

perts that Premier Khrushchev would never risk installing Russian missiles in Cuba appears to have influenced most of the intelligence judgments that reached the President in that period. The awakening led to a concentration on missiles only, that caused us to downgrade the significance of the small Soviet force that had been sent to Cuba.

Today, the basic differences between the President and his critics concern the size of this force, and whether it is being reduced. Both Mr. Kennedy and Senator KEATING are getting their information from the same source—Government intelligence agencies. But, because Cuba has become a partisan issue, it is not easy for the top level estimates that reach the President to remain completely objective. The men who provide these judgments are appointees of the President's own administration. Given the present centralization of intelligence activities, it is especially hard for minority views, which might happen to be right, to reach the top.

This problem will not be helped by the appointment of Clark M. Clifford to replace Dr. James R. Killian, chairman of the board of directors of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The board was established as a result of a recommendation of the Hoover Commission in 1956 to monitor continuously CIA and other intelligence activities.

Mr. Clifford has a brilliant mind, but, as a long-time troubleshooter for the Democratic Party, he is inextricably associated with partisan politics. He replaces a skilled and objective scientist-administrator. The selection is at best unfortunate. It is bound to give the impression that our intelligence activities will now be monitored—not by a chairman who is an expert in the field—but by one who is essentially a politician.

Cloudy Intelligence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CLARK MacGREGOR

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 30, 1963

Mr. MacGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, a great many Members of Congress, of the press, and a large segment of the general public have often questioned the discrepancies between various figures and claims made by the administration and certain Members of Congress in regard to the Cuban situation. The most recent example of these differences is whether the Russians are actually withdrawing troops from Cuba or are merely rotating them, bringing in new men as they take out some already there. Perhaps the following editorial from the April 29 New York Times gives at least part of the answer:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 29, 1963]

Cloudy Intelligence

Are U.S. intelligence estimates being colored or distorted by policy?

The differences between President Kennedy and Senator KEATING about how many Soviet troops in Cuba could reflect a serious weakness in the elaborate apparatus the Nation maintains for collecting and evaluating the data on which policy must be built.

The problem is not new to this administration, nor did it originate with the Cuban crisis. But when intelligence becomes, as it has become today, the very cornerstone of policy, an almost superhuman objectivity is required on the part of our intelligence chiefs to avoid estimates and evaluations tailored to policy. Intelligence, if it is to be worth anything, must be completely non-partisan.

A Senate subcommittee, which has been quietly investigating the Cuban crisis, has already found considerable evidence that the intelligence estimates of last summer and fall were keyed to the "It can't happen here" atmosphere, then prevalent in Washington. The belief of all the Nation's top Soviet ex-