sales have been running at about $98 million annually, although congressional action will reduce this year's total.

As the program's backers point out, military aid is only 7 per cent of all U.S. aid to Latin America. It also accounts for only 7 per cent of Latin America's total annual expenditures for defense purposes.

Three-fourths of U.S. military aid is for acquiring arms and equipment. This is subject to a statutory ceiling in foreign-aid legislation. The ceiling recently was cut by Congress from $85 million to $75 million.

Transfers of military hardware come through cash and credit sales and grants. The grant program covers transport vehicles, helicopters, spare parts and communications equipment, but no tanks, fighter planes, artillery or combat vessels.

The remaining aid funds are used for training and miscellaneous functions. A small portion (about $4 million a year) provides support for Civic Action—the highly publicized program of military participation in such national development projects as building roads and rural schools.

EMPHASIS ON SECURITY

The overwhelming emphasis in equipment grants and training is on internal security. Less than a decade ago the Defense Department insisted that the greatest danger came from "submarine action in the Caribbean Sea and along the coast of Latin America." Since 1961, however, U.S. strategic thinking about Latin America has focused on guerrilla warfare.

The nerve center of U.S. military activity in Latin America is Gen. Porter's Southern Command, headquartered in the Panama Canal Zone.

Its functions include supervising the 43 military advisory groups scattered through 17 Latin countries (all but Mexico and Haiti). These missions, separate from the military attaches on each embassy staff, have a total strength of about 800 officers and enlisted men from all four services. They range in size from five men in Panama to well over 100 in Brazil, and they train soldiers in everything from driver education to riot control.

They are extremely well-heeled in comparison with their sister civilian agencies. In Brazil the military mission's representation allowance for entertaining is $17,900 a year. The Agency for International Development people in Brazil, who administer the largest single U.S. aid program in Latin America, have a total representation allowance of $7000. The U.S. Ambassador's similar allowance is about $6000.

The Southern Command also oversees a more advanced training program. Each year it enrolls more than 2000 Latin officers in U.S. military courses at levels going all the way up to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Inter-American Defense College in Washington.

The focal point of this program is the School of the Americas at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone. (The school's location apparently contradicts the 1903 treaty with Panama, which says U.S. troops should be stationed in the Zone solely to defend the Canal.)

FORTY-WEEK COURSES

Although the school's stress is on counter insurgency, its curriculum includes 23 different courses, some running for 40 weeks. All are taught in Spanish or Portuguese by U.S. military instructors. The faculty is heavily weighted with Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans and Cuban exiles.

More than 20,000 Latin military men have studied at the school, and a graduate normally commands respect among his fellow officers back home. The school counts so many important Latin officers as alumni (including the current Defense Ministers of Colombia and Bolivia) that it is known throughout Latin America as the *"escuela de golpes"* or coup school.

During the Dominican Republic civil war in 1965, School of the Americas graduates turned up in leadership spots on both sides. When the Argentine army took over the government in 1966, the colonel acting as spokesman for the coup leaders greeted American correspondents by remarking how much he had enjoyed his "year in Panama."

GREEN BERET UNIT

The image of glamor—and lightning rod of controversy—in the military assistance program is another organization at Fort Gulick. A neat row of barracks is headquarters for the 8th Special Forces-Special Action Force for Latin America, a unit of 800 Green Beret specialists in the art of guerrilla warfare.

The unit consists of 17 training teams that travel through Latin America at the request of Latin governments, supplementing the work of resident U.S. missions by offering special instruction in counterinsurgency. Since the unit was established in 1962, the Green Berets have operated in all 17 countries where the U.S. has advisory groups.

It was one of these teams—its 16 members making it the largest force ever sent into the field in Latin America—that trained the Bolivian troops who bagged the master guerrilla, Ernesto Che Guevara. In Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala, Green Beret advisers are given much of the credit for helping local military forces crush guerrilla movements.

Despite the successes attributed to the Special Forces, many U.S. diplomats view their presence in Latin America as a mixed blessing. They believe that the increasing publicity they get draws too much attention to U.S. relations with the Latin military and hardens the image of the U.S. as a partner of repressive forces.

COMPARED TO VIETNAM

Anti-American propaganda increasingly focuses on the Green Beret rather than its old standby, the less easily identifiable CIA agent, as the symbol of Washington's behind-the-scenes domination of Latin America. Even in the U.S., there are people who recall that the Vietnam war started out with Special Forces troops in an advisory role, and who are uneasy about their prominence on the Latin scene.

During the Bolivian guerrilla campaign last summer, the air was filled with vague reports of "thousands of Green Berets" flooding into the Andes. Actually, in the past year the number of U.S. troops in Bolivia has never exceeded 150, and these men never got anywhere near the fighting. Their activities were carefully confined to training and helping the Bolivians unsnarl their supply, communications and intelligence problems.

Similar roles hold in all the other Latin countries where the Special Forces operate. Because U.S. officials suspect the guerrillas want to force the U.S. into combat by killing some American advisers, U.S. troops are forbidden to accompany Latin army units on patrol in countries with insurgency problems.

In Guatemala city recently, Communist guerrillas did kill two U.S. officers in an evident attempt to stir up political trouble. The U.S. scrupulously avoided any direct response to the provocation.

IS SUPPRESSION ENCOURAGED?

Critics on both sides of the U.S. border argue that military assistance cannot avoid the danger of encouraging Latin armed forces to suppress all dissent in the name of internal security.

Nor are they reassured by the official Washington doctrine that everyone is on the same team and working toward the same goals. They point out that many military advisers view the U.S. role in Latin America in the simple terms expressed by one high-ranking officer: "Our job down here is to see that the Commies don't take over."

From there, it is but a short step to the idea, long dominant in right-wing Latin circles, that Latin America is not yet ready for democracy and needs guiding by a strong hand like the armed forces.

Anyone who has much contact with U.S. military personnel in Latin America becomes accustomed to remarks about how "Washington is awfully naive if it thinks it can make the Latins over in our image."

YOUNG OFFICERS

But the assistance program also includes a fair sprinkling of younger officers who recognize that the day is passed when the U.S. could maintain Latin America as a sphere of influence through its friendship with regional military chieftains.

Unlike those liberals who regard Latin military as an institution to be destroyed, these officers think the armed forces can make a real contribution to the region's future progress.

They support Civic Action and other plans to rechannel the military's power from politics to national development. By greatly expanding and accelerating this side of the assistance program, they think, the Latin armed forces gradually can be brought to accept the idea of civilian dominance.

GENERATION GAP

"There's no denying that the top layer of the Latin officer corps is set in its ways," says an officer with long Civic Action experience. "But that's less an institutional problem than the result of the generation gap.

"What must be done is to become much more selective in deciding who we're going to make an effort with—who we pick for the openings in our schools. We've got to concentrate on the younger, idealistic men who haven't had their thinking cast in concrete. And if we do, we could revolutionize the Latin military in a single generation."

There are signs that this sort of thinking may eventually bring about big changes in the military assistance program. The program's supporters talk less about the dangers of communism now and more about the democratizing influence of U.S. advisers on their Latin counterparts.

But emphasis on internal security continues to be a very real and conspicuous first principle of U.S. Latin American policy. As long as it does, Washington's close ties with the Latin military will continue to strike most Latins as looking suspiciously like the tail that wags the dog of U.S. devotion to the Alliance for Progress.

Marketing Committee Serves Public Interest

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 5, 1968

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, last year Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge established a National Marketing Advisory Committee. One objective was to help bring to bear upon the Nation's social and economic problems the best thinking and the full resources of this important private sector of national life. The first meeting of the Committee was held in Washington last month, and it is already apparent that we stand at the threshold of a new and productive era in Government-business-academic relations. This type of partnership approach is constantly stressed by President Johnson.

But while the armed forces are increasingly willing to take part in the modernization process, they see their role primarily in physical development—the building of roads and dams. In the more basic area of social reform, the military seems haunted by the fear that any radical change will lead to communism, as it did in Cuba.

In fact, many observers think the militarism that parallels the Alliance for Progress is largely a reaction to Fidel Castro. Latin military leaders recall how Castro lined Cuba's senior officers up against the executioner's wall. They recall also that Castro began as a moderate reformer and as a result they view all reform movements as a potential threat to their lives and institutions.

During the early 1960s, the military in most Latin countries forced hesitant or reluctant civilian governments to make the diplomatic break with Cuba. In all nine countries where a civilian government was recently ousted by coup, the armed forces gave the need to save the countries from communism as one of their main justifications.

The military does not seem in any hurry to relax this attitude. In only five countries—Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama—do armed forces have a tradition of submitting to civilian authority. Colombia, which a decade ago suffered under an oppressive military regime, also has shown signs of moving in the direction of constitutionalism.

Eight countries are ruled by outright military dictatorships. These range from such tiny political backwaters as Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti to the two largest countries of South America, Brazil and Argentina.

In the smaller countries, where there is little or no democratic tradition, the military rules pretty much in the "banana republic" style of past generations.

In Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Bolovia, the armed forces have decided that civilian leadership is corrupt and incompetent and that the military is the only institution capable of prodding the country toward industrial modernity. The result has been a combination of capitalism and social conservationism reminiscent of pre-World War II Germany, Japan and Italy.

As Prof. Lieuwen points out, these armed forces are "attempting revolutions from above" with the emphasis on economic change.

In Argentina and Brazil, they favor the business and landholding interests and put the burden of sacrifice on such low-income groups as trade unions and small farmers. The justification is that if the economic reforms are successful, the entire country ultimately will benefit.

While it will be a long time before the final returns are in, all three countries have shown some tentative success in combating deep-seated economic maladies.

Although these experiments, particularly in Brazil and Bolivia, have enjoyed the enthusiastic backing of Washington, the military leaders of all three countries have made only token efforts to implement the social reforms envisioned by the Alliance for Progress. They have been increasingly dictatorial, with political activity and dissent either suppressed outright, as in Argentina, or kept under tight control; as in Brazil and Bolivia.

Finally, there are five countries—Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic—where a civilian sits in the president's chair but where the military has the power to pull it out from under him. Here, the collisions between military attitudes and Alliance ideals are not as obvious, but they exist.

THE MODEL OF PERU

A typical example is offered by Peru, whose armed forces are frequently cited by U.S. advisers as a model for other Latin armies. At first glance, there seems to be much to emulate.

The Peruvian army is a lean, tough force that fought and won the last war on the South American continent (a 1942 dustup in which Peru decisively whipped Ecuador). More recently, the Peruvian armed forces have faced a challenge from Castroite guerrillas and wiped it out with a speed and precision unmatched by any of the other countries with an insurgent problem.

At the same time, the armed forces here have participated in an extensive and sophisticated nation-building program. Until recently, the army was the only active road-building agency in Peru. Its vocational training schools offer many young Peruvians their only chance to learn such trades as bricklaying or shoemaking. It runs literacy campaigns for the peasants.

In the jungles of Peru's Amazon interior, a squadron of gunboats (facetiously called "the Atlantic fleet") cruises the river tributaries bringing medical and dental care to remote outposts. The air force operates an airlift whose pontoon planes swoop down on the rivers to transport the sick.

The Peruvian military takes justifiable pride in these services. The result of this pride, however, is to bolster the military's image of itself as a sort of supreme court with the duty to act as arbiter between civilian politicians and, if necessary, to cast them aside and take over.

Twice within the last 20 years (from 1948 to 1956 and from 1962 to 1963), it has done so. The memory of those times causes every politician in Peru from President Fernando Belaunde Terry on down to regard the good will of the generals as their first rule of survival.

Thus, when the air force decided recently that it wanted to acquire a squadron of French supersonic Mirage jets, neither the vehement objections of the United States nor the shaky state of Peru's finances were able to prevent it from having its way.

Not a single voice was raised publicly to question the wisdom of the move or point out the problems, it would create for Belaunde's efforts to bolster the sagging economy, even though the jet purchase probably will cost Peru a badly needed U.S. loan.

Instead, Belaunde, who is regarded as one of the region's most articulate advocates of reform, led the bipartisan chorus applauding the purchase of the jets. The planes were needed, he explained with a straight face, to help further the armed forces' development work.

No one familiar with Latin American affairs is under any illusions about what happened in Peru. There are those who argue that this is the price that must be paid to protect Latin America from Castroism and give the Alliance for Progress time to work. But others wonder how much protection of this sort the Alliance can stand.

LATINS BLAME THE UNITED STATES FOR MILITARY COUPS—AID IS SUSPECT

(Second in a series)

(By John M. Goshko)

LIMA.—Brig. Gen. Vernon D. Walters is an affable, urbane man whose many talents include a remarkable facility with languages. At one time, he was well-known in Washington as President Eisenhower's favorite interpreter.

More recently, "Dick" Walters has had a reputation of a different sort. In Brazil, where he served as U.S. military attaché, political circles still whisper about how he allegedly prodded his old World War II comrade, the late Marshal Humberto Castello Branco, into leading the 1964 coup that brought Brazil under military rule.

Half a continent away, in the Bolivian capital of La Paz, similar stories are told about another former U.S. attaché, Air Force Col. Ed Fox. A flying instructor and drinking companion of Gen. Rene Barrientos Ortuno, he was regarded as one of the Air Force leader's intimates in the days before the coup that catapulted him into the Bolivian presidency.

The victim of that coup, exiled former President Victor Paz Estenssoro, still insists that Fox was behind his ouster. Among Bolivians with an awareness of politics, it is hard to find anyone who disagrees.

These stories are now part of Latin political folklore. Spokesmen for the U.S. Embassies in La Paz and Rio de Janeiro have grown hoarse in their denials.

Washington, while conceding that it was not unhappy to be rid of Brazil's leftist President Joao Goulart, insists that it gave no comfort to the forces that toppled him. Lincoln Gordon, U.S. Ambassador in Rio at the time, later told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Neither I nor other officials of the U.S. Government nor the Government in any way, shape or manner was involved . . ."

Still, U.S. officials admit that Walters did drop around to have breakfast with Castello Branco the morning after the coup and urged him to assume the presidency. During the ensuing three years, Walters, with his links to the Brazilian military leadership, was known to be one of the most important behind-the-scenes figures in the Embassy.

BOLIVIAN SITUATION

Denials of U.S. involvement in the Bolivian coup follow the same pattern—with the additional point that U.S. policy in 1964 aimed at keeping Paz Estenssoro in office. Yet there are former members of the U.S. mission in Bolivia, who, in private, hint at "contradictions" among the Embassy personnel at the time of the coup.

Both Walters and Fox are gone from the Latin scene. Argument about what they did or didn't do would now be academic—except for one thing. To most Latin Americans, the stories of their alleged extracurricular activities have the ring of truth.

So do the rumor-clouded reports of other U.S. military activities in such places as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras. More than six years of U.S. investment in the Alliance for Progress have been unable to rid Latins of their conviction that U.S. policy is made in the Pentagon.

For they are aware of the close collaboration between the U.S. and the powerful Latin armed forces, including those in most of the eight countries that live under military dictatorships. Why is there such collaboration?

SEE FEAR OF CASTRO

Latins believe the answer is fear of Fidel Castro. They feel U.S. policy is aimed less at furthering the Alliance than at keeping the Latin military establishment pro-U.S. anti-Communist.

U.S. officials insist that military and civilian goals are really two chips from the same block. A recent State Department pronouncement puts it this way:

"Basically we support the Alliance for Progress. But you can't separate the military from the far-larger area of economic and social change and improvement. The economy of a nation and the welfare of the people cannot progress in a climate of civil disturbance."

Gen. Robert W. Porter, head of the U.S. Southern Command, praises the Latin armed forces as an instrument for "change through evolutionary rather than revolutionary means."

In a recent Washington speech, Porter said Latin America threatens to become another Vietnam unless the U.S. helps armed forces there provide a shield against insurgency while the governments build a stable society.

This is the rationale on which officials base the equipment sales and training programs that make the U.S. the chief outside influence on the Latin armed forces. Grants and