

as good as gold because they can be turned into gold on demand.

Holdings of such other currencies arise through normal trade: A French manufacturer sells ties here, gets paid with a check on a U.S. bank, and turns in the check to the French central bank in exchange for francs. The central bank then may buy gold from our Treasury, or it may prefer to leave the money here, perhaps invested in U.S. Treasury securities, thus earning interest on it.

The "bug" that is causing the current debate is that this practice means some of the very same gold, that continues to be used as backing for U.S. currency, is also now used as backing for the French currency. This double usage begins to take on serious proportions when the Nation with the good-as-gold currency (including both citizens and Government) persistently spends more abroad than it takes in. As a result of a decade of deficits in the U.S. balance of payments, foreigners (not just central banks) have accumulated here \$21 billion of potential calls on our gold supply. But our gold stock totals only \$17.5 billion. Exaggerating somewhat, it may be said that our whole gold supply is now subject to double usage.

Obviously, a halt has to be called somewhere, or some day the good-as-gold currency will become no better than wallpaper. In that case it would cease to be of any use as a reserve currency. The cures being proposed to obviate such a disaster run along four main lines.

The first recommended cure is for the United States to do all in its power to eliminate the constant excess of its outpayments over receipts. That is a fundamental one which everyone agrees. Without it, nothing will work. With it, almost anything will work.

A second proposed cure is a joint international boost in the price of gold, to twice or more the present \$85 an ounce. That would, for instance, make our \$17.5 billion gold reserve worth \$85 billion or more, substantially overshadowing the \$21 billion of potential foreign claims upon it. But, aside from the inherent dishonesty of such a writing down of our debts, it seems unlikely that a cut in the value of our currency in terms of one commodity, gold, could be achieved without a corresponding fall in the currency's value in terms of all other commodities. That is, all other prices would probably rise too, and we'd soon be back where we started.

A third proposed cure is the abandonment of the gold-exchange standard, through repayment of the debts, such as the billions we owe to foreign central banks, over a long period of years. Under this scheme, the world would thereafter return to a strict regime of settlement of all international debts in gold.

Doubtless that would work, but it would be a very long and very painful process, so painful that it would be politically impossible. One might as well ask for the abandonment of the banking and paper money system of the United States and a return to payments in nothing but coin.

The fourth proposed cure is a sort of internationalization of the problem. The functions of the International Monetary Fund would be expanded, somewhat as our Federal Reserve System was set up to ease and equalize banking stresses between various regions of the United States. Actually, this would amount to a further extension of the international paper money system. The idea, with many possible variations, will be given consideration at the IMF meeting in September.

But whether it or some other scheme is adopted, nothing will eliminate the need for each nation to make sure its balance of payments doesn't fall out of line too far and too long.

GEORGE SHEA.

PUBLIC POLICY AND MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY—ADDRESS BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas, today delivered an address to the opening session of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. His subject was "Public Policy and Military Responsibility."

As my colleagues in the Senate know, this subject has been discussed on a number of occasions on the floor of the Senate in recent weeks. The Senator from Arkansas has raised some very fundamental questions about the relationship between military forces in the United States and civilian government. I commend his speech to my colleagues.

His remarks are broader even than the title of his speech suggests, because he discusses some of the events of recent years which have tended to influence our thinking, not only on domestic policy but on foreign policy as well.

Because of the importance of these remarks, I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES—PUBLIC POLICY AND MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY, AUGUST 21, 1961

The extreme difficulty of defining the proper relationship between military and civilian authorities in a democracy derives basically from the stubborn refusal of the world of reality to accommodate itself to the tidy compartments of theoretical logic. It has always been difficult, and in the modern world of nuclear weapons and cold war it is all but impossible, to separate military problems from general policy; to designate one neat area labeled "questions of military policy to be decided by generals" and an altogether separate area of "questions of politics to be left to the politicians."

David Lloyd George once declared "there is no greater fatuity than a political judgment dressed in a military uniform." The reply might well have been: "No, except a military judgment dressed in civilian clothes." The real answer, if not in Lloyd George's time then certainly in our own, is that the problems of national security are so inseparably related to problems of diplomacy, economics, and technology that lines cannot be drawn and decisions must be made jointly. The politician must acquire knowledge and sensitivity to every aspect of national security, including the military, while military officers are under a heavy obligation to bring to the performance of their tasks much of the wisdom of history and statecraft.

The military profession is now involved intimately in national policy processes. This involvement is not the result of any conscious quest for political power on the part of the military but rather the inevitable product of the new worldwide commitments of the United States and of the revolution in military technology. Power in a democracy is inseparable from responsibility. Accordingly, the Military Establishment is under the most compelling obligation to exercise the power which has been thrust upon it with wisdom and restraint.

There has been considerable public and

rather vitriolic discussion and controversy in recent weeks regarding a memorandum which I submitted to the President and to the Secretary of Defense concerning the sponsorship by military personnel of public meetings primarily devoted to highly controversial political issues. I have been more than a little surprised that this private memorandum has aroused such animated arguments about the involvement of the military in politics and above all has brought into question the principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.

This latter principle, rooted in our Constitution and in many centuries of Anglo-Saxon tradition, has served the Republic well. It is indispensable to the preservation of democratic government, and it is equally indispensable to the preservation of the professional integrity and effectiveness of the military. As President Kennedy pointed out in his press conference on August 10, nothing would do more grave damage to the prestige and integrity of the Armed Forces than their embroilment in transitory partisan controversies.

The memorandum which I submitted to the Secretary of Defense was based upon my strong belief in these principles. Its purpose was certainly not to silence military officers who choose to express their own views in public and who are subject to the discipline of their superiors and their own sense of duty and propriety. Nor was the memorandum prepared for the purpose of criticizing private individuals or organizations for holding or promulgating any opinions whatsoever. There is no question of the right of groups of private citizens, such as chambers of commerce, to organize programs of any character, to select speakers freely, and to discuss any topics they choose. The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety of officers of the armed services permitting their prestige and official status to be exploited by persons with extreme views on highly controversial political issues.

The memorandum set forth instances of military sponsorship of attacks by radical extremists on the policies of our Government. The point cannot be overstressed that it is not these verbal attacks which are at issue, but their sponsorship by military authorities. These acts of official sponsorship are far more significant than the few cases in which military officers—often retired or Reserve officers—took the platform themselves.

Nor does it matter whether the extremist views expressed were those of the left or of the right. The instances cited in the memorandum happened to be cases which reflect the extremism of the right. I would have been equally concerned had I known of military participation in attacks from the extreme left.

Nor was I concerned with disciplining individuals or groups. It is the constitutional right of all Americans, civilian and military, to hold whatever political views they are led to by conviction and conscience, be they moderate or extreme. Military men in their official status, however, are committing not only themselves as individuals but the prestige of the armed services when they promote or appear to sponsor partisan political meetings. They are therefore doing a disservice both to the American people and to the armed services when they lend their support to any groups or organizations which espouse policies that run counter to those of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and which have the effect of generating distrust and suspicion among our people.

The memorandum contained a specific recommendation that the Defense Department issue general directives to bring under overall control the activities of military officers in lending the weight of their official status to organized expressions of extremist

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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As you may be aware we purchased, yesterday, \$6,836,000 Anchorage city and school district bonds and we have been making good progress in the distribution of this issue. The prices for the long bonds represented a decrease in yield and therefore an improved price of about one-fourth of 1 percent over the sale of a year ago. This again is a reflection of added confidence in our new State.

I was very happy to see the reply you made to the unfortunate article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal. It's too bad that an uninformed writer is permitted such prominence.

PROPOSED CLOSING OF SHIPYARDS

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, in today's issue of the Washington Daily News appears a very interesting article entitled "Don't Give Up the Shipyard—Naval Maneuver Gets J.F.K. Off Hook."

I now read the article:

[From the Washington Daily News, Aug. 21, 1961]

DON'T GIVE UP THE SHIPYARD—NAVAL MANEUVER GETS J.F.K. OFF HOOK

What does a President do when his Defense Secretary decides to close down a big defense installation in his own home State? Like many lesser men, he calls for help.

That's what President Kennedy did last week when he learned that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara had decided to phase out the Boston Naval Shipyard, along with the Philadelphia and San Francisco shipyards.

Mr. Kennedy apparently was bothered by the decision to shut down the shipyard in his very own bailiwick. But he remained obviously reluctant to reverse the decision.

Looking around for help, he finally landed on Representative JOHN F. SHELLEY, a tough but personable 55-year-old onetime labor leader, wartime Coast Guard officer and long-time Democratic Representative from San Francisco.

CORNERED

Mr. SHELLEY, cornered by Mr. Kennedy during a tour of the White House with his wife and children, was told of the planned closing from what he later was to describe as an "unmistakably reliable source."

"But, Mr. President, they can't do that," Mr. Shelley exploded.

"Well, why don't you go to work on it," Mr. Kennedy reportedly answered.

The onetime truckdriver did exactly that. He crossed party lines to get the help of Senator THOMAS H. KUCHEL, the effective Republican whip from California, and Representative WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, his Republican colleague from San Francisco. He also was assisted by California's razor-tongued Democratic Senator, CLAIR ENGLE.

Mr. Shelley and his staff got on the phone and alerted San Francisco leaders to the danger of losing the shipyard which, with its more than 7,000 employees, is the city's biggest employer.

PROTESTS

Within hours, Defense Secretary McNamara was deluged with telegrams and telephone calls protesting the planned closure.

In the past all such protests resulting from "rumors" that a military installation was to be closed have been answered with a denial that any such action was under consideration "at this time." The denial, however, always has been qualified with the warning that all military bases are "constantly under study" as to the importance to the defense effort.

Last week, however, the White House chose not to deny the report but to declare that

the recommendation to close the three shipyards had been rejected by the President himself because of the Berlin crisis.

The statement made it clear that Mr. SHELLEY's fears were real and his protest against the planned closure was based on actual recommendation.

Once the word of the President's decision was out, a jubilant Mr. SHELLEY sat back in his office as congratulatory calls poured in from his colleagues and from San Francisco.

His greatest moment came, however, when Mr. McNamara called and said laughingly: "Next time I'd like to have you on my side."

Mr. President, I most respectfully suggest that the President of the United States has set a very poor example of fiscal responsibility when he overrides a decision of his own Secretary of Defense to close certain shipyards in Massachusetts and California, especially when his intervention is based not on their need, but, rather, because one of the shipyards which the Secretary of Defense proposed to close happened to be in his State of Massachusetts.

This method of the President of the United States undercutting his own Secretary of Defense by generating the support of the California delegation fools no one. It merely demonstrates that when the President in his inaugural address suggested that we "Ask not what our country can do for us, but rather what we can do for our country," he forgot another popular maxim, "What is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander."

MONEY SYSTEMS

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article which I hold in my hand may be printed following my remarks in the body of the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, I call attention particularly to this article from the Wall Street Journal today because it deals with a situation which is growing very rapidly in importance. The article starts off by saying:

The world is seeing these days the development of an international paper money system resembling the paper money systems long since developed within nations.

The article states that they will be the subject of debate at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Vienna next month.

I may say parenthetically I intend to go to that meeting as an observer from the Senate, because I think this subject particularly, and other subjects which will be discussed there relevant to this subject, will be of vital importance to the United States.

The article points out that:

Almost every commercial crisis of the past couple of centuries has been accompanied by a deep slash in the amount of paper money outstanding in the nation affected, and most such crises were caused at least in part by the excess issuance of paper money during the boom phases that preceded the crises.

We have seen this happen in so many countries in our lifetime. We saw it in Germany after World War I. We saw it in China, where, in a short period of 12 years, from 1936 to 1948, the value of the Chinese dollar went from 4 Chinese to 1 American dollar down to 5 million Chinese dollars to 1 American dollar, due to the issuance of paper money.

In a period of a few years, before Frondisi came into office and bravely stemmed the tide, we saw the Argentine peso under the Peron regime go from 4 pesos to a dollar to 72 pesos to a dollar.

We have seen the same thing happen in France and other countries.

So I seriously commend the reading of this article to Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. I hope it may help us to appreciate the importance of the whole question, which involves our balance of payment problems, and likewise the balance of our own income and outgo, which we call the budget of the Government of the United States.

[Exhibit 1]

THE OUTLOOK: APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS IN BUSINESS AND FINANCE

The world is seeing these days the development of an international paper-money system resembling the paper-money systems long since developed within nations. And, as in the case of the national systems, the new machinery has developed "bugs." These will be the subject of debate at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Vienna next month.

Paper-money systems are always in danger of being abused, in the form of issuance of too much paper. Such excess issuance generally results, in one way or another, from loans made to finance speculation at rising prices in one or many commodities, or in stocks, rather than from loans that finance production—though even production loans can grow excessively. Almost every commercial crisis of the past couple of centuries has been accompanied by a deep slash in the amount of paper money outstanding in the nation affected, and most such crises were caused at least in part by the excess issuance of paper money during the boom phases that preceded the crises.

Nevertheless, in spite of these recurrent breakdowns, people have always refused to abandon the use of paper money once they got accustomed to it. They always found it too convenient to give up. Instead, after each crisis they tried to write new safeguards against excessive use of paper. Some of the safeguards worked, some didn't.

Generally speaking, the most dependable safeguards lay in education of sellers and lenders on how to make loans or sales on reasonable terms, and how to enforce their claims if trouble arose. In the past 30 years, for example, lenders have increasingly required that loans of all kinds (except those of only a few months' duration) be repaid gradually through regular amortization, rather than waiting until maturity to enforce the whole claim. This method has proved both workable and highly successful.

The extension of the paper-money idea into the international field—aside from credits to finance exports, which are very old—has taken the form of adoption, mostly since World War II, of the so-called gold-exchange standard. Whereas central banks used to depend on nothing but some proportion of gold as backing for their national currencies, they now count, as part of their reserves, their holdings of other currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, which are considered

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opposition to the policies of our Government. No disciplinary action against individuals was called for. The primary objective of my recommendation was to insure that military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their duty as soldiers, to refrain from public expressions of criticism of the overall political policies, as distinguished from the technical military policies, of the Government and of their Commander in Chief.

Wherever there is power there is the possibility that it will be used and the danger that it will be misused. This assumption, expressed in Lord Acton's maxim that "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely," is common to all effective democracies. This principle is one of instinctive distrust of power itself wherever it exists. It has nothing to do with the motives of any group or individual who may wield it. It has been directed against big business, big labor, and big government, and now, inevitably, it is directed against our big Military Establishment.

There are powerful barriers in the United States to the rise of a political military establishment—the country's long history of antimilitarism; the recruitment system which creates a corps of officers nurtured in this history; the officer rotation system; the strong bonds of our professional soldiers to the political and social values of the democratic society from which they are drawn; and, finally, the longstanding tradition, which is tightly woven into the whole fabric of American military custom, that the officer corps should be nonpolitical.

The roots of the American military tradition lie deep in the history of the Western World, particularly that of the English-speaking countries. Since the emergence of the modern state system in Europe, and perhaps even further back in the Middle Ages, the military, like the church, in most Western countries has enjoyed special status, prestige, and perquisites. With its special privileges went special responsibilities. Like the church, the military, in the United States, Great Britain, and other countries, gradually discovered that the retention of its special status and its effectiveness in performing its mission were best served by rigorous abstention from the controversies and intrigues of politicians. There emerged thus a tradition of disciplined abstention from political activity. In the few instances in the modern history of the West in which this tradition did break down, the military, like the church in similar circumstances, found itself beset by hostile reactions and the weakening of public confidence.

The military remains in accord with the basic values of our society. There are no fundamental disagreements, such as prevail in France, for example, between the professional soldier and the rest of society with respect to the written and unwritten rules—the general political consensus—of our society. Generally the military profession is a fair representation of all of the major elements of American society. The principle of civilian supremacy thus remains intact even in the face of an enormous expansion in the power and influence of the Armed Forces.

In the most democratic of societies, however, there are differences in spirit and mood between the professional soldier and the politician or statesman. The politician must move tentatively in an atmosphere in which goals and means often become mixed. Only in the most general terms does he have predefined objectives, and excessive precision will only make movement difficult. The soldier works differently. His objectives are defined clearly in advance; he will then state his requirements and dispose his forces so as to gain the object. As one student of military affairs recently expressed it: "In military arrangements flexibility is a necessary evil and ambiguity may easily cost lives; in

politics flexibility is the first rule and ambiguity an essential instrument."

In considerations such as these lie the wisdom and justification for civilian supremacy and military professionalism. As long as democratic government is honest and efficient and as long as the military adhere to nonpolitical professionalism there can be no impairment either of democratic institutions or of the integrity of the military establishment.

The problem of maintaining military obedience to civilian authority is fortunately not one which in any basic sense threatens such settled communities as the United States or Great Britain. Nonetheless, by reason of the differences in training and outlook between the soldier and the politician, the possibility of mutual distrust or even hostility is ever present in a time of grave threats to the national security. Our military leaders are experts in the complex technical questions of national defense. Their counsel, with its admirable qualities of expedition and decisiveness, is indispensable to political leaders. Politicians, on the other hand, must concern themselves with a wide variety of nontechnical factors, including the interplay of diverse interests in a pluralistic society. This involves interminable bargaining and compromise—a process which may often strike military experts as inefficient or even dangerous to national security. In the higher reaches of the defense hierarchy, the expert who knows what should be done finds himself at the mercy of the politician who knows what can be done.

Under these circumstances, it can readily be understood that dedicated and patriotic soldiers are subjected at times to a great temptation to descend into the arena of political conflict. Few of our military leaders have done so—a fact which evidences their wisdom as well as their restraint. The few who have raised their voices in public partisan controversy have inadvertently done a disservice both to the American people and to the Military Establishment itself.

The effectiveness of our armed services depends upon the maintenance of their unique prestige and integrity. These will remain intact only so long as the services adhere to their tradition of nonpolitical professionalism. No group or institution can participate in political debate without itself becoming an object of partisan attack. It is precisely because of its status as a nonpolitical institution that the military in the past has enjoyed the virtually unanimous support of the American people and has thus been beyond partisan assault. It will be recalled that the late Senator McCarthy, who succeeded in frightening or humiliating many reputable groups and individuals, took a fatal step toward his own undoing when he directed his irresponsible charges against the U.S. Army. The prestige of the Army was such that the people rallied to its defense. It is my hope that the armed services will never yield to misguided temptations which can only shatter the high esteem in which they are held. The preservation of that esteem is essential to the success of the Armed Forces in fulfilling their assigned mission and essential also, therefore, to the defense of the Republic.

The appeal of certain ideas espoused by the radicals of the right is not difficult to understand. To a nation beset by onerous challenges and responsibilities, they offer deceptively quick and simple solutions. They tell us that we have only to proclaim our dedication to total victory over world communism and to root out subversives—real and imaginary—at home and our problems will be solved. They tell us that our system of alliances and our military and economic commitments abroad are unnecessary and dangerous, that they somehow "play into the hands of the Communists."

Instead, they offer us clear and simple solutions—ringing declarations about foreigners and rooting out the disloyal at home. And those who disagree with them, they say, are "soft on communism."

It seems to me that it is these extremists who are advocating a soft approach. Their oversimplifications and their baseless generalizations reflect the softness of those who cannot bear to face the burdens of a continuing struggle against a powerful and resourceful enemy. A truly tough approach, in my judgment, is one which accepts the challenge of communism with the courage and determination to meet it with every instrumentality of foreign policy—political and economic as well as military, and with the willingness to see the struggle through as far into the future as may be necessary. Those who seek to meet the challenge—or, in reality, to evade it—by bold adventures abroad and witch hunts at home are the real devotees of softness—the softness of seeking escape from painful realities by resort to illusory panaceas.

The most astonishing of the propositions of the radical right is their contention that the internal Communist menace is the primary problem of the cold war. They thus credit a wretched handful of Communists in the United States with greater power and influence than the Soviet Union and Communist China with their vast military and political power. I think that this viewpoint is patently absurd. It reflects an amazing lack of confidence in the wisdom and good sense of the American people and their ability to identify and reject Communist propaganda. If this proposition were true, we would be wasting billions of dollars on the Armed Forces themselves, funds which instead should be transferred to the FBI to fight internal subversion. In fact, the FBI has for years received all of the funds it has requested of the Congress. The internal danger exists and requires constant vigilance, but it would be a tragic irony if in false and panic-stricken mistrust of our own free society we were to neglect the overriding danger—that of worldwide Sino-Soviet imperialism.

Implicit in much of the propaganda of the radical right is the assumption that our free society is permeated with corruption and decay. It is said, for example, that the schools and churches of this country are infiltrated with Communists. I recently received a propaganda sheet from an organization which calls itself "conservative" that declared among other things that "Any Member of Congress who votes for foreign aid should be defeated for participating in an act of treason." I do not understand how an organization can be regarded as conservative that in effect charges the majority of the Members of every Congress since World War II and three Presidents with treason.

Extremist and irresponsible pronouncements are being widely heard in the land. In a recent speech at a Fourth-Dimensional Warfare Seminar in Pittsburgh, sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Pittsburgh in cooperation with various local military organizations, a retired rear admiral developed the theme that American foreign policy since World War II has consistently played into Soviet hands, that the United States is militarily incapable of surviving surprise Soviet attack, and that negotiations with the Russians for disarmament are in fact appeasement. In a speech last week a prominent elected official denounced Mr. Kennedy's bunch of muddle-minded advisers. Contending that our foreign assistance program aided the Communist case, he assailed as irresponsible elements those who favor the independence of the emergent nations of the world. And he declared that it was fatuous nonsense for American foreign policy to take cognizance of some nebulous thing we call world opinion.

The extremists of the right call themselves conservative. In my judgment their views are not conservative, but radical—radical because they fail to distinguish between democratic social progress and totalitarian communism, regarding the former as a step toward the latter. The true conservative is one who wishes to conserve the historic values of our society. He recognizes that the world does not stand still and that, because it does not, we must at times modify and reform traditional practices through orderly processes of change in order to adapt them to new conditions. Social progress is thus seen to be the indispensable means of preserving traditional values in a changing world.

Far from being a step toward communism, social progress through orderly and constitutional procedures is one of the best defenses against communism. The reforms which were undertaken in the United States in the 1930's are believed by many to have thwarted the Communist movement which might have thrived on the mass suffering caused by the depression. Governmental action, for example, in the creation of the TVA, or the Arkansas River development program, is not, in my opinion, a step toward communism. We are now encouraging the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to undertake basic economic and social reforms because experience has shown that social progress is the key to stability and popular support for governments, and that these in turn form the most solid barriers to Communist penetration.

Those who have faith in our free people and our free institutions must dismiss the wild charges of extremists as malicious and absurd. Only if our society is in an advanced state of disintegration is it as susceptible to Communist infiltration as the radicals of the right contend. I, for one, believe that our free society is strong and stable, and that it is strong because it is free. Because this is so, we need not be fearful of Communist propaganda. The American people can be counted upon to reject it as they have always rejected totalitarian doctrines.

Those who contend that our free society is permeated with corruption and subversion are in fact espousing a line that the Communists themselves would be the first to applaud.

Indeed, the radicals of the right, whose avowed intent is to save our society from destruction, are painting the same picture of ineptitude and decay that the Communists, whose aim is the destruction of our society, would want the American people to believe.

There is a tendency in the history of democratic nations for overly emotional groups and individuals to react to threats from foreign totalitarian powers by permitting themselves to entertain illusions regarding totalitarian forms of an opposite tendency. Thus, for example, when we were threatened by the right-wing totalitarianism of Nazi Germany, a few Americans suddenly professed to see democratic virtues in the Communist abolition of the left. Now that we are endangered by Communist imperialism instead, a few Americans have fallen prey to the delusion that the radicalism of the right is not totalitarian at all but is in reality the true philosophy of freedom.

It is my belief that all forms of radical extremism, left or right, are anathema to freedom and democracy. Indeed, the totalitarian left and the totalitarian right have far more in common with each other than either does with genuine democracy. The unholy alliance of left and right is an old combination in certain countries of continental Europe. Together they have formed the "disloyal oppositions" which have beleaguered the democratic center in

postwar France and Italy. It is illuminating to note that the Weimar Republic in Germany was destroyed by Nazis and Communists acting in league for their common purpose of destroying the democratic republic. The experience of these countries reveals that the totalitarianism of the left and the totalitarianism of the right have a single common bond; their shared hostility to democracy and freedom.

The United States has been virtually free throughout its history of the destructive presence of a powerful disloyal opposition. With the exception of a few marginal groups, our political parties and our people have shared a virtually unanimous faith in constitutional Government and free institutions. We have enjoyed the immense benefits of political consensus among a people who were born free and who never in their history have had a serious or prolonged flirtation with any form of absolutism.

It is this incontestable fact of history that reduces the shrill charges of the radical right, and of the radical left as well, to palpable nonsense.

Now as in the past the success of our national policies must be rooted in the basic unity and consensus of the American people. This consensus, in a time of overriding danger, must of necessity consist in unified national support of our elected leaders, and especially the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. "Although the rod of fire may be passed about," wrote the historian Herbert Feis, "it comes back to him. It is his 'yes' or 'no' that settles history." The President alone, in his role as teacher and moral leader, can arouse the American people from apathy and indifference and inspire them to the efforts and sacrifices that must be made if we are to survive in this century of peril. In the past the American people have never failed to unite behind their chosen leaders to overcome external dangers. By their wreckless charges that the evils that threaten our survival are not external but are within our society, the extreme rightwingers generate distrust and suspicion and, in so doing, threaten to shatter the basic unity of the American people and to undermine the consensus in which vigorous and successful national policies must be rooted.

The problem was admirably expressed in a recent editorial which appeared in the conservative Arizona Daily Star of Tucson, Ariz. "It is one of the unfortunate characteristics of American life" the editorial pointed out, "that too many of our good citizens and government officials have a definite inclination to think in terms of reckless absolutes, when it comes to foreign policy. Americans like to think in terms of freedom and democracy, as if they were something that could be bequeathed automatically by us to all nations of the world. Similarly, we are prone to boast and threaten and talk in terms of total war. If it is not that, we must have total peace. Tragically, we think that by total war we can bequeath to the world total peace." The editorial further pointed out that "There is a vast difference between telling the masters of the Kremlin that we will stand by our rights in Berlin with all of the might and power our country can mobilize, and in making irresponsible threats. It is one thing to make war to defend our rights it is quite another thing to go out on another futile crusade, and expect total victory to give us what we want."

Americans, unfortunately, tend to take a single-factor approach to world politics. Prior to World War II, we thought of international relations too much in moral and legal terms. Since 1945 we have increasingly shifted our thoughts to the terms of military strength and balance-of-power alliances. Actually, a successful foreign policy has many facets—military, political, economic, cultural, moral, and ideological. All of these

must be used, not independently and consecutively, but interdependently and simultaneously. Realism in world politics consists in knowing how and when to shuffle the various factors in the face of changing dangers and opportunities.

No one understood the subtleties and complexities of foreign policy better than Winston Churchill, who wrote: "Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in a majority of instances, they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting good will. How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands. How many misunderstandings which, led to wars could have been removed by temporizing."

The realities of American foreign policy lie in the fact that the world has undergone revolutionary changes since World War II and that the end of this historical upheaval is not yet in sight. To live in a world of revolution, and to attempt to shape the forces of change toward constructive purposes requires patience, discipline, and sustained effort. Only by the cultivation of these qualities can the American living in the 1960's hope to escape the defeatism and despair that arise when initial efforts fail to produce total victory.

The basic principles of American foreign policy for a world in permanent revolution were shaped in the years immediately following World War II, or more specifically, in the spring of 1947 in what has been called the 15 weeks. During those weeks, the historic principles of American foreign policy were radically overhauled. The landmarks of that transformation were the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan. Through these instruments the United States acknowledged its permanent involvement in the affairs of the world. The responsibilities of the United States were now extended beyond the confines of the Western Hemisphere to the far outposts of the free world.

The revolution in American foreign policy was expressed in the policy of containment, which implied the permanent commitment of American resources around the perimeter of the Soviet empire. The Marshall plan implied the involvement of the United States in world affairs in an even more intimate way. The United States now recognized its responsibility to help nations which were threatened with economic disaster and, beyond that, its responsibility to help develop a viable international economic and political order.

These were days of imagination and innovation in our foreign policy. The crisis of the 1960's derives from our failure to adapt the now classic policy forms of 1947 to new conditions and new challenges.

The conditions of the world have been greatly altered since the immediate postwar period. Four fundamental changes have occurred.

First, The balance of military power has changed radically. In the years following the war we forged a system of alliances which, with our monopoly of atomic power, provided substantial protection for the nations threatened by Communist imperialism. That protection has now diminished and it has been replaced by a highly unstable nuclear stalemate, which Winston Churchill has called the "balance of terror."

The second great transformation of recent years is the impressive recovery of Western Europe to booming economic well-being and substantial political stability as well. The

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military dependence of Western Europe on the United States remains, while in the political field it has diminished and economic dependence has all but ended.

The third significant change has been a fundamental alteration in Soviet foreign policy. Ten years ago, one of the greatest assets of our own foreign policy was the heavyhanded tactics of Stalin. Whenever Western efforts slackened or Western unity cracked, Stalin could be counted upon to take some drastic action which would galvanize the West to renewed efforts and unity. Khrushchev's foreign policy is of a quite different nature. His tactics are far more varied. Besides using diplomatic and military pressures wherever these seem promising from his point of view, Khrushchev seeks to subvert the entire non-Communist world through the impact of Soviet power and economic and technological accomplishments. The Khrushchev approach is more skillful, more insidious, more subtle, and, therefore, far more challenging to the nerves, the patience, the resourcefulness, and the dedication of the West.

The fourth overriding change of our time is the rise of the former colonial and semi-colonial nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These nations, most of which are uncommitted and all of which are caught up in the emotional fervor of nationalism, are now the great prize in the struggle between East and West. Their political and economic stability, and their continuing freedom from Communist subversion and domination, are now among the foremost objectives of our foreign policy.

It is against the background of these great transformations that we must reassess the foreign policy of the United States for the decade ahead. The crisis of our foreign policy at present derives from the failure to devise adequate responses to these four great changes in the world situation.

The policies devised in 1947 have been largely successful. With only a few exceptions the power of the Soviet Union and of Communist China have been militarily contained. Such losses as have been suffered are counterbalanced, and perhaps more than counterbalanced, by the growing unification of the resurgent nations of Western Europe and by the gradual development of a broader Atlantic community consisting of nations which possess a great preponderance of world resources and industrial productivity.

We must now focus our efforts on the insidious challenges of psychological penetration, of political subversion, of economic conquest, of the use of foreign aid and trade as political weapons. To meet these threats we have already begun to devise, and we must now go on to perfect, new and varied instruments of foreign policy that go far beyond containment and military alliances.

Foreign policy in our time is inseparable from domestic policy. It is more accurate to think of every aspect of public activity as part of national policy. How we conduct ourselves in Cuba, Laos, Berlin, or Montevideo are indicative of our maturity or lack of maturity as a nation. But our neglect of education, our tolerance of criminal activity, our impulsive reactions to the criminal hijacking of an airplane are also indicative of our maturity or lack of it, of the trustworthiness of our national—or foreign—policy, and of the integrity of our "national style."

We must view the nation not as a set of compartments in which foreign and domestic affairs are neatly divided but rather as a unified whole. And in this view of things, we must understand that it is only as we are ready to sacrifice many of our personal and group interests and predilections that we have a chance of surviving as a society, not by luck but by our own efforts. In short, it is our character as a people, rather than

any arid collection of predetermined formulas and prescriptions, that will determine our capacity to meet the Communist challenge.

The overriding question is whether this Nation is prepared to accept the permanent and inescapable responsibilities of having become a major power. We have clung too long to our youth as a Nation, during which our foreign policy consisted in a series of exhilarating and successful adventures. Our history—from the Minutemen to the Alamo, from the conquest of the West to the charge up San Juan Hill—was an unbroken chronicle of victory and success. But that was in the days of our youth and we live now in a far more difficult and more dangerous world—a world in which we must come of age. Neither God nor nature has preordained the triumph of our free society and it would be a tragic mistake to assume the inevitability of our survival.

History plays cruel tricks. It allowed us to believe that the triumphs of our past were the product of our vigor and resourcefulness alone. What we failed to perceive in our past was the presence of another element—the element of an improbable run of luck—the luck of a rich and unspooled continent far removed from the centers of power politics and world conflict.

That immunity from the conflicts and afflictions of the Old World ended 50 years ago.

Woodrow Wilson knew it. He perceived the ultimate fact of this century of American history—not that America must come out into the world but that the world had come in on America. "There can be no question," he said in his address to the Senate of July 10, 1919, "of our ceasing to be a world power. The only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world."

America rejected the confidence of the world in 1919. We preferred to count on a continuation of the good luck that had never before failed us. It was a thoughtless and unsuccessful gamble for which both we and the world have already paid an incalculable price. Nonetheless, there are those among us who are still bemused with the dazzling illusions of our lost youth.

Our prospects have narrowed greatly since the lost opportunity of 40 years ago. I do not know how long it will be before they finally dim into darkness if we do not finally reconcile ourselves to the burden of continuing and onerous responsibility in a harsh and dangerous world. Our power is inseparable from continuing trusteeship, and this trusteeship, as Wilson perceived, derives not from choice but from inescapable compulsions—"the compulsion of honor, the compulsion of interest, and the compulsion of humanity. * * *

Our proper objective as a nation must be, as it was to Woodrow Wilson, "to make a society instead of a set of barbarians out of the governments of the world." Advancement toward this objective will require persistent effort in the face of inevitable frustrations. More fundamentally it will require the cultivation of qualities that are associated with maturity rather than youth—qualities of wisdom as well as resourcefulness, persevering determination as well as righteous dedication, and, perhaps most of all, moral courage in place of adolescent bravado.

The purpose of our foreign policy is the very gradual improvement of human life on earth. Our success is not guaranteed and if our efforts are to be coherent and sustained, we must accept this fact with sobriety and serenity. Besides patient and continuous effort we must bring to the task a little of a sense of mission—and I emphasize little. A consuming messianism will surely lead us to

false hopes and frustration, while action without purpose is action without meaning or hope. But a little of a sense of mission can guide us—unencumbered by either extravagant hopes or unwarranted despair—toward worthy and attainable objectives.

These are not easy counsels. But they are, I think, counsels of reality. We must learn, among other things, that there are limits to foreign policy and limits to the objectives which a nation can hope to realize in the world—even so powerful a nation as the United States. One of the principal lessons of the two World Wars of the 20th century is that wars, even when they end in total victory, generate more problems than they solve. We must come to grips with the fact that there are no final and complete immediate solutions, that while some problems can be solved, others can only be alleviated or deferred while we wait for deeply rooted trends and gradually changing circumstances to reduce present tensions and to foster the conditions for solutions and accommodations that cannot now be foreseen.

Our national purpose is a process to be advanced rather than a victory to be won. That process if the defense and expansion of our democratic values, the furtherance of which rest ultimately on the wisdom, the maturity of judgment, and the moral fiber of a society of free individuals. The cultivation of these qualities and the advancement of the democratic process, both in our own internal affairs and in international relations, are the responsibility of every individual in a free society. If we are to meet the challenges of our time, we must reject the false and simple solutions of irresponsible extremists who cannot, or will not, accept the world as it is. We must instead dedicate ourselves to the national purpose with fortitude and discipline. These are the imperatives of military responsibility, as indeed they are imperatives for all Americans.

THE CALENDAR

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to consider the measures on the calendar beginning with Calendar No. 682, Senate bill 2000.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Main.

The motion was agreed to.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The measures on the calendar, beginning with Calendar No. 682, will be stated.

BILL PASSED OVER

The bill (S. 2000) to provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower was announced as first in order.

Mr. MUSKIE. I ask that the bill go over, inasmuch as it is not properly a calendar item.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard, and the bill will be passed over.

EMERGENCY EVACUATION PAY ADVANCES TO MILITARY DEPENDENTS FROM OVERSEAS

The bill (H.R. 7724) to provide for advances of pay to members of the armed services in cases of emergency evacuation of military dependents from oversea areas, and for other purposes,

was considered, ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

PAYMENTS FOR DAMAGE DUE TO AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE ACCIDENTS

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 7934) to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to make emergency payments to persons who are injured or whose property is damaged as a result of aircraft or missile accidents, and for other purposes, which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services with an amendment, on page 2, line 2, after the word "of", where it appears the first time, to strike out "\$2,000" and insert "\$1,000".

The amendment was agreed to.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time, and passed.

BILLS PASSED OVER

The bill (H.R. 4785) relating to withholding for State employee retirement disability, and death benefit system purposes, on the compensation of certain civilian employees of the National Guard, was announced as next in order.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I request that this bill go over.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will go over.

The bill (H.R. 6103) for the relief of the Stella Reorganized School R-I, Missouri, was announced as next in order.

Mr. MUSKIE. Over, by request.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over.

ELWOOD BRUNKEN

The bill (S. 631) for the relief of Elwood Brunken was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Elwood Brunken of Tripp, South Dakota, such sum as the Secretary of Agriculture determines the said Elwood Brunken would have been entitled to receive under his crop insurance policy with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation for crop losses sustained by him in 1959 had the croplands on which such losses were sustained not been determined (after such losses were sustained) to be noninsurable by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. In determining the amount the said Elwood Brunken would have been entitled to receive, the Secretary of Agriculture shall subtract an amount equal to the amount refunded to the said Elwood Brunken by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation on account of insurance premiums paid by him for the years 1958 and 1959.

HOWARD B. SCHMUTZ

The bill (S. 651) for the relief of Howard B. Schmutz was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading,

read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Howard B. Schmutz, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the sum of \$1,242.50. The payment of such sum shall be in full satisfaction of all claims of the said Howard B. Schmutz against the United States for reimbursement of one-half of the costs incurred by him in constructing two reservoirs on federally owned land in reliance upon the approval by the Agricultural Stabilization Committee of Mohave County, Arizona, of his application for Federal sharing of the costs of constructing such reservoirs under the agricultural conservation program for 1959: *Provided,* That no part of the amount appropriated in this Act in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding \$1,000.

GIOVANNA VITIELLO

The bill (S. 1787) for the relief of Giovanna Vitiello was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purposes of sections 101(a) (27) (A) and 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the minor child, Giovanna Vitiello, shall be held and considered to be the natural-born alien child of Antonio Vitiello, a citizen of the United States: *Provided,* That the natural parents of the said Giovanna Vitiello shall not, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

JOHANN CZERNOPOLSKY

The bill (S. 1880) for the relief of Johann Czernopolsky was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding the provision of section 212(a) (6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Johann Czernopolsky may be issued a visa and admitted to the United States for permanent residence if he is found to be otherwise admissible under the provisions of such Act, under such conditions and controls which the Attorney General, after consultation with the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, may deem necessary to impose: *Provided,* That unless the beneficiary is entitled to care under chapter 55, title 10, United States Code, a suitable and proper bond or undertaking, approved by the Attorney General, be deposited as prescribed by section 213 of the Immigration and Nationality Act: *Provided further,* That this exemption shall apply only to a ground for exclusion of which the Department of State or the Department of Justice had knowledge prior to the enactment of this Act.

FARES SALEM SALMAN HAMARNEH

The bill (S. 1906) for the relief of Fares Salem Salman Hamarneh was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purposes of sections 101(a) (27) (A) and 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the minor child, Fares Salem Salman Hamarneh, shall be held and considered to be the natural-born alien child of Mr. and Mrs. Sami Khalaf Hamarneh, citizens of the United States: *Provided,* That the natural parents of the said Fares Salem Salman Hamarneh shall not, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

SONJA DOLATA

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 233) for the relief of Sonja Dolata, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment on page 1, line 11, after the word "Act," to insert a colon and "And provided further, That unless the beneficiary is entitled to care under the Dependents' Medical Care Act (70 Stat. 250), a suitable and proper bond or undertaking, approved by the Attorney General, be deposited as prescribed by section 213 of the Immigration and Nationality Act," so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Sonja Dolata may be issued an immigrant visa and admitted to the United States for permanent residence if she is found to be otherwise admissible under the provisions of such Act: *Provided,* That this Act shall apply only to grounds for exclusion under such paragraph known to the Secretary of State or the Attorney General prior to the date of the enactment of this Act: *And provided further,* That unless the beneficiary is entitled to care under the Dependents' Medical Care Act (70 Stat. 250), a suitable and proper bond or undertaking, approved by the Attorney General, be deposited as prescribed by section 213 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

YOUNG JEI OH AND SOON NEE LEE

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 547) for the relief of Young Jei Oh and Soon Nee Lee, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, in line 8, after the word "the", to strike out "beneficiary" and insert "beneficiaries", so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purposes of sections 101(a) (27) (A) and 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the minor children, Young Jei Oh and Soon Nee Lee, shall be held and considered to be the minor alien children of Mr. and Mrs. Robert J. Riddell, citizens of the United