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to the extent that their limited supplies of gold, dollars, and foreign exchange must be used for food, they cannot be used to purchase military or other equipment.

Our allies have long been engaged in extensive sales of wheat and other farm products to the Communist bloc, and, in fact, it would be foolish to halt the sales of our wheat when other countries can buy wheat from us today and then sell this flour to the Communists. In recent weeks Australia and NATO allies have agreed to sell 10 million to 15 million tons of wheat and wheat flour to the Communist bloc.

This transaction advertises to the world as nothing else could the success of free American agriculture. It demonstrates our willingness to relieve food shortages, to reduce tensions, and to improve relations with all countries. And it shows that peaceful agreements with the United States which serves the interests of both sides are a far more worthwhile course than a course of isolation and hostility.

For this Government to tell our grain traders that they cannot accept these offers, on the other hand, would accomplish little or nothing. The Soviets would continue to buy wheat and flour elsewhere, including wheat flour, from those nations which buy our wheat. Moreover, having for many years sold them farm products which are not in surplus, it would make no sense to refuse to sell those products on which we must otherwise pay the cost of storage. In short, this particular decision with respect to sales to the Soviet Union, which is not inconsistent with many smaller transactions over a long period of time, does not represent a new Soviet-American trade policy. That must await the settlement of many matters. But it does represent one more hopeful sign that a more peaceful world is both possible and beneficial to us all.

Q. Mr. President, do you have any misgivings about possible political repercussions from your decision?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I suppose there will be some who will disagree with this decision.

That is true about most decisions. But I have considered it very carefully and I think it is very much in the interest of the United States. As I said before, we have got 1 billion bushels of this in surplus, and American taxpayers are paying to keep it, and I think we can use the \$200 million or \$250 million of gold which will help our balance of payments. I think it is in our interest, particularly in view of the fact that the sales are being made by other countries.

[2.] Q. Mr. President, could you discuss some of the recent public accounts of CIA activities in South Viet Nam, particularly the stories or reports of how the CIA has undertaken certain independent operations, or independent of other elements of the American Government, that are in South Viet-Nam?

THE PRESIDENT. I must say I think the reports are wholly untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr. McCone sits in the National Security Council. I imagine I see him at least three or four times a week, ordinarily. We have worked very closely together in the National Security Council in the last 2 months attempting to meet the problems we faced in South Viet-Nam. I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last 9 months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. I know that the transfer of Mr. John Richardson, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises. But I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions.

So I think that while the CIA may have made mistakes, as we all do, on different occasions, and has had many successes which may go unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is unfair to charge them as they have

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been changed. I think they have done a good job.

Q. Mr. President, you are meeting tomorrow with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko under somewhat different conditions than you met a year ago. I am wondering if you would care to give us your assessment of the principal objective of your talk tomorrow with him?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, this continues to be an exchange of views on those matters which are at issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. In my speech before the General Assembly, I indicated those areas where the Soviet Union and the United States had disagreement. It is my hope that those disagreements will not lead to war. I am hopeful that what has happened in the last months will lessen that prospect. Really, what has happened since a year ago when I saw Mr. Gromyko will lessen the prospect of a military clash. But the differences go on. The systems are very different.

Mr. Khrushchev has said that there is no coexistence in the field of ideology. There are bound to be very severe matters which concern us on which the Soviet Union and the United States have very different views. As we don't want these disputes and frictions to escalate into military clashes, it is worthwhile to have consultations. The Secretary of State has been having them for several weeks, and I will see Mr. Gromyko this afternoon to just go over the ground which has already been laid by the Secretary of State.

Q. Mr. President, will you discuss with Mr. Gromyko the joint moon project proposal that you made before the U.N., and, if not, will that be pursued through some other channels?

THE PRESIDENT. We have received no response to our — to that proposal, which followed other proposals made on other occasions. As I said, our space program from the beginning has been oriented towards the peaceful use of space. That is the way the National Space Agency was set up. That is the position we have taken since my predecessor's administration. I said this sum-

mer that we were anxious to cooperate in the peaceful exploration of space, but to do so, of course, requires the breakdown of a good many barriers which still exist. It is our hope those barriers, which represent barriers of some hostility, some suspicion, secrecy, and the rest, will come down. If they came down, of course, it would be possible for us to cooperate. So far, as you know, the cooperation has been limited to some exchange of information on weather and other rather technical areas.

We have had no indication, in short, that the Soviet Union is disposed to enter into the kind of relationship which would make a joint exploration of space or to the moon possible. But I think it is important that the United States continue to emphasize its peaceful interest and its preparation to go quite far in attempting to end the barrier which has existed between the Communist world and the West and to attempt to bring, as much as we can, the Communist world into the free world of diversity which we seek. So the matter may come up. But I must say we have had no response which would indicate that they are going to take us up on it.

[4.] Q. Mr. President, in the reported agreement in principle between Russia and the United States to ban nuclear weapons from outer space, has the issue of verification come up in any way, and if so, sir, in what way?

THE PRESIDENT. No, there is not an agreement. The United States has stated it would not put weapons in outer space. We have no military use for doing so, and we would not do so. The Soviet Union has stated that it does not intend to. We are glad of that. There is no way we can verify that, but we are glad to hear the intention. We must recognize that there is no secure method of determining that someday they may not decide to do so. So we obviously have to take our own precautions. But we do not intend to, although we intend to protect our security, and we are glad to hear the Soviet Union does not intend to.

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investigator, I wonder whether you feel they are serving any useful purpose?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I wouldn't want—I haven't commented on the Senate procedures and I wouldn't now on this hearing or other hearings. That is a judgment for Senator McClellan and the committee. I do think that we shouldn't get a distorted idea from the hearings. I think—particularly as Columbus Day comes up I think there may be some feeling of some people that the name Valachi perhaps causes embarrassment to other American citizens. I don't think it should. These difficulties occur in a good many different racial groups, and I think that they ought to feel a good deal of pride in what they have done and not be concerned because a Valachi or an Irish name or some other name may occasionally get in trouble.

[11.] Q. Mr. President, Congressman Pucinski of Illinois has said to me, and I think he has proposed to Secretary Wirtz, that we should have three categories instead of two in our labor statistics, general statistics. He is proposing that we have employed, unemployed, and unemployables, because of their lack of skills. Would you agree with the Congressman that this would be helpful in highlighting the problem we have in employment and education?

THE PRESIDENT. I wouldn't want to put it in that kind of a category. I think I can see there might be some merit in trying to mark out those who are unemployed because of structural unemployment, those who are unemployed because of the seasonal nature of their work, those who are unemployed because of illiteracy or lack of motivation. I think all that information—we have a good deal of it—a good deal of technical information, but I don't think I would label anybody in the United States unemployable.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, how do you feel about Senator Gruening's proposal to set up a congressional committee as a watchdog over the CIA?

THE PRESIDENT. I think the present committees—there's one in both the House and Senate which maintains very close liaison

with the CIA—are best, considering the sensitive nature of the Central Intelligence Agency's work.

As you know, there is a congressional committee in the House, one in the Senate, composed of members of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee. They meet frequently with Mr. McCone. He also testifies before the Foreign Relations Committees of House and Senate and the general Armed Services Committee. And I think the Congress has through that organization the means of keeping a liaison with him.

In addition, I have an Advisory Council which was headed by Dr. Killian formerly, now Mr. Clark Clifford, which includes Jimmie Doolittle and others, and Robert Murphy, who also served as an advisory committee to me on the work of the intelligence community. I am well satisfied with the present arrangement.

[13.] Q. Sir, there seems to be some connection between the attempt of the State Department to discharge Mr. Otto Otepka, the Security Officer, there seems to be some connection between the fact that he gave much information to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee about various employees of the State Department—William Arthur Wickland and Walt W. Rostow and many others. Also Secretary Rusk has now put forth an order that employees of the State Department cannot talk or give information to this congressional committee. Isn't that a direct violation of law?

THE PRESIDENT. No, it isn't.

Q. That Government employees are allowed to give information to Members of Congress and to committees?

THE PRESIDENT. By what means? You mean secret dispatches?

Q. Well, any information. The law doesn't say what it will be. It says that any Government employee can give information to Members of Congress or to the committees.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, let me just say that the Secretary of State has been prepared to testify since August before the Internal

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Security Committee and discuss the case very completely.

Q. Well, but

THE PRESIDENT. Excuse me. There was a hearing scheduled for early September, but because of the Labor Day weekend that hearing did not take place. The Secretary of State stands ready; he is the responsible officer. Now the best thing to do is to give the Secretary of State a chance to explain the entire case, because in all frankness your analysis of it is not complete.

Q. Would you like to complete it, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I will be glad to have the Secretary of State talk to the Internal Security Committee about what it is that has caused action to be taken, administrative action within the Department of State, to be taken against the gentleman that you have named, the kind of actions he carried out, what the law said, how he met the law, how he didn't meet the law. This is all a matter which is going to be heard by the State Department board. Then it will be heard by the Civil Service Commission for review. Then it can be discussed in the courts.

In the meanwhile the Senate subcommittee can have all the information that it requires as to why Secretary Rusk has taken the action that he has. I think that is the best procedure. And I can assure you that I will examine the matter myself, when it comes time, as the Secretary of State will, who bears the responsibility, when it comes time to take any disciplinary action, if such a time does come.

[14.] Q. Mr. President, last spring there were selective price increases in steel, recently there have been price increases in steel. Are you concerned about these increases, sir, and do you feel you are going to take any action about them?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we are watching very carefully the rises which have taken place in certain industries. This country has avoided an inflationary spiral. We see no reason why there should be one now. The Wholesale Price Index has remained relatively constant for 5 years. We are con-

cerned that price increases in one or two basic areas may stimulate other price increases which will affect adversely our competitive position abroad, and therefore affect our balance of payments, therefore affect our national interest.

In addition, profits are at a record high now—they have never been higher in history. The whole year of 1963 looks very good and, therefore, we should be concerned also with reducing prices as well as increasing them. For the time being we are watching the matter with concern and will continue in the days ahead to do so.

[15.] Q. Mr. President, has there been an official ruling that giving commercial credits to Russia would not violate the Johnson act?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is correct, because it is not a government-to-government transaction.

Q. It is not a government-to-government?

THE PRESIDENT. It is not a government-to-government. These are private traders that will be involved and the credit will be granted by banks. In the case of Canada, as you know, the terms were 25 percent down, 25 percent then for every 6 months for a period of 18 months. But because the interest rate was of a certain figure, I think 4 7/8 percent, the Soviets decided to pay cash and, therefore, paid something like 80 percent cash. We will be dealing on the same matter with them on interest rates. Our interest rates would be slightly higher than the Canadian rate, possibly, under the private commercial system, and it may be that they will decide, therefore, to pay a very large percentage in cash.

But I have gotten a ruling from the Department of Justice that this does not contravene existing laws, particularly the Johnson act.

Q. Will the grain dealers take the risk, then?

THE PRESIDENT. The grain dealers will take the risk with the private banks.

[16.] Q. Mr. President, former head of the CIA Allen Dulles said in an interview

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in the Journal American today that reports of disputes between the CIA and the State Department and various branches of the government in South Viet-Nam have arisen because "of a lack of a clearcut operational policy in Washington." And he goes on to say that he thinks what is needed is less backbiting between U.S. agency officials. In view of the defense you just gave CIA, would you care to agree with the Dulles charge or contest it?

THE PRESIDENT. I would agree with the last part of it, that the agencies—as we all know, they are faced with a very difficult problem in South Viet-Nam, which we are all familiar with, both on the military and political side. Men have different views about what actions we should take, and they talk to members of the press, to all of you, in Saigon and here in Washington. But I must say that as of today, and I think this is particularly true since General Taylor and Secretary McNamara came back, I know of no disagreement between the State Department at the top, CIA at the top, Defense at the top, the White House and Ambassador Lodge, on what our basic policies will be and what steps we will take to implement it. Now if down below there is disagreement, I think in part it will be because they are not wholly informed of what actions we are taking. Some of them are necessarily confidential. But I think our policy, though we can't say what effect it is going to have, I think we are in agreement about what we ought to do. I would think that Saigon, and personnel in the various agencies, should support that policy, because that is the policy we are going to carry out for a while.

[17.] Q. Mr. President, if I understood you correctly on the wheat statement, you said the Russian people will know they are receiving American wheat.

THE PRESIDENT. That is correct.

Q. Is that by some agreement with the Soviet Union or how would that come about?

THE PRESIDENT. No, but we have our own means of informing the Soviet Union. As

you know, for many months the Voice of America has not been blocked, for example, and therefore we believe that we have adequate means to inform the Russian people of the arrangement.

In addition, I am not sure that there is any reason for the Russians themselves to keep it quiet as it is a commercial transaction. But in any case, we have the means to provide that knowledge.

[18.] Q. Mr. President, as the election year approaches, there is an unusual amount of political activity already, as the questions reflect. I wonder if you would give us your thinking as an experienced politician as to the prime assets of your administration next year, and the prime liabilities of your administration?

THE PRESIDENT. I think that you would not want to—as we only have a relatively short time, I think we ought to make a judgment on that in 1964. And I say that without any—a lot of these matters we will have to decide whether the United States is better off economically than it was before, and whether our position in the world has improved, and whether our prospects for peace are greater, and whether our defenses are stronger, and whether we are making progress at home and abroad. That is a matter which it seems to me will be argued very strongly in '64. For example, we can't make a judgment about the state of the economy in '64. I think if they pass our tax bill, we are going to be able to demonstrate a very successful, ebullient economy for a period of 4 years. If they do not, we will have a different situation.

I cannot tell what our relations will be in Southeast Asia a year from now. I know what results our policy is attempting to bring. But I think that result ought to be judged in the summer of '64 and the fall of '64, and I have hopes that the judgment will be that the economy is moving ahead, that the rate of growth has been almost \$100 billion, will have been from about \$500 billion to \$600 billion, that we are substantially stronger militarily, that the chances

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...ilities in South Viet-Nam, could it  
...our Government tends occasionally  
...locked into a policy or an attitude  
...then finds it difficult to alter or shift that

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think  
...case of South Viet-Nam we have been  
...with a government which is in con-  
...been in control for 10 years. In  
...we have felt for the last 2 years  
...the struggle against the Communists  
...ing better. Since June, however, the  
...with the Buddhists, we have been  
...about a deterioration, particularly  
...Siengen area, which hasn't been felt  
...in the outlying areas but may spread.  
...faced with the problem of wanting  
...the area against the Communists.  
...other hand, we have to deal with  
...government there. That produces a  
...of ambivalence in our efforts which  
...us to some criticism. We are using  
...influence to persuade the government  
...to take those steps which will win  
...support. That takes some time and we  
...patient, we must persist.

Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our  
...South Viet-Nam now?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think we think  
...would be helpful at this time. If you  
...your aid, it is possible you could have  
...effect upon the government structure  
... On the other hand, you might have  
...ation which could bring about a col-  
... Strongly in our mind is what  
... in the case of China at the end of  
... World War II, where China was lost, a weak  
...government became increasingly unable to  
...of events. We don't want that.

Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, have you had  
...reason to doubt this so-called "domino  
... that if South Viet-Nam falls, the  
... of southeast Asia will go behind it?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe  
...I think that the struggle is close enough.  
... is so large, looms so high just beyond  
... frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went,  
... would not only give them an improved  
... geographic position for a guerrilla assault on

Malaya, but would also give the impression  
that the wave of the future in southeast  
Asia was China and the Communists. So I  
believe it.

Mr. Brinkley: In the last 48 hours there  
have been a great many conflicting reports  
from there about what the CIA was up to.  
Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

THE PRESIDENT. No.

Mr. Huntley: Does the CIA tend to make  
its own policy? That seems to be the debate  
here.

THE PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent  
charge, but that isn't so. Mr. McCone, head  
of the CIA, sits in the National Security  
Council. We have had a number of meet-  
ings in the past few days about events in  
South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated  
in every one, and the CIA coordinates its  
efforts with the State Department and the  
Defense Department.

Mr. Brinkley: With so much of our pres-  
tige, money, so on, committed in South  
Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little  
more influence there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence.  
We have some influence, and we are at-  
tempting to carry it out. I think we don't—  
we can't expect these countries to do every  
thing the way we want to do them. They  
have their own interest, their own person-  
alities, their own tradition. We can't make  
everyone in our image, and there are a good  
many people who don't want to go in our  
image. In addition, we have ancient  
struggles between countries. In the case of  
India and Pakistan, we would like to have  
them settle Kashmir. That is our view of  
the best way to defend the subcontinent  
against communism. But that struggle be-  
tween India and Pakistan is more important  
to a good many people in that area than the  
struggle against the Communists. We  
would like to have Cambodia, Thailand,  
and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but  
there are ancient differences there. We  
can't make the world over, but we can in-  
fluence the world. The fact of the matter is

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a very close vote. So we would have to take a look at the details of the bill. But as of now—I looked at the statement of Congressman Albert, the Majority Leader. He indicated that he did not think any bill would pass this year.

[13.] Q. Sir, in El Paso there are 900 jobs in the smelter dependent on some executive action by you. And according to the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and management there, and even the Chamber of Commerce, there are plants in Denver, Colo., and California and other States that are also dependent on executive action that you might take in reallocating lead quotas from South Africa. I wonder how you think this affects domestic mining and what you plan to do about it?

THE PRESIDENT. I am not familiar with the matter. I will be glad to look into it, but I am not familiar with what the executive powers might be in regard to the importation of lead from South Africa, nor am I familiar with the exact quantity of lead we are receiving from South Africa. But I will be glad to look into it.

[14.] Q. Mr. President, there is still quite a lot of discussion in the Congress, Senator Lausche among others, on the increasing buildup militarily of Cuba. Is there anything you can say that would be in any way encouraging about the removal of the Russian troops there, or of the military situation in Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT. We do not have any evidence of increasing military buildup of the Soviet Union. I think in previous press conferences I have given an answer in response to the question of how many Russians were there and the comment in regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We have no evidence that there is an increasing military buildup. There has not been a satisfactory withdrawal as yet. That is quite true, but we have no evidence that there is a number coming in larger than going out.

Q. Pardon me, sir. I was thinking more in terms of military equipment going into Cuba.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I understand that. We have no evidence that there is an increasing military buildup in Cuba. The intelligence community has not found that.

[15.] Q. Mr. President, do you think Mr. Freeman's effectiveness as Secretary of Agriculture has been seriously impaired by the results of the wheat referendum?

THE PRESIDENT. No, no; I think he is doing very well. If you compare farm income this year—the last 2 years, 1961, 1962—it is higher than it has been any time since 1953 at the end of the Korean war. The farmers are better off today than they have been for 10 years. In addition, if we had not had the feed grain proposal, there would have been a much higher surplus and there would have been a much lower farm income.

So I think that while this is a very complicated problem, because automation has hit the farmers much harder than it has hit any other element in our community and their production is growing faster than our consumption, and therefore this has a tremendous effect on support prices and it has a tremendous effect, of course, upon the market price. Mr. Freeman is attempting to deal with them. My judgment is that he has met with some successes, because he has prevented us from spending a lot more money than we would have spent.

We are getting rid of our grain surplus. We are hopeful in 2 years it will be gone. I think we could have made important progress with our wheat surplus if we had been successful. It may be that with the experience we are going to have now, the farmers may agree with that next year. But the fact of the matter is in 1963 the farmers are better off than they have been for 10 years, and I think Mr. Freeman deserves some of the credit for it.

[16.] Q. Mr. President, there has been considerable discussion in the Far East that Chiang Kai-shek might be preparing to invade the mainland of China. How would our Government view an attempt of that sort?



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lems which we face and the exiles face with 200,000-250,000 people coming into our country. But a government in exile, I think that is a different question, and in my view it would be imprudent today and I don't think it would help the struggle.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, Senator Keating says that according to his information there has been no reduction in the number of Russian troops in Cuba. He said several thousand have left, several thousand have arrived there, with no change in the overall number since November. Would you care to comment?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I have already said that the best information we have from the intelligence community—and I rely upon the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as chairman of the intergovernmental intelligence community for the information which I have given publicly. We attempt to ask any Congressman or Senator who has information to the contrary for his sources so they can be evaluated. I have stated that our information was, I think the last time we met, that 4,000, we thought, left in March, and that no substantial number had come in this winter. There is some evidence that some have left in April, but not a large number. Of course, the equipment itself seems to still be there, however, so that I would think there has been some reduction this winter in the number of Russian personnel on the island. There has not been a substantial reduction in the equipment. There has been no evidence, however, of any substantial introduction.

It is not, in my opinion, a grave question as to whether there's 17,000, 15,000, 13,000. There are still important elements on the island, and there's still Soviet equipment on the island. So I don't think Senator Keating and I are debating a serious question, unless there is a challenge on one side or the other of good faith, and I am sure there isn't. It is our best information that 4,000 or 5,000 have left since January and that there has not been an equal number come in. In fact, much, much less—300 or

400 at the most. That's our best evidence and I repeat it as it has been gathered by our intelligence sources.

[13.] Q. Mr. President, you have rejected the Civil Rights Commission's proposal for the withholding of funds from the State of Mississippi in particular; yet Negroes and other persons in some Southern States are encountering violence and the withholding of some of their rights. Could you discuss with us what alternative steps the Federal Government might be able to take to bring some of these States into line with the law of the land?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, in every case that the Civil Rights Commission described, the United States Government has instituted legal action in order to provide a remedy. The Civil Rights Commission gave a number of cases, the dogs, of a denial of equal rights at the airline terminal, and all of the rest. We are attempting through the established procedures set out by the United States Constitution to give protection, through lawsuits, through decisions by the courts, and a good deal of action has been taken in all of these cases.

Now, it is very difficult. We had outrageous crime, from all accounts, in the State of Alabama, in the shooting of the postman who was attempting in a very traditional way to dramatize the plight of some of our citizens, being assassinated on the road. We have offered to the State of Alabama the services of the FBI in the solution of the crime. We do not have direct jurisdiction, but we are working with every legislative, legal tool at our command to insure protection for the rights of our citizens, and we shall continue to do so.

We shall also continue not to spend Federal funds in such a way as to encourage discrimination. What they were suggesting was something different, which was a blanket withdrawal of Federal expenditures from a State. I said that I didn't have the power to do so, and I do not think the President should be given that power, because it could be used in other ways

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a \$13½ billion tax cut without any reforms at all?

THE PRESIDENT. No, that isn't what I said. The program which we have sent up is the fairest and most equitable program, and the most fiscally responsible program. It provides for a combination of tax reduction and tax reform, and I think that a good many of the reforms make more equitable the tax reductions, make more equitable the burdens which the great mass of our taxpayers carry.

So that I think that the best program is the one we sent up which provides for \$13½ billion in tax reduction and \$3¼ billion revenue in tax reform. I think that's the best combination. What we will do will depend of course on what kind of a bill the Congress enacts, but my judgment is that they will enact a tax reduction bill which will include important elements of the reforms that we sent up.

[3.] Q. Mr. President, can you say whether the four Americans who died in the Bay of Pigs invasion were employees of the Government or the CIA?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would say that there are a good many Americans in the last 15 years who've served their country in a good many different ways, a good many abroad. Some of them have lost their lives. The United States Government has not felt that it was helpful to our interest and particularly in the struggle against this armed doctrine with which we are in struggle all around the world to go into great detail.

Let me say just this about these four men: They were serving their country. The flight that cost them their lives was a volunteer flight and that while because of the nature of their work it has not been a matter of public record, as it might be in the case of soldiers or sailors, I can say that they were serving their country.

And, as I say, their work was volunteer.

[4.] Q. Mr. President, on Monday Adrian Fisher of the Disarmament Agency said that even if the Russians were able to test underground indefinitely this would not alter the strategic military balance between

the United States and the Soviet Union. He said this was the executive assessment. Given that assessment, can you tell us what considerations then would prevent accepting a test ban on the terms set by Russia?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think, if I may say so—in my opinion that is not what is the administration's position. We have suggested that we would not accept a test ban which would permit indefinite underground testing by the Soviet Union. We would not accept a test ban which did not give us every assurance that we could detect a series of tests underground. That's the administration's position. We wouldn't submit a treaty which did not provide that assurance to the United States Senate. Nor would the Senate approve it.

Q. You believe that the present insistence on seven will have to be maintained—is that correct?

THE PRESIDENT. I believe that we will insist upon a test ban treaty which gives us assurance that if any country conducted a series of clandestine underground tests that that series would be detected.

Now we have not only the problem of the number of inspections, but the kinds of inspections, the circumstances under which the inspections would be carried out, so that we have a good deal of distance to go in securing an agreement with the Soviet Union. We've not been able to make any real progress on the question of the numbers, but I want to emphasize that this is only one phase of it. We have to also discuss what the area would be, in each test, what would be the conditions under which the inspectors would move in and out.

I want to say that we have made substantial progress, as a result of a good deal of work by the United States Government in recent years, in improving our detection capabilities. We have been able to determine that there are a substantially less number of earthquakes in the Soviet Union than we had formerly imagined. We have also been able to make far more discriminating our judgments from a long distance of what

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because the military threat to Europe is less than it has been in the past. In other words, whatever successes we may have had in reducing that military threat to Europe have brought with it in its wake other problems. And that is quite natural and inevitable. I prefer these problems to the other problems.

I think that in the summer of 1961—and of course this all may come again—we were calling up reserves in preparation for what might be a collision of major proportions between the Soviet Union and the United States in Berlin. I would say our present difficulties in Europe, while annoying in a sense, or burdensome, are not nearly as dangerous as they were then. As far as Cuba, it continues to be a problem. On the other hand there are advances in the solidarity of the hemisphere. I think we've made it clear that we will not permit Cuba to be an offensive military threat. I think that we are making some progress in other areas so that if you ask me whether this was the "winter of our discontent" I would say no. If you would ask me whether we were doing quite as well this winter as perhaps we were doing in the fall, I might say no, too.

[8.] Q. Mr. President, yesterday Governor Rockefeller charged that you had been appointing "segregationist judges" to the Federal bench in the South. Privately, some NAACP officials have said before that that they, too, had been critical of some of the judgeship appointments that you had made in the South, and that that had blunted a certain amount the aggressive stand that the executive branch had taken against segregation and race problems in the South. Will you comment on that?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I think that some of the judges may not have ruled as I would have ruled in their cases. In those cases there is always a possibility for an appeal. On the whole, I believe—and this is not true just of this administration, but the previous administration—I think that the men that have been appointed to judgeships in the South, sharing perhaps as they do the general outlook of the South, have done a remark-

able job in fulfilling their oath of office.

So I would not generalize. There may be cases where this is not true, and that is unfortunate. But I would say that on the whole it has been an extraordinary and very creditable record and I would say that of Federal judges generally that I have seen in the last—certainly in the last 10 years.

[9.] Q. Mr. President, of late some of your congressional critics have started to charge that your administration has been deliberately withholding important information on the Cuban situation. Among the claims that have been made is that your Central Intelligence chief, John McCone, actually knew before October 14th that the Soviets had planted offensive missiles in Cuba. Is there anything that you can say on this?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I've seen charges of all kinds. One day a distinguished Republican charges that it is all the CIA's fault, and the next day it is the Defense Department's fault, and the next day the CIA is being made a scapegoat by another distinguished leader. So that we could not possibly answer these charges, which come so fast and so furiously. Mr. Arends<sup>1</sup> said the other day that the testimony by the Air Force before the committee indicated that we knew all about this October 10th, even though General LeMay<sup>2</sup> made it very clear in the same testimony that the Air Force didn't have such information. So we are not in a position to answer these.

I think in hindsight, I suppose we could have always, perhaps, picked up these missile bases a few days earlier, but not very many days earlier, because the missiles didn't come in, at least in hindsight it now appears, until some time around the middle of September. The installations began at a later date. They were very fast, and I think the photography on the same areas, if we had

<sup>1</sup> Representative Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, ranking Republican member of the Armed Services Committee.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

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known that missiles were going in, 10 days before might not have picked up anything. The week before might have picked up something. Even the pictures taken October 14th were only obvious to the most sophisticated expert. And it was not until the pictures taken really the 16th and 17th that you had pictures that would be generally acceptable. So this was a very clandestine and fast operation. So I feel that the intelligence services did a very good job. And when you think that the job was done, the missiles were discovered, the bombers were removed, the bombers were removed, I don't think that anybody should feel that anything but a good job was done. I think we can always improve, and particularly with the advantage of hindsight. But I am satisfied with Mr. McCone, with the intelligence community and the Defense Department, and the job they did in those days particularly taken in totality.

[10.] Q. Mr. President, as you prepare for your visit to Costa Rica this month, there seems to be a position there among the Central American countries in Panama that the United States should take a more active leadership in attacking the problem of Cuba. I wonder if you could give us some of your thoughts about how you think this project should move along that you might find it possible to discuss with your colleagues there in San José?

THE PRESIDENT. Well one of the matters, of course, that is of interest to us is the question of the movement of people in and out who might be trained by the Communists in Cuba for guerrilla work or subversion in other parts of the hemisphere. This is an action which must be taken by each of the countries in Latin America. We are making proposals to them bilaterally. There has been an OAS Committee which has reported on the need for control. Now it's up to the Latin American countries, I would hope in common consultation as well as individually, to take those steps which will control the movement of people in and out. So we'll know who

they are, why they're going, what happens to them when they get there, and when they're coming out, and what happens to them when they come out. This is the kind of thing which each country finally has to do itself because it is part of the element of sovereignty that the control of movement is within the country of citizenship, but we are bringing this to the attention of the Latin American countries as perhaps one of the most important things we can do this winter. In addition there have been other things which have been done on trade, diplomatic recognition, and all the rest. But I think we've indicated very clearly that what we feel is the wisest policy is the isolation of communism in this hemisphere. We would hope that the countries of Latin America with us will participate actively in that program.

[11.] Q. Mr. President, recognizing the interdependence of Canada and the United States and of course conscious that the current anti-American flareup is about defense, are there any attempts being made to ease the irritations that are chronic, such as wheat surplus policy or the trade balance between the two countries?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, on the wheat we're in constant communication with the Canadians and other wheat producers, that our disposal under P.L. 480 would not disturb their normal markets. In the question of trade balances, we were able to be of some assistance to Canada during its difficulties some months ago, on the Canadian dollar, with other countries, and I would hope that the United States and Canada would be able to—having been joined together by nature—would be able to cooperate.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, for 20 years the Justice Department has assured Congress that it had evidence showing that Interhandel was a cover for the German firm of I. G. Farben, and therefore the seizure of General Aniline and Film in this country during World War II was justified.

Now in the past few days there has been an agreement between Justice and Inter-

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er, joined with the power of the North American Continent, would provide a source of strength in this decade which would tilt the balance of power to be maintained with us, and which would inevitably provide for an attraction to the underdeveloped world.

I think it would be a disaster if we should be divided. The forces in the world hostile to us are powerful. We went through a very difficult and dangerous experience this fall in Cuba. I have seen no real evidence that the policy of the Communist world towards us has basically changed. They still do not wish us well. We are not, as I said at the press conference, in the harbor. We are still in very stormy seas and I really think it would be a mistake for us to be divided at this time when unity is essential.

Now, the United States is prepared to make every effort to provide Western Europe with the strong voice, to join with Western Europe, to cooperate with it to work out mechanisms that permit Europe to speak with the power and the authority that Europe is entitled to.

What we would regard as a most serious danger would be, however, a division between the Atlantic, the division between the United States and Europe, the inability of Europe and the United States to coordinate their policies to deal with this great challenge. There is the danger to Europe and the danger to us. And that must not take place. If it does, it will have the most serious repercussions for the security of us and for Western Europe.

Q. Mr. President, at a time when the Secretary of State and his department have been coming in for some criticism, Senator Jackson's subcommittee on national security policy has said the Secretary should play a larger role in national security affairs. What do you think the Secretary of State's role should be? And do you think your view and his are the same on this matter?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, my view and his are

the same. The Secretary of State is the principal adviser to the President in the field of foreign policy. He is also the chief administrative officer of the Department of State which includes many responsibilities but whose central responsibility, of course, is to carry out the day-to-day business, as well as to set down the larger—and advise the President on the development of larger policies affecting our security.

Mr. Rusk and I are in very close communion on this matter. We are in agreement and I have the highest confidence in him, and I'm sure that—but I do think that Senator Jackson's suggestions deserve very careful study. One of our great problems is we deal with the whole world, and the Department of State is involved, the Treasury may be involved, Agriculture may be involved, Defense may be involved, and the intelligence community involved. The coordination of that in an effective way which finally comes to the White House is one of the complicated tasks of administering our Government in these days.

[5.] Q. Mr. President, what, if anything, do you propose to do about the continued presence in Cuba of the Soviet military personnel? Are you just going to let them stay there?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, we've been carrying out a good many policies in the last 4 months, since October. We were able to effect the withdrawal of the missiles. We were able to effect the withdrawal of the planes. There has been a reduction of 4,500 in the number of personnel. That was done by the United States being willing to move through a very dangerous period and the loss of an American soldier.

The continued presence of Soviet military personnel is of concern to us. I think the actions the United States has taken over the last 4 months indicate that we do not view the threat lightly.

Q. Mr. President, Defense Secretary McNamara apparently failed to convince some Republicans that all offensive weapons are

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withdrawn from Cuba. What more, if anything, do you believe the administration can do to convince some of the critics?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't know what more we can do. Mr. McNamara went to great length. As he pointed out, he exposed a good deal of information, and also he went further than under ordinary conditions we would have liked to have gone in telling our story.

Now, he has asked, and I endorse, and Mr. McCone has asked, that if anybody has any information in regard to the presence of offensive weapons systems or, indeed, the presence of any military force or weapons on the island of Cuba, I think they should make it available to General Carroll, who's in charge of intelligence for the Defense Department—if they would turn the information over.

Now, we get hundreds of reports every month, and we try to check them out. A good many of them are just rumors or reports, and even some of the Members of Congress who've come forward either refuse to say where they've heard the information or provide us with reports which do not have substance to them.

How I cannot carry out the policy of the United States Government on the question of obviously there were offensive missiles found in Cuba contrary to Mr. Khrushchev's phrase. It would raise the nuclear risks, much greater, in my opinion than we faced in October, and we faced great risks in October. But to take the United States into that path, to persuade our allies to come with us, to be and our allies as well as the security of the free world, as well as the peace of the free world, we have to move with hard intelligence. We have to know what we're talking about. We cannot base the tone of war and peace on a rumor or report, which is not substantiated, or which some member of Congress refuses to tell us where he heard it.

This issue involves very definitely war and peace. And when you talk about the presence of offensive weapons there, if they are

there, I think the Soviet Union is aware and Cuba is aware that we would be back where we were in October but in a far more concentrated way.

Now, if you're talking about that, and talking about the kinds of actions which would come from that, it seems to me we ought to know what we are talking about. Now it may be that there are hidden away some missiles. Nobody can prove, in the finite sense, that they're not there, or they might be brought in. But they're going to have to be created, and we continue complete surveillance. They have to be moved. They have to be put onto pads. They have to be prepared to fire. And quite obviously, if the Soviet Union did that, it would indicate that they were prepared to take the chance of another great encounter between us, with all the dangers.

Now, they had these missiles on the pads and they withdrew them, so the United States is not powerless in the area of Cuba, but I do think we should keep our heads and attempt to use the best information we have. We've got, I think, as Secretary McNamara demonstrated we're taking the greatest pains to try to be accurate, but we have to deal with facts as we know them, and not merely rumors and speculation.

Now, as I say, these things may all come about and we may find ourselves again with the Soviet Union toe to toe, but we ought to know what we have in our hands before we bring the United States, and ask our allies to come with us, to the brink again.

Q. Mr. President, what is the administration's position now about the on-site inspections that you were insisting upon in October? Is that now a dead letter?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that's right. Cuba did not agree to on-site inspection unless there was inspection of the United States, which we did not agree to, and part of that was the question of the no-invasion pledge, and the rest. So that there has been no on-site inspection and I don't expect to get any. And I don't expect that Cuba will agree to the kind of on-site inspection that would give

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us more assurances than we have at the present time through photography.

Q. Mr. President, because we depend so much on photo reconnaissance, what would be our position if the President of Cuba should forbid that and perhaps take a protest to the United Nations about what you call our daily scrutiny over their territory?

THE PRESIDENT. I would think we would deal with that situation when it comes up. This is a substitute, in a sense, for the kind of on-site inspection which we hope to get and which was proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations at the time of the October crisis. The United States cannot, given the history of last fall, where deception was used against us, we could not be expected to merely trust to words in regard to a potential buildup. So we may have to face that situation, but if we do, we'll face it.

[6.] Q. Mr. President, the New York newspaper—and Cleveland—strikes do not fall at the present time under the Taft-Hartley law, and the impact of the New York strike can be seen by the fact that New York's economy is off 8 percent in department store sales. Do you feel that there should be some sort of legislation to bring strikes of this nature which affect the economy within the Taft-Hartley law, or do you see a larger role for the Government in these types of strikes?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's hard to have a strike under the Taft-Hartley law or under any language. You mean, really, that the Government would be involving itself in hundreds of strikes, because a good many strikes which do not affect the national health and safety can affect local prosperity, so that you would find the Government heavily involved in dozens of strikes.

I must say that I think that I believe strongly in free, collective bargaining, but that free, collective bargaining must be responsible, and it must have some concern, it seems to me, for the welfare of all who may be directly and indirectly involved. I am not sure that that sense of responsibility has been particularly vigorously displayed in the

New York case, this trial by force. It may end up with two or three papers closing down, and the strike going on through the winter.

It would seem to me that reasonable men—there should be some understanding of the issues involved, and I don't think in my opinion that the bargaining there has been particularly responsible.

[7.] Q. Mr. President, Mr. Khrushchev apparently gave you some reason to believe last October that the Soviet military personnel were going to be withdrawn from Cuba. That hasn't happened. And my question is: Is there any official dialogue going on now to find out why the Russians are still there?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, as I say, there has been this reduction which we already described. In addition, as Mr. McNamara described yesterday, a picture of some evidence of some equipment being moved out. This is a continuing matter which is being discussed, obviously, with the Soviet Government, and we would expect that we would have clearer information as to the prospects as these days go on. But it has not been completed, and quite obviously in that sense is unfinished business.

Q. Mr. President, what chances do you think or do you believe there are of eliminating communism in Cuba within your term?

THE PRESIDENT. I couldn't make any prediction about the elimination. I am quite obviously hopeful that it can be eliminated, but we have to wait and see what happens. There are a lot of unpleasant situations in the world today. China is one. It's unfortunate that communism was permitted to come into Cuba. It has been a problem in the last 5 years. We don't know what's going to happen internally. There's no obviously easy solution as to how the Communist movement will be removed. One way, of course, would be by the Cubans themselves, though that's very difficult, given the police setup. The other way would be by external action. But that's war and we