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In seeing it through we would do well to follow the best advice of the wisest generals and of our most knowledgeable civilian leaders against bombing North Vietnam, particularly the principal port, Haiphong, and densely populated Hanoi. The facts are that nearly \$1 billion worth or possibly more, of our best aircraft have already been destroyed in bombing runs over North Vietnam. In addition, precious lives of many of our pilots and airmen have been snuffed out. One reason for the bombing pause ordered by our President was the view that the destructive effects of our bombing did not justify the huge cost in money and in lives of very fine young Americans.

Were we to bomb Haiphong we would be placed in the same despicable category as the French colonialists who for years oppressed the people of Indochina. In their final effort to save their vast Indochina empire in late 1953, the French admiral commanding the fleet off Haiphong harbor saw thousands of people on the main highway leaving the city for the interior. He ordered a cannonade from his warships, hurling shells along the highway, killing 7,000 civilians—men, women, and children—and not killing or wounding any soldiers. Asiatics have not forgotten this, nor have they forgotten that the United States did not use the atom bomb against the Germans but used it against the yellow race.

Recent demonstrations and rioting against the military regime of General Ky indicate a vicious anti-American revolt in addition to a coalition against the military warlords in power in Saigon, in power because our CIA and Armed Forces uphold this puppet regime. In fact, there is an insurrection waging within a civil war. Prime Minister Ky, installed by the military last June, never proposed any program of social and agrarian reform until President Johnson at Honolulu treated him as a leader of all South Vietnam. Inspired by publicity and flattery, and those President Johnson-Ky photographs, Ky started to prove that he had control over the whole country. President Johnson knew Ky controlled only a small part of the area of South Vietnam outside Saigon. When Ky, flattered by the President Johnson treatment, tried to eliminate General Thi, commandant of the I Corps area, he fell on his face. Even though we furnished American planes to transport Ky's soldiers to Da Nang, they were pinned down in the airbase and then returned to Saigon.

Fifty thousand U.S. soldiers in Da Nang were directed to keep off the streets and American lives and property were endangered there and in the rioting at Saigon. The Saigon government may be overthrown. If Ky is overthrown by civilians in revolt and the new prime minister of the Saigon government demands, "Americans go home," that leaves Secretary of State Dean Rusk high and dry. He claims we are in Saigon to support a government and a nation against external aggression, knowing such claim is false and knowing also that Ky's Saigon government does not govern.

The Geneva agreement of 1954 specifi-

cally stated that separating Vietnam at the 17th parallel was a temporary line of demarcation until the elections prescribed in the agreement took place. Then, later, the proposed election was called off, not by leaders in Hanoi, but by our puppet leader in Saigon, Diem. Historically, there is no North and no South Vietnam. There is no aggression from any foreign government bordering on Vietnam. There has been infiltration from north of the 17th parallel. Such Communist infiltration naturally increases as the numbers of American GI's committed to combat in South Vietnam increases. Our escalation brings out Vietnamese escalation from the north. Each is self-defeating.

Secretary Rusk and other administration officials say we are defending freedom in Vietnam. But the fact is that there has never been a democratically elected government in Saigon and Ky himself was installed as Prime Minister by a group of 10 generals who overthrew the civilian government last June. Also, the fact is that if the Hanoi regime were anything but Communist it could be fully as dictatorial as it is and fully as ruthless in pursuit of its present goals and we would never have dreamt of intervening in internal Vietnamese politics.

We have seen a succession of South Vietnamese leaders—the latest being Ky—all ruthlessly dictatorial and having no wide support from the people of South Vietnam.

In spite of this, our involvement has continued to grow—more men, more money, and more weapons. All this is given in the cause of preserving democracy in Vietnam and resisting aggressors from the north.

Even now, experts on Vietnamese affairs maintain that if popular elections were held that they would heavily favor the Communists.

As a matter of fact, former President Eisenhower stated that had elections been held in 1956 as stipulated in the Geneva accords, Ho Chi Minh would have received 80 percent of the vote of the Vietnamese people living to the south and north of the 17th parallel demarcation line.

The tragedy of Vietnam lies in our massive involvement—virtually without allies. What began as a little war is now a major conflict.

For several years we have listened to fatuous prediction from Defense Secretary McNamara, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

In 1963 President Kennedy was told by McNamara and Taylor that "the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965."

And in June of 1964, Cabot Lodge asserted:

I don't see the need for more troops in Vietnam.

In March 1965, Secretary McNamara told the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives:

I think it is also clear that we cannot substitute U.S. troops for Vietnamese troops to carry out counter guerrilla operations against subversion directed against the people of South Vietnam by North Vietnam.

### THE VIETNAM DILEMMA

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Madam President, Congress has been kept off balance by our preoccupation with the dilemma of the Vietnam conflict. How can we solve our predicament in South Vietnam? How can we disengage from fighting in a grim civil war to which we should never have been committed in the first instance? Before the birth of our Savior, Sallust the great historian wrote:

It is always easy to begin a war but very difficult to stop one, since its beginning and end are not under the control of the same man.

This is precisely the situation with which we are now confronted.

Our distinguished colleague, Chairman RICHARD RUSSELL, of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, has said:

Vietnam is of no strategic importance to the defense of the United States and we should never have committed troops to combat there, but now that we have done that we must see it through to gain an honorable settlement.

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In 1964 he testified before the House Armed Services Committee:

I don't believe that pouring in hundreds of thousands of troops is the solution to the problem in Vietnam.

In October 1963, the White House issued the following statement based on the predictions of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor:

Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Vietnam are capable of suppressing it. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1963, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of that year—1964—the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Certainly, these statements indicate that many administration leaders have consistently underestimated the strength and staying power of the Vietnamese who consider they are fighting for national liberation, and have time and time again been wrong regarding our involvement in the Vietnam war.

A major obstacle to bringing about an armistice and ceasefire has been the refusal of some shortsighted, stubborn administration officials and unduly influential military leaders to express willingness to negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front which is and has been for years the political arm of the Vietcong.

The Vietcong forces are the major adversary against which our forces are fighting. Of course, Vietcong delegates must participate in any conference if a ceasefire and peace is to be restored to Vietnam.

Vietnam is one country, artificially divided at the demarcation line fixed at Geneva. There is no south Vietnamese nation in our understanding of the word. If the Saigon military junta is overthrown, and the new regime says "Americans go home," there is no alternative. Otherwise, it would be evident before the world that our Armed Forces have supplanted the French colonial power as aggressors. The claim of Rusk, McNamara, and others that we are there on invitation of the government would be rejected. We should then get out on their invitation. There would be no alternative for a self-respecting nation regardless of whether it is or is not the most powerful nation that has ever been known under the bending sky of God, and that is the United States of America.

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