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18 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: 303 Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Retention of the CIA IDEALIST Program

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	1. The A	gency U-2 pro	gram provi	des the U.	S. a flexible	2
over	head recon	naissance syst	tem with un	ique capabi	lities for hi	gh
reso	lution	photograph	ıy,	4	,	
The	system can	react rapidly	to world-w	ide crisi <b></b>	situations cl	heaply,
effec	tively, and	at little politi	cal risk to	the U.S. G	overnment,	
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		With the co	operation o	f the Navy	they can als	o be
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This U-2 capability can be utilized on short notice with a reaction time of approximately fifty hours anywhere in the world. The current improved version of the U-2 has an average survivability better than 92.5% over a single SAM site, even if it flies directly overhead, and a survivability of about 99.6% if attacked by MIG-21's. The actual mission survivability can be made even higher by programming the flight path to avoid SAM installations. Direct costs are approximately operational mission.

3. This program provides the U.S. Government with a low cost option for meeting future crisis situations in areas other than the more heavily defended areas of the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of satellites makes such an option especially desirable, particularly when it is recognized that neutralization of these vehicles would deny this country a high percentage of its strategic intelligence. During 25X1 non-crisis periods this asset is being used to collect ChiCom intelligence as well as to bolster political 25X1 relationships. All responsible U.S. officials feel that serious political repercussions and might adversely affect other important joint intelligence projects. The program assets (airplanes, major equipment and

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	facilities) are now paid for. The Agency program as now envisioned
	is projected to cost approximately including NRO 2
•	and CIA funds.
	4. Agency U-2R's have a mission altitude capability of
	feet and a maximum range s, at a speed of
	The standard camera configuration provides for a swath width of
	63 n.m. with 2300 n.m. of coverage in the flight direction. They have
	a full complement of equipment
`	capable of operating successfully
	They are the only covert reconnaissance vehicles in
	the NRO inventory. SAC aircraft of similar type do not now have
	adequate
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5. It is the opinion of CIA that the availability of this flexible, quick reaction capability for covert reaction to world-wide crises more than justifies the cost of retention. It is recognized that broad U.S. policy considerations must govern U-2 operations and decisions, especially as far as overflights of China are concerned. And it is true that for the past few years we have been reluctant to allow overflights

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even with covert manned aircraft. However, it is important to note that in times of crisis our attitude in this regard can change rapidly. It is for such contingencies that a covert capability like the U-2 would become very important to the President. If we terminate this program now, this option will be lost.

6. It is therefore recommended that Project IDEALIST be continued.

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