

negotiation to the alternative of military action."

It quoted one "non-admiring official" as saying: "Adlai wanted a Munich. He wanted to trade the Turkish, Italian and British missile bases for the Cuban bases."

#### At NSC Meeting

Mr. Stevenson was at the White House today participating in a meeting of the National Security Council Executive Committee, which heard a report from Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman on his fact-finding mission to India and the kind of aid needed by India in fighting Chinese Communists, and discussed continuing Cuban crisis negotiations between American and Soviet representatives at the U. N.

When reporters asked Mr. Stevenson if there was anything accurate about his Cuban crisis role in the Saturday Evening Post article, he replied, "Nothing."

He added that he had not read the article carefully, but had glanced at it and "found five inaccuracies in rapid succession."

Asked if he discussed the article with Mr. Kennedy, he said the President brought it up himself and was going to issue a statement.

#### Meetings Secret

Shortly thereafter Mr. Salinger read to newsmen a statement which he described as his own. That statement follows:

"Proceedings of the National Security Council have been secret since its founding in 1947 and will continue to be.

"The various positions of members of the NSC taken during deliberations must also remain secret in order to permit access by the President to the frankest expression of views.

"I can state flatly, however, that Ambassador Stevenson strongly supported the position taken by the President on the quarantine and brilliantly developed the United States position at the United Nations during the days that followed.

"He also played the key role in the negotiations at the United Nations on the Cuban matter."

#### Won't Elaborate

Mr. Salinger refused to go beyond his statement when a reporter pointed out that it did not deny that Mr. Stevenson expressed other views during discussions on the Cuban problem even though he supported the President's decision once the decision was made.

When asked if Mr. Stevenson had advocated trading some allied missile bases for the Cuban bases, as the mag-

azine article quoted an official as saying he did, Mr. Salinger still said he could not go beyond his statement.

The article notes that John J. McCloy, termed a "tough-minded" man who has held several key Government posts in the past, was summoned from a business conference in Germany to work with Mr. Stevenson in the U. N. negotiations on Cuba and says that "White House aide Arthur Schlesinger was assigned to write the uncompromising speech which Stevenson delivered at the U. N. on Tuesday," October 23.

#### Roles Assessed

The authors assess the roles of several other presidential advisers in the week leading up to the decision for the naval blockade as the first step in a series of actions planned after aerial pictures disclosed Soviet missiles and bombers in Cuba.

It says one of the men involved summed it up this way: "At first we divided into hawks and doves, but by the end a rolling consensus had developed, and except for Adlai, we had all ended up as dawks or hoves."

The article reports that the hawks favored an immediate air strike to eliminate the missile bases in Cuba, while the doves opposed the air strike and favored a blockade. By becoming "dawks or hoves," the article says, "the hawks became less bellicose and the doves became tougher, and they merged as something inbetween."

Secretary of State Rusk's "position does not come through loud and clear—he appears to have been a dawk or a hove from the start," the authors say.

As original "hawks" they include CIA Director John McCone, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and McGeorge Bundy, the President's special adviser for national security affairs.

Favoring a blockade instead of an air strike from the first, the article says, were Secretary of Defense McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett and Llewelyn Thompson, former Ambassador to Russia.

The article adds that Mr. McNamara finally became the "chief instrument of the consensus" for a blockade as a first step while maintaining the option of destroying the missiles if the blockade did not cause Khrushchev to back down."