

June 15, 1965

promising start 4 years ago, is in danger of becoming an "Alliance for Reaction." That is the title of his article.

Professor Flores writes, in part:

The passwords are now military aid, counterinsurgency, civic action, and armed intervention.

In addition to the heavy emphasis upon military activity and the placing of more and more control over the civilian economy in the hands of military officers, as evidenced by the steady expansion of civic action into the domestic economic affairs of these countries, Professor Flores also indicates that much of the money is being spent under the Alliance for programs that ignore the basic difficulties of the countries of the hemisphere.

The material I have placed in the RECORD in recent days shows that in the Dominican Republic, in Ecuador, in Bolivia, and in Colombia, political conditions are extremely bad, because economic conditions are extremely bad. It would seem that the problems of economic expansion in these countries have not been helped by the Alliance; and Professor Flores believes they have not been helped in Brazil, either, by our massive aid to Brazil.

In further support of the amendments I offered yesterday to reduce military aid to Latin America, to cut the Alliance fund by \$100 million, and to limit the definition of "civic action" to public works, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in full in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LATIN AMERICA—ALLIANCE FOR REACTION  
(By Edmundo Flores)

(NOTE.—Edmundo Flores is a professor of agricultural economics at the National University of Mexico, and at present a visiting professor of the social sciences at the University of Chicago. Dr. Flores has frequently advised the U.N. and the FAO on matters of land reform and economic development.)

The Alliance for Progress, born a little more than 4 years ago, has undergone an ugly transformation and has entered a hard stage peopled by characters out of the Pentagon, the CIA and the Marine Corps. The passwords now are military aid, counter-insurgency, civic action and armed intervention. The Brazilian coup and the occupation of Santo Domingo are the two better known—but by no means the only—incidents of this hard stage.

What is the rationale behind the return to direct intervention and U.S. military power? What are the differences, if any, between President Johnson's "invade thy neighbor policy" and Theodore Roosevelt's "gunboat diplomacy"? How will Latin America react this time?

In 1960, Cuba demonstrated only too clearly that the pressures for social and economic reform in Latin America were formidable. The defensive response of many frightened American nations was the Alliance for Progress. In 10 years, with the magic of 10 billion U.S. dollars, the Alliance would streamline rigid social structures, revitalize economies and pave the way for political stability. The miracle of the Marshall plan would be repeated in Latin America and Communist expansion would be contained once more. There need be no more Cubas in the Western Hemisphere.

As originally envisaged at Punta del Este, the Alliance was to achieve the rapid economic and social transformation of Latin America essentially by parliamentary, peaceful, and gradual reforms. The key to the whole program was to create and maintain favorable incentives for foreign and domestic private investment. The monetary and fiscal systems of Latin America were to be improved along the lines of traditional banking orthodoxy. Efficient and equitable systems of land tenure were to be implanted through reforms which would encourage family farms. Effective systems of labor relations were to be institutionalized. Low-cost housing, educational programs, and improvements of public health and sanitation were the main goals on the social reform front. A general target was the annual increase of per capita income by 2.5 percent.

For the North American official mind the long-term, ideal sociopolitical model for the lesser members of the Alliance was, of course, the United States—or, more accurately, the simplified, Sunday supplement stereotype which plain Americans and the State Department take to be the essence of the United States: free elections, free enterprise, free trade, free press, consumer sovereignty, balanced budgets, and the pursuit of happiness. However, no one suggested the outright adoption of this ambitious model. Instead, a more modest showcase was sought.

The first showcase was Puerto Rico. But though President Kennedy and his advisers seemed pleased with it, the Latin Americans were unambiguously upset by the colonial connotations which they, and many Puerto Ricans as well, associate with that island. North Americans finally caught on to the notion—though they did not understand it—that the prospect of having more Puerto Ricos in the hemisphere is as obnoxious to Latin Americans, of whatever ideology, class, or income level, as the prospect of more Cubas is to the State Department. After Puerto Rico, therefore, Colombia became the showcase, but not for long either—not with the anarchy and violence of the last 15 years. After its military coup, Brazil captured the model country award, though by the time this had happened the search had been abandoned and the initial hopes of the Alliance had been replaced by a more realistic policy. By then, Teodoro Moscoso, the Puerto Rican bureaucrat who with some embarrassment had coordinated the initial stages of the Alliance, had been fired. Thomas C. Mann then had shouldered the burden of redirecting the Alliance toward the overt freezing of the status quo, even if this meant keeping more and more of the hemisphere under military control.

The Latin American oligarchies like the status quo. They are content with their lot and do not want change or development. They fear reform, revolution, and Castro. Although in unguarded moments they perhaps envy the stability and progress of Mexico, they despise its nonaristocratic, nouveau riche, anticlerical ruling classes. Not surprisingly, therefore, during the formative stages of the Alliance, the conservative Latin American governments disagreed with its goals and rhetoric. Loud opposition was voiced by governments, political parties, and private-interest groups. However, as soon as the Latin Americans cut through the unfamiliar pieties and torrid slogans that the North Americans were using so freely, and grasped the essentially conservative character of the enterprise called the Alliance, they gave their support. The Latins had been scared by the revolution of rising expectations because this vague cliché does not translate well into Spanish and carries connotations of *revolucion* in its straightforward sense, not in its recent Madison Avenue usage. But once they realized that the North Americans were in no mood for change either, they promulgated with loud fanfare the leg-

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IS  
IN DANGER OF BECOMING AN  
"ALLIANCE FOR REACTION"

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in an article published in the current issue of the Nation, Prof. Edmundo Flores, a professor of agricultural economics at the National University of Mexico, and a visiting professor at the University of Chicago, has written that the Alliance for Progress, which got off to such a

lation to start phony fiscal and land reforms—and to get dollar credits.

President Kennedy got from Congress funds to start operations and assembled a cumbersome international bureaucracy around the Organization of American States. The Inter-American Development Bank, capitalized at 8850 million when it was founded in 1959, was put in charge of virtually all the finances of the Alliance and brought onto its staff a few good economists from Latin America. The Committee of Nine, dubbed the "Nine Wise Men," developed into a sort of Cecil B. De Mille spectacular in which nine local talents were charged with advisory attributions and billed as Latin America's Brain Trust. Recently, when it became obvious that the Alliance was on the verge of collapse, the Inter-American Committee ICAP, headed by the Colombian Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria, was improvised as an emergency booster to keep it alive until military reinforcements arrived.

The Alliance was not designed to put into effect real, fundamental, irreversible reforms. Its purpose was precisely the opposite: to devise technological and administrative improvements as a means of avoiding drastic shakeups. Insofar as the reforms of the Alliance fulfilled these conditions, great efforts have been made to carry them out. Thus, President Belaúnde, of Peru, an architect by profession, pushed for the construction of his pet project: a highway in the Amazon (instead of land reform); the Colombian Government began to build dams (instead of land reform); land-reclamation projects were launched in several countries (instead of land reform); and the construction of low-rent public housing mushroomed.

The Inter-American Development Bank and other agencies provided credits and conventional technical assistance. The United States, the Economic Commission for Latin America, FAO, the foundations and many universities also engaged in research and technical assistance. Foreign experts could be seen everywhere. Some were concerned with fiscal policies, others with industrial and urban schemes. There were specialists on farming, seeds, birth control, 4-H Clubs and all the measures which, under different guises, are commonplace in the advanced countries. However, these techniques seemed singularly incapable of developing their own momentum in most of Latin America. Some built-in mechanism that operates wherever there is widespread poverty, hunger, unemployment, illiteracy, religious fanaticism, and rigid social stratification seemed to reject innovation as rigorously as the human body rejects kidney transplants.

The foreign technicians and Peace Corps adolescents who were not corrupted and absorbed by the local elite or who were not immediately discouraged by the futility of their efforts gradually became aware of the enormous difficulties they were facing and realized the tragic inadequacy of their ethnocentric, feeble tools, and incantations. Thus they came to understand something that many Latin American nationalists who are really interested in the development of their respective countries had known since the inception of the alliance: that La Alianza para el Progreso was another case of too little, too late, and too damned superficial.

In the meantime, the economies continued to deteriorate. Inflation rose at staggering rates, food shortages and food imports increased, capital flight persisted, the exodus of peasants to the cities mounted, and the military share of the budgets kept growing. In Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia landless peasants occupied haciendas and challenged the army. Sometimes they were killed but at other times were left alone. In the mines of Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil miners went on strike and fought the army and the police. The plantations of tropical and equa-

torial Latin America were rocked by labor disputes. The men and women on the streets of Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Rio looked shabbier every season. Prostitutes proliferated. University students—the only opposition not in jail or exile in the countries run by the military—went on strike, rioted, and battled the police and the army practically everywhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, U.S. military activities in Latin America were greatly intensified. The Defense Department expressed strong support for the "Military Civic Action" concept defined as "the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture." Civic action is "a weapon against Communist-inspired subversion . . . a technique of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency." The proposed total Latin American military assistance program for 1964 amounted to \$77,262,000.

In June 1963, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara asserted:

"Until about 1960, military assistance programs for Latin America were oriented toward hemispheric defense. As it became clear that there was no threat of significant overt external aggression against Latin America, emphasis shifted to internal security capabilities for use against Communist-inspired subversion or overt aggression and to civic-action projects designed to promote stability and strengthen national economies."<sup>1</sup>

When Thomas C. Mann became the head of Alliance in 1964, he added to it this military dimension. All kinds of gimmicks were tried to improve the image of Latin American soldiers in the United States. College professors got grants to study their positive role in social innovation. The idiotic notion that the military is the only group on which the United States can rely because it is familiar with discipline and technology and is sincerely anti-Communist is being pushed in the mass media. Time recently called General Barrientos, the American Air Force-trained Bolivian usurper, "The Steve Canyon of the Andes."

Many Latin American officers are training in the United States. It is plausibly expected that through professional contacts with U.S. soldiers they will absorb apolitical attitudes and that as they become "more professional in outlook, they will by conviction and necessity eschew politics."<sup>2</sup> The obverse proposition—that increased contact may further politicize the U.S. military—should at least be considered.

Thus, the inadequacies of the Alliance, the anticipation of a spreading revolutionary wave, and the recognized incapacity of the local elites to defend even their own interests, resulted in hurried attempts by the United States to increase the political influence of the military in their respective countries. More ominously, it also brought the "no-nonsense" unilateral decision to intervene directly in order to avoid the threat of communism in any Latin American country. This attitude sooner or later would blast the Inter-American system, but North Americans knew from experience that the OAS could be intimidated and bought when the need arose.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Armed Forces Information and Education: for Commanders," "Civic Action: The Military Role in Nation Building," vol. III, No. 14 (Jan. 15, 1964). U.S. Department of Defense.

<sup>2</sup> "Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress," by Michael J. Francis; Journal of Inter-American Studies, July 1964.

<sup>3</sup> "The Military," by Lyle N. McAllister in "Continuity and Change in Latin America," edited by J. J. Johnson (Stanford University Press).

After the army, of course, the carpetbaggers would follow. The external expenditures for military aid and counterinsurgency would be neatly brought home again by private U.S. enterprise. Freedom—and U.S. corporations abroad—would be protected. The differences between this policy and gunboat diplomacy or dollar diplomacy are matters of style. After Santo Domingo, there is not much difference in the Latin American mind between Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, or Johnson. At the receiving end, intervention is intervention is intervention.

The Brazilian coup was the biggest triumph for the hard policy. Gen. Castello Branco received instant recognition, extravagant praise, and quick Alliance aid. Brazilian humor is famous. The U.S. Ambassador has been proposed as a candidate in the future Brazilian elections under the slogan: "Avoid intermediaries: Lincoln Gordon for President."

If Castello Branco could cure the ills of Brazil with unconditional financial and technical aid from the United States, then, perhaps, the hard Alliance would find a way out. But his chances of success are negligible. It is more likely that as the pressures in favor of genuine radical reforms rise—and they will inexorably—local military repression and U.S. armed intervention will grow in scope and brutality. In addition to Brazil, many countries are under the tutelage of the Alliance-Pentagon-CIA axis. Primarily, they are the 14 countries that were corralled into the sad farce of giving retroactive legality in the OAS to the invasion of the Dominican Republic.

To believe that the pressures for reform in Latin America are created by Communist activities is childish. The turbulence that pervades the politics of most of the Latin American countries stems from the prevalence of ancient and rigid social conditions and institutions inimical to economic development and social change. As long as a handful of men own almost all the land, and a few foreign corporations control the mineral wealth, the public utilities and plantations, Latin America will be torn by violence and instability. The Communists are not responsible for these conditions; they only exploit them to their own advantage. Mr. Mann should have learned this basic lesson while he was Ambassador to Mexico.

Ironically, Juan Bosch is one of the few Latin Americans who understand and value the great democratic tradition which De Tocqueville admired; the tradition of which F.D.R. and his New Deal form part. The way Juan Bosch has been treated and the clumsy invasion of the Dominican Republic have created more hatred toward the United States in Latin America than the combined anticolonial propaganda of China and Russia.

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## U.S. ASIAN POLICY SCORED AT RALLY

Morse, at Garden, Warns of  
'Abyss of Total War'

By RAYMOND DANIELL

United States policy in Vietnam was assailed last night by speakers at a rally in Madison Square Garden organized by the National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy.

Senator Wayne Morse, a Democrat of Oregon, who has long been critical of President Johnson's policy, said in a speech prepared for the rally that Administration policy was leading the United States to the "abyss of total war."

Before the rally, Senator Morse said at a news conference at the Dorset Hotel that the war in Asia could not be won and that in the end the United States would be "kicked out."

"There are doubts beginning to show at the grass roots about our policy there," he said, "and when the coffins begin coming home those doubts will grow."

The Socialist leader Norman Thomas and several civil rights leaders also spoke at the rally, which was supported by many liberal and pacifist organizations.

Tickets From \$1 to \$10

Ticket prices ranged from \$1 to \$10. Voluntary subscriptions provided the \$1,500 down payment for reserving the Garden. A spokesman for Sane said that the use of the Garden cost \$8,000 more and that the cost of services added \$3,000 more.

Sane seeks to raise \$250,000 this year to press its cause.

Many organizations prominent in civil rights and pacifist causes were listed among the supporters of Sane. Among them were the American Ethical Union, some Reform Democratic clubs, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, the Student Peace Union, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and church and university organizations.

A listing of scheduled speakers included Dr. Benjamin Spock, the child-care specialist; Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science history at the University of Chicago; Bayard Rustin, organizer of the 1963 Civil Rights March on Washington; Coretta Scott King, wife of the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., wife of the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

### Decries 'Consensus'

Senator Morse, who has assailed President Johnson's efforts to govern by "consensus," said in his prepared address that the consensus on Vietnam "is not a consensus of our people, nor even the community of nations; it is a consensus among the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency and the White House staff."

He said the "same ominous signs of an imposed and enforced" national unity that characterized much of Europe before World War I were in evidence in the United States today.

He castigated the record of the Departments of Defense and State, the C.I.A. and the White House staff, which, he said, have "been wrong not once but consistently over the last 11 years" on Vietnam. In the last four years, he said, that record has grown worse.

"With each mission to Vietnam," he declared, "we were told by the Secretary of Defense or of State that one more increment of American funds or helicopters or advisers would be the one that would put the effort over."

He continued: "I predict that they will continue to widen and expand this war unless the American people rise up to stop them."

Senator Morse asserted that the United States had not brought peace to South Vietnam nor halted the advance of Communism there, but, by its tactics, was "driving Asians by the millions into the arms of Communism."

Contending that the United States was being dragged into a "hopeless war," the Senator urged that the United States seek an international police force, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or the United Nations or with an African-Asian peace force as suggested by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India.

Professor Morgenthau quoted Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as having said that the issue was not whether the United States should continue its role in South Vietnam but whether it should continue to try "to halt Communist expansion in Asia."

The United States, Professor Morgenthau declared, could no more contain Communism in Asia by arming South Vietnam and Thailand than Communist China could contain United States power in North America by arming Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

He offered a program for ending the conflict, including a proposed 12-point program for political and cultural predominance of Communist China on the Asian mainland.

Mr. Thomas, in his speech, said that attempts to police the world against ideas—Communist or otherwise—and intervention in other people's wars would force "a divided Communism" to close ranks.