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SENATOR McCARTHY QUIZZED ON CIA CONTROL**MODERATOR:** Cokie Boggs**GUEST :** Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minn.)**PANELISTS:** Students from Italy, Soviet Union, Korea, Israel

MODERATOR: (Addressing Korean student) Do you have such an intelligence agency in your country, and is it controlled?

KOREAN STUDENT: Yes, we do have an agency like that. As a matter of fact, it has the same name--the CIA--and as you know, in 1963, we had this change-over from military rule to civilian rule, to elections, and we're in the process of broadening these sort of democratic bases...but we haven't come up with the question of more control, stricter control, greater control by civilian government on this agency. The agency is responsible to the president directly, but we may in the long run face the same problem, but I don't really have an opinion on that.

ITALIAN STUDENT: I think I would not agree on that, because, you know, the CIA is some sort of very peculiar thing. It's a tool, I should say, in the hands of the government, so it's up to the government to make CIA or something like that work. Now, for the Congress, to check on this very delicate instrument, I think would be complicated. You know, we have an old saying in my country; "Too many cooks spoil the food." And this is my point of view, I think.

ISRAELI STUDENT: Before the Senator answers this question, I would like to raise another question, because we in Israel have something similar to the CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, but it's controlled by the Prime Minister, and by the government, directly, and I therefore would like to ask the Senator, don't you think that a control, a parliamentary control on the CIA, on every intelligence agency, could affect the efficiency of operation and information of the agency?

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SENATOR McCARTHY: Any more questions before I answer that? (LAUGHTER) Well, I think that we have to make a number of distinctions--first of all, the difference between the ministerial system, the cabinet system of government, and the kind of government we have. In theory, at least, when you have a cabinet system, the ministers are the agents of the parliament, and consequently are responsible to the parliament. We don't have that system here; we really have a shared responsibility, and supposedly, therefore, the authority ought to be shared in the conduct of foreign policy and all of the other responsibilities of government. With reference, therefore, to the CIA, the question of how efficient it is really cannot be left only to the executive branch of the government, since Congress is also held responsible for efficiency and for the quality of the administration of government policy.

The Central Intelligence Agency is more than that, however. It's a large organization. It gathers information; it's consulted by the military and also by the State Department. It therefore is a force in helping to formulate policy. I don't say it makes policy; you get into the question of what the word make means, so on the two counts, one, if it's bearing as a force, developing and influencing foreign policy, and the other, its operation as an agent of government in the field of foreign policy; both of these, I think, make it subject to some kind of Congressional control and some kind of Congressional direction. It would be almost as logical to say the State Department should not be subject to any kind of Congressional control or supervision because it's an instrument of the President, of the executive branch of the government. It really isn't; it's also an instrument or an agent of the Congress.

The difficulty we have, I think, is--right now, particularly--is in working out procedures and techniques whereby responsibility for decision as well as for execution can be shared between the President and the Congress, especially in the field of foreign policy and in the field of foreign intelligence.

QUESTION: What do you mean by some kind of control?

McCARTHY: Well, what we're proposing in this resolution is the --that this agency, which now does report to the Armed Services Committee--it accepts that it has a responsibility to report to the Armed Services Committee; the argument could be made that it ought not to report to that committee of the Congress, if this is dangerous to its operations and to its security.

When it was set up after the war, it was primarily an agency that operated--it grew out of military intelligence during the war, and almost 20 years since that time, it's become a very different kind of agency, one which is less important to military operations than it was, and much more important and significant to foreign policy and the conduct of foreign affairs. Consequently, the early practice of having it report to the Armed Services

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Committee, I think, will now have to be broadened so that a limited measure of Congressional control can be exercised over it through the device of a committee which includes members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

QUESTION: But, with all respect, of course, due to the CIA, aren't you overrating this agency? In other words, you're putting the CIA on the same level as the State Department....In my view, CIA should be just a tool in the hands of the State Department and the White House, and so on, of the government--just a tool, you know.

McCARTHY: Perhaps it should be, but there's good reason to think that it's more than a tool, that it's become a positive force especially in some of these smaller countries, and in the areas of somewhat unstable governments. The theoretical danger is one which I think everyone will understand. It's not just a question of whether it becomes independent of executive control. It might very well be controlled by the executive, and everyone says it is controlled by the executive; I don't mean to dispute that. Even if it were, it would not satisfy, it seems to me, the demands of our constitution for a sharing of power with Congress. You might have a situation in which, fully controlled by the President, an agency of this kind could carry on foreign policy activities which were, we'd say, unconstitutional or at least unconstitutional in the sense that the kind of Congressional approval that should be--effective Senate approval in the field of foreign policy, had in no way been obtained or in no way been indicated.

QUESTION: Senator, what is the opinion of the President on the subject?

McCARTHY: Well, I don't know. We haven't had any public statement by the President. The general record has been that men who later became president who were in the Congress were generally in favor of exercising some kind of Congressional control over this agency and over other agencies, but that once they were elected to the presidency, they seem to have a slightly different view of how the agency should be handled.

QUESTION: Senator, since you have offered that resolution, what do you think are the prospects for this resolution to pass through the Senate, on a roll call?

McCARTHY: Well, it's a little bit difficult to say. I'd like to--I am the author--I don't think I'll really be the author of what will come out of the Foreign Relations Committee. I've taken the initiative in trying to get action on this matter in this session of Congress, but the proposal to have some kind of Congressional control over the Central Intelligence Agency has really been before the Congress in some form since at least 1955.

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The Hoover Commission Report of that year recommended a joint committee to exercise supervision over the agency, and their interest was in it primarily as an intelligence gathering, to some extent, and operating agency, but the involvement in foreign policy has really grown tremendously since that time, I think, and this was the motivation for the resolution which I introduced this year. I don't know how it would go if we would have a vote. I would think that we would have a relatively close vote. Whether it would be approved or not, I'm not sure. We haven't really taken a count yet. It's not considered in good form to go around counting votes too far in advance of the actual taking of a vote.

QUESTION: But how about the efficiency this congressional control will have?

McCARTHY: Oh, it depends on how you control it. We don't have in mind any kind of day-to-day supervision. Those who oppose our resolution give you the picture of the Central Intelligence Agency being followed by a member of Congress every step of the way (LAUGHTER) and they're getting in the way of him and fouling up his activities. This is not what we had in mind, but if there's a question of--well, let's take something like the--Guatemala, for example. Supposedly the Central Intelligence Agency, nearly ten years ago, was involved in the overthrow of what was pretty close to a legitimately elected government. Well, here's a policy question on which really the President doesn't have authority to act--overthrowing a government.

Now whether, if we'd had control over the agency, we could have asked some questions, say, "What's this operation all about? You don't have to tell us who your sources are and whether you're supplying guns and this sort of thing, but is this a policy decision to overthrow this government? If it is, we are--as representatives of the Foreign Relations Committee at least ought to know about it.

QUESTION: Why (attack?) the government?

McCARTHY: Why do we what?

QUESTION: Why the government?

McCARTHY: Which government?

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: I can imagine, Senator, that the CIA is not happy with your proposals.

McCARTHY: I haven't heard whether they're for it or against it. The indications are that the men who are opposing it are saying about the same things that they said in opposition to a somewhat similar resolution ten years ago. I think the CIA has

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changed significantly since then, but the arguments against controlling it that are being made today are the same arguments that were being made back in 1956, and I would say that the men who have argued against it--the speeches they have given sounded as though they were their own.

QUESTION: Senator McCarthy has talked about the foreign policy making role of the Congress and the importance of Congress in foreign policy making. Can you tell us in this regard what kind of coverage is given in Korea to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and what the reaction to them has been?

KOREAN STUDENT: Well, I must say there was a great deal of interest in the hearings, at least where I come from. Our newspapers have very limited space, but my stories and the stories of my colleagues have been given very good press. That shows--of course in my country, which is in a very special position regarding the Viet Nam problem--we have troops there--but anyway, I think the hearings impressed many observers in my country and countries of Asia about the depth of, shall I say, democracy or the extent that dissenting opinion can be expressed in this country. Maybe it's not very strange to you, but to many people in many other parts of the world it's very important.

But on the other hand, we Koreans have the worries about the future of the Viet Nam war, and we're a little bit puzzled about how to go about engaging (SIC) the extent of opposition in America to the government policy.

STUDENT: I fully agree with you that this is a very good lesson in democracy, but even after, and I think our papers in Israel carried large coverage on this subject, on the hearings, especially on foreign aid things, because we are clients, but even after the hearings I think that the American people are not enough informed about the subject of Viet Nam, foreign aid, and so on and so on.

STUDENT: I agree on that perfectly, but I must tell you another thing. This is a very good lesson in democracy, but it's a dangerous one in a way. First of all, I don't think Americans got very well informed after these hearings--they got mixed up even more, I should say--and Europeans got mixed up also. You know, here you have real freedom in this country and we don't have such freedom in Europe, but we have a freedom which is our (own?) one. We also are going to have freedom in the future but not so far. We are free but not as free as you are in this country. So any sign of dissent, of opposition, is understood in European terms. For instant, this Fulbright hearings, this sharp statement against government policy, this demonstration, they have been interpreted in Europe because they have been interpreted in a European way, and in Europe something like that would be something, I should say, revolutionary, you know. So Europeans are almost convinced that the people of the United States are not following this Johnson

in Viet Nam, as far as Viet Nam policy is concerned, and they are wrong on that.

So, in this way, as far as the other countries are concerned, this hearing I believe has been a good lesson in democracy but it hasn't been very much help as far as it goes.

STUDENT: Do you think this really is a danger? Do you think the lack of consensus these hearings might have shown have postponed negotiations in any way?

STUDENT: Well, speaking of the Fulbright hearings, I don't really believe the hearings had any important effect on the policy of the government in Viet Nam. It was a source of information for the American public, what was going on in Viet Nam, and the question Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, as far as their effect on the White House, I'm not really sure it really had any effect. The war is going on along the line it started and continues. I don't see any proposals by the Senators being taken into consideration in Viet Nam and taken into consideration by the White House.

Speaking about Viet Nam, I want to emphasize one point -- I was really surprised and couldn't understand how the local press-- American press--when covering the Viet Nam situation, they kind of overlooked very important statements made during the 23rd Party Congress in Moscow. And, as you probably know, the Party Congress accepted their resolution and statement on Viet Nam, which says that any escalation in Viet Nam will lead to increase of help from countries to Viet Nam. And then again, what I want to say we are thinking about the commitment of this country to Southern Viet Nam, but I don't think that one should forget that others have their commitments too and they are going to keep their commitments, not drop them, and if one doesn't take it into consideration, you could bring the confrontation of the countries, the confrontation of commitments, which will certainly mean the confrontation of the two countries, which we are trying to escape nowadays--the confrontation of our country with the United States. No one wants it--no one wants it in this country, and no one wants it in my country. I think the policy should be to avoid a confrontation.

McCARTHY: Well, I think the results of the hearings were probably somewhat mixed. I think maybe the American people were somewhat more confused, but that doesn't mean they were less well informed after the hearings. There's a tendency, I think, to over-simplify the case before we held the hearings, and the fact that people were confused--when you're talking about something like Viet Nam--may mean they have a more objective basis upon which to pass judgment than they had before you held the hearings, when they think they know what's going on, when they think there are simple answers.

So I thought the hearings were justified in this particular kind of war, when we're calling upon the American people for a very deep and highly significant kind of moral commitment to this war,

but the kind of intellectual support of that, in terms of a factual basis or reasoned judgment on how it's going to come out, lagged far behind the commitment we were calling upon them to make. This was not true in World War II--in fact, the judgment ran ahead of the commitment there--we realized what we had to do and this was true in the Korean War as well.

So an effort to close the gap or at least have the people of the country realize what great uncertainty there was in high circles, what great confusion there was--it seems to me does not do a disservice to the process of democracy, and the fact that Democrats have been the critics, again I think is not fully understood by people with Cabinet systems, where they accept that you have an opposition party within the party in power. We're not really constructed quite that way. The Senate has a responsibility which is quite independent, really, of its identification with a political party.

Now I suppose that if the Republicans had been critical of our foreign policy in Viet Nam, the Democrats would have stood back and said, well, the criticism is being made, and so we may have to defend our administration, but the Republicans--what might be the opposition party--have really been almost more for the Vietnamese war than the President himself, and consequently, the problem of raising questions and creating a kind of opposition, is nothing else but requiring the administration to justify its actions. And this we did in the hearings, setting up, I think, if you could, an occasional guidepost and say if you do extend the war, at least every time you go by these points that we've laid out, you have to bow in our direction. Give us some explanation as to why you resume bombing, or why you escalate, or why you may change the qualitative character of the war. We did that, I think. I would agree they've gone by pretty fast, without much hesitation.

And the third thing I think the hearings did do were to open some possible courses of action for the administration -- what are your alternatives? Well, it's not an alternative, really--it's not that kind of a simple question--do this and it's all over. But the possibility of negotiation with the Viet Cong--this was the question raised in the hearings. Well, the administration would say this was not a realistic proposal, and perhaps not. The United Nations effort, the possibility of using the Gavin approach of limiting the number of people committed and restricting the war. All of these were possible courses of action that were--at least it was indicated to the administration that if they were to do any of these things, that they would have some strong support in the Congress--they would not be all alone if they took the initiative--that they would not be marching up the hill without anybody following.

So I think these three good things, potentially good things, did come out of the hearings so far as they've gone.

STUDENT: But the United States is asking for support from abroad, from NATO allies, from French nation, and so on, and these hearings didn't help very much in this direction.

McCARTHY: Well, perhaps not, but I'd like to think that the foreign countries, if they were to join us, would join us with a reasonably objective understanding of what was involved--in the same way that I think we should undertake to have the people in this country understand, if they wish to pursue the war, if they wish to support it, the confusion and the uncertainty and the very questionable aspects about success.

STUDENT: You mentioned about the commitments of the United States in Viet Nam. It would be interesting to know if the Viet Nam war is the real touchstone for fulfilling American commitments all over the world, especially in the Middle East -- for instance, in Berlin. I'm really confused. I'm not convinced yet.

STUDENT: The same thing goes in the case of certain parts of Asia, like Korea.

McCARTHY: I suppose you have to keep proving yourselves every six months or so. Some of the people in Asia would have doubts, and the Europeans will have doubts, the French say they have doubts now. I think the record is quite good. This is a rather clear indication of our willingness to make a rather great effort to honor even what was a questionable commitment on our part. We were not the only ones who signed up with reference to Viet Nam--we're not the primary signatories in the area.

Certainly the commitment in Korea--the position we've taken--we haven't been tested in Europe, I suppose, but as far as you can expect people to respond to a promise and to a commitment in a treaty, why we seem to have stood pretty well there. As I say, you're going to have doubts -- like those Kafka stories, no matter how secure things look, if you're just quiet you can always hear a scratching sound somewhere, you know.

STUDENT: You say these are all similar commitments?

McCARTHY: Well, I think that some of our commitments are even more binding than the commitment that we had in Viet Nam, and here was a case where you had a rather thin commitment, and we responded very strongly, and the effort we're making there is very strong -- not all comparable to the kind we have in Korea or the kind of commitment we made to the countries of Western Europe, and I say even to Israel. I don't think there's a problem there of our not honoring our obligations and our commitments.

STUDENT: The Senator has referred to our treaty commitments in Viet Nam. There has been a lot of discussion as to whether SEATO is a treaty that calls for this kind of action. Do you think that the regional pacts are as strong now as they were a few years

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and that the Warsaw Pact and NATO are beginning to fall apart and disintegrate, leaving the world with two great powers opposed to each other?

STUDENT: Well, to the second part of your question, are the Warsaw Pact and NATO, from what I know of being in this country and from the American press, I know very well that NATO is getting apart, and as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, there have been very contradictory reports in the press, about the statements of President (Johnson)--they've been rejected, denied, and there is no clear picture of it.

And as far as the first part of your question, about the regional treaties, it's my opinion that the world would benefit if all the treaties were abolished, liquidated -- that's the policy of my government, and the policy supported by my government for quite awhile -- and I think we can best be at peace without any pacts and treaties than with them.

McCARTHY: In regard to that proposal, I have on here that we ought to have some kind of policy for getting rid of statues around Washington that no longer have any meaning; we might be able to do this on a kind of worldwide basis to get rid of statues and also treaties that our outmoded -- clear the decks every now and then and start over again.

STUDENT: Just a dream, Senator, we cannot do it right now.

MODERATOR: In a country like Israel, that has not been aligned with either bloc, do you find now that there is more a spirit of detente, that foreign policy is more flexible in your country?

STUDENT: American foreign policy?

MODERATOR: No, that you can deal more easily with every other country.

STUDENT: To a degree, I think. You know Israel does not belong to the non-aligned countries, and she's regarded as a Western country, but I think after the Tashkent conference, Israel seeks to apply the Tashkent spirit to the Arab-Israel dispute.

MODERATOR: On that hopeful note, we'll have to close the discussion.