

A SERIES OF ARTICLES ON REINHARD GEHLEN

Following is a translation of three articles by Alain Guerin and Jean Hansi on Reinhard Gehlen entitled, "When the Shadow General Was Going to School," "A Chalet in the Alps and a Plane to Washington," and "This Man is Dangerous," in the French-language newspaper l'Humanité (Humanity), Paris, 22 June 1966, p. 9, 24 June, 1966, p. 2, and June 28, p. 2.

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When the Shadow General Was Going to School.

Let us first turn the pages of some newspapers. For the Weltwoche of Zurich it is "a man without face;" for Paris-Presse it is "an invisible general;" for the "Westdeutsche Allgemeine of Essen it is "the man with a thousand ears;" for Combat it is "the most enigmatic and best-concealed person in history;" for the Westdeutsche Tageblatt of Dortmund it is "the Shadow General;" for Aux Eclaires it is "the king of espionage;" for Christ und Welt of Stuttgart it is "the man of whom nothing is known;" for the Sunday Telegraph of London it is "the secret phoenix of Germany;" for Time of New York it is "the doctor;" for the Allgemeine Zeitung of Mainz it is "the most dangerous man of the West;" for the Swedish daily Stockholm Tidningen it is "a strange chief of spies;" for the Daily Express of London it is "a Hitler general who now spies for dollars," etc.

Does this journalistic honors list define a man or does it proceed from a legend? To answer this question is one of the goals of this inquiry. A question among others which one, moreover, could pose in a different manner. Like this, for example: Has Reinhard Gehlen, the present President of the BND, known for the past 25 years an exceptional fate and is he now one of the last and most insistent proselytes of the "cold war," one of the most dangerous revengers of Bonn, a man who can raise a grave provocation in this still explosive land of Germany? It is a question which acquires its full sense, its full range when one knows that the BND is the Bundesnachrichtendienst that is to say the Federal News Service of West Germany, the heritage organism which Jacques Bloch-Morhange called the war of German spies.

manufacturers." .... (1)

An inquiry on Gehlen, therefore.

To be appraised in the ordinary practice of our times, this type of inquiry does not present many difficulties if one wants to avoid all effability. The men of the secret like to practice intoxication, even indirect, and it is often difficult to distinguish the border between the lie and the truth. For that reason we propose to stick to the facts.

The first fact in the life of a man is his birth. Reinhard Gehlen was born in Erfurt in Thuringia on 3 April 1902 in the apartment occupied by his father at No. 63 Löberstrasse. Who was this father? He was an Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) in the army of the Kaiser, Walther Gehlen, himself the son of a governmental counselor of the Prussian monarchy. And his mother? Katharina Margarete van Vaernewyck belonged to a noble family of Flemish origin. Reinhard was the first son of the household. He was three years old when his younger brother Walter was born, a future Jurist.

The Gehlen family remained only a few years in Erfurt. In 1908, in fact, the Oberleutnant left the army and Thuringia and installed himself on the banks of the Oder, in Breslau, (the present Polish Wroclaw). In partnership with Reinhard's uncle, his brother Max, a doctor of jurisprudence at the University of Leipzig, the Oberleutnant had purchased the Royal University Publishing House Ferdinand Hirt at Königsplatz No. 1.

At the Breslau Gymnasium, Reinhard Gehlen received in 1918 the diploma equivalent to our baccalaureat. He is sixteen and a half years old. He spends his adolescence in a Germany militarily defeated and economically ruined. For other sons of the nobility and bourgeoisie, the war of 1914 - 1918 and its tragic results had been the occasion to open the eyes and to range themselves at the side of the working class. The young Reinhard did the opposite. He applauded with his family the bloody crushing of the Spartakist epopee, and, faithful to the Prussian tradition of his ancestors, he chose the army profession in a Germany officially without an army.

His destiny is from now on outlined: As soon as he can,

(1) "The War Manufacturers -- German Spies - 1918 - 1950." -- Paris, 1950.

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he becomes Fahnenjunker (student officer) in the renascent Reichswehr, where he is admitted on 20 April 1920, hardly 18 years old.

Enterprise of the National Socialist Model.

These endowments as man of war and a mind dedicated to the cult of revenge assure the young Gehlen a rapid and brilliant career, so much more remarkable as despite the repeated violations of the Versailles Treaty, openings were rare in the German army. Thus, on 1 December 1923, he is appointed Leutnant (second lieutenant) and sent to the second battery of the Third Artillery Regiment in Schweidnitz (the present Polish city of Swidnica). The Third Artillery is an Ausbildungsregiment (training regiment). This affectation illustrates the concern that now seems primordial for Reinhard Gehlen: to acquire the maximum military knowledge. He left Schweidnitz in 1926 to spend two years at the cavalry school in Hannover. He left there as Oberleutnant (first lieutenant).

From then on his rise continues. He is Hauptmann (captain) at 33, and in 1935 he is chosen as one of 50 officers who receive the title of Generalstaebler (officer of the General Staff).

Who chose these fifty officers? The Nazis, to be sure, who were in power for the past two years and who, by the law of 16 March 1935, constituted a Wehrmacht already 36 divisions strong. It are still the Nazis who admit Reinhard Gehlen to the Kriegsakademie (war academy) they just have opened, violating once more the Versailles treaty.

It is true, as Julius Lader so excellently remarked (2), that the entire family Gehlen got on excellently with the Hitlerites from the beginning. The Ferdinand Hirt Publishing House had received the title "model Nationalist Socialist enterprise." The president of the "control committee for the protection of National Socialist writings" had written in the "National Socialist Bibliography," the principal work of Reinhard's father. And when the young brother Walter Gehlen had supported a doctoral dissertation in jurisprudence at the University of Breslau, it had been on the question whether a deputy should feel responsible to his voters or whether, on the contrary, he should be

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(2) In his book "Die graue Hand" (The Gray Hand) -- Berlin 1961.

concerned only about reasons of State.

Politically sure in the eyes of the Nazis, the young officer Reinhard Gehlen was it not less in those of the Prussian Junkers. When he married on 10 September 1931 at Glogau (the present Polish Glogow), he had taken as wife Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, the daughter of Junkers whose properties even then bordered on Polish soil.

The Colonel Is Forty Years Old.

Now that he is wearing the reverse amaranth that distinguishes the officers of the general staff in the Third Reich, the run of honors for the son of the Breslau editor is accelerated.

He spends his eighteenth and nineteenth years under arms in Liegnitz (the present Polish city of Legnica) as battery commander of the 18th Artillery Regiment, and he participates as major at the general staff of the 213th Division of the 8th Military Region in the invasion of Poland.

In 1940, flung upon France, Reinhard Gehlen pursues in the "lightning war" the career as specialist of the "operational bureau" (army intelligence officer), which he has undertaken under the protection of General Von Manstein. He savors the pleasure of invading our country as a liaison officer. On his missions he circulates between the headquarters of Marshal von Brauchitsch, the army of von Busch and the "Panzers" of the Generals von Hoth and Guderian.

Already, however, Hitler prepared the war in the East. Successively Adjutant (aide-de-camp) of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army, Helder, then head of the "Eastern Group" of the operational group, under orders of an officer who achieved later a certain celebrity, Heusinger, Reinhard Gehlen participates in the preparation of the aggression apparatus against the USSR, the Barbarossa Plan. He distinguishes himself and receives in the spring a decoration and a promotion. In June he is decorated with the Kriegsverdienstkreuz Erster Klasse mit Schwertern (Distinguished War Service Cross First Class with Swords), and on 1 July 1941 he is promoted to Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel).

During the first months of the "Russian campaign," Oberstleutnant Gehlen continues to be an "army intelligence" officer, that is to say, in charge of operational questions (in France the first bureau of the general staff), but his specialty

will change very soon. In fact, General Franz Halder, who has been his patron since October 1940, has annoyances with "Service 12" of his General Staff: the "Fremde Heere Ost" (Foreign Armies East). Commanded by an elderly colonel, Kinzel, "Service 12" did not furnish the detailed information a chief of the general staff of the land armies has the right to expect of his intelligence service. This dearth of "secrets" is particularly annoying when the Wehrmacht, first victorious, experiences in the East its first reverses.

In the spring of 1942, General Halder therefore discharges Kinzel from the direction of "Fremde Heere Ost." To replace him, he chooses an officer of his general staff who just has turned forty: Reinhard Gehlen, and promotes him on this occasion to the rank of Oberst (colonel).

Until now an "I A" officer (operations), the son of the Breslau publisher becomes therefore an "I C" officer (intelligence) (the equivalent of the 2nd Bureau in the French general staffs). And at once, with a higher rank, he becomes the head of a service including several hundred officers whose authority extends from Scandinavia to the south of the Balkans, uniting all the questions relating to the enemy No. 1 of the Third Reich, the Soviet Union.

#### The Money-bag Thieves.

Reinhard Gehlen understands at once the amplitude and interest of his new situation. Between the "Abwehr" (3) of an Admiral Canaris, who gets winded and gets himself in the trap of his intrigues with some British and American agents and the S.D. (4) of Schellenberg, whose Machiavellism is sometimes impeded by the fanatical madness of some Nazi leaders, the new chief of "Fremde Heere Ost" feels that here is a place to take. At once he conceives the project of a service uniquely dedicated to intelligence and anti-Soviet action. Anti-communism must be the sole rule of this service. It is logical that he therefore

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(3) Accurately "Abwehr Ausland" (counter-espionage abroad of the OKW) (General Staff of the Land, Sea and Air Forces). Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was its head since 1939.

(4) Accurately SD fur das Ausland (security service abroad, or Amt VI (Sixth Bureau) of the RSHA (Central Security Bureau of the Reich). Under the authority of the supreme chief of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, the SS chiefs Heydrich -- before his execution by the Resistance in Prague -- and Kaltenbrunner have successively directed the RSHA. One gets an idea of the importance of the RSHA when one knows that its Amt IV (fourth bureau) was the Gestapo itself (Secret State Police).

will obey the best anti-Communist of the time: Adolf Hitler, but he will nevertheless not let himself be restrained by the rules regarding the Hitlerian camarilla, nor, furthermore, by the intrigues of the various general staffs of the Wehrmacht.

In the Prussian tradition, he will seek his sense of organization, in the "new order" of the Nazis his bloody efficiency, and from both he will get their contempt of man and their desire for supremacy.

Modernism mixed with the absence of scruples will permit him to practice in a "total war" "total intelligence" (political and military, scientific and economic, etc.) and in his desire for subversion and provocation not to take into account the rule of espionage that requires that action and intelligence be carefully overhauled.

Such will be the service -- essentially counterrevolutionary, this war machine must not disappear with the one who gives it birth: the Hitler Reichsmark, the dollars of the United States, and the Deutschemarks of Federal Germany can, one after the other, be the fuel.

But let us not anticipate. We are still in 1942.

The manner in which Reinhard Gehlen profoundly modified and totally remodeled the service whose head he had become, comes into view in the comparison made by Julius Mader (2) between the Fremde Heere Ost and its homologue for the Western front: Fremde Heere West. Whereas the first will see its effectives multiplied by ten and foreshadows in its methods the American CIA, the second will remain a service of the general staff, concerned especially with military operation and synthesis and very comparable with the French Deuxième Bureau between the two wars. Gehlen "took new roads," Mader concludes. This says it all.

The new chief of Fremde Heere Ost received simultaneously from his superiors "special powers" and the transfer of dozens and then of hundreds of young non-commissioned officers he needed in his service. Young non-commissioned officers and all kinds of other professions: chemists and geographers, economists and physicists, linguists and policemen, forgers and physicians, printers and parachutists, etc.

Pretending friendship for Canaris, when in April 1945 he let him be executed without moving a finger, Oberst Gehlen obtained from the chief of Abwehr the "cession" of a large part of his Ostabteilung (Eastern Section), this organism of which

G. Colvin has written (6): "the incomparable Russian department of counter-espionage that Canaris had prepared." At the same time he creates and organizes a new corps, the Frontaufklärungstruppen (front reconnaissance troops) subdivided in regiments and companies, placed under the orders of specially-chosen "I C" officers. One of the first directives Gehlen gave his new troops when he sent them behind the Soviet lines -- by infiltration or by parachute -- was to assassinate a maximum of Red Army officers in order to steal their wallets.

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The chief of Fremde Heere Ost ordered these wallet thefts even at a time when he worked out new missions for Gruppe II and Gruppe III of his service. While the 3d section from now on is to devote itself to the "liquidation of the partisans," the 2nd is to devote all its efforts to the interrogation of the prisoners of war. A center is organized for this purpose, the fort of Boyen, near Lötzen.

To this fort are brought officers and soldiers of the Red Army, "raided" by Gehlen's men from the various Soviet prisoner of war camps. The Oberst also gave his instructions for these "raids:" Leaders of the Communist Party, officials, scientists and artists must be specially searched for.

A Chalet in the Alps and a Plane to Washington.

Hundreds of Soviet war prisoners were interrogated each day at the Prussian fort of Boyen by the men of Gehlen's Gruppe II. (1)

-- Mix violence with sweetness! the chief of Fremde Heere Ost told his officers.

It would have been more correct to say: enticement and torture. A certain enticement was, in fact, the great concern of Reinhard Gehlen.

-- The instructions of the Führer for the conquest by force of the Russian land and its total exploitation as a German colony can only lead us to our destruction, he readily

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(6) In his book "Admiral Canaris, Chef des Geheimdienstes" (Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Secret Service), Vienna, Munich, Zurich, 1950.

(1) See in yesterday's l'Humanité the first article of this inquiry "When the Shadow General Was Going to School."

told his young officers. We can conquer the Soviet system only if we succeed in making the mass of the Soviet population our ally ..."

Certainly, this reflection of Gehlen might cause quite some remarks. To report it after the Hitlerian defeat (2) was evidently aimed at nourishing the veritable campaign created by Gehlen himself, tending to present him as an "opponent" of Hitler, a silent ally, but not thinking less of the men of the "twentieth July," which he was not. Such a reflection stapes, moreover, by its unreality ... But what we want to retain here is a preoccupation that often carries the master-spy Gehlen over to espionage: subversion.

From 1942 on, the chief of Fremde Heere Ost wants the members of his service to be constantly concerned about recruitment... To recruit the Soviets is easy to order but difficult to execute. That is why Gehlen is not so particular about the quality of his recruits: The "political adversaries of the Soviet regime" will be especially those sentenced by common law and liberated by the German advance, "white Russian adventurers picked up all over Europe and some deserters.

As neither this sort of recruitment nor corruption proved very successful, Gehlen also used "psychological warfare" to the letter. He tried to reawaken nationalism and chauvinism in the territories occupied by the Nazis. He tried to arouse the Georgians, the Balts and the Ukrainians against the Russians. What were the results of these attempts, on which we insist especially here because they were resumed by Gehlen later when led the "cold war" in Germany for the account of the Americans?

They contributed in an important way to the setting up of the "Vlassov army" and the utilization of the "collabos" of the O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Nevertheless, if the Fremde Heere Ost was able to outfit a few thousand traitors with the German uniform, the millions of pamphlets it had printed and distributed in Russia did not have the anticipated result. Torture and assassination remained more successful.

#### "Cold Realism."

The prompt development of the espionage service that had been entrusted to him, certainly won Reinhard Gehlen a still

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(2) As Jurgen Thorwald did in Die Welt am Sonntag of 30 November 1955.



more rapid advancement than he had had until then. The manner in which he experiences this advancement confirms, moreover, what we have said earlier about the attempted poisoning that constitutes the campaign tending to make the chief of Fremde Heere Ost appear as an ally of the officers who on 20 July 1944 tried to kill Hitler and who after their failure were savagely executed. Canaris suffered the counterstroke of 20 July, not Gehlen. On the contrary. It was at the time when the members of the Wehrmacht had been purged and each promotion was submitted to the approval of a political committee dependent on the SS that the master of the espionage network in the East was successively promoted to Generalmajor (brigadier general) and then to Generalleutnant (general of a division). These promotions took place on 1 December 1944 and the beginning of 1945. (3)

The committee we spoke about had expressed the opinion that Reinherd Gehlen was "without reproach and absolutely worthy of confidence." On 9 January 1945 he was personally received by Hitler.

It will be understood that under these conditions the recasting of the Nazi special services undertaken on the eve of defeat, when Schellenberg had to double his Amt VI by an Amt "Mil" and take over the rest of the dissolved Abwehr, did not affect Gehlen. (4)

On the contrary, says Lucjan Wolanowski (5), the R.S.H.A. had acquired the habit to transmit to Fremde Heere Ost the intelligence on the East European countries for analysis and synthesis. And at the end of March 1955, the Swiss paper with social-democratic tendencies, Freie Inner Schweiz, published in Lucerne, wrote:

" SS Reichsführer Himmler and the chief of the service "Fremde Heere Ost" had during the war the supreme control over all the East European allies of Germany."

(3) The last of these two promotions, the one to Generalleutnant, is often hushed up or even contested in Western Germany. The reason is easy to understand. However, the proofs are numerous, including the edition of 28 July 1956 of the Munzinger Archiv, devoted to Gehlen's biography (p. 5623).

(4) As we explained in our preceding article, Amt VI was the SD für das Ausland (Security Service Abroad) of the RSHA (Central Security Office of the Reich), of which Amt IV was the well-known Gestapo.

However, in 1944, Reinhard Gehlen is very much in doubt about the German victory, and, as Jurgen Thorwald notes (6): "At the latest in mid-1944, Gehlen began to collect the reports, documents, studies and archives on Russia in various areas of the Bavarian Alpine redoubts. Thus -- and I have learned it from numerous sources -- it was impossible for the archives of "Fremde Heere Ost" to have been destroyed.

While thus taking these precautions, Gehlen obviously prepared his transit to the American side. However, the General-leutnant, who always praises "cold realism" as opposed to "dangerous dreams of power," continues to act with prudence. One must not compromise one's future in case a miracle hands victory to Hitler. For that reason he prepares, parallel with his "American operation" his "operation Werwolf."

The "Werwolf plan" for the "desperados."

It will be recalled that under the name of Werwolf, some Nazi desperados, acting in small groups, threatened terrorist actions in Germany following the Hitlerian defeat on 8 May 1945. While these fanatics pulled about here and there, Gehlen, we shall see, was received with open arms by the Americans; but it was he who had conceived the action plan of the Werwolf, a plan approved by Himmler and put into operation by the SS Obergruppenführer (general of an SS Army Corps) Hans Prützmann.

To provide for this clandestine Werwolf operation, Gehlen had drawn his inspiration from the Polish Bor-Komorowski movement. The British officer of the Intelligence Service, H. R. Trevor Roper, who interrogated Walter Schellenberg on the day following his capture by the Allies, reported (7): "Schellenberg told us that during the days close to defeat a certain Major General von Gehlen, who had worked for a long time studying the Polish clandestine movement, had worked out a precise plan of German resistance on the same basis."

It is not far-fetched to believe that Gehlen owed his promotion to the rank of Generalleutnant to his Werwolf plan. However, with things developing as they did, Gehlen obviously devoted himself essentially to his "American operation," while the allied troops in the East and the West occupied with

(6) In Die Welt am Sonntag of 27 November 1955. This publication is the Sunday edition of the largest paper of the right in Western Germany, Die Welt, published in Hamburg.

(7) In his book "The Last Days of Hitler," London 1947.

successive offensives the ruins of the Third Reich.

Another eminent member of the Intelligence Service, Sefton Delmer, wrote (8): "When the Hitlerian armies were destroyed in 1945, General Gehlen was able to flee to the West with the most important documents of his service. He had kept the most secret lists of German agents in the USSR and in the neighboring countries to the East (...). He had the key to the espionage net created by Canaris, Himmler and Schellenberg."

This "key," one may say, was voluminous. In fact, concerned not simply to furnish the American services with intelligence and archives, but to continue with the operation of his espionage and subversion apparatus, Gehlen had taken his dispositions so that his principal collaborators could escape the annoyances of defeat as he had done.

-- Go quietly and have the Americans take you prisoners, the chief of Fremde Heere Ost said to his officers and V-Männer (trusted men). Do not say anything, once you are there. To speak, wait for our orders, for mine or those of my direct collaborators.

At the same time, those who remained of the German military post transmitted to many families of Gehlen's network the advice to die "for the Führer, the people and the fatherland." Was "death" not the best cover? Especially accompanied by forged papers ...

#### Financing With ... Cigarettes.

At first Gehlen and his staff sought refuge in a camp where bombs were stored, the "Maybach I," not far from Zossen. From there, when all the records had been "hidden" (micro-filmed in triplicate and classified in hermetically-sealed containers), they went to a Bavarian Alpine area, where a vast chalet was waiting for them. According to Jurgen Thorwald, (6) this Alpine place is called Elends-Alm; Julius Mader calls it Oelendsalm (9) ...

In his Alpine chalet, Reinhard Gehlen experienced a short time of inactivity -- not more than a few weeks -- the only one of his career, and then he came down to Miesbach. In this small Bavarian town he met American officers. He placed

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(8) In the Daily Express of 17 March 1952.

(9) In his book "Die graue Hand" (The Gray Hand), Berlin 1961.

himself into their hands as a prisoner, declined to give his rank, and asked to see as quickly as possible a high official of the intelligence. Thereupon "prisoner Gehlen" was sent to the Intelligence Center of the Seventh US Army in Wiesbaden.

The contact thus established with the leaders of the C.I.C. (10) soon bore fruit. In June 1945, Reinhard Gehlen was already no longer a captive but an interlocutor. The records of the Fremde Heere Ost left their hiding-places for the offices of the American headquarters at Wiesbaden. The principal collaborators of the services came out of the sheds or the prison camps to join their chief. In July a plane left for Washington ...

Thus, less than three months after the Hitlerian defeat, the head of the principal espionage service and anti-Soviet subversion of Hitler was received by American generals and officers at the seat of the O.S.S.(11) in the US capital. Negotiations began between Reinhard Gehlen on the one hand and Professor Sherman Kent and Brigadier General Magruder on the other.

Feeling that his interlocutors were lured, the former chief (but still alive) of Fremde Heere Ost laid down his conditions. The main ones were: To be employed as a German contributing force in the US Services, but not to be integrated with them; to have a budget in dollars, but to have relations only with American top officials; to receive the assurance that whenever an autonomous German Government would exist, he would be subordinated to it and would no longer be dependent on the Americans; to have to furnish intelligence only on the Communists and the countries of the East, with the exception of any information susceptible to embarrass the future German Government; finally, to be assured that all his agents would escape prosecution for war crimes and "denazification" investigation that was in progress at that time.

-- O. K., answered the Americans, and especially General Bill Donovan, the chief of the O.S.S.; Allan W. Dulles, the future head of the CIA, and General George V. Strong, the head of "G 2." (12)

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(10) Counter Intelligence Corps.  
(11) Office of Strategic Services, the American Intelligence Service during the war and the ancestor of the present CIA.

(12) The American "G 2" is the equivalent of the German "I C" and of the French "Second Bureau, i.e. the section of the various general staffs charged with intelligence.

Reinhard Gehlen was even presented to Edgar J. Hoover, the head of the FBI (13), another gourmet in anti-Communist matters. The effective preparation of the Gehlen network within its new American setting was entrusted to a jurist specializing in intelligence, a future CIA personality, Loftus Becker (14). Financing began immediately in two ways: directly with 3,500,000 dollars from the very beginning, according to Sefton Delmer (8), and indirectly with thousands of packages of cigarettes, which the agents of the network sold at gold prices on the black market.

And this soon was to lead to the establishment of the *Süddeutsche Industrieverwertung* (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany).

### III. This Man Is Dangerous.

Sometimes "Doctor," sometimes No. 30," sometimes "Herr Doktor Schneider," etc. Reinhard Gehlen likes cover names. For himself. And also for his service. Thus, before the "industrial" cover: "*Süddeutsche Industrieverwertung*" (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany) he had a historic cover. (1) In fact, he returned from Washington under the historic cover name Historical Division of the US Army and installed the center of his network in Wiesbaden. He remained there until 1948. A trial period? A testing period? Did the Americans want to verify the efficiency of a service that already cost them more than two billion former francs annually?

Yes and no. In fact, on the one hand these two or three years were for gehlen only a waiting period, for, as the newspaper *Die Tat* (2) of Zurich says: He "had already in 1946 and 1947 the possibility to extend his secret service network to the East;" but, on the other hand, it is evident that the

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(13) Federal Bureau of Investigation: American federal police, an important part of which follows activities of the same order as the DST in France, but with a more pronounced MacCarthyist orientation.

(14) Loftus Becker did not hesitate to take part in the Nuremberg trials, but without appearing among the American audience.

(1) See in yesterday's *l'Humanité* the second article of this inquiry: "A chalet in the Alps and a plane to Washington."

(2) In its edition of 2 February 1954.

recuperation of the organism Fremde Heere Ost and its de facto insertion in the US special services system had not taken place without causing some disturbance in the leading circles of the United States.

The liberals formed in the Roosevelt school, Americans for whom Nazism remained a historic villainy, men who sincerely believed in peace and friendship among the people attempted to oppose this immoral re-employment of a gang of whitewashed war criminals and of their thousands of agents for ends whose odious character did not escape them. But the future MacCarthysts carried the day. "In the end," noted Jurgen Thorwald, (3) "Gehlen's choice sanctioned a veering of American policy." It was the choice of the cold war.

With this first promontory crossed, Reinhard Gehlen could incontestably develop his organization in a more systematic manner. The more so as Washington was then mounting the star of a master of his dimensions -- master but also pupil -- Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and placed by Truman at the head of the CIA, when this instrument of war preparation was born. (4)

From its Hauptverwaltung (General Management) at the Keilmannstrasse in Pullach, in the Munich suburbs, the so-called "Süddeutsche Industrieverwertung" (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany) therefore achieved from its establishment in 1948 a rapid progress.

Systematically using the commercial cover, Gehlen organized his network under the appearance of a vast commercial firm, with branches called Generalvertretungen (general representations), Bezirksvertretungen (district representations), Unterververtretungen (subrepresentations), and Filialen (small branches). This took place in Germany, while Residenturen (residences) were established abroad.

It should be mentioned that even when the Gehlen Service

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(3) In Die Welt am Sonntag of 27 November 1955.

(4) The "Central Intelligence Agency," of which it is known that it could be called the "invisible government" of the US and which, from the overthrow of Mossadegh (in Iran) and of Arbenz (in Guatemala) to the recent massacres in Indonesia and the incessant provocations against Cuba has shown that no warmongering activity is unknown to it.

ceased to be the clandestine Süddeutsche Industrieverwertung to become the official BND, the "commercial" vocabulary remained in existence and the type of organization was not modified. Geographically, even if the "Filialen" and the "Untervertretungen" often changed their seats, the "Generalvertretungen" (installed in Stocking near Munich, in Munich itself, in Hamburg, Darmstadt, Düsseldorf, Karlsruhe, etc.) were relatively fixed and the "Bezirksvertretungen" more stable. Abroad, the "Residenturen" were generally in the capitals and the networks-- according to the importance of the country -- spread almost everywhere.

The "Darling of the Chancellor."

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We have seen that one of the conditions laid down by Gehlen in 1945 to the Americans for his re-employment had been the amnesty de facto for all the Nazis whose employment in his organization he wanted to continue. That was the reason for the public notoriety that former Hitlerians were abounding in Pullach. It is estimated that of the 5,000 collaborators and the 12,000 agents of the organization, 57 % have come from Fremde Heere Ost, the Abwehr-Ausland of Canarias and the "IC" Bureau of the General Headquarters of the Wehrmacht (OKW), while 25 % or more than 4,000 men, are former members of Bureaus IV (Gestapo) and VI (SD-Ausland of Schellenberg of RSHA (5).

Some "former" names should be cited which all figure or figured still recently among the members of the Gehlen Service. These include the names of Franz-Alfred Six, SS Brigadeführer (SS Brigadier General); Emil Augsburg, SS-Sturm-  
bandführer (SS Commander); Fritz Schmidt, alias Friedrich Schutte, of the Leitstelle (directing office) of the Gestapo in Kiel; of Franz Goring, alias Wilhelm Thorwald, alias Wilhelm Tobias, SS Hauptsturmführer (SS Captain); Wilhelm Hötti, alias Walter Hagen, SS Sturm-  
bandführer; Franz Wimmer-Lemquet, SS Standartenführer (SS Colonel); Bruno Kauschen, alias Berthold Kastner, alias Krause, SS Officer.

One can throw light on some of these names by pointing out that Wilhelm Hötti was under Hitler the collaborator of Adolf Eichmann; that Bruno Kauschen was the collaborator of Otto Skorzeny, and that Franz Schmidt distinguished himself during the massacre of the "foreign workers camp" of Friedrichs-

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(5) The relations between the various secret services of the Hitlerian Germany were recalled in the first article of this investigation.

Ott near Kiel, where 2,000 captives were killed by a bullet in the nape of the neck, and also during the extermination of 6,000 deported persons on the vessel "Cap-Arcona."

One would have to cite still dozens of other cases just as exemplary ... But that is not all. For it should also be noted that, by protecting them and by permitting them not to lose their lives, Reinhard Gehlen has constituted between 1945 and the creation of the Bundeswehr a reservoir, a breeding-ground of militarism. Adolf Heusinger gave the example by working first at Pullach before experiencing the nice career that is known. And General Ernst Ferber, chief of the NATO "standing group" in Washington until his removal..., etc.

Moreover, on 21 August 1945, Georges Penchenier could write in Le Monde about Gehlen and his men: "Even before the first noise of the boots has resounded, even before the first hissing of a jet motor, the Federal Republic will dispose, thanks to the Americans, of an intelligence and counterespionage service whose ramifications are extended all over Eastern Europe and perhaps even the West."

Paris-Pressé said the same one year later, on 13 August 1955: "The Federal Republic of Bonn inherits today a service polished by 13 years of uninterrupted labor, which even its adversaries consider as the most dynamic anti-Communist intelligence network."

In fact, the transition of Reinhard Gehlen from the American lap to the official control of Bonn, his elevation to the rank of Ministerialdirektor and the new title of Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), or BND, that has been given to his network were one of the first guide-posts to German rearmament and took on the quality of a symbol.

~~Konrad Adenauer, moreover, knew to appreciate Gehlen's value and often received him privately -- this Gehlen whom the Soviet writer V. Chernov (6) baptized "the darling of the Chancellor."~~

#### The "Konzerns" Paid.

The transition of Reinhard Gehlen from the Americans to the Bonn authorities took officially place in 1956. The word "transition" should be correctly understood. It is certain, in fact, that the BND continued to be associated with the CIA and to serve the designs of the warmongering American circles in

(6) The title of a book published in Moscow in 1962.



Europe and elsewhere. However, Gehlen gained by this transfer greater liberty and vaster means.

Since 1948, the head of the Fremde Heere Ost service had joined a "syndicate" section to his network. This section permits the principal Konzerns, the big trusts of the "economic miracle" in Germany to use espionage and provocation as means to fight labor claims. For that reason, excellent relations developed between Reinhard Gehlen and men like Hermann J. Abs, Robert Pferdmenges, Wilhelm Zangen, Hermann von Siemens, Max Ilgner, etc. Abs was the biggest German banker of the West, a member of some thirty administrative councils; Pferdmenges, another powerful banker, twenty administrative councils, a financial counselor of Adenauer, Zangen, director general of the Mannesman trust; von Siemens, director of the same trust, one billion marks of capital; Ilgner, the man with a position of trust at I.G. Farben.

When he wanted to profit from his transfer to BND to grow and multiply, Reinhard Gehlen did not in vain appeal to the good heart and the gratitude of these magnates. "The heavy German industry has turned over ten million marks for the transition of Gehlen," wrote the Gesamtdeutsche Rundschau on 20 January 1956.

And since then, the manna has not stopped dropping into the coffers at Pullach, nor the domicile of Gehlen, estate 68 in Berg near Sternberg from being open to the representatives of the Konzerns. Direct subventions and very remunerative cover money offered to the numerous collaborators of the BND arrived in this manner and furnished 50 % of his budget for organization at Pullach. The other half is made up by official financing which, by official accounts, reached 23,100,000 marks in 1956, 43,000,000 in 1959, and 58,100,000 in 1963...

Such increases during the years of his human, financial and technical means led Gehlen to give more amplitude to the BND. While continuing the lance head of the "cold war" in West Berlin and the Federal Republic (8), the former chief of the Fremde Heere Ost service (7) has been concerned during the past

(8) Activities of provocation and aggression against the German Democratic Republic are and remain a constant concern of Gehlen. Statistics covering the period between 13 August 1961 and 31 July 1962 give a good indication: 459 attacks and 236 cases of aggression against the border of the GDR; 493 tear-gas bombs dropped; 200 cases of border violations and 1,746 of sabotage against the railway lines of the S-Bahn.

(7) Service of Foreign Armies East. See the preceding two articles.

ten years with giving some sort of universal competence to his instrument of subversion and espionage.

Let us throw a rapid glance on some of these activities. The countries of the People's Democracies and the USSR are, of course, the main subjects. But not only they, far from it, have to suffer from Gehlen's activities. Sweden, Great Britain, Italy, numerous countries in Africa, Austria, the Netherlands, France and Egypt have during the past few years been reached by the enterprises of the BND.

Terror in Tyrol and Explosives at the Zuyderzee.

Who, as was revealed by a document found by the French services at NATO in July 1958, had ordered his agents to find the localities where explosives could be most efficiently placed in the dikes of the Zuyderzee to inundate a part of Holland?

Who, as we said at that time, has actively aided in Germany itself the terrorists of the "Red Hand" against the Algerian patriots?

Who supports in Austria and Northern Italy the terror actions of the members of the Cultural Work of Southern Tyrol, of the Edelweiss league, and of the Liberation Committee of Southern Tyrol (BAS)?

Who established contacts with former General Salan, the head of OAS and gave him some aid against promises of privileges in case the subversion would have removed him to France?

Who uses systematically, as formerly the "Vlassov Army," all emigrant organizations to recruit agents and stir up trouble in the countries of origin?

Who has sent armed groups to Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine?

The answer to all these questions, to be sure, is: Reinhard Gehlen.

And this answer, coming after we have told about him since the beginning of this investigation, shows how dangerous this man is. Spy merchant, manufacturer of provocations, maniac of subversion, he is one of those who in Bonn continue to dream of war.

CPYRGHT

War for Gehlen is the E-Fall, the case of emergency, and all agents of the BND, under all circumstances, have precise instructions concerning this subject. Very precise instructions.

It will be necessary to speak of this again.

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Captions to Photographs

June 22, 1966.

Upper center:

Colonel Reinhard Gehlen had just passed his fortieth birthday.

Bottom:

The S.D. (Nazi Security Service Abroad) was placed under the supreme authority of Himmler, the Superior Chief of the SS, who is seen here addressing troops at Linz, Austria.

June 24, 1966.

Center:

A chalet in the Alps and a stock of microfilms.

Bottom:

One of the very rare photographs of Reinhard Gehlen: Bathing. In the rear two life-guards in a boat.

June 28, 1966

Left:

A certain smile... That of master and pupil. But who was the master? and who the pupil?

Above: Reinhard Gehlen.

Below: Allen W. Dulles.

Center:

Keilmannstrasse at Pullach, in the suburbs of Munich: the seat of the BND.

Above: the entrance.

Below: A lane among the others in the labyrinth of the secret.

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