

23 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director (Plans)  
Deputy Director (Administration)  
Special Assistant to the Director  
All Assistant Directors  
Executive Assistant to the Director  
Director of Training  
General Counsel

FROM: Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: Progress Report (due 1 January 1952)

On January 1, 1952, Central Intelligence Agency will submit to the President and to the National Security Council a comprehensive progress report for the period October 1950 to December 31, 1951. It is intended that this document provide a critical self-analysis of all CIA operations that the President may be accurately updated on the health and condition of our national intelligence system.

Temper, Character, and Range of the Report:

1. If this report is to provide a critical self-analysis of all agency operations, it is essential that we insist upon objectivity and honesty in our appraisal of the progress we may claim to have made. At the same time, we must scrupulously avoid over-emphasis on internal organization at the expense of a more analytical examination of the concepts that guide us, the functional responsibilities we claim, and the difficulties with which we are beset.
2. The report will be a CIA report on CIA and its role in the national intelligence system. To be effective it must be penetrating and candid. It must admit to omissions as well as confess to commissions; it must take a position and reach a conclusion.
3. It is not intended that the report shall simply enumerate and extoll our achievements for the period under review. Instead we must say and say plainly:
  - a. This is what we have done.
  - b. This is why we have done it.
  - c. This is how we have done it.
  - d. This is where we once stood.
  - e. This is where we now stand.
  - f. This is what yet remains to be done.

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Consequently we must state with unrestrained objectivity the ~~nature, the magnitude, and the importance~~ of those problems that ~~have not yet been solved~~. Where probable solutions to these difficulties are within range, we can indicate the probability and means of solution. But we have no desire whatsoever to conceal those problems for which we may not yet have found answers.

Style:

To be readable the report must be crisp and plain-spoken. Wherever possible, specific incidents should be used to make the point more graphically than it might be made in the abstract. Above all, we shall try to avoid the conventional government gobbledygook that produces such terms as "implement," "formalize," and "promulgated."

Illustrations:

Where drawings, charts, and tables can be used to tell a story, they should be. Illustrations, however, will be submitted in work drawings that they may be executed in a standard design.

Classification:

1. TOP SECRET for body of the report.
2. Necessary classification for pertinent annexes.

Timetable:

1. Sectional drafts due November 16, 1951.
2. Board reviews by November 30, 1951.
3. Draft copy to DCI, DDCI, DD/P, DD/A, SA/DCI by December 14, 1951.
4. Completed text December 28, 1951.
5. Printed copies January 30, 1952.

Tentative Outline: Attached.

25X1A9a

C. B. HANSEN  
Colonel, USAF

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TENTATIVE OUTLINE

SECTION I. A preface or introduction that will establish the need for and value of intelligence in the policy-making processes of government.

Tentative Title: Intelligence and the National Policy Structure

- Objectives:
1. To provide a basic lead-in to the report by indicating what intelligence is and what purposes it seeks to serve.
  2. To introduce covert operations and show how intelligence leads to the necessity of counter-action in the cold war.

*no more  
continued  
by accurate  
int.*

Length: Approximately 15-20 pages

Responsibility: [REDACTED] ONE 25X1A9a

SECTION II. A historical discussion on how we have sought to fulfill the need for intelligence. This section should carry us to the threshold of October 1950 and provide a jump-off for the phase to be covered by the report. Consequently, it, too, is in part an introduction whose purpose it is to provide the background that will enable a reader to understand the reorganization and outstanding problems of CIA.

*should  
include  
economic.*

Tentative Title: The National Intelligence Problem

- Content:
1. Establishment of SSU for the liquidation of OSS.
  2. Establishment of CIG, 1946, with emphasis on an examination of:
    - a. Concept
    - b. Its place and role in the intelligence community
    - c. The system that was devised by CIG to carry out its role
  3. Establishment of CIA with emphasis on an examination of:
    - a. Concept and successive changes in concept as evidenced by its pattern of growth.

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- b. Place and role of CIA in the national intelligence system
- c. The emergence of an organization in terms of responsibility for:

- \*1) Coordination
- 2) Collection
- 3) Processing
- 4) Covert operations

Length: Approximately 20 pages

Responsibility: Lawrence Houston, OGC

SECTION III. A critical examination of CIA for the period under review. This section will probably be subdivided into five parts:

Part 1. The need for and the pattern of REORGANIZATION

- Content:
- 1) The Dulles report; its findings and conclusions
  - 2) NSC 50; its objectives and follow-through

Length: Approximately 20-25 pages

Responsibility: [REDACTED] ODCI 25X1A9a  
(tentative)

Part 2. CIA's role and responsibility in the COORDINATION of intelligence within the national intelligence system

- Content:
- 1) General statement on the need for, the authority for, and the concept of coordination, contrasting previous practice to present-day practice, tracing the emergence of the latter.
  - 2) IAC: A critical examination of the device with emphasis on the need for this committee, the method by which it was employed, and a study of the use that is currently made of it.

\* This pattern will be paralleled in detail in SECTION III.

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- 3) An examination of the dissolution of ORE and its replacement by OCI, ORR, and ONE.
- 4) Establishment of OI● with an explanation of its ●concept and role.

Length: Approximately 30-35 pages

Responsibility: [REDACTED] SO, in collaboration with James Q. Reber, OIC, with draft to be edited by [REDACTED] ODCI. 25X1A9a 25X1A9a

Part 3. Role and responsibility of CIA in the COLLECTION of intelligence for the national intelligence system.

- Content:
- 1) The need for, concept of, and role of:
    - a) OO
    - b) OSO
  - 2) Critical examination of the progress and problems of both offices.
  - 3) An examination of the problem of "requirements"
  - 4) The relationship of OPC to covert intelligence collection.

Length: Approximately 40 pages

Responsibility: [REDACTED] OSO, with such assistance as AD/OO may designate. 25X1A9a

Part 4. Role and responsibility of CIA in the PROCESSING of intelligence for the national intelligence system.

- Content:
- 1) The need for, concept of, and role of:
    - a) ORR
    - b) OCI
    - c) OSI--with a lead-in discussion of OCD

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- 2) Critical examination of the progress, the projects, and problems of these offices
- 3) ONE and the production of national estimates

Length: Approximately 40 pages

Responsibility:

- 1) Offices to submit individual studies; chapter to be melded by 25X1A9a [REDACTED] OCI.
- 2) 25X1A9a [REDACTED] to produce discussion on ONE.

Part 5. Covert operations; (including their relationship to the intelligence undertaking.)

- Content: The need for, concept of, and role of OPC with emphasis on:
- a) NSC 10/2; the previous, present, and probable future relationship of OPC to CIA.
  - b) The "magnitude paper" and the problems it entails.

Length: Approximately 35-40 pages

Responsibility: AD/OPC

SECTION IV. A critical and candid examination of those present-day problems we have not solved and those we anticipate in the future with particular emphasis upon: \*

- 1) The possible need for access to operational knowledge if CIA is to perform its mission.
- 2) The ONE-OCI relationship.
- 3) Role of CIA in the national intelligence system.
- 4) Scientific intelligence.

\* This selection of "problems" is purely tentative. Some may not warrant inclusion. There will be many more pertinent ones but they must be spotlighted by the offices.

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- 5) The relationship of CIA to the military in theaters of operations.
- 6) Escapees and defectors.
- 7) Specific problems of the separate offices.

Length: As needed

- Responsibility: 1) [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
- 2) William Langer - Kingman Douglass
  - 3) James Q. Reber
  - 4) AD/OSI
  - 5) DD/P
  - 6) DD/P
  - 7) Assistant Directors

ANNEXES: 1. Administration

- Content:
- 1) Concept and nature of the task
  - 2) Detailed in terms of:
    - a) Personnel requirements
    - b) Fiscal requirements \*
    - c) Supply requirements
  - 3) Existing and anticipated problems

Length: Approximately 30 pages

Responsibility: DD/A

2. Communications Intelligence

Length: Approximately 10 pages

Responsibility: To be indicated

3. Nuclear Energy

Length: Approximately 15 pages

Responsibility: AD/OSI [REDACTED] OSI) 25X1A9a

\* Here we might examine the budgetary problem posed by the DCI during the AD's meeting on October 22, 1951.

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