

# Usage in 'Penkovsky' Said to Prove Forgery

CPYRGHT

By Victor Zorza  
Manchester Guardian

LONDON—So far as can be established, the Russian manuscript of Penkovsky's memoirs just does not exist.

When news of the imminent publication of the Penkovsky Papers was reported in the world press, the American publishers of the book were inundated with requests for permission to serialize the story in newspapers and to publish it in foreign languages.

Among these requests was one from a small Russian emigre publishing house in West Germany. All it could offer was \$250. This was accepted without any haggling, since all the proceeds from the book are to go to the "Penkovsky Foundation," formed in the United States for this purpose.

That the American publishers had accepted the book for publication in good faith is shown by their willingness to procure the Russian text for the emigre publishing house. But after several weeks and repeated requests to the "Penkovsky Foundation," the Russian text has not been made available, and it looks as if it never will be.

On Monday, the Russian emigre publisher made a telephone call from Frankfurt to Doubleday, the New York publishers, to get the final answer which had been promised for the beginning of this week. He was told by R. E. Banker, for Doubleday, that they were still unable to provide a Russian text. However, they were prepared to let the Russian publisher go ahead—if he was prepared to re-translate the Penkovsky text from English back into Russian. As for the Russian "original," Banker said, they had twice asked the "State Department" about it, but were still not able to provide it.

### Strange Phrases

The English text is peppered with words and phrases that no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use. He is made to refer repeatedly to "Soviet Russians" or to "Soviets" describing his countrymen. These terms

would sound as strange in Russian as "United States Americans" or "British Englishman" would sound in ordinary English usage.

These are not mistakes in translation, but they arise from ignorance of Soviet terminology. The stock Soviet phrase for the kind of political deviation for which Marshal Zhukov, the Defense Minister, was purged in 1957, is "Bonapartist tendencies." Yet Penkovsky is made to report Khrushchev as saying that Marshal Zhukov was displaying "Napoleonic characteristics." No translator would depart so far from the original. But if the remark was inserted in English by someone writing some time after he had read an account of the Zhukov affair, a faulty memory for phrases might have easily led him to use the associated, but incorrect, term.

Penkovsky is made to illustrate the change in Sino-Soviet relations by remarking that the phrase "Great China" has now been replaced in official terminology by unadorned "China." However, the official usage was never "Great China"—it was "the Great Chinese People."

Penkovsky is made to refer to a high party official as an "R.S.F.S.R. Communist Party Leader"—a phrase that would never be used by a Soviet official, who would know that the R.S.F.S.R.—the initials of the Russian Republic—has no Communist Party distinct from the Soviet Party. One of the chapters begins with a reference by Penkovsky to his recent rip to "Europe"—although a Russian returning to Moscow would speak of a visit to the "West." But the reference to a trip to "Europe" would have come naturally to an American compiler of the papers.

Among Penkovsky's many unlikely digressions, his excursion into the history of the Party appears particularly improbable—and factually wrong. He provides a long list of Party leaders over the years who, as successive editions of the Party history went to press, were purged and described variously as en-

emies of the people, traitors, and imperialist hirelings. This is an exercise beloved by anti-Communist propagandists, and figures in many of their tracts. But a true professional would never make the mistake of listing Marshal Zhukov as "Khrushchev's enemy"—a phrase that would never be used in an official Soviet textbook. Penkovsky would certainly have known it to be wrong.

### Meaningless Titles

In listing the official functions of high Soviet officers, he often describes them as "deputies of the Supreme Soviet"—a meaningless dignity on which the good spy that he was would not waste his breath. However, a western compiler might well have taken these and other details from any good reference book, just to fill out the picture for the inexperienced reader.

Penkovsky is made to show his indignation at Khrushchev's recklessness in 1961 in testing a 50-megaton bomb which he describes as having a yield of 80 and, elsewhere, of 100 megatons—although the accurate measurements taken by western experts have put it at under 60 megatons. Similarly, he reports that several Soviet launches of manned sputniks took the lives of their crews. In fact, all Russian launchings have been monitored by western radio and radar tracking devices which would have revealed beyond any doubt, through the nature of the communications passing between the satellite and the base, the presence of a human being aboard. Western experts have repeatedly dismissed this particular rumor.

### Confusion Over Events

The report attributed to Penkovsky that Marshal Chuikov, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, was dismissed from this post in 1961 and appointed chief of civil defense is wrong. It is true that he got the civil defense job at that time, but he continued as the commander of the ground forces, and the Soviet military press referred to him repeatedly as such.

It was only in 1964 that he lost this post, nearly two years after Penkovsky's arrest. It would appear that someone compiling the "Papers" more recently has confused the two events and dates, making Penkovsky report something that occurred after he was executed in 1963. Similar confusion is evident in Penkovsky's references to the removal by Khrushchev in 1957 of the anti-Party group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin—although Bulganin remained prime minister until 1958, without at first being charged with membership in the group.

Virtually the whole section on the Soviet military doctrine appears to have been written by a western pen. It is here that the references to "Soviets" and "Soviet Russians" are most obtrusive. Penkovsky is made to explain that he had sent out the full text of the "Special Collection" on military doctrine to the West—and at the same time to go on for pages on end, giving long quotations from it.

Would Penkovsky really have bothered to write out long passages from a publication which he had photographed and dispatched to his western masters? This whole section, and a number of others in the book, is accompanied by repeated warnings from Penkovsky about the Soviet determination to acquire a first strike posture, and to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the West.

The chapter on strategy is made the main vehicle for the message, and the long quotations from the "Special Collection" are designed to give it an air of authority. But the impression is false, for Gen. Gastilovich, on whose contribution the compiler relies to drive the first strike lesson home, was strongly contradicted by equally authoritative contributors to the "Special Collection." But the Penkovsky Papers give no hint of this.

### Undoubted Forgery

Gen. Kurochkin, a respected Soviet strategist, went so far as to describe some of the more extreme views as "anti-

Continued

Marxist. This is the chapter that can be described without any hesitation as forged. The compiler of the book adds insult to injury by making Penkovsky say that "I am sorry that I cannot copy here the entire 'Special Collection'"—or is it, perhaps, a private joke inserted for the entertainment of the compiler's colleagues? The use—or misuse—of the "Special Collection" in this way is a great pity. Its publication in full would have added greatly to the understanding of Soviet strategy among students in the West. But there is now reason to fear that the account given in the papers will prevent the full publication which would inevitably show up the imbalance of the Penkovsky book.

It may be that some of the errors pinpointed in this article are not necessarily evidence of forgery, but the cumulative weight of the evidence is too great to support any other interpretation.

#### Work of CIA

The book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency. No other organization in the West, apart from British Intelligence, and certainly no individual, could have had access to the information of which the book is made up. British Intelligence officers did at one time entertain the idea of building Penkovsky up posthumously as something of a hero, but permission to proceed was withheld.

The CIA has been repeatedly stung and provoked by the attempts of the Disinformation Department of the Soviet intelligence organization to discredit its activities throughout the world. The Penkovsky Papers are the CIA's answer. But in psychological warfare of this kind the intelligence agencies of the democratic countries suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public. It is the function of a free press to uncover such deception. Some of my best friends are in the CIA, but if they want their psychological warfare efforts to remain undiscovered, they must do better than this.

© 1965, Victor Zorza

CPYRGHT

NOV 16 1965