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CONCEALED INSTRUMENTS OF

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

*F.D.K.*

by

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Presented at  
The National War College  
Washington, D.C.

October 30, '46

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Seminar F  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, State Department

Presented: 30 October 1946

CONCEALED INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Preface

It is only fair to warn the reader at the outset of the many limitations of this report. Aside from my own shortcomings, the limitations of time and space--a few brief weeks and a paper of some 10,000 words--are clearly insufficient for investigation and analysis of a question which has fascinated, baffled and alarmed the world for a quarter of a century.

The topic itself would indicate that the subject is not a matter of public record. This is to a certain extent true. The Soviet Government has understandably attempted to hide from the public eye the identity and activity of its agents and the machinery with which they operate. But in a world of human beings perfect concealment is impossible even for a totalitarian dictatorship. There is accordingly a surprisingly large quantity of direct evidence available, as well as a mass of pertinent fact and circumstance and of testimony of varying reliability.

I have been unable, within the time limits imposed, to investigate more than a portion of the materials available in the English language. Vast fields of possible inquiry, particularly in other languages and in the fruitful realm of biography, have been untouched. I have found enough, however, to persuade me that more extensive research would serve rather to confirm than to alter the picture here presented.

I may here add a comment on two phenomena which, while not directly connected with the subject, struck me with particular force during my investigations:

1. Our unnecessary ignorance as regards Soviet organization and intentions. Uncritical acceptance of the thesis that Russia is an insolvable riddle can be compared only to the world's unfortunate equanimity in dismissing Mein Kampf as the ravings of a madman rather than a "Blueprint for World Conquest."

2. The fallacy of seizing upon the latest Soviet soporific as proof of a permanent change of heart. Those who wishfully follow this popular fashion would do well, for example, to ponder current developments in the Balkans in the light of the resolutions on that area adopted by the

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Fifth Comintern Congress in July, 1924. These directed the Communist party organizations in the Balkans to work, not only for their national revolutionary movements, but for "the separation of Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia" in Yugoslavia, and "the principle of Balkan Federation of equal and independent Workers' and Peasants' Republics". The questions raised by "the new partition of Macedonia and Thrace", they declared, "must be solved by the Balkan Federation of communist parties through the development of the proletarian revolution." 1

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I

INTRODUCTION

"We are living not merely in a State, but in a System of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately, one or the other must conquer." Lenin, 1918.<sup>2/</sup>

"Only blockheads or masked enemies ... can deny the danger of military intervention and of attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists ... the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organized ..." Stalin, 1938.<sup>2/</sup>

"Between us and America there is an unbridgeable chasm. We are two worlds. They cannot be united. We have with us the strength of the masses. When we are victorious over the American world, the world will be one." Kardelj, 1945.<sup>4/</sup>

An understanding of the goals which the Soviets expect to reach seems essential to a proper evaluation of the instruments they plan to use in the pursuit of these goals. A detailed examination of the philosophy and objectives of the Soviet Government in the field of foreign affairs lies beyond our responsibility in the present study, but I believe we can agree that:

- (1) The Soviet regime seeks power, prestige and security for itself and for the territory which it rules;
- (2) The Soviet leaders believe this security can not be assured in a world divided between communism and capitalism; they are accordingly convinced that they must eventually achieve world domination;
- (3) Stalin and his colleagues have a keen appreciation of the relativity of national power "in a system of states"; they accordingly seek maximum present security and the attainment of their final goal not only through an absolute increase in the power potential of the U.S.S.R. but also in a decrease in the strength of other nations.

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## II

### INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF POLICY

"It is necessary ... to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of truth ..." Lenin, 1920.<sup>5/</sup>

"The reserve forces of the revolution are of two kinds, direct and indirect.

"Direct reserves:

- "1. The peasantry and the intermediate strata of the population of one's own country.
- "2. The proletariat of neighboring countries.
- "3. The revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries.
- "4. The conquests and achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat may temporarily renounce one of these conquests or achievements, in order to buy off a powerful adversary or secure a respite.

"Indirect Reserves:

- "1. Antagonisms and conflicts between non-proletarian classes of one's own country, which the proletariat can turn to account in order to weaken an adversary or strengthen its own reserves.
- "2. Antagonisms, conflicts, and wars (imperialistic war, for instance) between capitalist states hostile to the proletarian state, disputes which the proletariat can turn to account for its own purposes--maybe an offensive, maybe manouvers to cover an enforced retreat." Stalin, 1924.<sup>6/</sup>

#### A. LEGITIMATE INSTRUMENTS.

In Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology the end justifies the means. The victorious proletarian dictatorship substitutes its own scale of values for those which have hitherto prevailed in the civilized world.

The Soviet statesman chooses his weapon from the arsenal of Soviet foreign policy solely on the basis of its utility in any given circumstance. He is influenced by considerations of established international practice

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and usage only in so far as they affect the utility of the weapon in question. He sees no advantage in playing the game according to the rules, which he regards as suspicious devices of the antagonistic Western World. The dividing line between the "legitimate" and the "concealed" instruments of Soviet foreign policy thus becomes blurred and shifting. We may do well to have a glance around the outer chamber before attempting to penetrate to the inner recesses of the Soviet arsenal. What weapons do we find exposed to our view?

### 1. Development of Economic Strength.

"Lenin put the question squarely: 'Either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically.'" Molotov, 1938<sup>7/</sup>

"Only under such conditions (fulfillment of economic goals) will our country be insured against any eventuality. Perhaps three new five-year plans will be required to achieve this, if not more." Stalin, 1946.<sup>8/</sup>

The sustained and successful Soviet drive for the development of the basic economic strength of the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1941, under the first three five-year plans, is a matter of recorded history. The prompt post-war resumption of that drive, in the face of the wartime devastation of the country and the needs of the long-suffering Russian people, is a remarkable manifestation of will and determination. The direction is again toward the development of basic extractive and heavy industries.

All this is clear. Whether the resulting plant will be used to increase the production of guns or butter is not so clear, despite the apparent significance of Stalin's above-quoted remark.

It may thus be noted that totalitarian economies contain elements and possibilities of concealment not available to capitalist democracies, in which industrial development is guided by the laws of supply and demand, and governmental appropriations for special projects of national importance are matters of public knowledge and debate. Similarly, complete control of the national economy enables the Soviet Government to manipulate the faucets of its economic relations with outside countries on the basis of political rather than economic considerations, for the attainment of political or power objectives. Such manipulation is difficult of detection and frequently incapable of proof.

### 2. Internal Psychological Controls.

"The Communists are engendering hatred in the Russian people towards everything foreign ... Through numerous party agitators the Soviet Government stirs up the Russian people in every way against the peoples of the democratic countries, preparing the ground for a third world war." Gouzenko, 1945.<sup>9/</sup>

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Government control of the channels of information and literature expression and the use of that control to mould the minds of the Russian people along the lines desired by the regime are facts which need little elaboration or comment. The situation does have an elusive aspect, however; for outside powers. They can have no concept of the state of mind of the Russian people, without undertaking the most assiduous observation of the impressions being conveyed to that people, or withheld from it, by the agencies of public information and education.

### 3. The Soviet Armed Forces.

"The guarantee of the victory of the working people over capitalist reaction is Soviet patriotism and the boundless devotion of the Red Army to the cause of proletarian internationalism." Executive Committee of the Comintern, February 23, 1938.<sup>10/</sup>

"If we render the necessary assistance to our scientists they will be able not only to overtake but to surpass the achievements of science outside the boundaries of our country." Stalin, February 9, 1946.<sup>11/</sup>

The size of the Soviet land forces is only too obvious. Concealment of troop dispositions, plans, equipment, and weapons is general international practice. For present purposes, we may only note that unusual measures are taken in the U.S.S.R.--such as isolation of foreigners, control of the population, and viciously effective counter-intelligence--to ensure that such concealment be complete; and that the secret decision of a few men, rather than public debate, fixes the percentage of the nation's wealth devoted to scientific research and the development of implements of war.

### 4. Narkomindel - The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"... duality of purpose inevitably became clearer ... The administration of the internal and foreign affairs of the Soviet state, as such, remained in the hands of the Soviet Government; the propagation of revolutionary doctrine became the province of the Communist party. It should be remembered, however, that Lenin was chairman of both ..." Vernadsky, 1944.<sup>12/</sup>

"It seems, however, that several parallel under-cover systems, or networks, existed in Canada under the direction of members of the Soviet Embassy ..." Canadian Royal Commission, 1946.<sup>13/</sup>

In the conduct of their day-to-day intercourse with other governments, the Soviets ostentatiously follow the established pattern of the civilized world. They have built up for themselves the elaborate apparatus of western diplomatic practice: a foreign office, worldwide diplomatic and consular services, capable of excessive devotion to

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protocol and lavish representational display, and an array of treaties. The apparatus hides a subversive espionage network based on the communications facilities and privileged position of their representatives abroad, which will be investigated below; and a contempt for international law and the pledged word which has given them a record of treaty violation comparable to that of the Nazis.<sup>14/</sup>

### 5. International Organizations.

"It was stressed by the great powers that their special voting position would be used with a great sense of responsibility and consideration of the interests of the smaller nations and that therefore the 'veto' would be used sparingly ... Any misuse of the voting procedure would impair the development of the prestige upon which the ultimate success of the Organization will depend." Stettinius, 1945.<sup>15/</sup>

"The whole United Nations scheme is now being used by the U.S.S.R. as a huge sounding board for communism." Isaiah Bowman, 1946.<sup>16/</sup>

The intransigent attitude of the Soviet representatives nearly wrecked the San Francisco conference; and the indispensable adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations was finally assured only by concession of the principle safeguards they insisted upon. These related notably to the application of the great power veto in the Security Council and to limitations on the initiative and authority of the General Assembly. While underlying Russian motives were difficult to evaluate at the time, it would appear from the subsequent conduct of Soviet representatives that membership is calculated to serve Soviet ends mainly by:

1. Providing a sounding board which enables Soviet spokesmen to distract world attention in one direction, while the Soviet Government pursues objectives in another;
2. Preventing the development of an international security organization with sufficient strength and authority to exercise a collective will against the U.S.S.R.; and
3. Preventing the development of any outside bloc of world powers excluding and actually or potentially hostile to the Soviet Union.

An interesting feature of Russian participation in the United Nations, connected with the Union's internal structure and capable of attempts at further development, is the position of the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian Republics as voting members. There are fourteen other republics in this Pandora's Box, which may be opened by the Soviet representatives if and when they feel such action may serve their ends in the battle of the veto.

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In this latter connection, it is clear that, despite the safeguards secured, the Soviet Union is not happy about the development of the post-war voting lineup in international gatherings. At the Paris Peace Conference an East-West split in a ratio of fifteen to six "marked most of the votes on controversial commercial and military issues."<sup>17/</sup> In his final speech to the Conference, on October 15, 1946, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov accused Great Britain and the United States of controlling the voting by exercising pressure on smaller states.<sup>18/</sup> On the same day, the Yugoslav delegation provided an illustration of the semi-concealed Soviet technique of using its own satellites; Yugoslavia refused to agree to the Conference recommendations, stating in its official note: "The method of taking decisions by means of voting ... when the vital problems of a nation and the fate of peace among nations are in question--is incorrect, even formally, because it leads to the imposition of the will of one group of states upon other sovereign and equal countries; and at the same time it is unjust in its essence because it permits the solving of the problems, not according to objective criteria, but according to the point of view of the special interest of the groups of states representing the majority of this conference."<sup>19/</sup>

Another factor in this field, relatively unnoted by the public but more significant for world cooperation than Russian participation in the United Nations, is Russian refusal to participate in any of the post-war arrangements designed to stabilize and strengthen the (prevaillingly capitalistic) world financially and economically, to develop international air transport, and to intensify cultural cooperation and interchange.

#### B. SEMI-CONCEALED INSTRUMENTS.

A short step takes us into the next gallery of the Soviet Arsenal. Here we find a further store of devices, somewhat more strange to Western practice but by no means all new or unknown.

##### 1. Member and Puppet Republics.

"Soviet autonomy is not a rigid thing fixed once and for all time; it permits of the most varied forms and degrees of development ... This elasticity of Soviet autonomy constitutes one of its prime merits, for this elasticity makes it possible to embrace all the various types of border regions in Russia, which vary greatly in their cultural and economic development." Stalin, 1920.<sup>20/</sup>

"You have two types of political union, of which one type, the capitalist type, leads to the disintegration of the state into its component parts, while the second type, the Soviet type, on the contrary, leads to a gradual but stable amalgamation of formerly independent nationalities into a single independent state." Stalin, 1922.<sup>21/</sup>

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We have previously noted Soviet use of member and puppet republics in connection with the battle of the veto in the United Nations. There are clearly many further possibilities of exploiting this weapon in the field of international politics, some of which have already been used. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister lays a smoke screen by preferring charges against British troops in Greece before the Security Council, while Yugoslavia serves as a secure assembly ground for the Communist forces which actually penetrate that unhappy country. Bucharest and Sofia protest American "dollar imperialism", while Moscow drains their economic substance. The Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian Republics receive vast quantities of UNRRA supplies; Moscow incurs no obligation. The puppet regimes on the shores of the Danube and Black Sea obediently assert their claims to exclusive control of those arteries by the littoral states, and accuse the resisting Anglo-Saxon powers of pushing "small nations" around.

But the real utility of this device lies less in the international field than in the peripheral area adjacent to the U.S.S.R. Here it is a ready tool for penetration and absorption.<sup>229</sup> Backed by the presence and power of the Red Army, it has effectively served the purposes of Westward projection of Soviet Power. The Baltic republics and Bessarabia ("Moldavia") were readily absorbed simply by application of the nationalities formula of the Soviet Constitution. The same process failed in the case of Finland, but a "dissatisfied" Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic remains for use at a convenient future time. The Byelo-Russian Republic regained its historic living space in Poland, and the puppet Polish Republic in turn carried Soviet power deep into Germany. The Ukrainian Republic welcomed its unredeemed brothers in Ruthenia. In Federated Yugoslavia, final results are still to be achieved; but "autonomous" Croatia clearly can not exist without Trieste; dismembered Macedonia (a historic, geographic and demographic farce) must regain from Greece its amputated territories and "historic capital", the great seaport of Salonika. Bulgaria is vitally handicapped without Thrace. Albania, which presents the remarkable and intriguing phenomenon of the satellite of a satellite, likewise claims a slice of Greece.

The process has not yet been extensively applied in the East, but its infinite potentialities are clear. Here are the peripatetic tribes, the amorphous Asiatic masses whose "national" consciousness awaits development. Let us rapidly survey the Soviet Eastern frontiers. Where lie the unredeemed territories of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic? Of the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Turkmenian Soviet Socialist Republics? Of the Azerbaijan and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republics? Ah! At last we reach familiar ground. Here we know the answers. The Azerbaijan territories are in the hands of the feudal Persians; Armenia irredenta in those of the reactionary Turks. The campaign of liberation is already in course.

In the case of Azerbaijan, substantial victory has already been obtained. Though the Soviets were obliged by external pressures to stop

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short of their final goals, the fact remains that a Moscow-trained minion now dominates the "autonomous" Persian province of Azerbaijan.<sup>23/</sup>

The Armenian process has been carried less far, being subject to the exigencies of the more important campaign for control of the Turkish Straits. But preparations are well advanced, and several features deserve mention:

1. There are about two million Armenians in Soviet Russia, and one million outside, the deposit of mass migrations in the past fifty years following recurrent massacres and deportations by the Ottoman Turks. All have a strong "national" consciousness deriving from common religion, language and traditions and kept alive by their clannishness. For a quarter century, ties between the two groups were severed by Soviet isolation of the homeland; but in the past two years, the Soviet Government has conducted a successful campaign to acquire the moral, political and material support of Armenia-in-exile for the claims of Soviet Armenia to the strategic Turkish provinces of Khars and Ardahan. Propaganda emphasizing the achievements of Armenia and Armenians within the Soviet Union and exploiting traditional Armenian hatred for the Turks has evoked favorable response even from those Armenians firmly attached to their countries of adoption.<sup>24/</sup>
2. Naturalized Armenian organizations throughout the world are in turn propagandizing these claims and endeavoring to influence the policy of their adoptive governments in favor of the cause.<sup>25/</sup>
3. During the past year, the Soviet Government has offered repatriation to the Armenians in the Near East, constituting about half the total number of emigres. Over 200,000 are estimated to have registered and actual repatriation is under way. It seems likely that we will in due course hear loud demands for lebensraum.<sup>26/</sup>
4. The Russian shift on the question of religion has been effectively exploited as regards the Apostolic (Gregorian) Church of Armenia, one of the oldest institutions of Christendom and the principal custodian of Armenian Nationalist sentiment. A well publicized Congress of delegates from Armenian communities all over the world was held at the religious capital of Echmiadzin in June, 1945 for the announced purpose of electing a new Catholicos. This ecclesiastical business was quickly disposed of, and the Congress went on to devote a major share of its time to political matters, notably denunciations of the Vatican and

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vehement affirmation of Armenian claims to Turkish territory. A petition was addressed to Stalin, stating, in significant part: "We have hope that the statesmanship and political wisdom of the U.S.S.R. will find both the means and the way to redress the injustice to which our people was subjected during the last world war." By strange coincidence, this petition was released just as the Soviet demands for territorial adjustments were being served officially upon the Turkish Foreign Minister.<sup>27/</sup>

## 2. Religion.

"Our new religious policy will be valuable in smashing the anti-Soviet propaganda of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and other religious groups ... We have the chance to draw the Orthodox Church in other countries closer to Russia and make Moscow the Third Rome ... Don't worry about the new generation being spoiled by religious superstition ... It's clear to everyone that a young man with religious inclinations cannot possibly make a career ... The Komsomols, you may be sure, will be a stronger force than the priests." Sovnarkom Official (Mironov), 1943.<sup>28/</sup>

Comparatively speaking, the Armenian Church is an air rifle. The religious weapon with real range and power is the Eastern Orthodox Church. It is not very secret and certainly not new. The Soviet leaders have taken it out of the armory of Czarist-Russian foreign policy, polished it up and added a few improvements.

Signs of an easing attitude toward the Church, after 25 years of suppression and persecution, began to appear in 1941, as the Soviet Government encouraged every possible stimulus to the loyalty of the embattled Russian population and sought the good will of its Allies. High water marks have been the publication, in 1942, of a book "The Truth about Religion" by the Orthodox Patriarchate at Moscow, pledging loyalty to the Soviet cause, denying persecution and castigating the Hitlerite anti-Christians;<sup>29/</sup> the decision, in September, 1943, to create a Government Council on Orthodox Church Affairs and permit full restoration of the Patriarchate; the highly propagandized elevation to that high office, in January 1945 of the Metropolitan Alexei of Leningrad; and the subsequent successful tour of the new Patriarch to Orthodox centers in the Near East.<sup>30/</sup>

It seems clear that the internal religious "revival" will be kept strictly in hand. The Patriarchial installation, and other ceremonies featured by the outside press, have been little publicized in the Soviet Union. Members of party organizations can still not admit to religious sentiment. And facilities are not likely to be granted for any church expansion.<sup>31/</sup>

But the regime has clearly decided to give full support to the Church as an instrument of its foreign policy, directed at several objectives:

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*It would be invaluable for*

Disarming the criticism and opposition of foreign religious bodies: In this respect the new policy has already been notably successful. It promises to be even more so as the Russian Church emerges from its isolation and reestablishes its relations with world religious organizations. In this connection, a recent Geneva press despatch reports: "Signs of a rapprochement between the Russian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarch and the Protestant and other Orthodox Churches of the world, through the World Council of Churches, continue to increase ... Religious News Service is able to state authoritatively that a basis for cooperation of the Russian Church with the World Council is being sought."

*It would attract*

Support for the Soviet All-Slav Policy: Religious penetration was one of the most effective elements in the Pan-Slavism of Czarist Russia. After the Soviet revolution, however, religious opposition was second only to fear of communism in creating and maintaining the long estrangement between the Eastern European and Russian Slavs. The removal of that opposition and the restoration of fraternal ecclesiastical relations already largely accomplished, will be a factor of primary importance in solidifying Soviet influence and control in that area. *Central Europe*

*The Church would be useful as an avenue of*

Penetration into Orthodox communities throughout the world: In this field, the Moscow Patriarch has undertaken a vigorous offensive, already successful in gaining control or hegemony over the Slavic Orthodox churches in the Baltic States, Finland, Poland and Czechoslovakia and over Russian emigre churches in France, Germany, Manchuria, Korea and Japan.

Avoiding the historic complexities of international ecclesiastical politics--more devious even than secular politics--and at the risk of over-simplification, ~~we can say~~ that Moscow's only serious competition in this offensive is that of the Oecumenical (Universal) Patriarch at Istanbul, *traditional* *the Istanbul* *prima inter pares of the Orthodox structure.* But this ~~time~~ *time* Byzantine potentate has gradually lost all temporal support and protection except that of weak and bankrupt Greece, and can offer no serious resistance.

*Patriarch*

Even the historic and holy Orthodox Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria need support *and are unlikely long to* withstand the persuasions of the Russian Church. *When they were* fall, Lenin will surely turn in his tomb--for Stalin will have succeeded the Czar as the protector of the Christians of the East.

*to*

*would*

*and might be unable*

*If would*

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4. Battle against the Vatican: The anti-Vatican blasts issuing from the Armenian Congress at Echmedzian were of a piece with precedent and subsequent attacks by Orthodox organs. Typical of the new revolutionary tone characterizing the revived Russian Church is the resolution of the "Sobor" held in February 1945, following the installation of the new Patriarch, voicing an "appeal to the peoples of the world to raise their voices against those, particularly the Vatican, who shield Germany" by their appeals for leniency, thus seeking "to allow misanthropic, anti-Christian teachings and their advocates to survive on earth after the war."<sup>37</sup>

But the Patriarchate has also conducted a more direct attack on the Vatican, designed to wean away from their allegiance to Rome the Uniate Churches in the areas of Eastern Europe annexed by the Soviet Union. Considerable opposition was encountered in Poland; but the NKVD conveniently removed recalcitrant ecclesiastical leaders, compliant clerics were promptly promoted into their places and in May 1945 the Polish churches united with Moscow. It's small wonder that on March 1, 1946, the Ruthenian Uniate Church in Trans-Carpathian Ukraine peacefully renounced "proud and power-loving Rome" and petition for admission to the fold of Soviet Orthodoxy.<sup>38</sup>

Before leaving the subject of religion, we may note the religious power potential of the Soviet Union in the vast reaches of the Moslem world, so far little exploited. The southern areas of the U.S.S.R. contain a population of many millions raised in the Mohammedan faith. This great reserve has so far been tapped mainly to provide prospective communist agents for training at the Moscow "University of the Peoples of the East" (see below), and Moslem staff members for diplomatic and consular establishments of the Soviet Union in the Near and Middle East. But the reserve exists, and in combination with the relatively impassive, but unimpeachable, Soviet record on Zionism, may well become a formidable force throughout Islam.

### 3. Pan-Slavism (All-Slav Movement)

"The Slavonian race should endeavor to attain two objects, each separately—an independent political and social life in their own country and all together a closer tribal union with Russia, under her military and international predominance. Each tribe requires a sovereign of its domestic affairs, and a great Slav Tsar for the affairs of all collectively." Tadjiev, 1870.<sup>39</sup>

"In solving the crucial problem of eradicating the remnants of fascism and the establishment of lasting peace in the world, the Slavic peoples will play an equally outstanding role as they did in defeating Hitlerite Germany." Stalin, 1946.<sup>40</sup>

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As weapons for the Soviet expansionist forces, Pan Slavism and religion are closely related. Both were found in the Czarist arsenal. Both have roughly the same range of maximum effectiveness--the Southern Slavs in Europe and Slavic minorities in all parts of the world, notably the United States.

1941 The affection and feeling of affinity of the Southern Slavs for the Russian people, resulting from ties of blood, language and religion, and gratitude for 20th century Russian efforts to secure their liberation from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, had made Pan Slavism the most effective instrument of Czarist Russian policy in Southeastern Europe. Despite opposition to Soviet religious and social policies, these sentiments had persisted. The courageous resistance of the Red Army after 1941 inevitably revived fond memories and inspired desperate hopes of a second liberation.

The Soviet leaders were not unaware of the existence of these sentiments and gradually came to appreciate the superiority of their strength as compared to that of the Comintern class appeal. Shortly after the German attack, Soviet propaganda began to describe the war as a struggle between Teuton and Slav, in an effort to stimulate resistance behind the front. The next move was the summoning of an All-Slav Congress, which met at Moscow on August 14, 1941, and set up a permanent All-Slav Committee, consisting of Russian, Polish, Czech, Yugoslav and Bulgarian representatives. The first meeting has been followed by others at least once a year. All have invoked recollections of inter-Slavic fraternity in earlier days and stressed and encouraged the unity of all Slavic peoples. As regards program, the meetings during the war urged a united front against the German Fascist aggressors; those since, unfortunately, against the Anglo-Saxon imperialists.

As time went on the Pan Slav approach was skillfully blended with communist and religious penetration. Backed by the strength of the Red Army, these combined forces greatly facilitated Soviet capture of the resistance movements and, through them, of political control throughout Eastern Europe. 41/

Meanwhile, beginning in 1942, the movement was expanded by the creation of subordinate committees among Slavic communities in all parts of the world.

The American Slav Congress warrants some inspection. 42/ It was organized in 1942, largely on the initiative of the Slavic "national" sections of the communist International Workers Order, with the active support of the militantly pro-Tito United Committee of South Slavic Americans (headed by the leftist author Louis Adamic). The Congress presented itself as "a federation of organizations, non-partisan in character, representing 15,000,000 Americans of Slavic ancestry." A first nation-wide Congress, assembling 2500 delegates from thirteen "Slav National Groups" met at Detroit in April 1942. The keynote was Slavic "unity in working for the ever greater realization of true democracy." Greetings were exchanged with the All-Slav Committee, simultaneously meeting in Moscow, but controversial subjects were avoided, whether domestic or foreign.

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For nearly two years the Congress continued to speak with an American accent. But at a "special conference" at Pittsburgh, in January 1944, the Communist organizers took the wheel. The organization veered sharply to the Left and rapidly gained speed. Decisions were taken to create the office of Executive Secretary (a familiar technique, as we shall see later); establish a permanent headquarters and regional offices; and raise large funds for a "program of action": organization of a network of local committees, mass meetings in key cities, radio broadcasts, and a publications program. Resolutions were passed approving the Teheran agreements; condemning reactionary Polish nationalists; greeting Stalin and Tito and "leftist Slavic committees all over the world"; and vigorously endorsing a fourth term of the New Deal. The second nation-wide Congress, which followed in September and was marked by the attendance of many PAC-CIO representatives, was less militant but similarly partisan on both domestic and foreign issues.

The shift of control and direction had been engineered with remarkably few defections--only two Right-wing Polish and Serbian groups--the moderates going along mainly "for domestic political reasons."

The third nation-wide Congress, held last month in New York,<sup>43/</sup> attracted press attention not only for its own activities but for connected incidents resulting from "bureaucratic" uncooperativeness on the part of the Departments of State and Justice as regards visas for and registration of "Communist" delegates from Slavic countries. The tone and tenor of the Congress may be judged from its final meeting, featuring addresses by such figures as the Polish and Yugoslav Ambassadors, Polish Undersecretary of War--General Swierczewski, Chairman of the Moscow All-Slav Committee--General Gundorov, and the "lady executioner" of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front<sup>44/</sup>--Tsola Dragoitcheva. It was graphically described by the New York Times: "The foreign policy of the United States as it affects Russia was condemned yesterday as anti-Slav, Secretary of State Byrnes was booed, former Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was vigorously applauded, and 9,000 persons set up an acclaiming din with the reading of a message from Joseph Stalin."

"The scene was Madison Square Garden, and the setting was the closing session and 'Win the Peace' rally of the Third American Slav Congress. For four and a half hours, ending at 7 p.m. the assembled thousands listened to speeches in which the Soviet was pictured as the friend and benefactor of its Balkan satellites, now termed newly-free, and the staunch bulwark against obstructionists who sought to precipitate another war."<sup>42/</sup>

#### 4. State Agencies of the U.S.S.R.

"After you reach America, you will continue to take an active part in the work of our party. But remember that as far as the American authorities are concerned you are not and never have been a party member ... In America, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. functions on an underground basis." Instructions to Kravchenko, 1943.<sup>45/</sup>

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We should note for further study and possible future reference, in this middle chamber of the Soviet arsenal, a miscellaneous collection of weapons of apparently longer range but relatively limited power. These are the various State agencies which perform, in the contacts of the Soviet Union with the outer world, the cultural, commercial and informational functions carried on by private organizations or individuals in other countries. They include:<sup>47</sup>

1. The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreigners (VOKS);
2. Amtorg, the Soviet foreign trade organization;
3. Tass, telegraphic press agency of the USSR;
4. Preslit (formerly International Books), agency for import and export of books, translation and publishing arrangements;
5. Artkino, Soviet Agency for the import and export of motion picture films.

VOKS has its offices in Moscow. Within the USSR it sponsors foreign visitors, foreign participation in Soviet meetings and the like; to judge by journalistic accounts, these functions might be accurately described as restrictive. Outside Soviet borders, VOKS sponsors the formation of "Societies for Cultural Relations" between the U.S.S.R. and a given country, or "Societies of Soviet-Given Country Friendship"; in this respect its functions are more expansive, and they have been increasingly so in recent years. More than a score of these Societies are now known to exist, a large number of which were formed in the autumn of 1944, not long after the "dissolution" of the Comintern (see below). As a sample of VOKS possibilities, we may cite the case of the Kurds. When the Red Army entered Northern Iran in 1941, they were accompanied by a printing press and a supply of paper which were deposited in the Kurdish capital of Mehabad. Soon after the occupation a group of Kurdish leaders were taken to Baku for a friendly and well-organized visit. Following their return a "Soviet-Kurdish Cultural Relations Society" sprang up in Mehabad. Not long thereafter the world heard the rumblings of a demand for a national "Kurdistan" issuing from the remote mountain fastnesses lying athwart the Persian, Turkish and Iraqi frontiers.<sup>48</sup>

The other four agencies mentioned above have offices throughout the world. All are established in the United States. So far as could be ascertained by brief investigation, they are honestly performing only the functions indicated. But even if this is correct, they still provide considerable encouragement and incentive to American Communism by recruiting from its ranks their hundreds of local employees.<sup>49</sup>

From what we know of Soviet methods and lack of scruple, it seems clear that we would be well-advised to keep our eyes on these agencies.

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~~SECRET~~5. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

"Marx always stressed the primacy of politics over economics",  
Lozovsky.<sup>50/</sup>

"Communists should have Communist fractions in all the trade unions and factory committees and acquire by their means an influence over the labor movement and direct it. The (Amsterdam) International of Labor Unions ... strove to avoid all revolutionary collisions ... The Communist workers must on the contrary strive to create an international battle front of labor unions." Comintern, 1920.<sup>51/</sup>

"Where the majority of the working class took the road of social-democratism, the historically rare opportunity for conquering power was missed, and capitalism succeeded in saving itself." K. Gottwald, 1938.<sup>52/</sup>

Any serious report on the development and status of international labor movements would require at least a book. We shall try only to sketch the general outlines.<sup>53/</sup>

The principal independent labor organizations during the inter-war period were: the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), powered mainly by the British Trade Unions Congress (BTUC) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), from which Soviet labor was excluded by a rule barring labor movements which were not "free", i.e. were controlled by their national government; and the International Labor Office (ILO), an organization of representatives of labor, employers and government affiliated with the League of Nations, to which the USSR was ineligible on the grounds that the Soviet Government should not represent all three elements.

The discomfited and resentful Soviets set up their own revolutionary Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern). They did their best to compete, but Profintern never became more than an ineffective appendage of international communism.

The break finally came through the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, one of the products of Allied good-will and fraternity during World War II. Beginning in June 1943, by as clever a bit of diplomatic finesse as was ever perpetrated, the Russian delegates jockeyed the BTUC into agreeing to call an international labor meeting, which would necessarily include Russia. The British stalled and evaded as long as possible, but finally had to act.

A preliminary conference in London, in February 1945, charted the main lines of the proposed Federation. The work was completed and accepted by a plenary Assembly at Paris, in October 1945, "representing 65 nations" (including 10 dependent colonial units) and 70 million workers. Under the WFTU charter, the Federation's main responsibilities will be delegated to an Executive Committee of 26 members and a small Steering Bureau of 7 members

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(notice the resemblance to Communist Party organization). Voting will be in accordance with a formula by which voting strength and membership fees are both based upon claimed membership, the fees being on a regressive scale after the first five million members (a good precedent for the UN and other international organizations, where voting procedures have proved so unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union?). The formula will cost the Russians something, but it will surely be worth the price in terms of control. The line-up of principal members will be approximately as follows and the possibilities are clear:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Claimed Membership</u>	<u>Votes</u>
U.S.S.R.	25,000,000	206
British TUC	6,600,000	116
American CIO	5,500,000	110
French CGT	5,000,000	101
Italian CGIL	5,200,000	102

A word should be inserted about the American position. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the Latin American Federation of Labor (CTAL, a recently developed regional organization representing 17 countries and 2½ million workers) enthusiastically supported the Soviet WFTU initiative from the start. Their leaders, the late Sidney Hillman, one-time Profintern delegate<sup>24</sup> and organizer of CIO's Political Action Committee, and Vincente Lombardo Toledano, Mexico's dynamic Marxist leader, were active at both the London and Paris meetings. CIO had been excluded from IFTU by a rule prohibiting membership of more than one national organization, and CTAL, a regional organization, had no direct international affiliation. AFL has refused to take part in WFTU, and a resolution adopted at its recent convention charges that the organization "was conceived by the Russian dictatorship" and "has clearly and unmistakably proved itself as an agency to foster Russia's expansionist foreign policy."<sup>25</sup> However, AFL finds itself alone, at least for the time being. As AFL has itself recognized, IFTU is doomed as a result of formal French withdrawal and British TUC commitment to WFTU.

Profintern has simply disappeared without trace, so that only ILO and WFTU remain in the international field. They are admittedly somewhat different types and, in theory at least, there should be room for both. But they are hotly competing for official representation on the Economic and Social Council, with the energetic backing, respectively, of Britain and the USSR. The situation is a difficult one for the British Labour Government. Despite BTUC participation, it distrusts WFTU politically; moreover, it regards ILO as a more able and effective organ to fix minimum labor standards, which will aid British foreign trade.

The British delegates have valiantly insisted that the new organization "must confine itself to trade union matters and not dabble in politics." This is clearly the opposite of Soviet views, and the WFTU Charter and resolutions already have a political flavor quite foreign to those of the

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old IFTU. However, the Soviet delegates have shown themselves conciliatory and have carefully refrained from any militancy or demonstration of strength. Their great goal of a single Trade Union International, in which they have the dominant position, has been achieved; its exploitation can well await an appropriate time.

### C. CONCEALED INSTRUMENTS; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND WORLD REVOLUTION.

We now come to the inner recesses of the Soviet arsenal. The principal "concealed instruments of Soviet foreign policy" are those which seek to exploit in the national interest of the USSR the worldwide strength of the ideology of world proletarian revolution. The method of operation is principally through professional international Communist agents who assure the smooth functioning of a complex but effective worldwide system, and through national communist parties, their members and victims.

The original concept of Lenin and his internationally-minded colleagues was clearly that of Russia as an instrument of the world revolution. Stalin's concept is just as clearly that of the world revolution as an instrument of the Soviet National State. That this subtle but all-important transformation has been achieved without losing the allegiance of international communism is due mainly to:

1. The immediate and profound impact on international socialism of the proletarian revolution in Russia, which gave a practical base and tangible power to what had previously been a purely theoretical movement. 56/
2. The principles and practice of Communist organization; which deprive the lay membership of any voice in, or sometimes even knowledge of, "Party" decisions, while exacting unquestioning obedience thereto. 57/
3. The utter dependence of National Communist Parties on Moscow for prestige, leadership, and support, as well as for a secure base of operations. 58/
4. The clever and effective development of the idea that the preservation of the USSR, as the flagship of world revolution, is the most vital concern of international communism. 59/

#### 1. The IIIrd or Communist International (Comintern).

"The IIIrd International has to a certain extent become identical with the U.S.S.R. ... The international union of parties directing the movement of the proletariat to throw off the yoke of capitalism has the inestimable advantage of resting upon a basis of unprecedented solidity: on a number of "Soviet" Republics who are in a position to bring about on an international scale, the dictatorship of the proletariat and its victory over capitalism". Lenin, 1919. 60/

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"If there is a war it will undoubtedly be against the USSR. This will not be a war between classes. If Hitlerite Fascism wages war against the USSR it will be a war of Fascism against Communism. Your duty, comrades, is at the front. If in this period you make your revolution in France you are traitors." Komsomol Secretary Chemodanov to French Communist Youth, 1934.<sup>61/</sup>

"Today, as in the past, the ultimate goal of the Communist is the same. The rich and fruitful teachings of the glorious Comintern will remain forever inscribed in the hearts and minds of all Communists." French Communist Ruffe, 1945.<sup>62/</sup>

In the early days of the Revolution the Narkomindel acted as the world revolutionary center and the then Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, asserted in July 1918 that assistance to outside proletarian movements was a recognized function of revolutionary diplomacy.<sup>63/</sup> It soon became clear to Lenin, however, that the needs of state administration and of the world revolution required separate operational machinery. To meet this requirement and to combat the revival of the "opportunistic reformist" Second International, then being attempted in Bern, he and Trotsky issued the call for an international revolutionary gathering at Moscow. Delegates from a dozen countries responded, and in March 1919 created the IIIrd or Communist International (Comintern) to promote "the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie regime and the passing of power into the hands of the workers".<sup>64/</sup>

Harmony prevailed at this first meeting as the Soviet leaders displayed to their outside brethren the advantages of real over theoretical power. The delegates exchanged mutual felicitations and words of encouragement, issued calls for militancy to the workers of the world, and hastened home to direct their own revolutions, then thought to be imminent throughout war-shattered Europe and its Empires.

The IIInd Congress, held at Moscow from July 19 to August 7, 1920, was the organizational meeting. Considerably less harmony prevailed as Lenin and his Bolshevik colleagues proceeded to apply to the new organization the principles of "democratic centralism". "There was considerable heated protest against the 'steam roller' methods of the organization and some of the foreign delegates were indignant to discover that they had been invited to Moscow not to confer but to submit."<sup>65/</sup> But steam roller tactics, backed by the fundamental realities of the comparative power position, easily won out. The Congress adopted an elaborate compendium of Theses and Statutes, which laid the foundations of the Comintern organization and defined the obligations and responsibilities of membership.

The structure of the organization, as laid down at this Congress, developed in practice and finally formalized in the Constitution and Rules adopted by the VIth Congress in 1928, provided for:

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1. The World Congress, "to be convened once every two years", with votes "allocated in accordance with the membership of the given Party and the political importance of the given country". The dominant position of the Russian Communist Party under this formula is clear.
  
2. The Executive Committee (ECCI), "which gives instructions to all the Sections of the Communist International and controls their activities". Out of a membership of 15 "at least 5" must be Russian, since "the bulk of the work and responsibility of ECCI lies with the Party of the country where it finds its residence." The Central Committees of the separate national Parties (Sections) were made directly responsible to the ECCI, which was specifically assigned the functions and power to:
  - a) Take decisions mandatorily binding on all Sections;
  - b) Annul decisions taken by any Section;
  - c) Expel entire Sections, groups or individual members;
  - d) Approve and authorize the programs of individual Sections;
  - e) Accept the affiliation of "organizations and Parties sympathetic to Socialism";
  - f) Approve changes of officers of Sections ("The leading posts in the Party do not belong to the occupant of that post, but to the Comintern as a whole");
  - g) Approve transfers of individual members from one country to another;
  - h) Fix amount of and collect dues from Sections;
  - i) Establish its own permanent bureaus for areas or individual countries, authorized to issue mandatory instructions to local Sections;
  - j) Assign to the Sections its own representatives "especially obliged to supervise the carrying out of the decisions of the World Congresses and the ECCI instructions";
  - k) Publish the official organs of the Comintern.
  
3. The Presidium of the ECCI, "the permanent body carrying out all the business of the ECCI in the interval between the meetings of the latter" (i.e. once every six months). This is the real residence of the international Communist power. In addition to exercising the functions and powers nominally assigned to the ECCI, as outlined under 2 above, the Presidium is exclusively charged with:
  - a) Election of the Political Secretariat;
  - b) Appointment of the editorial staffs of Comintern publications;
  - c) Setting up "permanent committees for guiding the work of definite groups of Sections of the Comintern and other departments necessary for its work".

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4. The International Control Commission, elected by the World Congress. This is the NKVD of the Comintern, empowered to investigate "matters concerning the unity of the Sections and also the Communist conduct of individual members of the various Sections".

The "Conditions of Admission", included in the Theses of the IInd Congress, imposed the following principal requirements on member parties ("Sections" of the Comintern):

1. Complete acceptance and active propagation of real Communist ideology, in accordance with Comintern program and decisions.
2. Systematic and regular removal and replacement by Communists of all "reformists and followers of the 'center' holding responsible posts."
3. Creation and maintenance of "a parallel illegal apparatus" in countries where the Communist party is legal.
4. Adoption of "cellular" organization, and especially the formation of Communist cells for propaganda and agitation "in every military organization" and in labor unions.
5. Renunciation of "social patriotism".
6. Active support of the liberation of colonies and suppressed nationalities including those of its own country.
7. Organization of Party on the "principle of democratic centralization", and prevention of discussion of any questions after decisions have been taken with respect thereto by higher organs.
8. Rendering of "every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counter-revolutionary forces".
9. Submission of program to Comintern for approval.
10. Obedience to all decisions of Congresses or of the Executive Committee (ECCI) of the Comintern.

The operation of this marvel of power centralization is well described by the American Communist Benjamin Gitlow, a repentant one-time member of the ECCI: "Decisions reached by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were handed down to the Communist Party in question through the Comintern. The internationalism of the Communist International was thus never more than a reflection of Russian desires and Russian policy. Hence the policy of every Communist Party became dependent on the exigencies of the foreign policy of the USSR. That was not apparent (in the early days)

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... but with stabilization and crystalization under Stalin's personal dictatorship, it is clear that this characteristic of Communism was inherent from the start."<sup>66/</sup>

Subsequent Comintern Congresses were held in Moscow in 1921, 1922, 1924, 1928, and 1935. They were for the most part occupied with: approval of the interim activities of the ECCI, usually by unanimous vote; reports of the various Sections; establishment of subordinate international revolutionary agencies designed to broaden the base of the revolutionary movement by drawing in special groups and classes;<sup>67/</sup> adoption of resolutions approving alterations in the "Party line" required by the Soviet Union's "internal problems (industrialization, socialization, periodic purges, etc.); by shifting values and pressures in the constellation of Powers, and by the flow and ebb of the revolutionary tide throughout the world."<sup>68/</sup>

Work had also been going forward since the beginning on the drafting of a basic "Program of the Communist International". This was finally brought to finished form and adopted by the Sixth World Congress on September 7, 1928. It is a document of capital importance to serious students of international politics, as it surely is to all Communists. A detailed analysis is beyond the scope and limitations of this study. Suffice it here to say, in broad outline, that after reviewing Marxist-Leninist theses of the inevitability of the revolutionary collapse of Imperialist Capitalism and reaffirming the Comintern aim to give the process a shove at the appropriate moment, the Program proceeds to outline the strategy and tactics necessary to assure the smooth establishment and functioning of the dictatorship of the proletariat along Soviet lines.

The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, following Lenin's death in 1924, shook international Communism to its very depths. For several years national leaders and aspirants jockeyed for favor in accordance with their latest estimate of the battle raging in the USSR. In 1927, after his victory and exile of Trotsky, Stalin was in a position to move his henchmen into the Presidium, the ECCI and the Control Committee and through these agencies to remake the Comintern in his own pattern. "In every party the most tried and trusted leaders fell under Stalin's axe precisely because of their integrity, prestige and independence and their places were taken by sycophants beholden to Stalin. [He] put an end to factionalism in the American Party by directly appointing the leader ... and subjecting him completely to Russian plenipotentiaries with full powers."<sup>69/</sup> Stalin's methods were mainly the devices of character assassination and organizational terror which had served him so well in the internal struggle, and the purge was soon accomplished.<sup>70/</sup> The process destroyed whatever shreds of independence still remained to the National Sections and they were henceforth purely satellites of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.<sup>71/</sup>

On May 22, 1943, the Presidium of the ECCI adopted, and national Sections promptly approved, a resolution dissolving "the Communist International as the directing center of the international working class movement."<sup>72/</sup> The text explained that: "The whole development of events in the

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last quarter century and the experience accumulated by the Comintern convincingly showed that the organization ... has been outgrown by the growth of the working class movement and by the complications of its problems in separate countries, and has even become a drag ...

"For example, in countries occupied by the Hitlerites the basic task consists in promoting the armed struggle developing into a national war of liberation against Hitlerite Germany.

"The mobilization of the people can be best carried out by the vanguard of the working class movement working within the framework of its own country.

"Communists have never been supporters of the conservation of organizational forms that have outlived themselves. They have always subordinated forms and methods ... to the fundamental political interests of the working class movement as a whole; to peculiarities of the concrete historical situation and problems immediately resulting therefrom".

The decision was therefore taken "in consideration of the foregoing" and of "the growth and the political maturity of Communist parties and their leading cadres in separate countries ..."

What are the real reasons for this decision? What is its significance?

The resolution is itself extraordinarily frank and revealing, when read in appreciation of the meaning of Marxist terminology. The type of substitution which might be made in the interest of clarifying the document for the untrained Western reader is suggested by the following examples:

FOR

READ

"complications of its problems in separate countries"

Lenin's law of uneven development

"national war of liberation"

guerilla warfare on the conspiratorial, cellular lines of revolution

"mobilization of the people"

tactics of the united front

"subordinated forms and methods"

to use any ruse ... evasion ... concealment

"fundamental political interests of the working class"

revolution and proletarian dictatorship

"growth of leading cadres"

development of a world-wide bureaucracy of professional revolutionary agents

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Marxist analysis of the resolution and other considerations, equally clear, lead one to the inescapable conclusion that the decision to "dissolve" the Comintern eliminated some of the disadvantages but practically none of the advantages of that organization, from the Russian point of view; that the control of the world revolutionary movement by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continues undiminished; that the goal of that movement has not changed; and that the essence of the decision might, in fact, be epitomized in the slogan: "The Communist International is dead! Long live international communism!"

Let us briefly survey the factors leading to this conclusion:

1. As we have seen, the "centralist" organization had in fact made the national communist parties, through their ruling central Committees, directly responsible to the very small Presidium of the ECCI, dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This power was applied and ensured by a Political Secretariat selected by the Presidium, operating not only in the directing center but in regional and country offices by Comintern representatives in the various countries; and by an International Control Committee. During the years this international bureaucracy had been trained and disciplined and developed to enormous proportions. It was not liquidated by the passage of a resolution.
2. The Comintern had served its purpose by the end of the 1920's in bringing the world's revolutionary groups together and sponsoring their international organization. As the effectiveness of the real and invisible operating machinery developed, the public apparatus of the Comintern fell into progressive disuse. Gatherings of the World Congresses and even of the plenary Executive Committee became increasingly rare, thus paralleling the experience in Russia itself as respects meetings of the Supreme Soviet. The visible organization which antagonized and frightened the outside world had in effect been a mask for the dictatorship developing underneath.<sup>73</sup>
3. The Comintern had been an increasing handicap in several ways to the Soviet dictatorship:
  - a) Its public existence and program had fed ammunition for the propaganda and repressive proposals of counter-revolutionaries in the democratic countries, and had thus hampered the growth of the movement.
  - b) Meetings of revolutionary leaders tended to revive memories which contrasted Stalin unfavorably with Lenin, who--disciplinarian though he was--nevertheless had always tried to maintain a large measure of "inner party democracy."
  - c) The exclusive nature of the horizontal class appeal prevented the effective exploitation of nationalist and other vertical sentiments such as Pan-Slavism and religion.

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- d) As the war progressed toward victory and inter-Allied discussion of war aims became insistently necessary, the existence of the Comintern became increasingly dangerous. The Soviet Government could not convincingly advance limited claims for expansion when the world believed that an agency which it operated was reserving unlimited ones.<sup>74/</sup>
4. Communist ideology and planning had foreseen and provided advance solutions for practically every conceivable world situation except that which actually developed in the 1930's, when an unprecedented degree of secrecy, deception, and maneuver became vital to Soviet foreign policy. This situation was touched upon at the VIIth Comintern Congress by the Italian delegate, Ercoli; declaring that the main task of world Communism was to ensure the victory of the Red Army, he added evasively but significantly: "If anybody asks us what this position means and how we are going to act ... we can give a single answer--in each given case we shall act as Marxists ... We have a leader, Comrade Stalin, who has always found the line that led to victory". Here was clearly the admission that henceforth Communist policy would not be openly discussed or declared; that unexpected and apparently incomprehensible actions might become inevitable; that complete power and authority would be placed in the hands of the leader; and that obedience, even to sometimes incomprehensible directions, was the chief duty of world communism.<sup>75/</sup>

The confusion of the Communists during the vertiginous gyrations of Soviet foreign policy after 1935 was obvious to all the world; but so was their loyal support of Soviet interests and policy. And during this period the public apparatus of the Comintern, though not yet officially "dissolved", was entirely inoperative.

5. The Capitalist-Communist wartime coalition clearly made impossible the orthodox application of the Marxist-Leninist concept of "turning imperialist war into civil war." However, the development of the war brought other opportunities capable of maximum exploitation only outside the framework of the Comintern. The resistance movements in the German-occupied countries were seen by Moscow as a peculiar synthesis of a military anti-German organization with a popular underground revolutionary movement of the traditional type, with voluntary participation, rigid self-imposed discipline and secret and conspiratorial operating techniques. Here then were the organizations to be penetrated, captured and developed as the strong points in the immediate sphere of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the nuclei of revolution in Western Europe.<sup>76/</sup>

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6. Finally it must be noted that the Comintern did not end in the internal strife marking the collapse of previous international political bodies, but as the result of a deliberate, agreed decision of the participating parties, with no apparent residue of intra-Party disagreement or antagonism. "Plainly, nothing was farther from Moscow's thoughts than to deprive itself of such a forceful weapon of world policy as the power to direct the activities of numerous parties in other countries, <sup>77/</sup> especially Great Britain and the United States, at a time when that power was becoming more important than ever before.

The essential control is unchanged. The key individuals remain. Their dependence on Moscow and that of the national Communist Parties, has in no way been lessened. International Communism has at last become a really "concealed instrument of Soviet foreign policy,"

Competent observers agree, however, that while Moscow's control remains there has been considerable administrative adjustment and decentralization. Paris is now believed to exercise operational control for the Western democracies, Sofia for Southeastern Europe, Yenan for the Far East, Cuba for Iberia, and Brazil for Latin America. <sup>78/</sup> An interesting case in point is last year's ousting of Earl Browder from the leadership of the American Party, as the result of an article published in a French Communist journal by the well-known Comintern Agent Jacques Duclos. The article accused Browder of being an "opportunist", guilty of deviating from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that "the achievement of socialism cannot be conceived of without seizure of power". These charges could obviously not have been made without Moscow's approval. They have in fact been generally regarded as the authoritative signal to the Comintern Sections to resume revolutionary and subversive policies toward the Western democracies. <sup>79/</sup>

Some of the Comintern functions and many of its functionaries have also been diverted to other agencies of Soviet foreign policy. Several have been traced specifically to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs - and through that Ministry, in a few instances, to the Foreign Offices of the satellite governments in liberated Eastern Europe. <sup>80/</sup> Moreover, such agencies as VOKS and the All-Slav Movement (see above) enjoyed observable spurts in their activity following the adoption of the resolution of May 22, 1943. However, evidence adduced in the Canadian spy case included official communications between the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa and Comintern headquarters in Moscow and reference to Comintern central records dated as late as 1945.

## 2. Agents of International Communism.

"By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, thus fitting it to seize power and to lead the whole people toward Socialism, to carry on and to organize the new order, to become the teacher, the guide, the leader of all who labor and are exploited ... " Lenin, 1917. <sup>81/</sup>

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We have seen that the real strength of international communism resides in an international bureaucracy operating under the direction and control of the Russian Communist Party and thus in the interest of the Soviet Government. The strength of that bureaucracy in turn resides in the individuals who compose it. Here is a fascinating and well-nigh inexhaustible subject. We can barely sketch its outlines in this study, but the following samples <sup>82</sup> may suggest its unlimited possibilities:

Klemens Gottwald - Czech Communist leader, Comintern official, Moscow training and residence, now Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.

Tito (Joseph Broz) - Comintern functionary in the Vienna regional office, Moscow training and residence, now dictator of Yugoslavia.

George Dimitrov - Comintern functionary in Vienna and Berlin, hero of the Reichstag fire trial, Comintern official, Moscow training and residence, prospective Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

Dimitri Z. Manuilsky - long-time Comintern Secretary, Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian S.S.R., member Soviet delegation at Paris Peace Conference and United Nations.

Wilhelm Pieck - Communist member of German Reichstag, anti-Hitler propagandist in Moscow during war, organizer of "Free German Committee" with which he has now returned to Soviet Zone in Germany.

Gerhardt Eisler (Hans Berger) - German Communist leader, Moscow residence and training, Comintern functionary in the Far East, Spain, Germany and France - alleged Comintern representative in the United States since 1941, now under Congressional investigation.

A. Lozovsky - Russian trade unionist and propagandist, President of Profintern, member of Comintern (ECCI), Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs in 1939 and again in 1945, chief Soviet representative in WFTU.

Jacques Duclos - Comintern functionary in Spain and Latin America, Comintern representative in France - member ECCI, now Secretary French Communist Party.

Andrei A. Zhdanov - Member of Secretariat, Orgburo and Politburo of the Russian Communist Party - Member of the ECCI.

Earl Browder - Comintern functionary in China, Moscow training and residence, long-time Secretary of the American Communist Party and member ECCI.

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...Pishavari - leftist guerilla in first world war - Moscow training, twenty years residence in Baku, now puppet Premier of the "autonomous" Persian province of Azerbaijan.

Delores Ibaruri ("La Passionaria") - Communist member of the Spanish Cortes and leader in Spanish revolution, member ECCEI, now resident in Moscow.

Maurice Thorez - deserter from French army during war - Moscow training and residence, now member French Coalition Government.

Pak Hunyong - Moscow training and residence, leader of Communists in Northern Korea.

Fred Rose (Rosenberg) - Polish-born Secretary of Canadian Young Communist League, functionary of YCL at Moscow, member of Central Committee of Canadian Communist Party, Communist member Canadian Parliament, recently jailed for espionage for the USSR.

These are but a few outstanding examples of an international legion which certainly numbers in the thousands. Selected from the ranks of the separate Communist parties as ideologically sound and operationally promising, these individuals are given a thorough training in Communist strategy and tactics, interesting and remunerative employment and the prospect of leadership in the proletarian world of tomorrow. "Soviet Russia was our fatherland, its Red Army our army, its red flag our flag", confessed Ben Gitlow, "we enjoyed the idea that we were part of a State machine that ruled a mighty Empire ... It is this tie-up with a mighty Government that holds the Party together more than any other single factor."<sup>83/</sup>

Development by indoctrination and study is a feature of Communist life from the earliest stages, as we shall see below, but the training of the top levels is naturally centered in Moscow, and notably in the "Lenin Institute". Its curriculum is described as including not only Communist theory and "political subjects, but also such practical subjects as the organization of political movements, fomentation or extension or prolongation of strikes for ulterior purposes, sabotage methods, espionage and barricade fighting," in sum, "a very good training as 'agents conspirators!'"<sup>84/</sup> The total student traffic in Moscow training centers is difficult to estimate. Referring to American Communism alone, Congressman Dies asserts that, "Scores of the leaders of the American Communist Party received their training in the Lenin Institute,"<sup>85/</sup> and Gitlow testifies that in the 1920's there were generally over one hundred American Communists in Moscow, "all paid and supported by the Comintern", either acting as liaison officers or "in the various schools, colleges and institutes, in training as organizers and propagandists".<sup>86/</sup>

For the description of another remarkable institution in the Moscow educational system--the University of the Peoples of the East--we are indebted to no less an authority than Marshal Stalin. Speaking in 1925

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at the fourth anniversary of the founding of the University, and after wishing it success in "the task of training communists for work in oriental lands", he explained: "Fifty nationalities and racial groups find a home under its roof. Still, the students are all children of the East... There are, in fact, two distinct groups.

"One group is made up of those who came to us from Soviet lands in the East ... The other group is composed of those who have come to us from colonial and vassal lands ... where the people have still to win their independence and clear out the imperialists.

"This twofold grouping ... explains why the University has one foot on Soviet ground and the other foot on the soil of the colonies and dependencies

"Two tasks, therefore, confront the University. One task is to train up citizens competent to minister to the needs of the Soviet republics of the East. The other task is to train up citizens competent to minister to the needs of the toiling masses in the colonial and vassal lands of the East."<sup>87/</sup>

### 3. National Communist Parties as Subversive Tools.

"The Party is the rallying point for the best elements of the working class, of those who are in touch with the non-Party proletarian organizations. The Party forms the best training school for leaders. The Party is the only organization competent ... to transform all non-Party working-class organizations into accessory organs and connecting belts linking up the Party with the working class as a whole ... Trust is gradually inspired by the prolonged work of the Party among the masses." Stalin, 1924.<sup>88/</sup>

The raw material with which these international agents work is the membership of the separate Communist Parties. Here is the dough, leavened by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, which responds to the expert kneading of the Moscow-trained bakers. End products are in the form, mainly, of:

(a) Domestic "front" organizations, supporting policies and interests of the Soviet Union, usually by means and at the cost of jeopardizing those of their own government. Lack of time, space, and facilities makes quite impossible an adequate investigation of the infinite and confusing ramifications of this subject. A catalog of those actually identified in the United States would itself exhaust our space limitations (a current partial compilation will be found in Appendix A). In general, it may be said that two principal methods are employed: (1) The creation of organizations with innocuous or mass-appeal names, pursuing ostensibly "liberal" purposes, and sponsored by a "potpourri of tested Stalinists and simple-minded citizens with vaguely 'progressive' ideas";<sup>89/</sup> and (2) the infiltration or penetration, by the approved Party tactics of "boring from within", of labor unions or established and unimpeachable liberal or progressive organizations of every type. In either case, the objective of the Party agent is the same--control

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of key positions, especially the Secretaryship and office staff, and of the publicity and publications of the organization.

A good current sample of the first technique is to be found in "The National Committee to Win the Peace." It is co-chairmanned by retired Brigadier General Evans F. Carlson, U. S. Marines, and actor-singer Paul Robeson, and backed by an imposing list of sponsors which includes the publicity-fetching names of such gullible "liberals" as Marion Hargrove, Edward G. Robinson, Dorothy Parker and Carl Van Doren. In its short life it has: charged that the United States is aiming at "war and world domination"; advocated that we "destroy every atomic bomb we have and smash every facility we possess" for making more; supported the Soviet position on the veto power in the United Nations; and defended Tito's action in shooting down unarmed American transport planes. It recently organized a national "get-out-of-China" week and a national conference to discuss and publicize the same subject. The executive director of this Committee is one Abbot Simon, former member of the Young Communist League and a founder of the defunct "American Peace Mobilization", which six years ago was calling President Roosevelt an imperialist war-monger and demanding that the United States stay out of the war.<sup>90/</sup>

An equally good illustration of the second method was provided in the recent Chicago Conference of Progressives, the leading sponsors of which must be estimated as earnest loyal Americans, however "misguided" some may consider them to be. Reports indicate that remarks condemning "communist meddling" were mysteriously missing from the stenographic transcript of a speech delivered by CIO President Phil Murray; that he rejected as "written in the Kremlin" the original version of a foreign policy resolution presented by the Secretariat; that former Treasury Secretary Morgenthau blocked passage of a "proposed resolution to the effect that the U. S. was spending 28 billion dollars to build an aggressive war machine" by pointing out that the figure included, inter alia, the entire cost of the Veterans Administration; and that the mimeograph machine strangely broke down before copies could be made and distributed of Mr. Iches' speech characterizing the Russian atomic energy proposal as "childish" compared with "the much sounder proposal of Mr. Baruch". A resolution condemning the Baruch plan was subsequently engineered through the Conference, which had the unfortunate result of bringing to an abrupt and bitter end the peace talks then going on between Messrs. Baruch and Wallace.

Soviet Ambassador Gromyko may indeed have been more knowing than prophetic when he warned Mr. Baruch last June that the apparently unanimous American support for the Baruch plan would prove illusory.<sup>91/</sup>

(b) Fifth Column Networks of espionage agents operating directly for the Soviet Government.<sup>92/</sup>

The tortured conscience of a young cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa--and that alone--was responsible for revealing to the Canadian Government and to the world, in September 1945, the existence of

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several parallel under-cover networks of Soviet espionage, based upon a combination of Soviet diplomatic establishments, professional Comintern agents and facilities, and the apparatus of local Communist Parties. The subsequent investigation by a Special Royal Commission was able to trace in detail only the Military Espionage Network in Canada, but it disclosed the unquestioned existence and general functions of parallel NKVD and Comintern (also referred to as Political or Party) Systems in Canada, and of similar espionage networks in other countries. The three systems were operated, respectively, by the Military Attache of the Embassy, a Second Secretary who was a NKVD functionary, and a Second Secretary who was a Party functionary. Each separately reported to and received instructions from his respective headquarters in Moscow.

The NKVD System, which had been operating in Canada "at least as early as 1924" was responsible for keeping tab on Russian members of the Embassy staff and checking and reporting on members of the Communist Party of Canada, as well as general espionage.

The "Comintern" system had the tasks of obtaining and submitting biographical and other material on Canadian Communists and other Communist sympathizers; and transmitting Moscow's political directives to Canadian Communist leaders, not only regarding general lines of political propaganda, "but also instructions on techniques of operation. Examples of the latter would be the instructions to create or to get control of functional organizations such as the 'Canadian Association of Scientific Workers'; to occupy important positions in labor unions; when necessary for special purposes, to instruct certain Canadian secret Communists to take up temporarily an anti-Communist line; to get members into controlling positions in the executives of youth movements, international friendship councils, etc., which would be important from a propaganda point of view."

The principal operators of the Military System in Canada were two professional communist agents, Sam Carr and Fred Rose, naturalized Canadian citizens born in Eastern Europe, officials of the Communist Party of Canada, both with Moscow training and experience. They were able to "draw into the net" dozens of strategically placed Canadian citizens--scientists, officials, military officers and government employees--holding positions of public responsibility and trust. Through this network they obtained and sent to Moscow: actual samples of Uranium 235 enriched and of Uranium 233; authentic reports on the development of atomic research; detailed information on radar, anti-submarine devices (Asdic), improved explosives and propellants and the V.T. fuse; top secret political and economic information useful in estimating Canada's postwar economic and military potential or in connection with possible sabotage operations; and Canadian citizenship documents for use in facilitating the movements of Soviet agents.

This is real melodrama, but it has the fatal defect that the villain keeps the loot and remains unpunished.

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(c) Individual Communists.

As the Royal Commission points out: "... the most startling single aspect of the entire Fifth Column network is the uncanny success with which the Soviet agents were able to find Canadians who were willing to betray their country and to supply to agents of a foreign power secret information to which they had access in the course of their work, despite oaths of allegiance, of office, and of secrecy which they had taken."

Examining this astonishing phenomenon in some detail, the Commission concluded that "the original and principal motivation was supplied by the psychological development courses in Communist 'cells'; and that "financial incentive (in the form of expense money for which receipts were given) was only gradually and tactfully introduced to supplement and perhaps eventually supplant the original motivation", or to provide possibilities of "blackmail, if the agents' enthusiasm for the cause should later wane".

Unfortunately time and space do not permit us to explore the tortuous path to subversion uncovered by the Commission, despite the fact that its revelations regarding the techniques of "The Development of Ideological Motivation" are literally hair-raising. The principal features go something like this:

1. The initial contact in an ostensibly non-political "front" organization of the "reformist" or "improvement" type;
2. The invitation to join a secret "cell" or study group;
3. Study of a curriculum of political and philosophic works, supplemented by reading of current Communist literature and discussion of current affairs, designed progressively to develop:
  - a) A critical attitude toward Western democracy and its ideals;
  - b) A sense of loyalty to what appears to be an international ideal;
  - c) A blending of that ideal with the current doctrines and policies of Communist Parties throughout the world and the current conception of the national interests of the U.S.S.R.;
4. Indoctrination designed gradually to replace the original loyalty to principles professed by the Communist Party with over-riding loyalty to the Party as such;
5. Exploitation of individual social or psychological maladjustments due to racial prejudice or discrimination and the like;
6. Progressive absorption in the multiple Party activities and resulting isolation from other Society;
7. Gradual habituation to an atmosphere of secrecy and conspiracy, calculated to develop the psychology of a double life and double standards;

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8. The invitation to subversion or treachery; and finally
9. The act.

### III

#### CONCLUSION

In dealing with such a multi-faceted subject as the "instruments of Soviet foreign policy," considerations of clarity and logical development have dictated that we reach conclusions from point to point. This procedure has enabled us, in seeking our way through the dim-lit vaults of the Soviet foreign policy arsenal, to take bearings on our starting point - Soviet foreign policy itself - and finally to emerge again into the light and fresh air of Western civilization.

Soviet foreign policy, we assumed, seeks "a relative increase in the power of the Soviet Union as compared with that of other states not under Soviet influence", an objective requiring, on the one hand, the strengthening of Russia, and on the other, the weakening of other powers.<sup>93/</sup>

The apparatus through which the Soviet leaders hope to achieve their goals is very complex, as we have seen. But Marxist doctrine provides a remarkable method for centralizing power and ensuring discipline; as well as a strong cohesive force, the sinews of which we have been able to trace from the Kremlin to the lowliest Party member. Marxist ideology also supplies to the apparatus dynamic drive, a mass appeal and convenient justification for a complete disregard of the established practices and social and moral standards of Western society.

Consequently, any categorical classification of the many weapons in the Soviet arsenal, including that herein adopted, is necessarily artificial. Both legitimate and "illegitimate" weapons are used in unusual ways or in combinations strange and repugnant to Western practice, solely on the basis of the judgment of the Soviet leaders as to their utility in securing the desired result.

Valid evaluation of the machinery of Soviet foreign policy would require more penetrating investigation and study and more unhurried thought than has been possible in the preparation of the present report. We venture only a few suggestions.

The Soviet system must clearly be rated as an effective instrument of power. However, its successful utilization in directly increasing the strength and influence of the USSR--the primary Soviet objective--has been limited to areas subjected to the physical presence and pressure of the Red Army. The rest of the apparatus helped, but was not strong enough by itself. The absolute power of the Red Army depends upon the internal strength of the Soviet Union, particularly economic, to which there appear

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to be definite limitations. The relative power of that army of course depends upon the strength of potential opponents. Here is clearly the first guide to action for the democracies: they must remain strong.

In support of the second Soviet objective - weakening the power of other states - international Communism has been able to multiply its real strength in free societies by techniques of confusion and by the exploitation of ignorance and discontent. In the United States, for example, where membership in the Communist Party constitutes but a fraction of one per cent of the population, public polls in recent years have indicated "full approval of Soviet Russia's foreign policy" by over seven percent of the people.<sup>94/</sup> Here, too, is a clear guide to action for democracies: confusion can be overcome by disclosure, ignorance by education and discontent by removal of its causes. The means of taking the necessary measures is in our hands. We need only the courage and determination which our traditions and the love of our free society should inspire.

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

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APPENDIX

AMERICAN COMMUNIST "FRONT" ORGANIZATIONS :

The following material is quoted from Submission to Moscow by Norbert Muhlen, the New Leader, Vol. XXIX, No. 41, Section II, October 12, 1946:

"There now exist more than 70 nationwide organizations and national committees, not to mention literally thousands of local groups, which have been founded and conquered or are predominantly influenced by the Communist machine. The 'solar system of organizations' (Lenin) moving around the party, but ostensibly without connection with it, more or less controlled and/or influenced by Communists or fellow-travelers, includes:

"General, sex and age groups: American Youth for Democracy; Congress of American Women; League of Women Shoppers; Consumers' Union; Consumers' Councils; Sweethearts of Servicemen.

"Church and religious groups: People's Institute for Applied Religion; United Christian Council for Democracy; (Episcopalian) Church League for Industrial Democracy; Methodist Federation for Social Service; Protestant Associates; American Unitarian Youth; Unitarian Service Committee; Committee of Catholics for Human Rights; Jewish People's Committee; Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee.

"Civic and progressive groups: Civil Rights Congress; National Conference for Democratic Rights; International Labor Aid; International Labor Defense; People's Radio Foundation; National Committee to Win the Peace. Also, to a degree: National Citizens' Political Action Committee; Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions.

"Minorities, foreign and foreign relief groups: American Committee to Free Spain Now; American Committee for Spanish Freedom; Committee for Armenian Rights; Committee for a New Democratic Hungary; American Friends of India; American Committee for Indonesian Independence; Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; Emergency Committee for Indonesian Seamen; Japanese-American Committee for Democracy; American Slav Congress; United Committee of South Slavic Americans; Council for Pan-American Democracy; Council for International Democracy; to a degree also Institute for Pacific Relations.

"Also, Council on African Affairs; National Negro Congress; United Negro and Allied War Veterans; Southern Conference for Human Welfare; American Crusade Against Lynching; Committee for the Protection of the Foreign-Born; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee; Friends and Widows of the French Resistance; American Committee for the Relief of the German

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Needy; American Committee for Yugoslav Relief; American Committee for Greek Democracy; North American Spanish Aid Committee; Spanish Children's Relief Funds.

"Groups Interested in Russia: National Council of Soviet American Friendship; American Society for Russian Relief; Russian Economic Institute; American Russian Institute; American-Soviet Music Society.

"Occupational and Trade Union Groups Influencing Public Opinion: National Lawyers Guild; Screen Writers Guild; New York Chapter of the American Newspapers Guild, CIO; Radio Directors Guild, AFL, New York and Los Angeles locals; Screen Publicists, AFL, Los Angeles local; Los Angeles local of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL; Teachers Union, New York; also, several other unions, and many locals; of key importance for formation and dissemination of public opinion.

"This is not a complete list, and now fronts are being created. None of these groups showed in its name, its program, or its constitution that it is run by and for the Communists, or that it follows the Party line. In fact, every one of them appeals for a good, liberal cause. The majority of them stood for specific improvements of the domestic and international scene--against conditions people were discontented with. For Lenin had written: 'Our task is to utilize every manifestation of discontent, and to collect and utilize every grain of even rudimentary protest.'"

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FOOTNOTES

1. Resolutions of the 5th Comintern Congress, quoted in memorandum of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, October 1, 1925.
2. Nicolai Lenin, Collected Works, Russian Edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 12, quoted in Joseph Stalin "Reply to Comrade Ivanov", The Communist International, Vol. XV, No. 3, March 1938, pp. 222-226.
3. Joseph Stalin, "Reply to Comrade Ivanov, Feb. 12, 1946", published in The Communist International, Vol. XV, No. 3, March 1938, pp. 222-226.
4. Edward Kardelj, Communist Vice Premier of Yugoslavia to Bogdan Raditsa, quoted in latter's article "Yugoslavia's Tragic Lesson to the World", Readers Digest, Vol. 49, No. 294, Oct. 1946.
5. Nicolai Lenin, "Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder", London, 1920; quoted by Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself, N.Y., 1946.
6. Joseph Stalin, Leninism, Vol. 1, International Publishers, N.Y., 1932, p. 150.
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8. Stalin's Speech to the Moscow Electorate, N.Y. Times, February 10, 1946.
9. Statement of Igor Gouzenko, civilian employee of the Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, October 10, 1945, from the Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Communication of Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power, Ottawa, June 27, 1946.
10. The Communist International, Vol. XV, No. 3, March 1938.
11. Stalin's Speech to the Moscow Electorate, N.Y. Times, February 10, 1946.
12. George Vernadsky, History of Russia, Blakiston Co., Phila., 1944.
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18. V. M. Molotov, address to the Closing Plenary Session of the Conference of Paris, October 15, 1946, N.Y. Times, October 15, 1946.
19. Chairman of the Yugoslav Delegation, Note to the Chairman of the Conference of Paris, October 15, 1946, N.Y. Times, October 16, 1946.
20. Joseph Stalin, "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia", Pravda, October 10, 1920; reprinted in "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question", p. 78; quoted in Stalin's Kampf, edited by M. R. Werner: Howell, Soskin & Co., N.Y., 1940, p. 201.
21. Joseph Stalin, "Report of the 10th All-Union Congress of Soviets", December 26, 1922; published in "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question", p. 121; quoted in Stalin's Kampf, edited by M. R. Werner; Howell, Soskin & Co., N.Y., 1940, p. 208.
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31. Embassy Moscow telegrams Nos. 320, Feb. 3, 4 p.m. and 368, Feb. 8, 7 p.m., 1945.
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Program of the Comintern adopted by the VIth World Congress, Moscow, September 1, 1928, reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, Human Events, Inc., Chicago, 1946: "In view of the fact that the USSR is,

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the only fatherland of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of its achievements and the most important factor for its international emancipation, the international proletariat must on its part facilitate the success of the work of Socialist construction in the USSR and defend her against the attacks of the capitalist powers by all the means in its power."

60. Nicolai Lenin, "The Third International and its Place in History", The Communist International, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1, 1919.
61. Quoted by C.L.R. James, World Revolution--1917-1936, Pioneer Publishers, N.Y., 1937.
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63. Narkomindel and Comintern: Instruments of World Revolution, by Bruce C. Hopper, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, July, 1941.
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  2. The Peasant International
  3. The Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern)
  4. The International Society of Aid to Revolutionaries (Mepr)
  5. The International Workers Relief
  6. The Sport International (Sportintern)
  7. The International Women Secretariat
  8. The International of Educational Workers
  9. The International Cooperative Alliance
  10. The International Information Bureau
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