

ESPIONAGE

Honest-to-Badness

CPYRGHT

Beyond the least shadow of a doubt, this is the year of the spy. Television abounds with glamorous and garrulous agents; movies are bottled in Bond and sandwiched with Ipress. But the truth of that grim, grubby business, espionage, will never be told on film—or even through the written word. Last week the West was buzzing with two new spy "memoirs," both of which proved once again that while honest-to-badness spies really exist, their reflections are inevitably suspect.

The authors are Soviet Agent Gordon Lonsdale, whose account of his

the West. Penkovsky's contact was Greville Wynne, a businessman and go-between for British intelligence who served as Penkovsky's chief courier.


Through Wynne and others, Penkovsky leaked details of the impending Berlin Wall operation (apparently disbelieved by the West, or at least not acted upon), and the presence and location of missiles installed by Russia in Cuba before the crisis of 1962 (information that may have aided Washington in calling Khrushchev's bluff).

Penkovsky's memoir—smuggled out of Russia on one of the secret routes that carried Abram Tertz's and Boris Pasternak's works westward—is gritty and gripe-ridden in its condemnation of Moscow's upper-echelon morals, and filled with "revelations" presumably intended to compromise Soviet agents.

SMIRCH or Conjecture? Gordon Lonsdale's memoir is not nearly as revealing. Though the Moscow-born Lonsdale (*né* Konon Trofimovich Molody) rants against the FBI ("hated enemy of the CIA") and Scotland Yard ("no match for a well-trained intelligence officer"), he slips quietly past the fact that the Yard nabbed him in 1961 Red-handed. Lonsdale's main aim is to compromise a number of double agents apparently still working for both Russia and the West. This aggressive note has led such knowledgeable Western Sovietologists as Britain's Victor Zorza to decide that Lonsdale is working for the KGB's "Department of Disinformation"—an outfit dedicated to sowing dissent and confusion among Western intelligence networks, and hence worthy of the nickname SMIRCH.

Both books are chock-a-block with colorful but valueless details. Penkovsky quotes verbatim a lecture on how to spy in America: "Agent meetings can be held at golf courses . . . at, let us say, the 16th hole or at some other hole (there is a total of 18 holes)." "Each motel room has its own entrance." "A taxi can be stopped anywhere by loudly shouting 'Taxi!' The driver writes in his log the place a fare entered, the place he got out, and the time. Therefore an intelligence officer must never take a taxi directly to the meeting place." Lonsdale cites "dead drop" sites, such as a cistern in the "gents" on Baker Street, the "loo" in Leicester Square's Odeon Cinema, and a phone box near the Savoy.

But despite this amusing, primerlike detail on how to be an agent, neither account says much about what the spies actually learned. The paucity of startling, specific examples of the agents' enterprise suggests that both books were carefully edited—Lonsdale's by the KGB and GRU, Penkovsky's presumably by U.S. and British intelligence—to safeguard sources and techniques that might still have value to the enemy. But if those heavy-editing hands snatched much of the meat from both books, there are still some rewards. Lonsdale, at least, is assured of \$140,000 in his London sales alone.



LONSDALE

Fuddled, footnoted and heavyhanded.



VADIM BIRYUKOV

PENKOVSKY

20 years in the upper echelons of the British government is now available in Europe under the title *Spy*, and Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, executed by the Russians in 1963 after 16 months of spying for the CIA and Britain's M.I.5, whose fuddled and footnoted journal is due this month under the title *The Penkovsky Papers*.

Hating Nikita. Penkovsky was the optimum spy: unlike the mere information gatherers, he had the golden gift of evaluation. As a colonel in the GRU (Russia's military intelligence agency), he not only had access to top defense information but was also trained by no less a lot of key figures than Top Spy Ivan Serov and Missile Boss Sergei Varentsov to spot what was most valuable in the Soviet military treasure chest. Penkovsky's equivalent in U.S. circles, say his U.S. editors, would have been "a vice president of the Rand Corp., a graduate of West Point and the Military War College, a close friend of the general in charge of SAC, secretly a division head in the Central Intelligence Agency, with important contacts in the Pentagon."

According to his journal, Penkovsky approached Western sources—both in Moscow and abroad—many times before he convinced the West that he was a legitimate informer. His reasons: sheer hatred of Nikita Khrushchev, coupled with fear of thermonuclear war. At least, is assured of \$140,000 in his London sales alone.


NOV 19 1962

Penkovsky story sets off U.S. spy debate

By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

CPYRGHT

Washington



Associated Press

Allen W. Dulles

'This is a useful book, and a valuable one'

A lively debate has caught fire here on whether Soviet spying poses a serious threat to American security.

It centers on "the Penkovsky papers"—the story of a Soviet intelligence colonel, Leg Penkovsky, who leaked Soviet secrets to the West for 16 months in 1961 and 1962.

Colonel Penkovsky's own diary is appearing in a series of 14 newspaper installments across the country. On Nov. 19, Doubleday is to publish the diary in book form.

The diary contains many details of how Soviet embassy staffs and visiting delegations were meticulously trained in spying.

Colonel Penkovsky, married to a general's daughter, moved in high Soviet society and had access to secret military and strategic plans against the West. He furnished valuable information, said here to have helped American planners during the Berlin crisis of 1961-62 and the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962.

He was detected and executed in 1963.

Some members of the government here explore publication of his story—which is being avidly followed by newspaper readers.

'Provocation' question

They say it will only feed the fears of the far right; it will also make the proposed consular treaty with the Soviet Union, as well as the cultural-exchange agreement, more difficult to obtain.

The consular treaty would pave the way for a small additional number of Soviet diplomats to enter the United States to staff consulates in major cities.

It is reported here that some Soviet sources are asking if publication of the papers is a provocation to the Soviet Government by Washington.

On the other hand, other experts welcome the "papers."

They praise the freedom of the British and American societies that causes men like Colonel Penkovsky to work for and publish in the West; this freedom, they say, is a powerful weapon in the fight against communism.

These experts point out that the Amer-

Department was generally aware of the contents of the book.

They refused to vouch for the authenticity of Colonel Penkovsky's statements, although other experts agree that his statements sound true.

Officials admit that "they have a plausible ring," and that "many of the observations contained therein have been borne out by events."

Much of what Colonel Penkovsky said about Mr. Khrushchev was "representative of Soviet opinion at the highest levels," officials said.

'On balance . . .'

The officials defended the cultural-exchange program and the American Government's measures to defeat Soviet espionage methods.

It had been long recognized, they said that the main Soviet objective in the exchange program was to gather information, particularly technical data. But, they said "we have taken measures" to ensure that the Soviet Union had made "only minimal progress."

American goals were different: They were to open up Soviet society, to begin an evolution in the country which "might result in more acceptable international behavior" by the Soviet Union.

While both sides had achieved some of their aims, "on balance, the net gain clearly rests with us."

Officials said it came as no surprise the Soviet personnel abroad collected intelligence. "Agencies in the United States responsible for internal security have indeed and are continuing to act to minimize Soviet gains."

Intelligence experts have said there was nothing particularly new in the Penkovsky papers, although the details make interesting reading for the general public.

A spokesman for the CIA told this newspaper that the manuscript of the paper and a commentary by newsman Frank Gibney had been given to them before publication.

CIA agents had examined it for material which might "compromise national security." The CIA will not say whether it believed the details in the papers to be accurate; there is every reason to believe, however, that they are.

The CIA did not approve of publication but it made no move to prevent it. Whether it deleted portions from the manuscript