

# The Fulbright 'Fixation'

By Henry J. Taylor



IF we are to know what is happening to us we have to know that fixations do grip relatively unknown men whose influence on our country is enormous. Consider the idea that America must not defend herself any place on her own—which was at the root of the Cuban debacle. In short, our so-called collective security.

That fixation is typified by Sen. J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and he is as wrong as a summer oyster. But ideas can get into men's minds and all circumstances and history does not seem able to blow them out.

They just think something and that is all there is to it.

Because Sen. Fulbright is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he effects promotions within the State Department, its congressional relations and budget prospects and, thus, most importantly, America's policies not alone thru the committee's statutory authority but merely on the basis of his own thinking.

We do not have collective security. We have collective insecurity. We are wise to be attached firmly to the principle. Often it is indispensable, as in NATO. But there is no NATO in Latin America, for example, and depending on collectivity wherever this involves numerous weak and shaky countries means we flounder into exactly what happened in Cuba.

Sen. Fulbright opposed any kind of intervention there unless we could waltz in with a whole group of Latin American states, as if our nation could order such a tidy state of affairs.

Many much more knowing, practical and tested observers than Sen. Fulbright find we are not blamed in Latin America for the intervention but, instead, for allowing the intervention to fail.

We got slight, if any, credit for our Government's self-defined morals in non-intervention, even within the Organization of American States. For all grows worse by our

remedy. Everywhere southward most of our neighbors realized that both under the benefits to them of the Monroe Doctrine and because of Castro's relentless and psychopathic provocations an intervention was completely justified on moral or any other grounds. And is it, in truth, really moral not to intervene in a murder unless you can locate your cousins to walk with you? Or if you have no cousins, to turn your back?

There is widespread conviction the United States failed to intervene openly in Cuba, not for a moral reason, but because our Government feared that this would provoke war between the powerful Soviet Union and the United States.

Countless millions thruout Latin America who love freedom would have welcomed U. S. intervention in Cuba (and still would) because they fear the expansion of Castroism into their homelands and doubt it will be stopped without intervention. These millions cannot dream in Sen. Fulbright's office and telephone thunderbolts to the State Department. They have to live (or die) with what they get. Their only test of the intervention is that it succeed; and when it did not they are the victims in all the shame and despair of this sickening tragedy along with the entire free world.

How could America conceivably "lose more in other countries," in Latin America or anywhere, than we lost by the effect of this debacle on Khrushchev's estimate of the United States? Isn't Russia a country? The result there alone can mistakenly rationalize Russia into such pressure on us that, God forbid, there is a war. Meanwhile, our no-matter-what non-intervention policy frees Soviet strategy to pillage like a leopard turned from the cage.

Sen. Fulbright can sit frozen by his fixation and wrap a moral toga around himself if he prefers, but it does not fit. When the Cuban intervention design was allowed to be so disastrously frail to conform to our policy—and even then the dribble that was laid on for this was drawn back half-way our country suffered a disaster far, far greater than Pearl Harbor. We knew how to tighten our belts and, like Americans, fight our way back from that. But we do not know how to fight our way back from this.