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M'NAMARA SAYS RED ARSENAL HAS NO SUPERBOMB

Asserts U.S. Employs Winning Strategy — Defends Intelligence in Cuban Crisis

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WASHINGTON, March 29—

The Soviet Union has no 100-megaton bombs in its arsenal. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told the defense appropriations subcommittee of the House. (A megaton is an energy-yield equivalent to that of 1,000,000 tons of TNT.) He said also that the destruction created by 25 two-megaton bombs far exceeds the destruction occasioned by an attack of one 50-megaton bomb.

"We have under study and are capable of developing, should the need arise, weapons of much higher yields, 50 to 100 megatons," McNamara said. "It does not appear to us at the moment that the need for such weapons requires their development."

The questioning of McNamara was far-ranging and after censorship, filled more than 300 printed pages. The committee's questioning about what it considered the failure of our intelligence in Cuba last year was particularly critical. The result was that the first full story of the intelligence operations, with the omission of certain sensitive means of gaining information, was brought out.

Although there had been hundreds of reports of the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba, the analysis of the Defense Intelligence Agency singled out one particular significance Sept. 23, directed toward an area that appeared to be of special interest to the Russians.

This could have been called more than a suspicious

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reports developed between Sept. 8 and 21. These reports were raw, unevaluated intelligence which is distributed daily to the agencies concerned in quantities that could fill barrels.

By Sept. 27, the analysis under Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, made a more detailed report. Further analysis by Oct. 5 led to placing this particular area on the list to be covered by aerial reconnaissance. Although flights were made on Sept. 28 and 29 and Oct. 3, they were concerned with other targets, principally the surface-to-air missile sites. Examination of these sites indicated that they are arranged to protect some critical areas that did not appear to be targets, unless important installations were to beaced there.

Some of the sites pointed toward a defense of the same area that had been picked up on Sept. 18 to 21. A specific U-2 mission was directed to the San Cristobal area on the next night, Oct. 14. This flight took the historic picture that gave the first positive evidence of the presence of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba.

Immediately, the few CIA U-2s were replaced by U-2s assigned to SAC, because SAC had larger numbers. In the next eight days 10 missions were flown, disclosing the eight other ballistic missile sites and all the surface-to-air installations.

When it is considered that the first missiles are believed to have reached Cuba on Sept. 8, this was a remarkable intelligence performance, as McNamara maintained.

The committee did not go into the question with McNamara

and Carroll about why there was no dependable spy service in Cuba that could have furnished information earlier. If this was a failure in intelligence, it was a CIA failure, since defense intelligence does not operate spy networks.

The committee was particularly critical of the fact that William Bundy, deputy assistant secretary of defense, on Sept. 23 and George Ball, under secretary of state, on Oct. 3, denied that there was any intelligence of the presence of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba.

The members could not understand why the suspicions of the defense intelligence analysts had not been communicated to them. The raw intelligence was available and distributed to all agencies that needed it, but the

It was not until the Council made the following statements:

The 1963 budget for military functions of the Defense Department of 18.3 billion dollars is equivalent to 34 billion dollars in terms of 1953 dollars. There are funds in the budget for an improved Minuteman or conventional ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, greater yield and better flexibility of control and targeting. The program for a mobile medium range ballistic missile is being continued. It is still in the development phase. That is, contracts have been selected and contracts awarded to study the extent to which they can meet the Defense Department objectives. One of these is a missile and warhead weighing 11,000 pounds. McNamara has asked the Air Force to consider cutting back the Dyna-Soar program and proceed in partnership with the National Aeronautical and Space Administration with Gemini thereby saving substantial funds. The cost of each program is approximately \$800,000,000.

He denied that the development of conventional forces detracted in any way from our will to use nuclear weapons if necessary. He said: "We are approaching an era when it may become increasingly improbable that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude a devastating retaliatory blow."

"This may result in mutual deterrence, but it is still a grim prospect."

This is due to the large increase in numbers of Soviet missile-firing, nuclear-powered submarines and to the fact that the Russians are hardening their missiles (making them safe from attack). In imitation of our practice. There is no way for us to prevent the Russians from taking these measures, he said.

This represents a shift in the situation, not a change in policy or strategy.

McNamara denied that we have no plan to win. "I believe in any reasonable sense of the word we are winning," he said.

"Our objective is the defeat of the Communists. I do not believe we can achieve that victory by engaging in strategic nuclear war."

"I think it is very dangerous, as a matter of fact, for any significant number of people to believe we can achieve defeat of Communism by engaging in strategic nuclear war."

"In my opinion there would be such severe damage done to this country, that our way of life would change, and change in an undesirable direction. Therefore I would say we had not won."

"We would win in the sense that their way of life would change more than ours because we would destroy a greater percentage of their industrial potential and probably destroy a percentage of their population if they destroyed of

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He does not believe it is possible for bombers used against a major power, to move directly over the target to drop their bombs.

He has asked the Air Force to study the possible development of a long endurance aircraft (the dynamary) which might serve as a mobile launching platform for certain types of missiles that might be added to our air force. Two days' endurance in the air may be possible.

He added 100 Minuteman missiles to the program to make up for the cancellation of Skybolt. This made a total program savings of two billion dollars even after the cost of the additional Minuteman missiles are considered.

The budget estimate for continuation of development of anti-missile missiles is \$335,000,000. This includes funds for Sprint, Nike-M and Nike-Zeus.

The SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) control system and a semi-automatic backup for it, will cost \$3,740,000,000 through 1964.

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