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Russ Agent Tells of Sex and Spies in U.S. Embassy in Poland

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WASHINGTON, D. C. —

The information on sex and subversion in the U.S. Embassy in Poland was so extensive that chief security evaluator Otto F. Otepka could hardly believe it.

But three high officials from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assured Otepka and the then Deputy Undersecretary of State Loy Henderson that it came from a reliable informant who was high in the Soviet intelligence apparatus. They made a special trip to convey the information.

It was early in 1959, and the CIA officials said they could give no clues as to the identity of the man for he

was still operating in the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) network, and had agreed to remain in his job as a "stip" or stay-in-place informant.

THE INFORMATION on conditions in the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw was shocking. Polish party girls, acting as agents for the KGB, had seduced nearly all of the members of the Marine guard and were given a rather free run of the barracks and embassy at night.

The informant stated that a high foreign service officer, serving as embassy security officer, was in fact acting as a foreign agent for the KGB.

The wife of one of the highest foreign service officers in the U.S. Embassy had

made a trip to Moscow where the Soviets had seduced her by employing a handsome and debonair young Communist, the CIA undercover agent reported. She had lived with him for a week.

SHE HAD BEEN photographed, and the KGB had plans to try to use this material and a money payoff to obtain security information from her husband. The husband did not know of it yet.

The CIA undercover agent reported that there were other U.S. officials of lower stature in the embassy who had been compromised through sex and money who were delivering information but he did not know all of the details on their names and positions.

After explaining the story of Soviet espionage in the United States Embassy, the CIA officers assured Otepka and Henderson that they were following up the information and that no major State Department probe would be necessary.

The CIA officials stated that action to remove the security risks from the embassy should be done slowly and with a great deal of caution, for any unusual activity might alert the KGB to the fact that they had a spy in their ranks.

NEITHER Otepka nor Henderson knew at the time that the informant was a man known to the CIA as Lt. Michael Goleniewski, a high ranking KGB intelligence officer stationed in Poland.

Goleniewski was not his actual name, for as an experienced intelligence agent he feared that he would be exposed by Soviet agents in the CIA if he used his actual name. He operated through a "cutout" or third person he trusted rather than directly through the CIA.

The CIA also sought to protect the identity more, and used still another code name in sending information from Goleniewski to the State Department, the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies.

SEVERAL months before the State Department was told of the existence of this important informant, the FBI was given information that was passed to the subversive section in the Washington field office.

Goleniewski's code name was used in reporting lists of immigrants or Polish embassy officials in Washington who were in fact part of a Communist spy apparatus. The FBI agents were astounded at the amount of precise information.

The information was reliable, the FBI reported. Leads from Goleniewski were to be followed up carefully.

The security office program was simply to move with caution. The members of the Marine guard were rotated out of Warsaw to Bonn and Frankfurt, West Germany, where they could be questioned.

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