PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE OPERATIONS AND THE CRISIS IN NATO

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in its study of the conduct of national security policy, the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations this week received from Prof. Richard E. Neustadt perceptive testimony on the problems of alliance operations and the crisis in NATO.

An eminent analyst of the Presidency, the author of "Presidential Power"—1960—and a consultant to President Kennedy and to President Johnson, Richard Neustadt is a professor of government at Harvard University and is associate dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration.

I believe Professor Neustadt's initial statement at our hearing on June 29 will be of special interest to all Senators, and also to other Government officials in Washington and to many private citizens. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

(By Richard E. Neustadt, professor of government at Harvard University, June 29, 1965)

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I take your invitation to appear today as a command which I obey with pleasure and appreciation. This is, for me, a rather sentimental occasion, having been associated with your work, from time to time, since the first "Jackson Subcommittee" got its start 6 years ago. Also, this occasion lets me emphasize again the gratitude of those of us who teach in universities for your assistance to our work these past 6 years.

Whether you know it or not—and I expect you do—the academic specialists in policy development lean heavily upon you as a source of reading matter for their students. Your subcommittee documents appear routinely in the reading lists and reference books assigned to college classes across the country. There is no comparable source of information and appraisal on the conduct of our Government in foreign affairs. So, on behalf of all of us who teach, and for our students: Thanks.

You have asked me to consider and to comment on ideas and issues raised in the initial memorandum of April 26, with which you opened this new phase of your continuing inquiry. So far as I am able I am happy to respond, but I am conscious of two limitations as I do so. Let me tell you what these are:

First, the memorandum bristles with questions, many of them basic, penetrating questions—any many of these penetrate beyond my range of observation or analysis. They impress me very much as the right questions to ask. But I do not impress myself at all as the man with the right answers. Indeed, I have no ready answers.

My professional preoccupation, as you know, has been what someone recently called "President watching"— to which, of late I've added as a hobby a bit of intermittent Prime Minister watching. But no one save a President or Premier really can be expert on the conduct of their offices. And not even a President knows half of what goes on beneath him and around him in our governmental world, to say nothing of other governments. As an observer—for the most part an observer from outside—I know a great deal less. So all I have to offer are some personal reflections drawn from limited observation.

Second, I appear here at a moment when our Government is struggling with the very sharp dilemmas of two complicated crisis operations overseas, while academic criticism of them both mounts higher than at any time I can remember since the regime of the late John Foster Dulles. But even though I come here with an academic title, I've no stomach for the role of critic-of-the-moment. Nothing I shall say here passes judgment on our current operations. I have enough experience in Government to know how much I do not know, from the outside, about the issues of Vietnam and the Dominican Republic as those present themselves to our decision-makers. And I have too much sympathy for men who bear the burdens of decision to allow myself the luxury of current criticism without current information.

So much for limitations. Now for your memorandum: I find in it two fresh conceptions which strike me as particularly worth pursuing. The first of these is what you have called operational feasibility. The second relates to alliance operations. Let me deal with each in turn.

OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY

Your memorandum states:

"Top policy officers tend to pay a great deal of attention to what is called political feasibility. They also need to give a great deal of attention to what we might call operational feasibility. Is the plan of action do-able, in terms of real men * * * given the realistic limitations of knowledge, resources, and organizations with which they must make do?"

The distinction you suggest here is important. Government decisions, action decisions, the decisions which accrete into what we call public policy, always involve weighing the desirable against the feasible. The public officer at every action-level asks himself not only what but also how, considering not only goals but also ways and means, and then he calculates his chances to secure the means. Consciously or not, the man in public office has to make that calculation every time he contemplates an action. (The academic man does not, which frequently accounts for differences between them.)

And it is fair, I think, to say what your statement implies, namely that our public officers have generally inclined to make the calculation without bothering their heads too much about administrative means. Generally speaking, they have tended to assume that if they could secure political assent, they could invent, or improvise, or somehow force the requisite responses from the men who actually would do the work, in Government and out. The great machines of management would surely manage somehow, if the necessary sectors of the public, or the press, or Congress, or the Cabinet, as the case might be, were acquiescent.

That assumption probably has roots deep in our history: Americans have often improvised the means to do what nobody had done before. We invented federalism, won the west, conducted civil war on an unprecedented scale, coped with immigration, mastered mass production, built the Panama Canal.

And since the start of World War II, when we began to fashion our defense and our diplomacy in modern terms, we frequently have followed the assumption in those spheres as well, with consequences which appear to prove it out. Witness Franklin Roosevelt's war-production targets, and lend lease, or Harry Truman's aid to Greece, the Marshall plan, the Berlin airlift, NATO. In instances like these, a calculation of administrative prospects from the standpoint of existing capabilities or past performance would have been depressing, to say the least. Happily, the men who made such calculations at the time—and drew from them the counsel of inaction—were overruled by Presidents with faith that we could improvise. In these instances, and others of the sort, the faith was justified.

But faith was helped by fortune in these cases. Running through them all were certain favoring conditions. These were instances when we espoused a large objective, simple in conception, easily identified and understood by managers at many levels, bearing some analogy to previous experience, and calling for an effort of great scale, not great precision. These were, moreover, cases where the need was plain enough to spur the effort. An overriding menace to our country was personified in Hitler, then in Stalin. And where we had to work through governments abroad, their operators saw the menace too, and saw it in our terms, and even more so. Also we were favored rather often by good luck: Tito's break with Stalin, for example, cost the Greek guerrillas an important sanctuary.

Such favoring conditions, I suspect, become prerequisites for an effective outcome of decisions which take management on faith. Unfortunately, these conditions are not always present. In their absence, portions of our record since the war wear quite a different look than do the instances just cited. They wear a look of ineffectuality. Here too, the issues of administrative feasibility were not pursued until after decisions had been taken. But here the consequences were unhappy. Faith in our capacity to improvise is justified, it seems, under particular conditions, and not otherwise.

Let me cite a few examples on the unsuccessful side: consider Roosevelt's wartime aim, from 1942, that we should occupy a northern zone in Germany, extending to Berlin. Or take what is supposed to have been his decision that we should not let the French return to Indochina. Or think of Truman trying to conduct a limited war with General MacArthur as his agent. Or look at Eisenhower trying in the last year of his term to move toward a détente with Soviet Russia. Or take Kennedy's endeavor in the first weeks of his term to undermine the government of Cuba.

In all these cases we had qualified objectives, subtle aims based on a line of reasoning and on anticipations which were far from fully understood by operators in our own or other governments, and often were not shared by those who did perceive them. Subtlety was matched by strangeness; we were trying to accomplish unfamiliar things in unaccustomed ways. Effective follow-through would have required great precision in obtaining information and coordinating action on the part of the American bureaucracy. It also would have called for great precision in relating our own actions to the acts of other governments. But large-scale organizations find it hard to be precise. And it is hardest when they tackle novel tasks for obscure reasons.

The Korean war provides perhaps the most dramatic instances where our decision-makers took too much for granted on the side of operational feasibility. In the fall of 1950 there were few things Truman wanted less than a severe and costly clash with the Chinese. But to assure himself that he could minimize the cost would have required him to override the then prevailing military

doctrine of autonomy for field commanders—or at the least to appoint a more malleable commander. He also would have had to build a better capability than we possessed for judging what went on inside Peiping. He would have had to use it, too, instead of leaning on the hunches of MacArthur. But none of this was thought through by the President (or his chief advisers) when we chose to support South Korea and then to cross the 38th parallel.

In the spring of 1951 there were few things Truman wanted more than a negotiated settlement with the Chinese. This led him to accept truce talks without a time-limit, and without keeping up our military pressure. That proved to be a formula for stalemate, not settlement. Truman often has been criticized in retrospect for taking off the pressure, halting our advance as talks began and thus reducing the Chinese incentive to conclude them. But our troops, to say nothing of the public or Congress—or our allies—were psychologically unready to press forward, take the casualties involved, for the purely political purpose of exerting influence at a conference table. Save for some commanders in the field, our chief officials, with the President among them, were equally unprepared.

By the time talks began, continued military pressure for this purpose seemed impossible to them on grounds of management as well as politics. Without it a quick settlement proved quite beyond their reach. That might have been foreseen by the decision-makers who had long since settled on negotiation as their means to end the war. Had it been foreseen they might have managed to prepare the ground in popular psychology, and with the troops, and in their own minds. Apparently, they took no steps to do so.

The Korean war, of course, becomes dramatic in proportion to its character as an unprecedented—and entirely unexpected—sequence of events. Truman and his colleagues dealt with what was then uncharted territory, limited war, with nothing in our modern history, military planning or diplomacy to prepare them. The whole affair was a gigantic improvisation undertaken in a context of political adversity as well as unpreparedness. When I hear concern expressed about the standing of a Johnson or a Kennedy in Gallup polls, I am reminded of the popular approval given Truman in the spring of 1951: 24 percent. I find it hard to criticize the Truman administration under those conditions. More recent Presidents have had at least a better base of popular support from which to face unprecedented problems.

Another source of illustrations, less dramatic but more frequently encountered, can be found in foreign aid. The Marshall plan was an immense success precisely because it attempted no more than was operationally feasible: physical reconstruction and modernization of economies in countries which possessed political and bureaucratic resources to make our money and our know-how serve the purpose. It is true that portions of our own bureaucracy and public tried to aim more broadly, at a social reconstruction. But it is also true that the directors of the program kept such aims in check. They fitted ends to means.

The Marshall plan's success was not a precedent, however, for our aid to less-developed countires. Ever since point four in 1949 our programs—and our rhetoric—have suffered very often from a failure to achieve that fit: we often neither trimmed our aims to match the means at hand, nor found new means sufficient to our purpose. Worse still, we often talked and sometimes acted as though we were under no compulsion to do either. Both in economic and and in defense support, I gather that the record has been studded with occasions where we worked with little reference, or with none at all, to operational feasibility.

Everyone has his pet peeve with foreign aid. Mine is the tendency, marked until recent years, to treat connections between politics and economics in the third world by analogy with some one aspect of historical experience in this country or Europe. You will recall when technical assistance was the rage, on the analogy of land-grant colleges. Later, in the fifties, we inspired aid missions with zeal for private capital, on the analogy of Europe's contribution to our economic growth during the 19th century. When Kennedy was new in office we became proponents of the takeoff, on analogies from the industrialized nations: once a certain stage was reached, political development and economic growth were bound to become mutually supportive. Maybe so. But this assumption by analogy, like the others, seems to me a positive incitement to aid programers. Given such assumptions, those who proffer aid for less-developed countries may expect too much by way of bureaucratic and political capacity—or they may think too little about practical political effects.

Before the day of David Bell they certainly did both. I take it that they now do rather better.

In my own occasional experience, I vividly recall the report of an expert special panel, several years ago, which assessed the economic prospects of an Asian country. Their report proposed to make much of our future aid conditional on tax reforms; these were demonstrated to be well within the country's economic capability. Not a word was said about its governmental capability. Those measures of reform threatened to disarrange its system for rewarding men in public life. The ruling politicians and the bureaucrats who would have had to put the measures through were very much affected by them, not just personally but in terms of settled custom and procedure. The operational question for our Government is obvious. That panel never asked it.

By definition, foreign aid presents this sort of question. It is at once the hardest sort to answer in advance and the least safe to leave for improvising later. No wonder our aid programers have trouble. For on matters of this sort, a judgment of the feasible in operating terms involves not only our machines of management but also those of other countries, and not alone their governments but oppositions too, overt and otherwise.

Foreign aid, indeed, presents routinely and in lower key the operating problem we apparently confront in our two current crises: how to guide another country without running it, or still more crudely, how to govern through another government. In the heyday of 19th century imperialism this was no trick at all. The device of the "protectorate" was well developed. And in the heyday of the empire of Stalin, party discipline served even better. But we genuinely are not imperialists in either sense. We do not want to be, nor can we be. Devices of both sorts are beyond our reach. In lieu of command we experiment with influence, a chancy substitute.

These comments will suffice, I hope, to emphasize two things: first, that we can illafford to take administrative feasibility on faith—except under conditions which are frequently denied us—and second, that in calculating feasibilities we often have to reckon not alone with our own men, but also with the men who do the work of other governments. This puts a premium upon detailed control of who does what to whom, with what, and when inside our Government; control is hard to get and hard to keep, but of the essence. And it suggests an equal premium on detailed information, properly appraised, about the who and whom, et cetera, in other governments (or would-be governments). Nothing could be harder to obtain, especially an adequate appraisal. But difficulty is no warrant for discontinuing either need.

A careful calculation of operational feasibility, in terms like these, can be rewarding even though we act despite it, as we often must. We need control and information to dispel the risk of action-in-the-dark. The next best thing, however, is awareness of how much we have not got. A grasp of limitations makes for careful footwork. This itself reduces risk and often is the most we can achieve. The alternative is action without careful calculation, hoping we will be sustained by favoring conditions, trusting our capacity to improvise after-the-fact. This has worked before—sometimes—but I would hate to count on it. This is a way to maximize the risk.

Let me turn now to another aspect of your memorandum.

ALLIANCE POLITICS

Your memorandum states:

"An alliance in operation is a group of governments each made up of men who, by the nature of their work, are bound to view the purposes for which they are allied through the perspective of their own national preoccupations."

This concept of allies as governments, and governments as politicians-on-the-job cuts through our native tendency to talk about alliances in terms of their machinery or governments in terms of single individuals. I see two implications, one of which you indicate:

"When external dangers are immediate and severe, and the situation looks similar from the several national perspectives, then closely allied courses of conduct can be expected. When external dangers are less severe, alliances are bound to be in some disorder. Pulling and hauling is not necessarily a sign of weakness. * * * It serves no useful purpose to complain that national interests diverge. They do."

In short, when several governments are frightened by the same thing at the same time, and perceive it much alike, they tend to act in concert not because of but regardless of alliance ties. Truman used to say sometimes that Stalin was his agent on this hill in putting through the landmarks of our postwar foreign policy. Anyone who recalls the reaction here to the Czech coup of 1948 will grant his point. And it applies to western European capitals as neatly as to Congress.

A second implication is perhaps less obvious. Because allies are governments, each is a more or less complex arena for internal bargaining among the bureaucratic elements and political personalities who collectively comprise its working apparatus. Its action is the product of their interaction. They bargain not at random but according to the processes, conforming to the perquisites, responsive to the pressures of their own political system. Some men and some machines within the system thus are naturally advantaged over others. With us, Defense and Treasury, for instance, are frequently advantaged over State. In foreign policy the President is usually advantaged over Senators. So it goes. In France, the Elysée is currently advantaged over everybody else, if and when De Gaulle himself is known to take an interest. (The qualification, I suspect, may mean more than we think.)

It follows that relationships between allies are something like relationships between two great American Departments, say Defense and State—except that there is no Supreme Court like the White House to adjudicate their differences or overcome them. These are relationships of vast machines with different histories, routines, preoccupations, prospects. Each machine is worked by men with different personalities, skills, drives, responsibilities. Each set of men, quite naturally, would rather do his work in independence of the other set. They overcome that preference when they find the others useful or essential in their business. The impulse

to collaborate is not a law of nature. It emerges from within, arising on the job, expressive of a need for someone else's aid or service.

From this, two more things follow: First, if one government would influence the actions of another, it must find means to convince enough men (and the right men) on the other side that what it wants is what they need for their own purposes, in their own jobs, comporting with their own internally inspired hopes and fears, so that they will pursue it for themselves in their own bargaining arena. This is what we did, with Stalin's help, in Europe nearly 20 years ago. This is what we failed to do, without that help, on EDC 11 years ago.

And second, if one wants to tie the policies of governments together, over time, one seeks joint ventures or concerns which link the daily doing of keymen on either side, making them dependent on each other in their work, giving them concrete incentives to collaborate.

Before NATO, the most intimate, sustained peacetime alliance between major powers in the modern world was that of Germany and Austria-Hungary, from 1879 to 1914. Save for some joint meetings between military staffs, this alliance lacked machinery such as we associate with NATO. But what it had instead was great weight in the public politics and also in the bureaucratic politics of both regimes, together with the sanction of a powerful tradition: Except for 13 years after the Austro-Prussian War (and a decade in Napoleon's time), the two countries had always been mixed up with one another. In July 1914, the bureaucratic politicians of Vienna pulled a fast one on their colleagues at Berlin and dragged them into war. In 1917 Berlin got its revenge and made the Austrian Emperor drop his separate peace negotiations. The ease with which each side compelled the other testified to the political imperatives behind their close connection.

Shore of the pervasive links in politics which characterized Berlin and Vienna, particular joint ventures often have contributed to binding an alliance. Until the missile age, for instance, while the bomber still gave SAC its strength, the shorter flying time of Britain's bomber command made English capabilities count heavily with us. In the deterrent business we, of course, were senior partner, but the British saved us trouble, also money, and indeed provided something irreplaceable, an "unsinkable carrier." American defense officials, therefore, had to think about the British every time they thought about themselves. That is a very binding tie between two governments.

The common status of the dollar and the pound as reserve currencies for the free world becomes another tie of roughly the same sort, and one which still is very much at work between these governments. As Eisenhower found in 1956 when he decided to change British policy on Suez, there is a lot of leverage in this relationship. But as we have seen recently there also is a lot of common ground because of it.

Ventures or concerns in common of these sorts give men inside each government a handhold on the hopes and fears of men inside the other as they do their work, pursue their needs, in their arena, day by day. For a peacetime alliance, lacking Stalin or his like, few things can help more to keep two governments together.

Our current problems with De Gaulle now seem to stem, at least in part, from the fact or appearance that he has several handholds on men in Bonn, and Bonn, in turn, has many holds on Washington, while we and they alike cannot return the favor. In the current French political and economic context, his "presidentialist" regime seems smooth as glass, impervious to us or to the Germans. He must know that he needs us to deter the Soviets. But this we do on our account, not his, so French security in the strategic sense gives us no hold on him. We seem to have no others, though this may be more appearance than reality. But even the appearance gives him more room for maneuver on his side than we on ours. So at least I gather from the New York Times.

To comment on alliance operations without mentioning machinery is to give our NATO organs, and others of the sort, less than their due. They play a role, undoubtedly. But in the terms of this analysis it is and has to be a derivative role. Alliance institutions, civil and military, are not sovereign states—though SHAPE at one time often played the part and got away with it—but rather they are creatures, or at least creations, of the governments concerned. Thus their importance turns on their symbolic quality, together with their actual capacity (which often is not very great) to influence the work of men inside those governments. For short of open war, it is the government machines, not those of the alliance, which alone possess the capability to act. And short of imminent incursions into NATO countries from the East, the views of SHAPE or North Atlantic Council (NAC) officials matter less in many governments than views of men with power in their own right close to home—or nearer Washington.

If alliance organizations are to make a larger impact, they require greater leverage upon the work and worries of keymen in national machines. This is what distinguishes the EEC from NAC. "Eurocrats" can do (or at least start) some things, quite independently, which vitally affect the work of ministers in government. A dozen years ago, the same thing could have been said about SHAPE, in fact if not in form, but less so now than in the days of Eisenhower, who was something of a sovereign power in himself.

However, it does not appear to me self-evident, or even likely, that alliance agencies can have such leverage (or, anyway, can keep it if they get it). I do not see the payoff for the national machines. Confederacies are another matter, but NATO governments make no pretense that their alliance is a nascent state. EEC and NAC are thus in different categories; the one is not a precedent for the other. Nor do I see why we should mourn the passing of our "proconsuls" from SHAPE. At the present stage of our political development, alliances exist to serve their member governments, not vice versa. And governments are served by meaningful relations with each other. These center necessarily upon each other's capitals, upon the great machines and their internal bargaining. Alliance agencies are on the margin.

This does not mean that alliance organizations serve no useful purpose. At the least they serve as symbols and as supplementary switchboards for communication among national machines. Still more, they may provide a quiet corner where keymen from different capitals review the bidding on collaborative plans and action. This last, I take it, is a major aim of NAC. If so, then the small subgroup of key ministers, recently suggested by our Secretary of Defense, might be a very useful supplement.

But machinery is the least of my concerns today.

MEN AND MACHINERY

These comments on alliance operations reinforce my comments on operational feasibility. For if peacetime alliances are what I think they are, then our ability to make productive use of them depends, at least in part, upon our comprehension of the who-and-whom, and what, and why, in other governments. It also will depend in part upon the skill with which we translate comprehension into appropriate action, a delicate endeavor calling for control. Put these two parts together, add material resources, and you have a formula for gaining from alliances; leave either out and you do not, unless by luck or with a substitute for Stalin. In working an alliance, as in calculating feasibilities of any other operation overseas, the premiums are on control and information.

I have testified before about control, the need for it and difficulties of it in our government. There is nothing I would add today except to note that Johnson, quite like Kennedy before him—some say even more so, many say too much—is trying to control details of operation in each crisis situation overseas. Seen from the outside, he seems to act as though he thought his every purpose were at risk in anything subordinates contrived without his knowledge. If this indeed should be his thought, he would not lack for reasons from the record of the Presidency or its outlook since the missile age began. I cannot think him wrong to try. The difficulties, naturally, remain.

Information presents still more difficulties. From what little I have seen of our intelligence and our political reporting I surmise that the chief difficulty is conceptual: apparently we lack a frame of reference in our heads to prompt the questions on which we are often most in need of answers—or to guide appraisal of the answers we can get. This is not a problem inside government alone; far from it. It also is a problem in the scholarly community. Curiously, we are very much aware that our own Government is not a monolith, yet we are prone to treat a foreign government as though it were. We know that our own public officers are bound to think not only about men across the water, but also and intently about colleagues here at home. Yet we often neglect the possibility that foreigners do likewise.

In the sphere of military operations, we have learned with pain and slowly but quite thoroughly, I believe, that ends take means, while means take application to a given case, and application calls for an assessment of the case, before, during, and after. In recent years, particularly, we have made serious efforts to review our aims and to refine our means in light of our experience and prospects, case by case. Not only have we tried to do these things but also we have tried to instill knowledge of the doing, and of how, and why, in the upcoming generation of staff planners and commanders. War colleges, I gather, turn experience into doctrine as fast as they can. They even make a place for planners out of uniform, from State and CIA or even Budget, on the theory that it pays to spread the word.

In the "political" sphere, so called—a term for anything or everything except the actual use of force—what comparable efforts do we make? Virtually none. The intelligence community has little taste for history, or so it seems. At any rate it continually looks forward, rarely back. The Foreign Service, while at home with history or at least anecdote, seems prone to a professional astigmatism which mistakes diplomacy for governance. The Pentagon, although no stranger to political work, is under a constraint not to admit what it is doing, even to itself. Defense officials, in and out of uniform, are likely to display a double standard: hard-headed and informed on feasibilities of force, haphazard or unknowing (or simplistic) about feasibilities of politics. Many of them are experienced in bureaucratic politics at home; some of them have extraordinary experience with governments abroad. But nothing in their training tells them to treat this experience as carefully or as analytically as they would treat combat experience.

I made a bow just now to the war colleges. But it is pertinent to add that they reserve no time for studies of what actually went on inside of governments as one of

those machines dealt with another. Nor, naturally, is time devoted to analysis of what to do, if anything, about resultant problems. The colleges are not to blame; they do not have such studies. And with rare, piecemeal exceptions, neither do Defense, nor State, nor CIA, nor AID—I may have missed a hidden treasure somewhere, but I doubt it—to say nothing of our universities, where scholars either pine for lack of access or accept as gospel what they clip out of the New York Times.

Were this the situation on the military side, we would not tolerate it for a moment.

The question becomes, what to do about it? With that question let me bring this statement to a close. The answer, obviously, depends on many people in and out of government. None of us here can speak for all of them and I would not presume to try.

But it is plain, I think, that steps toward an answer will involve at least two sorts of studies. First are studies of method, of our training needs and programs, inservice or out. Congress has been cool to a civilian counterpart for the war colleges. If not that, what? Second are studies of substance, of relevant historical experience in critical encounters between governments looking at what happened inside national machines as well as across national frontiers. Just as we dissect past military actions, so we should examine such administrative confrontations, and for the same reasons: to sharpen our perception of our problems, to enhance our capabilities for training, to improve our question asking, and to give us the beginnings of a frame of reference adequate for future operations.

Studies of the first sort certainly are open to the competent authorities at both ends of the avenue. Studies of the second sort could well be fostered by many institutions both downtown and outside government. Security requirements are such that government support is always indispensable, but private capabilities would also be essential. Cooperation is indicated. Some of us in Cambridge hope we can contribute to this work through our established organizations and also through the institute of politics, honoring President Kennedy, which Harvard is in process of creating. Other research centers elsewhere in the country should chime in, or take a lead. I hope they will. For this job is bigger than all of us. And studies are but steps toward answering the question.

One other thing is plain: this question and its answer are not matters of machinery. To be sure there are some problems here of method and procedure. But the question does not pose issues of government reorganization. The answer does not turn on whether we have more or fewer members of the National Security Council. Machinery is not of the essence here. Men are of the essence: what they carry in their heads, and how they use their minds, and where they look for information.

Yet this seems to me preeminent among the long-term problems in the conduct of our foreign operations.