as I mentioned before, that virtually every single country where poppy culture is prevalent now has signed and ratified the 1961 convention that obligates them to close it down if it results in illicit trade, and in all of the Southeast Asian countries under their own laws, opium poppy culture is illegal.

It is legal in Turkey in the provinces in which it is permitted, but in all of the Southeast Asian countries and in Afghanistan, it is illegal.

It was made illegal in 1955 in Iran. It was only in the last few years that the Shah of Iran reluctantly, because of the tremendous trafficking of heroin and opium over the border from Turkey, sold and supplied in Iran. He felt that if it was going to come over the border from Turkey, anyway, then the Iranian farmers might as well get the benefit of that cash income.

But now that we are closing down with Turkey, it seems that we ought to be making intensive efforts with the Shah of Iran to reinstitute the prohibition against the opium production in Iran.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. When Congress starts off on a program of \$20 million to \$50 million and that is not comprehensive enough according to your recommendation, in what area of reference, then, on amounts of money, are you thinking? If \$20 million to \$50 million annually is not enough, it would seem to me that it would run into figures of the billions sim-

ply to get a comprehensive plan going that would have to be spent annually by the U.S. taxpayers.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Fulton, I didn't say \$25 million to \$50 million wouldn't be enough. We are not spending anything now. We haven't even plans to spend the \$2 million that we have contributed to the special U.N. fund. It has only been established within the last 12 months.

I would think that we ought to gear up to the point where we are spending \$25 million or \$30 million in these five or six producing countries. There isn't a very great population of farmers involved.

In Turkey they had 200,000 farmers growing opium poppies several years ago. They have reduced that to 80,000.

If we simply gave every Turkish farmer what he is making from opium poppy culture, \$50 or \$60 per year, you are only talking about \$4 million or \$5 million.

In Southeast Asia, the standard of living is less than Turkey. They are not making \$50 a year apiece. So in each of these countries you may talk about \$3, \$4 or \$5 million. You are not talking about a large population. Opium poppy is grown in remote areas, in very sparsely settled areas. So you are not talking about very many farmers and you are not talking about very much in the way of dollars per farm family to get them to something better.

I think what we ought to do is try it for a few years at the \$25 million or \$30 million level and see what kind of a bite it is having.

Let me tell you, at the other end of the line when it hits the South Bronx, Los Angeles, and Chicago, and we end up with 300,000 heroin addicts, the cheapest known method of treatment is methadone maintenance which costs approximately \$2,000 a year with very minimum supportive services. If we did the job right, it would cost more than that. Let's say it costs \$3,000 a year.

When you are talking about 300,000 addicts at \$3,000 a year you are talking about almost \$1 billion.

The President has asked for in the neighborhood of \$125 million to \$150 million in new money for his Office of Drug Control at the White House. We are spending more than that annually in New York State for drug addiction, and we are doing a poor job.

So, what I am suggesting is, if we are spending \$3,000 per capita for 300,000 addicts, we would be spending almost \$1 billion in this country. If we have additions to our addiction population, it is going to be over that.

I am suggesting that the dollars that we would spend abroad to close down opium poppy culture are the cheapest, most cost effective dollars we can possibly apply anywhere in the spectrum of the heroin cures from cradle to grave, from the poppy fields of Anatolia to the south Bronx.

This seems to be the most obvious place to spend resources. I certainly would try it for \$25 million or \$30 million a year and see if we really could close down supply.

Mr. FULTON. With the Internal Revenue Department being so careful with all of the ordinary honest U.S. citizens, it would seem to me that with the amount of trade going on dollarwise one of the most vulnerable places to hit the drug trade would be to make it unprofitable, to get the IRS service after them.

How is it so profitable when the rest of the U.S. citizens are always hit with taxes and yet this drug organization with a distribution system that is evidently matched only by the supermarkets—how is it that they escape and can make so much untaxed money? I don't see how it happens.

Mr. SCHEUER. The whole thing is illicit. The whole distribution system is owned, operated, organized, and controlled by a half dozen international criminal syndicates. As I mentioned before—

Mr. FULTON. Sure, but when it is in this country, these 200,000 people being supplied in a certain area, it seems to me that the Federal Government ought to be tracking them down and making it unprofitable because of taxes, penalties, fraud, et cetera. The Capone gang was broken, I understand, largely by this method.

Mr. SCHEUER. It seems to me if you did track them down, the least of their problems would be paying income taxes. I think we have to put them out of business and do more than just tax them.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Perhaps the witnesses from the Department of Justice can respond to those questions.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you very much.

Let me compliment the witness on his nice presentation and his good, direct-to-the-point answers.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the witness has made a good case, and I compliment him for it. I have no questions.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Our next witness is Mr. Andrew C. Tartaglino, Assistant Director for Enforcement, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) together with Harvey R. Wellman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Mr. Tartaglino is accompanied by Robert Rosthal, Deputy Chief Counsel, and John W. Parker, Deputy Chief, Strategic Intelligence Office, BNDD.

We would be happy to hear your statement, Mr. Tartaglino.

**STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. TARTAGLINO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR ENFORCEMENT, U.S. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS
DRUGS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, the international organized traffic in heroin is a clear, present and deadly danger to the United States of America.

The May 27, 1971, report authored by Congressman Morgan F. Murphy of this subcommittee and Congressman Robert H. Steele does not overstate that danger. Indeed, overstatement may be quite impossible.

I do not address myself here to the myriad of factors, ancient and modern, which cause addiction. Rather, as a law enforcement official, I will speak of men and money; of worldwide enterprises in which profit margins are so great that no single seizure or group of seizures diminishes the traffic.

On May 29, 1971, a Citroen sedan was loaded on a Spanish vessel at Barcelona. It had been driven from Marseilles by a French couple and was ticketed to Vera Cruz, Mexico. At San Juan, Puerto Rico, the vehicle was seized by customs, and 246 pounds of pure heroin were found in specially designed traps.

On June 3, 1971, a Citroen, driven by another French couple from Marseilles, was loaded on a Spanish vessel at Barcelona. At Cadiz, the couple received a cable: "Your son is ill, return home." At that point, the couple insisted the vehicle be removed from the ship, and they drove away from dockside. Intercepted by Spanish police at Valencia, the vehicle was found to hold, in its specially designed traps, 249 pounds of pure heroin, the largest heroin seizure in modern history.

On June 24, 1971, two men and a woman arrived at Cadiz to claim a Peugeot unloaded from a Spanish vessel arriving from Vera Cruz. Again there were specially designed traps, but only traces of heroin remained. This vehicle had made the round trip.

Intelligence in these three incidents involved close cooperation between our agents and Spanish police. It revealed that the shipments were part of a single operation, and the ultimate destination of each of the vehicles was New York City, from which distribution to other major cities was planned.

Now, let us see what we are talking about in terms of money. Pure heroin in bulk wholesales in New York at \$5,000 a pound. Therefore, the heroin involved in the May 29 seizure cost the buyer \$1,230,000; he paid \$1,250,000 for the heroin seized on June 3, and we can reasonably speculate about the same for the one that got away. Note also that only 5 days after the May 29 seizure, another, and even larger, shipment was ready to go.

Reduce these figures now to the street level. One pound of heroin results in sales totaling \$100,000 in going through all levels of distribution to the addict. In the approximately 335 kilos carried by the three vehicles, we are concerned with some 737 pounds of heroin and \$73,700,000. Go backward with me now to origins, and we find that 10 pounds of opium in the illicit market in Turkey goes for approximately \$100, and 10 pounds of opium is converted into 1 pound of pure heroin.

The initial base price, therefore, for the three shipments was approximately \$73,700. Between the farmer in Turkey and the street peddler in New York, some \$73,626,000 represents the spread.

It is absolutely inconceivable to consider heroin trafficking in terms of ordinary crime or even the highest level of nondrug organized crime. The possible skim from Las Vegas casinos cannot remotely offer the money potential of heroin. Even gambling, the queen of domestic criminal enterprise, will not reach the dollar amounts. Loan sharking and extortion must be major targets for law enforcement, but in terms of profits and human misery they cannot be equated with the drug traffic. The sinister spread of organized crime into legitimate businesses menaces our economy, but how many legitimate businesses could sustain the losses involved in the seizure of the cargo of the two Citroens?

In the past 6 months, two tons of heroin and morphine base have been seized here and in Spain, France, West Germany, and Turkey.

I can report that international cooperation is becoming a reality but, in candor, I cannot say that seizures alone are a viable solution. With all these successes, heroin availability has not lessened in the United States, the purity of heroin is higher, the price remains the same, and heroin-related deaths have increased.

We have eliminated in these 6 months a quantity of heroin sufficient to satisfy the needs of all addicts in the United States for 4 months, or, put another way, the needs of one-third of all addicts for an entire year. A similar reduction in that timespan of steel production or the manufacture of automobiles would jeopardize the entire national economy. The economy of heroin survives.

It can logically be deduced that seizures and the elimination of couriers, the so-called mules, have no lasting or even serious temporary impact upon those vast distribution systems with their unlimited financial resources, their tax-free operations, their secret bank accounts.

Our objective must be, and it is, to reach into the systems; to destroy the operating centers. The tentacles are far removed from the brain, and amputation has not killed the creature. To do this, we need more agents abroad for intelligence purposes, and we are getting them. To do this, we need the cooperation of many foreign governments. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, designated by President Nixon as the U.S. representative to foreign law enforcement agencies in the narcotics area, is beginning to get that cooperation.

I have spoken of the Spanish police. Increasingly substantial assistance is also being given by France, Mexico, Australia, Canada, Argentina, West Germany, Great Britain, and other nations. The recent agreement with Turkey is a landmark.

In certain parts of the world, BNDD agents, with the knowledge and support of host countries, have gone underground in actions designed to penetrate the international organized criminal syndicates. There has been a real measure of success, and here I would respectfully request that any discussion of persons, places, and events follow in executive session. We cannot risk compromising our plans, our agents, or our relationships with assisting governments.

I wish I could tell this subcommittee now that progress to date is cause for great optimism. At the risk of bureaucratic sacrilege, I will not do so. What I will say is that painfully, methodically, but surely we are building a force to meet the entrenched, sophisticated, world-wide enemy. Agents are not trained overnight. The confidence of knowledgeable traffickers is slow to gain. There can be no instant victory, but we will persist.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is a victim Nation in the heroin traffic. With all the determination and resources of this Government, with all the support of the American people and our State and local police and courts, the problem can never be solved on a completely domestic basis. And so we must look to our friends abroad.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has not too often become a forum for consideration of the problems of law enforcement. It is an entirely proper forum today.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am going to ask Mr. Wellman to go ahead, but I want to ask one question.

You heard Mr. Scheuer's statement regarding the failure of French cooperation. He used the words "token effort" and he cited a litany of failures—in sophisticated equipment, secretaries, 5-day week, two-way radios and things like that. What is your comment on his statement?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I did hear Congressman Scheuer's statement. You can only train so many men within the basic limitations of management. They have recently quadrupled their force. We have a protocol of agreement which we have never had before. We have two French agents, who are rendering invaluable service, stationed permanently in New York City today. It has been some time in coming and I am optimistic that some seizures I pointed out here are a result of that cooperation.

I, too, am disappointed in the inability of the French to find laboratories, and I think it has been slow in coming but I think, also, we have progressed.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Have they done enough? Has their performance been satisfactory in the last 2 or 3 years?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say they are building. With regard to "done enough," you just can't do enough in a problem like this. This has to be measured against all their priorities. I know they have quadrupled their forces. I, too, would like to expect a great deal more.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Wellman.

**STATEMENT OF HARVEY R. WELLMAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NARCOTICS MATTERS**

Mr. WELLMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add to that, but I would first like to say that a statement will be made tomorrow morning by Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand on our cooperative arrangements with France.

My observation has been at the intergovernmental level, attending the meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee. I have been impressed with the fact that the French are working as part of a team with us, that they are exchanging information, taking advice, and working as if they were part of a single organization with us. At the policy level, we are very happy with their attitude in the last year.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How would you describe your emotional feelings prior to the last year?

Mr. WELLMAN. Well, I have been in this position only for 9 months. More than a year ago the French did not acknowledge that this was their problem as well as ours. They did not acknowledge that they had a responsibility with us to try to bring it under control. They do very much now and have for the last year.

I am not competent to talk about the effectiveness of their law enforcement, as such. I would have to defer to the Bureau of Narcotics on that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did you want to take your presentation beyond that?

Mr. WELLMAN. I should like, Mr. Chairman, to put my statement into the record, but, with your permission, I would like to do two things: First, I would like to report to this committee briefly what

the status of the multilateral programs is. I do not wish to get into our programs in particular areas or countries which will be dealt with tomorrow morning by the Assistant Secretaries in those areas.

I would like to talk about the three main initiatives, briefly, which the United States is supporting and participating in. They have been referred to before. The United Nations' expanded program and the voluntary fund to finance it; our proposals to strengthen the narcotics treaty by amendment; and our signing, and now it is before the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

(The prepared statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT BY HARVEY R. WELLMAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NARCOTICS MATTERS

Mr. Chairman: I appreciate this opportunity to make a statement with respect to international aspects of the President's Comprehensive Drug Control Program which was the subject of the President's message to the Congress on June 17.

The Administration and the Congress are in full agreement that our nation faces an extremely grave drug problem. President Nixon said in his special message of June 17 to the Congress: "We must now candidly recognize that the deliberate procedures embodied in present efforts to control drug abuse are not sufficient in themselves. The problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency."

In order to meet this emergency the President has proposed a far-reaching and coordinated series of proposals. These are outlined in the special message and deal with all aspects of the problem, including domestic demand, treatment and rehabilitation as well as international supply and traffic.

The President's message emphasized that to wage an effective war against drug abuse, particularly heroin abuse, we must have international cooperation. As described in his message the President has initiated "a worldwide escalation in our existing programs for the control of narcotics traffic." The Secretary of State has brought the President's message to the personal attention of the chief of every US diplomatic mission around the world. At the Secretary's direction they have given the text to foreign governments and international organizations, making clear that the United States considers the heroin addiction of American citizens an international problem of grave concern to this nation. The Secretary has asked each chief of mission to consider on a priority basis how the necessary international cooperation can be translated into specific measures for joint efforts with individual countries.

The President is proposing, as an international goal, an end to opium production and the growing of poppies. The development of effective substitutes for the opium derivatives, and in particular, codeine, now used for medical purposes would eliminate any valid reason for opium production. In the interim, because there are still indispensable medical uses for opium, and because production of the opium needed for medical purposes is a legitimate source of income in some countries, we are pressing ahead with programs to 1) develop synthetic substitutes for opium derivatives, 2) assist countries in their efforts to end illicit drug processing and trafficking and illegal opium production and 3) make national and international controls more effective.

We are proceeding both bilaterally and multilaterally against the illicit drug traffic, the supplies that feed it and the demand which provides the market. We are seeking simultaneously to improve controls and to cope with the complex social and economic causes that underlie illegal drug activity and drug addiction.

We have bilateral arrangements for mutual assistance in drug control with Mexico, Turkey, France and Canada. In Southeast Asia we are examining with the governments in that area what we can do together to stop the growing traffic in heroin, with particular concern for the effects on American servicemen. We have informal cooperative arrangements with many other countries. Wherever the international nature of the problem makes a multilateral approach essential, we are working through the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations.

The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control was established largely on our initiative; we are contributing substantially to it. The United States will go to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs next fall and to a special plenipotentiary conference called for early 1972 on our initiative with specific proposals to strengthen international controls under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. The President has sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification the UN convention that will extend international controls for the first time to psychotropic substances. Additionally, the President is asking the Congress to amend and approve the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act of 1971 to permit assistance to presently proscribed nations in their efforts to end drug trafficking.

I would like to report on the status of the multilateral programs which the United States is actively supporting.

UNITED NATIONS EXPANDED PROGRAM AND SPECIAL FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL

On April 1, the Secretary-General established the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to be made up of voluntary contributions, to finance an expanded UN program of concerted action directed against the supply of drugs for purposes of abuse, the demand for such purposes and the illicit traffic. Preparations for such an action program have gone into high gear.

A short and long-term operating program is being submitted by the Secretary-General to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in late September of this year, and, through that Commission, to the Economic and Social Council. In the meantime, priority projects are being drawn up for immediate implementation. These projects focus mainly on assistance to governments of countries in crucial areas—notably, the Middle East and Southeast Asia—in the establishment of effective national drug administrations and control machinery and the training of enforcement and customs personnel. They include pilot projects aimed at developing substitute crops or other means of livelihood for farmers engaged in illicit opium production. There will also be programs of preventive education and treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts based on cooperation and exchange of experience among the major victims of the illicit traffic.

The United States has pledged two million dollars to the Fund for 1971 and has already paid one-half its pledge to the Secretary-General. The Administration stands ready, subject to Congressional approval, to make substantial contributions in future years, provided the Fund demonstrates the capacity to carry out effective programs against drug abuse.

We anticipate that other governments will also assist in this efforts: to date, contributions have been made by Turkey (\$5,000), the Holy See (\$1,000) and Sweden (200,000 Kroners—approximately \$39,000), and the German Federal Republic has declared its intention to contribute one million DMarks (about \$280,000). In addition there have been several small private donations; it is hoped that contributions from private individuals and organizations will increase in demonstration of public support for the United Nations campaign against drug abuse. We have urged the Secretary-General to speed up the preparation of the UN's expanded program and the implementation of priority projects capable of immediate impact against drug abuse. We have also urged him to intensify his efforts to obtain financial and other support for the Fund from other governments and the private sector.

Under the arrangements setting up the Fund, the Secretary-General is prepared to accept contributions for which a specific use is designated by the donor. Such contributions held in trust by the Secretary-General will enable us to join, for maximum effect, our bilateral efforts with the multilateral operations of the United Nations. We stand ready to make the most of this opportunity.

The Secretary-General's Personal Representative with overall responsibility for the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control is Ambassador Carl Schurmann of the Netherlands. He will meet this month, July 1971, with the representatives of United Nations specialized agencies to discuss the comprehensive programs being drawn up for drug abuse control world-wide.

Several agencies in particular have important contributions to make in both the planning and execution of this program: the World Health Organization (WHO) in medical treatment and research, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in crop substitution, the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the reintegration of drug dependent persons into society, the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in programs of preventive education. Other international agencies and organizations are also available to help in this international effort.

Ambassador Schurmann's objective is to meld the plans and activities of each agency with special responsibilities in drug abuse control into a coherent global program for attacking the world drug problem at its three critical points—production of drugs not needed for medical purposes, the illicit traffic in them and the demand for their consumption for misuse or abuse.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961

On United States initiative, a plenipotentiary conference is to be held under UN auspices next March to consider amendments to this basic narcotics Convention. To date, only the United States has proposed specific amendments—all of which are designed to put teeth into the Convention with a view to limiting narcotic production and trade to the minimum essential for legitimate medical and scientific purposes.

Under the Convention's present terms, the Parties are committed to restrict the production, manufacture, export and import of narcotic drugs exclusively for these humanitarian purposes. However, compliance with this undertaking is essentially voluntary. While the Convention created an International Narcotics Control Board—composed of eleven technical experts—to keep watch over world narcotics activity, it gave the Board power essentially only to make recommendations. The Board has little authority to take the action necessary to identify and eradicate illicit traffic. Our proposed amendments have the following objectives:

To enable the Board for the first time to require detailed information about opium poppy cultivation and opium production—thus permitting the Board access to essential information about narcotics raw material from which illicit diversion occurs;

To accord the Board authority to base its decisions about narcotics activities not only as at present on information officially submitted by governments, but also on information which the Board obtains through public or private sources;

To authorize the Board, with the consent of the State concerned, to carry out an on-the-spot inquiry on drug related activities;

To give the Board new authority to modify governments' estimates of narcotics production and requirements, including intended opium poppy acreage and opium production, thus giving the Board better control over real or potential sources of illicit diversion and greater capacity to adjust production and trade to world medical and scientific requirements as determined by experts.

To authorize the Board in extreme cases to require States to embargo the export and/or import of drugs to or from a country that has failed to carry out its obligations under the Convention. Our amendments would also make narcotics offenses enumerated in the Convention immediately extraditable.

If these amendments are adopted, the international community will be able for the first time to require as a matter of right full information on the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of opium, to order reductions in cultivation or production where there is a significant danger of illicit diversion or where world needs are already being met, and to order world-wide remedial measures to be taken.

For the United States strengthening the 1961 Convention is a high priority objective. We are intensifying our diplomatic efforts to secure support for stronger international narcotics control and for the adoption of our proposed amendments to the treaty.

CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, 1971

The United States has played a leading role in promoting the development of international controls over a whole new family of dangerous drugs that are being increasingly abused in a number of countries. These are the psychotropic or "mind-bending" substances, such as LSD, mescaline, the amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers.

In early 1971 the United States participated in a 71-nation conference held in Vienna under UN auspices to close this gap in the international regulation of dangerous drugs. The conference adopted a comprehensive Convention which to

date has been signed, subject to ratification, by the United States and twenty-two other countries. On June 29, the President submitted the Convention to the Senate with the request for its advice and consent to ratification.

While recognizing that psychotropic substances should be available for medical and scientific purposes, the Convention by its terms reflects the widespread concern over the public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of these substances, and establishes rigorous measures to restrict their use to legitimate purposes and prevent illicit traffic in them.

Once the United States has ratified this Convention, we intend vigorously to promote its ratification by other countries so that the Convention will enter into force as soon as possible, and thus complete the coverage of the international regulation of dangerous drugs.

Mr. WELLMAN. I would like to comment on how the Department and Foreign Service view our responsibility in this field of drug control.

It is clear from what the President, the Secretary of State, and Members of Congress have said, that drug control these days is a No. 1 priority in our foreign policy. The President said that drug abuse is public enemy No. 1. If that is the case, we must put drug control at the top of the list of the issues we have with any country where drug control is a problem affecting us, where heroin is coming from that area or where opium is grown and not under control.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Does the present attitude of the State Department coincide with what Congressman Scheuer suggested, namely, that a high level, well respected international figure, an American, should be designated to lead this fight? He suggested people such as Elliot Richardson or George Ball. He said that we have to demonstrate with a concrete, overt act to other countries, our commitment to solving this problem.

Mr. WELLMAN. I would have to express a personal opinion in response to that. My feeling is, and I believe this feeling is shared in my department, that the way to get ahead, Mr. Chairman, in drug control in international relations is to keep it within the operation of our foreign relations and not take it out, to make the people who are dealing every day in relations with countries and with areas give this problem a high priority. I am in a position, responsible to the Secretary of State, reflecting his personal interest. I have access constantly to the two Under Secretaries. But my office is a staff office and my office is interested in helping the operating offices in the Department of State make drug control the issue in our foreign relations that it should be. If, as you will hear tomorrow, we have a problem and a program in Southeast Asia, that program is being developed in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary for that area is responsible for that program to the Secretary and to the President.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Scheuer was saying that by the very nature of your office—it doesn't have the muscle to lean on the Assistant Secretary to achieve the needed ends.

Mr. WELLMAN. The President and the Secretary do.

May I say that the Secretary of State is our principal foreign policy officer in the field of drug control, and right behind him are the Under Secretaries who are as concerned as the President's remarks indicate. Our ambassadors around the world are equally concerned. They are

talking with prime ministers and foreign ministers and they are developing with these governments programs for those countries.

I suggest this is the approach we must follow. We must develop our drug control programs as part of our foreign relations, using the bilateral or multilateral approach as we determine one or the other to be the more effective.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Have we signaled to these other governments the urgency and commitment that we have put into this area?

Mr. WELLMAN. Yes, sir. I believe we have. I believe we are doing it more and more strongly as the crisis builds up in this country.

The President's message, for example, was sent by the Secretary personally to every chief of mission with the instruction that he deliver it and discuss it with the prime minister or foreign minister of that country. That is being done the world over.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Take the case of Iran. For 13 years they didn't grow poppies. The last 2 years they have. We have a military credit sales assistance program with Iran. Is our ambassador there really letting them know of the deep concern of the American people about their renewing the growth of poppies?

Mr. WELLMAN. Yes, but, of course, Iran is not a danger to us as yet. Iran went back into the growing of poppies because it could not face uncontrolled opium production all around it and the traffic that emanated from that over its borders, and the losses that it incurred as a result. Iran is on record, without any pressure from us, that they will go out of opium production the day their neighbors bring their opium under control or eradicate it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We have an ongoing program with Iran? We have certain bases for conversation with the Iranian Government?

Mr. WELLMAN. Yes; and we are working very closely with the Iranian Government, which is a member along with the United States, of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

Iran, although going back into production, has effectively controlled opium, like India. There is no problem with Iran of leakage from the legal production. But we would like Iran's support in getting opium elsewhere in the world brought under effective control. That is our posture with respect to Iran.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The full committee this morning passed an amendment authored by Mr. Monagan, of Connecticut, that directs the President to suspend economic and military assistance furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act to any country when he determines that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs being processed or produced or distributed to the United States.

This now gives the President very, very strong authority to act in this area.

Mr. WELLMAN. Of course the President has authority even in the absence of that provision.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes, but this now is a congressional mandate to the President, assuming it stays in conference and assuming it is passed by the other body. It is a mandate to the President that clearly shows the congressional concern which in turn is a reflection of the

urgency of the country. What this committee wants to know, and I know my colleagues who are answering a quorum call want to know, too, is: Does the Department of State feel this same great urgency that Congressmen feel and the people in our country feel?

Mr. WELLMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I can express it any more forcefully than we do, and we could not be effectively representing the United States in relations with foreign countries if we did not. We are fully aware of the urgency and we are putting that sense of urgency into our relations with foreign countries.

It is merely a question—and the only difference between the Congress and the Executive is this, Mr. Chairman—of what is the most effective tactic.

We who have to deal with foreign countries every day have to make a judgment on that. I believe the Congress would expect us to make a responsible judgment on that.

The objective is the same, but we may differ as to what the most effective tactic in a given situation is. We do not feel that the termination or the threat of termination of American aid will be effective in carrying us forward to the objective that we share. That, of course, is the position of the administration, not only my personal position.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am aware of the position of the administration; but administrations have been wrong in the past. I am not saying this way is right or the other way is right, but it may well be that this way will have to be tried, commensurate with the urgent need in the United States. Congressman Rangel, who testified yesterday, made a very eloquent and moving presentation. He suggested that in ordinary times, ordinary State Department government-to-government relations are adequate, but there comes a time when a crisis envelops our communities and then appropriate crisis-type steps have to be taken.

It may well be that some countries are susceptible to the pressure, if you want to use that kind of word, that can come from this amendment and other countries are not. This is a judgment that we must make country by country.

For example, Turkey over the past 20 years has received \$5.7 billion of American assistance. It ought to have been a little more responsive to stopping a \$3 million a year cash crop. In other words, we have been negotiating with the Turks for 10 years to reach the point when our actions become effective only a year from now. In other words, we finally succeeded with the Turkish Government, a success in futuro, but it took us 10 years to reach that.

During that period of time, we have delivered billions of dollars of grant aid, and loans to that government.

The question that many of us have intellectually is couldn't we have done more to reach that point sooner?

Mr. WELLMAN. This was a decision, Mr. Chairman, that Turkey had to come to themselves. We could only point them toward that decision. Turkey finally decided that it was more economical and in accordance with Turkey's international obligations to eradicate the cultivation of opium rather than to seek to control it.

Their only obligation was to control it. They failed in that obligation, so they decided to eradicate it. This could only be a Turkish decision. Our job was to try to get them to move toward it.

But, as the President has said, the name of this game is not coercion, but cooperation. We must choose our tactics in order to get the cooperation that we need, else we are going to have just words and not action.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Some people say that coercion is in bad taste in dealing with other governments. Congressman Rangel suggested yesterday that when people are dying on the streets, and when U.S. Senators cannot walk through Harlem without being attacked by narcotics addicts, that something else has to be tried.

Mr. WELLMAN. I can't see why we consider that nations are any different in this respect than people. Mr. Chairman, if I want and need your cooperation, I probably will get it only by persuading you that it is in your interest to cooperate with me.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me put it another way. If you will give me \$5 billion, you can have my cooperation so fast it wouldn't take any time at all.

Mr. WELLMAN. But suppose that \$5 billion was as much in my interest as it was in yours, and I hope our programs around the world are on that basis—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Rangel's response was that American national security vis-a-vis Turkey is a matter of high priority. But American security fails if crime becomes so prevalent that people cannot walk in their communities. There is no point in saving Turkey if we are going to lose Harlem.

Mr. WELLMAN. That is why we have been working so hard with Turkey to bring them to this decision. But I do not believe it would be helpful to this decision if we had threatened to suspend or had suspended our assistance to Turkey.

I have a feeling that the effect would have been just the opposite from what we wished.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I don't want to belabor the point. Some people think that perhaps all you have to do is show them the balance sheet. I know if I were there and looked at the balance sheet, I would have been very much impressed with the flow in my direction.

Tell us what else the State Department is planning to do for the future, because I think there is something to be learned from the Turkish lesson.

I applaud the efforts we have made—Ambassador Handley's, the President's, your effort, and those of the Turkish Prime Minister—I think he showed a great deal of leadership.

Is there something we have learned from that experience that can now be translated into dealings with other countries?

Mr. WELLMAN. I think the decision by Turkey to eradicate production is going to have a tremendous effect around the world in fortifying our efforts to get countries to face up to the question of control and, if they cannot control, to the obligation to eradicate.

As has been pointed out, this is not particularly relevant to areas where opium is produced illegally outside the control of governments, but as pressure comes on other legal producers, the Turkish experience will be quite relevant.

What are we doing? We are looking at every area of the world where there is a problem of drug control. Of course, Southeast Asia is an important area along with the Middle East.

We are examining the resources we have to put together with the resources of other countries in order to make their efforts more effective than they now are. That is so right around the world. These are our terms of reference.

The Assistant Secretaries will tell you tomorrow the kind of thing that we have in mind in the areas which they are discussing, and also, I think, some of the difficulties that we encounter.

We are not only thinking of bilateral programs; we are also thinking of using these multilateral programs that we have referred to. We are not only thinking of law enforcement. We are thinking of cooperating with foreign countries, also, in the field of preventive education, in the field, where they have a tremendous number of addicts, of treatment and rehabilitation of the addicts, and, in the longer term, in programs of trying to provide incentives for the opium producer to go out of production of opium and into a beneficial activity.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the State Department going to do about these high-ranking Vietnamese generals and the Laotian political figures that are allegedly involved in heroin trafficking?

Mr. WELLMAN. Because of the nature of this traffic and the profits involved—I am sure every country has individuals in office involved in this traffic or condoning it or looking the other way. What are we going to do? If we have hard information and intelligence, we are going to make it available to those governments because it is their responsibility to take action.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Steele said yesterday Ambassador Bunker already has that intelligence.

Mr. WELLMAN. Then you can be sure it is being made available to the government to which he is accredited.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What are we going to do about it?

Mr. WELLMAN. It is their responsibility, Mr. Chairman, to do something about it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Under the Monagan amendment, we could stop aid to Vietnam.

Mr. WELLMAN. If it is to our interest, but I think we should carefully consider our interests in the circumstances, and also consider whether that is the way to induce them to take the action we would like.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. This passed the committee unanimously this morning. It gives you some kind of reflection of how Congress feels about this. In other words, what I hope is when you leave here today and go back to report to the Secretary of State you are going to tell him that the fellows up here, irrational as they may be, are pretty serious.

Mr. WELLMAN. We know that.

May I say that the question is not a difference in objectives. It is a question of difference in tactics and in evaluation of what the most effective tactics are.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I must say, Mr. Secretary, you seem to be taking a very simplistic position in this matter. I have been reminded repeatedly by the State Department that parliamentarians do not speak for the government. We don't. But we speak for the American people.

Everybody you deal with in the State Department knows you are the people who speak for the U.S. Government.

If I get up on the floor of the House and say we ought to cut off all aid to anybody in sight who has anything to do with drug traffic, I am speaking for myself and probably a great many Americans, but it is not an official pronouncement of the U.S. Government.

But the fact that the American people are so deeply concerned, and as expressed by their elected representatives in such action as taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee and will doubtless be taken by the entire House, it ought to say, in my judgment, to the State Department and to the administration we mean business about this and we want you to do everything conceivably possible to get this message across to the people with whom you are dealing.

Why will that not strengthen your hand? Why can't you say to these governments with whom you are dealing, "Look, the American people are so aroused and the Congress is so concerned about this that they have taken this strong action and unless we can get together on doing something they may take even stronger action and say, 'You shall cut off aid period.'" Why doesn't it strengthen your position rather than weaken it?

Mr. WELLMAN. This position of the Congress expressing the feeling of the people on this crisis is extremely helpful. I am just talking about the use of this particular tactic. I am not talking about the very strong and vigorous and eloquent declaration of policy that it represents.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would certainly hope that you would find ways to make use of what it does represent as an outpouring of American concern, outrage, and insistence. It would seem further, to me, that if I am a government which depends upon U.S. support for my survival, I have to take some note of such a strong feeling on the part of the Congress which ultimately controls whether that assistance shall be forthcoming or whether it shall not be.

It would seem that this conveys a clear message that these nations need to understand, however they react to it.

Mr. WELLMAN. Mr. Chairman, a year ago the world looked at this as an American problem, the problem of drug abuse. Today the world looks at it as a world problem, for which there is a world responsibility.

But we still very much depend on the cooperation of other countries, and the only issue here, Mr. Buchanan, is how we get it. That is all we are talking about.

We certainly are anxious in the executive branch, and we feel that this is the will of the Congress and the people, to use every effective measure to get this international cooperation we need.

Certainly the policy judgments of the Congress are very helpful in this.

Mr. BUCHANAN. We certainly want to give you every weapon you can conceivably use, and I think one you better use is the fact that, unless some kind of dramatic action is taken reasonably soon, the Congress may go even farther than the House Foreign Affairs Committee went this morning. I think that is a safe prediction to make.

Mr. WELLMAN. We do want to do what is effective, though, I think.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Certainly.

Mr. WELLMAN. And we don't want to do things just because they make us feel better if they are not effective.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Certainly not. I think we want to convey a clear message, though, and I think that message will be conveyed.

Mr. WELLMAN. I think we do, and I think that the Government of the United States, through the President and the Congress, have made that very clear to people like myself and we are following that guidance very closely.

My statement, Mr. Chairman, does bring right down to the present the status of these multilateral programs, in which I know the members of your subcommittee and the Congress are very interested. We in the Department of State and the other departments of Government want to continue what I look upon as a very useful dialogue with the Members of Congress because we need, I think, to move together on this. We need to know what you are thinking about and what you think are good tactics, and we need to be able to tell you what some of the difficulties are. We need your support.

Of course we are going to need funds of the United States where assistance can be helpful in moving a country toward objectives that we want. But we are going to have to be satisfied that those programs for which our assistance may be asked are effective. We can't just put out the money without some assurance that we are going where we want to go, whether it is a bilateral program or a multilateral program.

The international organizations which have quite a history here in drug control and in some respects very effective drug control are perhaps more slow to gear to the struggle than the agencies of a single government. Although even in our own Government sometimes we don't move as rapidly on an issue as we would like. But we are pushing and we are using every possible channel that we think will give prospect of achievement.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Has Ambassador Watson conveyed these sentiments to the French Government?

Mr. WELLMAN. Ambassador Watson has taken a very close personal interest in the cooperative arrangements with France. When we have something to say to them, whether it be critical or commendatory, he is very much involved.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Has he reported to your office or do you see any cables from him reporting on what progress has been made vis-a-vis the French enforcement policies?

Mr. WELLMAN. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is he satisfied?

Mr. WELLMAN. I think he, like the Department of State, is satisfied with the attitudes and cooperation of the French Government. I don't think anyone is satisfied with the law enforcement results. And possibly we are not satisfied with our own.

This is a tough nut to crack. This is difficult.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Some people seem to think that we haven't put the kind of money and effort into it that the situation warranted these last 5 years.

Mr. WELLMAN. I think in the whole world, every country, not excluding our own, has been slow to come to a realization of the magnitude of this crisis and what was required because of it. I think we, probably because we are hurting more, are coming faster to that point than any other nation. But we are carrying our message around the world and other nations are beginning to recognize that our problem can be their problem, and that they had better work with us and with others to bring it under effective control.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Tartaglino, going back to what the French have done, you talk of cooperative arrangements with them. I know you suggested you didn't want to talk about numbers of personnel involved over there, except in executive session, but what else can be done in terms of enforcement?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. There are a number of things that can be done, and there are a number of things that are being done, but this, I think, would be more appropriate for executive session. I think it would be counterproductive to discuss it here. Some of the things Congressman Scheuer mentioned today are good things that should be done, and a lot of these things are being done. I would prefer to comment on those items in executive session.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. May I expand just generally without referring to France?

There are sovereignty issues involved and when a country permits you to work under cover, make under cover penetrations, to set up networks of informers with their knowledge, I don't think those particular countries want it publicized because there are internal elements there that may capitalize and use the cooperative effort against our best interests. I don't have to publicize this.

These are some of the things that have been going on around the world. These are some of the accomplishments that have been made in the past in a very short span of time.

To be specific here in this area, I think, would be counterproductive to our effort abroad.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I wonder if there is any action on the part of this committee or of the Congress that you would recommend—and I will say this just generally—we have heard from State on reservations about cutting off the aid approach. I assume that the authorization which the President has sought to give assistance to other countries where appropriate obviously would have support. I wonder if there are any other actions any of you would recommend on the part of this committee or the Congress which we might take, which, in your judgment, would be helpful.

Mr. WELLMAN. I welcome commenting on that. Authorization to the President to use the resources of the United States whenever it can be demonstrated that they will help other countries make drug control more effective is very useful to us. That is the basis of some of the legislation that the administration has proposed.

It is helpful for the Congress to make clear that this is an important problem for us, that whenever our resources—technical, technological or financial—can be used to advance this objective, particularly in countries that have inadequate resources to do it for themselves, then we should make them available.

We also should support those United Nations programs which advance our cause, because in some cases the multilateral approach is more effective, more acceptable than a bilateral approach.

You have had testimony today about some of these multilateral programs. When we come back to the Congress for additional funds which we can justify for the United Nations expanded program, for example, we hope that the Congress will support that request.

At the present time, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances is before the Senate. If we want to have any chance at all of getting more effective narcotics control by the opium producers, we have to put our psychotropic drugs under international control. It is the other side of the coin. We are a producer in this case. We are the potential danger.

In Africa, Asia, and Europe, they are fearful of these new drugs. So as an earnest of our good intentions, we have to put those dangerous drugs under effective control internationally.

So, there are things that the Congress can do.

Going back to what you said, I think the declaration of the national crisis and the national judgment about it is extremely helpful. This is an effort in which the Congress must participate.

I was at the United Nations Conference on Psychotropic Substances and we had four congressional advisers, two from the Senate, and Congressman Scheuer and Congressman Hastings from the House. This was very helpful to the U.S. representation. We would like more of this.

A group of Members from both Houses went to Europe to support the United Nations Fund and to try to get our friends in Western Europe, through contacts with parliamentarians, to make voluntary contributions. It hasn't yet produced very much, but I think that it will.

I think we are going to have voluntary contributions from our friends in Western Europe that are necessary to get this U.N. program moving. I am sure it will be in part due to the force of the congressional presentation. I think there are a lot of places where we can move together.

I think it is probably not mainly in the field of legislation. It is mainly in the field of representation of the U.S. position.

Mr. BUCHANAN. As I said yesterday, Mr. Wellman, concerning the State Department, it is all right with me if the State Department wants to speak softly, but Teddy Roosevelt said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." We are going to give you a big stick whether you want it or not.

Mr. WELLMAN. We have a big stick. The United States means a great deal in the world, and U.S. cooperation means a great deal in many countries. I think we lead from a position of great strength.

Mr. BUCHANAN. As long as they understand how strongly we feel.

Mr. WELLMAN. That is right. And I think they do.

Mr. BUCHANAN. As a law enforcement problem, where, essentially, is the problem? Turkey has been producing 80 percent of the opium. Now they have taken some action. Law enforcementwise, where is the problem primarily, or specifically?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The problem, as I outlined in the statement, is in people.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I mean geographically.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. In France today there are Corsican organized criminal syndicates; some in Italy, and many here in the United States. Here lies our basic problem. Another basic problem that I now have is a short-term goal. The short-term goal, in addition to these long-range goals, relates to tomorrow—and relates to the kids who are dying in the street. We must cut off the distribution systems. We have some 2,000 traffickers identified and involved in the United States in the major drug distribution systems. We have about 1,000 agents working on those suspects. All of us have an understanding of resource allocation—it is just not possible to work on all these people at the same time.

If you were to ask me what my needs were today, I would have to say that I know you can't give them to me. I need 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 agents trained overnight to work on those suspects. But we are building toward that goal.

The problem, dealing in hindsight, is that we, I guess historically in many cases, react to situations, and in this particular crisis there were many indicators during the 1960's that should have been observed in this drug explosion and building should have started a lot sooner than it did. We find ourselves with 10 fingers and 40 holes in the dike. We are readjusting priorities daily. We have cocaine just exploding through the roof. We don't want another heroin situation. So we have some resource allocation of our manpower into the cocaine systems. We all know of the consequences of dangerous drugs, so we must have some resource allocation in that area. We don't want another heroin problem there either.

So it is actually resources and I know men can't be trained overnight.

What we are trying to do is get a unified effort with State and local enforcement to help in a joint effort, and together with customs, to try and stem this tide as quickly as possible.

We got the ball on the 2-yard line and maybe we are out to the 7-yard line. We have about 90 yards to go. It is going to be a long fight.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, of course, we aren't giving foreign assistance to France. I am aware that France is particularly independent, and so forth.

Does anyone have suggestions as to what might be done to help in this problem with France? Do you feel you are getting reasonable cooperation now?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would like France to have 1,000 trained men in this fight. I would like to have them locate laboratories. But they have quadrupled their force. They have trained an additional 200 men in the last year. I hope they will build further. I am optimistic that they will. I am a product of our French overseas operation and understand their past priorities. They just got this priority recently and are building now.

Many of the things that Congressman Scheuer mentioned about the lack of technical equipment, et cetera, is now being remedied.

I think they have been responsive in a very short period of time, and I hope there will be greater response.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I won't take further time. I will only say I personally applaud the efforts of this administration toward taking action in this field, and I certainly appreciate Mr. Tartaglino's work toward narcotic control.

To the extent you need additional forces, I would hope it would be in the wisdom of the Congress to provide you with those resources and people you need. I think the urgency of this problem is so great that it is certainly a matter of the highest national priority.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We are very grateful. You should tell your associates to keep a very close 24-hour surveillance on their activities.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Our next witness is the distinguished New York State Senator, Senator John Hughes, chairman of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control, and Effect on Society.

We are grateful that you took the time to come to Washington, Senator. We know of your concern in this field and of your earlier visits to Washington on this matter.

We have a slight problem. We have a recorded teller vote. We have 8 to 10 minutes to get over to the House Chamber and vote. It is very embarrassing not to vote on these things. If you would just give us about 8 minutes, we will be back.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN H. HUGHES, CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK STATE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON CRIME, ITS CAUSES, CON-
TROL, AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY**

Mr. HUGHES. We have some charts that have been made which I think are important to this presentation.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why not set them up and we will be back in about 8 minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.

Senator, as I said earlier, we are very grateful for your coming down to make this report.

We are pleased to hear from you.

Mr. FULTON. From the minority side, and as a former State senator, myself, from Pennsylvania, I also welcome Senator Hughes and congratulate him on his public spirit in coming this far.

Mr. HUGHES. Thank you. We very much appreciate the opportunity.

As I said, and as you gentlemen know from the testimony of other people, we are the ones who really have the problem. New York State is in a terrible situation at the present time. New York City is virtually dying as a result of this disease, which is a creeping thing and very contagious, as some of our charts will show you.


I would like to run through this rather quickly.

Mr. McKenna, who was formerly with District Attorney Frank Hogan, has been with our staff for some time, previously on a part-

time basis, and now on a full-time basis, and has been doing a special job relating to a particular section of New York City, Bedford-Stuyvesant. His study is very revealing.

First, I will refer to the following charts taken in order. No. 1 is the chart on the wall.

(The chart referred to follows:)



Mr. HUGHES. I think I can briefly describe this material.

We have put together a résumé of the felony narcotic arrests, of adults only, from 1960 through 1970. The figures may not be legible from where you sit.

In 1960 there were 1,807 felony arrests; in 1965, 4,100. Then, things started to escalate. In the next year, 1967, there were over 8,000. In 1968, there were nearly 12,000; in 1969, 18,000-plus. So we went from 1,800 arrests in 1960 to 18,000 felony arrests in 1969.

You can readily see the catastrophe that has taken place. From 1960 to 1970 the record went from 1,800 to 30,000 felony arrests of adults in the State, and this mostly covers cases involving heroin.

Mr. FULTON. Is this largely in the New York City area?

Mr. HUGHES. The largest part of it is in New York City, but it is now spreading to other parts of the State—Albany, Rochester, and so on. We are all getting our share of it, but not on the same scale that New York City has and is.

However, the figures which I have given you are statewide figures. This chart covers the whole State, not just the city of New York. There were 26,000 cases in New York City alone for 1970.

To give you some idea of the magnitude of the problem, we had 40,000 felony arrests, for all crimes in 1960. Compare that with 1970, and the 30,000 arrests and there is no question of the terrifying increase. 1971 will show something more than that. How much, we won't know until this year is over.

The increases from 1969 to 1970 exceeds the first 5 years on the chart.

The results of this, however, are due to numerous problems. We have congested our courts beyond any measurable way of administering justice. The police have not given up, but they certainly are disillusioned. Commissioner Murphy has made statements recently on the subject. There has been an increase in corruption in this area of enforcement with regard to drugs.

Next is chart No. 2.

Mr. FULTON. Before we leave that chart, may I ask a question?

If you will note the first chart, in 1963 there seemed to have been in convictions and prison sentences an increase. Then there was a decrease for 1964 in both items, and also a decrease in the calendar year 1965 even further.

In 1965, although the arrests and the indictments had gone clear up, it looks to me as if the 1965 figure on convictions and prison sentences was clear back to the 1960 level, when there were just the 1,800 arrests.

If you will look again at the statistics, in 1966, 1967, and 1968 there seems to be a higher plateau of convictions and prison sentences, but these in no way correlate in either case with the two factors of arrests and indictments.

I see you do not have 1970 figures yet. You will note, taking the figures of 1966, 1967, 1968 and some increase, in 1969 in the convictions, but no increase in the prison sentences.

So, in those four years, which are just recent, the prison sentences seem to be running pretty uniform. In fact, from 1967 there is a reduction in 1968 and a further reduction in 1969. So it would seem to me to be an inverse proportion of law enforcement compared to the problem increase. Why is that?

Mr. HUGHES. A combination of circumstances. One is that we don't have the facilities to handle the business our courts have.

Mr. FULTON. Is that the State or the city or county?

Mr. HUGHES. It is a combination of things. I think for all practical purposes it is reaching the point where it should be a total State problem. I have been sponsoring a proposal that the State take over

the operation of the courts. Within that period, however, I sponsored, and we passed legislation which created 125 new judges. But, again, this is only scratching the surface.

We could create many more judges, and it wouldn't produce many more results. On the basis of the number of judges we have, we cannot exceed 4,000 cases a year, and the available facilities, which are numerous, are still not enough, due to the rate of increasing crime. We are only talking here about one type of crime and that is the felony narcotics case. We have a multitude of other crimes related to this.

The answer to your original question is, yes, this is true, and we have criticized this.

The second part of the problem is that our major drug program started in 1966. Many of those people convicted of felony arrests are entitled to escape the prison sentence by going into a drug treatment facility. So, many of the people who, prior to, let's say, 1966, would have been treated simply and solely as a narcotics offender, but subject also to penalties, can escape those penalties now by taking refuge in one of these rehabilitation centers.

But it is a combination of the two. As you look at the chart, you see that people are not going to prison. But this is true with other crimes in our State. I don't know, perhaps this is characteristic of the whole country. But our prison population is not in proportion to the increased crime rate.

There are many factors involved. I shouldn't bore you with all the details. Many of the court decisions affect the question of obtaining convictions. On this particular chart, I think there are two major factors: One is the load of work that the judges have to dispose of and the other, the enormous program that has been under way since 1966, allowing many people to go into one of these rehabilitation programs.

Mr. FULTON. If you would take the increase in the potential of trial by the courts as something just under 4,000, because, of course, they cannot operate at full scale all the time—

Mr. HUGHES. This would be the whole State; not just the city.

Mr. FULTON. You then see by the chart that there are 30,000 cases pending. It then becomes apparent that out of the total number of cases, only one in eight can be tried, and seven out of eight narcotics cases in New York State cannot even come to trial because of lack of facilities.

Mr. HUGHES. And any other kind of case, too. It doesn't just apply to narcotics. Any other kind of case.

Mr. FULTON. So even if there is an arrest and an indictment found, the chances are seven out of eight that it will not even reach trial; and taking the factor of the possibilities of finding the particular defendants innocent, or subject to a lesser degree of crime, this would run the percentage down further, would it not?

Mr. HUGHES. No doubt about it. There is no question.

Mr. FULTON. So by inference from your chart statistics, in New York somewhere between 86 and 90 percent of the people who are arrested for narcotics offenses never even reach a trial, which would certainly discourage the best police officer.

Mr. HUGHES. That is very true.

Mr. FULTON. Is the question, then, one of the numbers of people expanding, or is it the question where there is inadequate deterrent? Where is the point where we can put a U.S. program to handle the problem? Is it the number of people who are expanding the use of narcotics, or is it the fact that there is adequate deterrent?

Mr. HUGHES. I think it is a combination. I think the general trend has been not to send people to prison.

Mr. FULTON. Or even try them; let's face it.

Mr. HUGHES. We can't try them. There aren't enough judges, courtrooms, and stenographers, and all that goes with it. We don't have enough actual people to do the job.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What happens to the indictment?

Mr. HUGHES. What happens?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.

Mr. HUGHES. They make a deal. They plead guilty to some lesser charge, whatever it may be; they make the best deal they can.

We have been criticizing this for years. But the only way we are going to get anywhere is if we can get some public support. The courts have been the stepchild of the Government of our State. I didn't come to make this speech. I have been saying this year in and year out. If all the plaintiffs could have been organized as other groups are, you would have had some action long ago. You get nothing, but limited action. It took many years to get our 125 judges. You live in the city of New York; you know they didn't have a supreme court judge for 30 years.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We just got five in Queens.

Mr. HUGHES. You got five in Queens. This is a big year.

But, basically, we get no results. Until such time as we can get the kind of leadership that will incite the public about this issue and give the problem the priority given other things, a man forced to go to court, gets involved on that particular day and that particular month only. The people are not concerned about the man in court, except that he may do harm to them. So he goes to court and is on his own.

What has happened is this: the decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the lower courts in the last few years have burdened the State courts still further. So we have all these hearings which have added more to the load. We haven't made provision for them. I think the Supreme Court of the United States had a responsibility to force the States to do some of the things they didn't want to do.

One of the things the State didn't want to do was to spend money on courts when there were demands from everywhere else. The State is in a tight fiscal situation.

Mr. FULTON. Could I ask about the Federal procedures, the Federal courts, and the U.S. district attorneys in the New York State area, what is happening there?

Mr. HUGHES. They have a handful of cases.

Mr. FULTON. What does that mean?

Mr. HUGHES. That means they don't have very many, and they can dispose of them.

Mr. FULTON. Why not?

Mr. HUGHES. Because they are selective in the cases. I am not an authority on this subject, but isn't it true that the Federal Govern-

ment is more selective in the prosecution of narcotics cases than the State is?

In our police departments, we have 700 men charged with handling the narcotic situation in the city of New York, besides all the plain-clothesmen who are supposed to be involved. So as Commissioner Murphy¹ has pointed out, they are supposed to be on the street to pick up the addicts.

Then there are complaints constantly coming in, on this subject. Gambling used to be a major grievance but now it is narcotics.

I would guess if the Commissioner were here, he could say he could make twice as many arrests as those on this chart. But what are you going to do with the people when you get them?

Mr. FULTON. Aren't these defendants tried in the Federal courts when they commit a U.S. offense?

That, Mr. Chairman, brings up the question: Are the Federal courts adequate and the U.S. prosecution agencies adequately staffed in New York State?

Mr. HUGHES. In the eastern district, which is Brooklyn, and the southern district of New York in the year 1965, 296 arrests were made by the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics. Of this number, 225 were dismissed, 130 were tried, and the balance of 131 were convicted on plea of guilty.

Mr. FULTON. How does that compare in that year with New York State?

Mr. HUGHES. 1965? We had 4,100 felony arrests.

Mr. FULTON. Maybe the Federal Government, itself, is not doing an adequate job. Did that ever strike you?

Mr. HUGHES. I don't believe I am qualified to speak on that subject. I think the most I can say is what I said in the beginning, that they are very selective in the cases they pursue, and New York State can't afford to be.

The city police departments and narcotics divisions of the cities throughout the State can't afford to be selective.

Mr. FULTON. As I am from Pennsylvania, Mr. Chairman, could you New Yorkers define for me the term "selective"?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I don't know if either Senator Hughes or I could do that. I have heard that statement before. I think the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs seek out certain people that they go after. They are much more discriminating in their choice of criminal clients. I think the city police are involved in more of a sweeping operation. They are obliged to respond to local arrests and local confrontations. They don't have the opportunity to be selective. I think that is a more responsive answer.

Mr. FULTON. Does it then mean that certain people who could be prosecuted are selected out and not prosecuted?

Mr. HUGHES. I wouldn't say that; no. I think the chairman has given a better definition than I. They give their attention to what they may consider to be major cases as opposed to the case of the ordinary felon. The major case may involve some alleged higher-ups, who they may feel are in an organized crime operation with people in other States.

¹ Police Commissioner of the City of New York.

Mr. FULTON. With the chairman's permission, could we have put into the record by the staff what has been done by the U.S. Government, the Department of Justice, in this area?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes, for a comparable period of years.
(The following was subsequently supplied:)

STATEMENT PREPARED BY THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

The BNDD has always felt that its enforcement efforts are best directed against those illicit drug traffickers who have been identified as major factors in the manufacturing and distribution of illicit drugs. This philosophy is particularly manifest in the Bureau's efforts to control the illicit flow of heroin. It has been well established that enforcement efforts against the addict-street peddler type violator will have little, if any, long term effect on the flow and distribution of heroin to a locality. To attack the heroin problem strictly at the street level, especially considering the limited resources of the Bureau, would in no way deter or eliminate the distribution of heroin. However, if a high or mid-level trafficker is immobilized from the heroin business the result may be a complete cessation of heroin flow to the area supplied by that trafficker for an indeterminate length of time. If we carry this rationale one step further, the elimination of a major international factor in the traffic may result in the cessation of heroin flow to an even larger area.

For many years the Bureau has maintained limited personnel in foreign, "source" countries to work with officials of those governments in the eradication and control of heroin and its precursors. But only recently have these governments begun to provide the full cooperation to Bureau personnel that will aid the Bureau in effectively eliminating the flow of heroin. By immobilizing major domestic traffickers and coordinating these efforts with the immobilization of their international counterparts, it is the belief of the Bureau that the flow of heroin can be stemmed.

To implement the Bureau's enforcement philosophy those individuals who are prominent in the traffic must be identified and immobilized. Intelligence through the years has indicated that heroin is distributed from its origin in overseas manufacture to the domestic, street-level addict through a relatively small number of large, diversified, identifiable systems of distribution. These systems are made up of the individuals in foreign countries who synthesize the heroin, those who arrange for the smuggling of the heroin into the United States, those who receive the heroin in the United States, those who are the primary distributors in the United States, and so on. In each of these systems there are key individuals who if immobilized, singularly or collectively, will greatly deter the effectiveness of the system to smuggle or distribute heroin. The Bureau thus directs much of its investigative and enforcement effort at those identified key individuals. Unfortunately, it is not as easy to immobilize key traffickers as it is to identify them. Given the number of key traffickers identified at any one time, along with the limited resources available, the problem becomes staggering. Thus the Bureau continues to concentrate more and more of its enforcement efforts on those key individuals. To say then that the Bureau is selective in choosing the violators it attempts to prosecute is true in the sense that we focus on target violators whose immobilization will have a significant impact on the traffic. This does not mean that we avoid or decline to prosecute violators of lower stature in the traffic when the opportunity presents itself.

The effect of the Systems' approach is reflected in the Bureau's statistics. In 1960 the Bureau arrested 1525 defendants for narcotic violations, 1495 defendants in 1965, and 1104 in 1970. In 1960, 383.8 pounds of heroin were removed from the illicit market, 323.0 pounds in 1965, and 345.0 pounds in 1970. On the face of those figures no apparent improvement in our effectiveness is demonstrated. However, the purity of the heroin removed from the illicit market in 1960 averaged 43.6%, in 1965 the average was 23.1%, but in 1970 the average was 61.1%. The purity of the heroin involved is a good indicator as to how far removed that heroin is from the ultimate source. So while we arrested fewer violators in 1970 than we did in 1960 and 1965, the violators that were arrested in 1970 were on the average much higher in the echelons of the traffic. Additionally, the conviction rate of those defendants tried in 1969 was 97% and the rate in 1970 was 96%. Many of the violators convicted in recent years have been identified by other federal and state enforcement bodies as being deeply involved in other forms of organized crime. A Bureauwide emphasis on directing enforcement effort towards

development of conspiratorial type cases accounts for the lack of increase in heroin actually removed from the market. Frequently conspiracy cases are initiated and successfully prosecuted without the purchase or seizure of any substantial quantity of heroin. It is not a coincidence that many of the defendants in these cases are those who actually do not handle or possess heroin, but rather are the major factors who cause the heroin to be distributed by financing its smuggling.

Still we are aware that the Systems' approach to enforcement will not halt the flow of heroin overnight. We are also aware of the immediate problem in the streets and our Congressional mandate to do something about it now. The Bureau has taken several significant, effective actions to deal with the immediate heroin problem. Upon the merger of the Bureau of Narcotics and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control in 1968 to form BNDD, the National Training Institute was established within the Bureau to train new agents for the Bureau. An equally important collateral task given to N.T.I. was to establish training programs for state and local law enforcement personnel in the techniques of drug enforcement, with particular emphasis on the enforcement of drug laws relating to heroin. These programs are designed to help local law enforcement officials cope with the heroin problems peculiar to their areas. We believe that effective local enforcement can best be accomplished by trained local officials with support from the Bureau in terms of money and manpower when specific needs arise.

The recent emphasis on the training of state and local personnel is shown in the statistics. In 1960 the Bureau (the Bureau of Narcotics) conducted two weeks or longer schools for 169 officials; in 1965 the number rose to 345 officials; and in 1970 a total of 1854 law enforcement officials were students in two weeks or longer schools. Also, in 1970 Bureau personnel conducted law enforcement seminars in which 61,583 local law enforcement officials participated.

Naturally such training programs foster a spirit of cooperation and exchange of information between the Bureau and these local enforcement bodies. In 1969, BNDD cooperated with state and local authorities to make 982 drug violation arrests. In 1970, the arrest figure on such cooperative investigations rose to 1531. (These arrests are not included in the figure of narcotic arrests made by the Bureau alone in 1970.)

Another Bureau program established to deal with the immediate heroin crisis is the task force program. The task force concept is used in situations where a local drug problem has ballooned to such an extent as to require an immediate concentrated effort far exceeding the capabilities of the personnel stationed in that area. Such task forces may be made up of agents from offices throughout the country; they may be partially made up of personnel from state, local, and/or other federal enforcement agencies; and they may be established for durations ranging from several weeks to a semi-permanent basis.


A prime example of the task force concept is the New York Joint Task Force which was established in February, 1970, to add an additional punch to the enforcement operations in the New York City area. The New York Task Force is currently composed of approximately 155 enforcement personnel. Of these approximately 40 men are BNDD agents, approximately 100 are NYCPD narcotics detectives, and the remaining 15 are men from the New York State Police Narcotics Unit. This task force is completely funded by BNDD and the laboratory services are provided by BNDD. This task force naturally has the intelligence resources of all three contributing agencies immediately available to it. The target area for the enforcement effort of this task force is the mid-level narcotics distribution and those violators who may be significant but not identified as belonging to a known system. The violators in this category include those who sell directly to the street peddler. In the first eleven months of its operation (during which the manpower level was a fraction of its current size) the N.Y. Task Force made 47 heroin arrests, purchased 1.9 pounds of heroin, and seized another 4.9 pounds of heroin. In the first six months of 1971, the task force made 61 heroin arrests, purchased 7.2 pounds of heroin, and seized another 7.2 pounds of heroin. The total drug related arrests made for the first eleven months of operation was 84 and the total for the succeeding six months was 108. With the recent increase in the manpower of the task force these figures will undoubtedly continue to rise. The task force works independently of its contributing agencies but renders enthusiastic cooperation on investigations of common interest.

Another area in which the Bureau renders an immediate impact upon the public is through its educational programs. Again the emphasis on stopping

heroin use is paramount in these programs. The increased emphasis on public education is reflected in the statistics. In 1965 Bureau personnel delivered 566 speeches to an audience of 42,000 people and in 1970 personnel delivered 2140 speeches to a total audience of 274,500. In 1965 Bureau personnel did not make any radio or television appearances, but in 1970 280 appearances were made.

As stated earlier, the Bureau believes that heroin can best be controlled by coordinating the immobilization of key distribution systems individuals with the cooperation from the officials of the source countries. But by its other programs the Bureau is also attacking the heroin problem simultaneously at the other levels as well.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I would like for you to explain this chart to us, Senator, if you would, and explain what the implications are.
(The chart referred to follows:)



ESTIMATED NUMBER USING DRUGS AT LEAST SIX TIMES A MONTH

Mr. HUGHES. This chart was put together on June 24, 1971, by the Narcotics Control Commission of the State of New York. It involves all shades of drugs. This was done on a contract with an organization that did a sampling job for them to determine the extent of use of these various drugs.

The significance of this is we have had all kinds of figures.

I had hearings in Harlem 2 years ago and we got figures. They differed depending on who gave you the figures and how many people were involved. We got figures that were larger than the red figure. Nevertheless, we tried to be conservative about it.

At the end of the Second World War, it is generally conceded, we had no real problem in the city of New York. Heroin was not a problem. But from that time on, it began to build up.

In 1958 we had a figure for identifiable addicts at 28,000, and in 1968 at 52,000. Then in 1970 the best figure that we had was 103,000. This is the latest report we can find that has any degree of accuracy. We have to assume, on the basis of the sampling made by people skilled in the field, that this presents an indication of the number of people who are involved.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That figure of 157,000 heroin users of New York State represents, I think, about half of the total for the entire United States.

Mr. HUGHES. I think it is more than that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They estimate between 250,000 and 300,000. This New York figure represents half of the U.S. total. New York State is bearing the lion's share of the burden and the pain of this heroin problem.

Mr. HUGHES. That is right.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What, in your view, can be done about it? I see by the title of your committee that one of the things you concern yourselves with is causes, control, and effect on society. What do you see as some of the causes and what controls and effects are relevant?

Mr. HUGHES. I think the cause is, of course, the opportunity to bring the illegal product into the country, the money involved, and the huge profits. Of course, once these people become addicts, the burden is on them to satisfy their habit 365 days a year. This means that they either have to steal or have employment. Many of them don't have any employment and they must steal, rob, murder, or whatever. An easier disposition of the problem is to sell the drugs themselves. If they sell, of course, they make new customers.

One of the charts shows what happens to the younger people in the city.


I think the problem feeds on itself. It is just like an infection. The fellow who is hooked has to get the thing, and if he can pick up 10 or 15 customers, it is almost like getting a paper route in the old days, he has it made, at least until such time as something happens to him.

Next is chart No. 3.

(The chart referred to follows:)

CAUSES OF DEATH


Persons Aged 15 to 35, NYC, 1969



Mr. HUGHES. This relates itself only to New York City, 1969.
 These are the official figures on the causes of death from the medical examiner's office in New York City.
 These deaths cover ages 15 to 35, with narcotics being the major cause, 770 deaths; accidents, 570; homicides, 525; so on and so forth.
 Mr. FULTON. I am glad to see, as 1970 Chairman of the Heart Fund from Pennsylvania, you don't even have heart statistics on that chart.
 Mr. ROSENTHAL. Not in that age category.
 Mr. HUGHES. Next is chart No. 4.
 (The chart referred to appears on p. 94.)
 Mr. HUGHES. Chart No. 4 is heroin deaths, starting in 1950 to 1954 and so on.
 We show what the increase has been, let's say, in the 1960's. These, again, are official figures.
 Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is this for the city or the State?

Mr. HUGHES. The city. That projection can be debated, but what they did was to take the figures for the previous periods and put them

DEATH FROM HEROIN
NEW YORK CITY 1950 - 1969



together as best they could and estimate what might be the situation if it continues without any real interference.

So we had almost 3,000 heroin deaths in the city between 1965 and 1969.

Mr. FULTON. How many are located in New York City?

Mr. O'CONNOR. All are in New York City.

Mr. FULTON. And in what age groups did the deaths occur?

Mr. HUGHES. These would be all ages.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In general what age groups are they?

Mr. HUGHES. If you look at chart 3, you can see that the number of young people involved is increasing. In this chart we are only talking about 1969, young people, 15 to 35.


But the 770 figure in 1969 shows the increase, if you try to relate it to what happened over a period of 5 years.

Mr. FULTON. One point of my question is this: Are these the new users who take an overdose, who don't understand how to do it?

Mr. HUGHES. I think not necessarily new, but old users, too. Death comes from an overdose and depends upon the source, the individual from whom they buy it, the different qualities, et cetera. Of course, there is also the question of instruments used and what kind of physical condition they are in when they take the heroin.

Next is chart No. 5.

(The chart referred to follows:)



Mr. HUGHES. Chart No. 5 outlines what the State of New York has done since 1961, through new agencies, to try to combat the problem of crime. You will see there was police training in 1959, the temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Code in 1961 and identification

intelligence, the newest system we have. It has drawbacks in it, but, nevertheless, it is an attempt.

There was the Narcotics Addiction Control Commission in 1966, the Crime Control Council; the Office of Crime Control Planning, the special narcotics unit added to the State Police and last year we passed the statewide organized crime task force.

Mr. FULTON. What is the correlation between your narcotic felony arrests of 30,000—


Mr. HUGHES. Apparently the more we do the worse it gets.

Mr. FULTON. And the State budget in dollars?

Mr. HUGHES. That is on chart No. 6.

(The chart referred to follows:)

NEW YORK STATE NARCOTICS EXPENDITURES
1963 - 1972 (1)



Mr. HUGHES. Starting in 1963-1964, we were spending \$1.7 million. In 1964-1965, \$2 million; 1965-1966, and so on. Then we started to

move in 1967-1968. Now, we see the new narcotics program that was inaugurated in 1966, spending \$20 million, \$33 million, \$49 million, \$85 million, and finally \$91 million, for 1971-1972, that being only part of the story. This is the principal State purposes appropriation.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it correct that the State is spending close to \$100 million in 1972?

Mr. HUGHES. It is much more than that. That represents the basic State purposes. There are State purposes and local assistance, and then special funds. This is the basic, \$91 million. You have to add to that \$51 million for local assistance, which amount the local people are supposed to match. So we are talking in terms of between, conservatively, \$142 million, and as much as \$200 million.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What reaction do you have to the fact that President Nixon in his special message said we want to spend \$155 million nationwide?

Mr. HUGHES. I was going to get to that a little later. I don't think it does very much.

Mr. FULTON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. The question arises: Is this for prevention?

Mr. HUGHES. Treatment and prevention. Not police or law enforcement. It has nothing to do with that.

Mr. FULTON. This is not including law enforcement.

Mr. HUGHES. No; those are all aside. The law enforcement expenditures are aside and apart from this. This simply has to do with the treatment and the attempt to rehabilitate people.

Mr. FULTON. If the defendant figure goes up from 1,800 in 1960 to 30,000 arrests in 1970, even with spending \$91,739,000 for prevention and treatment, what is the area of reference of funds that the State should have to get the optimum results?

Mr. HUGHES. I don't think anyone has the answer. You will see the bottom line there. The grand total indicates that we have spent \$416 million. We have taken on capital construction, et cetera. If you move the \$91 million up to where it belongs, which is more closely to \$150 million, you will see that we are approaching \$500 million.

Mr. FULTON. Please say that last again.

Mr. HUGHES. The \$91 million in the budget passed in April only includes the basic State purposes budget. We also have big programs, in our State which share money, so to speak, with the communities, State aid, we call it. That is another \$51 million to add.

Mr. FULTON. Would you have that figure supplied to us, how you have the revenue sharing with local community agencies and voluntary agencies? What we are doing is getting from you the New York State government picture. But, obviously, with New York voluntary agencies and local communities, counties, cities, boroughs, townships, villages, these are really doing much more to meet the New York drug problem. I think you are to be commended on what you are doing. If you could give us the total picture, it will demonstrate to many Congressmen what has to be done nationally to meet this problem so that the drug programs get adequate funds. I think one of the great products of your visit here is this, that it is of very great benefit to all members of Congress to have this kind of information.

Before you recess, Mr. Chairman, may I compliment the witness on his fine presentation and on the figures, which are very helpful to us in Congress in looking at the problem nationally. Likewise, what the

Federal Government should be planning on meeting adequately the drug problem not only for New York State but for the whole country as well.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will have to recess at this point so that the members can return to the floor for another vote.

(Brief recess.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.

Please proceed, Senator.

Mr. HUGHES. I would like to have Mr. McKenna pick up.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. At some point, I want to make sure to ask you if you do have charts you can leave with us. We will put them into the record.

Mr. HUGHES. We will.

This is Jerry McKenna, and he has had charge of this special job we have been doing in connection with Bedford-Stuyvesant. I would like to have him run through these and a few other charts to give the committee an idea on some special situations that exist.

**STATEMENT OF JEREMIAH B. McKENNA, ASSISTANT COUNSEL,
NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON CRIME,
ITS CAUSES, CONTROL, AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY**

Mr. McKENNA. We have been working under a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to study the impact of organized crime on an inner-city community. We selected Bedford-Stuyvesant because it was neither the best nor the worst in terms of their crime picture.

The picture we did find was rather phenomenal.

(The chart referred to faces this page.)

Mr. McKENNA. Bedford-Stuyvesant is located in the heart of Brooklyn. It is a unique community in that almost 30 percent of the homes are owned by the occupants of the homes themselves.

During the 1930's Bedford-Stuyvesant was built as a prime residential area. The depression came and the homes didn't sell. Simultaneously with that, they moved rapid transit into the area and there was a migration from Harlem. The more prosperous blacks began buying their homes in this area.


During the 1940's a lot of people at Bedford-Stuyvesant were employed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard at substantial wages. It was a community that didn't suffer from the traditional problems we associate with Harlem.

But in the fifties we can trace and show the growth of the narcotics traffic in Bedford-Stuyvesant. It was small, but the addiction rate did begin to grow all through the 1960's.

We see some of the results when we measure the rates of arrests in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.

In 1963 through 1966, the rate of felony arrests, for selling narcotics or possession of narcotics are presented. In 1967 there was a low point, but it wasn't until 1967 that the narcotics bureau of the police department of the city moved into the area and began sending in the undercover agents to make the purchases. We see what they found.

From 33 felony arrests for sale or possession of felonious amounts of narcotics, to 1967 when there were 875 felony arrests in the two police precincts that cover the heart of Bedford-Stuyvesant. In other



words, I think the conclusion can be drawn that there are as many narcotics felons there as the police care to arrest.

The only limitations on the number of arrests that could be made in these two precincts are due to the amount of manpower the police can divert from other sections of the city to go into Bedford-Stuyvesant and make the purchases of narcotics.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. When you describe a narcotics felon, what type of person are you describing?

Mr. MCKENNA. A lot of these are street arrests, where the fellow is dealing with the addict on the street. There are large drug seizures made by the police department, but, by and large, this is what is called the street addict.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it the street addict or the street pusher?

Mr. MCKENNA. Both. The addict who is selling to support his own habit, and also, because this thing has become so profitable we find that more and more nonaddicts are going into this business. You need \$600 to purchase an ounce of pure heroin. That \$600 in one day will get you \$1,400. So, from a very small stake, you can suddenly make enormous profits in this traffic.

We estimate now in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area, which was a stable black inner-city community with homeownership, there are 10,000 hard-core addicts and probably 10,000 to 20,000 more heroin users who aren't classified as hard-core addicts. It gives you some idea of the traffic in narcotics that goes on in this community.

The police must respond to the complaints that they get, where, for example, the citizen calls up and says someone is dealing in drugs right on the street corner. The police, because of the nature of their system, respond by sending in the undercover agent. This is concerned with the obvious sale of narcotics, and you are right to say that such selling is at the bottom of the ladder in terms of the narcotics traffic. It is the undercover agent who can most easily make that type of arrest with a fellow who is not careful to whom he sells.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Have you been working in this community? Have you seen this yourself?

Mr. MCKENNA. Yes; we have seen the traffic. The police can point it out to you.

The police problem is manpower. They have a 700-man narcotics squad. You were asking why don't the undercover agents make more arrests? I will give you an insight into this system. The undercover agent is brought in. It is a black community, and the undercover agent in most cases must either be black or Puerto Rican. He is called upon by the narcotics squad that covers this area of Brooklyn. They need an undercover agent. They have four locations. They have an informant who will introduce the undercover agent to the fellow who is selling. So the undercover agent is supplied by a central headquarters. He is protected. There is an element of security here.

Let's say he will make four or five buys from a series of addicts throughout the community. But that undercover agent is pulled out because he is needed in Harlem. He is needed to make buys in the Bronx, in the growing narcotics traffic in Queens. He makes his purchases. About 1 or 2 weeks later, the police officers who covered the buy, the men who were stationed and hidden, who tried to observe the buy, will arrest the man who sold to the undercover agent. But the undercover agent must testify before the grand jury in order for a

narcotics felony indictment to be returned. He must testify Tuesday in the Bronx, Wednesday in Manhattan, Thursday in Brooklyn. So half of his available time is spent in the process of testimony.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Isn't his cover off at that point?

Mr. MCKENNA. No; before the grand jury, they try to protect the cover as long as they can because these men are precious. There is a limited number of men in the police department who can function as undercover agents. You can't be 6 foot 2, well built, et cetera. You must look like an addict.

So, they arrange a deal with the arrested narcotics seller, if he will plead to a lesser charge without demanding that the undercover agent testify against him. Thus, he will get a better break. But if he insists on going to trial, where the undercover agent is exposed and his usefulness is lost, then he will suffer a greater penalty. That is how the system works.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I know this is purely hypothetical, but do you have an opinion as to what would happen in this community if the supply of heroin dried up?

Mr. MCKENNA. You would have a stampede to the methadone program to cover their habit, because we are dealing with addicts, people who cannot suddenly go off heroin. But, fortunately, at this point we are beginning to build a base where we could handle the stampede in terms of the methadone programs that are going.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If that happened, how would that affect the crime problem?

Mr. MCKENNA. I think you would have a dramatic decrease. That is one of the main uses of the methadone program. The rate of recidivism in terms of arrest, of people who are on methadone, is rather low. You would probably bankrupt a good deal of the nonaddict sellers who have narcotics in the pipeline, who have made their purchases, who have laid out their money. If suddenly you could cut off that flow, you would severely injure this whole system and industry which has grown up in the local community.

Mr. HUGHES. May I make one comment on that?


It is my understanding that this happened at the beginning of World War II, in the 1940's. They had a hard-drug problem. Suddenly everything was kept out of the country because of wartime. These people went into a state of withdrawal and finally got over their habit. So this is a possibility, in addition to the supplement that we have now in methadone.

Mr. MCKENNA. Now, I have another chart.

(The chart referred to appears on the following page.)

Mr. MCKENNA. This shows the incidental effect of the narcotic spread. One of the key indicators of heroin in a community is the rate of violent death. A lot of people argue what about robberies, burglaries, what is being reported. But violent deaths are something that the Department of Health keeps statistics on, and we can be sure of the crime rate there.

We see the rate of growth in the violent deaths in the face of a declining population. In 1960 the census said there were 324,000 people living in that community. In 1968 they estimated between 254,000 and 268,000. So we have a growth in these indicators that there is a tremendous crime problem in terms of homicides and violent deaths in the area, so much so that by 1969 the homicides and suicides in the



area had outstripped the rate of accidental deaths, which in 1969 was the major problem in terms of violent death.

The incidental effects we can hardly estimate. For example, doctors will not practice in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area because of the crime rate in that area. The median age of the general practitioner in Bedford-Stuyvesant is 61 years of age. These are the doctors who came in when Bedford-Stuyvesant opened and began to develop. We have interviewed these doctors and to function, their security system must be enormous. They will not go out on house calls. You must come to their clinics.

We have two small hospitals in the area which are completely overwhelmed because there are no doctors who give even a penicillin prescription. Everyone must go into the hospital, for everything.

My brother-in-law was an intern in one of those hospitals in 1967 when we had the flu epidemic. They had 8,000 cases of children with the flu, processed through two very small hospitals because there were no doctors to which the residents could go to get some kind of a diagnosis.

So, we show an incidental effect of the narcotics traffic on that community.

We did some surveys of what happened in terms of the businesses operating in the area.

Where are the crimes being committed?

In 1962 there were approximately 580 crimes being committed on the business premises in Bedford-Stuyvesant. By 1969 there were 2,295 crimes being committed on business premises.

What are the results?

You can't get insurance in the area. This is in the face of declines in the actual business locations.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much of this do you feel is chargeable to heroin or other drug addiction?

Mr. McKENNA. We have talked to the police about this and this is what they call the dark figure of crime. There is a real dispute as to which comes first, the crime or the addict. The police say it is due to the heroin addict. Invariably when they arrest the person involved, he is an addict or he is using drugs, and he is committing crime to support his habit.

Look what has happened on the street in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In 1962 we had approximately 1,500 criminal incidents on the street. By 1969 it had gone up to 6,550 in that area.

The banks in Bedford-Stuyvesant tell us their deposits are declining because the people are afraid to leave their home to walk on the street with the money to put in the bank. The result is the banks that are operating in the area no longer have the funds to finance home renewal and all those things that a bank does for a community, primarily due, again, to the crime on the street.

Look at the dwelling places in terms of criminal incidents. This is a community which has double locks on its doors, steel wire on windows, people are afraid to leave their dwelling places because if they do they are liable to be burglarized.

We have now the new phenomenon of crimes occurring in churches and schools, again in the face of a declining population base.

So, the impact of the narcotics traffic in the community, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant community, has been horrendous.

Many of our governmental programs, such as Small Business Administration loans and the like, can't even undo some of this damage until something is done to arrest this major problem of public safety. So this underlies many of the problems we face in the inner city. Unless something is done about the narcotics traffic, it will continue.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If you were the President of the United States, what would you do tomorrow morning about the situation?

Mr. McKENNA. I will let the Senator answer that one.

Mr. HUGHES. May I?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Sure.

I am sorry the State Department people were not here to hear your presentation.

Mr. HUGHES. Do you think it would have made a difference?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I don't want to speak for the rest of the committee. But my judgment is that at the minimum they might have been jogged up a little bit in their attitude. You can't really appreciate the urgency of the problems until you see it so graphically described.

Mr. HUGHES. You are absolutely correct.

One thing we have done, in answer to Mr. Fulton's earlier questioning, is, at the last legislative session, we established a special court. We have \$9 or \$10 million to do something about the disposition of these cases. This would be a narcotics court, set up in 12 parts. How long it will take to get it together, I don't know. We will have 12 supreme court judges, clerks, stenographers, the whole business, perhaps ready for a trial in the next year. Then we will see if these felony narcotics cases can be handled.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If you were the President of the United States tomorrow morning, what would you do?

Mr. HUGHES. I would undo the decision he made last week, or 2 weeks ago, whenever it was, in which he had some understanding, which is still a little vague to me, with the country which is the major heroin supplier, and that is Turkey. We think that what is wrong is this: I can't imagine, though I heard the testimony of this gentleman, that this has all suddenly come in the last 2 or 3 weeks. We have been talking about this for quite a long time. We have had all sorts of information on the subject. I can't believe that it is a surprise.

We know this: A long established route of this traffic starts in Turkey, and comes to the United States by way of Lebanon, Corsica, France, et cetera. We know if they are going to establish new routes, they will have to go farther east for a longer route. We know this is going to take time. We know that under the President's proposal they are going to have the time because they are not only going to be allowed to harvest the crop that they are growing today—it all comes to bloom on 1 day and they harvest it in 48 hours—but they are also going to be allowed to plant again in October. That means that a year from now they will be harvesting another crop.

What they will harvest at this time of year, 1971, will get to the illicit market in the early part of 1972. This 1971 product will take them through whatever extended period of time there may be. This means that the 1971 crop will be available in 1973.

So we are talking about a timelag of at least 3 years until 1974, before the illicit producers are really in trouble.

I am talking about the people who are carrying on the traffic.

They should cut it all off now. I don't know what kind of a deal Nixon made with this man, but it didn't sound like a lot of money to

begin with. As a matter of fact, we met with the United Nations Ambassador and we met with the Turkish Ambassador to the United States. We had a nice conversation with both of them. We didn't expect they were going to do anything dramatic, but we were surprised by some of the things they said. One was that they never had any complaints from the United States. This was a great surprise, so I penned a letter to the Secretary of State, from whom I haven't yet had a response—I assume it will come in due course—and asked, "Is this true and, if so, why?"

We said if we are spending \$150 million or \$200 million a year of our own New York State tax money, not Federal funds, we could afford to go over and buy up this whole crop and pay these men, as you do on your programs for conservation, not to grow the product.

This sounds like the kind of thing the Federal Government is talking about, but it is too little and too late.

With New York City dying as it is, with children dying, with youngsters as young as age 6 using a needle, we just can't afford this kind of time. It is disrupting everything. People are moving out of the city. People are afraid to go out of their homes. The problem is increasing, as we have demonstrated, by leaps and bounds.

We can't wait. This is an emergency. People don't seem to feel this emergency. I heard the Secretary's assistant claiming we must talk this out with these people and saying we can't afford to be heavy-handed.

Fine, that is great, if you have all the time in the world and you are talking about something you can talk about for a couple of years.

We can't talk a couple of years. We can't talk at all. People are dying on the streets. The infection is escalating every day and every week. We just can't afford it.

So, in answer to your question, I think they made the wrong deal and I think the Congress of the United States should take a look at this.

These men told us they weren't going to stop. This is interesting. Well, we met on the 10th and 11th. We talked this out with these men and I said, "We would be willing to get authorization from the legislature to go over and sit down with whoever is in authority and make a deal. If the Federal Government is going to continue to drag its feet and not do anything about it, the State of New York can afford to do it in the interest of its economy and its own citizens."

They said, "You couldn't do that. You have to do it through the Department of State."

I said, "We are ready and willing to do it."

Then he said, "Our country is humanitarian and all this sort of thing, but we are not going to stop. This is an economic factor in our country. We have long-term contract commitments with drug firms, et cetera. So we are not going to stop growing this."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Who told you this?

Mr. HUGHES. This is the Turkish Ambassador to the United States.

Within a matter of 10 days, we read in the paper that there is an about face, and now they are going to stop, but they are not going to stop until 1972, or whatever.

Why they think they can persuade these people who haven't lived up to the treaty, who haven't licensed their people, why they think they can stop them from diversion, between now and October, when they have never done it before, is beyond me.

So, I think we are in for more trouble instead of less, and I don't think we have made a good arrangement with them.

I think Congress ought to take a close look at it.

We are suffering. And when they talk in terms of any other city, and I know there are other cities that have this problem, anything they have is insignificant compared to what our problems are. I know you know something about it because you live there. You know what it is like. But we live with it every day.

Until the time comes when somebody can feel, really feel, as members of your committee have said today, that there is a real urgency and the Congress is upset about it, and the time for polite talk is over then we may make strides. When we give a country \$5 billion or whatever it may be—and the Congress is giving Turkey more money this year, we should be able to handle a mere \$3 million or \$5 million. We could handle this very well. But it is a case of really talking to Turkey. They have to understand. If we wait until 1974, by that time the purchasers will have gone into Burma or Iran.

Iran has halted production for years, but now they may say, "These fellows are peddling, and we will go back in."

Somebody has missed the boat someplace. I don't think you can put the blame on any one particular source, but somebody has missed the boat. It has been no secret. It is a matter of public information. We have been suffering.

As long as it is New York, we can suffer.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. This has been a very fine presentation. I wish more of our members were here. We are in the process of amending an important bill.

Mr. HUGHES. As far as we are concerned, nothing is more important than the State.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. One of the great problems is that Washington is too far removed from the streets of our cities and communities, and villages of the country. There is a kind of a mental moat around this city. I don't know what can be done about it.

Mr. HUGHES. Even with our own delegation, there are many people who are not too well informed.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Rangel was here yesterday and he made a very eloquent statement.

Mr. HUGHES. He knows about it, sure. He made this same kind of pitch 2 years ago when we had hearings in Harlem. But there is nothing new about it. You know, it isn't all money. We have been taxing our people and spending slathers of it, so to speak. Our program has not been a success.

The Governor has recognized now that it is not a success. Even though we are putting people on methadone there are many people who cannot chemically accept it. You can't take everybody and think that even if you get them to use it that it will take care of them. Then you depend on a small fraction of the people who are going to have the desire to break the habit, but they are a very limited number.

We need muscle from the Federal Government and we haven't had it.

I talked with New York yesterday afternoon to find out some figures, and I discovered that last year's distribution of money was very minimal on the subject, statewide, and we didn't get any from the Federal Government. I don't know if it would make any difference

if we did or didn't. We have the problem and we have the money to do what we can.

The police department is overwhelmed. There are 32,000 policemen and we have hundreds of them on this. I am sure Pat Murphy would tell you, "I have to do it but what does it prove?" All you see on the chart is that black line. I suppose by June of 1971 it will probably be where the end of the tape is.

The answer, as Mr. McKenna has pointed out, is they could make as many arrests as they wanted. They could do it all day and all night.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much.

Mr. HUGHES. I appreciate your invitation to appear.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am going to make a special effort to have the transcript of your presentation delivered to the White House and to the Secretary of State, in addition to the members of the committee, to see if we can't do a little bit more than was done in the past. I think the time has come for serious action.

Thank you very much, Senator.

With unanimous consent, we shall insert Senator Hughes' prepared statement at this point.

(The statement follows:)

STATEMENT TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING DATA OF NEW YORK STATE SENATOR JOHN H. HUGHES, CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON CRIME, ITS CAUSES, CONTROL, AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY

I am New York State Senator John H. Hughes, and represent the 45th Judicial District which is located in Central New York and includes the counties of Onondaga, Chenango and Madison as well as the City of Syracuse. I have been a member of the New York State Senate for the past 25 years and presently I am Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as the Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control, and Effect on Society.

My duties as the Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime for the past five years have involved my conducting investigations into the administration of criminal justice in the State of New York. During the past two years, these investigations have revealed that the system of criminal justice as administered in New York State is being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of criminal cases which the system is called upon to handle. If a single cause were to be assigned to the impending collapse of this system, it would be the veritable explosion in the numbers of heroin related crimes presently flooding our courts.

In order that you might have some grasp of the full extent of the present crisis, you should have some understanding of the principal elements of our criminal justice system as it presently exists.

In 1965, the cost to the taxpayers of the State of New York for police, courts, probation and correctional services exceeded seven hundred twenty-eight million dollars. This expense has now climbed to an annual cost of very close to one billion dollars. Our criminal court system is divided into those courts with jurisdiction over lesser or misdemeanor crimes and those with jurisdiction over serious or felony crimes. I note at this point that, in order to focus your attention on simply the most serious aspects of the narcotic problem, I shall limit my discussion to felony crimes.

We have 62 county district attorneys in New York State, five of which are located in the City of New York. We have approximately 110 judges who devote a substantial portion of their time to the disposition of felony cases. We have a State Correctional system with a total capacity of approximately 21,000 inmates. Of this number, approximately 10,000 cells are located in state prisons, which places of detention we limit to the confinement of those sentenced to serve in excess of one year for a felony crime.

Our State operates with a minimum of one grand jury in each of the 62 counties. Before a defendant can be tried for a felony, the grand jury must first be presented with sufficient legal evidence that if uncontradicted and believed by the trier of fact, would permit the defendant to be convicted by the trial jury. Our investigations have shown that the maximum number of felony

indictments which our grand juries can return in any one year is approximately 26,000. In 1969, the police in New York State arrested nearly 90,000 adults who were charged with the commission of felony crimes.

It is against this background which we must view the impact of the heroin related crimes upon the existing system. In 1960, the total number of adults arrested for felonies in New York State was 40,916. Of these, 1,807 were charged with felony crimes involving narcotics. By 1969, the total number of felony arrests had grown to 89,326 adults and the total number of narcotics felony arrests to 18,489. While the increase of narcotic arrests between 1960 and 1969 is dramatic, when one considers that in the single year between 1969 and 1970, total felony narcotic arrests increased from 18,489 to slightly over 30,000. In effect, the 12,000 increase in arrests exceeded the total of all felony narcotic arrests for the five-year period from 1960 through 1964.

If narcotic arrests continue to grow at the present rate, we can anticipate that for this single crime, more arrests will be made in 1971 for felony narcotic violations than were made in 1960 for *all* felony crimes. When you consider that the several elements of our criminal justice system, that is, court rooms, judges, district attorneys and correctional facilities, have not grown in any significant way from what they were in 1960, one can appreciate the problem which we in New York are attempting to cope.

Up to this point, I have limited my discussion to those crimes directly related to violations of the narcotic laws. I am unable to give you verifiable statewide figures for common law crimes which are committed by addicts in their efforts to obtain the necessary money to purchase the drugs which they need to satisfy their habit. However, the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, with the support of a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and through cooperation with the Policy Sciences Foundation, has recently completed an analysis of the impact of narcotic users in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of the Borough of Brooklyn. This district in New York City had an estimated population in 1960 of 324,000 and in 1970 declined to 255,000. This district is policed by two precincts of the New York City Police Department. In 1960, these precincts reported a total of 451 felonious assaults. In 1969, they reported 1,107 assaults. For the crime of robbery, they reported a total of 201 in 1960 and 2,133 in 1969. They reported 487 burglaries in 1960 and 4,800 in 1969. The addict population for this area is presently estimated at 10,000 hard-core heroin users and an additional 20,000 occasional users. According to the best of our information it is these addicts who are responsible for the largest number of the crimes reported above. Assuming that addicts in other sections of the State are as active criminally as those in Bedford-Stuyvesant, you can see what the impact is in terms of the total criminal justice picture.

It must be remembered that these fantastic increases in crimes related both directly and indirectly to the heroin traffic in New York State, have come about during a decade when our State was vigorously exploring every avenue to stem the flood.

In the field of imposable punishments, we began in 1951 to provide for the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. Since that time, mandatory minimum imposable sentences have been increased on four separate occasions. The last increase was in 1969, when New York State adopted a law allowing the same punishment to be imposed for the sale or possession of more than 16 ounces of heroin as can be imposed for murder or kidnapping, that is, not less than 15 years nor more than life. In addition, we have supplemented local narcotic enforcement agencies by the assignment of special units of the State Police. We have also provided additional investigatory tools including legislation permitting wiretapping and eavesdropping; legislation to permit the police to stop and frisk individuals whom they suspect of committing a crime in their presence; we have also enacted legislation allowing the police, when armed with a search warrant, to break in without announcement if the court issuing the warrant is satisfied that the more usual procedure would allow the suspects to dispose of the heroin sought. Last year, in order to lend support to local district attorneys, we created the office of the statewide prosecutor to assist in the prosecution of cases involving organized crime which of course, would include those members of the criminal syndicate involved in narcotics traffic. At the legislative session just completed, we provided for the creation of a new court with citywide jurisdiction in New York City for the sole purpose of expediting narcotic prosecutions.

At the same time that the State was involved in attempting to reinforce local police, prosecutors and courts, we also attacked this problem on the front of education and rehabilitation. In 1966, we created a Narcotics Addiction Control Commission and have financed this Commission with over four hundred million

dollars in the past five years. During the current fiscal year, our rehabilitation and education expenditures will exceed two hundred and twenty-five million dollars.

In a word, we have called upon the citizens of the State of New York to sacrifice their treasure, their freedom and their privacy in an effort to bring the heroin problem under control. Our efforts have failed. In 1945, the State had virtually no heroin addicts. In 1958, it was estimated that there were 28,000 addicts. In 1968, this number had grown to 52,000 heroin addicts. In 1970, it was reported that we had 103,000 addicts. The most recently published figure by the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission for the state population of heroin addicts is 157,000.

The fact of the matter is that New York State has reached the limit of its resources in manpower, correctional facilities, rehabilitation facilities, and prosecutorial facilities. We cannot stem the tide. Our fate is now in the hands of the Federal Government and what it can do to insure that the heroin problem is controlled at the only point in its traffic that it can be controlled. We simply must stop the diversion of opium cultivated in Turkey, to the heroin factories. We, in New York State, are convinced that heroin is vulnerable to control only while it remains locked within the opium poppy. The recent pronouncement by the Turkish Government that cultivation of the opium poppy will not be permitted after the harvest of 1972 is laudable, and it is certainly a step in the right direction. However, it is my considered judgment that the benefits expected to be derived from this program may prove only a painful illusion. At the present time, diversion of opium from Turkey supplies 80 percent of the entire heroin stock coming into the United States. While I have no more precise figures for New York State, it is fair to assume that the percentage of heroin in our State which originated from the diversion of opium in Turkey is far higher.

The fact remains that New York State needs immediate relief from the heroin problem, and the present proposal simply will not provide that kind of relief. Under the present schedule, the 1971 opium crop which is this very day being harvested in Turkey, will not reach the cities of New York until January or February of 1972. The 1972 crop will begin to reach New York in January or February of 1973. The supply which will arrive in 1973 will be sufficient to accommodate the heroin addict population of my State until early 1974. This schedule assumes that there is no more opium diverted from the lawful opium crops of 1971 and 1972 than has been diverted in the past. I am aware that the Turkish Government has included in its recent pronouncement its intention to increase its surveillance this year and next on the opium farmers, but when one realizes that approximately 80,000 farmers will be involved in the cultivation of opium in Turkey, and that the needs of the United States are approximately 10,000 pounds of heroin a year, it becomes evident that each farmer need divert slightly more than one-half kilo in order to supply the heroin laboratories with sufficient opium to manufacture all the heroin we need in the United States for one year. It strains credibility to assume that a country which gave its solemn word in 1967 to completely stop the diversion of opium, and has not been able to keep that promise, would within the next two months be capable of mounting a surveillance campaign of sufficient vigor to accomplish this task of surveillance so vital to the success of the present program.

It was for this reason that the New York State Legislature, on May 13, 1971, adopted a concurrent resolution calling for the destruction of the 1971 crop before it was harvested and that further cultivation of the opium poppy cease immediately in Turkey. We have failed to destroy the 1971 crop. We have failed to stop the further cultivation of opium. I have been advised that the reason that the Turkish Government is going to permit additional planting in the fall of this year is caused by the existence of internal Turkish laws which require one year's notice to the farmers. On its face, this would appear to be a reasonable restriction; but in the light of the Single Convention On Narcotic Drugs, which Turkey ratified in May of 1967, which provides in Article 22 that when a producing country is unable to prevent diversion, it shall prohibit cultivation, the delay takes on more sinister aspects.

I have the uneasy feeling that the recent pronouncement by the Turkish Government to prohibit cultivation after the 1972 harvest, could be used as an excuse for a letdown in its present proposed program of control. If this were done, it would be a disaster of incalculable magnitude to New York State, for if the diversion this year and next year were allowed to increase by even so small an amount as one-half the traditional diversion, New York State would see no benefit from the recent pronouncement until 1975 or even 1976.

It is precisely this slow cutting off of Turkish opium which the New York State Legislature in its joint resolution sought to avoid. We must assume that every individual who has accumulated an ill-gotten fortune from the diversion of Turkish opium is now aware of the planned program. In the time available to them, they will most certainly expend every effort to acquire new sources. What we in New York State had hoped the Federal Government would be able to accomplish was the sudden shutting off of the supply. Had we done this, the present stocks of heroin would have been exhausted in early 1972 long before new avenues of smuggling and new sources of supply could be developed. Had our plan been implemented, we, in New York State, would have had at least a year and possibly even two years, to bring to bear on our heroin addict population all of the rehabilitation programs now available. The hiatus would have also provided a real opportunity for our educational programs to take hold before new heroin supplies could be brought into the country. It would appear that we have lost this opportunity, for which loss we may pay dearly.

Accordingly, I must vigorously recommend the following steps be initiated immediately:

1. All necessary funds be supplied to Turkey to insure that absolutely no opium from the 1971 and 1972 crop is diverted.
2. That the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs increase its surveillance to detect any signs of a breakdown in the Turkish control program. If such signs are detected, the U.S. State Department should be directed to immediately make this dereliction known to the public and that immediate diplomatic penalties be imposed.
3. That contingency plans be prepared now to provide for the necessary steps to accomplish the imposition of these penalties.
4. That contingency plans be prepared to insure that opium-producing countries who have ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs do not violate their treaty obligations and become new sources of diversion.
5. That countries who have banned poppy cultivation in the past do not re-establish such an industry in the future.

Mr. Chairman: This concludes my statement, and I wish to thank you and the members of your committee for the attention which you have given me.

NARCOTICS LAW CHANGES, 1951-69

Description of offense	Previous punishment		Punishment changed to	Year
	Minimum	Maximum		
1909 penal law (Sec. 1751):				
Sale or possession $\frac{1}{4}$ oz. opiate narcotic			2 to 10	1951
Sale of any narcotic drug	2	10	2 to 15	
Sale to person under 21			5 to 15	1952
Possession with intent to sell			2 to 15	
Sale of narcotic drug	2	15	5 to 15	1956
Sale to person under 21	5	15	7 to 15	
Possession with intent to sell	2	15	5 to 15	1966
Sale of narcotic drug	5	15	7 to 15	
Sale to person under 21	7	15	10 to 20	1966
Possession with intent to sell	5	15	7 to 15	
1967 penal law, art., 220, dangerous drug offenses: Sale and possession, classified by degrees:				
Criminally selling dangerous drug (narcotic) in the 2d degree	7	15	At least 1 to 15 (indeterminate minimum, class C felony)	1967
Criminally selling dangerous drug (narcotic), to person under 21, in 1st degree	10	20	At least 1 to 25 (class B felony)	
Criminal possession of dangerous drug in the 2d degree	7	15	At least 1 to 7 (class D felony) or definite sentence of 1 year or less	
Criminal possession of dangerous drug in 1st degree (1 or more ounces opiate narcotic)	7	15	At least 1 to 15 (class C felony)	
1969 amendments: Criminal selling and possession of 16 ozs., or more of opiate products become class A felonies (former classifications, by degree, lowered without change in penalty):				
Criminally selling in 1st degree (16 ozs., or more)	1 1	1 25	At least 15 to life (class A felony)	1969
Criminal possession in 1st degree (16 ozs., or more)	2 1	2 25	At least 15 to life (class A felony)	
Criminal selling in 2d degree (1 to person under 21, or (2) more than 8 ozs.)	1 1	1 25	(1) 1 to 25 (class B felony)	
Criminal possession in 2d degree (8 ozs., or more)	2 1	2 15	(2) 1 to 25 (class B felony)	

¹ Class B felony.

² Class C felony.

Note: The 1969 changes for selling and possession in the 1st degrees doubled the number of class A felonies, previously confined to murder and kidnaping in the 1st degree.

BACKGROUND RE TURKEY AND THE OPIUM POPPY

Following the passage of the New York Legislature concurrent Resolution No. 141 on May 13, 1971, the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control and Effect on Society initiated efforts to confer with representatives of the Turkish Government in furtherance of the Resolution's proposal ". . . to persuade the Government of Turkey to immediately destroy its opium poppy fields . . ." The following is intended to assist the participants in these discussions.

OPIUM AND THE POPPY PLANT

The opium poppy, *Papaver Somniferum*, often grows to a height of 3-4 feet. The leaves are a whitish dull green. The flower is usually white with a purplish spot at the base although other varieties have pink, red or purple petals. Poppies cultivated for opium production have pods or capsules at that part of the flower to which the petals are attached that are approximately the size of a hen's egg and even larger. Successful cultivation depends on fairly dry climate and a light rich soil. Asia accounts for the vast bulk of the world's licit and illicit cultivation of opium poppies with India as the largest *licit* producer—868 tons in 1969—followed by Russia's 217 tons in 1969 and Turkey's 117 tons in 1969. Burma, North Vietnam, Laos, China, Iran and Japan are among the countries which continue to produce opium for medical purposes. There is a small amount grown in the western hemisphere mostly in Mexico, Peru and Ecuador.

While all opium producing countries have successfully prevented diversion of their opium into the illicit market it is estimated that approximately 10-25% of the opium produced by Turkey finds its way into illegal trade. It is Turkey's opium that is the source of 80% of the heroin used in the State of New York.

In October after the first rain the ground is plowed twice, the second time crosswise. The seed is mixed with four times its weight in sand to prevent it from being sown too thickly, $\frac{3}{4}$ to 1 pound being used in every *toloom* ($\frac{1}{2}$ acre). The crop is very uncertain owing to droughts, ground-frosts and locusts. To avoid failure, and to allow time for collecting the produce, every *toloom* has three sowings, from October to March, the crops thus coming to fruition in succession. For the October crop, the first green shoots appear in mid-November. If it snows in December before it freezes, the farmer will have a good crop because the snow blankets the young plants and protects them from freezing temperatures.

If the frost does destroy his autumn crop, then the farmer must plant again at the end of March or beginning of April, when the earth is soft. He will get an opium crop at harvest time, at the end of June or beginning of July. However, the morphine content of the spring opium is considerably lower.

Women and children hoe and weed the land from the time of sowing, and in the spring weed out the plants growing too close together. The flowers expand at the end of May on the plains, and in the highlands in July. When the petals fall at the end of June, the capsule is exposed. The capsules grow so rapidly that in a short time they are ready for harvesting. This is the crucial period because harvesting must start at precisely the right moment. Usually two or three days after the petals fall off, the pods are ready. The farmer can tell the exact moment by the capsules yielding to pressure from the fingers, by lighter green tint of the pod and by the appearance of the bloom called *cougak* which is easily rubbed off with the fingers.

Either the pods must be cut at night and the opium collected the next morning, or they must be cut in the morning and harvested at night. If the farmer cuts too soon, the milky opium will be too thin and will spill on the ground. If he cuts too late, the natural aging process will change the morphine to codeine, a similar alkaloid which is feeble in potency content.

Some 98 percent of the farmers cannot afford to hire workers, so their entire families must aid in the harvest to collect all the opium in the required 24-hour period. The harvest cannot be extended beyond the single space of a day or the opium crop will be ruined. Equipped with a *cizgi bicak*, a cutting knife shaped like a scalpel, with a tiny prong protruding from the edge of the blade, the harvesters begin making incisions. They hold the capsule in the left hand and draw the knife two-thirds of the way around the pod. Great care is taken not to let the opium flow inside and be lost. If the fruit is cut, its juices will dilute the opium. The skill of incision is close to an art.

That 24 hours is a long, laborious day. How long it takes and how many people are required to do a field is difficult to estimate. But roughly, an acre of opium poppies would keep ten grown men and women at backbreaking labor all day.

One estimate states that 1 pound of opium equals 250 man-hours. The average production is approximately 7 pounds to an acre.

When the poppies are cut in later afternoon, the following morning a small glob of opium, which has been oxidized from white to a dark reddish brown, appears along the length of the incision. With an *algi bicak*, a scraping knife with wooden trough, each family member sweeps the opium into the wooden trowel. When the *algi bicak* is filled, the opium is emptied into a copper cup and eventually kneaded together into a lump weighing about 2 kilos—4 to 4½ pounds.

The cultivation of opium in Turkey this year has been limited to seven provinces: Kutahya, Usak, Denizli, Afyon (which means opium in Turkish), Isparta, Burdur, and Konya. For the 1971 planting, the Turkish government has promised to limit the provinces growing the poppy, to four: Afyon, Isparta and Burdur and Kutahya. Although such figures sound encouraging, Afyon alone produces 80 percent of the country's licit supply and diverts an unknown quantity of illegal opium.

About 10 percent of the raw opium sap, if the poppy is properly grown and harvested, is morphine, an analgesic narcotic. Heroin is a derivative of morphine prepared by chemical conversion.

On May 23, 1961, Turkey signed the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, agreeing to limit its production of opium poppies, but did not ratify it until 1967 and has yet to pass the called for internal legislation. In early 1971, Turkey agreed that its Government would purchase the entire 1971 crop and compensate the 170,000 Turkish farmers who would then be compelled to switch to a less lucrative substitute. These efforts have been unproductive in stemming the flow of heroin produced from Turkish poppies into the United States.

STATE OF NEW YORK

IN SENATE

ALBANY, N. Y., May 13, 1971.

RESOLUTION NO. 141

Concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of New York to memorialize the Congress of the United States to take all necessary steps to persuade the government of Turkey to immediately destroy its opium poppy fields before the 1971 harvest in return for reimbursement to its opium poppy farmers of the damages suffered thereby from funds appropriated for that purpose by the State of New York and the United States Congress.

By: Messrs. Hughes, Brydges, Zaretzki, Bernstein, Bloom, Bookson, Bronston, Calandra, Conklin, Ferraro, Garcia, Giordano, Goldin, Greenberg, Griffin, LaFalce, Lentol, Meyerson, Ohrenstein, Powers, Santucci, Schwartz, Stewart, Thaler.

Whereas, Death from an overdose of heroin represents the greatest single cause of death among the youth of New York City; and

Whereas, All efforts by local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to interdict the smuggling of heroin into the United States and its sale within this state have failed to curb this traffic; and

Whereas, On April 7, 1971, the New York State Commission of Investigation reported to the governor of this state that

"Law enforcement's approach to this problem has been ineffective. The traffic in heroin has not been curbed. Indeed, it is flourishing";

and

Whereas, The New York State Legislature has four times in the last twenty years amended the anti-narcotic laws of this state to provide for both more severe and mandatory punishments for heroin traffickers with little effect on the traffic itself; and

Whereas, Despite every effort by New York State to curb the increases in the number of persons addicted to heroin, the number of identified addicts has increased in New York City alone from 52,000 in 1968 to an estimated 103,000 in 1971; and

Whereas, New York State is required to spend over \$100,000,000.00 annually directly for the care, treatment, rehabilitation and retraining of a small fraction of the narcotic addict population; and

Whereas, The Addiction Services Agency of the City of New York will have spent over \$80 million during the 1970-71 fiscal year to assist 3,500 addicts and would require \$2½ billion to treat and care for only 100,000 of the addicts now residing in the City of New York; and

Whereas, There are an estimated 15,000 narcotics addicts presently receiving welfare assistance from the City of New York at a direct cost of over \$50 million annually; and

Whereas, The major portion of violent and other serious crimes committed in New York City and the other cities of this State results from the tragic need of heroin addicts to obtain funds to pay for the heroin they consume; and

Whereas, In 1960, there were 1,841 felony arrests in New York State of persons charged with selling narcotics or possessing narcotics in an amount sufficient to create a presumption of intent to sell and in 1969 there were 18,489 felony arrests in New York State for this same crime, an increase of 1,000% and in 1970, in New York City alone, there were 26,799 felony arrests in this category, a 44% increase over the entire state-wide figure for the year previous, so that our law enforcement agencies are being overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of narcotics sellers and addicts being processed through our criminal justice system; and

Whereas, It now appears that the only practical solution to halt the continued flood of heroin into the State of New York is the destruction of the opium poppy at its source; and

Whereas, It would be less expensive and more effective for the State of New York to contribute toward the cost of preventing opium cultivation than to concentrate its resources in treating heroin addicts or combating the huge and profitable traffic in narcotics taking place on the streets of its cities; and

Whereas, Eighty-five percent of all of the heroin sold in the State of New York is refined from the sap of the opium poppy (*papaver somniferum*) grown in Turkey; and

Whereas, Opium, unlike other dangerous drugs, cannot be synthetically produced, nor can it be cultivated in any but selected areas within the world; and

Whereas, To date Turkey has failed and neglected to control the diversion of its opium crop to illegal channels; and

Whereas, By the end of 1970, the Turkish government and nation has received in excess of \$5 billion in military and economic assistance from our federal government which monies were raised in substantial part through taxation of the citizens of this state; and

Whereas, The public statements of members of the Turkish Government on the problem of limiting the cultivation of the opium poppy in Turkey have evidenced an appalling lack of concern about the crisis caused in this state as well as this nation by Turkey's failure to strictly enforce the international treaty binding it to destroy all opium poppy production not grown for legitimate purposes; and

Whereas, Opium can be harvested only during one twenty-four hour period each year, which period occurs during the last week of June or the first week of July each year; and

Whereas, The illegal opium poppy production in Turkey intended for diversion to the heroin traffic can only be harvested simultaneously and from the same fields as those devoted to the legitimate cultivation of the opium poppy; and

Whereas, The world supply of legitimate opium presently in stock is sufficient to satisfy all legitimate needs for the foreseeable future; and

Whereas, Eighty-five percent of the heroin supplied to the addicts of this state can be interdicted if all the Turkish opium poppy fields now under cultivation were destroyed prior to the approaching harvest date, which destruction can be accomplished for a fraction of the present cost to this state resulting from the traffic in heroin; now, therefore, be it

Resolved (if the Assembly concur), That the Congress of the United States be and hereby is memorialized to take all necessary steps to persuade the government of Turkey to immediately destroy its opium poppy fields before the 1971 harvest in return for reimbursement to its opium poppy farmers of the damages suffered thereby from funds appropriated for that purpose by the State of New York and the United States Congress; and be it further

Resolved (if the Assembly concur), That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the Congress of the United States by forwarding one copy to the Secretary of the Senate and one copy to the Clerk of the House of Representatives and one copy to each member of the Congress from the State of New York and that the latter be urged to devote themselves to the task of accomplishing the purposes of this resolution.

By order of the Senate :

Secretary.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Our next witness is the Comptroller General of the United States, the Honorable Elmer Staats.

Mr. STAATS. May I say while Senator Hughes is here that I have been tremendously impressed with his statement. We thought we knew something about the seriousness of this problem, but we really didn't.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I only wish more people as important as you are were listening to Senator Hughes and Mr. Rangel.

Mr. STAATS. I think this is a story that needs to be told to as wide an audience as you could tell it.

Mr. HUGHES. Maybe we should do it at the White House, you and I.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ELMER B. STAATS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

Mr. STAATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. As you know, Mr. Staats, we are in the final stage of the amendment process for the foreign aid bills.

We had this morning a unanimous vote in the full committee, on the Mr. Monagan's amendment, which is similar to the Rodino bill in many respects, in that it directs the President to cut off assistance to countries which fail, in his view, to cooperate with us in stopping this heroin traffic.

The committee, in my judgment, is very determined to do something about this problem.

There have been 10 years of negotiation with Turkey. As Senator Hughes said, the results of that agreement, as good as it was, wouldn't be felt for 2 or 3 years.

You have to close your mind to what happens in Bedford-Stuyvesant in those 2 or 3 years. You don't even want to look at it.

Mr. STAATS. I might introduce my colleagues, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Oye V. Stovall is head of our International Division, and Mr. Samuel Bowlin, on my left, has been spending full time working in this area, and is one of our supervisory auditors in the international division.

My comments, Mr. Chairman, relate primarily to the provisions of the bill bearing directly on the responsibilities of the Comptroller General, and specifically to amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require that :

(V) (1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall review and determine annually (A) the effectiveness of measures being taken by each foreign country to prevent narcotic drugs, partially or completely produced or processed in such country, from unlawfully entering the United States, and (B) whether that country has undertaken appropriate measures to prevent any such narcotic

drug from unlawfully entering the United States. Not later than March 31 of each year, the Comptroller General shall make a report to the Congress of his review and determinations for the preceding calendar year.

There is more than one bill which has this provision in it.

My comments will be addressed primarily to this point, but we also will outline some steps which we think will be in the direction of helping to control drugs entering into this country.

The bill further provides that a negative determination by the Comptroller General would set in motion a procedure to stop further economic assistance to that particular country.

I am aware that the United States faces an extremely grave drug problem, and that effective ways must be found to eliminate or greatly reduce the unlawful entry of drugs into this country. We will, of course, make every effort to effectively carry out the intent of any legislation that is enacted. We have considerable question as to whether as a practical matter it would be possible for us to effectively carry out the above provisions.

I would like to discuss these matters and then suggest for your consideration some alternatives which I believe would contribute to a sound procedure for more effective controls.

Two principal obstacles which we believe would limit the effectiveness of the present proposals, as far as GAO is concerned, include (1) a problem of availability of information, and (2) the need for criteria as to what would constitute "appropriate" measures by a particular country. Also, there is the question that several countries involved in the drug problem are not recipients of U.S. assistance.

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION

To carry out the provisions of the present proposal, it would be necessary for the General Accounting Office to make physical inspections of the activities of various foreign countries, and to have access to and examine the records of those countries, that relate to measures taken by such countries to prevent narcotic drugs from entering the United States. There is serious doubt that the General Accounting Office could obtain even limited access to the data of foreign governments which would be essential to permit us to make an independent determination of effectiveness or appropriateness of measures taken by a country. Only where there is a mutual agreement between the United States and the recipient country would there be any basis or right for our auditors to make internal inspections or examinations of the activities of another sovereign country.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CRITERIA

For the General Accounting Office to make a determination as to whether a country has taken "appropriate" measures it will be necessary to give consideration to the social and political conditions prevailing in the particular country. These, coupled with the technical complexities of the narcotics drug problem, suggest that criteria against which any determination is made would be subjective and debatable. The determination of what would be "appropriate" under the circumstances in a particular country would require GAO to make foreign policy judgments.

If the legislation spelled out the general criteria and required the executive branch to establish specific criteria for each country for

which determinations are to be made, GAO could make factual examinations as to whether such criteria have been met. I would like to point out, however, that even if the law did specify criteria such as "complete cessation of production and shipment of narcotics" as comprising an "appropriate" measure, the unreliability of available data in many countries and the access problem mentioned above would, in our opinion, preclude GAO from determining with any reasonable assurance whether production or shipments were in fact stopped.

COUNTRIES NOT RECEIVING U.S. ASSISTANCE

Countries that are not receiving assistance from the United States under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and consequently would not be subject to penalty, may be involved in the production and processing or transportation of narcotic drugs. These would include Burma, France, Lebanon and Hong Kong to mention several that have been reported either in testimony or in the press as being possibly involved. I make this point not to suggest that some form of sanction against foreign aid recipients could not be effective but only to point out that this proposal would not affect some of those countries involved in narcotics traffic.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH--CENTRAL AUTHORITY

In my earlier comments on H.R. 6882, transmitted to the chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on May 28, 1971, I suggested that the committee may wish to consider legislation to require the executive branch to clearly establish a focal point of responsibility for administration and coordination of U.S. efforts to stop the entry of illegal narcotics including the relationships with other countries and international organizations.

As you are aware, the President submitted a message to the Congress on June 17 which proposed the establishment of a central authority with overall responsibility for all Federal drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, training and research programs in all Federal agencies. This authority, to be located within the Executive Office of the President, would be known as the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention. The President stated that this Special Action Office would concentrate on the "demand" side of the drug problem and "would not be directly concerned with the problem of reducing drug supply," that is, the international aspects of drug abuse. The committee may wish to consider whether legislation on this subject should not also establish leadership authority within the executive branch for planning, policy-setting, objectives and priorities relating to the international aspects of drug abuse. In other words, we see this as a major oversight.

As a possible substitute approach, we believe such legislation might be more effective from a viewpoint of congressional control if it included a provision to require annual or other periodic reports from the executive branch to the Congress on the measures being taken in concert with foreign governments to control and eliminate the production, processing and traffic in narcotic drugs; specifying those countries who have not taken appropriate measures.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

The United States is currently pressing toward strengthening the international machinery to gain better cooperation in controlling narcotics traffic.

On March 18, 1971, the United States submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a series of specific amendments to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. These proposals, which we understand have been urged by the U.S. representatives, are designed to strengthen controls over the cultivation of opium poppy and other narcotic producing plants, and on the production, manufacture, and export of opium derivatives and other narcotics.

The amendments, if adopted, would enable the international community for the first time to (a) require fuller information from the countries involved as to the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of opium, (b) order reduction in cultivation or production where there is a significant danger of illicit diversion or where world needs are already being met, and (c) order worldwide remedial measures to be taken, including a partial or full embargo on the export or import of drugs to or from an offending country.

Although the existing Single Convention calls for certain controls and sanctions against countries not taking appropriate steps, the responsible implementing bodies, for example, the International Narcotics Control Board, have lacked effective enforcement powers. We believe that the proposed legislation should include provisions that would promote multilateral pressure under a strengthened Single Convention or other international means.

INSPECTOR GENERAL. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The extent of interrelationships between foreign assistance programs and narcotics control efforts is clearly a policy matter for determination by the Congress. If the committee should assert that relationship, we would like to offer some thoughts as to the means of administering the control mechanism and responsibilities for audit. The committee might wish to give consideration to strengthening the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, as an agency established by the Congress for an independent inspection corps to represent U.S. interests in inspecting all elements of foreign assistance.

The Inspector General of Foreign Assistance already has broad legislative authority to stop a transaction or a program. That authority might be extended to include specifically the narcotics element. The authority and responsibilities of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance under section 624 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, now include the making of such reviews, inspections, and audits of programs as he considers necessary, not only for ascertaining the efficiency and economy of their administration, but also for the purpose of ascertaining the extent to which they are in consonance with the foreign policy of the United States.

I might add that he reports directly to the Secretary of State.

He is charged with maintaining continuous observation and review to carry out these responsibilities and for making recommendations and evaluating the effectiveness of the foreign assistance programs in attaining U.S. foreign policy objectives.

GAO RESPONSIBILITY

Specific legislation would not be needed for GAO review and evaluation of organizational arrangements and activities of the executive branch to deal with the international aspects of drug abuse since our present authority for such reviews is adequate. Indeed, the GAO has work now underway in this regard. For example, we have undertaken (1) a review of the drug abuse problem among military personnel to be performed in the United States as well as in overseas locations, (2) a review of Department of Justice—Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs—efforts to reduce diversion of dangerous drugs which are produced domestically, and (3) a review of the domestic Federal narcotics rehabilitation program.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the status of those matters?

Mr. STAATS. With respect to the review relating to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, we will have a draft in by the end of this month, in another couple of weeks. We will be happy to go over the draft with the committee staff if that would be helpful.

We have a draft report already—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am thinking from a rather pragmatic point of view. The full committee presently is marking up the legislation and it will probably be another week or two. Anything that might be pertinent to what the committee has under consideration could be very persuasive, I think.

Mr. STAATS. Why would it not be in order, Mr. Chairman, for members of our staff who have been concerned—because some of these involve others than are here today—to meet with the committee staff and review any findings that we have? We would be delighted to make them available to you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Fine.

Mr. STAATS. We now have under consideration the possibility of a review of U.S. efforts to stop the flow of narcotics into the United States.

I would like to mention in this connection a staff paper which Mr. Bowlin here is largely responsible for, I think quite a good paper, which we prepared in preparation for a review of the international control of the importation and processing of narcotics. We are prepared to make this available for the record, if you wish.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That will be made a part of the record.
(The paper referred to follows:)

STAFF PAPER, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE—OBSERVATIONS AND DATA
CONCERNING ILLEGAL ENTRY OF NARCOTICS, MAY 21, 1971

BACKGROUND

Addiction to heroin and the illegal means employed by addicts in the United States to finance their habit has contributed greatly to the U.S. crime problem. In recognition of this fact, the President of the United States in November 1965 asked the Treasury Department to review the problem of illicit heroin entering the United States with a view toward developing measures that might effectively bring this situation under control.

The Treasury's review led to the conclusion that the majority (some reports estimate as high as 80 percent) of the heroin entering the United States was produced from opium grown in Turkey. Focusing on Turkey, ways and means were explored for ending the illicit traffic of heroin into the United States.

In 1966 the United States proposed to Turkey that it completely ban the cultivation of opium poppy. U.S. officials believed that the elimination of Turkey

as a source of heroin would contribute greatly to a solution to the U.S. heroin addiction problem.

The Government of Turkey did not ban the production of opium in spite of considerable pressure applied through U.S. diplomatic channels, and through public, third-country and multilateral pressure aided and stimulated by the United States. The Turkish Government did promise a gradual eradication of opium production and on this basis, the United States undertook a program of assistance in 1968.

The U.S. assistance took the form of an Agency for International Development (AID) loan of \$3 million; \$1.4 million for the development of a substitute crop to replace opium poppy and \$1.6 million for equipment and supplies for narcotic enforcement activities. About \$1.9 million has been disbursed or authorized for disbursement as of May 1971. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) is administering the loan for AID and is also providing direct assistance to the Turkish enforcement agencies.

The assistance provided by AID in conjunction with BNDD to the Turkish enforcement agencies helps the Government of Turkey to meet its obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs¹ of 1953 which Turkey ratified in 1966. The Single Convention requires that opium-producing countries maintain a licensing control system which will limit opium production and prevent illegal diversion. Such a system requires strict enforcement and controls. In the absence of such enforcement and controls, much of the opium from poppies grown in Turkey enters the illicit trade.

The Government of Turkey has reduced the number of provinces where poppy cultivation is authorized from 21 in 1967 to four in 1971. However, the area cultivated has not been reduced proportionately because those remaining provinces are among the highest producers of opium. In 1970 there was an estimated 15,300 hectares planted in opium poppy compared to an estimated 20,000 hectares in 1967.

U.S. officials estimated that the amount of Turkish opium available to the illicit market in 1967 was 280-480 tons out of a total production of 400 to 600 tons. Estimates for 1968 were 100 tons out of a total production of 220 tons, and estimates in 1970 were 70 tons out of approximately 130 tons.

The reduction in the estimated amount of opium available to the illicit market indicates that progress has been made since the inception in 1967 of U.S. narcotic control efforts in Turkey. However, the estimated 70 tons of opium available to the illicit market in 1970 was more than adequate to supply the increasing illicit U.S. heroin market.

U.S. efforts to eradicate opium production in Turkey have been hindered by:

- (1) Traditional growing of opium poppies and farmers' resentment against being denied the right to cultivate this crop,
- (2) The influence on the Government of Turkey by those with vested interests in the illicit opium market. With the new government which recently took office, AID has indicated renewed optimism that more progress will be made in the future, including passage of a licensing law,
- (3) The lack of a suitable substitute crop that yields a comparable return per unit of land. Much of the farmers' cash income is from the sale of opium. The poppy plant is also the farmers source of poppy seed, cooking oil, and animal fodder,
- (4) Internal Turkish political reaction against U.S. pressure.

The potential for an immediate, dramatic impact on the flow of heroin into the United States by the elimination of Turkish opium from the illicit traffic has been diminished because of increasing amounts becoming available from the Far East and other areas.

The Far East is the second principal source of heroin entering the United States. Burma, Northern Thailand, and Laos are sources of opium which is shipped to Bangkok and Singapore for conversion into heroin. In the past, most of the heroin produced in the Far East was consumed in Hong Kong and elsewhere, but recently significant quantities are reported to have been smuggled into the United States via the Philippines and Canada. A third source is Mexico, where the opium poppy is grown in remote mountain areas and converted into heroin in clandestine laboratories.

AID has no active programs to assist in the control of opium production in areas other than Turkey. Preliminary discussions are being held with the Government of Thailand, but a program of assistance is probably a year or more away.

¹ A codification of 9 previous international agreements relating to narcotics control.

In 1969, AID made a \$1 million grant from the contingency fund to the Government of Mexico to assist in improving its technique for locating and eradicating opium poppy and marijuana production. Two previous grants totaling \$627,000 had been made by AID in 1961 and 1965.

The increasing flow of illicit drugs into the United States has been the subject of several recent studies and reports. For example, the House Select Committee on Crime included this element in its report on a study of "Heroin and Heroin Paraphernalia" issued January 2, 1971, (H.R. 91-1808) and containing 21 recommendations.

U.S. officials generally agree that the heroin addiction problem needs to be approached through a comprehensive world-wide program of total elimination of poppy cultivation involving crop substitution and diversification, law enforcement, and drug abuse education and rehabilitation. Officials believe that because of widespread production of illicit opium, the vast network of smuggling routes, and because illegal opium is an international problem affecting many countries, any American assistance in the solution of this problem should involve close cooperation with international institutions. Attacking the problem on a country by country basis does not appear to offer much chance for success.

UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATIONS AND THE SPECIAL FUND

For some time the U.S. has urged that the United Nations and related organizations such as the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Food and Agricultural Organization expand their programs to deal with the drug abuse problem. At U.S. urgings, a United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control was established, effective March 1, 1971, to finance priority programs to help governments and international bodies combat illicit trafficking, unauthorized production of narcotic raw materials and drug addiction. The U.S. has contributed \$2 million to the Fund for 1971.

On March 18, 1971, the U.S. submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a series of specific amendments to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. These proposals, which we understand have been urged by the United States representatives, are designed to strengthen controls over the cultivation of opium poppy and other narcotic producing plants, and on the production, manufacture, and export of opium derivatives and other narcotics.

The amendments, if adopted, would enable the international community for the first time to require fuller information from the countries involved as to the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of opium, to order reduction in cultivation or production where there is a significant danger of illicit diversion or where world needs are already being met, and to order world-wide remedial measures to be taken, including a partial or full embargo on the export or import of drugs to or from an offending country.

We were told by BNDD officials that the U.S. is awaiting action on the part of the U.N. regarding the use of the Special Fund. If the U.N. demonstrates the capability to properly administer the program and gain better international cooperation, the U.S. would be inclined to continue to press toward a multilateral approach for the ultimate elimination of illicit production of narcotics. We do not know what the relative prospects are for adoption of the proposals for strengthening the Single Convention nor do we know to what extent the U.N. would be able to enforce the conditions or to obtain reliable information from the member countries concerned.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO FOREIGN ASPECTS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL

Within the Executive Branch, several Departments have responsibilities relating to international narcotics traffic. These include the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, Justice, Treasury, and State. Based on the limited information gathered, following is a breakdown of the respective Departmental responsibilities.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's responsibilities include education, rehabilitation and research programs relating to drug abuse and addiction. The Department also participates with international organizations such as World Health Organization in seeking to deal with the problems of drug dependence or demand.

Departments of Justice and Treasury

In an effort to clarify a jurisdictional dispute between the Departments of Justice and Treasury, the President issued a directive in February 1970 approving recommendations which outlined responsibilities for dealing with the international traffic in narcotics. Pursuant to the directive, the Attorney General prepared jurisdictional guidelines between the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Customs of the Department of Treasury. The guidelines were approved by the President on June 22, 1970, and are as follows:

BNDD's Responsibilities.--A. BNDD controls all investigations involving violations of the laws of the United States relating to narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs, both within the United States and beyond its borders except as set forth under Bureau of Customs responsibilities below. BNDD has primary jurisdiction over all investigations originated by officers of that Bureau either within or outside the United States, including smuggling of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs into the United States.

B. In foreign areas, BNDD is the accredited United States agency for contact with foreign law enforcement officers on narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drug matters.

C. BNDD has as one of its principal missions the detection of persons in foreign countries who may transport contraband drugs to the United States. BNDD also has the responsibility for fully advising Customs of all information (in writing, if possible) regarding the identity and circumstances of the probable movement into the United States of smugglers and/or contraband.

D. In order to promote greater efficiency and to minimize risks, in those BNDD investigations where smuggling of narcotics, marihuana, or dangerous drugs is probable, BNDD shall fully and promptly advise Customs. When it is in the best interests of overall enforcement objectives to have controlled passage of contraband drugs into the United States to be delivered to the intended recipient, BNDD shall request Customs assistance for this purpose. Customs shall be invited to participate in the controlled passage of the smuggled contraband to the intended recipient.

E. The Director, BNDD, will assign such officers of BNDD as he deems necessary to any foreign country with which arrangements may be made in consultation with the Department of State. BNDD officers will work with enforcement officers of that country in developing information and evidence against international narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drug traffickers. They will pursue illicit producers of opium, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs and endeavor to immobilize illicit manufacturers and distributors of dangerous substances destined for the United States.

F. BNDD has jurisdiction and authority to investigate and coordinate with foreign personnel in all narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drug matters in those foreign countries where both BNDD and the Bureau of Customs have assigned personnel.

G. BNDD may establish offices in border cities where necessary and conduct investigations in other border locations to achieve its mission and objectives. BNDD shall inform Customs as soon as possible of all investigative activities in the Mexican and Canadian border areas of the United States which have a smuggling aspect to insure maximum safety, cooperation, and coordination.

Bureau of Customs Responsibilities.--A. The Bureau of Customs, because of its responsibility to suppress smuggling into the United States, has primary jurisdiction at ports and borders for all smuggling investigations, including those involving narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs, except those initiated by BNDD. For this purpose, smuggling is understood to mean the actual passage of undeclared merchandise, or contraband, through the Customs lines. It does not include preparatory acts prior to bringing the articles within the boundaries of the United States. Smuggling violations not terminated at ports or borders come within the jurisdiction of BNDD unless such jurisdiction is waived (in writing, if possible) by the Director of BNDD or his designee.

B. Customs shall promptly make available to BNDD information or investigative leads relating to the illicit production, possession, trafficking, or transportation of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs. The direction of subsequent activity with respect to such production, possession, trafficking, or transportation is the responsibility of BNDD.

C. Customs officers with the advanced concurrence (in writing, if possible) of the Director of BNDD or his designee, may convoy narcotics, marihuana, or dangerous drug investigations to their destination from the point of entry into

the United States. To insure proper coordination, BNDD may assign special agents to accompany the controlled delivery.

D. In the vicinity of the borders, Customs officers may communicate with Mexican and Canadian officials on narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drug matters. In this regard, the Bureau of Customs will support BNDD's efforts to eliminate the flow into the United States of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs, and shall inform BNDD with respect to the nature and extent of such contacts involving narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drug smuggling, and all information derived therefrom shall be transmitted to BNDD upon request.

Department of State and AID

As part of his overall responsibility, the Secretary of State coordinates and supervises all U.S. departments and agencies abroad dealing with international drug control activities. In this regard, within the last 2 years a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Narcotics Matters has been named within the Office of the Secretary to assist in carrying out this responsibility. This is solely a staff function which calls on individual country officers for assistance. The Special Assistant also acts as chairman of an interdepartmental group which helps to formulate government-wide policies and plans in this field.

We were told by State Department officials that it plans to expand its efforts in each geographic bureau by naming officers who would have specific responsibility for programs relating to international traffic in narcotics. The Department has established positions at a couple embassies which would carry such responsibility.

As mentioned earlier, the Agency for International Development (AID) has provided a \$3 million loan to Turkey and three grants to Mexico totaling \$1.6 million to assist in controlling opium production. AID has stated that it was the only agency with legal authority to make assistance grants to foreign governments.

OBSERVATIONS

It is our impression that, in addition to the specific responsibilities of BNDD mentioned above, that organization is now considered to be the primary point of leadership in attempts by the U.S. to reduce and eliminate the flow of narcotics into the U.S. The Director, BNDD represents the U.S. on the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and in this capacity is the prime spokesman for U.S. strategy in this area. This strategy has included recent proposals to strengthen international treaties and to establish the U.N. Special Fund to help develop a comprehensive plan of international attack on the illicit trafficking.

As indicated, many resources and several U.S. agencies are involved domestically and internationally in a variety of programs related to the drug problem. The U.S. has, in recent months, undertaken several moves to combat illicit trafficking. Because of the complexity of the world problem and the need for interaction and cooperation within the U.S. and foreign governments, some members of the Congress and BNDD officials have suggested a need for a single organization to set goals, assign tasks and be responsible for results. Although our impression is that BNDD comes nearest to that single point within the Executive Branch at present, we have not seen any formalized statement to this effect.

Mr. STAATS. Mr. Chairman, the present language of the proposal which would require the GAO to exercise foreign policy judgments which are now vested in the Secretary of State, thereby raises a basic question of displacement of executive branch responsibility.

What we are concerned about, and I think this is the point Senator Hughes was making earlier, is that somewhere in the Government we have to make somebody clearly responsible for some action.

What we are suggesting in essence here today is that we believe that the law could make this clear, that in addition to the responsibilities that this new office in the Executive Office has, it ought to be concerned with the importation problem. We are not experts in the field of drugs, but as we see it, this is the heart of the issue. Until

something can be done about the importation problem, then we are going to be paddling upstream pretty badly.

Regardless of the merits of the issue of whether aid should be cut off, we wouldn't want to see the GAO in any way placed in the position of attempting to usurp or assume the basic management responsibility that rests in the executive branch, recognizing the possibility that it could weaken GAO capability to render service to the Congress as its independent auditor of executive branch activities.

In other words, if we are making a determination, we are in no position to evaluate how well we have done, so far as our responsibilities to the Congress are concerned.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. The question comes up, then, on dealing with Turkey, as to whether it is correct for the Executive to make a treaty or an executive agreement that will permit the present poppy crop, I guess you would call it—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is exactly the point Senator Hughes was making.

Mr. FULTON. That solution is so far in the future. This has made quite an impression on me. We see this curve of drug cases in New York going up so high. If we extend the curve that is on these charts, then giving Turkey 2 more years, the chart figures will go right up and go through the ceiling to show the amount of narcotics arrests in New York State then.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Right after he made that presentation, he showed some diagrams of life in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and he showed the total incapacity of the community to help itself.

Senator Hughes raised that very same point. Everybody applauded the accomplishments, and it was important, but still it leaves us 2 years' worth of opium in the pipeline.

Mr. FULTON. What happens, though, to the projection of the New York State chart? If it is for New York at that steep ascent rate, what is it going to do to not only New York but the country in the 2 years?

It just hits me right in the face.

Mr. STAATS. I think anyone who saw this presentation would reach the same conclusion.

What is impressive to me is the total cost of this program in relationship to the \$3 million to \$5 million planned to be sent to assist Turkey. If one applies a cost-benefit ratio, it is completely out of line in relation to the cost in Bedford-Stuyvesant alone. You could afford to do much, much more than this, and make tremendous savings on our own costs.

I think somewhere along the line this whole problem has not had as much attention as it should have had.

Mr. FULTON. Nobody can guess what will happen in the 2-year period before the Turkish agreement comes into effect.

Unless it is an immediate agreement, to me this solution is not only courting danger, but disaster.

Mr. STAATS. Any agreement that has been made, I guess, can be remade.

Mr. FULTON. Would you say it would be cheaper to remake the agreement, in light of the figures that were presented?

Mr. STAATS. I would think so, very much so. It is a terrible problem.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is so hard for me to figure out is in all these years why somebody didn't give them \$3 million or \$5 million and tell them to knock it off over there. It is costing New York State \$100 million or \$150 million a year. The Governor himself could have given them the \$5 million and solved a lot of the problem. Why didn't anyone think of this?

Mr. FULTON. Why put it off for years, before you do something?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I don't know.

Mr. STAATS. I don't know, either.

Mr. FULTON. This was the point I was making in my most recent question. Would this be a better course for the Executive to pursue costwise than on a cost-benefit ratio if the agreement were moved up to present?

It would prevent such terrible damage occurring in the 2-year period in the United States.

Mr. STAATS. I believe Senator Hughes was saying that a new crop will be planted in October, so the time to catch this would be between now and October.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think we can ask that question tomorrow morning with respect to the Secretary of State.

Senator Hughes said a new crop would be planted in October.

Mr. FULTON. So that before the agreement takes effect with Turkey, there unfortunately would be two new crops?

Mr. STAATS. That was the point he was making; yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think we can direct those questions tomorrow morning to the Secretary.

Mr. STAATS. On the last page, Mr. Chairman, we summarize how we have come out on this insofar as our role is concerned.

We believe, first, that a strong and clearly defined management control point be established in the executive branch, with requirement for periodic reports to the Congress.

We believe that certain legislative proposals you have before you would provide that.

Two, more effective international controls be encouraged and insisted upon.

Three, the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance, be assigned specific responsibility for inspections and audits in this area, and

Four, if the committee believes that further specific responsibility needs to be assigned to the Comptroller General:

(A) the Comptroller General be directed to review and evaluate the effectiveness of executive branch activities for carrying out the purposes of the legislation and to make reports including recommendations to the Congress; or, as an alternative, that the Comptroller General be directed to review and evaluate the reports submitted by the executive branch, and the underlying supporting data, and

(B) the Comptroller General have access, as he may require, to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations or other material of the agencies of the United States administering this legislation, or of the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance.

We want to be involved in this, Mr. Chairman, to the extent we can do so feasibly and consistently with the fact that we are a part of the oversight responsibility of the Congress.

So, our concern, I guess, comes down to this: First, acting by ourselves and not backed up with the diplomatic responsibilities of the

executive branch, we would be misleading the committee, I think, if we said that we felt we could carry out the responsibility which is contained in H.R. 8093 or 6882.

Second, we do agree that there needs to be more clearly fixed responsibility in the executive branch for doing something about this problem than we have today. We would certainly raise no objection if the Congress wanted to spell out in the statute the kind of responsibilities on our office which we have suggested here in point 4 on our last page.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think you have made some very useful suggestions. I think the subcommittee will consider them very carefully. It is obvious to me that something has to be done. Maybe I am having difficulty in getting a fix on just exactly what it should be.

I think the point you make, a very valid one, is someone has to be charged with real overall responsibility in this area, particularly with the import situation. In the President's message he was worrying about what we do with treatment and research and things like that. There has never been a really high level effort or mandate directed to any one individual in terms of the import of heroin into the United States.

Mr. STAATS. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to further outline activities that we have ongoing with respect to the drug problem both in the Defense Department and our review of the activities of other agencies.

Our Defense Division has recently undertaken a review of drug abuse among military personnel. This review will be performed in the United States as well as in overseas locations. The objectives of this review are to evaluate the policies, procedures and practices of the military departments concerning (1) preinduction screening of actual or potential drug abusers, (2) educational and law enforcement efforts to prevent drug abuse, (3) the scope and extent of the amnesty and rehabilitation programs, (4) identification of drug abusers and (5) what arrangements are being made for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers by the responsible Federal agencies after separation from the military service.

Our Civil Division is conducting a review of the efforts by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice, to reduce the diversion of dangerous drugs. The Los Angeles region is involved in this assignment with the New York region also participating. We are expecting the draft report from Los Angeles in August. Tentative findings are in the area of (1) information gathering procedures and coordination with other agencies on findings and potential problems; (2) State compliance programs; and (3) self-recognition by the drug industry.

We currently have a draft report with three agencies for comment—HEW, Justice, and VA—dealing with domestic Federal narcotics rehabilitation programs.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If this other report is worth seeing, might Mr. Brady have to look at it? I don't think we will finish markup of the bill for 2 more weeks. Some of the suggestions you made about notice to the Congress I think are relevant to matters we have under present consideration.

Mr. FULTON?

Mr. FULTON. I have a question on your jurisdiction. Do you have the jurisdiction in the executive branch to make recommendations

at the level below the Department of Justice? That would mean in the particular offices of U.S. attorneys for various districts in the United States.

Mr. STAATS. Yes. We have, of course, very broad authority and responsibility to review the operations of most agencies of the executive branch. There are some exclusions, but for the most part we have very broad jurisdiction.

Any place where we have appropriated funds and where the GAO has access to records authority, we can go in on our own or we can go in at the request of a committee of Congress, or even a Member of Congress.

Mr. FULTON. In the eastern district of New York, the statement has been made by the State senator from New York, that the Office of the U.S. attorney operates on a selective basis in these narcotics cases. That means to me a very restrictive basis. So that there is a very limited official Federal action in response to a major problem which would appear not only to be citywide, statewide, but national in scope, with New York as one of the main entries and points of distribution.

Would it be beyond your jurisdiction to recommend expansion of the policies and administration of the Federal agencies operating in New York State?

Mr. STAATS. It would be within our jurisdiction; yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. With the chairman's permission, could the witnesses and their supporting technicians give Congress recommendations at this level as to the policies that should be put into effect. These, obviously, have not been implemented at the present time in the U.S. district attorney's office in New York State.

(Subsequently, the Department of Justice was asked to comment on Mr. Fulton's inquiry. The Department's response appears on p. 215.)

Mr. STAATS. I would like to know more about the specifics and details of what Senator Hughes was referring to today.

Mr. FULTON. This is pretty much, especially to me, Mr. Chairman, a shock treatment. I am sure the average Member of Congress does not realize the extent of the problem, nor the fact that the Federal jurisdiction is not being used to an extent comparable to the increase of the problem.

Mr. STAATS. We would be happy to develop that a little bit further and discuss it with the chairman.

Mr. FULTON. Would that be all right?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Staats. We are grateful to you, again, for a very important and significant presentation.

Mr. FULTON. And may I add my compliments, too? It was explicit and plain and directed to the point.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. There are some good ideas here.

The subcommittee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, July 9, 1971.)

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.

We shall continue hearings this morning on international aspects of narcotics control. Our first witness is the Honorable Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs and Operations).

We are happy to have you with us and we would be pleased to hear your prepared statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE T. ROSSIDES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY FOR ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AF- FAIRS, AND OPERATIONS

Mr. ROSSIDES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate being here to discuss this important subject with you. On behalf of the Treasury Department I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Treasury's role in President Nixon's antiheroin action program and to comment upon the overall antidrug abuse program of this administration. The problem of drug abuse and particularly heroin abuse was not created overnight, and it will not be cured overnight. The drug problem of the 1950's became the drug crisis of the 1960's. It will take hard work and cooperative effort in the 1970's by many groups on the Federal, State and local levels to win this battle.

Early in his administration the President moved on several fronts with a multidimensional action program:

First, he elevated the drug problem to the foreign policy level and has taken personal initiatives in soliciting the cooperation of other governments.

Second, he stressed the crucial role of education, research and rehabilitation, and provided for increased funds and emphasis in these essential areas.

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Third, he recommended differentiation in the criminal penalty structure between heroin and marihuana; and flexible provisions for handling first offenders.

Fourth, he provided a substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law enforcement in this area.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much did he provide in additional funds?

Mr. ROSSIDES. In the law enforcement in probably the last 2 years, Mr. Chairman, we estimate over \$50 million. That is my recollection. I can get the figures for you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What are we spending altogether on law enforcement?

Mr. ROSSIDES. That would be difficult to actually determine although I think OMB has that figure and I will endeavor to get it for the committee. My recollection is when the President announced his new program, he added \$155 million. A question about that was asked and OMB says that about \$375 million is earmarked for the overall drug program.

Approximately \$55 million of that would have been increased budget in the enforcement area, but it is difficult to say.

Today the Bureau of Customs has an added budget of \$15 million that was just added now plus the regular parts for enforcement, but literally the entire Bureau has become enforcement-minded on drugs. So what percentage of their total budget do you say is involved?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yesterday State Senator John Hughes said that the New York State budget and problems connected with heroin use and importation is over \$150 million.

Mr. ROSSIDES. It is.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It is hard to put that in relationship to the President's very significant statement, saying that the U.S. Government would now spend \$155 million. There is something wrong somewhere if the State of New York is spending \$150 million and the Federal Government is only spending twice that.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I think the Federal Government is spending probably three times that much.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is still not that impressive.

Mr. ROSSIDES. The question is how fast you can spend the money available. But, secondly, it may not be that much of a differentiation, Mr. Chairman, or a difference. New York State has the greatest problem. New York State has done more than any other State through the leadership of Governor Rockefeller, starting in 1966 for the first time to alert the citizens to the drug problem.

You remember the problem he had getting through his massive rehabilitation program. We have not had the success with that program that we would like, but can you imagine where we would be if we had not broken the ground in 1966? The big problem rests with the States and the President's program recognizes that.

Law enforcement and reserve police powers is on the States and they have not done the job. New York and California have led the way because they have had more of a problem.

Take the educational system—it is the States and must remain there.

Primary responsibility for hospital administration and rehabilitation lies with the States. We must not take away the responsibilities from the States.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If the United States kept heroin out of the United States, there would be less of a problem.

Mr. ROSSIDES. That is correct and the President recognizes that as a foreign policy matter and as an enforcement problem, and that is where there has been a massive effort in funds.

Fifth, he recognized the central role of the States and the need for close Federal-State cooperation in a unified drive against drug abuse; and

Sixth, he stressed total community involvement—the private sector as well as governmental agencies—in this anti-drug abuse drive.

There is no question we are talking about community groups, action groups that can do more good on the local level than the Federal Government.

Take research, which I will mention in a moment, specialized research, maybe only the Government can do and that is where I think the latest program of the President will have its impact. I would say, Mr. Chairman, for the first time in history we have seen not only the total involvement of the institution of the presidency in the battle against drug abuse, but also the personal involvement of the President.

In my judgment this program has arrested the United States' incredible downward slide into drug abuse—although we have a long and steep climb ahead of us to return to the level from which we fell—and has alerted the international community to the global problem of drug abuse.

1. FOREIGN POLICY AND PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE

As you said, Mr. Chairman, if we could keep the stuff out, we would not have the problem we have had, that is absolutely true, but we failed to appreciate in the past that it was a worldwide problem calling for an international response. Prior to this administration, international activity by the United States was principally on the enforcement level.

President Nixon raised drug abuse to the foreign policy level at the beginning of his administration and took personal initiatives to elicit the cooperation of other governments.

The result of this major change in the approach of the executive branch was to make the Department of State, as the primary representative for communicating to foreign governments the vital interest of the United States, responsible for doing everything necessary to advance our antidrug abuse policy through diplomacy.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers has given high priority and personal leadership to the Department of State's efforts in this area.

This role of the State Department in the administration's war on drugs has had a unique and important impact. Through the use of diplomacy we have achieved a substantial advance in our objectives.

The administration's diplomatic efforts have been worldwide. The President's words, in his address to the United Nations on its 25th anniversary in October 1970, sums up the problem:

It is in the world interest that the narcotics traffic be curbed. Drugs pollute the minds and bodies of our young, bring misery, violence, and human and economic waste. This scourge of drugs can be eliminated through international cooperation.

An example of such cooperation is the effective partnership we have developed with the Government of Mexico. Operation Cooperation, the successor to Operation Intercept, has led to joint efforts by the two governments in the area of opium poppy and marihuana eradication and smuggling suppression. Both governments realize that a great deal more has to be done, particularly along our common border.

The French Government has pledged its cooperation and has increased substantially its enforcement efforts against heroin production and trafficking.

The most important and dramatic diplomatic news was the joint announcement on June 30, 1971, by Prime Minister Erim of Turkey and President Nixon that Turkey has decreed that within 1 year, in accordance with the law of Turkey, the opium poppy will no longer be planted in Turkey.

The Government of Turkey has pledged that, in the meantime, it would make a full effort to prevent the diversion of the crop now being harvested. The President has called the action of Prime Minister Erim important and courageous.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The Turks will, in fact, have the opportunity under this arrangement to plant two more crops, isn't that correct?

Mr. ROSSIDES. In part. Actually they are harvesting a crop now and they plant one crop in September and October, and if there is an unsuccessful planting, if there is a winter kill, say, a bad season, then they can plant in March. It is one more crop basically in September plus the crop that is being harvested right now.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. For all practical purposes the product of two more crops will enter the pipeline of the world opium market, and will keep things going for another 3 or 4 years.

Mr. ROSSIDES. If the crop that is being harvested now and if there is a crop that is planted in September and if that crop gets planted and there is significant diversion, then it will keep things going for at least 1 year and probably 2.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why couldn't we get them to agree to kill the whole show now with no 1972 crop and confiscation of the present crop?

Mr. ROSSIDES. They have a statute which requires a year's notice on plantings. They have now given that notice and I think the President characterized it as a courageous and important act. They have coupled that with the pledge of full collection of the present crop and harvest.

I think that is where the world should be focusing its attention and the Congress keeping its eye on the collection process going on right now in Turkey, and I would hope that the world press would follow this daily.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I just want to pick that up in a minute. Do you have any idea how much money we have given in grant and aid to Turkey in the last 20 years?

Mr. ROSSIDES. The figures come to approximately \$5.7 billion starting with the Marshall plan aid to Greece and Turkey.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. After giving them \$5.7 billion, why can't we get them to confiscate the present crop and kill the planting of the September crop?

Mr. ROSSIDES. As I say, Mr. Chairman, they have had a history of centuries of planting poppies and to the farmers they are not aware

of the damage that eventually results from the conversion of opium to morphine to heroin.

The Prime Minister has made in our judgment a very courageous move, and we are hopeful that the increased enforcement and collection effort will purchase up the present crop. We don't control the Government of Turkey. I think that the achievement in 2 years of getting the Turkish Government, which has planted these crops for over 200, 300, 400 years, is a significant diplomatic achievement.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I would say that would be true if we had not given them \$5.7 billion. Then we would be equal to negotiations.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Once the money is given, it is like your constituents. You may have been able to do many things for them in the past, but they say that is over with. But what are you going to do for me now?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We are doing more good for them now. I wouldn't belabor that.

What are your people, such as customs, doing in terms of cooperation with the Turkish Government?

Mr. ROSSIDES. In terms of cooperation with the Turkish Government we are prepared to offer on what we call a TDY—temporary basis—numbers of persons. In fact, our Commissioner has been developing a plan that would involve a certain number of customs inspectors to work with the Turkish customs inspection service that we will propose to the Turkish Government.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Will they work in Turkey?

Mr. ROSSIDES. It will be to work in Turkey during this next 3-month period during the collection and harvesting of the present crop. We have not proposed that to the Turkish Government. We have that plan in being to do that on short notice. As a matter of fact, I have had initial discussions of that with the State Department, but they may not have had a chance to review it as yet.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you consider that this is an important and urgent step in combatting the importation of heroin into the United States?

Mr. ROSSIDES. We feel it would be helpful. It would be up to the government receiving assistance to accept that. We have been working with the police force of Turkey through the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and we are just trying to offer customs inspectional expertise to work with their Customs Service at the border, to help with our experience to mount an effort to stop the huge overland traffic from Turkey to the labs in Western Europe.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Up to now there have been three principal agencies of Government dealing with heroin—State, Justice, and Treasury. I still find it difficult to get a fix on who is really in charge. Who is leading the fight against heroin drug importation and abuse in the United States.

Mr. ROSSIDES. That answer is very simple. The President is leading the fight, Mr. Chairman. We have a very clear demarcation of effort and it is working well. In fact, as far as Treasury is concerned on the enforcement end, it is working remarkably well.

The State Department is involved and this is one of the great advances, in my judgment, of this administration. The State Department is saddled with the diplomatic negotiations with other countries

around the world and has done a fine job, particularly with the recent announcement from Turkey.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Other than the President, is there any one person in command of all of the U.S. resources that are necessary to prevent the importation of heroin into the United States?

Mr. ROSSIDES. You are talking on the enforcement level?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Enforcement. Justice, Treasury, or State?

Mr. ROSSIDES. There cannot be by the nature of our federal system, Mr. Chairman. We have the Customs Service, which has the responsibility to stop the smuggling into the United States. Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs are responsible for working with foreign governments to stop the source of the cultivation of it. Once it starts in the pipeline and starts toward the United States, that is a Customs responsibility on smuggling and we have a working arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Customs agency service that gives the guidelines of operational enforcement matters.

It is just like the FBI which has operational guidelines with CIA, with the Internal Revenue Service, with the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of IRS. This is standard procedure.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It may be that standard procedure is just not good enough any more. When the President felt and the Congress agreed with him there was concern here over environment and pollution, we created an agency and a new job for Mr. Ruckelshaus.

When the President felt there should be a greater effort to fight cancer, he set up a separate agency. Would it be useful in your judgment if the President set up a new agency so that coordination among these three branches would be more efficacious?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Your reason is it has not worked so well in the past?

Mr. ROSSIDES. In the enforcement end my answer is no. On the other hand, I agree fully with a coordinated effort on nonenforcement aspects of drugs which is a coordinating office, not a directing office in the White House.

To return to my statement—

2. EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND REHABILITATION

The drug abuse problem is one of both supply and demand, and President Nixon's response has been guided accordingly. While we are working to eliminate the supply at the sources, to stop the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States, and to stop the distribution of illicit drugs internally, eliminating the demand for drugs among our young is also central to success.

The key to eliminating the demand for drugs lies in education. The vast majority of youth, when given access to the facts, will reject drug abuse as against their own self-interest as well as against the interest of their Nation.

President Nixon is convinced that much of our problem is attributable to the mass of misinformation and street-corner mythology which has filled the vacuum left by our failure in the past to deal with the

young on a mature, reasoned and factual basis. In the past our Government took the easy but ineffective route of "do as I say because I say so" rather than the more difficult route of clearly presenting the facts necessary for informed decision.

In his June 17, 1971 message, President Nixon stressed "reclamation of the drug user himself," and has requested congressional approval of a total of \$105 million in addition to funds already contained in the fiscal year 1972 budget to be used solely for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug-addicted individuals.

He asked the Congress to provide an additional \$10 million in funds to increase and improve education and training in the field of dangerous drugs. This will increase the money available for education and training to more than \$24 million.

3. DIFFERENTIATION IN PENALTY STRUCTURE AND FLEXIBLE PROVISIONS FOR HANDLING FIRST OFFENDERS

Before enactment of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of 1970, Federal laws erroneously treated marihuana as a narcotic drug and compelled felony sentences upon conviction for any drug offenses for first offenders. The harsh and unrealistic effects of the Federal law generated credibility problems with our youth and posed enormous problems for Federal prosecutors and judges in dealing with first offenders.

President Nixon proposed a change in the penalty structure which for the first time provided a reasonable distinction between narcotic drugs and marihuana and provided the courts needed flexibility in dealing with the first offender. The courts were granted authority to clean the slate on the first offender by striking from the record mention of the first offense without adjudication of guilt. Both of these measures enhance credibility and acceptance of our drug laws, not only with youth, but also with those charged with its administration.

4. LAW ENFORCEMENT

Drug law enforcement is a difficult and dangerous business. It demands the highest standards of professional competence of enforcement agents. President Nixon has increased substantially the budgets of the two Federal agencies primarily concerned with drug law enforcement—the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the Department of Justice and the Treasury's Bureau of Customs—and has initiated a major new Treasury enforcement program of tax investigations by the Internal Revenue Service of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers. I will discuss the Treasury programs later.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Isn't it a fact in the last year or two your Department wanted to be a good deal tougher with the Turkish Government. You wanted more stringent action taken and the State Department dragged its heels in dealing with the Turkish Government? Isn't that true?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No; I would say what you are talking about. Mr. Chairman, is normal give and take of any policy question in the Gov-

ernment. There were many people in different departments and different areas who took different points of view of how to achieve the objective in Turkey and in other countries, in Mexico.

In interdepartmental meetings, these were thrashed out and a policy decided upon.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think if one person would be in charge, it could be decided in 24 hours.

Mr. ROSSIDES. The concept that some one person in charge is going to be the oracle and come up with miracles is nonsense. The coordinating system in the Federal Government works pretty darn well. We have to thrash out very many conflicting problems and interests and views.

As far as I am concerned, in the enforcement area we have done all right. I am not that familiar with the research and rehabilitation area, so I could not comment on that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is Dr. Jaffe's role?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Dr. Jaffe would come in and coordinate the non-enforcement area. He is not going to come in and tell each of the 14 agencies what to do. He is going to try to coordinate that aspect of many, many different departments.

The point is, they are trying to coordinate and bring more emphasis in the nonenforcement area. I think in the enforcement area we have been highly successful on the Federal level, particularly against smuggling. On the State level, where most of the enforcement should be internally, we have not been.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Senator Hughes testifies the police in New York City could pick up all of the addicts—customers—they want, but there are so many customers on the streets that if they were arrested, it would take the courts 20 years to hear all the cases. The jails can't process fast enough those who are arrested, and the penal institutions can't handle them.

I don't see how you can say there has been much success when five kids a day are dying from narcotics addiction.

Mr. ROSSIDES. At the Federal level, the customs enforcement has been remarkable. Enforcement at the State level has not been. This has been a role of the States and the role of the cities. They have tried to throw their failures off on the Federal Government; not that the Federal Government has done such a fine job in the past, but to try to throw the blame on the Federal Government is too easy a way for mayors and others to duck their responsibilities.

I get quite annoyed when I see that. Talk about the police. More support being given to the support of the police in their role in the cities could also help in this area.

I remember when I first devoted time to this in the first months of the administration. If I had had a dollar, I probably would have spent 75 cents of it on education; maybe 90 percent. I still feel that the overwhelming amount should be spent on that. I am convinced of the youth—if you talk of facts of the dangers of heroin—the youth can be convinced.

Marihuana is a different story. I say we have made substantial headway in the Federal Government in the past few years.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is not what Congressman Rangel said the other day.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I respect the problem very much, and I know his problem, and I cut my eyeteeth in 1966 on the drug problem as deputy manager in New York City for Governor Rockefeller, and I am very familiar with the problems in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant on drugs. I am not saying it is getting any better or getting any worse there.

One of the results of President Nixon's initiative in making this a priority issue, a national issue, an international issue, is that for the first time we have had the proper debate on the subject. Before January 1969, there was not discussion, and parents were even concerned whether they should bring it up with their children.

Now at least there is a full national debate. Many programs are underway on the Federal, State, and local level, and I think we are making progress. You have to remember it took 10 years to get to this crisis stage, and it will take several years to get out of it, but I think we have turned the tide.

I could discourse a long while about the problems in Harlem and various groups in Harlem and outside of Harlem and their responsibility.

I think I have discussed education. To return to my statement—

5. CENTRAL ROLE OF THE STATES AND FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION

Federal-State cooperation is one of the essential elements for success in the struggle against drug abuse, and this administration is working closely with the States in this effort. Except for certain areas of special Federal interest, law enforcement and our educational system have been and must continue as essentially State and local responsibilities.

President Nixon has emphasized the Federal-State cooperation in his message to Congress of July 14, 1969, on control of narcotics and dangerous drugs; again at the Governors' conference on drugs at the White House held in December 1969, and as outlined in his more recent message to the Congress on June 17, 1971.

6. ACTION WITHIN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The President has stressed that the private sector must provide community leadership in organizing drug-abuse educational and other action programs. Religious organizations and community and civic groups such as Rotary, Kiwanis, Chamber of Commerce, and Jaycees are best equipped to get directly into the home where they can assist parents in handling the problem of drug abuse with intelligence and credibility.

TREASURY'S ROLE IN THE PRESIDENT'S ANTIHEROIN ACTION PROGRAM

Treasury is playing a major role in the enforcement phase of the President's antiheroin action program. Its Bureau of Customs, the Nation's first line of defense against heroin smuggling, has achieved spectacular success; and the Internal Revenue Service is embarked on a major presidential program designed to take the profit out of narcotics.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS

In his September 16, 1968, Anaheim, Calif., speech, the President stated:

Let us recognize that the frontiers of the United States are the primary responsibility of the United States Bureau of Customs. I recommend that we triple the number of customs agents in this country from 331 to 1,000.

The President has followed through on that pledge and more. In his July 14, 1969, message to the Congress on the control of narcotics and dangerous drugs, he stated:

The Department of the Treasury, through the Bureau of Customs, is charged with enforcing the nation's smuggling laws. I have directed the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate a major new effort to guard the nation's borders and ports against the growing volume of narcotics from abroad. There is a recognized need for more men and facilities in the Bureau of Customs to carry out this directive.

This directive was backed up with a substantial antinarcotic supplemental budget request. The Congress responded with full bipartisan support in December of 1969, by passing an appropriation for \$8.75 million for 915 additional men and for equipment for customs.

The hiring of these people, begun in January 1970 and completed in June of that year, has produced remarkable results.

CUSTOMS SEIZURES

In a 2-year period the number of seizures by Customs has more than doubled.

Preliminary statistics show that narcotic and drug seizures by Customs in fiscal year 1971, were 9,042, an increase of 2,500 over the 1970 total of 6,507. In fiscal year 1969, 4,024 seizures were made.

Most dramatic is the increase in seizures of hard drugs. Customs seizures of hard drugs in fiscal year 1971 are over 1,200 pounds, more than was seized in the whole preceding 7 years. During the same period seizures of heroin alone, 906 pounds, in more than 460 seizures, exceeded the total amount seized for the preceding 10 fiscal years combined.

Cocaine seizures have also increased with 344 pounds seized this fiscal year as compared to 109 last year. In fiscal year 1969 separate statistics for cocaine were not even kept.

Hashish and marihuana have also increased. During fiscal year 1971 there were about 1,208 seizures of hashish with more than 3,000 pounds seized. This is nearly twice the seizures in fiscal year 1970, but the pounds seized remains constant, 3,122 pounds of hashish being seized in fiscal year 1970.

In fiscal year 1969 only 623 pounds of hashish were seized. In that same year 57,164 pounds of marihuana were seized. During fiscal year 1971 this figure has grown to 76 tons in 5,490 seizures. 52 tons were seized in fiscal year 1970.

Over 6 million 5-grain units of dangerous drugs such as amphetamines and barbiturates were seized during fiscal year 1971. This is about half the number seized last fiscal year, though the number of seizures increased to about 1,348 from 1,080. Attached is a chart setting forth Customs' drug seizures in detail for the past 3 fiscal years.

(The chart follows:)

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, DRUG SEIZURES BY FISCAL YEAR

	1969		1970		1971 ¹	
	Seizures	Pounds	Seizures	Pounds	Seizures	Pounds
Heroin.....	240	311	203	45.5	462	906
Cocaine.....	2	3	88	109	159	344
Opium.....	42	34	42	21	132	-----
Hashish.....	186	623	646	3,122	1,208	3,000
Marihuana.....	2,673	57,164	4,113	852	5,490	876
Dangerous drugs.....	630	4,763,361	1,080	12,271,000	1,348	6,000,000
Other.....	253	199	335	-----	243	-----
Total (seizures)....	4,024	-----	6,507	-----	9,042	-----

¹ Preliminary figures (minimum amounts—there may be slight increases).² Cocaine figures for 1969 included in the "Other" column.³ Tons.⁴ 5 grain units.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Major seizures of pure heroin have included:

1. 98 pounds (October 1970—Miami).
2. 210 pounds (December 1970—Miami).
3. 98 pounds (April 1971—Newark).
4. 155 pounds (May 1971—Miami).
5. 247.5 pounds (May 1971—San Juan).

The men and women of the Bureau of Customs, under the dynamic leadership of Commissioner Myles J. Ambrose, deserve enormous credit for these outstanding accomplishments.

These results took dedication, imagination, and total commitment of forces. Let me mention some of the things Customs has done with the resources provided by Congress for this drive:

In 6 months Customs added 915 trained personnel to its staff. These included an increment of inspectors who were able for the first time to give priority attention to checking for narcotics enforcement purposes persons, vehicles, cargo, and mail entering the country. A substantial addition to our force of special agents enabled us to run down intelligence leads, investigate violations of the smuggling laws, and gather evidence for the convictions of those apprehended.

CADPIN, from the initial letters of Customs Automated Data Processing of Intelligence, has been installed across the country. One hundred and sixty terminals, located at every important port of entry along the Mexican-United States border, at major international airports, and at various intelligence centers now have access to CADPIN's huge data bank. Merely by punching the keys of his terminal, the inspector on duty at a border crossing or an airport can obtain an almost instantaneous reply if a car or person is suspected of smuggling, the car is stolen, or the person is the subject of an outstanding warrant.

Customs' communications system has been expanded and modernized, with better radios, repeater stations, and sector communications centers. Physical equipment, particularly cars, boats and planes, both fixed-wing and helicopters, have been increased giving Customs agents the tools with which to deal rapidly and responsively with smugglers and their syndicates.

Additional customs stations have been opened. Two of these are in the remote Big Bend area of Texas, a favorite section of the border for smugglers.

New laboratories, to provide rapid identification of narcotic and dangerous substances, now speed the judicial processing of violators.

The use of dogs specially trained to locate marihuana in cars or in mail packages entering the country has been greatly increased, and they are now making substantial contributions in intercepting that substance as it enters the country.

EXPANDED CUSTOMS PROGRAM—1971

The President, in his program announced on June 17, 1971, recognized these accomplishments of Customs and proposed a budget amendment of \$18 million to maximize Customs-demonstrated capabilities in interdicting the flow of drugs into the United States. This amendment funded major additions to equipment and 1,000 additional personnel.

The Congress, with bipartisan support, authorized \$15 million and the Appropriations Subcommittees stated they would entertain a supplemental request after use of the \$15 million. The Congress acted swiftly, passing the appropriation bill on June 30.

The effects of these additional resources will be felt from the New York docks to the Florida airports, from the marinas of southern California to sod airfields in the State of Washington, and along the lengths of the Mexican and Canadian borders. They will yield better enforcement at border crossings without increased delays.

The additional funds also provide for major equipment additions, principally aircraft and boats, with appropriate detection systems for both new craft and those in current inventory. The current intelligence indications of extensive smuggling by unscheduled planes and boats create this substantial need for detection, communication and interception resource. These will have particular impact along the Mexican border and against small craft making end-runs into southern California, Florida and Texas.

CUSTOMS-TO-CUSTOMS COOPERATION

As one part of the antidrug smuggling program, designed to disrupt the traffic in drugs between countries, Treasury established the policy of fostering and strengthening cooperation between and among the customs services of the various countries. The Bureau of Customs was directed to put the policy into effect.

The first customs-to-customs contacts, and the ones that have resulted in the most cooperation, have been with our neighbors to the north and south. In discussions with the Governments of Mexico and Canada we have improved cooperation in the attack on the drug traffic through customs-to-customs cooperation.

Applying the policy of increased customs-to-customs cooperation to a wider area, the Treasury Department obtained authorization and appropriations for U.S. Customs to become a full member of the Customs Cooperation Council. This is an organization of the customs

services of more than 60 nations. Its purpose is to foster close working relationships between and among these services.

At its annual meeting in Vienna last month this Council adopted a resolution calling for its member countries to exchange information on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Previously the customs services of many countries had paid little attention to the drug traffic.

The Bureau of Customs has an ongoing program, sponsored through AID, with the Vietnamese Customs Service. This has been helpful to the Government of Vietnam in its efforts to stem smuggling of heroin into that country. The Bureau is also preparing plans now for possible technical assistance to the customs services of other countries of Indochina, particularly Thailand and Laos.

As part of this ongoing program of full cooperation among the customs services, the Commissioner of Customs recently made an on-the-spot survey and talked with his counterparts in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In these contacts, the resolution for the exchange of information on the drug traffic adopted at Vienna was the stepping stone for talks on increased action against drug traffic by the customs services of each of these countries against the flow of opium and morphine base from Turkey to Western Europe.

PROPOSED CARGO-THEFT LEGISLATION

On April 22, 1971, Secretary Connally transmitted to the Congress new legislation designed to increase the security and protection of imported merchandise and merchandise for export at ports of entry in the United States from loss or damage as a result of criminal and corrupt practices. This measure is currently pending in both the House and Senate. We hope that hearings will soon be held.

This legislation is designed to provide security against cargo theft and will provide increased protection against the smuggling of narcotics through tighter control over a major area within which organized crime has been operating.

PROGRAM FOR TAX INVESTIGATIONS OF MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS

Included in the June 17, 1971, Presidential message, which announced the administration's expanded effort to combat the menace of drug abuse, is a high priority program to conduct systematic tax investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers. These are the people who are generally insulated from the daily operations of the drug traffic through a chain of intermediaries.

This program will mount a nationally coordinated effort to disrupt the narcotics distribution system by intensive tax investigations of these key figures. By utilizing the civil and criminal tax laws, our objective is to prosecute violators and to drastically reduce the profits of this criminal activity by attacking the illegal revenues of the narcotics trade.

Reflecting the high priority given this program by the President, Congress has provided financial support for the program amounting to \$7.5 million in fiscal 1972 and authorization for 541 additional posi-

tions—200 special agents, 200 revenue agents and 141 support personnel.

Certain major features of this program should be noted:

1. Treasury will not only coordinate its efforts with all other interested Federal agencies, but will actively seek the maximum cooperation of State and local agencies as well. This is a vital feature of this program.

2. With the manpower provided, our goal is to have at least 400 full-scale IRS on-going investigations.

3. In line with the high priority given this program by the President, the Internal Revenue Service is assigning, effective immediately, 100 experienced special agents and 100 experienced revenue agents, full time to this program.

We believe that this program will make a major additional contribution to the President's offensive against drug abuse.

INTERPOL

Interpol plays an important role in providing the mechanism for cooperation and the exchange of information among the law enforcement agencies of over 100 nations. The United States has been successful in sharpening Interpol's focus on the international narcotics traffic. At the 1969 and 1970 Interpol General Assemblies the drug traffic was the subject of a great deal of productive attention.

In closing, I would like to express Treasury's appreciation for the bipartisan support that the Congress has given the Treasury programs. The support and swift action of the Appropriations Subcommittees of the House and Senate in approving the amendment to the Treasury appropriation bill for fiscal year 1972 made the funds for the new increased programs promptly available to us.

This was made possible under the leadership of Chairman Tom Steed and Congressman Howard W. Robison in the House and of Chairman Joseph M. Montoya and Senator J. Caleb Boggs in the Senate.

I assure you that all the personnel of Treasury will do their utmost to express that appreciation in the way I know that each Member of the Congress wants it to be expressed—in the most effective possible attack on the illicit heroin traffic.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. At the top of page 8, you say that Bureau of Customs has achieved spectacular success.

Mr. ROSSIDES. That's right.

Mr. Chairman, the estimate is that 4 or 5 tons of heroin is used per year illegally. The Bureau of Customs in these last 12 months, thanks to the President's initiative in seeking the appropriation and the enormous support of the Congress in December 1969 passing a supplemental appropriation, this last fiscal year we have seized over 900 pounds of pure heroin.

That is not only spectacular, but I could not think of a better word and it is spectacular and it will show results.

One of the problems is this—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much came in?

Mr. ROSSIDES. We don't know, but we know what we take. You don't know statistics in this area. I say in my judgment we have turned the tide. I cannot prove it.

When you seize 900 pounds, when you get reports that the kids are turning it off in the colleges, I say that we are making progress in the heroin area. But that does not mean that you don't have an inventory of heroin available.

As you pointed out, if you have the crop coming in now, they can snap it up and put it away and use it for future years.

But we are at the threshold in enforcement of making the risks for the smuggler maybe up to a 50-50 chance instead of before when it might have been a 10-, 15- or 20-to-1 shot that he would ever be caught. These are enormous seizures that have been made.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Were they made overseas or in the United States?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No, in the United States; 247 pounds in San Juan in May—we seized that and that hurts. It is not the idea of some farmers not planting and you go to another farmer. A lot of money passed at this point; 155 pounds in Miami, 98 pounds—I have the list here, and there is a chart, Mr. Chairman, that gives more full statistics.

On page 10, 210 pounds in Miami, 98 pounds in Newark, 150—all in the United States. Even the criminal syndicates may start to think twice when the odds of possibly getting caught have increased. That has happened and we feel that this is a most salutary development.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yesterday New York State Senator Hughes testified that from 1965 to 1969 deaths from heroin in New York City were 2,935, close to 3,000 deaths, that the projection for the period 1970 to 1974 would be 6,600 deaths in New York City. The availability of heroin in New York City is greater today than at any time in the past. How that stands up as spectacular success I don't understand.

Mr. ROSSIDES. It stands up in the following: First, no one can prove that the availability of heroin is greater than in the past and I challenge that statement on any kind of evidence. Indeed, the evidence is the opposite when you have 900 pounds you can look at, you can see it and you can weigh it—no speculation. That does not mean that the inventory that has been on hand has not been available, and with the heroin there is the gradation of strength.

They may be cutting it even more. I am not saying that it is not still readily available—obviously it is, but not to recognize the tremendous achievements of the administration and particularly in the customs enforcement, I think, is unfortunate because this has been a bipartisan effort.

The Congress has recognized this and they have moved and given us the tools and we will do more, but it is only one of the parts.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. According to the National Institute of Mental Health the rate of addiction to heroin has increased two to three times the last 2 years.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I have not seen that study, Mr. Chairman. When they say the rate of addiction has increased, I have not seen those statistics and I would question them. Are they talking about for the first time they are getting statistics? I get reports from different areas that the youth are turning it off. I get a report from my college dean that there

is less use in the college, less college students are going for counseling on the heroin.

I am not talking about marijuana statistics regarding what the youth are doing or not doing, but one of the great problems in this area is we don't know enough on statistics in this area. For the first time these last couple of years we are getting more reports as to what should be happening, and we know the drug-related death reports.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How many deaths are there in the United States from addiction?

Mr. ROSSIDES. We don't have the statistics. In New York they have an average of three deaths a day. I believe it is estimated over a thousand a year and it is the largest killer in the age group of 15 to 35.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I still don't see how you can use the words "spectacular success."

I really wish all of us would say nobody has done enough, there has been no spectacular success, but spectacular failure, and we will try to do more.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I don't believe that. I believe that there has been spectacular success in the Bureau of Customs when you have more seizures of pure heroin than you have had in 10 years. Nowhere do I say the picture is rosy. All I have said is we have stopped the downslide.

We have a long way to go to get back to where we should be. We have 12,000 people in the Bureau of Customs. We want to let them know we recognize the job they are doing and we want them to do a better job. We are not saying more cannot be done.

The IRS program that Secretary Connally and the President adopted we should have had that a long time ago. We hope that program will help take some of the profits out of the narcotics traffic.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. I don't minimize the crisis. Everyday for 2½ years I have spent time on this problem. So, I am well aware of the enormity of the problem and the job to be done.

In this statement I was trying to show in this particular area we have had what we feel is enormous success. That takes time to pay off in less heroin on the street, but combined with other efforts, Federal, State and local, we feel it will.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How are you doing in Vietnam?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I understand that Assistant Secretary Green from the Department of State will testify later. Again let me give you a balanced picture as I feel of the matter.

As you know, last year heroin started appearing on the scene with the American troops. We happen to know a fair amount about the activities because there was a Customs advisory team that was most helpful to the Ambassador in making recommendations, which have been accepted by the Saigon Government regarding a reorganization of the Vietnamese customs service. We have had a team of advisers under the AID program, which has been helpful to them. The military has had a program. I would say, because I have been there on one trip and I work closely with the military on an interdepartmental committee, that they have done a job of education and of rehabilitation, that is commendable.

Do you realize they had an amnesty program before all of the hullabaloo of the stories about the large alleged heroin percentages

there and we are very hopeful that the low percentages that we have heard so far will bear out, but this was the military rehabilitation programs that have been in operation for the last few years. These were well-thought-out programs.

I remember reading the MACV program in December 1970. You can't say they don't have a tough problem. They have been overly hit, but that is the nature of the game.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think they are overly hit when there are 25,000 to 30,000 heroin addicts there?

Mr. ROSSIDES. They have been overcriticized as to the amount of heroin addiction. I have not read the latest story of yesterday, but as I recall the percentage rate was 2 percent.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The Army itself admits 10 to 15 percent.

Mr. ROSSIDES. They do not admit 10 to 15 percent. You don't know. Mr. Chairman—they are all estimates, Mr. Chairman. How many were on drugs before they went and so on. No one can say there isn't a problem when you have an enormous availability. What surprises me is that the marketing syndicates in Southeast Asia didn't think of conversion from opium to heroin earlier than last year, because there is a vastness of the supply of opium from the Burma-Laos-Thai area.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I will pass to my colleagues.

Congressman Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been somewhat interested in your figures on page 10, which I think add up to a little over 800 pounds of the 900 pounds that you were talking about that were seized. What surprised me is that one of these, listed in Miami, I think, was the heroin that was taken off at Port Everglades in a car that was shipped here. They found it was bulging in on one side and they inspected it, but that was discovered somewhat by accident. Nevertheless, it was a good thing. What about seizures at other ports, for instance, New York which obviously is a large port, and the ports in California and on the Mexican and Canadian borders where we have a great deal of traffic coming in?

Mr. ROSSIDES. The main number and amount of seizures are at the borders by inspectors without advance evidence. We are trying to increase the intelligence we gather so that we decrease the amount of seizures that are not by pure luck, but inspections without prior evidence.

Actually we had one, the 98-pound one referred to, in Newark, N.J., which is part of the New York waterfront, and that stemmed from an inspector who wanted to give a little further review of a particular automobile that was on the docks there, but that stemmed in my judgment from the total effort being made by Customs.

We have increased the intelligence efforts and intelligence bulletins go out to our inspectors, and they say, "One of the favorite methods is automobiles." These inspectors read that and take a little more care.

The 247-pound seizure in San Juan was definitely—we had the pattern of routes and ships down to Vera Cruz and on up through Mexico—as a transit. We gave it a tough going over in San Juan and it proved most fruitful.

Mr. BURKE. What I am driving at, it would seem to me this is sort of a hit-and-miss method. What we need is greater education in the

methods by which it is brought in individually to the various customers and a beefing up of the Customs Bureau.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I agree completely. The President's current proposal which has been passed by the Appropriations Committee allocated a thousand more employees in the Customs Service. Let me say it ties in with that exact point.

First, we increased the intelligence. We never had intelligence units before. Commissioner Ambrose has such an intelligence narcotics unit and it was the intelligence that helped break at least three of these five cases.

Second, inspectors had never had schooling other than routine narcotics and the techniques of narcotics. So we sent a team around throughout the country to visit each of the places so that inspectors could be upgraded.

Now any new inspector goes through a special training course. Our intelligence network, automatic data processing, the CADPIN, computer for automatic data processing, it was practically nothing before and now we have it nationwide. You just type onto the machine and you will be able to tell whether that car is a stolen car within a matter of minutes, and that has been most helpful in the number of seizures that customs has made.

But again we are talking about a sleeping giant that was literally unused. That is why I say, Mr. Chairman, I still feel it has been spectacular in the last few years. We have gotten off the ground. We feel with the 1,000 men Congress has authorized we will be able to help close the net.

You can go along any dock in Boston, New York, Miami and there is no security.

Mr. BURKE. We talk about getting at the sources. We had testimony about why the poppies should be destroyed at their source and so on, which I agree with. But it seems with all of the increased fight against addiction in this country that dope is coming in from other sources. By that I don't mean necessarily by commercial airlines or ordinary methods of travel.

In my area, for instance, in south Florida, there are a good many planes that fly to Bimini and to other areas. It would seem to me that those planes should be inspected before they leave an area rather than wait until they get in, because they could dump almost anyplace in Mexico or Canada.

Mr. ROSSIDES. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. As you know, a couple of those seizures were from light aircraft. That is the major loophole we have learned and discovered in the last 2½ years' efforts. By beefing up the inspection and investigations, we have done a fairly good job.

But now what we have found is that this whole belt along the southern border, including Florida, is a loophole because you don't have the equipment and the radar for the low-flying general aviation aircraft.

Mr. BURKE. You have a good many small airports also.

Mr. ROSSIDES. That is correct and this appropriation request we made of \$18 million, which the Congress allowed \$15 million and said as soon as we spent it, our appropriations committee would further entertain a supplemental—primarily the large share was for equip-

ment, for aircraft and boats. The original was \$12 million for that and \$6 million for the additional thousand manpower. We feel that this one item may prove enormously helpful in stemming what comes up.

Mr. BURKE. The trouble is you are working on suppositions and I think this attack upon the problem takes more than suppositions of what we can or cannot do.

Going back to what I tried to indicate, are there any working agreements that we have with flying aircraft out of other countries so that they can be examined and inspected before they enter through our borders?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No, we don't and it might not prove fruitful unless that other country was willing to seize and arrest and give a stiff penalty.

Mr. BURKE. They don't have to seize and arrest if you know the aircraft is there and have the evidence which they have to dump. At least you could have a look at it if you knew an aircraft was coming over our borders that had contraband.

Mr. ROSSIDES. We are working closely with the Mexican authorities. If there is a suspect plane—

Mr. BURKE. I think if we are going to get to the source, you have to find out when it leaves.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Say the Mexicans inspect the plane and there is some contraband, which we want them to do so it doesn't come up. That is all to the good.

Mr. BURKE. We could refuse its landing in this country and the pilot would be rather concerned about what he is going to do.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I don't really want to comment on the caliber of the inspection that we could expect from the Mexican inspectors.

Mr. BURKE. Could we have our own inspectors?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No, that is the problem. We have preclearance of aircraft in Canada and the Bahamas and it has been very harmful to the drug problem. We have tightened up because what happens, if they found somebody, they can't arrest him. There is no arrest authority on foreign soil and it really is more for facilitation of passengers.

Just 2½ years ago a passenger could be precleared in Montreal, go downtown and have lunch and come back and get on the aircraft.

Mr. BURKE. It seems to me with all of the charter fishing and whatnot that they have in certain areas, and certainly in south Florida, anybody coming over from those areas could drop a package, a fisherman could take it in and it is not subject to any inspection at all.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Congressman Burke, this is not easy. We are not saying it is. When we say we have had spectacular success, we have had that.

Mr. BURKE. But you have not had success with the older methods—the fact that somewhere in your report you mentioned about two times as much as you seized.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Seizures.

Mr. BURKE. When you get two times as much doesn't it mean anything at all? Maybe the job was not being done very well in the past. As our chairman tried to indicate it is important to discover where it is coming from and where the new addicts are getting it from rather

than just talking about spectacular success in the field, which I don't really think have been spectacular. You have had enough to get some big headlines.

Mr. ROSSIDES. 900 pounds of heroin is spectacular success. It is not a question of new, old, side methods. It is a question of hard work and getting the intelligence which they did not have before. Customs was not even allowed in the business before. They are in the business now and it has been by hard work and not hit or miss or the old methods.

These successes have been based a great deal upon intelligence-gathering. One of the most important seizures we made stemmed from import specialists who never even thought of drugs before, we have galvanized them to check invoices and check suspicious ones. I am not trying to overplay it because this is a very balanced statement, I thought.

I am just trying to say, at least recognize the men and women of the Customs Service who have done this. Tell them, "You have done a tremendous job. Do better." Japan was able to beat this problem because of tough customs enforcement and tough internal enforcement. She is close to the greatest source of opium in the world and all I am saying is we have had this spectacular success, which means now for the first time with added effort and added manpower which the Congress has now given us, we are going to try to make it at least a 50-50 chance on anyone bringing in hard narcotics.

If we get to that, that is very good.

Mr. BURKE. It would be better if you had it 99. I am not trying to take anything away from the Customs officials themselves or those you have working in the narcotics field because I do think this is an extremely difficult thing to try to solve and it is something you don't stamp out overnight.

The trouble is it is difficult to say, "Let's be patient with the problem the way it is." I do recognize your problem, but I think there are certain things you should investigate further.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I will look into this one about inspection of aircraft.

Mr. BURKE. Not only aircraft. The thing that bothers me—is that it is easy to leave Bimini. I have been on fishing trips there, have come back and have gone through the Customs inspectors. At night it is quite easy to throw something over the side and have somebody pick it up. It would seem to me the only way you could stop that would be to have a thorough inspection of the ship, or plane, charter boat or even your personal craft before it leaves the dock.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I will pursue that to see to what degree that is being done.

Mr. BURKE. That would have to be done by our own inspectors. The problem is here, not over in Bimini.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Vander Jagt.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. You testified the war against heroin depends upon complete cooperation between Federal, State and local units of government. I also understood you to testify in response to a question of the chairman that in many instances the States and the cities have failed miserably and have done a terrible job.

If they are doing a terrible job and yet success depends upon this complete cooperation, is there any hope of solving the problem?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes. I am an optimist by nature. We have turned the tide. The States are doing more. They have to because States and cities particularly have been dragged into it. I credit in large part the Congress for arousing the public and the press in this area.

I am not going to read any names and I am using it as a general comment. I see attacks on police departments and the mayors saying to the Federal Government do this and do that, as if they are going to solve problems by serious headlines—it just does not happen that way.

When the police departments themselves and the International Association of Chiefs of Police for the first time are recognizing police corruption, and in their own convention they are passing resolutions and acting to do something, that is progress.

The American Bar Association and their efforts over the years have done very little, to say the least, as to court procedures, conditions in the court system, and finally it is just like an explosion and we have to do something because something has to get done.

I think the debate and the spotlight that has been put on it the last 2½ years has been most salutary. I credit the President with that, in large part, in the national community and the international community. When he spoke about it before the United Nations, it was the first time a head of state discussed this subject at the United Nations.

The President has raised the problem and instituted an action program. They say there are still drugs on the streets and there are, and it is dreadful in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant and they say he is doing nothing. I say a lot is being done. Because of this debate various cities are waking up, doing things, action programs in private communities.

I remember voluntarily the president of MGM records banned rock groups that were extolling drugs. This was an interesting action when this happened last fall. So, as I say, I think a lot of people have been awakened, but what can happen is if this becomes a political football, it would set it back.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. On a grading system, would you give a very good, fair, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory rating to the Bureau of Customs?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I would say they have had spectacular success, but the success has been poor because we need more spectacular successes.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. What rating would you give New York City? Good, satisfactory, poor, unsatisfactory?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I will not make that comment.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. You also testified that in your opinion we don't really need one person or one agency working full time on the coordinating aspect of this problem, because you said the President is the one who is leading it and coordinating it. I agree with you that there has been great leadership forthcoming from him, but he has many other problems on his mind in addition to drugs.

Don't you think it would be helpful to have one man or one agency or one commission working full time on the coordinating aspects of this. For example, you testified in response to Congressman Burke some of the legal problems that we have relative to arrest, inspecting airplanes at the point where they are taking off rather than landing.

Wouldn't it be good to have someone coordinating perhaps new diplomatic relations in regard to this problem?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I do support very strongly the coordinating role that Dr. Jaffe is playing. Specifically on the enforcement area, the effort on the Federal level is working well and, therefore, there was no need to talk about someone to come in and coordinate customs with other agencies.

The coordinating effort is going well and the enforcement end is going well. On the other part, it is different. That is all I was saying—just on the enforcement.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. You just told me a couple of minutes ago measured over the improvement 2½ years ago, it is a spectacular success. but you said a moment ago measured by the amount of heroin still flooding in, you are doing very poorly.

Mr. ROSSIDES. What I meant by that was we are not satisfied with spectacular success. We will only be satisfied when the evidence is visible of less heroin on the streets, of less addicts coming in for treatment or other evidence we can find, when the reports start coming back to the law enforcement communities around the country that it is not that easily available as it was, that is when we will be satisfied.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you and thank you for a prepared statement which was well balanced and very helpful to this subcommittee.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I would stress one additional item, Mr. Chairman, this new IRS program could be a great sleeper. It is one which we have substantial hopes for as part of the total picture.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Our next three witnesses will appear together so we can get a balanced view of the problem. We are happy to welcome Hon. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Hon. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

We will begin with Secretary Green and give each of you an opportunity to read any prepared statements that you might have.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHALL GREEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS**

THE DRUG PROBLEM IN EAST ASIA

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the serious and widespread drug problem in East Asia and the steps which we, together with the concerned nations of Asia, are taking to confront all aspects of this situation.

Drug production and use have long been a part of the Asian scene. In what is probably the most extensive area of illegal production, the so-called Golden Triangle where Burma, Thailand, and Laos converge, opium has been the sole cash crop of the inhabitants for nearly two centuries. This area has been for years virtually beyond the control of any government.

Approximately half of the world's illicit output of opium is produced in this area. Until fairly recently this production was consumed almost entirely by East Asian addicts, mainly overseas Chinese said

to number a million. Use was generally confined to refined opium, morphine, and purple—or smoking—heroin.

The appearance on the scene of white, 96 to 98 percent pure heroin is a very recent phenomenon aimed almost entirely at the U.S. serviceman in Vietnam. It is the brush-fire escalation of white heroin usage and addiction among our military forces in Vietnam which has created the sense of urgency and alarm which is shared equally by the administration, the Congress, and by the American people. Our concern is strengthened by the fact that now, in contrast with earlier practice, there is evidence that Southeast Asian heroin is increasingly finding its way into the United States through a variety of ingenious smuggling methods.

We greatly welcome recent moves to stem the flow of heroin to the United States from Turkey via France and the announcement of the Government of Turkey to outlaw opium production by 1972. We see as a result, however, a corresponding intensified effort by drug traffickers to concentrate more on East Asia. Unless we and the Asian nations take positive actions to prevent such a change of venue of these unscrupulous operations, much of the expected effect of the Turkish ban on production and increased pressure on European trafficking will be lost.

The enormity and complexity of the East Asian drug problem have become particularly apparent to us in the past few months, when drugs in increasing amounts have come into the hands of some of our servicemen in Vietnam. As a result, there have been a number of moves by both the legislative and executive branches to investigate the problem and seek corrective action. These moves include:

The visit to Southeast Asia in February 1971 by an interdepartment task force and the subsequent report of this group which focused attention on the rapid escalation in heroin abuse among U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Publication in April 1971 of the report entitled "Inquiry into Alleged Drug Abuse in the Armed Services" by a special committee of the House Armed Services Committee.

A regional conference held in Bangkok in mid-April 1971 including all U.S. agencies responsible for combating the drug problem.

The April 1971 visit to Southeast Asia by Congressmen Murphy and Steele of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. We are giving careful thought to their comprehensive report "The World Heroin Problem."

The working visit to nine East Asian countries in May 1971 by BNDD Director Ingersoll and Special Assistant for Narcotics Measures to the Secretary of State, Mr. Wellman. Discussions were held with senior Asian and U.S. officials.

The annual meeting of U.S. chiefs of mission in East Asia at Baguio in mid-May 1971. The drug problem was a key agenda item.

The visit to Southeast Asian countries in late May 1971 by Under Secretary of State Irwin and myself. The drug problem was a major topic of discussion with leaders of Southeastern Asian countries.

The recall by President Nixon of envoys to countries where drugs are a particular problem for a June 14 discussion of the problem with senior officials of the administration.

The presentation to the Congress on June 17 of the President's message on drug abuse.

The meeting in Bangkok on June 18, 1971, of U.S. Ambassadors and other senior officials in East Asia to consider and recommend actions to combat the problem.

These events highlight the growing awareness and concern over this situation. Related to these developments have been on-going discussions throughout Asia involving our Ambassadors and Asian leaders at the highest levels and leading toward effective measures for dealing with illegal drugs.

In the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs I have designated a senior officer to devote his full time to drug matters. A similar designation has been made in the East Asian Bureau of AID.

Earlier this week an interagency working group met under the chairmanship of the East Asian Bureau to take up on a priority basis the recommendations of the Bangkok ambassadorial meeting and to begin work on comprehensive plans to combat the problem in East Asia.

Thus we have been moving with deliberate speed toward the establishment of programs designed to attack the heroin problem throughout East Asia. As we increase our knowledge and delve more deeply into the problem, it is apparent that there are no simple nor quick solutions to this situation which involves political, social, economic, and legal problems of a most sensitive and complicated nature.

A key ingredient in effectively attacking the problem is an Asian leadership convinced that the trafficking in hard drugs is not simply an American problem, but one which knows no borders and respects no nation. Over 50 percent of Asia's population is under the age of 18. As we reduce our presence in Vietnam through the Vietnamization program heroin traffickers will undoubtedly seek new customers for their drugs. The youth of Asia are a prime target and this disturbing possibility is beginning to come home to Asian leaders.

As East Asian leaders increasingly come to understand that they share in what is an international problem of the gravest nature, we see a corresponding increase in their willingness to cooperate in attacking the problem. This is as it should be.

While we will work together with the East Asians and assist where necessary, positive results can only come about from Asian initiatives and actions, and to this end we look to the countries where the drug problem is found to apply their limited resources and capabilities to the greatest extent possible toward elimination of the drug traffic.

We recognize this to be a problem of major proportions requiring the complete cooperation of Americans and Asians alike. So far only a beginning has been made in tackling this problem, but we shall soon see more positive results. I am sure, as the full weight of U.S. and Asian resources is brought to bear in combating this deadly threat.

Some positive actions are being taken by Southeast Asian Governments.

In South Vietnam, top Vietnamese and U.S. officials are in close touch on the entire drug problem. In recent weeks, rigid control measures have been introduced by the Government of Vietnam at

Tan Son Nhut Airport, a major point of entry of heroin, and at other airports and seaports. A number of officials have been removed or transferred.

Laos is moving rapidly toward passage of legislation which would outlaw all forms of drug traffic. Armed with this legislation, the Government of Laos will for the first time have the authority to initiate positive steps to stamp out the production and traffic in opium and its derivatives.

In Thailand we are working together on a continuing basis with Thai officials at the highest levels, to plan and coordinate actions aimed at eliminating all elements of the drug traffic. Thai laws are comprehensive and strict and, together with the tradition of cooperation with the United Nations and the United States, provide the solid base needed to attack the problem.

What I have hoped to convey briefly to you this morning is the rapidly growing sense of awareness, urgency, and concern which the drug problem in East Asia has generated among both U.S. and Asian leaders. I can assure this committee that we are pursuing this problem as a matter of top priority, and that we will continue and intensify our effort to insure that our resources and those of the Asian nations themselves are used effectively against all drug abuse among both Asians and Americans.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Secretary Hillenbrand.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN J. HILLENBRAND, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. HILLENBRAND. Mr. Chairman, France has been a traditional source of heroin coming to the United States. Morphine base is smuggled to laboratories in southern France, where it is converted to heroin. Several laboratories exist in southern France, but they have proven most difficult to track down. They typically occupy no more space than a small garage.

The growth of a domestic drug abuse problem in France in the past several years has created public concern there and has contributed to the great increase in official French cooperation with the United States in the drive against illicit heroin production and international trafficking in drugs.

France and the United States have cooperated for a number of years on the problem of illegal drug trafficking. The basis for a closer and greatly expanded cooperative relationship was laid in late 1969, when President Nixon wrote to President Pompidou explaining his deep concern over the problem and suggesting that they discuss the matter during Pompidou's forthcoming visit to the United States.

President Pompidou replied that he shared the President's concern and agreed to put the item on their agenda. This exchange also facilitated the creation of a Franco-American Intergovernmental Committee on Drug Abuse, which now meets on a regular quarterly basis.

The drug problem was discussed during President Pompidou's state visit in February-March 1970, and Foreign Minister Schumann indicated an awareness of the need to enlarge the French program. French Interior Minister Marcellin's visit to the United States in

July 1970 was largely devoted to the drug problem and helped to cement the enhanced cooperation between our two countries. As a result of the agreements reached at these meetings, the French Government during 1970 increased the total number of agents dealing with narcotics traffic almost fourfold.

In order to facilitate the expanded cooperation and liaison between the French Police Judiciaire and the BNDD, a formal agreement was worked out that clarified the responsibilities and obligations of each side and established the basis for a concerted joint effort between the two agencies. This agreement for the "coordination of preventive and repressive action against illicit narcotic and dangerous drug traffic" was signed in Paris by Attorney General Mitchell and Minister of the Interior Marcellin on February 26, 1971.

The French Police Judiciaire are in charge of these efforts in France. The French enforcement agency increased the number of agents dealing with narcotics traffic from a total of 28 to 87 in the course of 1970, concentrated in its Paris headquarters and at Marseilles and Nice. The French also have two liaison personnel at the BNDD regional headquarters in New York. The BNDD has correspondingly increased its staff in France to five agents in Paris and two in Marseilles.

The French are a member of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs and participate in its programs. The French Government passed legislation last year, which restructured the penalty provisions for illegal drug activities and established prison sentences of up to 20 years.

Franco-American efforts in the drug field are carried out both through daily operational cooperation between the French Police Judiciaire and BNDD personnel at Paris and Marseilles and through the quarterly meeting of the principals where major programs and policies are developed.

In the technical field, the BNDD has furnished training assistance and certain equipment to the French; and exchanges are continuing regarding new and highly sophisticated methods and techniques.

The United States will continue to exchange suggestions with the French authorities, designed to intensify the cooperative efforts in controlling illicit production and traffic in heroin and other dangerous drugs. The exchange of visits by Attorney General Mitchell and Minister of Interior Marcellin, and the signing of the formal agreement on cooperation, on February 26, 1971, signal the importance attached by our two countries to this problem.

Illegal drug operations are international in scope. Information developed in one country may lead to arrests and seizures anywhere along the path of the illegal narcotics as it is processed and shipped to the United States. Recognizing that one cannot always pinpoint the major responsibility for a seizure or arrest, the results are so far encouraging. As a result of cooperation with French authorities and operations in France, seizures of morphine base and heroin (1 pound of morphine base converts to 1 pound of heroin) have been: 1969, 992 pounds; 1970, 1,014 pounds; 1971 (6 months), 2,864 pounds.

I have just received another message indicating that that last figure can be increased further because on June 21 in Montreal, Canada, acting on information furnished by the French Police Judiciaire, an

additional 50 kilos of heroin were uncovered in a vehicle there and several arrests were made at the time so that figure of 2,864 for the first 6 months can be raised to 2,974 pounds. When you compare that figure with the figures Assistant Secretary Rossides gave, it is a rather impressive demonstration when compared with previous years that some progress is being made and that the augmentation of the French police forces is having some effect.

To continue with the statement—

In the spring of 1970 an attempted suicide by an American university student while on an LSD trip brought to the attention of the Luxembourg Government and the American Embassy in Luxembourg the fact that a drug subculture was established in Luxembourg.

Investigation of the matter also revealed that drugs were being sold and consumed at the junior high and high school at a nearby Air Force base in Bitburg, Germany.

During the course of the investigation that followed, it became evident that there was scant expertise among Luxembourg police and medical officials about the problems of drug abuse. Additionally, existing Luxembourg drug laws made no distinction between sale and use and provided maximum penalties of a \$40 fine and 1 month in jail.

Our Embassy and the Government of Luxembourg, realizing the need for immediate action, organized an action program designed to promote official expertise in, and public knowledge of, the dangers of drug abuse.

The Embassy organized a briefing for top level Luxembourg officials by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. BNDD lectures and movies were given to the American community in Luxembourg and arrangements were made for the Chief of the Luxembourg Sureté to attend an intensive course in Washington last summer sponsored by the BNDD. A new drug abuse law distinguishing between sale and use and providing for rehabilitation programs for victims of drug abuse has been introduced in the Luxembourg Legislature.

The second part of the action program centered on a two-part, multinational drug symposium. The first session took place in October 1970 under the sponsorship of the Luxembourg Government at the initiative and with the close cooperation of the American Embassy.

The meeting studied the law enforcement aspects of the drug problem with police officers of six nations represented (Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the United States). Our BNDD was primarily responsible for the conduct of the meeting, which lasted 4 days and received very favorable reaction from both participants and press.

Drug Symposium II was held on June 19-30, 1971, and was directed toward the medical aspects of the drug problem: prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. It was the logical continuation of the first session and again represented a joint effort on the part of the Luxembourg Government and the U.S. Government.

On the initiative of our Embassy, the Luxembourg Government agreed to sponsor the meeting and to invite nine other nations to attend (eight of which ultimately sent representatives). A team of experts from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare attended and played an important role in the successful meeting.

This very fruitful cooperation by the two governments will continue. A special effort is now being undertaken to assist the Luxembourg radio-television network to obtain films for showing to the Luxembourg public on the national television.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Davies.

STATEMENT OF RODGER P. DAVIES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:

I welcome this opportunity to make a statement about the problem of illicit production and traffic in narcotics in the Near East and South Asian area. I can report to you today that in Turkey, the most important country insofar as the United States is concerned because it is at present considered to be the largest single source of opium being used for the manufacture of heroin reaching the United States, a major breakthrough has occurred. As you know, we have been engaged for some time in cooperative efforts with the Government of Turkey to eliminate the illegal diversion of opium from Turkey's legitimate production.

In late 1968 a \$3 million AID loan was extended, which provided equipment to improve the Government's enforcement program and to develop adequate and financially attractive substitute crops.

Since 1967 Turkey has also reduced the number of provinces where opium poppy planting was legally permitted (from 21 in 1967 to four for the fall 1971 planting). It took this action to reduce the enforcement problem to manageable proportions and to concentrate the Government's collection effort in a smaller and contiguous area. However, despite substantial effort, Turkey was unable to prevent opium-smuggling.

Against this background, the new Turkish Prime Minister, Nihat Erim, who when he assumed office just 4 months ago publicly declared that it was the policy of his government to eliminate the illegal flow of opium from Turkey, on June 30 took what we believe is a courageous and statesmanlike decision to end all opium production after next year's summer harvest.

Under Turkish law, farmers must be given 1 year's notice before opium poppy planting can be prohibited in areas where cultivation has been permitted.

In a public statement explaining his government's decree banning opium production, Prime Minister Erim said he will take every measure to eliminate smuggling. Since the future amount the farmer will be paid by the Turkish Government will depend on the quantity of opium turned into the government monopoly from this year's harvest, there will be a built-in incentive for farmers to present the entire production from this year's crop.

We have also been encouraged by other recent evidence of the Turkish Government's intention to prevent opium from entering illicit channels. In mid-June a strict opium licensing and control bill was passed by the National Assembly of the Parliament. It is now under consideration in the Senate, and we anticipate it will be passed this month by that body.¹

¹ The bill was enacted into law on August 25, 1971.

Other measures which the Turkish Government has taken to insure collection of the total production from this year's harvest will result, we believe, in a much improved performance. Among these are: Training of additional agents, an increase in the purchase price of the opium gum, provision for advance cash payments to the farmers, collection of the gum at the farm immediately after harvest, and improved coordination of the elements involved in the collection.

Enforcement efforts, with assistance from U.S. BNDD personnel, are also showing improved results. The amount of opiates seized during the first 4 months of 1971 (equivalent to 574 pounds of pure heroin, which would have been worth about \$60 million in the U.S. market) is more than double that seized during the entire year of 1970. It is also more than the total amount seized by U.S. enforcement agencies within the United States and at our borders during these same 4 months.

In the four provinces legally permitted to plant in the fall of 1971, the Prime Minister has announced that he will undertake a program to induce farmers to voluntarily abstain from planting.

Prime Minister Erim recognized that the cost and difficulties of controlling opium cultivation were greater than the economic importance it has for the Anatolian farmer, great as this is. His courageous and statesmanlike action will greatly help to reduce and to disrupt the existing pattern of illicit international trafficking, and we hope it will provide an example for other countries.

I would like to briefly cover the situation in Iran, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, other countries in the region where substantial amounts of opium are being produced.

Iran, which is an authorized opium producer under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics, resumed production in 1969 after a 15-year hiatus, to satisfy its own internal requirements. Like the United States, Iran is a victim country, having about 330,000 opium addicts and estimated 50,000 heroin addicts. Iran has a strong antismuggling law which imposes the death penalty on violators—more than 90 persons have been executed since 1969—and it has instituted a control system intended to prevent illegal diversion. At present there is no evidence to suggest that Iranian-grown opium is entering the illicit international market.

India is by far the largest legal producer of opium, accounting for about three-quarters of the world legal output and exports. Its annual production ranges from 500 to 1,000 metric tons. However, only a small amount finds its way into the international illicit traffic—an estimated 5 to 10 tons to the Arabian Peninsula and the same amount to the Far East. This is largely due to India's relatively effective system of controls and incentives which results in the bulk of the raw opium gum being sold to the government. The balance, together with small amounts smuggled in from neighboring countries, is used internally by an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 opium addicts.

There are no reliable statistics on opium production or trade in Afghanistan, but annual production has been estimated at 100-125 metric tons. Opium poppies are primarily grown in tribal areas of eastern Afghanistan where administrative control is not as strong as in other parts of the country. Smuggling is a way of life for these tribal people, and they live quite independently.

The difficult problem here will be to help the government establish and enforce an effective program, given the nature of the problem and Afghanistan's limited financial and administrative resources.

Pakistan has a licensed production of about 10 metric tons. However, illicit production has been estimated as high as 175-200 tons. As in the case of Afghanistan, most of this production takes place in remote regions, in part tribal areas unadministered by central authority.

We have made representations to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding opium suppression. We plan now to have more detailed discussions concerning how we, and multilateral agencies, can assist in improving the organization, training, and equipping of enforcement and control agencies, and in encouraging programs of crop substitution.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to answer any questions I can.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Could I ask the somewhat unusual? Have you ever met or talked with an addict or former addict, particularly young people? Have any of you ever had that opportunity?

One of the events that impressed me during the course of these hearings came 2 days ago when Congressman Rangel who represents the Harlem District of Manhattan, talked of the total inability to live a normal life in that community as a result of heroin availability. His own children are just not safe. He said that the problem is of such incredible urgency and desperation that he himself cared not at all about the security of the United States vis-a-vis other countries such as Turkey if that country did anything to help destroy his children and the children of his neighbors.

Yesterday, Senator Hughes, who is chairman of the relevant committee that has jurisdiction in this area, produced maps and charts showing the number of deaths in the city of New York which, even to myself, a lifelong resident, was shocking. He produced maps and charts of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area and described shocking conditions in that community.

I have visited heroin treatment centers in the city of New York and have seen 14-, 15-, 16-year-old kids that were shriveled up and whose lifestyle was totally stunted.

I think one of the problems—and we are all guilty—Congress and the executive branch—is that we never dedicated the energy or felt the urgency or the desperation during the growth of this heroin epidemic.

I think that perhaps some of the negotiations we have had with foreign governments have not been as vigorous as the situation warranted. One of the reasons is that none of us either on this side of the table or you three gentlemen have ever smelled what life was like in those areas where heroin addiction has become prevalent.

What I am going to ask is this: What do you three think of the idea of joining me and those members of the committee who are available to visit Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant and south Bronx 2 weeks from today so you could meet and talk with some heroin-addicted people, if we are not attacked on the street, but we could go to places like Odyssey House. I know it is not commonplace and I am somewhat embarrassed at making this suggestion.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I would be very glad to join.

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I think I will be out of the country on that date, but if something separately could be arranged, I would welcome the opportunity to do that.

Mr. DAVIES. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It will not be a pleasant day. There will be no hospitality and you will not enjoy lunch, and there will be no wine and no placecards. It will be a very gruesome experience, but I do think it would be in the national interest if we just all had our spines screwed a little tighter. That is one way of doing it.¹

Secretary Green, Congressman Steele said recently at this subcommittee meeting that General Dzu is the chief trafficker in narcotics in Vietnam. Attorney General Mitchell said before the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee that he had the names of those people but was not prepared to release them. Is there anything you want to tell us about information you have had or action you are preparing to take or have taken?

Mr. GREEN. With regard to the charges against General Dzu, we just do not know if there is a basis for these charges. I inquired last night by immediate cable to Saigon to find out what the story was. I just had a little slip of paper delivered to me, almost anticipating your question, Mr. Chairman. It says that the Government of Vietnam spokesman said the charges against General Dzu are being investigated. We have no information yet, and South Vietnamese spokesmen said no comment with regard to the allegations against them. He did go on to stress that a major effort has been launched against the drug problem.

Could I add here the South Vietnamese Government is fully alert to the strong feelings that we have on this subject, and they themselves have their own compelling reasons for moving, too. As I said earlier, their youth and their soldiers can be affected and they are giving this the same high priority as they are giving to the pacification program itself.

They have now removed either for corruption or inefficiency or other reasons a lot of officials. In other words, they are putting the best men they have onto the problem.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. As far as General Dzu is concerned, all you can report is that they have investigated?

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You have no information of your own?

Mr. GREEN. I have no information of my own.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Has the Attorney General communicated the names to you?

Mr. GREEN. I assume the Attorney General was referring to the people who had already been removed, and there are others who are now being investigated by the South Vietnamese Government.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have any figures about the total number of American troops involved in heroin addiction in Southeast Asia?

Mr. GREEN. I heard the colloquy while waiting here between you and Mr. Rossides, and I have nothing to add to that.

I might point out that many of the Armed Forces, when they arrive in Vietnam had already had a drug experience, and I have heard

¹ The chairman of the subcommittee, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Representatives Morgan E. Murphy and John Buchanan, together with John J. Brady from the Foreign Affairs Committee staff; Assistant Secretaries Martin J. Hillenbrand and Marshall Green, Messrs. Harvey R. Wellman and Rodger P. Davies from the Department of State; and Messrs. Andrew C. Tartaglino and Robert Rosenthal from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, visited New York on July 23, 1971. Their findings substantiated the testimony of witnesses concerning conditions in New York.

figures as high as 50 to 62 percent, and that one of the tragedies of this is they have never been exposed to this pure heroin, so when they take a shot of that, they are hooked, if, indeed, they survive.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hillenbrand, I have heard reports that West Germany is becoming a conduit country for some of this opium and heroin on its way to Marseilles. Is there any truth to this?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I have heard this rumor, too, but there has been no concrete evidence of processing in West Germany.

In this telegram that came in within the last 24 hours, it is reported that on June 21, 1971, in Munich, BNDD agents from Paris and the Frankfurt office directly assisted the police in the arrest of a Syrian and an Iranian national. They confiscated more than 200 pounds of morphine base. This would seem to suggest the answer to your question is yes, since things are toughening up in France, the natural tendency is to flow through other channels.

Obviously, the problem has not been as acute as in the case of France, but we will be in the process of making arrangements through the BNDD and the Embassy and the Germans if this is a pattern of the future so it will not be permitted to develop on any large scale.

The German police are already organized in such a way to enable them to make seizures and process information usefully that comes to them from outside sources.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hillenbrand, are you satisfied the French are doing enough in view of the severity of the problem?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. We, of course, rely largely on what we are told by BNDD about the technical police aspects of the French cooperation. I do think there has been not only a heightened willingness at the political level as the awareness of the nature of the problem has increased but also a willingness down the line through the Ministry of Interior, and so on, to provide more personnel. Now, whether these efforts are adequate to meet the actual needs of the situation is a judgment that only the BNDD could make. It maintains daily liaison with the organization.

All I can say is that at the political level, the French Government has proved exceedingly cooperative. If there are specific, concrete requests that we have to make, they will, I am sure, be equally receptive to these requests.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Davies, I am told that the Turkish Assembly passed this law and that it becomes law automatically if the Turkish Senate takes no action; is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. The Senate is expected to take action. As I understand it, it will become law if action is not taken, but we expect that the licensing law will be ratified by the Senate.

Now, the decree which Prime Minister Erim promulgated at the end of June is Turkish law. He acted under existing legislation which authorizes the Government to set the terms for poppy production.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How many crops will develop in Turkey that will be available for distribution to the heroin market from today on?

Mr. DAVIES. The harvest is underway at the present time as is the collection effort. There will be one planting in the fall of this year, in September, and a spring planting at the time of the rains. So, the

harvest which will take place in July and August of 1972 will be the last harvest of opium gum in Turkey.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. So, there will be two more crops?

Mr. DAVIES. It is actually one crop. They plant at the time of the rains.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They are harvesting right now?

Mr. DAVIES. They are.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And there is another planting, so there will be two to provide substantial quantities of heroin for the next 2 years.

Mr. DAVIES. This is coupled by increased measures of the Turkish Government to prevent leakage into illicit channels.

As I noted in my statement, already in this year the measures which have been innovated have shown very promising results.

The fact that the Turkish Government is willing to pay farmers on the basis of the harvest they turn in this year for not planting during the next authorized season, I think, will pay off in terms of a substantially reduced yield and a more complete collection by the official Turkish Land Office.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did we make any representations to the Turkish Government soliciting them or urging them not to permit the next planting?

Mr. DAVIES. The Turkish Government was bound by law which was passed by the Turkish Parliament to give 12 months' notice of planting restrictions. At the end of June of 1970, the decree promulgated by the government of Prime Minister Demirel reduced the provinces where cultivation was authorized to seven and said that in the following season it would be further reduced to four.

So, the Government was legally obliged by the June 1971 decree to authorize cultivation in those four provinces and to state that further production would not be permitted following the harvesting of that crop.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much assistance are we providing Turkey in this fiscal year?

Mr. DAVIES. We have several programs going, Mr. Rosenthal. There is of course, a military assistance program. We have provided Public Law 480 wheat. Economic aid runs about \$40 million.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Military assistance is confidential?

Mr. DAVIES. It approximates \$100 million a year, sir.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. So, we are giving the Turkish Government this year about \$140 million?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And the estimated cost of the opium crop is how much?

Mr. DAVIES. \$3 million to \$5 million.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. I would like to ask Mr. Green a question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

You say that in Thailand we are working together on a continuing basis with the Thai officials in coordinated actions aimed at eliminating all elements of the drug traffic. In what way are we doing this?

Mr. GREEN. The principal problem, of course, relates to the production by the Mao tribesmen up in the north where the writ of government does not extend. The Thai Government has a program through which they are going to try to give alternate means of livelihood to the people in the hills, and we are helping their Thai police with our assistance program.

So, in those ways, there will be assistance. But I think it will also be principally in intercepting and stopping the flow from that Golden Triangle that is so inaccessible. This will involve a whole series of steps. It would include amassing intelligence and making effective use of the intelligence as to what the movements are and how to intercept them. This would require the full cooperation of the Thais. This would be basically their operation. It is also a question of where the acetic anhydride and other types of chemicals that are used in the refinement of heroin are originating, and intercepting those shipments.

There is a question of aerial surveillance so you know where the poppy fields are. There is a whole series of measures being taken all across the board.

Mr. BURKE. I understand there was quite a black-market operation in dope in Thailand and it was not too difficult to acquire.

Now, if the laws are as strict as you say, why are there open traffickers in dope?

Mr. GREEN. The laws are stiff and there is a new awareness in tracking down. Our views and assertiveness on this problem do carry weight. But I think the Thais also realize this new heroin presents a great threat to their own young people. In other words, I think there is a parallel growing awareness among the Asian officials along with ours as to the gravity of the problem.

Mr. BURKE. Let's take South Vietnam, particularly Saigon, where there have continually been notorious operations. If these notorious black-market operations have been in existence and they have been tolerated apparently by our own military, our State Department and our own people there as well as the Government officials themselves, how can we possibly imagine we are going to get any cooperation with regard to the drug problem there with the enormous amount of money involved in the drug traffic?

Mr. GREEN. I think you have phrased the problem very well. It is a tough one and it will require tough measures in cracking down and severe penalties and the enforcement of severe penalties.

The first step is being taken and that is to put an effective inspection on at the airports and other places where drugs enter Vietnam. As far as we know, there is no production or manufacture of heroin in Vietnam itself. It is brought in from various sources. So, controlling your airports and other means of entry becomes terribly important at the same time as you suggest. Mr. Burke, it is terribly important that they root out all types of public officials and whoever is gaining from this trafficking. My guess is they are going to do this. They know how we feel about it and we believe they feel that strongly themselves. Throughout my remarks I have emphasized not approaching the problem as though they were doing us a favor. This is vital in terms of

their own interest, and I think this is perhaps truer in Asia than in Turkey. I understand in Turkey there is no local consumption of these illicit drugs, but in the Far East there is. There was already this drug culture going on in the overseas Chinese communities for many years. When you talk about countenancing this for all these years, that has to be borne in mind. It was countenanced by the governments, and the victims of opium in particular were set aside in little isolated ghetto communities and isolated from the rest of society. So, it is really a revolutionary situation now, and I think it does call for revolutionary methods.

I have tried to convey through my remarks the gravity with which we hold this problem—we all do—and I think the South Vietnamese Government does also. But it is the reversal of the attitude of the past.

You used the term tolerating or tolerant in terms of the Department of Defense. I don't think we are tolerant. I don't think we were aware of what was going on. This has hit us rather recently.

Mr. BURKE. All you have to do is walk down the streets of Saigon and you would be aware. This is not a new situation.

Mr. GREEN. I agree it is now.

Mr. BURKE. You would be walking down the street with blinders on if you could not be aware of it.

Mr. GREEN. We were not aware of the gravity of the problem a year or 2 years ago. I recall some people coming back from East Asia reporting how this problem had hit the communities where our troops were located. Obviously, it has been going on to some extent before and obviously the servicemen arriving in East Asia had had some experience, but the problem is that this is pure heroin which is arriving there now.

Mr. BURKE. It seems rather strange that if the military had been aware that 40 percent of those sent over would go to an area where dope was easy to acquire, they would not have been sent into that area in the first place. Perhaps troops could have been moved from the European area where it was not so prevalent.

Why does it seem to be our custom to make things easier for those we know who have a problem, at least in the military?

Mr. GREEN. I can't answer that question. This is, of course, a question of selecting our military for going overseas. This is something obviously that will have to be taken into account in the future.

Mr. BURKE. As a practical matter, you will have to agree, if the situation goes for the better and they stop the poppy production in Turkey and actually stop that source, there have to be measures taken in the Far East.

Mr. GREEN. I fully agree with that and I said that in my opening remarks. In my opinion, it constituted a new hazard in that part of the world simply because the problem had been alleviated elsewhere.

Mr. BURKE. Doesn't it have to be done with more than just rhetoric? It has to be done with concrete methods so you can say this is what is being done and we are going to do this before it starts.

Mr. GREEN. Absolutely.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Vander Jagt.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Earlier today it was testified that customs officials have been spectacularly successful in comparison to a few years ago.

On page 2 of your statement, you say now in contrast to other practice, there is evidence that Southeast Asian heroin is increasingly finding its way into the United States. Measured in terms of results at least as it applies to the heroin from Southeast Asia, our efforts there would be less than satisfactory. The situation is growing worse as it applies to Southeast Asia.

Mr. GREEN. Precisely. That has a great deal to do with the fact that the servicemen coming back, friends, and all the rest of it, so this becomes a new medium for transfer.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. It does not necessarily reflect on the efforts of the customs officials but it reflects on the nature of the problem.

Mr. GREEN. And the expanding proportion of the problems.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. If we are measuring results as applied to Southeast Asia—

Mr. GREEN. We cannot boast about the results so far. It is too soon.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Throughout your testimony, you emphasized that East Asian leaders came to the gravity of the problem because it is beginning to affect their young so that now they are cooperating with us. It seems to me before we could gain their confidence, they had to realize it would be to their benefit and their own children. Wasn't there any way to show them before that it was to their own self-interests to help thrust aside these problems before threatening withholding of aid, and so on? Wasn't there any leverage we could give them before they realized their own children would be involved? Wasn't there leverage that we could have exercised that we did not exercise?

Mr. GREEN. The awareness of this problem only hit us in recent months. In retrospect, obviously, it would have been desirable if we had moved in on this sooner. I guess we can all share a degree of blame in that.

What I was suggesting in my opening comments was that we did see this. It was almost a brushfire, sudden resurgence of drug use that was affecting our people: once we detected it I think both branches of Government have moved with alacrity in trying to approach it. If the peddlers are denied the Turkish production, they are likely to be in our area, and we don't know how effective the steps are going to be. I know all of the different steps, some of which I cannot say here, that will be taken but one of the difficulties we have in East Asia that we do not have in Turkey is that we will have great difficulty, I think, getting at the sources of production—the poppy fields themselves. I expect we will be able to do something about that, but I think our main effort is going to have to be directed against transportation and sale and consumption of the drugs.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. You also mentioned in your statement that success in South Vietnam will depend upon the close cooperation of U.S. officials and South Vietnamese officials.

You also identified that the South Vietnamese are conducting an investigation into the charges that have been leveled against General Dzu. Certainly if success depends on close cooperation, and certainly if a very top official is, in fact, himself engaged in the smuggling

business, it does not appear we will have the cooperation that is necessary for success.

My question is this: Are we going to merely rely on an investigation conducted by South Vietnam or will we independently try to ascertain the truth or falsity of the charges against General Dzu?

Mr. GREEN. Both.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Secretary Hillenbrand, do I understand the French now permit U.S. investigators on French soil to conduct investigations?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. They are working very closely together. We don't have all that many BNDD people, but there are five in Paris and two in Marseilles. How they work on a day-to-day basis, I am not quite sure, but obviously they work closely together and they exchange information. The effective police action—that is, the execution of police power and the staging of arrests, and so on—has to be done by the French police because we don't have any writ of authority. Nevertheless, I think the symbiosis is so close that that is not a problem.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. The mere fact that U.S. investigators are operating on French soil indicates some type of diplomatic breakthrough. Isn't it unusual for one country to permit foreign investigators?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I think that is an indication of their willingness to acknowledge that there is a real problem.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. When did our investigators start operating over there?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I think they have been there for several years, but the present group is the largest that there has been, and I am sure there would be no difficulty if we wanted to put more people there.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. How many pounds of heroin were seized in all of 1969?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. In 1969 it was 992 pounds of heroin and morphine base.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. How many pounds in the first 6 months of 1971?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. 2,974 pounds of heroin and morphine base.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Secretary Davies, I congratulate our Government for the agreement that Turkey has just announced, but my question is this: We have had testimony in these hearings suggesting the Congress should pass a law which indicates that if in our judgment a country has not made reasonable efforts to stamp out the illegal trafficking in heroin which originates within their borders, that there should automatically and totally be a ban on all further aid to that country. In your opinion, if such a law had been in existence over the past couple of years, would that have hastened the Turkish concession or would it have made the Turkish concession impossible to achieve?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not think it would have made it impossible to achieve the Turkish law; I do not think it would have been helpful.

The problem in Turkey, and as has been indicated by Secretary Green, there is no drug addiction in Turkey, is that here is a long-established socioeconomic pattern. For over four centuries the Turkish farmer has been raising poppies, taking the oil for cooking purposes, and taking the black seeds for flavoring. I think we even use these in this country. The problem is that poppies are planted and harvested

at a time when the Turkish peasant isn't doing anything else. It is a labor-intensive operation. They have to go out and make an incision in the head of the poppy and let the sap ooze out and then scrape the residue off. It is not an economic operation that yields very much to the peasant. But during the particular time poppies can be planted and harvested, the peasant and his family have nothing else to do. So, this is a very delicate internal problem for the Turks. The Turkish Prime Minister took this decision, I am convinced, not on grounds of possible economic pressure. He took it because the Turks value the alliance between the United States and the Government of Turkey. Also, they recognize their international responsibility to prevent the illicit diversion of this drug.

In sum, I think in most cases assistance is probably necessary rather than a threat to cut off assistance.

Let me be frank with you. I am very concerned that the Turkish action may increase pressures against countries in my region which are not as developed as is Turkey where notwithstanding the best will of government, it is going to be difficult to control the activities of tribes in the border areas. It is for this reason that we and other agencies of Government are looking at the results of pressures of these international thugs that may begin operating against even India where the controls have been very good. There may be more pressures against diversions from India.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. I am certain it is a delicate political matter in Turkey, and I admire his ability in making that decision, and I admire our ability to induce that decision.

But if they are weighing the loss of a \$300 million crop against \$1 or \$2 billion in foreign aid, would that not have induced them to arrive at that decision a little earlier, and wouldn't that same kind of threat rather than inducement work in the other countries for which you are responsible?

Mr. DAVIES. Based on my 15 years living in the Arab area, I feel these Governments do not react completely because of economic motivation. There is a great sense of national pride, and in the case of Turkey there was no lack of will on the part of the previous government.

Again, paralleling your question to Secretary Hillenbrand, we have had six BNDD agents working with the Turkish gendarmerie, and it will be increased to 12. It was the nature of the problem that made it difficult. The Turks for their own reasons and, I think, for their concern over Turkey's image in the world, have taken this very statesman-like step.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. What about changing the bill a little bit? In fact, there are bills of this nature already introduced, not that the ban would be automatic or mandatory, but if the country did not take some reasonable steps, you would withhold funds until they took such efforts.

You mentioned Turkey cooperated because they realized it was a concern to the United States and they wanted to be a good ally and friend. Wouldn't that be a way for the rest of the countries that you are responsible for, for getting the message across that this Congress is very much concerned about this problem?

Mr. DAVIES. I am sure that that message is well transmitted. I think giving the President authorization to use his discretion would be very helpful.

I have just seen a copy of the bill. I see it does have Presidential discretion. I think speaking as a father, in cases where foreign governments knowingly permit illicit diversion, we must move to stronger measures. But as a general proposition, I believe that through cooperation, technical assistance which perhaps is even more important than the economic input, we can achieve our goals, at least in the countries with which I am familiar.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, and I think all three of you have been most helpful in your contribution to this subcommittee.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I want to thank all of you for taking the time out to join with us. Mr. Brady tells me I sort of sandbagged you to come to heroin land on July 23. Rather than retreating, I am going to ask Mr. Wellman to join us. You, too, can come to New York City to meet some heroin addicts.

Mr. WELLMAN. I have already been up there, but I will be happy to join you on the 23d.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We are going to invite Mr. Rossides and Mr. Tagliano to come with us, also.*

Thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(The subcommittee adjourned at 12:15 p.m., to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

*See footnote 1 on p. 157.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

FRIDAY, JULY 30, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:40 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.

We are continuing this morning with a matter of great interest to the subcommittee, international drug traffic and trade, and what we can do about it in terms of Executive action and legislation.

We are very pleased this morning to have two of our distinguished colleagues, Congressman Roush and Congressman Sisk, with us, both of whom exhibited a longlasting and deep concern over this subject and have been out in front in trying to get us to do what ought to be done in this area. We are very pleased to hear from both of you. I assume on the basis of seniority more than anything else, Mr. Sisk, we would be very pleased to hear from you first.

STATEMENT OF HON. B. F. SISK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. SISK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me commend the committee on the efforts that have been made in this series of hearings which you are conducting.

Let me first say I do not claim to be any expert on narcotics or narcotics control, but I am, as I am sure the committee is, gravely concerned.

Mr. Chairman, the full committee was kind enough to write into the foreign assistance bill of 1971 a provision which directs the President to suspend all military and economic aid and military and agricultural sales to a country when he determines that country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotics produced or processed there from being sold to official U.S. Government personnel or their dependents or from illegally entering the United States.

I favor this provision, although I have a suggestion which would go farther in correcting drug abuse among young American servicemen in Vietnam.

The excellent committee report on the world heroin problem discloses that the main supply of heroin imported illegally into the

United States comes from Europe through South America and neighboring countries although the Far East may become a more important supplier.

However, the greater number of new heroin users probably will come from the ranks of discharged servicemen who have picked up the habit in Vietnam.

Although the recently inaugurated amnesty and treatment program begun in the Armed Forces will help, it is almost certain there will be many relapses by men who thought they had shaken the habit and cured themselves.

My proposal gets to the specifics of this problem. It would prevent servicemen in Vietnam from obtaining drugs unless they are prepared to go to great lengths to get them. It would certainly prevent involuntary addiction by removing an easy source of supply.

This proposal is to beef up the Public Safety Division of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Vietnam with a specific directive from Congress to assist the Vietnamese in controlling the drug traffic to American soldiers. The provision of restricting aid to the country could give force to the law enforcement attempt.

The military services have taken steps to correct the situation in the Armed Forces. The civilian agencies have not shown the same urgency toward the problem. This, too, was noted by the committee study.

The heroin problem can be solved, insofar as our forces are concerned in Vietnam, only if all branches of the U.S. Government there work hand in hand, if that is the correct description, with Vietnamese narcotics agents.

More than 2 months ago I sought the aid of the U.S. Agency for International Development in drafting legislation to accomplish the purpose I have outlined. Several telephone conversations produced information and also a noted resistance to legislation which would directly hit the problem.

I then wrote to the Administrator of AID and received an answer that the administration would submit a proposal to Congress which would authorize AID appropriations to be used in the drug control program in Vietnam. This still fails to get to the root of an immediate problem which can have broad and tragic consequences to the civilian population of the United States.

I had hoped I would have AID assistance so that the agency's legal and operative expertise in public safety programs throughout the world would be reflected in the bill. In the absence of that assistance, I again today propose that legislation be introduced to set up a Narcotics Corps in the Public Safety Division of U.S. AID Vietnam to train Vietnamese for the specific purpose of stopping the narcotics traffic to American servicemen serving there. Further, I think the agency should report on the progress of the program and the bill should be written to phase out the program with the withdrawal of American troops to avoid setting up a self-perpetuating bureaucracy.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, at the same time we are assisting in the development of South Vietnam we ought not to forget or ignore those who, through their help in trying to build that country into a free, democratic nation, have suffered medical or psychological problems.

Civilian employees of the U.S. Government could be included as well but I do not think they are faced with the same temptations. For

the most part, their service in Vietnam is voluntary. The hazards of their professions are less than those of the military, especially the front-line soldier. The civilians are older and better equipped to resist the psychological pressures of service far from home.

I am sure members of this subcommittee have been under the same kind of pressure from home that I have received about this problem. The public is adamant that something be done about it. It is both the cause and effect of bad morale in the military.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to again commend the subcommittee for the hearings that you have been holding and certainly would hope that the suggestions that you receive during these hearings will produce good legislation in this field. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity of appearing.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it agreeable with you, Congressman Sisk, that Congressman Roush present his statement and then we would enter into a dialog?

Mr. SISK. Very good suggestion. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Roush.

**STATEMENT OF HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA**

Mr. ROUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also would like to thank you and members of the subcommittee for giving me this opportunity to appear before you today. As Mr. Sisk testified, I could not help but think perhaps it would have been a little better if I could have had my son here in my stead testifying. He has just within the last couple of days returned from a year's stint in Vietnam as an infantry sergeant. I did question him briefly about the problem and he stated to me that it was really more serious than we realize, especially in the rear echelons and among the enlisted men, and some of them were actually avoiding detection even in the matter of taking their tests and coming home.

Sometimes we listen to the wheels and to the bureaucrats, and I think sometimes we could get some practical advice from some of these people who are actually mingling with people who are actually using these drugs.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why didn't you bring him along with you?

Mr. ROUSH. I didn't think of it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I had a son who came back just about a month ago. It is strange that we should have similar experiences, both have sons returning from Vietnam. Mine did not attain such an elevated rank as yours, however.

Mr. ROUSH. Well, my son didn't want to go any higher, he just wanted to come home and he wants everyone else there to come home.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will proceed with my formal statement.

I am here to testify on behalf of the bill introduced with other of our colleagues, H.R. 7822. This is a proposal which would discontinue all economic assistance to those countries which do not act to prevent the flow of narcotic drugs into this country.

First, I would like to emphasize that this legislation is far from a solution to the massive drug problem our Nation faces, but I feel it is a positive step in the right direction. Due to the epidemic proportions drug addiction has reached in this country, I feel that pressure at the highest level is crucial. This legislation acts as the strongest possible warning that this country will no longer tolerate partial cooperation on the part of foreign countries involved in illicit drug production and trafficking.

The need for control is immediate. The U.S. Congress must act now, expressing its intent to the world community that the flow of illicit drugs must be stopped. If those nations involved reach voluntary agreements, such as in the case of Turkey, I know this country would be delighted to make implementation of this proposal unnecessary. It is my hope that it will act as an incentive to prompt those foreign governments to introduce and, more importantly, enforce strict controls on illicit drug traffic.

I will not attempt here to set forth all of the now available statistics concerning the drug problem as I know you are all acutely aware of the statistics. However, I feel that citing a few facts is appropriate and worthy of repetition to emphasize the severity of the problem and the need for immediate action.

The United States has the largest single population of heroin addicts in the world. The National Institutes of Health estimates that there are over 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States. The U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has estimated that some 22,000 pounds of heroin were smuggled into the United States last year alone. The Bureau also reported that new addicts under the age of 18 in 1969-70 increased at a ratio $3\frac{1}{2}$ times that which this country experienced in the preceding 3 years (1965-68). Heroin addiction is responsible for approximately 50 percent of urban crime and causes an untold number of deaths each year. The situation has indeed reached crisis proportions.

Where do we begin to attack this problem? There are three critical areas involved in the fight against drug abuse: The source, the illegal traffic, and the demand. It is essential that we deal strongly with each of these categories. This legislation concentrates on the first: The source. It is a strong method of attack at the supply where I believe our prime target should be. We must work together and cooperate fully with all the countries of the world in combating the drug menace. The problem is international in scope and is spreading on a massive scale in such highly developed countries as the United Kingdom, Holland, France, Sweden, Spain, and Italy as well as in the underdeveloped countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. I recognize that we have long worked together with these countries in the fight against illicit drug traffic but more has to be done.

With the supply greatly diminishing in the Middle East, we must prepare for the fact that production will increase elsewhere. It is highly probable that the source will come much closer to our borders and perhaps impose a more serious threat than already exists, especially in the case of Central and South America. We must direct full efforts at cooperation with our neighboring countries of Canada and Mexico, continue and strengthen our efforts with France, one of the major processing points in the route from the Middle East, and give

all-out assistance to Turkey in enforcing the ban she has proposed in 1972. And perhaps most important, we must concentrate attention on Southeast Asia where opium production is increasing and is highly difficult to control due to the many remote and isolated areas where production is presently occurring virtually undetected. We must anticipate every possible source now.

If we can discourage illegal production, control the source, which is the specific goal of this legislation, we can somewhat control the epidemic and give more complete attention to drug education and rehabilitation. We must strive to isolate the problem so that we can more effectively deal with it.

It is of vital importance that we emphasize strongly our willingness to cooperate with foreign countries in any efforts they may undertake to control production and trafficking. I think it is interesting to note here the success of a cooperative effort between the United States and Mexico called Operation Intercept, a campaign launched last year by this Government working through the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to control the increased smuggling across our southern border. It is an example of an "economic squeeze" which prompted a foreign government to enforce tighter controls.

For weeks, Customs Bureau officials searched all vehicles at certain checkpoints, causing a traffic holdup which dissuaded many American tourists from crossing the border and thus badly hurting the Mexican economy. As Daniel Casey, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Regional Director in Los Angeles, put it, "Intercept convinced the Mexican Government that it had to work with us in combating the narcotics traffic." Operation Intercept has since led to Operation Cooperation which is an even more detailed program to cut back the drug traffic, attempting to destroy the poppy and marijuana fields deep in the Mexican interior.

Obviously, illegal traffickers have gone elsewhere as a result of such close scrutiny but the fact remains that Operation Intercept succeeded in that it jogged the Mexican Government itself into action. It is just this type of response that I hope this legislation will encourage.

I know your committee has an awesome task before it in face of the widespread drug abuse problem, one of the most complex problems we, as a nation, face today.

I merely hope that this legislation and other similar proposals will show the world that the U.S. Congress, insofar as it is able, will rise to the challenge and meet the responsibility of combating drug addiction. There are additional avenues to take but I believe this legislation to be a most promising one.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very, very much.

Mr. SISK, you said that when you spoke to the AID people about helping or cooperating in the drafting of legislation along the lines you suggested you sensed a certain resistance. Can you expand on that a little?

Mr. SISK. Yes. We were disturbed by what we felt to be a lack of interest. Maybe that is an unfair way of putting it. I can understand that AID people probably have a feeling, and maybe if I were Direc-

tor of AID I might feel the same way, that this is not an area in which we should necessarily be involved. On the other hand, our feelings—mine and my constituents—are so strong about narcotics abuse that I feel every agency of the Federal Government, particularly those attempting to help and assist foreign nations, are going to have to be willing to get into this, and this is what we are seeking.

Certainly not being expert in all those problems, we felt that our suggestions about the possibility of a Narcotics Corps in Vietnam, and in the areas where we are undergoing an almost unbelievable buildup of the drug problem, could be helpful. As I said, we were disappointed that they showed considerable resistance to any help in this field.

We were seeking expertise and suggestions on how they could cooperate.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Put in simple language, would you say that their attitudes seem to be, "Well, we are sympathetic but it is just not our baby"?

Mr. SISK. I think this generally reflects their attitude.

We have had a number of telephone calls and have written letters to AID. Of course, they finally replied and said, well, the administration was going to offer a proposal. As I said, we were attempting frankly to create a spark of interest we felt was needed in an agency which could then in turn cooperate with the armed services.

If the armed services are not to be alone in this field, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that an additional assist is needed. We are trying to prevent servicemen from becoming addicted, but with absolutely no control, no attempt to stamp out drug traffic in this case in Vietnam civilian circles, they are going to become addicted. So unless you have another source of help and assistance and cooperation to stamp out drug traffic, the Armed Forces program in Vietnam is going to fail.

Our only other answer there is to withdraw these people as quickly as we can. We had hoped that through the civilian population, through AID cooperating with Vietnamese counterparts, that a program or so-called Narcotics Corps could be successful. I still think it could be.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It sounds to me like a very creative, very useful idea.

Mr. SISK. Well, of course, as I say, not being expert in the field of narcotics we were desperately seeking any method to bring some rationale to the problem. We know that the heroin is coming from the civilian population within Vietnam. I think that we are going to have to work in that field through cooperation to destroy the source, to destroy the supply, and control the traffic to stop that disease from being inflicted on our servicemen.

As I understand it, narcotics of one kind or another in Vietnam are as easy to get as alcohol or tobacco here. So when you have that abundant a supply then Lord knows whatever program the Armed Forces alone itself has is certainly going to fail because you just can't surround servicemen with an iron shield to keep them away from it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Roush, after talking with your son, and from your own knowledge, how serious would you say the problem is (a) in Vietnam involving our soldiers, and (b) here in the United States?

Mr. ROUSH. Well, first I have really hardly had a chance to talk with my son seriously about many of these things, in that he just arrived in Washington the day before yesterday in the evening, but what brief conversation I had led me to this conclusion: First, it is in the rear areas where there is the problem. My son spent the greatest portion of his time with a line unit and there he said the men themselves police the problem, discipline each other; and when you are with a squad and you are out on night patrol you are not about to have someone with you who is addicted to drugs. So they took care of their own problems in those areas.

He said about 6 weeks or 2 months ago he was sent back to division headquarters in the rear echelon and there he found the problem to be quite severe. I asked him why, and he said mainly it is boredom. These guys are just plain bored and they don't have anything to do, and this is available and they are more tempted to experiment and they do.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You use the word "severe." Can you translate that into any statistics at all?

Mr. ROUSH. No, sir; I can't. However, Mr. Chairman, I did read a report issued by one committee of the Congress—I don't even recall which committee—which caused a survey to be made of both of the infantry divisions with which my son served; one was the 25th Infantry Division and one was the Americal Division. This report centered around these two divisions, and I am sorry I don't have it with me but this report is available and it emphasizes, I think, the severity of the problem within these two units which are both infantry divisions actually more involved on the line than perhaps in rear echelons and perhaps underestimates the severity of the problem because they are line divisions rather than rear echelon troops. Again, I have not really had a chance to sit down and talk with my son at any great length because of lack of time.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join in welcoming our colleagues to the subcommittee. Certainly the problem we are discussing is one that concerns us all. Is it not a coincidence that my son should have come back from Vietnam only a few weeks ago? I have had time to talk with him, and certainly what he tells me bears out what your son told you about the very widespread use of drugs and the reason for its use by the troops.

I am not quite sure whether you gentlemen are commenting on the language in the bill and criticizing it or whether you are saying you are glad we put something like this in the foreign aid bill because it is needed. In other words, does this go far enough, in your opinion? I would suppose the diminishing military presence in Vietnam is going to reduce the severity of the problem. Certainly the fewer of our forces there are in the area the less there are to be exposed.

I would suppose that you have an enormous problem, Mr. Sisk, if you are aiming at the destruction of the source of supply in a country like Vietnam throughout the civilian population. The Americans there would be a drop in the bucket with respect to a problem of that size. We have not done such a good job in controlling the supply and availability of drugs in our own country, so I would guess that AID is quite understandably chary about assuming responsibility. But the bill does say that the President may use foreign assistance funds for

this purpose, which presumably means that the AID may be drawn more or less directly into a program of cooperation with other countries.

Mr. SISK. Let me hasten to say to my colleague that I am very happy with the language you put in. I am in full support of that. I think anything we do in this area is to the good.

Now I recognize the enormity of the task of control in a country like Vietnam and other areas of Southeast Asia where there are vast supplies. I guess we were grasping around desperately seeking some way to get at the problem because we hope our men are shortly going to be home. However, as a part of the international development program, it seems to me that certainly this is an area in which aid is desperately needed. We could well devote a portion of the funds we put into AID to countries desirous of cooperating in the control of drugs as we try to eradicate these sources and traffic.

The enormity of the task is great but I know of nothing that would be more helpful to some of these countries than the elimination of traffic in drugs. This was the thing that led us, then, to seek this type of an approach. I felt that, at least, AID would be interested.

I understand that this is a problem for which there are no easy solutions. When we consider our own failures in this country, in not being able to keep drugs out of the hands of users, maybe we are asking more than we should. We are after measures that would help us keep heroin away from our own people and be helpful to a foreign country. That, after all, is the whole idea in appropriating and spending money on AID programs.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is your point, Mr. Roush? Are you endorsing this language by saying this is just what you had hoped we could come up with, or are you saying this does not go far enough? It is not clear to me whether you are arguing for a flat prohibition, a unilateral suspension or prohibition of assistance if there is not a full cessation by the country that otherwise would receive aid.

Mr. ROUSH. No. This bill to which I testified, H.R. 7822, provides that there shall be a determination as to whether or not the country is making an effort.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So there is in the foreign aid bill on page 7 language that covers your point exactly. I am not sure whether you want tighter restrictions. Your reference to Operation Intercept has me somewhat worried because the Mexicans certainly resented it keenly and you say it jogged them into action. But I would suppose that if we had eliminated the intercept process but had developed a cooperative process, one of education, we would have accomplished the same result at least as easily and perhaps without stepping on as many toes.

Mr. ROUSH. I don't mind stepping on their toes if it produces the result.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't necessarily mind either but I don't think you need to do it if you can get the result a different way. If you had had a prohibition on aid 5 years ago which was sufficiently tight to prevent Turkey getting aid, we might not have been able to develop the result which you now are praising in Turkey. What I am wondering now is whether you are suggesting that we apply much stricter standards which would have prevented this country from hav-

ing given aid to a country such as Turkey because it had not regulated the growing of opium.

Mr. ROUSH. I would applaud the provisions of the bill and I do feel that perhaps it could be somewhat more stringent. I think perhaps the effect of this bill I am advocating would be somewhat more stringent. I would be delighted to see this enforced and I would hope that we could reach agreements with these countries. I think, however, they should understand and understand with great certainty that this country is intent on prohibiting the trafficking of illegal drugs and that perhaps in this instance we leave the determination to the President.

And it would appear to me that perhaps in spite of good intentions, that because we don't want to step on toes, that we might not proceed as aggressively as we might if we had a definite pattern of action set out such as is set out in H.R. 7822, a definite determination by the Government of what is happening in each country to which assistance is given as to whether or not the country is making a good-faith effort.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, to clarify in my own mind what your position is, had your bill been enacted 5 years ago, would it have prevented aid to a country such as Turkey which had not at that time taken the steps which have presently led to the happy state in which you say now that we should give all aid possible to Turkey?

Mr. ROUSH. It would have prohibited it but it would not have prohibited Turkey from correcting its problem and making itself available for aid.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are suggesting that this would have encouraged them—is that right—to take these steps?

Mr. ROUSH. Yes.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think you have a very difficult political problem to be subjecting a country to perhaps severe economic pressure, withholding of badly needed aid unless they do something.

Mr. ROUSH. I am sure.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would guess we might well have done better in a quiet, undramatic way than by throwing the book at them in a public way at a time when they didn't realize the enormity of what their people were doing. This has been going on for hundreds of years in Turkey and there is no drug abuse in Turkey. An educational process was necessary to get the Turks to it and the political problem was important enough to have it an achievement when it came but one that might not have been achieved at all if we had thrown the book at them 5 years ago.

Mr. ROUSH. May I comment?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is what I am looking for.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Sometimes it is hard to tell.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't know why it should be hard to tell; I am asking for reactions, of course. The chairman must know my technique.

Mr. ROUSH. If we should follow your line of reasoning then we would have solved our trafficking of illegal drug problems a long time ago, and if we didn't we should have.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How can you possibly come to that conclusion, Mr. Roush? You astonish me. We have not even started the educational program in certain countries because there has not been the problem or it has only become a problem quite recently.

Mr. ROUSH. You pointed out yourself, Mr. Frelinghuysen, that 5 years ago we knew of the drug problem in Turkey and for 5 years we have done nothing to—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I didn't say any such thing, Mr. Roush.

Mr. ROUSH. Didn't you?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I said just the contrary. I think perhaps you weren't listening.

Mr. ROUSH. I was listening.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I said that our government engaged in very intensive efforts to educate the Turkish Government, to let their officials know that we are very seriously concerned about Turkey as a source of supply. You act as if I said that we had been indifferent because we had not thrown the book at them. I was just saying: Is throwing the book at the country the best way to secure its cooperation when cooperation is what is needed?

Mr. ROUSH. What I am saying is that we have certainly been ineffective.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How can you say that talking about Turkey? I think we should both be crowing about what has been accomplished as a result of the educational efforts.

Mr. ROUSH. I am glad for what has happened in Turkey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Why are you talking about being ineffective?

Mr. ROUSH. I am not just talking about Turkey, but about every country in the world. It seems to me that we have been ineffective because if they tell us there are 22,000 pounds of heroin being illegally smuggled into the country, then something is drastically wrong and we have been unsuccessful in our quiet negotiations with other countries to do much.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Now you are talking about the ineffectiveness of the control procedure, the inspection procedure. That is a different thing entirely. You have pointed with pride to two of the problem areas, Mexico and Turkey, and have said we made progress. I am not trying to get in an argument with you. I would have thought that we would be in agreement that a lot has been accomplished, and I would surely think we are in agreement that more needs to be done.

Mr. ROUSH. Then we are in agreement on that. We have made progress and we are also in agreement that a lot needs to be done.

I again did not come here to argue with you, either, certainly. I am merely a witness before this committee and I would hope that my colleague would not think that my fervor here is in any way critical of him: I merely want to discuss this with him.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would not dream that you were criticizing me.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The whole thing is not your fault, I don't think.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The first thing you know you will be saying that I have not been doing enough. I am not assuming anything you have said is critical of me, and I hope you are not saying that I am criticizing you.

Mr. ROUSH. I served in this Congress for 10 years prior to my involuntary sabbatical and I didn't do anything very startling, either, and I am sorry I didn't.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think the gentleman's time has expired.
Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I got here a little late but I think that the foreign aid bill reflects as best we can what we have to do with regard to our foreign affairs and the related question of drug abuse. I agree with Mr. Frelinghuysen and Mr. Roush that something has to be done. I think each country has to be treated on an individual basis. I think that had we pressed real hard against Turkey we might not have seen what has happened in Turkey; in other words, the Turks would have refused our overtures and said, "No, we are not going to be pushed into this thing."

I think, however, what has pushed them into their position in the past year and what will push other countries into the same posture is the fact that a chairman like Mr. Rosenthal is keeping the pressure and the spotlight on this problem internationally and here at home. We cannot be too proud of our efforts here at home. The State of New York, for instance, has spent more in the last 10 years than the Federal Government has spent in the last century on drug education and drug abuse control.

So I think the best approach is to give this problem the publicity that it has been receiving, and for us in the Congress to appropriate enough money. I think one of the big fields in which we have not done as much as we should have is pure research. I happen to serve on the Select Committee on Crime under the leadership of Chairman Pepper and as a result of hearings conducted by that committee I think that we must place more emphasis on pure research into this problem. This is where the answer lies. I think we can develop a blocking drug to immunize children in school against the future use of heroin.

I think methadone treatment is nothing but a continuation and development of another drug subculture. In 1904, I think it was, the cure for opium abuse at that time was the drug heroin—they thought it was a cure; now it has turned out to be a drug culture. I think we are developing the same thing with methadone.

We were in Harlem last week and one of the leaders of the program to fight drugs in Harlem told us that percentagewise there is a higher death rate among those who use methadone than there is among those who use heroin. So I think we are developing a subculture there. Congress must live up to its responsibility and appropriate enough money and get going in this field of research. I think that is where the answer lies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.

Mr. ROUSH. Mr. Chairman, a while ago you propounded a two part question to me and I only responded to the first and Mr. Murphy's comments lead me to want to express another thought here if I may.

I serve on Mr. Boland's subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations and we have under our jurisdiction the Veterans' Administration and I have interested myself in the problem of drug addiction as it is being handled by the veterans hospitals. I have to date visited only four of these hospitals and hope to visit many more. There are going to be, I think it is 31, drug treatment centers. We now have only five in operation but all of those drug treatment centers are going to use the methadone method except one.

I visited that hospital which is in Battle Creek, Mich., and Dr. Armatage who is in charge there is adamantly against the use of methadone except in the process of withdrawal for the very reasons

that you have stated, Mr. Murphy. It would appear that we are going off in all directions in our treatment and in our efforts to rehabilitate the drug addict, and I would hope that your committee through its efforts and through the pushing of the research effort might come up with some solution that would put us on a more definite track as to how to handle the treatment and more particularly, and I think more importantly, the rehabilitation of these drug addicts.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How many beds altogether do these 31 veterans hospitals have?

Mr. ROUSH. Not very many, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that they were only authorizing 20-some in each unit as I recall. However, the unit in Battle Creek has quite a few more than that. I think there are 60-some.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Putting it together, how many beds altogether? Quick arithmetic.

Mr. ROUSH. 600-some.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have any estimate or even speculation as to the total number of returning servicemen that are heroin addicted?

Mr. ROUSH. Well, no. We know that the tests I believe which they have been conducting reveal around a 5 percent figure of those who are tested being—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is assuming the test is accurate, and that gives about 15,000?

Mr. ROUSH. Yes. But you must also remember that these people are coming to these places on a voluntary basis.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Well, the estimate of servicemen addicted Vietnam-wise, using Dr. Jaffe's figure comes out to be about 15,000, the Murphy-Steele figure comes out to be about 35,000, and we have 600 VA beds to solve the problem. How do you respond to that?

Mr. ROUSH. Well, we are not going to have enough. However, the treatment again varies so it makes you wonder as to whether or not the VA really knows the direction in which it is going in that. For example, in Battle Creek the addict is kept there 6 months—that is not the average but he can remain there 6 months. However, in Omaha, which I visited just a couple of weeks ago, and it is going to be a drug treatment center, they don't plan to keep them there, say, more than a month or 2 months at the most. So you have that turnover which will occur which will take care of more than just 600 or 700 a year, of course.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What about the problem that Mr. Murphy mentioned? We were in New York last week in the Bronx, Harlem and over on the East Side and people tell us that the returning servicemen who are addicted are contagious; in other words, he spreads it to his peer colleagues in the street, his former school buddies and other people. The thing will go from 35,000 to you don't know how far out. How do you respond to that?

Mr. ROUSH. Well, it certainly emphasizes the problem, Mr. Chairman, but when it comes to treatment the problem is pretty well handled in these veterans hospitals by the men themselves. I spoke of my son being in a frontline unit where the men themselves handled the problem. In Battle Creek the men themselves discipline the group and they have actually—well, let me go back.

Because you have a drug treatment center, the pushers gravitate to that point and they have had people apply for admission, and are actually admitted, who were pushers. The men themselves see that those men are removed from that situation very quickly because those who are there are there wanting treatment; they came voluntarily and they want treatment, they want to be put back into society. They would like to be cured, and it is the contagion which leads more people into it. It can also go the other way and can take more people out of it. What little I have seen of it leads me to believe that you have something like they have with Alcoholics Anonymous and you need something like that where there is an interdependence between and among the men who are actually afflicted.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Just one more question. Mr. Burke has some questions, I know.

Are you aware of the arrangement we have with Turkey? In fact, there are two more heroin crops in the pipeline.

Mr. ROUSH. No, I was not aware. I am glad to have that information, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank our colleagues for coming here and offering their advice to us. I should not speak for Mr. Roush but I would like to say this about Mr. Frelinghuysen and his comments. I think we have all known over the years that we had a drug problem in this country. In fact, Lucky Luciano was deported when he was known to be a known underground criminal—one of the big things in this country was the fact that he controlled the illegal importation of narcotics. We also know that there is a larger syndicate that handles this; it can't be handled on a small basis, it has got to have very clever people handling the importation of the illegal traffic in this country. So I think we have all been somewhat lax and we are inclined perhaps to be looking for a whipping boy somewhere along the line and decide who it is. I think the trouble is that we have not recognized that it could hit each of us personally until probably the Vietnam war brought back many of those that became addicted overseas.

I think one of our faults has been that we look at Turkey as being the bad one, yet in all fairness I know that Turkey over the years has attempted to control the problem within its own country from a point of view of arresting people and even sentencing several illegal operators to death. I think one of the things that we have to recognize is that we have got the problem on our hands now.

Number one, we have got to stop the source; second, we have to stop the importation; and third, we have a real problem with regard to education. I think it is going to be necessary for us to look at the fact that if we are going to control it at all we are going to have to bolster up our own efforts right in this country, and by that I mean by saying that we have more agents perhaps that can check the importation of this traffic.

I know that in the Fort Lauderdale area they brought in a car which had several million dollars worth—it was an ordinary truck and they had taken the sides out and it was by accident really that it was discovered. So there are many ways that they can get it in. I think we ought to make sure, in addition to the growers, that we take

action against those countries that manufacture it such as France, particularly, where the greater amount of supply comes in through Marseilles and other countries.

So I think it is really going to be the job of both the Executive and certainly the Congress to give the executive branch the necessary tools to work on this problem. I think we are going to notice it and I think one of the reasons we had not noticed it is because it hadn't reached all of us. They knew they had the problem in Harlem. Most of us didn't know what that problem was until it moved into the other areas such as the middle-class neighborhoods and the more wealthy neighborhoods.

I want to thank you gentlemen for coming up. It is a serious problem for all of us. I think we, all of us, including the American people, will take the blame because we just didn't think it was going to happen to us.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to comment on the testimony by my two colleagues and thank them for coming before the committee and giving us the benefit of their opinions.

We all know what the problems are. I think we are all directing our efforts to eradicating the problem. However, it has so many facets that the only place where we would find disagreement would be in the method of going about solving these problems. How do we get to the source? Certainly the route that we took in the foreign aid bill is one and one which we should have taken some time back.

Operation Intercept I am not so sure about, Mr. Roush; you called it a cooperative effort. It was no cooperative effort with Mexico, it was strictly a unilateral project. Mexico had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

Mexico had no idea that Intercept was coming. Those of us who were briefed about 3 or 4 days before the operation began, and I represented a border district, warned the Department of Justice of what was going to happen and that they would not as a result of this type of operation capture illicit drugs, because the moment the word is out that everyone is going to be searched they are not going to come through the bridges.

Now, where I live along the Rio Grande, most of the time the river is shallow and narrow and a person can walk across. Unfortunately, we have almost 2,000 miles of border with Mexico from California to Brownsville and you cannot patrol all that border effectively. Most of the illicit drugs that come in from Mexico do not come through ports of entry. This is a fact. I was right there on the ground during Operation Intercept and exactly what we told the Department of Justice would happen did happen. Children coming across to school or just coming across with a lunch box would be stopped, their sandwiches opened, everybody looking at them, and then folding them up and giving them back to them. On one occasion a little 10-year-old kid told the customs inspector, "Well, you eat the thing after handling it this way."

They even looked in babies' diapers. Of course this was carried to the extreme. I don't know that it did too much for goodwill and under-

standing between the two countries. But later on particularly with a friendly country like Mexico we sat down and talked about the problem and they offered us their cooperation. We could have obtained the same results if we had originally talked seriously to them. Our approach before that didn't get results but thank goodness now everything is fine and the Mexicans are cooperating, they are burning those marihuana fields and making arrests.

At one time, Mr. Roush, and I have grown up with this problem, there was not a single person on the border that smoked marihuana. When I was a kid they used to teach us that anybody under the influence of marihuana—we used to call them marihuanos in Spanish, one under the influence of marihuana—was a very deadly person, we were taught to stay away from that fellow, and we did. But somehow or other its use became a fad and acceptable to a great part of society. This is one of our problems.

Now we have thousands of people smoking the stuff and they come from all segments of society and from all economic levels. You have the rich and the poor and the in between using the stuff. I don't know what we are going to do to erase that way of life from the minds of our people. But the more serious problem is the use of heroin. I think all of us are now very conscious of it, particularly after what has happened with our kids in Vietnam.

All of us talk about the same thing. We have a grasp of the problem. We have got to attack the source, the importation and the distribution. How we go about it is going to be the real difficult part. I think that all of us together may be able to come up with the answers, plus the treatment of addicts, as you were describing, in our hospitals.

I was telling Mr. Murphy a while ago that at the Fort Worth Hospital for years when I was in the State legislature we kept pretty good tabs on the work that that hospital was doing. We attacked the problem by trying to enact stiff penalties for people who used it and even stiffer penalties for pushers and particularly where minors were concerned. This had some deterrent effect but not too much. Actually we never did have too much of it down there on the border. It was just a passageway for the stuff to come through into the east coast and to our northern big centers where it was used, where organized crime had controlled it. As far as the cure is concerned, they tell me that a person can be withdrawn in 7 days and that in about 3 weeks he is completely off of the stuff. The problem then arises when he goes back to the environment from which he came where he can obtain the stuff.

These are some of the problems that we have to attack, I am sure that all of us recognize that. Now, whether we can do anything in the changing of our society, of our way of life, our finding jobs for everybody, this boredom, this not having anything to do, this having time on your hands is a thing that gets people interested in using narcotics. But what are we going to do about the environment that produced that addict to begin with?

I think you realize, as we all do, that the cure is not too bad, we can cure them. It is keeping them off of the stuff where we are really going to have a problem. So hopefully all of us working together, in the best interests of our country, can find the answer to all of these problems. It is going to take time but I am delighted that we are now moving

forward and that we are highlighting this problem. I think that the people themselves are now pretty much disturbed and will come in and give us ideas and support in whatever we may do in what we think is the best interest of our country.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much for coming in.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me just add one word or two if you want to bear with us for a moment. I, too, want to thank you for testifying and for continuing to keep the congressional spotlight on this very serious subject. Mr. Murphy made comment to something that we did last week. This subcommittee invited three Assistant Secretaries of State responsible—I guess it was for Europe, the Near East, and the Far East—to come up to New York City and to actually walk through and visit and see what the end of the narcotics pipeline—the end of the heroin pipeline—looks like.

I can only describe it—and I have been there before—as the most shocking thing one could imagine. It is beyond our ability to use the language to describe this, it is beyond my ability to describe it, and I know Mr. Murphy would want to add to that. Mr. Hillenbrand was quoted in one of the New York papers—he is Assistant Secretary of State for Europe—as saying that he had been in the most impoverished and depressed areas in Europe and north Africa and never in his life had seen anything like this.

We spoke to approximately 75 young people and I talked to children of 12 or 13 years old. We talked to two girls up in the east Bronx. One of the Congressmen asked her:

In your class in school—

We assume the class was composed of around 30 to 40 kids—

how many children are on heroin?

The girl hesitated a moment and said:

Five are not.

Out of a class of 30 or 35, five kids of 12 or 13 years old are not on heroin.

From the picture that we got, I think that it is impossible for a child to grow up—we are not talking about Vietnam veterans now but children—it is impossible for a child to grow up in that environment without becoming addicted to heroin—it takes the most massive resistance and family dependency and interdependency to preclude that from happening. In other words, we are developing a society where it is thoroughly dependent on the use of drugs, particularly heroin, and it is growing out, cancering out into other communities in the city up to Connecticut.

We met kids of all breeds and styles, all sizes, 12 years old, 13 years old, 14 years old. "How did you get the money?" They said they needed—it varied I guess from \$80 to \$100 a day. The girls did "tricks," which was obviously prostitution; the boys stole. A total breakdown of society.

Now the fact of the matter is the President has announced a very highly publicized effort to set up a new narcotics control operation and do things, and the budget is \$155 million. Well, New York State is going to spend \$150 million in this area this year. So \$155 million is a drop in the bucket, you will never even see it. So this country, if we

want to save our society—and we have lost it in large areas of our inner cities—is going to have to do something about stopping it overseas, stopping the production, stopping the importation, stopping the use, and do more in education, treatment. It is a whole series of things but it is one of an enormous severity.

And it is not only in the city. The lady from Odyssey House, Judianne Densen-Gerber, told us there are treatment centers in Florida, Utah, and one other State. This problem is in everybody's backyard.

One 16-year-old girl from Darien, Conn., who was obviously a real Junior League type, had tried to commit suicide. She was on heroin. Luckily she came into this institution where we met young girls with babies and the babies were heroin addicted. They were born of a mother of heroin addiction and the addiction passed right through to the child.

I am sure Mr. Murphy might want to add to this. You have to see it to believe it because it is not believable sitting in this room.

Mr. MURPHY. You see a 12-year-old boy, blue-eyed kid, and ask him when he got started. He said, "2 or 3 years ago." I asked who introduced him to drugs and he said, "My brother." I said, "How many brothers and sisters do you have?" He said, "There is a family of six, and five of us are on heroin." You can see there is no future for this young man.

I think it should be mandatory that every Member of the Senate and every Member of the House of Representatives take the tour that we took in New York: Harlem, Spanish Harlem, black Harlem. I am telling you it would really open your eyes. It has been said that words escape you; I don't think we have words to describe looking at a 12-year-old boy and a girl 15 years old with a baby that was born out of wedlock because of her prostitution habits. You see what these youngsters must face the rest of their life.

You see these kids lined up against buildings and talking about us because we have shirts and ties on as though we were something from outer space. It is just devastating. They seem to be resigned to abject poverty. I think everybody should go up there and see it because I don't have the words in my vocabulary to describe it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We walked down 116th Street with Charlie Rangel in the lead. One long block, I guess it would be maybe 400, 600 feet long. On every stoop was a drug addict. Sales were made in our presence. We were accompanied, I can tell you, by at least a half dozen plainclothes policemen. Nobody cares. We spoke to Police Commissioner Murphy and Mayor Lindsay. If they had 100,000 police, they could not stop it. With all the heroin seizures we have heard about and all the growing testimony we have heard, it has not made a dent. The price has not even risen a nickel in the city. As a matter of fact, the price has gone down which means the supply has become more plentiful.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the reasons I am very delighted we did put this provision in the foreign aid bill at this time.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Absolutely.

Mr. KAZEN. Because if we are to help any country on earth, these children deserve our help. When we see the facts as have been

described here this morning, they are certainly not helping us. If they cannot help us—actually they are throwing us down the drain by what they are doing. They should certainly cooperate this much with us in stopping that production that eventually gets here. If they don't do it, then they don't deserve any help from us.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You take the situation with Turkey. You know that crop was worth \$3 million. We could have raised that in charitable donations to get them to stop this. Now I know they had other uses for the poppyseed over there, oil and other medicinal uses, but the fact of the matter is we have not done enough. The fact of the matter was that until Congressmen got exercised about it no administration really moved with a vigor that the problem warranted.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, if I could impose just to make one further comment. I have seen some pretty serious problems of course in certain areas of California but what you gentlemen described here goes beyond anything that I have observed there. This again of course is indictive to me and I would hope your committee to the extent you can take the lead along with other committees having jurisdiction. This is a situation where frankly instead of \$150 million we ought to be putting some billions into it. You gentlemen have described an almost unbelievable situation right in our own country.

Lord knows, on the other hand, if we appropriate \$5 billion today, Mr. Chairman, I don't know how we would spend it properly. This then gets back to the leadership of you and others and other committees having jurisdiction. I think we ought to be devoting a lot more time to this problem, and let's make the money available of course, naturally, to make the kind of concentrated programs to eliminate that cancer because unless we do then it will surely destroy us.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much.

Congressman Biaggi is waiting. We would like to hear your statement, Mr. Biaggi.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIO BIAGGI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not going to read my statement. I think each member has a copy.

(The prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIO BIAGGI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the Committee, I wish to strongly endorse the several bills before you today that call for a cutoff of foreign economic and military aid to countries that do not cooperate with the United States in curbing the flow of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs. As a cosponsor of one of these bills, I have long advocated taking a tougher stand against countries that are sources of heroin and other illegal drugs in an effort to cut off the supply that flows into our country.

We are taking significant steps to deal with the drug abuse problem here in this country. Last year, Congress passed a tough Drug Abuse Treatment, Prevention and Control Act which provided for stiff penalties in the trafficking of

illegal narcotics and drugs, tighter regulations on the sale and distribution of legal drugs that have a high potential for abuse and educational programs aimed at preventing drug abuse.

Additionally, we have expanded our efforts at treatment through methadone maintenance clinics and increased research efforts to find a narcotic antagonist. These programs will have to be further emphasized, but a strong start has been made.

However, on controlling the foreign supply of these illegal narcotics, this country has been extremely lax. The opium poppy is not grown anywhere in the United States. Therefore, it must be imported. Considering the quantities that are imported, the extensive smuggling operations must be undertaken with the tacit approval of local officials in the foreign countries.

This is especially true in France. Local officials have taken more steps lately to stop the opium processing operations; however, the extent of the operations calls for a far greater commitment on the part of the French government.

I am pleased to note that Turkey has taken the final step toward eliminating opium production in its country and for that they are to be commended. Now though, our efforts must be extended to other countries that are leading producers of raw opium.

To look at another aspect of the drug problem for a minute, marijuana is imported primarily from Mexico. A strong enforcement stand at the border and great inconvenience to Mexican citizens got that country moving to stop the flow of this illegal drug. When the local shopkeepers and other business interests began to lose money because tourists were not willing to suffer long border inspection delays, action was taken by the government to cooperate with the U.S. authorities.

Thus, if similar economic pressures were taken against countries in the Middle and Far East and in Europe where opium is grown and processed for exportation to the United States, the source of virtually all the heroin in this country could be quickly wiped out.

The fact is, heroin must be brought into the country—smuggled in illegally. Toward this end, I am working on legislation that would create a rebuttable presumption in cases where a person is arrested for the illegal sale or possession of heroin to the effect that said person smuggled the illegal drug into the country.

The rationale here is that since heroin must be illegally imported, the possessor must be a smuggler. To disprove this charge, he would have to name his source. This, then, would provide a tool to trace back the handling of the heroin from the street pusher to the actual importer.

I am also working on a second piece of legislation that, in cases where a person died of an overdose of heroin, that person who sold or gave the drug to the deceased would be liable to a charge of manslaughter.

Drug abuse is fast overtaking a majority of our population. This could be the nemesis that spells the end to almost 200 years of democracy in America. Rome survived, until it gave in to its excesses. History tells us that had its rulers the courage to put an end to the evils pervading the Roman Empire in its later years, that government would have overcome the onslaught of the barbarians. This Nation, too, will be unable to protect itself against the sources of destruction, whether from within or without, if our society has emaciated itself through the abuse of narcotics and drugs.

The legislation before you will help solve the problem of drug abuse by cutting off the supply. It deserves your favorable consideration and speedy passage by the Congress.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I should say that Congressman Biaggi was the most decorated policeman in the history of the New York City Police Department and probably could tell us more about the problem on the street than any Member of Congress.

Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.

I would like to congratulate the chairman and the committee for continuing this work because in my judgment in view of all of the facts that we have in our possession today the one possible resolution to this problem is attacking the source. Law enforcement is just incapable of dealing with the problem.

I heard you testify you were up in the Bronx and saw those young people involved in drug addiction. I have seen it all of my life. I saw it as a boy, as an adult, as a police officer, as a legislator. What finally happened was the mayor woke up. The problem has been universal and as a result of it we have had some agitation in Congress.

I introduced a similar proposal in the last Congress. There was a proposal adopted by the House which was knocked out in Conference. Since that time there has been movement by this administration, which I think is salutary. There is no question in my mind—with all the knowledge I possess in this area—that Turkey and comparable countries provide large sources of this narcotic, heroin, and franchise their farmers to grow poppies for medicinal purposes and encourage them to develop that crop. The officials of that country have engaged in collusion and corruption. There is no question in my mind about this because that is where it is obtained and that is where it is permitted, notwithstanding those that have been arrested and executed. Those who have been arrested and executed are probably those who have not been able to work out some kind of arrangement with officials.

In France, where they process it, you look at "factories" that have been in the same location for 20 or 30 years. They almost operate with leascholds. The conclusion is inescapable.

Now what has happened here? My first approach to this was to have a strong prohibition of economic and military assistance. However, I think the discretionary aspect of it is more practical. As a result of Congressmen agitating for this in the last Congress—at least where it really boiled up—there has been movement. I strongly urge that this amendment be passed and address itself not simply to Turkey, which seemed to respond, but to other countries as well.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let's assume this goes back to last year. We included an amendment by Mr. Monagan, which was similar to the amendment passed on the floor last year. Let's assume for the discussion they go to the conference and the Senate takes it out. Would you then urge your colleague to reject the foreign aid bill in toto at that point?

Mr. BLAGG. No, because what I think will happen has already happened. The administration has learned the sense of Congress, hence they have learned the sense of the people that some action is necessary. Secretary Rogers moved in that direction. There has been some progress. It is a question of how much pressure was applied by Congress. What we say here certainly becomes a fact known to all the foreign countries that are involved. They will look at the intensity and the sincerity of our purpose and they will respond. They will see what is at stake; and rather than reaching a very critical confrontation, they will move.

I think the problem in Turkey could well be resolved without too much cost and effort. As you said, it would take \$3 to \$5 million to deal with the crop problem and we could raise that in charity. However, there are so many other countries that need attention. The real problem is that they are countries with which we have no relationship. That is where the administration will have to use its ingenuity. We don't have any real muscle. Perhaps we can do it through allied countries that do, but what is important is that we recognize that we don't have a solution to this aspect of the problem.

I suggest strongly that the pharmaceutical companies, through their research departments, apply themselves vigorously to the development of narcotic antagonists. They should think not solely in terms of dollars and cents in return. If necessary, the Government should subsidize that research. We have some. They have already developed several of these antagonists, but they have not been engineered properly to provide for lengthy duration. So then, when you have these addicts who are off drugs for a while, they would take these antagonists to help them resist the temptation to go back. If they did go back they would not get a high.

It has been said here that methadone is not the answer, and it isn't. They talk about overdoses. Most of those overdoses are the result of people taking methadone without medical supervision. Let me tell you what it accomplishes. It is a crutch but it takes them out of the crime cycle and puts them in a functional position. Taking them out of the crime cycle at least produces a favorable benefit for the entire community, as well as for the person on methadone.

We had a very substantial pilot program by Drs. Doyle and Islander; they said the rate of recidivism was minimal. People can live in a "normal" fashion.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Recidivism to heroin or methadone?

Mr. BIAGGI. No, to heroin. They stay on methadone. Overdoses of heroin is another aspect of the problem. We find such occurrences even in the use of methadone. The reason we are having so much of a problem with overdoses today is that there are amateurs in the business. They are giving pure heroin and they don't know how to administer it. The arrests in this country have skyrocketed and the markets for the drug have proliferated to every area. Every school is a marketplace. It was not that way in my youth, but there were drugs in the area. Today, every school is a marketplace. It is coming in from every area. There is no single point of entry, there is no single segment or particular crime or gang that is bringing it in. The amateurs are all over the place, and that is why it is difficult to control.

Mr. FULTON. Yes, but how do our law-enforcement agencies get at the professional organization, the method of distribution down to the amateurs? That is the problem to me. How does our Government operate against this operational structure that does this?

Mr. BIAGGI. We pass strong Federal and State laws. For those who are finally arrested they should be put away for 20 to 40 years. We have seen a lot of this happen. The point is well taken. As a matter of fact, I am preparing legislation that will give the law-enforcement officials additional instruments with which to work; that is, to create a rebuttable presumption that a person who possesses heroin is burdened with. The rebuttable presumption created is that he is the person who imported it into the country because it is not indigenous to the United States. It is imported illegally, and if it is in his possession, the presumption creates the notion that he brought it in. Now he can rebut that, of course, but he can rebut it by disclosing where he got it from. That is a step closer to the pusher.

Mr. FULTON. This drug distribution system is a social structure that is organized, and obviously highly profitable. How do Government enforcement agencies get at that organization and cut it off at the roots within this country? That to me is the problem.

Mr. BIAGGI. I don't follow your problem.

Mr. FULTON. There is some kind of an organization.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You mean a crime syndicate?

Mr. FULTON. I don't know whether it is crime or what you call it but there is some kind of an organization that wholesale drug distribution comes down through to get to the amateurs on the streets.

Mr. BIAGGI. The amateurs have gotten into the business, not simply the amateurs on the street. I am not talking about the user.

Mr. FULTON. Where do the amateurs get the drug supply from?

Mr. BIAGGI. They get it from all over the world. We have organized crime into it but they are not in it exclusively. It is coming in from South America, from Canada—all over the place. Organized crime represents a segment of the source of that whole mechanism.

Mr. FULTON. There is a wholesale distribution system to get mass distribution to our grocery supermarkets. There must be just the same type wholesale structure for this drug distribution to the amateur peddlers.

Mr. BIAGGI. No; let's use your analogy. We have supermarkets and we have the mamma and papa grocery stores and that is what you have in drugs. You have supermarkets and the mamma and papa grocery stores but the results are the same because it all goes to the consumer.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The fact is we have not had nearly enough agents. Every facet of this has been weak. You could have 10,000 agents on the Atlantic Ocean and not make a dent.

Mr. BIAGGI. Yes; they are making the greatest seizures in the history of our country.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Right, and it has not affected the supply.

Mr. BIAGGI. Each time they effect an arrest and recover some 3 or 4 kilos, that is a tremendous amount of heroin, historically speaking, as far as law enforcement is concerned. Each time they do that you can presume safely that thousands of kilos are coming in undetected.

Mr. KAZEN. There is another facet to this, Congressman; the types of indictments that are brought against these people. You are talking about the rebuttable presumption. Down along the border all of our indictments are three count indictments. They get them for smuggling, for transportation, for facilitation of transportation and violation of the Tax Act, but away from there the only indictment that they bring against them is possession. We have what you say in the law already because we are using it on the border and those fellows are going to the penitentiary for smuggling, for the transportation and facilitating the transportation of narcotics.

Mr. BIAGGI. What you are saying is not exactly what I am proposing. I am making a rebuttable presumption that makes the possessor of heroin subject to the additional charge of smuggling. Now the purpose of that is to burden him with the possibility of an additional penalty. However, he can cleanse himself of that charge by disclosing who his source is.

Mr. KAZEN. Mario, I won't burden the record but I would like to discuss this with you.

Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is a fine idea. My study, conducted with Representative Steele in Europe, revealed a syndicate-type operation and we named those areas and families in our report. There are any-

where from 100 to 150 members in these families. But in Southeast Asia we found an unorganized type of combine. In other words, we found two Nationalist Chinese divisions that were driven out of China by the Communists in 1948 and 1949. They now operate in the hill area of Burma. These fellows support their wives and families by growing poppy, and shipping it down to Thailand, Laos, and into Vietnam. So there you have an unorganized system.

But in the Near East and Europe we talked to the French police and the French secret police and they admitted there are clandestine laboratories where those involved in the processing take it and reduce it to heroin. The authorities found every time they made an arrest or had information leading to an arrest it involved one of these four Corsican families.

Those families have been there for decades, and therefore are entrenched.

I think one of the most significant aspects of Turkey's ban on the growing of opium is that you are going to make these four Corsican families shift to some new source, probably along the near east coast and the northern coast of Africa. Hopefully, the Bureau of Narcotics feels that in establishing new ties that they will be able to crack some of these families.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you all very, very much. We are enormously grateful to you for your diligence and perspicacity and staying with this problem and presenting it to the subcommittee.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned.)

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER S. BARING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEVADA

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee on Europe; I appreciate the opportunity to write in support of legislation to halt the flow of U.S. foreign aid payments to those foreign countries producing and marketing narcotic drugs for illegal import into the U.S.

This nation, at the Federal, State, and local governmental level, is spending millions to combat the illegal sale and use of narcotic drugs which harm body, mind, and spirit of our people at the same time that it has a foreign aid budget in excess of \$12 billion.

It is certain that some of that U.S. aid payment money is going to foreign countries which are spreading what I will call the disease of drug addiction to the U.S. as well as to other countries by permitting the production and traffic within and without of their borders.

I would not be at all surprised that some of the U.S. aid, even in the form of goods which some foreign countries can turn around and unscrupulously sell on the flourishing black markets, is being used by foreign countries we assist to produce just those dangerous narcotic drugs which make their way illegally into the U.S.

Now, we have today in the U.S., costly, but necessary, drug rehabilitative programs getting underway for some civilian, Vietnam war veterans, and military personnel at a tremendous expense to the American taxpayer who is also footing the foreign aid payment bill of this country.

I do not believe that one thin dime of economic or military aid from the U.S. should be allocated to those foreign countries which will not instigate strong prohibitions against the production of dangerous drugs in their own nations.

Therefore, I am urging the Subcommittee on Europe to act favorable on bills I have co-sponsored, HR 4412 and HR 7820.

STATEMENT OF HON. NICK BEGICH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF ALASKA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to submit a statement before this subcommittee concerning the illicit international trade in drugs.

We are becoming increasingly aware that the narcotics problem in the United States is a broad one that cuts across all strata of American society. The spectrum of addicts encompasses youths of the middle class as well as ghetto-dwelling youngsters, college students as well as business executive. We have no truly accurate measure for determining the number of addicts in the United States, but we are told that it might be as high as 300,000 people. It is estimated that New York City has an addict population of over 100,000; Los Angeles claims 30,000 addicts; and Cleveland has as many as 25,000.

I have no accurate estimate for my own district. However, I can point out that a city such as Anchorage is suffering from the same urban drug plight that has ravaged these other cities. So, I am painfully aware that cutting off the international narcotics traffic is as important to Alaskans as it is to other Americans in various large urban areas.

We have, thus far, failed miserably in developing a program of interdicting the flow of hard drugs from its sources in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to the veins of the helpless user.

The task ahead of us, I believe, is to cut off heroin production at its very origin: the poppy fields. This course of action is not an easy one to carry out. The United States has two methods at its disposal to curb opium growth.

The first method calls for the cessation of foreign aid to all countries which fail to crack down on illicit opium farming operations. This choice, in my opinion, constitutes a gross oversimplification of a very difficult and complex problem. The following table illustrates the world opium dynamic in 1968 and our foreign aid as of 1970:

[In metric tons]

	Licit production	Illicit production	Illicit into United States	U.S. economic aid (m.illions)
India.....	750	175 to 200		\$456.4
Turkey.....	120	100	30	90.6
U.S.S.R.....	115			
Yugoslavia.....				5.2
Pakistan.....		175 to 200		212.4
Japan.....				
China (Red).....	75 to 100	Unknown		
Afghanistan.....		100 to 125		7.9
Burma.....		400		.8
Thailand.....		200		29.3
Laos.....		100 to 150		52.9
Mexico.....		5 to 10	5 to 10	39.9

As shown, the principal countries in which illicit opium production occurs are Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the triangle of Burma, Laos, and Thailand. The total withdrawal of aid will not directly affect dollars taken into the economy from the sale of opium, because no nation, not even India, makes any significant gain in its coffers from opium. Withdrawal of aid will not be directed at cutting down opium revenues; instead it will affect all programs financed by foreign aid. This means that in Pakistan, for example, all health programs, all school programs, and all construction programs will be eliminated because the country cannot seem to cope with an illicit drug problem within its borders. Quite simply, if a country were not able to control illegal opium, it would not be reasonable to suppose that the denial of funds used for meeting the basic living needs of the populace would spark the transference of other funds to an opium control system. Rather, other funds would be shifted to take the place of the retracted money. Therefore, I believe we must turn to the second method at our disposal to curb opium trade; namely, increased assistance to opium-harvesting nations.

The cultivation of the poppy is a highly labor intensive process. There are few readily available substitute crops, at present, that can yield a comparable income return per unit of cultivated land. Unilateral cessation of opium growth would destroy the livelihoods of farmers whose sole income is a resultant of poppy cultivation. As outlined in H.R. 8262, a bill which I am co-sponsoring with Congressman Scheuer of New York, these farmers should be offered technical assistance in order to stimulate and develop remunerative crop diversification programs. Such programs might include the distribution of necessary seed, fertilizer and equipment, and should provide for the development of roads and machinery for an effective farm to market distribution system.

H.R. 8262 also authorizes the President to furnish assistance in strengthening the law enforcement machinery of countries seeking to control the production, processing, and distribution of dangerous drugs. Further, the bill recognizes that a large part of our assistance must be concentrated in the area of education and treatment.

I believe that a most effective way to provide this assistance is through some multilateral channel. Such a channel exists in the United Nations, where a Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control was established in November, 1970. Another international channel is Interpol, which currently functions with an incredibly inadequate budget of \$800,000, less than the police budget of Fargo, North Dakota. Illegal narcotics traffic can only be solved by an integrated international effort.

For, as Turkey cracks down on opium farmers, and France prosecutes heroin processors, organized criminal syndicates are shifting their drug operations from these countries to such other nations as Afghanistan, Burma, Laos, and Thailand. If we are to halt this shift, we must move quickly before these new drug refineries become well established.

Finally, this subcommittee might want to consider the proposals set forth in H.R. 7120, a bill I have co-sponsored that has been sent to the House Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The bill establishes an Office of Drug Abuse Control, with a Director who, among other duties, will work to coordinate all Federal drug programs. Presently the programs are scattered in such Federal departments and agencies as Agriculture, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Health, Education, and Welfare, State, Labor, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, NASA, and OEO. The battle against narcotic drugs must be effectively fought at home if we are to expect foreign countries to seriously respect our concern for the hard drug problem.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that with proper assistance foreign countries can prevent, at the source, continuation of the illicit world drug trade that has so devastatingly affected thousands of Americans. But such prevention will only materialize with understanding and serious cooperation on the part of the United States.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES J. CAENEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF OHIO

I am pleased to present testimony in support of H.R. 4412. This very urgent bill amends section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by suspending, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance and certain sales (sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act of Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954), to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent drugs, produced or processed in that country, from entering the United States unlawfully. The suspension of aid is required by the act and there is to be no exception made through this or any other legislation. The suspension is to continue until the President decides that the government of the offending country has taken steps to curtail drug trafficking from it to the United States.

That there is a need for such a bill is clear. The Select Committee on Crime pointed out the need for international control of drug traffic earlier this year in their report on heroin. Drug abuse has skyrocketed in the last few years, not only in the United States, but throughout the entire world.

According to the National Institute of Mental Health's estimates, there are over 250,000 heroin addicts in this country. Over half of them reside in New York City. In 1970 the deaths of 1,154 New Yorkers were attributed to heroin. Half of them were under 24 years of age. In fact, abuse of narcotics is now the leading killer of people in New York City in the 15 to 35 year old bracket, ahead of accidents, murders, suicides, and cancer. Drugs are hitting more Americans and at a younger age than ever before. New addicts under the age of 18, in the past two years (1969-1970), increased at a ratio of three and one-half times that which we experienced in the preceding three years (1965-1968). In California alone, juvenile drug arrests rose from 1,271 in 1961 to 14,112 in 1967 and there appears to be no end to the increase in sight.

What five years ago was restricted to the ghettos of major cities is spreading like a malignant disease throughout all sections of our society. As already pointed out the young have been affected. Suburbia and business have also run into problems. Among our armed forces, narcotics use has reached alarming proportions. Reliable sources estimate that between 20,000 and 60,000 of the American troops stationed in Vietnam use heroin by sniffing it or injecting it.

These same men are being re-introduced into our society as their tours of duty end. Their demands for heroin are expanding an already growing black market to astronomical proportions.

It is difficult to understand and measure the extent of the problem. With little precise information on the issue, because of the users and pushers operating underground, one can only make calculated guesses as to the extent of the problem.

The problem of heroin addiction is not simply one of people destroying themselves. It has reached such large proportions that it now threatens society in general. An addict needs \$30 to \$100 a day to support his habit. An estimated 75 percent to 98 percent of them resort to crime to get this money. In turn, because fences only pay twenty to twenty-five percent of face value, the addicts must steal merchandise four to five times the cost of their habit. A conservative estimate puts the cost of their crimes at \$8 billion a year. Officials estimate that 50 percent of all crimes are committed by addicts seeking to support their habit.

In addition, much of the increase in crime over the past few years can be attributed to the increase in the number of addicts.

The source of heroin is the poppy plant which is grown in Mexico, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Laos, Burma, and Thailand. The finished product is the result of processing the poppy into a morphine base and then refining it into heroin. Eighty percent of the world's heroin originates in Turkey. Producers then process the poppy in Syria and Lebanon and refine the morphine in Marseilles or other European cities, from where it is shipped to New York. Another principle source of heroin in the United States is the poppy grown and smuggled into the United States from Mexico. A third major source of heroin in the United States is Hong Kong, where poppy grown in the mountainous areas of Southeast Asia is processed, refined, and shipped to our country.

Obviously a cure is needed for this problem. The surest way is to eliminate the production of poppies entirely, or at least, limit production to small areas under strict national or international control. Without heroin, there can be no addicts. The United States and Turkey have arrived at just such a ban on the growing of poppies. Yet all the countries where the poppy plant is grown are underdeveloped and many have regions where the government can exercise little if any control, much less enforce such a ban.

Another solution lies in international controls set up and enforced on a worldwide basis. The U.N. Fund for Narcotics is examining numerous aspects of narcotics production, smuggling and usage, but it is only investigating.

This bill goes beyond merely attempting to stop production and researching the problem, to stopping the flow of it into this country. By cutting aid to countries responsible for heroin production, refinement, and shipping, it applies immediate pressure on them. Little room is left for escaping the issue. Although the bill does not permit a waiver, it allows the President some discretion. He does not have to suspend all aid. For example, in cases where total suspension of aid might have serious effects such as toppling the ruling regime, the Executive branch would apply only partial suspension of aid to force this issue.

Of the world's major poppy growing countries, six of them, Mexico, India, Laos, Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand, were among the top twenty recipients of economic aid from the United States in 1970. Depriving them of aid would move them decisively toward curbing their illicit drug traffic. A crackdown on illicit narcotics traffic would also deprive organized crime of a major source of revenue.

Perhaps it is time to stop building dams and power plants for people who are responsible for the deaths or destruction of so many of our young. It is time to stop arms shipments to countries who never use them to stop drug smuggling. Time is running out. We need to rearrange our foreign aid priorities and announce to the world our intentions on drug control. If cooperation is not forthcoming from other countries, then our financial, technical, and military assistance will not be so readily available to them, as it has been in the past. This bill forcefully and exactly calls for an end to the narcotics drug traffic. With its passage, meaningful discussion and realistic plans to stop this international traffic in death and degradation will result.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Today, I testify in favor of H.R. 5032 dealing with the problem of illegal international trade in drugs. The bill, to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, calls for suspension, in whole or in part, of economic and military assistance and certain sales (under the Foreign Military Sales Act or Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent drugs, produced or processed, in that country, from entering the United States unlawfully. The act requires suspension of aid, either in whole or in part, and no exemptions are allowed. The suspension is to continue until the President concludes that sufficient steps have been taken by the government of the offending country to curtail drug trafficking from it to the United States.

We are dealing with a major crisis that threatens the health of our nation. It is no longer the problem of a select few hiding in the slums of a few large cities. It has reached the businessmen, suburban families, and the young from coast to coast. According to the National Institute of Mental Health, there are about 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States. Half of these addicts are under 24 years of age.

As a member of the advisory board of the National Council on Drug Abuse, I have been profoundly concerned with the long range implications that drug use among young people may incur. According to the latest coroners report, drug deaths increased 4600% in Cook County, Illinois. Fourteen years ago the average age of addicts in the Cook County Jail was 28 years old; as of last year it was probably closer to 21 years old.

Among young people, the rise in arrests for all crimes between 1960 and 1968 was 64%, but arrests for possessing and selling narcotics had gone up 740%. In all age groups, close to 90% of all those arrested for drug violations had criminal records and 17% were armed. Some estimates place hard addicts responsible for 75% of all serious crimes committed against person and property in large cities such as New York and Chicago. In recent years, juvenile drug arrests have increased manifold. In fact, abuse of narcotics is now the leading cause of death for New Yorkers in the 15 to 35-year-old bracket.

The narcotic drugs come in many forms. Primarily they include opium, opiates, coca leaves and opium derivatives. The most common narcotic drug used is heroin. The cost of addiction is high, up to one hundred dollars per day.

The result is that over three-fourths of the drug addicts must resort to crime to make payments on their habits. Police officials attribute half of all crimes committed in the U.S. to drugs. That would amount to over eight billion dollars a year in stolen goods alone.

The poppy is grown in various countries around the world including: Thailand, Burma, and Laos in Southeast Asia, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in South Central Asia, as well as Turkey and Mexico. But growing the poppy is only the first step; conversion must be made to a morphine base and then to heroin. The process of conversion requires laboratories. Oftentimes this takes place in France or Syria or Hong Kong. The result is that heroin gets to the United States through many devious routes, all of which must be cut off to stop the importation of narcotic drugs illegally into the United States.

Eighty percent of the world's supply of poppy has been grown in Turkey. Following arduous diplomatic negotiations, the Administration has scored a breakthrough when on June 30 Turkey announced a ban on the production of opium, effective in the fall of 1972. It has been estimated by some officials involved in the negotiations that the Turkish agreement will only be a stopgap measure while other illegal sources gear up production.

Mexico has also accounted for a large share of the drug traffic into the U.S. The Mexican Government and the U.S., in 1970, under the auspices of Operation Cooperation, agreed to crack down on narcotics smuggling. To bolster her efforts, Mexico has received a million dollars in planes and helicopters from this country. Despite this program and the increase of 1,200 percent in heroin seizures in the past five years, the black market continues to thrive.

The result is an increasingly serious drug problem that threatens us from within. The way to stop it lies in cutting off the supply of narcotic drugs. Efforts must be international in scope and multilateral in cooperation. Immediate solutions are not forthcoming. The responsibility for action, then lies with us. H.R. 5032, by utilizing our foreign aid to force countries to take appropriate steps and prevent the smuggling of narcotic drugs into the United States, is an extremely effective means of impressing upon these countries our determination on the issue.

Perhaps the time has come when we will stop building dams and hospitals for those who share responsibility for the destruction of so many of our young.

Fertilizers and farm specialists should no longer be provided to nations who do so little to stop the cultivation of opium. Since most of the world's opium producers are also major recipients of American foreign aid, the bill aims dramatically at persuading them to crackdown on the illegal export of drugs to the U.S., or risk the loss of millions of dollars in aid. With passage of this bill, meaningful and realistic plans can hopefully result in stoppage of this international traffic in destruction and degradation. I urge immediate action by this committee to approve this bill.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES J. DELANEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to come before this distinguished panel to express my views on the alarming drug crisis that is endangering our

nation. The situation with respect to heroin addiction is particularly ominous, and requires the priority attention of Congress.

The traffickers in drugs are dispensing death and hardship throughout our neighborhoods. They have declared war on the United States and we must move immediately to combat this threat which has spread in our colleges, our suburbs, our factories, and even our secondary and elementary schools. We cannot afford delay. We must eliminate drug abuse now!

The drug war is costing us dearly. The lives of hundreds of thousands have been ruined and even ended because of illegal drug traffic. In New York City, drug addiction has become the leading cause of death in the 15-35 age group, killing nearly 1,000 persons each year.

According to a report issued by the Honorable Abraham D. Beame, Comptroller of the City of New York, there are at least 100,000 heroin addicts in New York City. He estimates that each one averages \$30 per day for his habit, which means \$3 million per day or over \$1 billion per year in New York City alone.

Most of these addicts are unable to work and few jobs pay enough to support the cost of addiction. The bulk of drug money is raised through crime. Recent testimony before the House Select Committee on Crime indicates that whole neighborhoods in the poorer parts of New York City are being terrorized by the crimes of heroin addicts. Robberies occur in broad daylight. Local citizens have learned that complaints will only lead to retaliation by the addicts. Estimates by police officials link as much as 50% of street crimes and thefts to drugs.

Comptroller Beame's study estimates that the cost of goods stolen by addicts, in relation to the amount of money received by them, is five to one. In other words, an addict must steal about \$150 in goods a day to maintain a \$30 a day habit. This means that the 100,000 addicts in New York City must steal several billion dollars of valuables a year.

Federal statistics reveal that narcotics addiction has increased 322% between 1960 and 1968, and an increasing number of these addicts are teenagers. We must also add the cost of the criminal assaults, injuries, and deaths inflicted upon innocent persons by drug-crazed addicts as they rob and steal to support their habit. Related costs for medical attention, hospital charges, and the growing number of addicts on the welfare rolls are almost incalculable.

Drug smuggling is controlled by organized crime. The police are exerting an all out effort to handle narcotics traffic.

The court dockets are full, and so are the jails, the juvenile halls, and the prisons.

Today, despite the obvious havoc being wrought upon our society, we have been almost totally ineffective in halting the spread of heroin addiction. Only by mustering the entire resources of the nation can this traffic be overcome.

I have re-introduced two bills to control drugs. One of them, HR 129, would suspend economic and military assistance to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs being produced by them from entering the United States illegally. Virtually all heroin and cocaine come into the United States from abroad. It is vital that we make every effort to eliminate this source of supply.

Three particular heroin traffic routes are utilized in bringing the drug into our country. A pattern originating in the Middle East is currently the most important route for smuggling heroin into the United States. Opium grown in Turkey and Afghanistan is transformed into morphine base and shipped via Lebanon to France. In France, in clandestine laboratories centered around Marseilles, the morphine base is converted into heroin and smuggled into New York, Miami, Mexico City, Montreal, and many other cities for ultimate distribution in the United States. Because the influx of Turkish workers into the Federal Republic of Germany has provided an ideal smuggling network, that country has also become a key location in the illicit traffic.

Another traffic route is the Far East. Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos are sources of opium which moves to Bangkok and Singapore to be converted into heroin. The heroin is smuggled into the United States by way of the Philippines and Canada.

A third opium producing area is Mexico. The opium poppy is grown in remote mountain areas and converted into heroin in clandestine laboratories located in isolated villages. It is then smuggled across the border into the United States.

It is essential that we do everything we can to eliminate these sources of supply. In attempting to do this, our government has requested that the governments in these opium producing areas take sterner measures to control this flood. Our re-

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quests have been ignored; we see token enforcement, but the endless deluge continues. We have tried persuasion long enough. Any country which will not effectively aid us in our effort to halt the flow of drugs does not deserve the aid of our American tax dollars.

As for those who prey upon the addiction of others, we must use every agency, whether political, governmental, religious or social, to pursue them relentlessly. Trafficking in drugs is a crime against humanity. It is a form of international treason against society and all the resources of this nation and the family of nations should be utilized to wipe it from the face of the earth.

I strongly support all measures which will eliminate this plague.

As I stated before, we are at war. We must not lose this war. If we do, we will witness the destruction of our youth and our nation. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, as a co-sponsor of H.R. 4412, I am pleased at the intense interest and the resulting progress which we are starting to make combating international drug traffic.

It is obvious that the Congress and the Nixon Administration are in full agreement on the need to control drug abuse and we are in agreement that heretofore the effort has not been sufficient.

The President's message of June 17 showed recognition of the problem, revealed a sense of urgency, and recognized the need for Congressional cooperation.

The cooperation of Turkey, Mexico, Thailand, and South Vietnam has been demonstrated and, while I believe more cooperation must come from the French Government, even there we have had favorable developments in the control of drug traffic.

One of the obvious points that must be made by our diplomats and even the President in his contact with the Red Chinese, is to obtain their cooperation in controlling the international flow of drugs, since they are a major supplier and have refused to cooperate to date.

As a member of the Full Committee, I trust the Subcommittee will expedite its hearings so that we might move forward with appropriate legislation.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSHUA EILBERG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Subcommittee, on February 17th of this year, my colleague from New Jersey, Mr. Rodino, submitted H.R. 4413 on behalf of himself and numerous co-sponsors. If passed, the bill would amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 "to suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance and certain sales to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs, produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States unlawfully, and for other purposes."

My name was included among the co-sponsors. As a Representative from one of the country's largest cities, I have become personally concerned with the spreading plague of narcotics abuse. Philadelphia now shares the ignominious position along with New York, Newark, New Orleans, Detroit, and Los Angeles of having had its drug problem expand to the critical level. My concern for the gravity and magnitude of drug addiction and its related problems led to my commitment to and involvement in community enterprises which seek to provide education and rehabilitation to addicts or potential drug-users. I recently pledged my assistance to the organization known as The ROAD—Responsible People Opposed to Abusing Drugs.

Individual concern is of course only the first step toward progress. It is encouraging to me that Congress has recently been awakened to the demands of the problem. In addition, I think changes are emerging in our attitudes and approaches to drug abuse.

We have come to understand that it can be a sickness as well as a crime, that our approach to it must be compassionate as well as firm, and that to cope we must educate and cure, not just punish, those addicted. You will recall that last year Congress passed the Drug Abuse Education Act and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, both of which I strongly supported.

This legislation provided wide authority to combat the drug problem in the fields of education, enforcement, and rehabilitation.

Offensive maneuvers to combat drug abuse are springing up on all fronts. Law enforcement authorities have intensified efforts to curtail the flow of illicit narcotic drugs into the United States. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs reports that the seizure of heroin, cocaine, and marihuana has increased since 1969 by 205%, 197%, and nearly 100% respectively. The Armed Forces has launched an intense and determined effort to halt the narcotics advance among U.S. servicemen, particularly among those stationed in Southeast Asia.

Yet each victory only serves to reinforce the immensity of the task ahead. It becomes increasingly apparent to me that with death rates from heroin overdoses on the rise, and the number of addicts growing, these measures are not really remedial; they simply provide means for coping with and controlling the further growth of the narcotics scourge. They do not attack the problem at its source. To that end, more pointed action must be undertaken. That is why I have supported H.R. 4413.

This bill is designed to use the lever of American economic and military assistance to influence those nations which are the major sources of illicit narcotics in the United States to take appropriate steps to arrest their illicit drug production. We are concerned not with those countries which are now making an honest effort to respond to our problem, but with those which are not making the effort. We have tried to show them through our bilateral negotiations and through this bill that the narcotics problem is a mutual problem, that the actions of a nation on one side of the globe can seriously harm another across the globe. We have tried to persuade them; failing that, we must try to coerce them. The problem has become too great, too threatening to accept ineffectual compromises. Consequently, the bill contains punitive measures to which, it is hoped, a recalcitrant nation will respond.

These proposals are understandably very controversial. Opposing arguments are in many cases persuasive and valid. Perhaps most disturbing among them is the question of the bill's effectiveness. There is merit in the argument that the bill is based on an assumption, and not on hard fact. Granted, the bill's supporters are assuming that nations will respond to the threat of losing American military and economic assistance. But this assumption is based upon two substantial considerations which I should like to explore with you for a moment.

The bill is directed at the world's major opium producers—Turkey, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Mexico, and the 'golden triangle' of western Burma, northern Thailand and Laos. Turkey, for example, supplies approximately 80% of the illegal heroin in the United States. (I should just like to mention here, that as a result of recent steps taken by the Turkish government to control opium production, the bill would not apply to Turkey after 1972). According to a study recently prepared by the Justice Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, opium production "does not benefit the national economies of any of the producing countries significantly," although it is "an important source of income to individual farmers and thus a political issue of moment in some countries." India, for example, which is the world's biggest producer and exporter of legal opium, earns just \$6 or \$7 million yearly from overseas sales compared to overall export earnings of \$2 billion. The position of the Turks is analogous. The report also states that "against the national income, it is apparent that illicit production is also of minor significance in all the other producing countries."

Having briefly examined the economic position of opium production in the national economies of these states, let us look at another economic factor—amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance. In Fiscal Year 1970, opium-producing nations received the following amounts of U.S. economic and military aid:

Country:	Millions
Turkey -----	\$203.9
India -----	440.5
Thailand -----	29.2
Laos -----	(¹)
Pakistan -----	214.3
Afghanistan -----	8.1
Mexico -----	41.0
Iran -----	133.3
Burma -----	.5

¹ Information classified.

One can see from the foregoing list that in several cases the sums are considerable. When placed next to the amounts earned from opium production, they seem even greater. What our bill, H.R. 4413, purports to do, is present a choice to these nations between their opium production, which is of little relative economic significance to their national economies, and their U.S. economic and military assistance, which is considerable. Since money speaks, it seems to me that national economies stand to gain more from the choice to cooperate in our efforts to reduce the production of opium, and, it is hoped, the supply of heroin.

Let me close with an ardent plea that my colleagues respond to the needs of their communities and their nation by enacting H.R. 4413.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, the increasing attention and priority which this Congress is giving to the critical issue of drug abuse has yet to show positive results in the efforts to combat this insidious problem.

The major reason for our inability to get a handle on the problem of drug abuse is implicit in the topic of these timely and important hearings on the international aspects of the drug problem in the United States.

It is an international problem, and, therefore, requires an international solution.

I have joined with many of our colleagues in proposing legislation which would direct an international approach to the elimination of illegal drug traffic in heroin and other hard drugs. H. Con. Res. 129 would require the Executive Branch to:

(1) Instruct U.S. representatives to international organizations and programs to support the development, under U.N. auspices, of multilateral efforts aimed at both the illegal production of and traffic in narcotics.

(2) Instruct the permanent representative to the U.N. to urge that body to strengthen the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs by empowering the U.N. to collect, investigate, and publish information relating to illegal production and traffic in narcotics.

(3) Instruct the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference on Psychotropics to exert every effort in support of the preparation of a draft treaty on control of psychotropics.

(4) Consider greater allocation of foreign aid assistance to those countries which cooperate with the United States and the U.N. in carrying out measures aimed at the suppression of illegal international traffic in narcotics.

A substantial part of the drug problem in the United States comes from the presence of U.S. servicemen in Europe and Southeast Asia. The Defense Department has taken action which I joined many colleagues in recommending, by initiating a new policy of identification of addicted soldiers coupled with treatment and rehabilitation prior to discharge. This is a constructive step, but here we are treating the symptom and not the cause of the disease.

Our objective must be international cooperation to locate and eliminate the sources and flow of illegal narcotics. The evidence suggests that Turkey is a major source, and some encouraging agreements have been recently announced which could control that source without economic harm to that country. We can and must go further.

Despite the crackdown on drug traffic and abuse in Southeast Asia, for example, reports in the press indicate that the availability of heroin to GI's has not been affected.

Mr. Chairman, again I commend this distinguished subcommittee for the attention which it is bringing to the resolution of this distressing problem. I am confident that your leadership in this regard will strike a responsive chord in the legislative and executive approaches to an international cooperation in combating illegal drug traffic.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, earlier this year two Members of Congress, Mr. Steele of Connecticut, and Mr. Murphy of Illinois, startled the world with their report about the increasing menace of drugs.

In their report, they declared that the "war against heroin must be sharply accelerated—now. Given the increasing use of heroin among our youth, immediate action is crucial. Unfortunately, time is not on our side, and as this report is being written, more young Americans are becoming addicted to heroin."

Mr. Steele and Mr. Murphy also asserted that "the United States alone cannot bring an end to the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly the use of opium and its derivatives, is causing among the youth of the Nation. We must have the cooperation of the entire world."

It was heartening, indeed, to learn of the decree by the government of Turkey that it will ban all opium production there after 1972.

The Administration had been seeking this type of agreement for some time and should be commended for helping to achieve it.

However, reports indicate that opium producers in Turkey are expected to try to circumvent the prohibition through clandestine operations—as they have done in the past.

Moreover, some U.S. officials reportedly expect opium producers elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia, to try to replace Turkey as the principal source for the U.S. market.

President Nixon, in his June 17 message to Congress on drug abuse, declared: "To wage an effective war against heroin addiction, we must have international cooperation."

However, despite international agreements and the beefing up of anti-drug agencies, only some 10 to 15 per cent of illegal drugs are intercepted on their way into this country.

President Nixon's recently announced plan to attack drug abuse includes \$1 million to help train enforcement agents, which should help to improve these percentages. It also calls for 1,000 new Customs investigators and inspectors, 325 new agents for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and 541 new Internal Revenue Service auditors and investigators.

The need for enforcement is truly there. But the United States has other means at its disposal to reduce the supply of dangerous drugs into this country.

And, that is why I am a co-sponsor of H.R. 4413, aimed at suspending foreign economic and military assistance to any country which fails to take steps to stop the movement of drugs from their country into ours.

This is a most serious step. But then, this is a most serious problem.

For, as Mr. Steele and Mr. Murphy have observed: "Once the poppy pod is cut and the opium gum extracted and sold on the illegal market, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict is lost.

"The problem must be attacked at the source—in the poppy fields of the Near and Far East, principally in Turkey, Thailand, Burma and Laos."

Mr. Chairman, if it takes a loss of foreign aid from the United States to stop the addiction of our youth, then let us use that weapon.

Turkey has agreed voluntarily to ban opium production. Perhaps other nations will follow. But if they do not, then our nation must use all of the weapons available—including suspension of foreign assistance—to gain the cooperation that is necessary.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM M. GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA

I am here today to testify in favor of H.R. 7472 and H.R. 7820. Both would amend Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. H.R. 7472 would call for suspension, in whole or in part, of economic and military assistance and certain sales to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs, partly or entirely produced or processed, in such country, from entering the United States unlawfully. H.R. 7820, if passed, would charge the Comptroller General with responsibility to review and determine annually the effectiveness of each country's activity in preventing drug traffic into the United States. In addition, provision is made for reporting to the Congress annually on the situation, and for suspension of economic aid ninety days after such report if that country has failed to undertake appropriate measures to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

That legislation to curb drug traffic is needed is only too obvious. The National Institute of Mental Health puts the number of heroin addicts in this country at a quarter of a million. Over half of them reside in New York City. Heroin is now the leading killer in the 15 to 35-year-old age group for New Yorkers, ahead of

accidents, cancer, murder, and suicide. It is taking a terrible toll among the young. Most addicts must resort to crime in order to support their habit costs of thirty to one hundred dollars a day. They account for an estimated fifty percent of all crime and upwards of eight billion dollars a year in stolen goods. Thus, narcotic addicts figure significantly in our spiraling crime problems.

And where does this heroin come from? A few countries including Turkey, Afghanistan, Mexico, Pakistan, India, Laos, Burma, and Thailand account for the world's heroin supply. They grow the poppy seeds and then process it into a morphine base and finally heroin.

Much of it eventually ends up in the U.S. since we are one of the world's major consumers of drugs. In the past few months alone the equivalent of 150,000,000 individual shots of heroin have been smuggled into this country. Heroin seizures have increased over 1,200 percent in the past five years but the market is up even more. Estimates are that it has doubled in the past six months. It now caters to 11 and 12-year-olds, besides many returning Vietnam veterans.

What is being done about this? The U.N. Fund for Narcotics is examining many aspects of it and gathering information on the problem, but that amounts to investigation, not preventive action. Turkey, the world's principal source of opium, has agreed to stop opium production. But hundreds of tons are hidden away in the mountains and will eventually find their way into Lebanon and France, where they are processed into heroin. Mexico and the United States, under the auspices of Operation Cooperation and with the help of a million dollars in helicopters and light aircraft, have attempted to crack down on the drug traffic. But the problem continues seemingly unabated.

Of the world's major poppy growing countries, six of them, Mexico, Laos, Thailand, Pakistan, India, and Turkey, are among the top twenty recipients of economic aid from the U.S. in 1970. The withholding of American foreign aid by the United States would force those countries, and any intermediary countries, which assist in the processing of heroin, to implement and enforce laws that would prevent heroin traffic to the United States. This amounts to striking at the source of the problem by cutting off the supply of heroin.

The moment has arrived when aggressive measures must be taken to stop the destruction of our young. Arms shipments to countries, which fail to use the necessary force to cut off illegal drug trafficking, must be ended. No more fertilizers and farm products should be sent to agricultural countries which fail to crack down on the growth of poppy seeds. H.R. 7472 and H.R. 7820 forcefully call for an end to illegal traffic in drugs. The withholding of American foreign aid to achieve this objective is a strong and emphatic way to impress upon other countries the importance of this issue to our well-being.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK HORTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I appear before you today to urge immediate and favorable consideration of two bills which I am cosponsoring to decrease the international trade of illegal drugs: H.R. 7821 and H.R. 7906.

Half-hearted efforts do not serve to combat a moral and physical illness which is sweeping the country in epidemic proportions. Each day we delay action, five Americans die of drug abuse.

Our children constitute the majority of these addicts. Indeed, health officials declare that drug abuse is the principal cause of death among New York City residents between 15 and 35 years old, surpassing even accidents and cancer.

And the staggering price of drug abuse does not stop here. The Department of Justice reports that 1969 witnessed approximately 1.5 billion dollars in drug-related theft alone.

True, drug seizures by customs officials rose 100 percent in 1970 through tougher law enforcement as exemplified by Operation Intercept. Yet, more than 200 million people will enter the United States in 1971. Tougher customs policies, therefore, only partially solves the problem.

In fact, drug addiction continues to spiral in the U.S. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) admitted in September of 1970 that "the list of addicts is growing by several thousand each year and, in 1969, the number of new addicts doubled from the preceding year."

Any successful effort to roll back this trend must attack the source of the problem. Since the BNDD reported in 1969 that 95 percent of America's addicts

use heroin, our concern must focus on opium and the poppy plant from which heroin is processed. Opium production, in turn, occurs principally in India, Southeast Asia and Turkey.

So, America's drug problem is a world drug problem. The Nixon Administration has recognized that fact through its actions during the last year. In October 1970 the U.S. proposed to the United Nations amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. These amendments, as President Nixon said, "would provide to the International Narcotics Control Board mandatory powers where it now has only the power to request voluntary compliance."

Furthermore, the U.S. signed on Feb. 21st of this year the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which restricts the production, distribution and international commerce of hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD.

Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. has pledged \$2 million of a \$5 million UN Fund for Drug Control to be used for research, trafficking controls, police training, replacement of opium crops, and the education and rehabilitation of addicts.

Yet the most significant breakthrough in the war against drug abuse came on June 30th of this year when Turkey agreed, under U.S. pressure, that starting in June 1972 no more poppies will be planted. Experts estimate that 60 percent or more of the heroin entering the U.S. had been processed from poppies grown in Turkey.

I applaud these Administration efforts, yet much still remains to be done. Both Southeast Asia and India outrank Turkey in producing illegal opium. An article published in the Washington Post on July 4th of this year indicated that drug networks have already begun to shift toward the Asian market. The elusiveness of the drug threat is further highlighted by the realization that only 4 or 5 tons of heroin, a fraction of the world supply, supports the entire addicted population in the U.S.

Yet Southeast Asian officials show little interest in controlling the drug trade. In fact, there are reports that they have actively sabotaged drug control efforts. It is no secret that officials in the Royal Laotian Army protect the flow of drugs for profit.

The stories of official protection are much the same in Saigon, a major market for the Laotian drug trade.

From a recent study mission to countries producing and processing opium, my distinguished colleagues, Representatives Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, concluded that "There is no sense of urgency on the part of most governments that action must be taken immediately to stop the illegal production of, and traffic in, heroin." The mission's report further recommended that U.S. diplomats should escalate the "use of all available political and economic leverages and each foreign government should be put on notice that failure to cooperate would prejudice bilateral relations."

For these reasons, H.R. 7821 provides a useful policy weapon, for the bill would discontinue economic assistance to foreign nations not taking "appropriate measures" to prevent locally produced or processed drugs from unlawfully entering the U.S.

A responsible drug policy must not merely take a "reform or else" stance. Such a policy would very probably lead to a shift in opium production into areas of low governmental control, as in parts of Burma. Rather, the U.S. must adopt a systematic policy of aiding foreign nations to control the drug trade.

Such a policy must be comprehensive. Where opium production and processing supplies a livelihood for local communities, alternate crops must be found as substitutes. Where crop substitution is inadequate to meet employment needs, jobs must be secured elsewhere.

Strategic in the drive to eliminate opium production will be a worldwide educational program to modernize the medical profession. The existence of adequate synthetic substitutes for morphine and codeine means that opium production is less justified for medical purposes.

Finally, the U.S. can aid other nations in developing law enforcement technology. Lack of administrative control over areas of Laos, Thailand, and Burma has already hindered drug control efforts.

H.R. 7906 would meet the need for a comprehensive program by enabling the President to aid foreign governments and international organizations in substituting alternative crops and employment, and in developing educational programs and strengthening law enforcement.

U.S.-Turkish relations represent an example of what can be done in this direction. With an American loan of \$3 million, Turkey has opened 26 offices supporting

280 special narcotics agents. An additional 470 men will receive similar training. The bills which I cosponsor would provide for such a diplomatic offensive worldwide while simultaneously encouraging foreign cooperation. If we are to save generations of American youth, we must take these steps immediately.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD H. ICHORD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. Chairman, I feel constrained to add my voice to those in the House of Representatives seeking to find solutions to the growing drug problem which is now threatening the very foundations of our society. The alarming increase of drug traffic in this country over the last few years has created at least three urgent problems: (1) it feeds and helps support organized crime; (2) it is one of the largest contributors to the high crime rate in the country since the addicts must steal an estimated \$8 to \$10 billion worth of goods each year to sustain their habits; and (3) like a plague of old, drug addiction threatens to destroy an entire generation of America's youth.

The fact that we now have a reported 250,000 heroin addicts in the U.S. and another thirty to forty thousand addicts among the American G.I.s in Southeast Asia means that this problem has already reached epidemic proportions. It has been reliably estimated that heroin addiction in the Nation's Capital has increased by more than 60% in the last year. If the national increase is little more than half that figure this means that we will be faced with a half million addicts in a couple of years and with a million or more in five or six years.

With 10 to 15% of the servicemen returning home from Vietnam slaves to a heroin habit, accustomed to the use of heroin that is often 90 to 95% pure, it is obvious that the extensive need for the diluted heroin available in this country will create a sharp rise in crime and drug sales. Certainly, we must take strong and immediate action to deal with this problem before it gets so far out of hand that it is impossible for us to control it.

One of the immediate programs must be improved and extended treatment of the addicts. We cannot stand idly by while thousands of our citizens, most of them young people, die horrible deaths each year from the effects of drugs and tens of thousands are prevented from living a good and fruitful life because of their involuntary servitude to hard drugs such as heroin. Apparently some of the amnesty programs conducted by the various branches of the services in Vietnam have proved successful on a small scale, and many of the drug treatment centers in this country have experienced encouraging results but these programs are reaching only a fraction of those affected. We are still doing too little too late in this area.

However, treatment of addicts, as important and necessary as it is, fails to get at the heart of the problem of stopping the flow and sale of hard drugs. Virtually all of the opium used to process the heroin that enters this country or is sold to our boys in Southeast Asia is grown in the poppy fields of Turkey, Thailand, Laos, and Burma. Turkey, Thailand, Laos, and to a lesser degree Burma, are heavily dependent upon American economic and military aid.

It is the absolute height of folly for us to continue to support their economies and help defend their countries while they are, in effect, permitting the invasion of our shores by smugglers of hard drugs intent upon destroying our young people and wrecking our economy. We have urged these countries to take steps to control the growing of poppies and limit the same to only such as is necessary for the legal market. We have heard nice words but have seen little positive action. The time is come for us to tell all of these countries that they have received the last dime of American economic and military support unless they take strong, decisive, and effective action to control the growing of poppies without further delay. France, Hong Kong, Syria, Lebanon, Mexico and any other countries in which the drugs reaching this country are either grown or refined must be given the same message in no uncertain terms.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that I am calling for strong measures, but we are dealing with a severe problem where time for effective action is running out. In his recent economic moves the President of the United States stated that the time has come for us to direct our attention to our own economy and take the necessary steps to protect our own interests in the world trade market. I am sug-

gesting that we must follow the procedure in dealing with the countries responsibilities for the illegal flow of dangerous drugs into our country.

In my opinion it is also high time that we told the government of South Vietnam that it must move immediately and decisively to stop the sale of hard drugs to our troops stationed in that country. We have invested over 50,000 American lives and billions of dollars into the defense of Vietnam. The price has already been too high and we must not mince words in dealing with Vietnam officials. At the present time more American lives are being permanently or partially destroyed by drugs in Vietnam than by the war. This is an intolerable situation and I call upon our President and our diplomats to spell out clearly the fact that we will not continue to tolerate this situation.

Mr. Chairman, we can effectively fight unemployment, poverty, the slums, cancer, heart disease and all the rest to absolutely no avail if we stand by and allow our most precious asset, America's youth, to be devoured and destroyed by the cruel and heartless monster of drug addiction.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR A. LINK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify in favor of legislation that would terminate foreign aid assistance to countries which do not act to prevent narcotic drugs from unlawfully entering our country.

When I came to Congress in January, I volunteered to serve on the House District of Columbia Committee because I wanted to be cognizant of the full spectrum of American life, from the sparsely populated agricultural communities in North Dakota to the urban population centers like the District of Columbia.

My few months in Congress have brought me face to face with the complexities of urban living. I have, of course, been aware of the cancerous growth of the national drug problem. I was not prepared, however, to learn that in some sections of the District over 24 percent of the young men between 15 and 19, and 36 percent of the young men between 20 and 24 are users of narcotics. These figures are staggering, symptomatic of a well-fueled epidemic, and totally unacceptable to citizens striving to build and maintain a healthy society.

Our traditional means of coping with national problems have not been effective in controlling the epidemic. While law enforcement and border inspections have produced an increasingly large number of arrests and confiscations, the problem has continued to fester and spread from community to community.

Throughout our country there is an awareness of the need for treatment and rehabilitation for drug users. Congress has certainly responded responsibly to this need. But these efforts, while providing relief for the problem, do nothing to eradicate the source. That is why this legislation is so important. When we terminate the source of illegal drugs, the market will be starved and our rehabilitation and treatment efforts will be more meaningful and productive.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to share my concern for the drug problem and express my optimism that innovative legislation like H.R. 8093 will help bring the era of drug exploitation to an end.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee as it commences hearings on proposed legislation to attack the international traffic in dangerous drugs. This matter is, as the members of the subcommittee know, crucial to our nation's public health. It is of special import to me as one of our nation's public health. It is of special import to me as one of the senior members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for it must clearly be the responsibility of the Committee to assume the leadership in Congressional dialogue on this subject.

Disclosures in recent months have brought home to Congress and the American people the immediacy and severity of the drug crisis. Reports have indicated that as many as fifteen per cent of our troops in Vietnam are addicted to high-grade heroin, precipitant to a far more costly and dangerous habit upon return to the United States, where they will require vastly increased doses of the drug

to maintain their intake level. New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy has estimated that his city now has over 100,000 heroin addicts. Furthermore, the same city saw some 1,000 deaths from drug overdoses in 1970 alone. As President Nixon recently stated, "... no step is too drastic if it will help to end this menace in our national life."

As the Nixon Administration has recognized, there are no simple answers to this plague which has infected our national well-being. Efforts to identify and treat addicts, with the aim of total rehabilitation, have been moderately successful and are increasing rapidly. Just as important in the long run, however, is the ending of drug trafficking and the prevention of further drug abuse and addiction. Every point along the production line of illicit drugs must be kept under surveillance and shut down whenever possible. Smugglers, processing plants, drug wholesalers, and pushers must be pressured and arrested, if effective results are to be had. Most important, however, is the source of the drug, whether it be the opium poppy fields of the Middle and Far East or the clandestine laboratories producing illegal synthetic drugs around the world.

The Administration has been aware of these problems and has given them a high priority since it first took office. Passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and its subsequent implementation, as well as the substantially increased appropriations for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, are indicative of the extent of the commitment of Congress and the Executive Branch to the eradication of drug abuse in this country. More recently, the President announced a legislative package aimed at providing a coordinated Federal response to all aspects of the drug problem. To be overseen by the proposed Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, substantial new efforts in rehabilitation, drug abuse education, domestic enforcement, and internal control were announced in the President's message to Congress. These include a proposed 44% supplemental raise in enforcement budgets for the Justice Department and the Customs Bureau, up to a record high of \$104.1 million. The proposals in the international area are especially significant, and I will discuss them further at a later point.

One of the most recent developments, and one which I consider of major significance, is President Nixon's joint announcement with the Government of the Republic of Turkey on June 30, that that nation will no longer allow opium production as of the autumn of 1972. After several years of negotiations, this agreement is a major victory for the State Department in the continuing war against drugs on the diplomatic level. However, though most heroin used in the United States now comes from Turkish opium, many have expressed the fear that importation from the Far East will now increase to fill the demand by American addicts. Thus, although one important milestone has been passed, the traffic in heroin, as well as in other dangerous drugs, will continue to flourish unless we receive the full cooperation of all the governments of drug-exporting countries. Many members of Congress, including myself, are convinced that legislative action to assist in obtaining this cooperation would be necessary and helpful.

Closely paralleling several of President Nixon's proposals, I cosponsored along with the Chairman and other senior members of the Committee, H. Con. Res. 129. The resolution recommends that the President take several steps to achieve greater international cooperation in combatting the drug traffic. It urges that American representatives at the United Nations and other multinational organizations initiate and support the development of effective international assaults on the production and traffic in illicit drugs, to be coordinated under United Nations auspices. Further, the resolution would support Presidential discretion in using foreign assistance funds to further support those nations which cooperate with the United States' efforts in this regard.

In addition to the resolution just mentioned, the Chairman and I have recently introduced H.R. 9344, which would grant the President immediate authorization to begin implementation of his drug abuse control proposals. Due to the critical nature of the drug problem, I feel that it is vital to empower the President to deal swiftly and powerfully in the area of international drug control. I am hopeful for positive House action on this legislation in the near future.

Mr. Chairman, I am gratified that the Subcommittee on Europe has chosen to look into the international aspects of the American drug problem in such considerable depth. Much effort has been made by the Administration and certain members of Congress in this area, and I look forward to early House action on these very vital proposals.

STATEMENT OF HON. PARREN J. MITCHELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, this committee is presented with a number of proposals calling for the mandatory cut-off of foreign assistance to nations which engage in the growing or processing of illicit narcotics which wind up in the United States, and whose governments fail to take serious measures to curb the drug trade.

Now it is an agreed principle of international relations that foreign aid is an element in the vital task of economic growth and social progress, not a Christmas turkey dispensed by an international political boss, and that it should not be used as a pressure tactic by the rich against the poor. In practice, of course, this principle is shamelessly ignored, but in theory it is agreed to.

In general, we write the theory into legislation, leaving its practical violation to the Executive Branch. This is known as the separation of powers.

Are there good reasons in the case of drugs to depart from this general rule and raise the violation to the status of an exception? I think so.

The case rests on four basic propositions about the American narcotics problem, which I believe will command general agreement:

(1) Heroin addiction in America is so widespread and so destructive as to constitute a major national disaster.

(2) No possible treatment program can keep ahead of the addict population unless the present rate of new addictions falls drastically.

(3) No enforcement effort at the local level can be effective unless the flow of narcotics into this country is seriously cut into.

(4) Customs enforcement at the ports of entry cannot of itself do the job; the attack must be made at the points of production and processing.

All this being the case, shipping, or allowing the shipment of, heroin into the United States is an unfriendly act on the order of poisoning the water supply. But this is not well understood by most foreign officials. They have little or no heroin problem, and therefore do not comprehend the extent of ours. After all, smuggling is generally accepted as a more or less harmless expression of the free-enterprising spirit, and a semi-legitimate source of income supplementation for underpaid public servants.

But heroin is in a class by itself; and we are entitled to expect cooperation in this area from those who would be our friends. We are also entitled to take measures to remind the world just how seriously we take this problem.

But why not leave the reminder to the Executive? This would have the advantage of flexibility. The argument is strengthened by the memory of the disaster the Hickenlooper Amendment has been. The problem is that we have a multiplicity of foreign interests and it is the function of the State Department and the National Security Council to safeguard these interests. We have reason to fear that our pressing national needs will be forgotten in the tangle of geopolitics. Consider for example, Southeast Asia.

Whatever the accuracy of the accusations which have been made against various individuals, it is quite clear that the governments of Laos and South Vietnam are massively involved in selling heroin both for use by American servicemen and for export Stateside. If any governments in the world are susceptible to American influence, they should be Laos and South Vietnam. Both depend on continued massive American support for their survival. And yet our support and the heroin trade both continue. Clearly, stopping the traffic is not a policy goal comparable in importance to maintaining an anti-communist South Vietnam. In effect, we are subsidizing with our arms and our men and our money the poisoning of this Nation.

There is a certain poetic justice in this. We have destroyed Indo-China with the sword (to be precise, with the bomber), and Indo-China is destroying us with the needle. The American soldier-addict is a perfect metaphor for the corruption which this war, waged on behalf of a corrupt tyranny, has worked upon the American soul.

A certain poetic justice, I say; and yet there is nothing poetic about a junkie. This Government should act decisively to stop the flow of filth into this Country and into the bloodstreams of its citizens. Whatever the merits of our Indo-Chinese military adventure, no conceivable result of its success or failure is of a magnitude which would justify allowing the continued entrapment of American soldiers into addiction, or, worse, the opening of another major heroin-supply route to replace the Anatolia-Beirut-Marseilles connection that may now be broken.

And yet our policy seems better designed to protect the feelings of South Vietnamese generals and ministers than to eradicate the heroin menace. It is in the light of this situation that we must view the State Department's comments on this legislation. The Department tells us that "An explicit threat to terminate assistance will not promote our mutual objective of controlling the illegal international traffic in narcotics. Such action would create internal political pressures which would make it difficult for governments to take the actions we desire." But what does that mean in the context of Laos and Vietnam? Both governments are filled with officials who are getting rich from dope-running. It is understandable that "political pressures" would result from any action which threatened their profits. But if we make it clear to these governments that stopping the drug traffic is not a distraction from their war effort but a vital part of it, that traffic will be stopped. If it is not, we can stop it by picking up and leaving. Somehow we must keep the heroin away from our troops or get our troops away from the heroin.

No, Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the Executive Branch, if left to itself, will always find something more important than stopping the opium trade. If we want action, we must allow an independent official like the Comptroller-General to make a determination which will trigger a mandatory aid cut-off.

I do not believe that encouragements to other governments to take action in this area should be entirely negative. It is our responsibility to make it economically feasible for those nations which want to get out of the drug business to do so. There is no reason why the Anatolian poppy-farmer should be sacrificed to the solution of America's social problems.

Finally, it should be noted that no legislation we write will be a panacea. The governments of some poppy-growing nations, notably Afghanistan, lack effective control over the relevant regions. We should not expect them to do the impossible. With others, particularly Pakistan, our influence may be weakened by the general course of events. But because we cannot do everything, it is not necessary that we do nothing. We can, and we should, make a start.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. MOSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, drugs have unquestionably become one of our nation's most disturbing problems. Drug addiction has become an indiscriminate national malady, observing no barriers, social or economic. The cancer is growing and spreading as drug addicts and drug-related deaths rapidly increase. Heroin is the virus of the disease. According to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, as of December 31, 1970, 68,864 individuals were known heroin addicts. The Bureau now estimates that at least 315,000 are drug addicted victims, over 40% of whom inhabit the New York City area. Washington itself is estimated to number about 5,000 addicts among its population. In New York City alone, 1,156 heroin addicts succumbed in 1970. I need illustrate the gravity of our problem no further.

Though recently worsened by the widespread use of drugs among U.S. servicemen in Vietnam, the problem of drug addiction has troubled the world and the country for many years. It is not a new trouble to those who have worked with it. If this is true, you may ask, then what remedial steps have been taken?

The Congress and the Executive have begun to move ahead on the matters of drug addiction and the crime it produces. Extensive exploratory hearings have been held recently in both the Senate and the House. The Armed Forces have begun a forceful crackdown on drug abuse among servicemen, particularly among those serving in South Vietnam. Other agencies like the Justice Department and the State Department have studied the problem, and are cranking their institutional wheels in efforts to bring about changes. But, the bureaucratic and the international processes are slow. As crime and addiction continue to rise, we cannot afford to wait out these procedures. The time has come for persuasive and, failing that, coercive action to halt the spread of the cancer, by cutting it out at its root.

Opium is the mother drug from which heroin is processed, and the poppy fields of the Near and Far East are its source. Turkey, India, Thailand, Burma, Laos, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mexico produce thousands of tons of opium yearly. The greatest sources of illegal heroin in the U.S. are Turkey,

which produces 80%, Mexico, which produces 15%, and the Laotian-Thai-Burmese triangle, which supplies 5%. It is interesting to note that opium production does not substantially benefit the national economies of these countries, although it is an important income for individual farmers. For example, India, which turns out the world's greatest supply of licit opium, earns only \$6 million to \$7 million yearly from overseas sales. The same is true for Turkey. Illicit opium production is apparently also of minor economic significance for these nations.

While opium production brings relatively little in economic benefits, it is interesting to note that U.S. economic and military aid to some of these nations is substantial. In Fiscal Year 1970, for example, the U.S. gave more than a hundred million dollars in economic and military aid to Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Iran. Of these nations, India received the most: \$440.5 million; Pakistan the second largest amount: \$214.3 million; and Turkey, the third largest sum—\$203.9 million. It seems to me that a loss of U.S. economic and military assistance would have a far greater effect on these countries economically than would a loss in opium sales.

After a careful look at drug addiction and its problems, I have concluded that the danger is clear and present, and that immediate action is mandatory. I also realize that the U.S. is in an advantageous position to influence the production of opium in other countries by using the lever of economic and military assistance. It is my feeling that the Congress should pass legislation which would suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance to countries which do not take appropriate steps to prevent narcotics produced or processed in such countries from entering the United States illegally. I therefore urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4415.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I introduced on June 24, 1971, a bill to amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance and certain sales to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States unlawfully, and to restrict immigration from and travel to any such country.

I am convinced that the American people are fed up with the inaction on the part of the world's opium growers and heroin producers. This was forcefully brought home to me by a recent questionnaire which I sent to every voter in the 16th Congressional District.

In answer to the question: "Do you favor suspension of military and economic assistance to countries which export drugs to the United States?" 87% of those responding indicated that they supported such an approach. In addition to the "yes" responses, many voters indicated their outrage over the fact that this country is the major dumping ground for the dope peddlers of the world. I feel this is a resounding vote of support for my legislation from an area that has seen first hand the ravages wrought on the young people of Staten Island and Brooklyn by the dope pushers in far off Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe and South America.

The problem of the elimination of opium production in many countries of the world is complicated by social and economic factors which influence the ability and the incentive of many countries to suppress the production of opium.

This has been going on for years. But I refuse to believe that those governments in the countries involved do not have the ability to eliminate either the production or the distribution and processing of opium and opium derivatives which are destined for the United States. I cannot believe that it is impossible to interdict either the production or the sources of supply by the law enforcement—or the army if need be—in France, Turkey, Mexico, Greece, Lebanon, and a host of others.

That is why I introduced this bill which will provide the incentive to those countries that have been dragging their feet in knocking out the clandestine production of opium and the criminal network of refinement and distribution that has been allowed to go on for fifty years. I feel it is time we quit playing games with these nations and let them know in no uncertain terms that the

United States of America will no longer tolerate this unhindered criminal traffic or be placated by the annual burning of a few poppy fields—which usually have already been harvested—and arresting a few secondary traffickers.

My legislation would take a hard line by punishing those countries which allow narcotic drugs to be produced and processed and which are destined for the United States by suspending economic and military aid to such countries.

Until they take the appropriate steps to stop the dope traffic, my legislation would do three things:

First, the legislation would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance and certain sales to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States unlawfully.

Second, the legislation would prohibit the issuance of visas to Americans who wish to visit those countries that have been identified as opium producers or processors. Under the provisions of my bill the Secretary of State may restrict travel to a foreign country or area by citizens and nationals of the United States if there is in effect with respect to such country or area a determination by the President that the country or area has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs (as defined by section 102(16) of the Controlled Substances Act) produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States unlawfully.

Third, my legislation would prohibit the immigration of residents from these countries into the United States. Under this provision, no immigrant visa may be issued under the Immigration and Nationality Act to any national of any country with respect to which there is in effect a determination by the President that the Government of such country has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs (as defined by section 102(16) of the Controlled Substances Act) produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States unlawfully; and no national of any such country may be permitted to otherwise acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

I take this step reluctantly—but these countries leave us no alternative. Nothing has worked so far at the diplomatic level and the problem has now gotten completely out of control.

I am certain my bill if enacted into law would provide the incentive to the governments involved.

I am certain they would—in very short order—devise ways to eradicate the poppy crops, the marijuana fields, the pill producers *and* those vicious criminals who refine, package, produce and smuggle these deadly powders and tablets into the United States.

When we realize there are 250,000 heroin addicts, 12 million marijuana users, and untold millions of our youths strung out on dangerous drugs, I feel that such a drastic step is warranted. The United States Congress should let these drug source countries know that the American people are fed up with their indifference and that we in Congress have had enough. We should let them know we are not going to be “nice guys” anymore and that we are willing to temporarily suspend our amicable relationships in order to put a stop to this outrageous international disgrace.

I urge Members to support this legislation. We in Congress must let these countries know that their lack of respect for the lives of young Americans has caused us to lose respect for them. Nothing could make this message more clear than to forbid our citizens to visit these countries and prevent their citizens from immigrating to the United States.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. SEIBERLING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement to your subcommittee.

I do not need to recite to you the extent or ramifications of the drug problem. The fact that your subcommittee is holding these hearings is obvious evidence of a new level of public concern about drug addiction—and a rather desperate feeling we all have to find some solutions.

This new level of consciousness is reflected in the President's call last month for establishment of a Special Office of Drug Abuse. The President has asked

Congress for \$351 million to fund the program, which will include treatment and rehabilitation, education and training, research and law enforcement.

I commend the President for his initiative, and I will certainly support appropriations to get this effort off the ground.

But in all honesty, we must do much better.

We must take a hard look at our attitude toward drug abuse, and our methods of bringing it under control.

And we must be willing to make a much greater commitment of national resources—upwards of \$1 billion a year—if we really intend to solve this problem.

This subcommittee has before it two bills which I have cosponsored (HR 4415 and HR 8093) to give the President or the Comptroller General and the Congress authority to cut our economic and military aid to nations which fail to take appropriate steps to see that illegal drugs do not enter the United States.

The recent decision of the Turkish government to ban the production of opium after August, 1972, is a hopeful step forward in this effort. But we must move quickly to see that new opium markets cannot step in to take Turkey's place in the world market.

I support any reasonable measure which will help us make a dent in the problem of drug addiction, and many experts feel that this authority is necessary and will be effective.

Therefore, I have endorsed these bills, but I must admit that I do so with a degree of caution. I feel that the approach of these bills will help in the battle against the drug menace, but that we must be aware of their limitations. We cannot promise the American public that these bills are a panacea for the drug problem.

Specifically, it is said that the United States needs only 50,000 to 60,000 pounds of opium each year for licit heroin use, which represents only about 1.5% of the total world opium production. This need could be met by cultivation of about 3,500 acres or less than 5 square miles. Obviously, all that is needed is a very tiny loophole in any control program to allow continued importation of heroin.

In addition, and more basic to the problem, is the fact that cutting off the supply does not solve the problem. Implicit in this approach is an attitude that drug abuse is primarily a criminal problem, and if we can just cut off the supply and put everyone who uses it in jail, the problem will be solved. This is an attitude which must be changed. Drug addiction is a complex medical, psychological and social problem, which demands far more sensitive and sophisticated solutions than a police crack-down.

If the supply is cut off, the need will still be there for many. If heroin is not available, there will be pressure on addicts to turn to other drugs, and on pushers to come up with heroin substitutes. England experienced this phenomenon when their heroin maintenance program cut off the easy supply of heroin, so many addicts turned to barbiturates and other addictive drugs.

So I approach these bills with caution. In and of itself, cutting off the supply of heroin will accomplish very little. Coupled with a number of other steps, including massive programs of methadone treatment, it could serve a useful purpose.

I would like to propose here five steps which we can take immediately to wage an all-out war on drug abuse.

Some will have immediate pay-offs, others will require a more long-term commitment. And they all will require a considerable commitment of manpower and money. We can no longer afford to skirt around the edges of the drug problem, poking here and there, but never really getting to the heart of the matter. Society is paying an enormous price for our neglect—and it is high time we dug in and put our best minds to work on the problem of drug addiction.

(1) *Establishment of methadone treatment centers in every city in the nation.*

Addicts in the United States today have only a small chance to break their habits. It is safe to say that only a small fraction, probably less than 10%, of all heroin addicts in the nation are involved in any kind of treatment program.

Yet there is a promising method which can help restore addicts to a normal life, and that is methadone maintenance.

Methadone treatment, although controversial from a moral standpoint, is generally considered to be the most effective and least expensive form of treatment now available to addicts. As measured by decreased arrests, job stability, continuation in the program and other indicators, up to 80% of those participating in methadone programs are successfully treated.

Yet in the entire United States today, where we have at least 250,000 known heroin addicts (and probably many more) no more than 10,000 have access to a methadone program. In New York City—home to probably one-half of all heroin addicts in the nation—there were only 2,700 persons under methadone treatment last month. But the city's clinics had received 5,000 additional applications for treatment without solicitation, and officials said that with proper funding, the number of addicts under treatment could be increased three-fold in a matter of months.

For approximately \$2,000 a year, an addict can receive daily doses of methadone along with the necessary supportive services aimed at helping him "kick the habit" permanently. That would call for an annual commitment of \$500 million just to service the known heroin addicts today.

Is it worth it?

Many believe that substituting one habit for another isn't the answer and I for one, don't believe it's the only answer or the entire answer.

But I do believe it is the most promising, short-term solution to give the addict a way out of the horror of heroin addiction. Methadone treatment allows addicts to seek jobs with confidence and self-assurance. It can end the life of frequent prison terms. It can return an addict to a relatively normal life, complete with family and friends.

And it could bring about a sharp reduction in our ever-increasing crime rates. In the major metropolitan centers, where most heroin addicts are located, it is estimated that 50 to 80% of all violent crimes are committed by heroin addicts. In stolen property alone, heroin addiction is indirectly responsible for an annual loss of \$10 billion.

Certainly \$500 million is not too high a price to pay with such possible dividends as these described above. I am hopeful that our government will have the courage to adopt a large-scale methadone treatment program.

(2) *Massive public education programs on the effects of drug addiction.*

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is making efforts to bring this issue before the nation. Television and radio messages have touched some of our citizenry. There have been federal grants to train teachers and school personnel in drug education. The newspaper in my district, the Akron Beacon Journal, is offering a booklet about Dangerous Drugs for a small price.

But again, much more is needed.

The field of drug education suffers from confusion and uncertainty about how best to proceed which in turn reflects the lack of knowledge we have about the effects of drugs.

Simple scare tactics will not be effective with sophisticated youth today. Many of them have experience with drugs. They know they will not die from smoking marijuana. They have seen people take LSD and survive. They have not seen the subtle, permanent damage to some person's minds and genes. Drug education programs must be accurate, factual and consistent with young people's own experience. And they must be aimed not just at youth, but at all ages. Ignorance among many adults about drugs is the cause of much distrust between parent and child today, resulting in family tension, and I am sure, in many cases in the early breakup of the family.

Obviously, public schools have an enormous role to play in drug education. But they need trained personnel, and materials to carry out these programs. All this will take money.

They also need the trust of parents. If public schools were not forced to report all drug users to local authorities, they could become an enormously effective tool in catching early drug addiction.

(3) *Establishment of public and private drug information centers where people talk about their problem and receive advice without fear of parental or police recrimination.*

Viewed as criminals by the law, young people will turn for help only out of desperation if they know they will be turned over to the law enforcement authorities. Arrests of persons under 18 for drug offenses rose from 1,688 in 1960 to over 57,000 in 1969—so their fear is well-founded.

For many years, our society viewed chronic alcoholics as criminals. We are now moving away from this attitude, and are beginning to treat alcoholics as people with serious medical problems. I am hopeful that we can apply this same sensitivity to drug users—and concentrate our law enforcement efforts on the drug pushers.

I have a more than passing experience with the successful approach to alcoholism developed by the group known as Alcoholics Anonymous. My mother brought together the two alcoholics who founded what later evolved into AA and she herself helped it evolve and contributed much of the religious and philosophical content of the AA approach.

The heart of AA is the dedication of its volunteer members working to help other victims of alcoholism. But a prerequisite to the successful rehabilitation of each alcoholic has been the recognition that he had a medical problem, and in appropriate cases he would not even be brought into AA until after medical treatment. Without hospital facilities and trained staff to treat the physical aspects of alcoholism, the miraculous success of AA's fellowship of volunteers would not have been possible.

Both elements, are, in my opinion, essential to any successful, long-term attack on the drug problem.

The success of two drug information centers in Akron proves the value of this approach. The Akron Hotline Extending Aid on Drugs (AHEAD) and Souls Re-Oriented (SRO) offer young people in Akron 24-hour telephone services, drug education classes, and a place to "rap" and to find help, sympathy and encouragement. The response has been tremendous.

At AHEAD, there are people of many professions volunteering their services or working for minimal pay. But as the demand grows, it will be humanly impossible for these men and women to carry the load. Many of them have other jobs and families. We cannot expect this system to work forever without a paid staff. We must bolster such centers now with more funds to hire full-time professional counselors, social workers, and health care personnel. AHEAD hoped to have a "medical room" complete with medical equipment, doctors and nurses. But because of a lack of funds and larger facilities, they have only one "medical night" opened for two hours one night a week.

Only with more money can these groups grow with the demand and continue to serve our community as they are now doing. We cannot afford to wait until the present system falls apart.

(4) *Federally-sponsored research into all aspects of the drug problem.*

Most drug experts will agree that we have a serious lack of knowledge about what leads people to drug addiction, the effects of certain drugs on the human body and mind, proper methods of drug education, and effective methods of drug treatment.

Heroin addiction, the most dramatic and visible of the various drug problems, is confined primarily to the inner cities, and primarily to blacks, Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans. But White Middle Class America has its own very serious drug problems.

Aside from marijuana and alcohol, there is considerable use of amphetamines and barbiturates—two drugs which can cause serious organic damage and even death—among young high school and college age people. There is also good reason to believe that a large percentage of middle age and elderly people use both legal and illegal drugs on a daily basis.

In short, drug addiction is a problem which is reaching into all social and economic classes of our society. We have very little knowledge of why this is so, and how to treat the basic problem.

The federal government must accept responsibility for the development of a comprehensive and coordinated research program into all aspects of drug addiction. If one looks over the list of esoteric projects sponsored by federal government research funds, particularly in the field of defense, it is difficult to believe that we cannot come up with sufficient funds to finance a massive war on drug abuse.

(5) *Elimination of the conditions in our society which foster drug dependency.*

This last point is perhaps the most obvious, yet the one which requires the greatest commitment from us. It is, in the end, the only sure answer.

An immediate end to the war in Vietnam must be the first priority in this category. One of the most tragic consequences of our mistaken involvement there has been the creation of thousands of new heroin addicts. The Department of Defense estimates that 10% of our servicemen are heroin users—5% hard-core addicts. Those figures mean that one month ago 24,720 Americans in Vietnam used heroin. Some servicemen have said that only on drugs could they face the situation in Vietnam. How many reasons do we need to leave?

Secondly, we must eliminate the conditions of poverty, squalor, overcrowding, and discrimination which cut off so many people from the opportunities of our society, and contribute to a sense of hopelessness which too often ends with drug addiction. The ghettos of America—where these conditions are rampant—have fostered unknown thousands of heroin addicts. It's reached the point where today many blacks believe that the white man has pushed heroin into the ghettos to keep the residents powerless and helpless. We have to prove otherwise.

And finally, we must begin to deal with the pressures, fostered by a highly technological and mobile society, which have driven many middle class people, both young and old, to a dependency on drugs. This is, over the long run, certainly the most difficult problem of all. To a large degree, its solution lies outside the legislative sphere, for it involves the spiritual and moral values of our people. But we must begin to do our share now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A P P E N D I X

(The following is the response from the Department of Justice to Mr. Fulton's inquiry on p. 126:)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D.C., November 12, 1971.

HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of October 8, 1971, in which comments were requested from the Department in response to Congressman Fulton's inquiry concerning the policies and administration of the United States Attorneys' offices in New York State as they affect the Federal narcotic and dangerous drug laws.

The fact that there are fewer prosecutions for narcotic violations by the United States Attorneys' offices in New York than by the local and state prosecutors does not mean the United States Attorneys in New York are unaware of the grave problem of narcotics, nor that they are not fully responding to this problem. Rather, the figures reflect the complementary arrangement that exists among the local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in New York.

The attack on narcotics is being waged at three levels. The New York City Police Department, because of its number and organizational structure, is concerned with stopping the distribution of narcotics, from a few grams of heroin at the street level to multikilogram quantities. Since the New York City Police Department is focusing on the least sophisticated and greatest number of narcotic offenders, the number of arrests is understandably much higher than that of the other two forces fighting the narcotics traffic.

The New York Joint Task Force of approximately 175 law enforcement officers, from the New York City Police Department, the New York State Police, and the federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, is concentrating its efforts on stopping dealers of heroin and cocaine, beginning at the middle level. Finally, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which has 180 special agents stationed in New York, is concentrating its attack on the international organized distribution of narcotics, at the highest level. This complementary arrangement is designed to avoid much wasted time and effort and, hopefully, allows each agency to fully develop and best utilize its talents.

It is thus apparent that the federal prosecutive effort is wholly responsive to the demands made upon it. Cases involving international organized distribution are less frequent than cases involving street dealers. The former type cases are appropriate for, and are prosecuted in, federal court; the latter type are appropriate for, and are prosecuted in, the state and local courts. It is our considered opinion that any other arrangement would hamper rather than improve the movement of narcotic cases through the various courts of New York.

I hope the above has been responsive to your inquiry.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,
Deputy Attorney General.

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(The following is a list of all bills and resolutions concerning drugs which were referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs as of July 7, 1971. All such bills and resolutions were referred in turn to the Subcommittee on Europe and were the subject of the hearings which began on that date:)

Amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend assistance to any country which fails to take steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in such country from entering the United States:

Mr. Delaney, H.R. 129; Mr. Murphy of New York, H.R. 250; Mr. Rarick, H.R. 364; Mr. Stratton, H.R. 1168; Mr. Howard, H.R. 1367; Mr. Rodino, H.R. 1539; Mr. Lennon, H.R. 2490; Mr. Helstoski, H.R. 3125; Mr. Casey of Texas, H.R. 3239; Mr. Rostenkowski, H.R. 3326; Mr. Scott, H.R. 3581; Mr. Edmondson, H.R. 4108; Mr. Monagan, H.R. 4146; Mr. Fulton of Pennsylvania, H.R. 4362; Mr. Hutchinson, H.R. 4373; Mr. Nix, H.R. 4384; Mr. McCormack; H.R. 7410; Mr. Peyser, H.R. 7426.

Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mr. Anderson of California, Mr. Andrews of North Dakota, Mr. Annunzio, Mr. Barrett, Mr. Baring, Mr. Beville, Mr. Biaggi, Mr. Brasco, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Burke of Massachusetts, Mr. Byrne of Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney, Mr. Cederberg, Mr. Celler, Mrs. Chisholm, Mr. Clark, Mr. Córdova, Mr. Corman, Mr. Coughlin, Mr. Crane, Mr. Danielson, Mr. Davis of Georgia, Mr. Dent, and Mr. Derwinski), H.R. 4412.

Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Diggs, Mr. Dingell, Mr. Donohue, Mr. Dorn, Mr. Dulski, Mrs. Dwyer, Mr. Edmondson, Mr. Eilberg, Mr. Edwards of California, Mr. Fish, Mr. Flood, Mr. Forsythe, Mr. Frenzel, Mr. Fuqua, Mr. Garmatz, Mr. Goldwater, Mrs. Grasso, Mr. Green of Pennsylvania, Mrs. Green of Oregon, Mr. Griffin, Mr. Halpern, Mrs. Hansen of Washington, and Mr. Hastings), H.R. 4413.

Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mr. Helstoski, Mr. Hicks of Washington, Mr. Hollifield, Mr. Horton, Mr. Howard, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Ichord, Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania, Mr. King, Mr. Koch, Mr. Leggett, Mr. Lennon, Mr. Lujan, Mr. Madden, Mr. Matsunaga, Mr. Mazzoli, Mr. McClory, Mr. McClure, Mr. McDonald of Michigan, Mr. Melcher, Mr. Mikva, Mr. Miller of California, and Mr. Minish), H.R. 4414.

Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mrs. Mink, Mr. Moorhead, Mr. Moss, Mr. Nix, Mr. O'Hara, Mr. Pelly, Mr. Pirnie, Mr. Podell, Mr. Price of Illinois, Mr. Pucinski, Mr. Railsback, Mr. Rarick, Mr. Reuss, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Roe, Mr. Roncallo, Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania, Mr. Roush, Mr. Sandman, Mr. Saylor, Mr. Schneebeli, and Mr. Selberling), H.R. 4415.

Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mr. Shriver, Mrs. Sullivan, Mr. Symington, Mr. Teague of California, Mr. Thompson of Georgia, Mr. Vigorito, Mr. Vanik, Mr. Waggoner, Mr. Widnall, Mr. Charles H. Wilson, Mr. Wyman, Mr. Yatron, Mr. Young of Florida, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Murphy of Illinois), H.R. 4416; Mr. Biaggi, H.R. 4505; Mr. Rangel, H.R. 4609; Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mr. Collier, Mr. Collins of Texas, Mr. Dorn, and Mrs. Green of Oregon), H.R. 5032; Mr. Rodino (for himself, Mr. Alexander, and Mr. Wright), H.R. 5713; Mr. Gibbons, H.R. 7472; Mrs. Hicks of Massachusetts, H.R. 7771; Mr. Rodino (for himself and Mr. Dennis), H.R. 8259; Mr. Burke of Florida, H.R. 8590; Mr. McDade, H.R. 9131.

Amending ch. 2 of pt. I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to authorize assistance for narcotics control:

Executive Communication 883, which was introduced by Mr. Morgan (for himself and Mr. Malliard) as H.R. 9344.

Calling upon the United Nations to help to eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and for other purposes:

Mrs. Hicks of Massachusetts, H. Res. 435.

Expressing the sense of the House with respect to the establishment of an international consortium under the auspices of the United Nations for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic in drugs :

Mr. Podell (for himself, Mr. Udall, Mr. Mikva, Mr. Rees, and Mr. Clark),
H. Res. 117.

For the control of international traffic in drugs :

Mr. Mailliard (for himself, Mr. Morgan, Mr. Fascell, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Monagan, Mr. Frelinghuysen, and Mr. Broomfield), H. Con. Res. 129.
Mr. Talcott, H. Con. Res. 180.

To amend sec. 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance and certain sales to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from entering the United States unlawfully, and to restrict immigration from and travel to any such country :

Mr. Murphy of New York, H.R. 9387.

Relative to control of the production and traffic in illegal drugs :

Mr. Frey (for himself, Mr. Biester, Mr. du Pont, Mr. Halpern, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Hogan, Mr. Keating, Mr. Kemp, Mr. Lent, Mr. McClory, Mr. McKeivitt, Mr. McKinney, Mr. Peyser, Mr. Ruth, Mr. Schneebeli, and Mr. Steele),
H. Con. Res. 352.

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide for international drug control assistance :

Mr. Scheuer, H.R. 7492; Mr. Scheuer (for himself, Mr. Badillo, Mr. Blackburn, Mr. Burke of Massachusetts, Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Collins of Illinois, Mr. Cotter, Mr. Drinan, Mr. Dulski, Mr. Eckhardt, Mr. Edwards of California, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Halpern, Mr. Horton, Mr. Metcalfe, Mr. Mikva, Mr. Morse, and Mr. Rees), H.R. 7906; Mr. Scheuer (for himself, Mr. Corman, Mr. Harrington, Mr. McCormack, and Mr. Meeds), H.R. 8012; Mr. Scheuer (for himself and Mr. Riegle), H.R. 8171; Mr. Scheuer (for himself and Mr. Begich), H.R. 8262.

To amend sec. 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit foreign assistance from being provided to foreign countries which do not act to prevent narcotic drugs from unlawfully entering the United States :

Mr. Hamilton, H.R. 6137; Mr. Rangel, H.R. 6709; Mr. Rangel, H.R. 6882; Mr. Griffin, H.R. 7582.

Mr. Rangel (for himself, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Dellums, Mrs. Abzug, Mr. Adams, Mr. Baring, Mr. Bell, Mr. Brasco, Mr. Byrne of Pennsylvania, Mrs. Chisholm, Mr. Clay, Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Collins of Illinois, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Diggs, Mr. Dingell, Mr. Dulski, Mr. Esch, Mr. Fauntroy, Mr. Fulton of Pennsylvania, Mr. Galifianakis, Mr. Gaydos, Mr. Gibbons, Mr. Gray, and Mr. Halpern), H.R. 7820; Mr. Hamilton (for himself, Mr. Dellums, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Harrington, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Hechler of West Virginia, Mr. Helstoski, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Hillis, Mr. Hogan, Mr. Horton, Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Keating, Mr. Kee, Mr. Metcalfe, Mr. Mikva, Mrs. Mink, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Moorhead, Mr. Nix, Mr. Obey, Mr. Perkins, Mr. Pike, Mr. Podell, and Mr. Preyer of North Carolina), H.R. 7821.

Mr. Dellums (for himself, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Rarick, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Roncalio, Mr. Rostenkowski, Mr. Roush, Mr. Roy, Mr. Roybal, Mr. Runnels, Mr. Ruppe, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Schwengel, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Van Deerlin, Mr. Charles H. Wilson, Mr. Wolff, Mr. Zion, and Mr. Badillo), H.R. 7822; Mr. Hamilton (for himself, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Dellums, Mr. Burke of Massachusetts, Mr. Frenzel, Mr. Hungate, Mr. Leggett, Mr. Link, Mr. Miller of Ohio, Mr. Rosenthal, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. St Germain, and Mr. Selberling), H.R. 8093; Mr. Sisk, H.R. 8949; Mr. Rangel (for himself and Mr. Gude), H.R. 9194.

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to U.S. contributions to international organizations and programs, to provide a program to control illegal international traffic in. Mr. Minish, H.R. 3881.

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to provide for programs of assistance to restrict and eliminate illegal international traffic in. Mr. Halpern, H.R. 9607.

To curb illegal production and illegal international traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs. Mr. Minish, H. Con. Res. 179.

To provide for increased international control of the production of and traffic in, opium, and for other purposes, Mr. Rangel, H.R. 4608.

(Following is an analysis and summary of the major types of bills listed above.)

The legislation referred to the Subcommittee on Europe deals with the problems connected with the illegal international control of the production of, and traffic in, narcotics.

Basically these bills fall into two general categories: those that would require the President to discontinue economic and military assistance to any country which fails to cooperate with the United States in its effort to control the illegal entry of narcotics into the United States and those that would direct the President to take action in the United Nations and in other international organizations to gain widespread support in this area. There are at least 200 sponsors and co-sponsors of the various legislative proposals referred to the Subcommittee. There are, however, different approaches taken to achieve these objectives.

Following is a brief description of each type of bill, listing the principal sponsor:

a. The Rodino Amendment

The Rodino amendment would amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by adding a new subsection (v).

It would direct the President to discontinue economic and military assistance, sales under Title I of P.L. 480 to any country when the President determines that that country has failed to take appropriate steps to stop narcotics produced in whole or in part in that country from entering the United States. The suspension shall continue until the President determines that such country has taken appropriate steps to control the illegal production of, and traffic in, narcotics.

The amendment would authorize the President to assist foreign countries in their efforts to prevent unlawful entry of drugs into the United States.

There have been 28 bills of this type referred to the Subcommittee. They are H.R. 1539, 4412, 4413, 4414, 4415, 4416, 5032, 5713, all introduced by Rodino with 121 co-sponsors.

In addition, H.R. 129, 250, 364, 1168, 1367, 2491, 3125, 3239, 3326, 3581, 4108, 4146, 4362, 4373, 4384, 4609, 4505, 7410, 7426, 7472 were submitted by other Members.

b. The Hamilton Amendment

(1) The Hamilton amendment would require the Comptroller General to review annually the effectiveness of measures being taken by each foreign country to prevent narcotic drugs, produced in whole or in part in such country from entering the United States and whether that country has taken effective measures to prevent narcotic drugs from entering the United States. A report would be submitted to the Congress not later than March 31 each year.

(2) If a foreign country has not taken appropriate action to control the illegal production and traffic in narcotics within 90 days all economic assistance shall be discontinued unless the President

(a) Finds that such country is cooperating, or

(b) Finds that the overriding national interest of the U.S. requires that aid be continued, or he may ask Congress to waive the provisions of this Act.

(3) The President is authorized to assist foreign countries in their efforts to prevent the unlawful entry of narcotic drugs into the United States.

There have been 8 bills of this type referred to the Subcommittee. They are H.R. 6137 and 7821 with 24 co-sponsors submitted by Mr. Hamilton. H.R. 6709, 6882, and 7820 with 24 co-sponsors submitted by Mr. Rangel; H.R. 7822 by Mr. Dellums with 19 co-sponsors, and H.R. 7582 and 7771.

c. The Minish Amendment (H.R. 3831)

The Minish Amendment would amend Chapter 3 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to U.S. contributions to international organizations and programs to provide for a program to control illegal traffic in narcotics.

It would:

1. Earmark 10 per cent of the annual U.S. contribution to the U.N. Development Program to establish a multilateral fund to support activities designed to end the illegal traffic in narcotics;

2. Require the President to direct the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations to support this multilateral undertaking;

3. Require the President to direct the Permanent U.S. Representative to the U.N. to prepare a protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics which would empower the United Nations to collect, investigate and publish information relating to illegal production and traffic in narcotics.

4. Express the sense of the Congress that economic assistance furnished under Section 201 should take into consideration the contribution that each country is making toward the international control of narcotics. It is also the sense of the Congress that the President consider withholding assistance from those countries which fail to cooperate.

d. The Rangel Bill (H.R. 4608)

The Rangel bill would provide for increased international control in the production of, and traffic in, opium. It would be called the "International Opium Control Act."

(1) The bill would urge the President to enter into negotiations with foreign countries in order to provide for a uniform international system of enforcement standards and penalties for illegal opium producers and traffickers.

(2) Would require the U.S. to propose the creation of a special opium control staff to investigate and propose specific actions to eliminate production of and traffic in opium.

(3) Establish a Committee composed of the Under Secretaries of executive departments who are engaged in the enforcement of laws dealing with the production, processing, selling, or use of opium in order to coordinate U.S. activities on the international narcotics control organizations.

(4) Urges the President to enter into negotiations to

(a) obtain authority for the staff of such organization to conduct investigations in member countries;

(b) further cooperation and coordination between the staff and law enforcement agencies in the member countries;

(c) provide for extradition of pushers and traffickers.

The Rangel bill also amends the Foreign Assistance Act by adding a new Title III (A) entitled "Opium Control." It authorizes the President

(1) to provide assistance to any friendly country to assist in the elimination of the production of opium. Such assistance shall help

(a) such country develop substitute crops;

(b) provide employment opportunities for those who become unemployed as a result of eliminating poppy growing;

(c) develop enforcement capabilities in such country.

(2) curtail Foreign Assistance if the President determines that country is permitting traffic to continue, he must cut off aid and seek international sanctions against that country through the United Nations.

(3) creates an Executive Committee on International Opium Control. The Committee will be composed of the Secretary of State as Chairman, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and one Senator and one Representative from each party and two members to be appointed by the President from public life. The Committee shall study what other countries are doing and shall report no later than February 1 of each year with its findings and legislative proposals.

Expenses of the Committee shall be paid by the Secretary of State from funds otherwise available under the Foreign Assistance Act.

e. The Scheuer Amendment

The Scheuer amendment would amend the Foreign Assistance Act by adding a new Title III (A)—"International Drug Control Assistance." It would

(a) Authorize the President to furnish assistance to any friendly country to encourage that country to control or eliminate the production, processing or distribution of narcotics or psychotropics within its boundaries and to any

international organization such as the U.N. Special Drug Abuse Control Fund for such purposes.

(b) Any assistance so provided would be used to

- (1) assist in developing suitable alternate crops,
- (2) provide employment opportunities for those displaced as a result of such action.
- (3) strengthen law enforcement capabilities in such countries, and to
- (4) Develop treatment, rehabilitation and preventive education programs.

There have been 3 bills of this type referred to the Subcommittee: H.R. 7492 and 8012 by Mr. Scheuer, and H.R. 7906 by Mr. Scheuer and 17 co-sponsors.

f. H. Res. 117, by Congressman Bertram Podell, states that the President, acting through the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, should propose the establishment of an International Consortium for the Control of Narcotics Production under the auspices of the United Nations. Such international control program should provide for the payment of direct subsidies to poppy growers for the growing of other crops. Such program would also include preemptive buying of opium and its derivatives. The costs would be shared by all members of the Consortium.

g. The Mailliard Concurrent Resolution

The Mailliard resolution would encourage the President to

(1) direct the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations to support international efforts to control the illegal production of, and traffic in, narcotics.

(2) direct the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations to urge the U.N. to give prompt consideration to strengthening the 1961 Single Convention.

The resolution also expresses the sense of the Congress that in furnishing assistance under Section 201 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President should take into account the contribution that each country is making to control the production of and traffic in narcotics.

There have been 3 resolutions of this type referred to the Subcommittee: H. Con. Res. 129, 179, and 180. H. Con. Res. 129 has been co-sponsored by Congressmen Thomas E. Morgan, Dante B. Fascell, Cornelius E. Gallagher, John S. Monagan, Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, and William S. Broomfield.

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