

H10448

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500430006-7

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

August 14, 1967

The mayor, the citizens council, and government people working with poverty problems seem genuinely pleased at the results of the fund-raising.

"These programs aren't going to solve basic problems. We've learned that only physical change will do that," said Gottehrer, "but they buy time for changes that are crucial."

SERVE TO EDUCATE

The programs also have served to educate some in the business world to the difficulties of dealing with poverty and the lack of communication between races.

They have not fostered the face-to-face contact between businessman and ghetto resident that some regard as an important basis for rebuilding trust among the country's split citizenry.

But they have caused many businessmen to take a personal interest in poverty problems for the first time.

PRIDE IS DEVELOPED

"A real pride in what they've done has developed in some of the businessmen," said Aschkenasy.

"We're hoping that we can carry this pride and involvement past September and the end of the summer program."

Next summer, the council will probably concentrate on finding jobs for more kids. "This was the weakest part of the program," admitted an aid to Helskell, "but we got started very late."

FEDERAL SECURITY PROCEDURES— AN ISSUE FOR THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, on February 16 of this year the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, appeared before a House Appropriations Subcommittee and presented, as he does each year, the most comprehensive report on the operations of the FBI which is available to the public. With regard to the increasing intelligence operations of the Communist countries within the United States, Mr. Hoover stated:

Though seeking any and all information which may be utilized to weaken the United States or implement their plan of world communism, special emphasis is being directed to such objectives as penetration of key U.S. agencies, penetration of U.S. industry, collection of scientific and technical data, collection of data of military interest, and collection of information of political significance.

One would think that, in the face of this increased effort to penetrate "key U.S. agencies," for instance, such agencies are countering such Soviet-bloc efforts with a tightening of security practices and procedures. One would expect that repeated warnings by Mr. Hoover in recent years would result in countermeasures to insure the protection of vital Federal operations. In 1961 Mr. Hoover warned that—

The current, widespread ramifications of the Soviet-bloc espionage networks which today extend throughout the entire United States, have indicated a realistic need for a further tightening of our security on the homefront. While the Communists speak of peace, their intelligence setup is the most extensive in world history.

Unfortunately, in various cases in the past few years are any indication, an apparent disregard of strict security procedures, instead of an increased awareness, has been taking place. One need but recall the case of the National Security Agency and its laxity of security procedures which was revealed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The vendetta against a conscientious security officer, Otto Otepka, came to light in the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee's 20-part hearings on State Department security. The Otepka case, it will be recalled, disclosed the incredible practices of safecracking, wiretapping, and possible perjury before a Senate committee, to name a few.

Another current case involves Stephen A. Koczak who was selected out of the Foreign Service and who claims that his records were manipulated so as to have him removed from the State Department. Mr. Koczak has repeatedly charged that the original pages of his efficiency report were removed and destroyed, substitute pages forged, backdated, and inserted as if they were the originals, and a statement added that Mr. Koczak had read the entire report when, in fact, he had not. The State Department has refused to deny these charges and has always responded with "no comment." These details of the Koczak case appeared in the Government Employees' Exchange, of August 9, 1967, a long-established newspaper for employees of the Federal Government here in Washington.

The same edition of the above-mentioned newspaper cites the case of an "admitted homosexual" who was promoted to the position of FSO-1, a high-ranking position in the Foreign Service recently. The name of this officer was omitted from the list of security risks when a State Department officer testified before a House Appropriations Subcommittee on March 2 of this year.

From the above-cited cases, the complexity of the security issue is apparent. It is not just a matter of suitability standards being violated, but extends to disgraceful practices to discredit Federal employees. If Federal employees must use their own funds to defend themselves against the vicious, vindictive measures of Federal agencies, then Federal employees will soon degenerate to mere automatons in the face of Federal reprisals. Few will relish a 2- or 3- or 4-year struggle against the Federal juggernaut to defend their record.

Another case was brought to light recently through the efforts of Congressman RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, of Indiana, and which appeared in the July 29 issue of Human Events, an alert newsweekly here in Washington. This case concerns Robert Arthur Niemann who was granted a secret security clearance by the Defense Department to work on an Air Force defense contract. Niemann admits to being a member of the W. E. B. DuBois Club, an organization which Mr. J. Edgar Hoover identifies as having been originated by the Communist Party U.S.A. The exhaustive listing of Niemann's activities, in addition to his DuBois Club affiliation, certainly justifies our concern.

The Defense Department has stated that Niemann's clearance is "clearly consistent with the national interest." If this is the Defense Department's idea of being consistent with the national interest, then it is time to draw up new security guidelines, review the Department's security program as the HCUA did in the NSA case, and ascertain how many more Niemanns are walking around with security clearances.

Because of its importance Federal security procedures should be given a high priority for discussion during the 1968 presidential campaign. To provide background information on one case in point, I place the article, "Pentagon Security Breakdown" from the July 29 issue of Human Events in the Record at this point:

PENTAGON SECURITY BREAKDOWN

Ever since the Kennedy-Johnson State Department began firing or easing out such topnotch security experts like Otto Otepka, veteran investigators in the Capitol have become alarmed at the department's security programs. But Foggy Bottom, it turns out, is not the only place where there is cause for concern.

Last week *Human Events* discovered fresh evidence of still another startling breach in national security standards, this time in the heart of America's military establishment. Within the Defense Department there is the Industrial Security Clearance Review Office, whose major purpose is to check out persons in industry or universities working on defense contracts. But this critical "watch-dog" agency has a novel approach to security matters.

Far from being very disturbed by those with leftist backgrounds, it has consciously given a secret clearance to a known member of a Communist-dominated group. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the Defense Department's security-gathering apparatus is either completely ineffectual or a victim of sabotage.

The story of ruptured Pentagon security actually begins some 16 months ago when Rep. Richard L. Roudebush (R.-Ind.) requested the Defense Department to find out why Robert Arthur Niemann, then an engineering graduate student and research assistant at the University of California at Los Angeles, possessed a secret security clearance to work on an Air Force defense contract when, in fact, he belonged to the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs. The DuBois Clubs have been termed "Communist controlled" and "subversive" by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The U.S. attorney general on March 4, 1966, petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board to order the DuBois Clubs to register as a Communist-front organization.

Fifteen months after Roudebush had queried the department came a supposedly complete reply. A few weeks ago, the Indiana solon received from the office of the assistant secretary of defense a letter dated June 29, 1967, signed by Joseph J. Liebling, director for Security Policy. The Liebling letter read, in part:

"In March 1966 Mr. Niemann's statements regarding his recent joining of the DuBois Club [sic] of America were brought to the attention of the Defense Department. Because he held an active Department of Defense secret clearance, the chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, initiated a complete background investigation of him. Upon completion of that investigation, his case was referred to this office for determination of his eligibility for clearance. . . .

"The Screening Board of this office, having considered all the available information, now has determined that continuation of Mr. Niemann's secret clearance is clearly con-