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SUPERVISION OVER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I have always been of the belief that some sort of closer supervision should be exercised over the Central Intelligence Agency than is presently the case. For this reason I have cosponsored bills calling for so-called congressional "watchdog" committees.

I well recall during the Bay of Pigs the acceptance of the generally held belief that those individuals and activities connected with intelligence estimates should be separated from those who plan and execute operations. This would mean that intelligence estimates will not be cut to the cloth of those who would like to engage in operations. To the best of my knowledge this has not been done.

While I recognize that the Central Intelligence Agency cannot announce its triumphs, I do believe that from the negative viewpoint the article by Mr. Stanley Karnow in the Providence Journal of September 7, 1965, might be of interest to my colleagues. It outlines various abortive projects of the CIA in the Far East, apparently often the result of the nonseparation of intelligence analysis from the execution of operations. And I believe that the reading of it will emphasize the need for tighter controls.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Mr. Karnow be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RECORD OF CIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PLACES U.S. NAME IN DISREPUTE
(By Stanley Karnow)

WASHINGTON.—In a petulant mood one day last week, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, unfolded an intriguing glimpse of history. Late in 1960, he disclosed, a Central Intelligence Agency operative had offered him a \$3 million bribe to conceal a bungled American espionage attempt. The shabby affair involved, he said, not, as Prime Minister Lee put it, "Like James Bond, only not so good."

A House subcommittee on foreign affairs led by CLEMENT ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin Democrat is scheduled to begin a closed inquiry into what happened in Singapore tomorrow.

But what happened in Singapore, though rather embarrassing, was relatively innocuous compared to a clumsier assortment of other covert American efforts in southeast Asia over the years. For example:

In Burma, more than a decade ago, U.S. secret agents striving to influence Burmese political leanings were somehow sidetracked into the more rewarding pursuit of opium trading.

In Cambodia, U.S. secret agents were indirectly involved in an abortive coup d'etat contrived to overthrow Prince Sihanouk's government.

In Indonesia, U.S. secret agents backed a desultory rebellion aimed at undermining President Sukarno.

In Laos, U.S. secret agents' operations ranged from stuffing ballot boxes to bulwarking a full-scale military offensive by insurgents against the country capital.

None of the operations succeeded in any significant long-range sense. Some served to justify local leaders' doubts or hostility toward the United States and nearly everywhere in southeast Asia, though supposedly clandestine, American covert activities were widely known.

INGENUOUS PLAN IS FAILURE

The first of these earnest efforts, back in the 1950's, was focused on the tangled jungles of northwest Burma. Defeated by the Communists in China, bands of Chinese Nationalist troops had retreated into this area, where they became brisk opium traders. It was considered, however, that they might perform a nobler purpose.

As it does now, Burma in those days adhered to a neutralist line. But neutralism, insisted the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was not only immoral, but shortsighted. Thus a clever scheme was elaborated to help the Burmese see the light.

The remnant Chinese Nationalists would be inspired to provoke Communist China into attacking Burma, thereby forcing the Burmese to seek salvation in the Western camp. Ingenious as it was, the plan worked poorly.

For one thing, the Americans assigned to supply the Nationalists with weapons and gold enlisted the aid of Gen. Phao Sriyanod, the police chief of neighboring Thailand. But Chief Phao, a leading narcotics dealer, cared little about international politics. He simply wanted to latch on to the Nationalists' opium.

And under his aegis, an operation originally dedicated to saving Burmese souls soon degenerated into a lucrative narcotics traffic. Aircraft mobilized to supply the Nationalists were employed mostly to transport opium, and several American agents, unable to resist temptation, eagerly joined in the smuggling. Finally, in 1963, Gen. "Wild Bill" Donovan went out to Bangkok, ostensibly as U.S. Ambassador, effectively to clean up the mess.

CIA REMAINS UNDETERRED

The whole maneuver, dubiously conceived and artlessly executed, had inevitable repercussions. Blaming the United States for

supporting the Chinese Nationalists on their territory, the Burmese renounced American aid and came close to quitting the United Nations. For other motives as well, Burma has since found an accommodation to Communist China more advantageous.

The abortive Burmese experience did not deter further covert efforts, however. In 1958, a somewhat different sort of tactic was initiated against another uncooperative leader, Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Financed by U.S. funds and equipment, a team of South Vietnamese operatives joined Cambodian rebels in attempting to overthrow Prince Sihanouk and replace him with Dap Chuon, then the Cambodian Minister of Security. The plot fell apart when loyal Cambodian troops invaded the rebel headquarters, killed Dap Chuon, and discovered among the insurgents a U.S. Information Agency employee.

Only a month before, Prince Sihanouk had publicly praised U.S. aid and denied any intention of flirting with communism. After the plot against him, he promptly recognized Red China and rejected a new offer of American assistance, terming it "suspicious."

About the same time, U.S. operatives began to cast an eye toward Indonesia, where local army commanders scattered across the far-flung archipelago were rumbling against President Sukarno's government. Some objected to growing Communist strength, others had regional grievances.

As rebellions spread through Sumatra, East Java, and other outlying areas, Secretary of State Dulles intruded with the opinion that the United States wished for Indonesia a regime that "reflects the real interests and desires of the people." Against the opposition of American diplomats in Jakarta, covert U.S. support for the rebels started to flow south from bases in Formosa and the Philippines. One American pilot, Allan Lawrence Pope, was shot down while on a bombing mission over Indonesia.

TURNING POINT FOR SUKARNO?

Undercover United States help to the Indonesian rebels was never extensive, it seems. It was enough, however, to reinforce Sukarno's distrust of the United States. Some analysts believe it was a turning point, after which Indonesian-American relations have steadily sild downhill.

By contrast, CIA operatives fanned out through primitive Laos with the authority of game wardens in a national park. They selected and subsidized local political leaders and actuated uprisings. They so rigged the April 1960, elections that all the contested seats were won by right wingers.

In one constituency their chosen candidate received 18,000 votes, while his pro-Communist opponent polled only 4.

Later in 1960, while a State Department spokesman warned that civil war would only help the Communists, a team of covert American advisers engineered General Phoumi Nosavan's drive against Vientiane, the seat of the neutralist government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. One effect of the turmoil was to open the way for Soviet intervention in Laos.

After the Bay of Pigs disaster, President Kennedy fortified a watchdog committee to supervise CIA activities, and the day of romantic undercover operations waned, but there is still talk in Washington of putting the CIA under some kind of firm surveillance.

And as Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew reflected in his Singapore charge, the notion still persists that U.S. policy in southeast Asia is planned and actuated by characters out of Ian Fleming novels—only not so good. In the popular image, these characters topple governments, subvert leaders and seduce dragon ladies.

But whether the image is always true or sometimes exaggerated, U.S. policy is often a victim of its image.

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