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## Our Man in the Kremlin

# Trickery Used by Russian Intelligence Against West Revealed by Penkovsky

*Fourth in a Series*


By Frank Gibney

Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the brilliant Soviet General Staff officer who volunteered to spy for the West, was almost the exact opposite of the drab, mousy professional spy, as celebrated in current "realistic" espionage novels. A sociable man who liked good food and good conversation, he had a ready wit and was prone to parlor card tricks.

When he arrived in London, in late April, 1961, he was consciously setting out to play an incredibly dangerous game of espionage against his own regime. But he managed to enjoy his stay at least ostensibly, as thoroughly as any tourist.

The Colonel took long walks through the city, visited department stores, restaurants and theaters, generally in the company of Greville Wynne, his British businessman friend. The obvious freedom of the British people delighted him. He told Wynne, again and again, how different it was from the closed society of Moscow.

Personally, he was manifestly relieved for once to be out of the orbit of Soviet secret police surveillance. He even managed some discreet nightclubbing and a few dancing lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in London, assumed that Penkovsky, a trusted officer, was attempting to "recruit" Wynne as a Soviet agent. So



his association with Wynne was not under suspicion.)

Penkovsky also did some guide work of his own, which considerably helped his stancing in Soviet Military Intelligence. Shortly before he left Moscow, Gen. Serov, the chief of Military Intelligence, had called him into his office and informed him that his wife and daughter were also flying to London for an unofficial tourist visit. He asked Penkovsky to look after them and give them any help they needed in getting around in a strange city.

Accordingly, the Colonel helped Mrs. Serov and her attractive daughter Svetlana make their purchases (with money drawn from local So-


viet intelligence funds). He even managed to take Svetlana on a tour of the better London night spots without arousing undue attention.

Beneath this facade of socializing, however, Penkovsky's new work continued in earnest. On the basis of the information he had submitted, the British and American intelligence officers were now convinced that his desire to work with them was genuine.

In their nocturnal meetings, they gave the Soviet colonel a complete short course in clandestine radio communications, as well as a small Minox camera for photographing documents. It was arranged to make contact with him through Wynne or another Western emissary, if he found it impossible to return to Western Europe in the near future. If necessary, instructions would be transmitted to him by radio.

When he finally left Lon-

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**PASS FOR SPY**—This is Col. Penkovsky's pass as an "expert" of the Scientific Research Work Committee.

don on May 6, Penkovsky carried with him presents for his highly placed Soviet friends, including Gen. Serov, a full report of the trade and technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success) and a complete set of instructions and equipment for getting further espionage information out to his "new friends" in the West.

In the following excerpt from the Papers, Penkovsky has some more to say about the real nature of his own Soviet delegation—and the stern ground rules still laid down to cover all Soviet contacts with foreigners.

**By Oleg Penkovsky**

The State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work is like a ministry. Our chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the privileges of a minister in the U.S.S.R. The committee is in charge of all scientific and technical exchanges with foreigners, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In fact, it is a large espionage apparatus, which not only collects scientific and technical information, but tries

to recruit Western technical specialists.

When I began my work in the committee, I was myself astounded by the number of intelligence officers working there. Eighty or 90 senior intelligence officers work in the foreign relations section alone. When one walks down the halls in our offices, one can see some of them saluting each other in the military manner. They have conspicuous difficulty getting away from military habits, even getting used to their civilian clothes.

The friendly contacts and "services" we provide visiting foreign delegations we might better call "friendly deceit." Often we Military Intelligence officers cannot understand ourselves why the foreigners believe us. Do they not understand that we show them in the U.S.S.R. only those things which are well known to everybody? If there is something new at a plant which foreigners are about to visit, we simply give orders to its director: "Show them everything, but have Shops 1 and 5 closed for repairs." That is all.

On my desk I have a list of pretexts and alternate proposals which we use to

keep foreigners out of certain areas of the U.S.S.R.:

- 1) The plant is under repair.
- 2) A bridge is closed.
- 3) There is no airport and the railroad tracks have been damaged by recent frost; therefore, for the time being there are no trains.
- 4) The local hotel is not ready for guests.
- 5) All hotels are completely filled with tourists, etc.

Sometimes we take foreign delegates through museums and parks in Moscow until the members are so tired they themselves call off the trip to a factory, preferring to rest. Or, instead of taking the delegation by plane, we put them on a train. As a result, the delegation has enough time to see only one or two installations in which they are interested, instead of five or six. Their visas expire and they have to leave after having seen nothing but vodka and caviar.

**Recruiting Tasks**

In Moscow our main task as intelligence officers inside the committee is to recruit agents among the foreigners visiting the U.S.S.R. Of course, this does not often happen. But we collect information by personal conversations, eavesdropping, examining baggage, literally stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets.

I have been assigned to British delegations visiting Moscow. My job is to establish friendly relations with these men, assess their intelligence possibilities, then

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write a report on each to our intelligence people in London. It will be up to them to collect enough compromising information on these men -- family problems, amorous adventures, personal finances, etc. -- to secure their recruitment.

We are also to obtain as much scientific and technical information as possible of value to our Soviet industry -- everything from cheaper methods of getting fresh water from sea water to the manufacture of artificial fur. Thanks to visits to our country by foreign delegations, we obtain vast quantities of extremely valuable information.

By contrast, all members of Soviet delegations traveling abroad are carefully instructed how to answer questions that might be put to them. I can honestly say that there is nothing new

that Western scientists and specialists could learn from the Soviet specialists -- or Soviet exhibitions abroad. For example, the exhibits to be shown at our London exhibition in 1961 were first carefully checked by intelligence technicians to make sure there was nothing new which foreign scientists could see or steal. Some exhibits were purposely put together in a distorted way; the cone of the sputnik on display was not built that way, the spheres were of another type.

Trips of Soviet delegations to foreign countries require special preparation. The departure of any delegation requires a *separate decree* from the Communist Party Central Committee. And no delegation ever goes abroad without some form of State Security involvement.

After a Soviet delegation has been formed, we select certain scientists, engineers or other suitable members and instruct them individually on the type of information we need. Take my own 45-man delegation to London. Five of its members were employees of the Communist Central Committee. Ten Military Intelligence officers left for London at the same time in the guise of delegation members or tourists. There were also three other Military Intelligence colonels in the delegation, besides myself.

As a rule, Soviet scientists and technicians in missile production work are not allowed to go abroad. But lately, because these scientists must learn something about missile work in the U.S., a few have been given permission to travel -- provided they have not partici-

parted in any missile production work for the last two years. Thus, if they defected to the West, their knowledge would not be so fresh.

#### Touring Instructions

Our intelligence instructions to traveling Soviet delegates are very specific. How many forms and autobiographies must be filled out before a trip abroad is processed! All of them in four or five copies! I myself had to submit 18 photographs before a single trip. What are they going to do with them? Marinate them? My wife and I worked on them for two days, and still could not finish all the forms.

Instructions we give to Soviet travelers stipulate that when traveling by train, you should always be seated with your own sex. Do not drink, do not talk

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too much and report any incidents on the trip to the consul or Soviet Embassy representatives. Do not carry any confidential materials with you, do not leave your hotel room, do not make any notes, but if this is unavoidable, keep them on your person.

I remember early in 1961 we sent a delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany. An engineer from Leningrad went with this delegation. He was co-opted, i.e., forcibly recruited by Military Intelligence. He had a notebook for making notes on the information he gathered. He left the notebook in a raincoat, then it disappeared. A search was conducted. We found nothing. The engineer became so upset that when his comrades went out shopping, he hanged himself in his hotel room. He used the cord of an electric iron which he found attached to the light fixture in the ceiling. (The delegation had taken the electric iron with them to save money on pressing.)

The engineer's body was sent to Leningrad by plane. Later, at the enterprise where he worked, it was announced that he was not normal and suffered from constant headaches. That is how things are done in our country.

Condensed from the forthcoming book: "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

THURSDAY: Penkovsky arrives in London with new top-secret information taken from the Kremlin's files: the true story of how Khrushchev shot down the U-2 and the RB-47.

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