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[redacted] 25X1A

Copy 8 of 9
19 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, DD/S&T

SUBJECT: EXCOM Meeting Notes

REFERENCE: Memo from DNRO to DCI dated 13 June 1969; Subject: List of Topics for Discussion with the Executive Committee [redacted] 25X1A

The following information is provided in response to the request of the DD/S&T for "memory aides" in commenting to the agenda items (Numbers 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, and 10) contained in the Reference and are keyed to the respective paragraphs.

1. Following the EC-121 loss a presentation was made to the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force (Systems Review), Harry Davis, on the capabilities of the U-2R to collect ELINT [redacted] on peripheral missions. (In this instance, the U-2R was considered a National Asset rather than an NRP asset.) More recently, U-2R system capabilities and costing data information was provided to the office of the DDR&E. 25X1A

25X1A 2. [redacted] it is not an NRP asset.

3. We cannot question the propriety of the proposed study of the U-2 program. We should carefully consider, however, the delicate matter of how the loss of the U-2 program would impact on [redacted] 25X1A

25X1A [redacted] Also, the strong arguments for continuation of the U-2 program, including U. S. manned flights, have centered around its flexibility and low mission cost during crisis situations. Identification of the costs expressed in this paragraph are estimated figures and difficult to break out. The 26.5 per cent flying hour reduction forecast for FY 71 covers both CIA and the Air Force. Since the CIA operational U-2 hours are forecast to increase significantly in FY 71, the bulk of the reduction must be in the Air Force program.

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NRO review(s) completed.
JCS and DOS review(s) completed.

SUBJECT: EXCOM Meeting Notes

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Could mean more BUSINES

9. The Agency remains satisfied with the present system of Operational Control of overflight of denied territory by reconnaissance aircraft. The desire of the JCS to go directly to the 303 Committee, instead of through the DNRO, on all but satellite flights, would appear to infer that the JCS should control all manned and drone flights, including CIA assets.

In the case of CIA/JCS coordination procedures, this question appears to have been resolved at the 17 June 1969 meeting of the 303 Committee.

10. The OSA Advanced Aircraft Program has not been aimed at Crisis Reconnaissance, per se. OSA is conducting a study of Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance Systems under direction of the NRO. This two-phase study explores various methods of achieving a quick reaction strategic reconnaissance capability survivable primarily in the SovBloc defensive environment through the 1975-1980 period. The first phase, using FY 69 funding of [redacted] involves two contractors. A contract was initiated with [redacted] January 1969 for the defensive threat analysis and establishment of survivable profiles and tactics options. This effort, funded at [redacted] is scheduled for completion on 30 September 1969. A contract was initiated [redacted] in May 1969 to provide a hardware-oriented technical reference for [redacted] their threat analysis and then to conduct a technological comparison of candidate concepts meeting the profiles and tactics

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SUBJECT: EXCOM Meeting Notes

25X1A [redacted] This effort funded at [redacted] is scheduled 25X1A
for completion in November 1969. The second phase of the study,
proposed for FY 70 funding [redacted] would involve analysis, 25X1A
refinement, and definition of the optimum candidate configuration
in terms of hardware technology and the threat. Both contractors
would be expected to participate in this second phase culminating
in a fully defined program in June 1970. (Refer to memorandum
25X1A concerning [redacted] studies passed to Mr. Duckett on 25X1A
18 June 1969.)

[redacted]

DONALD H. ROSS
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Special Activities

25X1A EO/SA: [redacted] 19Jun69)

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(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HELMS

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SUBJECT: List of Topics for Discussion with the Executive Committee

Attached is an agenda listing topics proposed for discussion on June 20, 1969, with members of the Executive Committee. The purpose of this meeting is to provide the members of ExCom and the DNRO the opportunity to hold general discussions on various matters (see agenda) before the budget meetings of August 8 and 15. It is not intended to reach final decisions on agenda items but to provide for an exchange of views.

M.L
John L. McLucas

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1. Agenda,
2. M/R, June 13, 1969,

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Agenda for June 20, 1969 Meeting of the

Executive Committee

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1. [redacted]

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2. [redacted] TAGBOARD

3. Manned Aircraft Reconnaissance

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4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

6. Readout

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7. [redacted]

8. [redacted]

9. Operational Control of Overflight of Denied Territory by Reconnaissance Aircraft

10. Comparison of Capabilities and Costs of Various Ways of Conducting Crisis Reconnaissance.

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June 13, 1969 25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: List of Topics for Discussion with ExCom

The following topics are suggested for possible discussion at the June 20 meeting of the Executive Committee:

1. Use of Drones for Peripheral SIGINT in Place of Manned Aircraft

The recent shoot-down of the EC-121 off North Korea highlighted our dependence upon manned aircraft for collecting COMINT and SIGINT from peripheral stations. Peripheral airborne reconnaissance operations are a necessary adjunct to overhead collection. They stimulate the defense system causing reactions which can be collected in the airborne platform, or desirably, can be used in a cooperative manner with overhead collectors to obtain more information than possible from either one alone. Peripheral missions can collect SIGINT over a longer duration 25X1D 25X1D

[redacted]

As you know, we decided a month ago to equip twenty 147T high altitude drones with COMINT-ELINT equipment. The data will be received on the ground via a data link. The system is expected to be operational in five months. Unmanned aircraft were selected because the possible loss of a vehicle by shoot-down or operational attrition would be less inflammatory, and because drones are relatively cheap to operate considering all costs including supporting costs for manned aircraft. For these same reasons, the JCS now prefers drones to manned aircraft for peripheral reconnaissance. The "requirement" is still being processed through DDR&E with assistance of JCS and NSA.

25X1A 2. [redacted] TAGBOARD

As indicated above, drones are attractive for special reconnaissance missions. We are now operating relatively short range drones and have in various stages of development two long range drones. Long range drones can be used to cover crisis situations and are an attractive alternative to satellites. They are designed to cover any region of the world. Further, they can be made available and launched a short time after a decision is made to collect photographic or ELINT data, or both. Two programs are under way, one in NRP, one in the USAF. TAGBOARD is a Mach 3.2 drone aircraft flying at

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[redacted]

90,000 feet altitude with a range of [redacted] miles. It is in its final stages of development and its potential as a reconnaissance vehicle is beginning to be evaluated. [redacted] is extremely low. TAGBOARD will have cameras capable of yielding two foot resolution, the [redacted] The [redacted] range can cover any region on the earth from two operating locations. The information from [redacted] or TAGBOARD can be available to decision makers in 24 hours.

The TAGBOARD development is nearing completion. After development is completed, we will have a maximum of 16 on hand. The vehicle is lost after each mission, but the camera is retrieved. The cost is [redacted] per mission.

[redacted]

It is difficult to state which of these vehicles would be less vulnerable since they now appear to be almost equally survivable. I would prefer the [redacted] because of lower operational costs; however, there is a large cost associated with its development.

3. Manned Aircraft Reconnaissance

Based on FY 1971 budget estimate recommendations from the NRO Program Directors, it is apparent that the NRP FY 1971 total budget will significantly exceed the FY 1970 budget. Accordingly, it is desirable to initiate critical reviews shortly of several on-going programs from a "value received" standpoint. One such area is U-2 aircraft support, which has been submitted at a [redacted] cost to the NRP, with added costs to the Air Force and CIA of about [redacted] In contrast to rising costs of this program, the total operational hours for U-2's is forecast to reduce in FY 1971 by [redacted] from FY 1969. The DNRO proposes that a study be initiated of the U-2 program, costs, and relationships of drones and other manned aircraft (such as the SR-71) to mission requirements, in preparation for the ExCom review of the FY 1971 budget.

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

It is difficult to establish the need for the SI camera. The Army has a requirement for large scale mapping. If the requirement is to be met, satellite photography is probably the best collector. The difficulty in establishing the desirability of the camera in relation to its cost lies in determining what would be lost if we did not have the large scale maps, how we make do without these maps, and what the total cost is. There is now a requirement for developing and procuring new cartographic equipment. There will also be a need for more personnel despite the claims of more efficient map production. The DIA should be asked to examine the requirement critically. I will talk to General Joe Carroll about this.

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

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

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9. Operational Control of Overflight of Denied Territory by Reconnaissance Aircraft

It is the national policy for the DNRO to maintain management control of all vehicles which overfly denied territory. The actual flights of these aircraft are supervised and conducted either by the CIA (under the auspices of the NRO) or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Permission for these flights is requested by the DNRO from the 303 Committee.

THIS IS OUR FRIEND

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adhere to this policy but believe it should be changed. They feel they should have the authority to request permission for manned or unmanned drone aircraft reconnaissance sorties directly to the 303 Committee. According to their view, the DNRO should be concerned only with satellites. The Executive Committee may wish to examine this question and perhaps issue new guidance or recommend changes in procedure.

Recently, the Chairman, JCS, transmitted a memorandum to Mr. Packard recommending a 303 Committee review involving a different but related problem. This involves the coordination procedures for NRO (CIA operated) flights in areas of responsibility of the unified and specified commands.

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10. Comparison of Capabilities and Costs of Various Ways of Conducting Crisis Reconnaissance

Providing the capability to conduct reconnaissance in crisis situations has been discussed for a number of years, although no firm requirement has been stated. At the present time there are several proposed arrangements which appear worthy of further investigation. These include: satellite vehicles having solid state array sensors with real-time readout, satellite vehicles having film recording with laser beam readout, space vehicles held in readiness for rapid launch, space vehicles orbiting in a dormant mode for long periods and driven down to lower altitude when crises occur, unmanned aerodynamic vehicles, and space vehicles launched when required from a large aircraft like a B-52.

I have initiated a study of the capabilities of each of the systems which will provide the advantages and disadvantages of the various systems and attached cost estimates to each of them.

John L. McLucas

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

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