

*Davenport, New York Times*

*E. STEVENS*  
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## 'Dear Adlai' Recalls 'Dear Alben'

Whatever the weather in Manhattan, Ambassador Stevenson must feel the chill of the crosswinds blowing over his role in President Kennedy's high councils.

Whether or not he counseled a cautious, even soft, course in the Cuban crisis it seems clear that someone in the position of influence is giving him less than that benefit of the doubt.

His position as an advisor to the President is under hot and maybe devastating fire.

There is not much comfort either, in the "Dear Adlai" note in which Mr. Kennedy reasserted his confidence in his ambassador to the U.N.

Stevenson as certainly as others interested in political affairs can remember when the late Alben W. Barkley, trusted lieutenant of President Roosevelt, got a "Dear Alben" message from FDR. It was designed to soften the impact of a decision that Barkley no longer served his purposes.

Lending credence to the widely held belief that this is a significant phase of the process of easing Ambassador Stevenson into a lesser role are recurrent reports of maneuvering within the administration.

Weeks ago Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott writing for the Times in Washington said there were indications of a shuffle which would involve Stevenson and Secretary Rusk. David Lawrence, another astute capital observer, cites the rumors that McGeorge Bundy, a JFK advisor and former Harvard dean, was being groomed for Secretary of State, with Rusk taking Stevenson's place in the U. N.

The current issue of "The Insider's Newsletter" says:

"Adlai Stevenson's usefulness at

the U.N. has been irreparably damaged, and diplomats there give him a year more at most, despite JFK's 'fullest confidence' letter, which actually is counted a 'minimum statement.'

"The Cuba crisis had little to do with it; a memo from Stevenson to the national Security Council written three days before the Kennedy speech shows that the implications of the Alsop-Bartlett magazine article were basically wrong. The real reason for administration's coolness to Stevenson is simply that he is not in tune with Kennedy and most of his top advisors. And the long memoried Kennedy clan has not forgotten — or forgiven — Adlai's attempt to stampede the convention in 1960.

"If it had not been necessary to win over the many, and well-heeled, liberal Democratic supporters of Stevenson, Kennedy might never have appointed him in the first place.

"Likeliest source of the 'Stevenson wanted' judgment, rather than the President himself, are the administration's hard-liners (they are called 'the War Hawks'), led by Dean Acheson, CIA Chief McCone and Robert Kennedy, whose views on Stevenson have never been kept secret."

It is President Kennedy himself who must make the decision and give the sign.

If he is genuinely appreciative of Stevenson's performance in the U.N. he will act quickly to determine how the seeming leak occurred in security deliberations of high secrecy during which the Ambassador may have suggested caution lest Cuba bring nuclear war.

If he is not, "Dear Adlai's," position will deteriorate to inconsequentiality.