

**CIA Defended**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF**

**HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE**

**OF TEXAS**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

*Wednesday, February 2, 1966*

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, among the many things that occupied my attention on my recent trip to south-east Asia was the caliber of CIA personnel who briefed me there. Prior to my departure from Washington, I had received detailed briefings from the CIA to give me a better grasp of the problems I would see in the area. The briefings were conducted by men who were obviously expert in their professions. The Agency men in the field to whom I talked were fully knowledgeable on their subject and impressed me as truly very competent representatives of this Government and of their profession.

Officers of U.S. Embassies to whom I spoke and military commanders alike assured me that the work of the CIA in that part of the world was fully integrated into the overall U.S. effort. The Agency is shouldering a full share of the load as a member of the team. I have watched them work for a number of years. It is an Agency which has a tremendous responsibility and I for one certainly wonder at anyone who would by word or written article leave the inference that this Agency was less than living up to their duty and responsibility unless they had sufficient proof to do so.

There have been a number of articles written on the quality and performance of the CIA and under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to include these articles:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 9, 1966]

**CIA MORALE DROPS—CRACK INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL QUILTS A TOP JOB AND DIRECTOR IS CRITICIZED**

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

Certain to impair declining morale in the Central Intelligence Agency is the unannounced, unprecedented decision of a top-flight professional intelligence man to resign as Deputy Director for Intelligence to take a lesser job.

Ray Cline has privately informed CIA Chief William F. (Red) Raborn that he wants to relinquish the Agency's fourth-highest post and take a field job in Europe. His decision comes as Raborn is under increasing internal CIA criticism for letting morale slip.

Although Cline disclaims unhappiness with Raborn as a factor in his unusual departure, colleagues think otherwise.

More important, the departure of the crack intelligence professional will leave a gaping hole in the Agency at the very time that internal dissatisfaction with Raborn is highest.

The question asked in Washington is this: If Raborn (justly famed as the father of

the Polaris missile) can't prevent the flight of a professional like Cline, how can he restore to his Agency the high morale it enjoyed under former Directors Allen Dulles and John McCone?

Another factor lies behind Cline's decision: his intimate ties to McGeorge Bundy, who is quitting as President Johnson's top national security aid effective February 28.

With Bundy as the chief White House link to CIA, he and Cline were in the thick of supersecret operations during the Cuban missile crisis. It was Cline who rushed the first U-2 pictures of Soviet missiles in Cuba to Bundy at the White House in October 1962. Bundy ran them upstairs to President Kennedy.

**CIA DEFENDED**

I write in answer to Richard Brightson's letter "Without the CIA" (December 23). Having commenced a career as a professional intelligence officer some 30 years ago and served subsequently in ONI, OSS, Battle Force Pacific, and finally more than a decade as an official of the CIA, I feel strongly that Mr. Brightson's attack on the competency of CIA's intelligence analysis and estimative staff must be answered by someone not bemused by the tongue-in-cheek whimsies of James Bond and "Uncle" and who has not only read more than a short serialization of "The Penkovsky Papers," but actually worked with the original material.

As to "suspicious-looking sources" and Mr. Brightson's assumption that the estimators do not have access to the sources:

The information that flows into the analytical and estimative process comes from a wide range of sources—all varieties of published materials and foreign broadcasts (65 foreign languages in daily use), photography, travel reports, items of equipment, etc., and, of course, clandestine agent reports.

The evaluation of these sources and the material supplied is performed by experts, and in the case of agent reports by those case officers who are closest to the agent net in question. All reports are accurately rated as to reliability of the source and as to the credibility of the material. If the need arises, there are not many cases where the intelligence analyst cannot be put directly in touch with the source.

As to the competence of the analyst and estimators—those "individuals without an immediate and intimate working knowledge of the subject matter":

Within the Board of National Estimates and its staff are prepared the periodic and ad hoc estimates which go to the senior policy level in State and Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President. Many of the men on the Board and its staff date their intelligence experience from the early days of OSS, almost a quarter century ago, others have come to the CIA from the military intelligence services and from the senior level of the academic community. Better than 90 percent have advanced academic degrees in fields of history, political science, or economics, directly pertinent to their work.

About 75 percent have enhanced their area and subject knowledge by residence overseas. In addition, the CIA for years has had in operation a program of sending analysts overseas on familiarization tours to compensate for lack of foreign residence. These all are men of dedication and highest compe-

tence, who have individually devoted the major portion of their mature lives to the study of the area or subject with which they now deal.

What new "more legitimate information-gathering operation," as suggested by Mr. Brightson, could possibly acquire such a wealth of talent and how long would it take? Decades certainly.

Finally, perhaps I might suggest to Mr. Brightson (and to others of like thinking) that instead of James Bond, they read with some attention such authoritative books as Allen Dulles "Craft of Intelligence" and Sherman Kent's "Strategic Intelligence," before recommending abolition of the present order and a possible return to the intelligence chaos of the pre-World War II era.

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[From the Washington (D.C.) Star, Dec. 19, 1965]

**REPLY TO CRITICISM OF CIA**

(By Carl T. Rowan)

Pity the poor old Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It is the perennial whipping boy of columnists and Congressmen and of just about every foreign dictator seeking to divert attention from his own crookedness or ineptitude.

As one who knows a bit about CIA (which most of its critics decidedly do not), I get a little sick of seeing it badgered and abused by just about everybody capable of scratching out a sentence or calling a press conference.

Now this may be interpreted as my being in favor of sin (which most people are), but put me on record as saying CIA does a pretty darned good job of protecting not only U.S. security but that of many weaker countries all over the world as well.

True, it makes mistakes. Big ones. But only at about the same rate that the State Department, the Defense Department, the White House or my old agency, the U.S. Information Agency makes boobos.

And you'd be hard pressed to convince me that CIA's ratio of incompetents is any higher than that of the U.S. Senate.

Those who leap to the firing line when they discover it's always open season on CIA seem to ignore one inescapable fact: A good intelligence system has become as crucial to national security as an army, or air force, or an arsenal of powerful weapons.

The foreigners criticizing CIA most (the Russians, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, etc.) know this and nobody expends more effort than they do trying to perfect their cloak-and-dagger operations.

What we ought not forget is that in many critical situations these last few years, the United States has been able to make the correct decision to guarantee our security because CIA had secured information that our enemies thought we could not possibly possess. The Cuban missiles crisis is an example.

Having said all this, I must concede that CIA is at a critical point in its history. Not only is it scorned the world over, but the standard device for discrediting the Peace Corps, USIA and other American agencies is to link them to the CIA.

During a recent tour of East Africa and southeast Asia, it was made clear to me that suspicion and fear of the CIA has become

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a sort of Achilles heel of American foreign policy.

This may seem to justify the attacks on CIA in Congress and elsewhere but the truth is just the opposite. The homegrown critics are 100 times more to blame for the wild and irrational foreign fear of CIA than is the Agency itself.

A Ghana official recently was lamenting the fact that the United States denied a food request because Nkrumah published a book attacking CIA and labeling just about every American who ever put foot in Ghana as a CIA spy.

"Are you surprised that Americans would react unfavorably to this kind of attack?" I asked.

"We are surprised that you would direct your anger at us," said the Ghana envoy. "Our President took practically everything he wrote out of American books and other publications."

At a dinner in Lusaka, the Vice President of Zambia began conversation by asking me to give him an appraisal of "The Invisible Government," a book by two of my journalistic colleagues about so-called CIA cloak-and-dagger operations abroad.

I ducked the question by commenting: "I only wish CIA were capable of half the things for which it is blamed or praised."

Several Zambian cabinet members refused to let me duck, however, and I soon found myself caught in a wild discussion with people who believe fervently that CIA is in the business of overthrowing and installing governments all over the world—without the approval or knowledge of the Secretary of State or the President.

I later learned that every top- and middle-level Zambian official had been instructed to read "The Invisible Government," Andrew Tully's book "The CIA," and Morris West's new book, "The Ambassador."

I'm not naive enough to suggest that newsmen and authors stop writing about CIA. Our society is naturally intolerant of secrecy (which any good intelligence operation requires), so the questioning and criticism will go on.

But it would sure help if some of the critics conceded that, whether we like clandestine intelligence operations or not, they are indispensable in this crazy, crooked, believe world in which we live.

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